Chair in Operations Research
Professor Steinberg is on sabbatical leave during 2013-14. If you require information regarding LSE matters, please contact Imran Iqbal at email@example.com
Professor Steinberg is Chair in Operations Research. Previously he has served on the faculties of Columbia University, the University of Chicago and the University of Cambridge. He has also held visiting positions at Stanford University, MIT, the University of Oxford, and CORE (Université catholique de Louvain).
Professor Steinberg has also worked at Bell Laboratories, Microsoft Research Laboratories, and Salomon Brothers, and has advised the U.S. Federal Communications Commission regarding the design of combinatorial auctions for the allocation of spectrum. During 2009, he advised the U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change regarding the design of an auction for the European Union to select demonstration projects for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).
He is Associate Editor at Manufacturing & Service Operations Management and Senior Editor at Production and Operations Management.
Auctions and mechanism design
Steinberg, Richard (2012) Auction Pricing. Chapter 27 (pp. 679-712) in: O. Ozer and R. Phillips, eds., Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Congestion-dependent pricing and forward contracts for complementary segments of a communication network
Reiter, Miklós and Steinberg, Richard (2012) Congestion-dependent pricing and forward contracts for complementary segments of a communication network. IEEE/ACM Transactions on networking, 20 (2), pp. 436-449. ISSN 1063-6692
Congestion pricing and noncooperative games in communication networks
Ganesh, Ayalvadi and Laevens, Koenraad and Steinberg, Richard (2007) Congestion pricing and non-cooperative games in communication networks. Operations research, 55 (3). pp. 430-438. ISSN 0030-364X
A contract and balancing mechanism for sharing capacity in a communication network
Anderson, Edward and Kelly, Frank and Steinberg, Richard (2006) A contract and balancing mechanism for sharing capacity in a communication network. Management science, 52 (1). pp. 39-53. ISSN 0025-1909
A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service
Kelly, Frank and Steinberg, Richard (2000) A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service. Management science, 46 (4). pp. 586-596. ISSN 0025-1909
Complete list of publications