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Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory

Below you'll find the programme for the Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory. The Seminar normally takes place on Thursdays from 2.00 pm - 3.00 pm in room TW2.3.01 (Tower Two, Clement's Inn - entrance through Tower One|), unless stated below. Please contact the seminar administrator on seminar@maths.lse.ac.uk|, for further information about any of these seminars.

Upcoming Speakers:

Thursday 30 October - Claire Mathieu| (ENS Paris, Brown University)
On the Glass Ceiling Effect in Social Networks

The glass ceiling may be defined as “the unseen, yet unbreakable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements”. Although undesirable, it is well documented that many societies and organizations exhibit a glass ceiling. In this paper we formally define and study the glass ceiling effect in social networks and provide a natural mathematical model that (partially) explains it. We propose a biased preferential attachment model that has two type of nodes, and is based on three well known social phenomena: i) rich get richer (preferential attachment) ii) minority of females (or other group) in the network and iii) homophily (preference to bond with similar people). We prove that our model exhibits a strong glass ceiling effect and that all three conditions are necessary, i.e., removing any one of them, will cause the model not to exhibit a glass ceiling effect. Additionally we present empirical evidence of student-mentor networks of researchers that exhibits all the above properties: female minority, preferential attachment, homophily and a glass ceiling.

Joint work with Chen Avin, Barbara Keller, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg, and Yvonne-Anne Pignolet. 

Thursday 6 November - Thomas Kesselheim| (Max Planck, Saarbruecken)
Title and abstract TBC

Thursday 13 November - Dan Kral |(University of Warwick)
Title and abstract TBC

*PLEASE NOTE DIFFERENT DAY AND VENUE*
Tuesday 18 November -
Eilon Solan| (Tel Aviv University)
Room TW1.2.03, Tower One, St. Clement's Inn, LSE
Stopping games with termination rates

Multiplayer stopping game with termination rates are continuous-time stopping games in which when some players stop at the time interval $[t,t+dt)$, the game does not terminate with probability 1, but rather stops with some probability, which is of the order of $dt$ and may depend on time and on the set of players who stop at that time. We prove that every multiplayer stopping game with termination rates admits an $\ep$-equilibrium, for every $\ep > 0$.

Thursday 20 November - Ilias Diakonikolas| (Edinburgh)
Title and abstract TBC

Thursday 27 November - Costis Daskalakis| (MIT)
Title and abstract TBC

Thursday 4 December - speaker, title and abstract TBC

Thursday 11 December - Jop Briet| (NYU/CWI)
Title and abstract TBC

Previous seminars in this series:

2014|, 2013|, 2012|, 2011|, 2010|, 2009|, 2008|, 2007|, 2006|, 2005|, 2004 and before|

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