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Seminar on Combinatorics, Games and Optimisation

Below you'll find the programme for the Seminar on Combinatorics, Games and Optimisation (a joining together of the former Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory and the former Seminar on Operations Research).

This semianr series covers many of the research areas in the Department: discrete mathematics, algorithms, game theory and operational research.

Unless stated below, this Seminar normally takes place:

Questions, suggestions, etc., about the seminar can be forwarded to the seminar administrator, by sending an e-mail to: seminar@maths.lse.ac.uk.

Upcoming Speakers:


Wednesday 26 April - William Zame (UCLA)
Endogenous Matching in a Dynamic Assignment Model

This paper formulates and analyzes a dynamic assignment model with unobserved worker characteristics and effort. It defines a notion of steady state equilibrium in which workers are matched to tasks endogenously on the basis of observable output. For each given payment schedule, such an equilibrium exists and is unique. At equilibrium, workers and tasks are matched assortatively and workers are incentivized to expend greater effort. Firm profit in equilibrium is compared against natural benchmarks.

This is joint work with Mihaela van der Schaar and Yuanzhang Xiao.

Thursday 27 April - TBC

Wednesday 3 May - Françoise Forges (CEREMADE and LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine)
Strategic information transmission: sender's approval matters

We modify the standard model of finite sender-receiver games by introducing an outside option for the sender. We assume that, after the cheap talk phase, the sender can reject the receiver's proposal and that the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver. We ask whether the modified sender-receiver game has a Nash equilibrium. We construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender, three actions for the receiver and a type-dependent utility function for the receiver) in which there is no Nash equilibrium, but there is a communication equilibrium. We find a variety of sufficient conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium: (i) two types (and arbitrary number of actions), (ii) two actions (and arbitrary number of types), (iii) type-independent utility function for the receiver (and arbitrary number of types and actions). We conjecture that a communication equilibrium always exists. We show that the conjecture holds for three types.

Ongoing research project with Jérôme Renault (Toulouse School of Economics)

Thursday 4 May - TBC

Wednesday 10 May - seminar cancelled, please see 2017 Colloquia in Combinatorics

Thursday 11 May - seminar cancelled, please see 2017 Colloquia in Combinatorics

Wednesday 17 May - Bary Pradelski (ETH Zurich)
Title and abstract TBC

Thursday 18 May - TBC

Wednesday 24 May - Sylvain Sorin (Paris)
Learning procedures and evolutionary dynamics: some recent advances

Abstract TBC

Thursday 25 May - TBC

Wednesday 31 May - TBC

Thursday 1 June - TBC

Wednesday 7 June - TBC

Thursday 8 June - Éva Tardos (Cornell)
Title and abstract TBC


Previous seminars in this series: 20172016

Seminar on Discrete Mathematics and Game Theory: 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004 and before

Seminar on Operations Research: 2016, September 2015 - December 2015, August 2014 - August 2015, October 2010 - July 2014