

# Suggested Reading List

Below is a list of articles ordered by topic area. Some articles are classics, some are introductory and some are more advanced. Please note that this list is only indicative and subject to change with respect to the participants' interests and own suggestions.

## Epistemic Game Theory

### Introduction

- AUMANN, R., AND BRANDENBURGER, A. Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium. *Econometrica* 63, 5 (1995), 1161–1180
- BERNHEIM, D. Rationalizable strategic behavior. *Econometrica* 52, 4 (1984), 1007–1028

### Advanced Theory

- BACH, C., AND PEREA, A. Utility proportional beliefs. *International Journal of Game Theory* (2014) 43, 4, 881–902
- BATTIGALLI, P., AND BONANNO, G. Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory. *Research in Economics* 53 (1999), 149–225
- BATTIGALLI, P., AND SINISCALCHI, M. Rationalization and Incomplete Information. *Advances in Theoretical Economics* 3, 1 (2003)
- PEREA, A., AND TSAKAS, E. Local reasoning in dynamic games. Epicenter Working Paper No. 4, 2015

## Bounded Rationality

### Classics

- SIMON, H. A. Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science. *The American Economic Review* 49, 3 (1959), 253–283
- SIMON, H. Theories of bounded rationality. In *Decision and Organization*, C. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds. North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972, ch. 8

### Applications

- CAPLIN, A., AND M., D. Search, choice and revealed preferences. *Theoretical Economics* 6, 1 (2011), 19–48
- SPIEGLER, R. The Market for Quacks. *Review of Economic Studies* 73 (2006), 1113–1131

# Evolutionary Game Theory

## Introduction

- ALEXANDER, J. Evolutionary Game Theory. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 2009

## Applications

- SKYRMS, B. Sex and Justice. *Journal of Philosophy* 91, 6 (1994), 305–320
- ALEXANDER, J., AND SKYRMS, B. Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? *Journal of Philosophy* 96, 11 (1999), 588–598
- HUTTEGGER, S. M., AND ZOLLMAN, K. J. S. Evolution, dynamics and rationality: the limits of ESS methodology. *Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Co-operation and Strategic Behaviour* (2012), 67–83

# Algorithmic Game Theory

## Introduction

- SHOHAM, Y. Computer science and game theory. *Communications of the ACM* 51 (2008)

## Computing equilibria

- ROUGHGARDEN, T. Computing equilibria: A computational complexity perspective. *Economic Theory* 42, 1 (2009), 193–236
- VON STENGEL, B. Computing equilibria for two-person games. In *Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications*, vol. 3. 2002, pp. 1723–1759

## Auctions

- MYERSON, R. Optimal auction design. *Mathematics of Operations Research* 6, 6 (1981), 58–73

# Games of Incomplete Information

## Introduction

- HARSANYI, J. C. Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players. *Management Science* 14, 7 (1968), 486–502
- MYERSON, R. B. Comments on Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III; Harsanyi's Games with Incomplete Information. *Management Science*, 1818–1824

## Applications

- CHO, I., AND KREPS, D. Signaling games and stable equilibria. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102, 2 (1987), 179–221
- MATEJKA, F., AND MCKAY, A. Rational inattention to discrete choices: A new foundation for the multinomial logit model. *American Economic Review* 105, 1 (2015), 272–298