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Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory

Below you'll find the programme for the Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory. The Seminar normally takes place on Thursdays from 2.00 pm - 3.00 pm in room TW2.3.01 (Tower Two, Clement's Inn - entrance through Tower One|), unless stated below. Please contact the seminar administrator on seminar@maths.lse.ac.uk|, for further information about any of these seminars.

Upcoming Speakers:

Thursday 23 October - Elizabeth Baldwin| (LSE)
The geometry of auctions and competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods
In order to develop new auctions for related but different indivisible goods, we study how an agent's demand changes as prices change. Simple geometric properties translate directly to economic properties, providing a new taxonomy for agents' valuations, and new results about when competitive equilibrium exists.

This is joint work with Paul Klemperer (Oxford University).

 

Thursday 30 October - Claire Mathieu| (ENS Paris, Brown University)
Title and abstract TBC

 

Thursday 6 November - Thomas Kesselheim| (Max Planck, Saarbruecken)
Title and abstract TBC

 

Thursday 13 November - Dan Kral |(University of Warwick)
Title and abstract TBC

 

*PLEASE NOTE DIFFERENT DAY AND VENUE*
Tuesday 18 November -
Eilon Solan| (Tel Aviv University)
Room TW1.2.03, Tower One, St. Clement's Inn, LSE
Stopping games with termination rates

Multiplayer stopping game with termination rates are continuous-time stopping games in which when some players stop at the time interval $[t,t+dt)$, the game does not terminate with probability 1, but rather stops with some probability, which is of the order of $dt$ and may depend on time and on the set of players who stop at that time. We prove that every multiplayer stopping game with termination rates admits an $\ep$-equilibrium, for every $\ep > 0$.

 

Thursday 20 November - Ilias Diakonikolas| (Edinburgh)
Title and abstract TBC

 

Thursday 27 November - Costis Daskalakis| (MIT)
Title and abstract TBC

 

Thursday 4 December - speaker, title and abstract TBC

 

Thursday 11 December - Jop Briet| (NYU/CWI)
Title and abstract TBC

 

Previous seminars in this series:

2014|, 2013|, 2012|, 2011|, 2010|, 2009|, 2008|, 2007|, 2006|, 2005|, 2004 and before|

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