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Analytical Results on the PAUSE Auction Procedure

Wednesday 09 March 2011, 4.30pm-6.00pm
NAB 1.14, New Academic Building

Dr Selin Damla Ahipasaoglu
Research Officer
London School of Economics

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Abstract:

In this talk, we focus on the analytical properties of a decentralized auction, namely the PAUSE Auction Procedure. We prove that the revenue of the auctioneer from PAUSE is greater than or equal to the profit from the well-known VCG mechanism when there are only two bidders, and provide lower bounds on the profit for an arbitrary number of bidders. Based on these bounds, together with observations from auctions with few items, we propose a modification of the procedure that increases the profit. We believe that this study, which is still in progress, will be a milestone in designing better decentralized auctions, since it is the first analytical study on such auctions with promising results.

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  Selin Damla Ahipasaoglu