Futures for diplomacy
Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century

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FUTURES FOR DIPLOMACY

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October 2012

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Preface

The Clingendael Institute was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland to write this report. It discusses the changing environment of diplomacy in terms of four key dimensions of what is termed integrative diplomacy: contexts and locations, rules and norms, communication patterns and actors and roles. It explores the consequences of this changing diplomatic environment for the processes and structures of diplomacy, particularly ministries of foreign affairs. The report is one output from a larger and developing international project on Futures for Diplomacy.
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Executive Summary

• The diplomatic environment of the 21st century is marked by change and uncertainty. Particular features include:
  » The **expansion in the number and variety of international actors** empowered by the ICT and social media. These actors now extend beyond traditional NGOs to more amorphous civil society groups.
  » The development of a **new international security agenda** focused on the security of the individual within the state and including issues such as climate change or pandemic disease that go well beyond traditional concepts of international security.
  » The **resurgence of more traditional geopolitical agendas** as states compete for power, resources or territory.
  » The **expansion of regulatory diplomatic agendas**, enhanced by the global financial crisis and demands for more effective banking regulation.
  » The **progressive fragmentation of the rules and norms** governing international political and trade relations as more confident emerging states increasingly assert their own values and rules. One consequence will be a continuing weakening of multilateral institutions.

• **Whilst diplomats must now share the stage with a broad range of actors and institutions**, despite much conventional wisdom regarding the impact of globalization, states remain important actors in international affairs. Government diplomacy therefore remains a significant factor in protecting national interests, developing global governance and promoting international peace and security.

• **Diplomats will cease to be gatekeepers** guarding the borders of the foreign, becoming instead boundary spanners integrating the different landscapes and actors of the diplomatic environment.

• **The Integrative Diplomacy** framework developed in this report argues the need to integrate change and continuity, different agendas and arenas, different diplomatic processes and structures and machinery of diplomacy. Above all, it stresses the importance of the growth of international policy networks and, consequently, the importance to effective diplomacy of collaboration between professional diplomats and the representatives of a variety of international actors.

• **The breakdown of the distinction between domestic and international affairs means** that the national interests of a country now involve the ‘whole of government’ and, therefore, the importance of coordination between government agencies. **Foreign ministries should see themselves as part of this ‘national diplomatic system’ and consider their changing role in this light.** The increasing demands of regulatory diplomatic agendas will imply increasing involvement of financial and other ministries in international policy.
• **Foreign Ministries will remain responsible** for managing their **diplomatic networks**. Demands on these networks will increase not reduce. With increasing pressures on expenditure, this will require clear prioritization of interests and innovative organizational solutions. These include:
  » **administrative hubs**, reducing administrative burdens on smaller embassies.
  » **virtual embassies**, with officers combining on-line monitoring of countries with periodic visits.
  » **swarming**, using innovations in human resource management to allow the rapid concentration of necessary resources in emergencies.
  » a ‘**diplomatic reserve**’, allowing the cost effective maintenance of a broad range of international knowledge or skills through networks of ‘reserve diplomats’ in the academic and private sectors.

• **Integrative diplomacy** involves an understanding of changing patterns of diplomatic communication. Foreign ministries must devise effective public diplomacy strategies integrated fully into the policy-making machinery. This requires a sophisticated understanding of stakeholders and audiences. Foreign Ministries must also ensure that other elements of the national diplomatic system understand the centrality of public diplomacy and its medium and long term strategic purposes.

• **The new international security agenda requires new approaches to diplomacy**. Its issues are highly interdependent, requiring holistic solutions, international cooperation and, increasingly, collaboration between international civil societies. **Diplomats will increasingly function as facilitators and social entrepreneurs** between domestic and foreign civil society groups as they operate in global policy networks.

• **Foreign Ministries and individual diplomats will need to make full use of the new social media** both to influence key debates and to network with key audiences of the NISA. In making optimal use of the social media, trivialising of content and the consequent loss of respectability is a greater risk than unauthorized disclosure of information or dissident opinions.

• **Conflicts will arise over interference in domestic affairs, which reflect a clash between new and old diplomatic agendas**. The extent to which diplomats are able to tackle the new international security agenda may hamper their ability to tackle geopolitical agendas. **The skill sets for the two agendas are very different**. The national diplomatic system may need different diplomatic skills, and even different agencies, to pursue the various agendas.

• **Fragmentation of the rules and norms** underpinning international political and commercial relations will leave many actors confused and at risk. **A key role for diplomats will be to understand the implications of this fragmentation**, for both assets and policies, and to navigate between the different alternative rule sets. Both their own government and commercial firms will look to them for reliable advice.

• Governments will continue to lay great stress on commercial diplomacy. But diplomatic services will need to analyse rigorously what services and support firms need and where. Diverting resources away from political work may leave diplomats ill equipped to offer the advice firms are looking for and limit their ability to make vital connections between trade promotion and broader international policy goals in fields such as development aid, the environment and resource security.
• **The pressure of consular work** will increase with growth in international travel in an uncertain world. To avoid being overwhelmed, diplomatic services need to innovate both structurally and in delivery of service. Apart from organizational innovations, they should also explore burden sharing with other governments, privatization of certain services and public expectation management. Foreign ministries should maximize the **potential of consular work in support of economic diplomacy**.

• To carry out the tasks identified above, diplomats will need a combination of traditional (e.g. linguistic and historical knowledge) and newer (network facilitation and new media) skills. The national diplomatic system as a whole must radically improve its capacity for geopolitical analysis and long-term strategic planning. The first stage of training is the identification (recruitment) of personnel with the right profile (including social skills) for the diplomatic roles identified in this report. Thereafter training should focus as much on capabilities as on knowledge.
Introduction: Puzzles for Diplomacy

Where does diplomacy fit in the emerging patterns of early 21st century world politics? In one sense this might seem an unnecessary question given the range of interlinked issues demanding the key functions – communication, negotiation and the representation of interests – traditionally associated with diplomacy. In short, the world has never required these assets more than it does now. Yet diplomacy, is experiencing an existential crisis, both as a set of processes for managing an increasingly complex policy environment, and as a set of structures through which these processes operate.

This uncertainty reflects a growing awareness that a transformational international system still dominated by sovereign states is having to respond to change at several interrelated levels. Whilst complex policy agendas still demand a central, if changing, role for the state, many of the norms, rules and roles associated with diplomacy as it has developed over the last few centuries are no longer fit for purpose.

Clearly, fundamental questions regarding the purposes of diplomacy, who is – or should be – involved in it and what forms and practices it should assume to deal with new policy challenges need to be urgently addressed. This applies to international organizations as well as the institutions of national diplomacy and offers a fundamentally different perspective from that based on the familiar claim that diplomacy is irrelevant to contemporary global needs. Rather, diplomacy has a central role but needs to adapt to the demands of a rapidly changing environment.

Against this background, a central assumption of this report is that diplomacy as a set of processes continues to be of central importance to the global policy milieu and that these processes need to be constantly re-evaluated. Furthermore, it is recognized that the on-going debate in by ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) around the world about the machinery of diplomacy needs to be seen in this light. Too often, internal debates within MFAs regarding their organizational forms and procedures are about their place in the structures of government and their organizational survival within them and fail to address broader issues relating to the changing purposes of diplomacy.

The nature of the report

This report aims to explore the puzzles surrounding, and challenges confronting, contemporary diplomacy. It draws on evidence from policy practitioners – not only professional diplomats but also an increasingly broad range of participants in international policy making – and analyses from external observers of international politics.

It is not our aim to rehearse familiar arguments regarding the present state of diplomacy and its possible futures. At the same time, we accept that the world of diplomacy has become more diverse and complex in terms of its tasks and those involved in it. We acknowledge that the institutions of diplomacy now have to work with a growing community of ‘stakeholders’, that diplomacy is becoming the business of managing networks and that public diplomacy is a key feature of the diplomatic environment. Rather than restating these points, our aim is to consider what kind of overall image of diplomacy in the early 21st century they present and their implications for its future development.
The report poses a set of interrelated questions on diplomacy. They focus on the challenges confronting the practice of diplomacy by locating them within a framework that helps us to explore in a more coherent fashion the modalities of change determining the patterns of contemporary diplomacy. This framework we term ‘integrative diplomacy’.

One important issue in developing such a framework is its scope. What is regarded as ‘diplomacy’? This constitutes part of the puzzle surrounding its changing nature and status in world politics. Attempts to grapple with a changing global environment have often responded to a growing ambiguity of roles and relationships by assigning the term ‘diplomacy’ to a range of activities engaged in by diverse actors operating on the world stage.

Hence we have ‘city’, ‘business’, ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) and ‘celebrity’ diplomacies. Much of this activity – whilst international in nature – may have little to do with the functions and objectives of diplomacy and assigning the term ‘diplomacy’ to it offers little enlightenment and creates confusion. On the other hand, it is obvious that the involvement of a growing range of non-state actors is fundamentally changing the environment in which the shaping and execution of international and domestic policy occurs.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of non-state actors, the focus of the report is primarily on the state-related mechanisms of diplomacy and their response to a fast-changing environment in which the growing international involvement of non-state entities is a critical element.

Clearly, the range of actors impacting on diplomacy has expanded and that they condition patterns of global communication, often affecting policy outcomes. But the following discussion assumes that the processes and structures surrounding state-based diplomacy remain significant and are vital features of global governance. Because of this, it is important to understand how the agencies of state-based diplomacy are adapting to change alongside the strategies (or ‘diplomacies’) of non-governmental actors.

**Integrative Diplomacy**

The key perspective utilized in this report we have termed ‘integrative diplomacy’. What does this mean? It is not intended to suggest that the key to understanding diplomacy is defined by regional integration projects. To be sure, these are a central feature of the current diplomatic environment and present policy practitioners with a series of challenges and opportunities – as in the context of the European External Action Service. But integration of national communities around the world, particularly in the European Union context, provides only part of the picture. More fundamentally, the rapidly changing landscape of world politics is marked by conflicting tensions which are global and national as well as regional in their scope. The resulting complex texture embraces disintegrative or fragmenting qualities.

The term ‘integrative diplomacy’ is intended to capture some of the key characteristics of the diplomatic milieu essential to appreciating the challenges confronting policy makers in an era of crowded agendas and increasingly dense patterns of communication. Here lies the main challenge confronting policy makers and diplomatic practitioners. The ideas that underpin this perspective on 21st century diplomacy will be developed later in the report but for the moment, it is useful to identify some of its key ideas:
• Between change and continuity

Unlike much discussion regarding the current state of diplomacy integrative diplomacy – whilst recognizing the impact of change in its form and functions – acknowledges the continuities that condition its evolution and functions. This contrasts with the traditional – and continuing – emphasis on discontinuities represented by the identification of ‘new’ diplomacies emerging in response to international and domestic change. More specifically, integrative diplomacy suggests that that 21st century diplomacy is characterized by features of pre-modern, modern and post-modern structures and processes. Aspects of each of these ‘layers’ determine the patterns of contemporary diplomacy with elements of the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ intermingled in complex patterns that cut across time periods, producing patterns of change at three interrelated levels of the diplomatic environment: the global, national and regional diplomatic systems. Each system comprises sets of actors, patterns of interaction and norms and rules of behaviour that are in turn challenged by the demands of changing global and domestic policy environments.

• Integration between agendas and arenas.

It has become a truism to argue that world politics is marked by increased interaction between sets of issues that were once relatively separate. Taking the trade agenda as one example, aspects of the environmental and development agendas are now firmly implanted in trade negotiations. Hillary Clinton’s presentation of the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, stressed the point that diplomacy, development and defence are linked more closely by the challenges of dealing with transnational terrorism and the problems posed by fragile states. This has, in turn, implications for the locations in which diplomacy occurs and the relationships between the agents of 21st century diplomacy. At the multilateral level, a growing issue of interconnectivity is challenging both the boundaries between functional international organizations and traditional working processes.

At the domestic level, policy interconnectivity is posing challenges for coordination between the increasingly diverse components of international policy processes. A major consequence of these trends has been to erode the boundaries between the organizational parameters that have traditionally defined diplomacy. At one level, diplomacy occurs across and within national boundaries (as subnational authorities seek to project their interests within regional and international arenas). At another, the role and constitution of international organizations as arenas of international activity are being redefined.

• Interaction between actors

Contemporary diplomacy is engaging an increasingly wide range of actors alongside professional diplomats. This reflects the growth of civil society and their claims for participation in the processes of world politics. The global financial crisis has re-awakened long-standing concerns with commercial diplomacy and hence relations between diplomats and the business community. How to accommodate these interests, whether in multilateral or national diplomacy, is one of the key challenges facing diplomacy. This phenomenon has given rise to a number of images that seek to capture the ways in which international processes are changing such as ‘multistakeholder’ and ‘network’ diplomacy. These acknowledge the growing interaction between the agents of the state and international organizations and non-state actors, whether located in civil society or the business community. Whilst the network image has received a good deal of attention, there has been relatively little discussion of the implications for the practice of state-based diplomacy, the impact on its norms and the demands it places on the professional diplomat.
Integration of diplomatic processes.

Much of the debate on the present state of diplomacy embraces traditional distinctions – but these are of decreasing relevance. Thus the distinction between bilateralism and multilateralism, and the character and role of summit diplomacy as a distinctive modality, for instance, look increasingly questionable, especially in such complex environments as the European Union (EU). Additionally, the emphasis on soft power and its manifestation in public diplomacy now requires that the latter be integrated into rather than separated from the mainstream of diplomatic intercourse.

Integration within the structures and machinery of diplomacy.

This follows from the previous point and can be seen at all levels of diplomatic activity: a) in multilateral organizations where relationships between international organizations (IOs) and IOs and civil society have become critical issues; b) at the national level where the definition of roles and responsibilities between the institutions of international policy management have expanded and are increasingly uncertain. c) At the regional level, the EU post-Lisbon Treaty environment is posing a distinctive set of issues regarding the nature of the appropriate structures for an expanded EU diplomacy.

Taken together, these developments in the diplomatic milieu are creating an environment in which basic questions regarding the nature and role of diplomacy are being debated. What is diplomacy as an activity? Does it have a place in a globalized international system that underscores the need for global governance and the need for ‘post-diplomatic’ processes? Who is now engaged in diplomacy? If complex networks are the watchword in managing world politics where does this leave professional diplomats and the sets of activities in which they have traditionally engaged?

Developing a framework for analysis

The current diplomatic environment provides a complex picture marked by a balance between change and continuity. Sets of expectations as to what constitutes diplomacy as an activity, how and where it can be practiced, by whom and according to what rules are all contentious issues. In order to cast some light on an often-clouded picture, the image of integrative diplomacy [see figure 1.1] provides a more coherent view of how diplomacy is adapting to change.

The framework is based on the following dimensions:

> **Contexts and locations.** What are the parameters of the debates surrounding the nature, significance and role of diplomacy? First, we are presented with conflicting images of the role that diplomacy and professional diplomats are expected to perform in world politics. Disentangling these images is an essential step in identifying the present and future contribution that diplomacy can be expected to play in a densely configured international milieu. As the European Union demonstrates in the context of the development of the European External Action Service, the very definition of what constitutes ‘diplomacy’ is open to debate. Second, how are changes in power structures and the emergence of complex agendas spanning domestic and international policy milieus impacting on the character of contemporary diplomacy? Third, the issue of locations poses the question: where does diplomacy occur? Traditional notions of the separation of the domestic and the international and the political and the diplomatic are clearly challenged; how can diplomacy manage this situation?
• **Rules and norms.** Diplomacy as a set of communication processes rests on rules and norms of behaviour (as enshrined, for example, in the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions) that have evolved over several centuries (and in some senses pre-date the system of states). The need to adapt to new power configurations and more complex diplomatic arenas in which civil society organizations are increasingly prominent, means that diplomats are having to define ‘rules of engagement’ with an increasingly disparate range of actors outside the world of formal, intergovernmental diplomacy.

• **Communication patterns.** developments in patterns of communication and communications technologies are central to the practice of diplomacy. One aspect of this has been the preoccupation with soft power and public diplomacy. In the 21st century, fibre optic and satellite technologies, mobile communications, joins with a more active electronic media and social networking to present a mix of new constraints and opportunities for the conduct of diplomacy.

• **Actors and Roles.** If the key characteristic of diplomacy in the 21st century is the emergence of multiactor networks, what demands does this place on the participants within them? One of the key challenges confronting both the structures and processes of diplomacy is the need to work with ‘coalitions of the willing’. How can these be constructed and managed? How can the qualities of the broad range of ‘stakeholders’ with whom professional diplomats now need to operate be determined and leveraged for the delivery of policy objectives? Answers to these and related questions are sought at all levels of diplomatic activity, not least the foreign ministry and the overseas diplomatic network.

The changing diplomatic environment is affecting the role perceptions of professional diplomats and their understanding of their work. This has implications for the skills required of professional diplomats and, consequently, for diplomatic training.

The framework presented in this report does not claim to offer an exhaustive picture of the state of 21st diplomacy, its processes and structures. However, it does seek to provide a perspective that highlights key features of its current condition. Characteristics that seem particularly relevant relate to policy and actor linkage, the demands imposed by ‘networked diplomacy’ and radical changes in patterns of communication. In this sense, integrative diplomacy has a set of descriptive aims and a prescriptive objective in identifying key issues confronting diplomacy and the professional diplomat.

![Figure 1.1: Integrative diplomacy: a framework for analysis](image)
1 Contexts and Locations for Diplomacy

Diplomacy exists in a state of continuing adaptation. This is one of its fascinations whilst, simultaneously, the source of confusion in mapping its changing landscapes. Thus in the context of its manifestation as a key feature of the states system both practitioners and analysts have proclaimed its centrality – as the ‘master institution’ – to the patterns of international politics whilst at the same time expressing concerns with its deficiencies...

Partly, this is manifested in the on-going dissatisfaction amply expressed by serving and former diplomats for whom the world they inhabit has never seemed quite what it was. Historically, this sense of diplomacy having been something other – and better – than it is has frequently reflected significant changes in patterns and technologies of communication such as the electric telegraph in the nineteenth century. Some contemporary observers regard the introduction of the cable as marking the end of diplomacy – or at least the institution of the ambassador – and so it has been with the advent of other technological innovations.

From the electric telegraph to Web 2.0 and Wiki Leaks, how information is passed between the critical actors in international politics and ever-broadening constituencies has generated intense introspection about what professional diplomats do and how they do it. The pressures on diplomatic structures reflect fluctuating demands. To the current reassertion of the need for diplomats to adopt a commercial role, are joined the need to enhance what has long been seen as consular diplomacy in an era where crises impact on a globalised, increasingly mobile citizenry. Additionally, the practice of public diplomacy has assumed centre stage. Whilst for some these may be welcome developments, for others they are deviations from traditional diplomatic functions of political interpretation, reporting and policy analysis.

And if this is true of the traditional ‘producers’ of diplomacy, it is even more so of analysts and its ‘consumers’ – that is the constituencies in whose name diplomatic processes are enacted. Here, diplomacy has long experienced a dual effectiveness and legitimacy problem. From the perspective of the general public and the growing range of actors claiming a voice in diplomatic arenas, the diplomatic processes and structures that have developed over the last four hundred years or so are incapable of responding to the complex range of interlinked issues with which we are confronted. At a deeper, normative, level a scepticism regarding what diplomats are, what they do and, particularly, how they do it, whilst a phenomenon as old as diplomacy itself, has become more deeply embedded as the widespread rejection of the norm of secrecy exemplified in the Wiki Leaks saga testifies.

This deeply entrenched dichotomy between aspiration and performance, claim and counter claim, is represented in the wealth of metaphors and images that diplomacy has generated. Advocating the utilization of social networking sites by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, former Foreign Secretary David Milliband has claimed that they have opened up the ‘secret garden’ of diplomacy. In an article in the Financial Times, Richard Haass has argued the case for ‘messiness’ (that is to say a variety of forms) as a partial solution to the problems confronting multilateralism. A former Canadian diplomat, Daryl Copeland, promotes the virtues of ‘guerrilla’ diplomacy (Copeland 2009) whilst Carne Ross, a deeply disillusioned ex-British diplomat, argues – and practices – the necessity of ‘independent’ diplomacy as an alternative to the pursuit of national interest inherent in state-based diplomatic practice (Ross 2007). In contrast, Parag Khanna has argued the case for what he terms ‘mega-diplomacy’ as an
essential means of managing a globalised world (Khanna 2011). These, together with a wealth of other metaphors, symbolize at once the significance of diplomacy and the difficulties of analysing its role in an era of rapid and fundamental change.

These conflicting images of what diplomacy is – or should be – and where its problems lie, form part of the challenges confronting diplomats as they seek to adapt to changing environments. How can we make sense of this in evaluating the present state and future for diplomacy in a complex world order?

**Landscapes of diplomacy: conflicting structures and complex agendas**

Since both the functions required of diplomacy and specific diplomatic machineries reflect the demands placed upon them in any given period, understanding the contours of both international and domestic policy milieus is a vital first step. Here the picture is one of both structural and systemic change. That is shifts in power distribution and in key aspects of the operating principles underpinning the international system. Both are marked by radical change and consequent uncertainty.

The relatively simple (and often simplistic) analyses of the transforming international order in the post Cold War era such as a quantum shift from geopolitical to geo-economic dynamics common in the 1990s have been subsumed by the recognition that the distinction was always suspect. Geopolitics continues to shape the international order, embracing huge shifts in the global economy, linked to equally significant shifts in technology – the triad of geo-politics, geo-economics and geotechnology as Khanna portrays it.

But the power configurations that this produces are uncertain and reflect the contemporary manifestations of two characteristic impulses of international relations: the realities of competition and the requirements of cooperation. First, there is now little agreement on the shape of the diplomatic environment, as the rejection of a unipolar model has not produced a clear alternative paradigm – other than that which agrees that there is now a highly complex diffusion of power. Convenient labels – such as the popular but artificial Goldman Sachs inspired BRICs – or more recently, BRIICS (including Indonesia and South Africa) – fail to capture the elusive realities of the evolving distribution of power. Thus broad identifications of a multipolar order have led to differing interpretations of its form and consequences from neo/non-polarity to multiple regionalisms led by regional hegemons.

Second, however shifting patterns of inter-state rivalry are interpreted, they are intertwined with a cooperative imperative underpinned by interdependence and the need for collective action in key areas such as environmental policy, food distribution, global pandemics, development, international crime and the challenge posed by fragile states. This has come to be identified in terms of a new international security agenda (NISA) associated with changes in society whereby international security is seen not simply in terms of the integrity and stability of the state, but rather in terms of the physical and economic security and welfare of the citizen within it.

The scope of these issues and interrelationships that they have created are captured in the concept of wicked issues reflecting the linkages between, for example, fragile states, organized crime and terrorism that constitute a central challenge for 21st century diplomacy. Wicked issues are essentially unique in nature and consequently every diplomatic ‘solution’ – or management strategy – has to be tailored to specific circumstances (Edwards 2008). Moreover, they are far less susceptible to rational policy processes of problem definition, analysis and solution – often because there is no clear and agreed definition of the problem – or at, least, significant dimensions of it.
Consequently, we are confronted by an international environment where traditional geopolitical agendas have re-emerged alongside NISA agendas. This is most obvious in the foreign policies of more determinedly ‘modern’ states such as Russia, China and Iran. Although their agendas differ in detail, they have certain features in common:

- they are little concerned about the new international security agenda (apart from terrorism, and then in a narrowly military sense);
- they have little or no tolerance for the new diplomacy, and are determinedly opposed to outside interference in their internal affairs (although they do not always abide by this norm);
- fundamentally, they think and act geopolitically.

In as far as European states, and the EU itself, need to engage with these (and other states) in pursuit of security or access to raw materials and energy, they too will need to develop and implement geopolitical agendas. At the same time, pursuit of European geopolitical agendas is likely to conflict with pursuit of the new international security agenda.

**Implications for diplomacy**

The early 21st century diplomatic environment therefore seeks to balance fragmentation and convergence around multiple agendas reflecting conflicting interests. There are three steps in analysing the consequences of this scenario for current diplomatic processes and structures. Briefly, we need to:

- be clear as to assumptions on which differing images of diplomacy and the diplomatic profession are based;
- identify the parameters of the challenge that current policy environments present and the requirements they impose on diplomatic institutions;
- locate the ways in which the functions of contemporary diplomacy are adapting — or need to adapt — to changes that transcend traditional conceptions of the international and domestic policy domains.

**Imaging diplomacy**

A first step is to recognize that the debate on the present and future condition of diplomacy embraces quite different assumptions concerning its character in the early 21st century. Unless we disentangle these and the assumptions underpinning them, we face an uphill task in making sense of what we are seeking to explore. More significantly, the key agencies of diplomacy both at national and international levels will find it impossible to articulate strategies for managing their policy environments.

Essentially, two perspectives on diplomacy have competed for attention in the last two decades, rooted in differing perspectives on the global environment.

- **Statist perspectives**: define diplomacy as a set of processes and structures, bilateral and multilateral, relating to communication, negotiation and information sharing between sovereign states. At the national level, the focus is on the traditional agents of diplomacy: foreign ministries and their networks of overseas missions. As such, there is a strong predisposition towards an ideal type of diplomacy predicated on centralized control, separation from domestic political environments and mediated through distinctive organizational structures and processes dominated by the agencies of professional diplomacy.
Globalist perspectives: emphasize the diminished significance of the state and the patterns of intergovernmental relations surrounding it. At its most extreme, the emergence of ‘globalist’ argumentation that came to be designated as ‘first wave’ globalization writing, proclaimed the growing marginalization of the state and its institutions. The enhanced importance of non-state actors (NSAs) was reflected in the growth of ‘non-state diplomacy’ whether this focused on the international activities of multinational business enterprises or transnational social movements related to ever-expanding and interlinked policy agendas. In other words, the application of the term ‘diplomacy’ to the activities of NSAs tended to separate the realms of governmental and non-governmental activity. And whilst the emphasis on global society and global governance sought to provide an image of world politics distinct from the traditional agendas of ‘international relations’ at least in its earlier manifestations, it did so at the expense of analysing the changing role of the state and its institutions.

Towards a third image for the 21st century

Integrative diplomacy moves beyond these two diametrically opposed perspectives and embraces a ‘post-globalist’ image that argues for the continued significance of state-related diplomatic systems and processes whilst recognizing the dramatic changes in the environments – domestic and international – in which they have to operate.

Rather than emphasizing the diminishing significance of the state due to a combination of internal and external forces – and zero-sum interpretations of the relationships between it and NSAs, it suggests a more nuanced argument. This moves beyond the identification of a state- or NSA-dominated environment. Instead, it favours one that underscores the complexities of the relationships between them and seeks to differentiate the roles and functions performed by actors (including the diplomat as professional agent of the state). Consequently, we can identify a range of normative-analytic images of global governance architectures in which diplomacy may play varying roles.

A recognition of the continuing significance of the state as actor combines with an appreciation of the importance of private as distinct from public actors to produce a re-evaluation of diplomacy and its place in global governance. Rather than emphasizing the exclusivity of state and non-state actors, what is important are the patterns of interaction between them and the implications that these have for our understanding of the nature of contemporary diplomacy.

Additionally, globalization changes the internal architecture of the state and redefines its functions. Since the national structures of diplomacy are integral elements determining the capacity of the state to manage its international environment and achieve its international policy goals, their changing character provides insights into the responses of governments to the pressures from the global environment. Seemingly distinctive, disconnected – and competitive – diplomacies pursued by states, international organizations and non-state actors are integrated into the complex, multi-faceted patterns of world politics. The task is to integrate what have often been regarded as distinct categories.

Pre-modern, modern and post-modern diplomacies

Much discussion on diplomacy is factored around the concept of the new as illustrated by Condoleezza Rice’s ‘transformational diplomacy’ and Hillary Clinton’s outlining in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of a new diplomacy based on the creation of a ‘global civilian service’ embracing the State Department and the US Agency for International Aid. Just as the electric telegraph was seen as moving the parameters of diplomatic practice in the nineteenth century, so the employment of Web 2.0 and social networking sites by foreign ministries are readily identified as symbolic of a ‘new statecraft’. This emphasis on ‘newness’ stresses the importance of discontinuity.
over continuity. However, as the foregoing discussion has indicated, the current diplomatic environment incorporates ‘layers’ of adaptation to an evolving international order.

Consequently, features of pre-modern diplomacy – that is those associated with the pre-modern state era – are intermingled with those of the modern era. Thus the image of a neo-medieval international order in which diplomatic agency embraced actors and arenas other than those now associated with the state resonates with features of the 21st century polycentric diplomatic landscape. Moreover, modern diplomacy is overlaid by a post-modern layer in which the dynamics of international politics are no longer dominated by concerns with balance, sovereignty and the separation of the foreign and the domestic, overseen by a highly centralized state with claims to total control. Rather, post-modernity in world politics is driven by the logic of mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, pursuing security through transparency and transparency through interdependence. The most developed example is, of course, the European Union. Whilst this has a clear resonance in the context of the fallout from the global financial crisis the logic of post-modernism is challenged by the continuing appeal of modernism reflected in the recourse to national sovereignty.

The diversity of diplomacy

One of the key challenges that this clouded picture presents for those engaged in diplomacy at all levels is the need to recognize the diffuse nature of diplomatic domains – the often intricate web of issues underlying negotiations and diplomatic sites – or the character of the processes through which diplomatic communication occurs in specific arenas. Rather than one overarching model, as Figure 1.2 suggests, several patterns co-exist reflecting the varied nature of diplomacy, the increasingly complex patterns underpinning it and the actors involved. These range from diplomatic encounters marked by high levels of governmental input from national policy communities and/or intergovernmental organizations, through ‘shared’ diplomatic arenas reflected in the multi-layered and private categories to the ‘loose couplings’ where government input is low and processes are furthest removed from traditional modalities of diplomacy.
| **Intergovernmental** | Diplomacy marked by a high level of governmental presence and leadership through national policy communities and intergovernmental organizations. Structured communication and clearly defined rules and norms of behaviour. | Traditional military security agendas:  
• Six party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme.  
• P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme  
• Basel III negotiations on global banking regulation. |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Multi-layered**    | Diplomacy cuts across differing levels of government and a range of international organizations together with non-state actors. Less structured than intergovernmental sites. | Intra-European Union diplomacy involving several horizontal and vertical layers of government. Often emphasizes specialist knowledge and involves regulatory issues.  
• Ottawa Process (land mines)  
• Kimberley Process (conflict diamonds) |
| **Private**          | Diplomacy in which non-state actors assume the leading role in delivering outcomes often with little governmental participation. Fluid communication patterns, rules and norms. | Systems of private regulation based on specialist technical knowledge, often under state supervision.  
Standards setting; certification of physicians and insurance.  
Credit rating agencies.  
Private arbitration services. |
| **Loose couplings**  | Unstructured diplomacy in which government has low presence: roles and relationships are fluid and responsibilities not clearly defined. Rules and norms underdeveloped or absent. | Policing the Internet |

*Figure 1.2 Diplomatic domains and sites*

Whilst the boundaries between sites and domains are obviously fluid, the essential point is that different models for diplomacy coalesce around different policy agendas involving varying patterns of actors and arenas. This makes generalizations regarding what is needed, for example, in a national foreign service or foreign ministry difficult to sustain. Nevertheless it is clear that much more of the diplomatic effort involves working with others both within and outside the agencies of government. The shift towards ‘networked governance’ conditions both the objectives and the strategies of diplomacy as it is required to develop several interrelated qualities:

- **holistic strategies**, recognizing that complex global agendas differ significantly from more traditional security issues and pose significant challenges to diplomatic services and foreign policy makers. They are all deeply interconnected and cannot be dealt with individually. They are beyond the capacity of any one state, or even regional groupings of states and demand global collaboration. However, not only are the solutions not obvious, even the questions may be difficult to frame.
• The ability to **construct and manage diplomatic spaces**: that is, to influence the shape and form of policy arenas as well as agendas. This is evident in the multilateral environment where international organizations are seen as constituting a ‘public realm’ in which issues can be inserted, debated rather than closed, state-based policy environments. Framing debates and agendas will become an increasingly significant diplomatic task. Often, informal, task directed engagement with others will be more significant than formal organizations and alliances.

• The **capacity to persuade others** to work towards the accomplishment of shared goals has assumed a growing significance— even in the case of the US where the concept of ‘coalitional primacy’ replaces that of ‘unipolar primacy’. Effective action frequently lies beyond central (or local) governments: collaboration must extend beyond governments and political elites to collaboration with civil society and business. Being able to identify and work with an increasingly diverse and fluid range of partners becomes a benchmark for judging the capacity of diplomatic systems. Genuine collaboration demands genuine dialogue. Traditional diplomatic paradigms based on framing policy and then imposing it on others (or convincing them to agree with it) do not work. Above all, the post-modern image not only permits interference in the internal affairs of other states, but positively demands it.

• The ability to **maximize knowledge capacity** and to act as a ‘thought leader’ producing relevant policy concepts, proposals and data which can generate consensus for action. Given the need for collaborative efforts, this will involve facilitating the knowledge capacity of others, whether in or outside government.

• Recognizing the importance of **policy legitimacy in domestic political environments** as international issues become the continuation of domestic agendas across national boundaries. Effectiveness in diplomacy — and the status of diplomats — will therefore become dependent on legitimacy among domestic publics and key domestic interests. Global policy arenas are more likely to reflect popular attitudes and views. Furthermore, national populations are more diverse, publics more mobile, more easily informed — and able to inform — and are critical consumers of key services (traditionally defined as ‘consular’ work) that diplomatic services now are required to provide.

The overarching challenge confronting diplomacy and diplomats in both national and international arenas is then the implicit **reconceptualization of the national interest** in terms of a set of global interests that can only be pursued in collaborative frameworks.

The foreseeable future promises to be a period of conflicting agendas and tensions regarding the definition and application of rules. The new international security agenda will conflict with more traditional geopolitical agendas. The hegemony of western values and interests will be increasingly challenged by alternatives emerging from Asia, Africa and elsewhere, and hence increase the demand for diplomacy as management of cultural diversity. At the same time, the demands for collaboration will require professional diplomats to work with others and to redefine their own roles in the process. But the differing functions and roles of those attempting to manage international relations may contradict each other, or at least complicate things. Different actors operating at different levels and through different networks will further complicate this scenario.

The challenge — and opportunity — for diplomats, and diplomacy, will be to mediate these differences in such a way as to maintain some coherence of policy while protecting and promoting the interests of those they represent.

An overriding issue is the extent to which this mediation can successfully be carried out by one kind of diplomat, or indeed one kind of diplomatic institution, and if multiple institutions are needed how they are to be constituted and coordinated.
Conclusions

The challenges set out above are reflected in each of the components of the integrative diplomacy model:

- **Contexts and locations** are both more diverse and uncertain in terms of their structural and systemic features. There is no clear consensus on a paradigm capable of explaining the power environments within which diplomats have to function and the demands posed by collaborative frameworks within which global agendas are located reflect the complex interaction of geopolitics and geo-economics.

- **Locations** for diplomatic activity increasingly fail to respect traditional assumptions. As much effort is needed in managing domestic environments which impact on international policy. Furthermore, traditional distinctions between multilateral and bilateral diplomatic strategies operating in discrete policy environments fail to accord with the heightened patterns of linkage between them.

- **Rules and norms**: the current global environment – in which the rules that have conditioned the post-Cold War order are challenged by changing power configurations – conditions both the environment of diplomacy and the tasks that it is required to perform. Second, working within diplomatic networks embracing a diffuse range of participants poses questions regarding the rules and norms of diplomacy as they have developed within the state-based international order.

- **Actors and roles**: arguments regarding who are the ‘most significant’ actors are replaced by recognition of linkages between actors that reflect their respective qualities (their actorness) within policy networks. Consequently, simplistic images of diplomacy seen as either a state (modern) or post-state (post-modern) set of structures and processes fail to capture the complexities of the environment of 21st century diplomacy and the challenges that it presents to diplomats.

- **Diplomats will need to re-evaluate the role models on which their activities are based.** On one hand, this will involve relinquishing claims to hold a privileged position in a hierarchical environment marked by special qualities such as secrecy. On the other hand, it involves developing strategies for reconciling the needs for policy specialisms with the more traditional diplomatic roles – such as the ability to interpret cultures and mediate between them – that globalization renders more significant.

- **Communication patterns** are therefore more integrated as they are focused on multi-actor networks rather than separated state and non-state diplomatic structures. This is reflected in the preoccupation with defining and operationalizing public diplomacy strategies that have tended to be seen as separate from rather than integrated into broad diplomatic strategies.
<table>
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<td>Communication patterns</td>
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<td>Actors and Roles</td>
<td>Diplomats whose credentials are based on principles of sovereignty. Non-state actors as consumers of diplomacy. Structures: focused on ministries of foreign affairs. Emphasis on guild-like qualities of the diplomatic profession; Clearly defined roles with emphasis on the diplomat as gatekeeper between domestic and international policy environments.</td>
<td>Multiple participation based on varying models involving stakeholders whose credentials are based on interests and expertise rather than status. Non-state actors as producers of diplomacy. Structures more diffuse: more broadly constituted national diplomatic system. Diplomat as internal coordinator in expanded international policy environment and external boundary-spanner. Redefinition of roles as facilitators and entrepreneurs in complex policy environments.</td>
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*Fig 1.3 State-centred and integrative diplomacy: a summary*
2 Rules and Norms

The future for diplomacy as an institution in a changing global environment will both reflect and be determined by the nature of the rules and norms of behaviour which underwrite and facilitate its operation. In one sense, the integrative diplomacy model accommodates the rules and norms enshrined in custom and law which have provided the framework for diplomatic structures and processes. At the same time, it challenges some key assumptions around which the state-based diplomatic system has evolved.

Diplomats will need to appreciate the implications of this for their work in both bilateral and multilateral settings. More than this, the need to interact with other stakeholders in diverse policy environments demands that state and non-state actors need to be aware of the ‘rules of the game’ informing both their own and others’ actions, and where these converge and diverge. As the current global financial crisis – and the central place of banks and credit rating agencies within it – demonstrates, the rules and norms informing the behaviour of such critical actors have implications for the ways in which diplomacy is conducted. Recognizing the importance of this mutual sensitivity to the rules and norms conditioning the actions of others is one facet of the changing role of professional diplomats and, consequently, the necessary skills and training strategies appropriate for the 21st century foreign service.

Sources and nature of diplomatic rules and norms

Rules and norms are derived from two interrelated sources which locate the diplomat at the interface of:

• a transnational diplomatic community sharing a professional culture, language and recognized sets of working procedures;
• a national diplomatic community whose norms and rules are traditionally embodied in the in the organizational cultures and values of the foreign ministry.

At the transnational level, The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Representation continue to provide the formal constitution of the world of diplomacy codifying a system based on the assumption that sovereign, territorial states are, if not the only actors in international relations, by far the most significant. These documents reflect the power, interests and claimed privileges of states. This system, with its attendant rules, conventions and norms, simplifies, clarifies, privileges and secures the work of professional diplomats.

• It simplifies diplomatic representation by identifying who is, and who is not, entitled to it. States and organizations created by states are entitled to diplomatic representation.
• It clarifies diplomatic practice by demarcating the proper subject of diplomacy. Relations between states, and not relations between others and not relations within states, are the proper subject matter of diplomacy.
• It privileges diplomatic agents by accrediting those people, whether professional diplomats or not, who are entitled to speak authoritatively on behalf of the governments of states.
• It secures diplomatic processes and institutions by providing diplomats with immunities and exemptions from the rules, conventions and norms which govern the conduct of others.
In doing so, these conventions provide guidelines to two key issues which are at the forefront of diplomacy as it responds to the changing environment of the 21st century:

» Who are the legitimate participants in diplomatic processes?
» What are legitimate conduct, rights and obligations attaching to the status of the diplomat?

The answer to both of these questions is increasingly unclear and is likely to become more so. The consequent uncertainty that this will generate in the medium to longer time is one of the key issues to which diplomats and their organizations will have to respond.

At the national level, rules and norms have reflected the key principles attaching to the international diplomatic environment and have reflected these in certain organizational and operational features:

• A sense of separateness from the ‘domestic’ political and bureaucratic environments in hierarchical organizational structures;
• an emphasis on the significance of secrecy;
• distinctive recruitment and training practices.

Taken together, these rules and norms constitute a powerful legacy shaping the environment in which diplomacy is conducted. But they are being challenged from several directions:

• Actors other than states now claim a seat at the diplomatic table and either work to their own rules and norms – which are often in tension with those expressed in the working practices and assumptions of traditional state-based diplomacy – or seek to modify the latter in significant ways.
• The distinctiveness of the professional diplomat – even the legitimacy of the diplomatic profession – is challenged by a refusal to recognize its claims to specialness within the structures of government and separateness from issues and processes seen as marking the realm of the foreign from that of the domestic.
• International policy now requires patterns of two-way communication (rather than top-down communication) which necessitate changed norms of behaviour on the part of diplomats and the organizations in which they operate – whether multilateral or national institutions. This is reflected in the need to adapt hierarchical structures and practices to the demands of operating within more broadly configured policy networks.
• Contemporary international agendas and the interface of domestic and international policy demand the deployment of changed strategies – such as those broadly associated with public diplomacy – which may test the boundaries of conventional diplomatic practice.
• Divergent approaches rooted in distinctive domestic cultures (e.g. China) and also geopolitical/geo-economic interests which shape attitudes on significant sub-sets of rules adhered to by the West on issues such as intellectual property. At the extreme, it is possible that these will extend to the rules and norms of diplomacy itself.
• The emergence of new actors with a claim to practice a new style of diplomacy. This is clearly exampled in the case of the EU as an international actor and the emergent External Action Service whose precise form, operational norms and activities may stand in tension with sovereignty-rooted principles of traditional ‘Westphalian’ diplomacy (see Box 2.1). Similarly, NGOs tend to embrace a campaign style-diplomacy that was, for instance, instrumental in the negotiation of the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court.
Box 2.1

A good illustration of the tension between traditional and contemporary foreign policy is the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which also governs EU diplomatic posts, even though the EU is not a state. Article 3 of the Convention states that the function of an overseas mission revolves around ‘the representation and protection of the interests of the sending state as well as the provision of information and friendly relations’. The text of the Convention lingers over definitions of sending and receiving states and diplomatic communications. Article 41 of the Convention also stipulates that diplomats have a ‘duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of the State’. However interference is the currency of the European Union’s engagement in many places overseas. Under the rubrics of post-conflict assistance, development aid, accession conditions or favourable terms of trade, the EU tells ‘receiving States’ how to govern and bow to behave. Yet conventional structures do not officially allow for this.


Diplomatic rules and norms in a changing environment

The rules, conventions and norms of diplomacy have always been violated, sometimes systematically. Actors other than states or their organizations have always attempted to engage in activities akin to the traditional functions of professional diplomats – representation, negotiation, explanation, information gathering and dissemination.

Furthermore, professional diplomats have always been prepared to interfere in the internal affairs of their host states. People other than accredited diplomats have attempted to claim the privileges of authoritatively representing states and others in their relations with one another. And immunities have always been violated, ignored or suspended on occasions. However, commitment to these rules, conventions and norms has been strong enough in the past for them to be operative as standards by which to determine whether it was worth departing from them for reasons of policy, and how such a departure from them might be justified, judged or punished.

This is no longer the case. Actors other than states engaging in diplomacy and seeking diplomatic standing are regarded as normal, rather than as departures from the norm. The blurring of the lines between internal and external affairs has made involvement in the former a normal part of a diplomat’s job. [Box 2.2 indicates how public diplomacy strategies have challenged the operational norms of the US Foreign Service.] The same developments, together with levelling and democratic expectations and about the ordering of societies have demolished the professional diplomats’ exclusive claim to authoritative representation. And the immunities and privileges of diplomacy are no longer effectively defended even on functional grounds.

More importantly, new international rules, conventions and norms are in the process of emerging which reflect the multiple and linked actor, multiple and linked agenda, cheap and plentiful information, openness environment associated with the processes of globalization. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm, for example, by attempting to make sovereignty conditional on the way it is exercised, poses a fundamental challenge to a basic organizing principle around which the modern state system is organized and on which the formal constitution of professional diplomacy rests.
Box 2.2

Changing the public diplomacy culture in US diplomatic missions

Despite establishing the ‘Rules of the Road’ clearance procedures, there was no pressure to make media engagement a priority. All that changed with the development of ‘media hubs’ in Brussels, Dubai and London, which helped to generate and facilitate media appearances by senior US government officials. The European and Eurasian Bureau (EUR), under the wise counsel of the first Senior Advisor for the Media Hubs, Adam (now Ambassador) Ereli, created a ‘Media Matrix’ which tracked who was going out on television, where and on what topic. This single-handedly changed the off-the-record default position: When the monthly chart came out showing, for example, that the consul general in Florence was doing more media than the ambassador to Spain, or that the ambassador to the Court of St. James’s (UK) was more engaged than the ambassador to Italy, suddenly television interviews began to be put on the schedule.


Future scenarios

How then is this gap between the emerging international rules, conventions and norms of integrative diplomacy, and the formal rules, conventions and norms of professional diplomacy to be managed in the future? There are several options:

- Resistance and pushback
- Muddling through
- Hybridity
- Transformation

Resistance and pushback

Reasserting the rules, conventions and norms of a ‘golden age’ of diplomacy is not an option. To insist on the leading role of foreign ministries, the centrality of resident embassies to a country’s international presence, and the exclusive right of professional diplomats, working out of the public eye, to engage in representation cannot work. If attempted, it would result in the marginalization of a professional foreign service from an international life which would increasingly pass it by.

Muddling through

This is currently the option of choice by default, as it is in many other professions such as medicine and education. The formal constitution of rules, conventions and norms remains the primary reference point for conduct, but professional diplomats and their governments are becoming skillful in recognizing when it is to be applied and when it is to be ignored. Depending on where they are working and under what conditions, professional diplomats have thus developed a sense of the kind of domestic interventions that they can engage in without triggering objections from a host government.
In a similar way, foreign ministries have learned when to make their ‘big picture’, ‘gatekeeper’, and ‘first-among-equals’ claims in inter-departmental exchanges over external policy and when to keep quiet.

The advantage of this approach is that it involves the skills associated with an art at which professional diplomats are by training and inclination good. The disadvantage lies in a future in which the daily life of the integrative diplomacy outlined in this report draws ever further away from the formal rules, conventions and norms regulating what is supposed to be going on. As the gap widens, scepticism, cynicism and the prospect of a collapse increase.

Hybridity

This is a term that resonates particularly with those engaged in the diplomacy of the European Union. It conveys the idea of thinking of the present, not as an incomplete transition from one condition to another, but as an ambiguous condition in its own right which exhibits sets of rules, conventions and norms from two or more ways of conducting relations. The scepticism and cynicism referred to above suggests that this is little more than bestowing the honour and dignity of a name on a condition which remains messy, chaotic and poorly understood. Perhaps, but hybridity also suggests that this condition is not likely to be resolved in the near future.

It is a condition to which diplomacy must be adjusted. It also suggests some possibilities for this adjustment. Might hybridity be reflected in separate rules, conventions and norms for the diplomacy associated with different times of international relations and issues? ‘Vienna diplomats’, for example, might work on issues associated with the traditional conception of ‘high politics,’ issues of war, peace, international status and national prestige, while ‘integrative diplomats’ would not be bound by the same constraints and would work on the coalition-building required for promotion interests and cooperation on economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues.

This would be difficult, given the increasing refusal of most important international issues to remain neatly compartmentalized, and given the ways in which perceptions of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics change. How would one maintain this distinction, for example, in a world where nuclear arms control increasingly acquires a technical and almost esoteric character while the manoeuvrings over the fate of the Euro and Greece take on the drama of a Cuban missile crisis? If it proves too difficult, professional diplomats will have to acquire and internalize the qualities of hybridity on an individual basis, moving between the rules, conventions and norms of Vienna diplomacy, on the one hand, and the requirement of integrative diplomacy, on the other, as each situation demands.

Transformation

The requirements for integrative diplomacy are becoming increasingly apparent and form the substance of this report. **The integrative diplomat creates, leads, and participates in policy coalitions that may shift from issue-to-issue.** Effectiveness in this regard requires that the integrative diplomat is well positioned on policy networks where these exist, seeks to create them where they do not exist, and manages them effectively, often in conjunction with a wide range of other actors and other types of actors. But what are the rules, conventions and norms which might be developed to govern and regulate this sort of diplomatic activity? This question is much harder to answer, although our sense of the future suggests that effective diplomacy will become more difficult in the absence of answers to this question. Rules about the openness of communication and conventions about the simplicity and brevity of its content suggest themselves fairly easily. The same cannot be said in regard to the oldest diplomatic question: who gets to participate in integrative diplomacy and on what terms?
Transformational perspectives suggest that diplomatic life is becoming and ought to become more like ordinary life. But can diplomats make a claim that their views carry more weight, either because of their expertise or because of the legitimacy which is inherent in their roles as public officials rather than private individuals or representatives of private enterprises?

More importantly, how might such claims be codified and operationalized? The answers to these questions remain very hard to see at present. The possibility exists, of course, that there will emerge no specifically integrative diplomacy rules, conventions and norms for building and participating in coalitions and managing networks, but merely coalition and network rules, conventions and norms.

What seems to be apparent is that the changing environment of diplomacy can easily result in mutual frustrations on the part of diplomats and non-state entities alike. Rules and norms fashion expectations. The behavioural expectations derived from sovereignty-related rules are not paralleled in the integrative diplomatic environment wherein patterns of behaviour characterized by some stakeholders clearly reflect different, non-sovereignty related norms.

To take one example, governments and NGOs have differing perspectives on confidentiality in negotiations. It is not simply that, humanitarian NGOs, for example, adhere to a norm of non-confidentiality rooted in a commitment to transparency and their nature as publicly accountable institutions. On the one hand, access to and participation in diplomatic processes dominated by sovereignty-determined rules come at a price and acceptance of confidentiality is part of that price. On the other, NGOs engaged in humanitarian diplomacy have become sensitive to the need to accept the need for confidential negotiations in the highly sensitive environments in which they work. Failure to do so can endanger the well being of populations whose interests they are seeking to promote as well as the safety of NGO officials themselves.

Civil society organizations may well entertain unrealistic assumptions as to what might be achieved through engagement in diplomatic processes, especially where they are seeking to redefine the political agenda in a way that diplomats – as opposed to politicians – may be unable to respond. This produces a crisis of expectations. Diplomats, for their part, may fail to appreciate the legitimate goals of non-state actors with whom they become involved in negotiating arenas. It is in this context that ‘rules of engagement’ between key sets of actors, especially government, business and NGOs need to be shaped.

If we are witnessing the emergence of a new phase in the evolution of diplomacy, an important aspect is the development of rules through which evolving processes can function. This involves a dual process in which diplomats need to behave in what might be seen as ‘non-diplomatic’ ways whilst civil society organizations have to accept that their success is likely to be as much determined by their diplomatic skills as their technical and knowledge-based capacities.

**Conclusion**

- Operating in an integrative diplomatic environment reaffirms the centrality of rules and norms, their origins, evolution and importance in managing the global policy environment. Whilst there will be increased tension surrounding their application and interpretation from new power centres in the international system as well as non-state actors, the basic rules and norms underpinning the functioning of the diplomatic system will continue to shape the broad framework for diplomacy.
• At the same time, sovereignty-related rules are being challenged and adapted and are likely to decline in significance in many areas of diplomacy. This is apparent within multilateral organizations whose norms and rules reflect structures and agendas of the post Second World War international environment as well as the institutions of national diplomacy. The functionality of norms rooted in hierarchy and secrecy, for example, will be a central issue in managing much of the 21st century diplomatic agenda.

• As diplomacy engages a multiplicity of stakeholders in complex policy networks, there is a need for norms and standards by which they can operate. This will require a clearer definition of the role and responsibility of governments and their agents, other stakeholders, and the shaping of rules of engagement. Such a process will be marked by conflicts of expectations on the part of all those enmeshed in international policy networks.

• Over the coming decades, participants in diplomatic processes will need to examine closely the rules and norms that inform their actions and their impact on the nature of the institutions involved in international policy. Just as professional diplomats will need to review continually their modus operandi, particularly in developing public diplomacy strategies, growing NGO engagement in international policy will impose on them expectations of ‘behaving diplomatically’ to which they will need to respond.
3 Communication Patterns

Vision for diplomacy

For diplomats, collaboration complements and reinforces the achievement of negotiation. Effective negotiations turn not just on a deal being done but on the expectation that it will be successfully implemented. This also means that agreements have to be supported more widely by key stakeholders and citizens. What was true for diplomacy under the reign of Louis XIV of France is as true today... But what has changed is that the theatre of diplomacy has expanded because of the multiplicity of stakeholders, the growth of the media and the rapid communication of information, privately and publicly. One seasoned international negotiator says: ‘It’s a negotiation on an even wider scale, with a larger number of players with stakes in a decision.’ And those with stakes tend also to have power and influence to support a negotiation or to undermine it. This requires diplomats and their teams to acquire new skills of public diplomacy and strategic communication.


A central challenge to the practice of integrative diplomacy is the need to adapt to and exploit changing modes of communication and the technologies that underpin them. Developing collaborative relationships with a range of stakeholders through policy networks, the growing emphasis on the significance of soft power and the utilization of public diplomacy strategies together with rapid change in communications technologies pose several interlinked issues:

- **Defining and working with networks.** Which stakeholders to engage with and how?
- **Defining diplomatic objectives and mobilizing the means of achieving them.** Identifying strategies for influence in 21st century diplomacy and the role of soft power in achieving them.
- **Integrating public diplomacy into diplomatic processes and systems.** What are the expectations surrounding public diplomacy strategies?
- **Making sense of new information technologies.** What are their implications for diplomacy? Balancing the needs of openness and access against external threats such as cyber security.

A changing communications environment

Communication is the essence of diplomacy, determining its purpose and operational modes. Each phase in the long evolution of diplomacy has therefore been marked by the need to adjust to and seek to shape the dominant features of the communication and information environment.

Over the last two decades, rapid developments in the speed and direction of communication have begun to pose fundamental questions as to what diplomacy actually is Another concern is how it should or can be delivered to meet the needs of global, national and transnational interests. Alongside the enhanced linkages between issues, actors and policy arenas sits the growth of transnational and trans governmental networks that transcend established
geographical and issue boundaries. These are accompanied by the compression of time and space and the impact that this has on the ways in which people view their place in local and global environments.

Underpinned by an active international media whose presence adds a variety of dimensions to the conduct of international policy and the revolution in communications and information technology enabling groups and individuals both to acquire and deploy information directly and outside the traditional official channels, the context of diplomacy looks very different from that of the Cold War era.

Interpreting these developments is one of the central challenges confronting governments. One perspective on the communications revolution is that (as in earlier eras) the state and, by extension, its diplomatic apparatus, is in decline. Whilst rejecting this argument, the integrative diplomacy model recognizes that a more complex communications environment is reshaping diplomacy and the forms and structures through which it is required to operate. This reshaping has four key aspects:

- **range, forms and direction**: the growing diversity of global agendas combines with the structural and systemic features of the international – and, increasingly, domestic environments – to make patterns of communication more diverse in terms of participation in diplomatic processes, less structured and hierarchical. **Consequently, there is a growing emphasis on identifying stakeholders and creating and managing networks** in which they can interact to achieve policy outcomes.

- **objectives**: increasingly the ability to set rules has become a core feature of world politics. As Van Ham writes: ‘the vast majority of rules, standards, and regulations that cover international society’s *acquis communautaire* are set through non-hierarchical means of policymaking involving such postmodern processes as best practices, benchmarking, and naming-and-shaming’ (Van Ham 2010: 165). Shaping agendas highlights the importance of persuading other actors and agencies to adopt a government’s preferred strategies by means of thought leadership. This is an increasingly important feature of diplomatic action which determines targets and methods of communication. One feature of this is the **growing preoccupation with the nature and uses of soft power** and the assets which can be deployed in utilizing it.

- **public and private domains**: 21st century diplomacy is confronting challenges clustered around traditional demands for secrecy – or confidentiality – set against the requirements of working in more open policy environments. Achieving preferred outcomes involves influencing attitudes amongst foreign and domestic publics by means of often loosely defined public diplomacy strategies. **Establishing the boundaries between openness and confidentiality** (challenged by a more open information environment and the WikiLeaks experience) is a major issue for diplomatic actors at all levels.

- **the impact of technology**: changing modes of communication have been major conditioning factors in the operation of diplomacy creating both constraints and opportunities. Symbolized by terms such as virtual diplomacy and e-diplomacy, the growth of rapid, real time communication, the electronic media and social networking creates a vastly different communications environment from that of even a decade ago. Here, the two central issues are the need to understand better the implications of these developments and responding to them in ways that meet the expectations of policy practitioners and publics.

**Diplomacy and policy networks**

Two contextual features of integrative diplomacy help to determine the nature of diplomatic communication in the 21st century. First, the growth of rival centres of authority and legitimacy to the state and the associated need to develop links with a range of actors (stakeholders) outside government in developing and implementing international policy.
Second, a symbiotic internationalisation of domestic policy milieus and ‘de-foreignisation’ of many policy arenas regarded hitherto as predominantly international. This provides integrative diplomacy with three major challenges:

- **how to construct and manage policy networks.** Who to engage with, how and for what purposes
- **understanding the nature of soft power,** how to identify and exploit soft power assets
- **integrating public diplomacy strategies** into the development and implementation of international policy

In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical model of diplomacy that stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations and modes of delivering diplomacy, integrative diplomacy rests on a more diffuse, network model. It is not that hierarchy is irrelevant since it is capable of providing direction and functional clarity. But increasingly successful policy processes require blends of hierarchical and network organizational forms. This is rooted in the recognition of the limitations imposed on both governments and non-governmental actors in achieving policy goals. Developing relationships through policy networks seeks to compensate for **three forms of deficit** confronting actors in achieving their policy objectives in diplomatic encounters:

- legitimacy
- knowledge
- access

The **legitimacy deficit** reflects a decreased level of trust in the institutions of government and a decline in public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy. In part, this is because in many countries the bases of legitimacy have shifted from foundations in sovereignty and patriotism to the delivery of an expanding range of services and the growth of single-issue politics such as environmental policies. This has a particular significance in the context of diplomacy which constitutes a mediating institution between people and policy arenas.

The tendency to question the value of such institutions poses particular challenges to those charged with the conduct of international policy. The involvement of a broader cross-section of societal interests, as represented in civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly NGOs, which draw on different sources of legitimacy, provides one strategy for dealing with this alienation. Building domestic support through consultative structures and procedures is a common theme in foreign ministry statements – in this case from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) on trade negotiations:

> By mobilizing popular opinion and keeping people fully informed of the issues and the direction of trade negotiations, transparency and engagement combine to establish the legitimacy, consistency and the durability of policy decisions and outcomes.

The second deficit that underpins the growing interest in developing stakeholder relationships relates to **knowledge.** In the trade sphere, negotiators have long recognized that advice from the business community is an essential component in the framing of trade policy. Similarly, NGOs command expertise and access to information which governments are often unable to match. They have, for instance, become key actors in environmental diplomacy. In the face of growing resource constraints, the knowledge capacity of government has diminished just as the demands imposed on it have grown. NGOs, firms together with think tanks and academia, have a window of opportunity to fill this gap by capitalizing on their own expertise.
The access deficit reflects the reverse side of the coin. Access to diplomatic processes and structures is still dominated by governments and the sovereignty-related rules and norms governing the international system. Despite changes in the access afforded NGOs in international organizations such as the UN and WTO, intergovernmentalism privileges states in the majority of international policy arenas. Governments also confront access needs in terms of leveraging linkages with transnational policy networks in which NGOs are influential players.

Overall, then, the diplomatic environment increasingly involves the trading of resources between different categories of actor. In one sense, of course, diplomacy has always been a ‘networking’ activity. It is the composition and character of the networks that are changing as they acquire a much broader profile than in earlier eras. As a result, diplomacy demands the establishment of coalitions of diverse actors to manage complex policy agendas.

The outcome is an environment in which diplomacy is no less important but where its character changes in important ways. The growth of the ‘enabling’ or ‘catalytic’ state produces forms of catalytic or enabling diplomacy. Here, governments pursue their goals less through their own resources but by aligning themselves with coalitions of other states, transnational institutions and private sector organizations. In some contexts – such as environmental diplomacy – the result is a symbiosis between state and non-state entities where diplomatic interactions can become a virtual seamless web of activity.

These patterns of diplomatic deficit and resource exchange underpin the growing concern with establishing policy networks which seek to change patterns of closed, club-like diplomatic environments into multi-stakeholder processes aimed at bringing together all major stakeholders in a new form of common decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue.

In such processes influence and the right to be heard are rooted not in the status accorded the diplomatic profession, but on the value of each stakeholders’ unique perspective and expertise. This modifies the dominant diplomatic paradigm in significant ways. Not only does it challenge the rationale of the guild-like characteristics of traditional diplomacy, it offers a very different picture of who is involved in diplomatic processes and in what roles.

**Working with diplomatic networks**

If networks are of increasing importance in contemporary diplomacy, the first step is to understand their implications. There is no doubt about the importance assigned by diplomats to developing and operating in networks whether at the multilateral or national levels. Arguments advanced by foreign ministers and diplomats alike acknowledge that collaborative links inside as well as outside government are now an essential component of diplomacy. Take for example the recent comments by the Japanese Foreign Minister in promoting the concept of what he terms ‘full cast’ diplomacy (see Box 3.1). Terminologies differ but the essential point is that achieving policy goals in an increasingly challenging global (and domestic) environment demands collaborative efforts.
Box 3.1

…addressing today’s global issues requires the involvement of the whole of Japan, meaning the participation of a wide variety of people in diverse fields. Japan’s strengths will be able to function most effectively when its national government, local governments, NGOs, small and medium sized companies, and individuals etc. unite toward international cooperation. In other words, Japan should implement diplomacy with the involvement of all parties concerned, which I would call ‘Full Cast Diplomacy’, with various individuals and organizations all doing their respective part in international cooperation.

Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba, ‘Japan’s efforts in the global agenda- implementing ‘full cast diplomacy’. Speech delivered at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 28 February 2012

International organizations – or at least some of them such as the UN and its agencies – have a longer history in developing such linkages and working within the structures intended to implement them. Experience at national level is more recent, variable and reflects a confrontation of organizational cultures and operational principles. Bearing this in mind, collaborative strategies pose several interlinked questions:

- What is a policy network?
- Who should one collaborate with?
- What are the objectives of such collaboration?
- What are the best means of achieving effective collaboration?

These are testing questions but ones which diplomats should be conscious of, even if the answers are unclear. And they are central to the debates about the nature of public diplomacy and how to pursue it.

Defining policy networks – and stakeholders?

Most, if not all, diplomats would regard themselves as engaged in some form of ‘networking’ since interacting with others is an essential dimension of their work. What has changed is the composition and the dynamics of such networks and their formalisation into structures of varying kinds that have come to be termed ‘policy networks’.

According to one definition, a policy network is ‘a set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests, acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals’ (Stone 1997). In the international context, global public policy networks have become indispensable in managing increasingly complex policy agendas and addressing a ‘diplomatic deficit’ problem reinforced by globalization.

Governments are deficient in terms of the scope of their activities and responsibilities, speed of response to global issues, and range of contacts. Whilst multi-governmental institutions remain key ingredients in the management of global issues, the more diverse membership and non-hierarchical qualities of public policy networks promote collaboration and learning and speed up the acquisition and processing of knowledge. Furthermore,
decentralised networks face fewer transactional barriers than centralised decision making processes and are able to direct relevant information speedily to where it will have greatest effect.

The key differences lie in patterns of participation and communication. In policy networks, the focus is on the identification of policy objectives in specific areas and ‘stakeholders’ who possess interests and expertise related to the issue area. This in turn involves viewing stakeholders less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages but as possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes. Hierarchical communication flows are replaced by multidirectional flows that are not directly aimed at policy elites although the ultimate goal will often be to influence elite attitudes and policy choices.

The challenge lies in identifying potential interlocutors or ‘nodes’ in policy arenas, and building relationships with them. Whilst an advantage of networks as patterns of communication lies in their openness and inclusiveness, they are likely to be highly unstable – in part because of the interpenetration of what in earlier eras could be regarded as reasonably differentiated domestic and international public arenas. Increasingly, diplomats need to manage both international and domestic environments to secure favourable negotiating outcomes. But the transnationalisation of patterns of communication reinforced by the rapid developments in communications technologies means that it is far harder to differentiate ‘publics’ in international and domestic environments. The result is that messages directed to overseas constituencies ‘leak’ back into the domestic environment and vice versa.

Public diplomacy: hierarchies and networks

One point at which the tension between traditional, government centred diplomacy and networked diplomacy can be seen is in the public diplomacy agenda that now preoccupies diplomatic institutions at all levels. Since the danger here is that in the race to embrace another ‘new statecraft’, anything and everything becomes subsumed under this label there are three basic tasks in developing this facet of integrative diplomacy:

- Disaggregating the components of public diplomacy and the ideas on which it rests
- **Deciding what public diplomacy is for** and how it can be related to policy objectives.
- **Developing a strategy of influence** through which these policy objectives can be achieved.

In short, the need is to integrate the ‘public’ and the ‘diplomacy’ components of ‘public diplomacy’, treating this as part of a holistic approach to developing and implementing international policy strategies.

Disaggregating public diplomacy

Foreign ministries and other government departments are sometimes confused about what they are trying to achieve through public diplomacy programmes. This can be seen in their treatment of ‘soft’ power. Whilst the term has become widely accepted, policy-makers rarely consider how soft power works as a form of relational power and the assets which can be used in its deployment. This reflects the broader tensions flowing from the historical evolution of early forms of public diplomacy programmes, their development during the Cold War and the adaptation of diplomatic structures and processes to the complex environments discussed earlier in this report. Consequently, there are two broad visions for public diplomacy, each rooted in differing aims and methods for achieving them.
Public diplomacy strategies | Hierarchical | Integrative
--- | --- | ---
Aims | Shaping images of the ‘sender’ | Influencing policy agendas by shaping policy attitudes in international environments
Methods | Unidirectional information flows | Developing dialogues with stakeholders
 | Developing collaborative policy networks

Hierarchical images

The first of these is rooted in the hierarchical cultures associated with diplomacy. Public diplomacy is viewed in terms of top down information flows, albeit adopting more sophisticated methodologies of ‘strategic’ public diplomacy founded on theories of strategic political communication. This implies a high level of awareness of the attributes of human behaviour determined by culture and patterns of media usage as well as a deep knowledge of overseas news organizations and political systems. In other words, it demands a holistic approach to building a ‘public diplomacy chain’.

But this ultimately rests on state-centred models of public diplomacy in which people, groups and interests are regarded as targets of foreign policy. ‘Publics’ are receptors of messages rather than partners engaged in dialogues with government and its agencies on policy agendas. Much of the logic of traditional cultural diplomacy programmes is rooted in this idea with its promotion of images and messages from the ‘sending’ state. Nation ‘branding’ is a more recent manifestation of the phenomenon.

In this light, public diplomacy debates and agendas – as seen in the United States during the George W. Bush years – centre on how to get the message across more effectively. The answer usually involves allocating more resources to public diplomacy programmes, adopting a better-coordinated approach and enhanced rapidity and flexibility in responding to crisis situations. On the other side of the Atlantic, EU public diplomacy has often been regarded as an exercise in top down ‘Infopolitik’ whose primary role is to establish the internal and external credentials of the EU. This stretches to the strategies for embracing social media which are seen as another means of message projection rather than building collaborative platforms through dialogue.

Integrative images

From this perspective, public diplomacy becomes more than a component of the power inventory. Rather, it suggests a different way of framing international policy and the means by which such policies can be implemented and therefore rests on a different understanding of the character of communication and negotiation processes. Consequently it demands that fundamental assumptions about how objectives can be achieved in a more complex international environment are critically examined.

The point here is not that one image is right or wrong but that they serve different purposes which need to be clearly identified if appropriate strategies are to be effectively deployed. Shaping images of a state or international organization through cultural activities and information programmes can serve diplomatic goals. But they are only part of the broader picture, having limited value in reshaping the processes through which international policy now
has to be managed. To do this, diplomats need to be conscious of the scope of public diplomacy and develop a clear sense of what it can achieve, where and why.

Anholt, in his work on public diplomacy and nation branding (Anholt 2007), helps here in differentiating four varieties of public diplomacy:

- **Promotion**: generating and projecting information on international policy
- **Persuasion**: influencing attitudes towards the source of such information
- **Image management**: through engaging with foreign publics
- **Policy shaping**: facilitating the achievement of policy goals through engagement and collaboration on specific issues

Whilst these may have developed over time to serve particular needs, they now comprise a diet of objectives and strategies that governments will need to employ in different contexts for different purposes. The trick is to develop the ability to articulate and implement them. There is no ‘one size fits all’ principle here: diplomats will increasingly need to mix and match elements from the public diplomacy inventory to suit specific needs. Three closely related tasks will become increasingly important in all diplomatic environments:

- **determine** policy objectives
- **identify** public diplomacy assets relevant to those objectives
- **develop** a public diplomacy ‘profile’ integrating public diplomacy assets into strategies delivering objectives

**The soft power conundrum**

Undertaking these steps leads inevitably towards familiar concepts: power and influence. Strangely, public diplomacy discourses have frequently failed to embrace them fully. We can see this in terms of the ways in which discussions regarding a key principle on which public diplomacy – **soft power** – have developed. Whilst the idea is hardly new, soft power has become hugely attractive to governments of all kinds (see Box 3.2). This is particularly so in parts of the world where modern rather than post-modern structures and processes of diplomacy prevail. It offers the prospect of succeeding diplomatically in international settings characterized by geopolitical rivalry, such as in East Asia. In ‘post-modern’ regions like the European Union, soft power approaches include the use of more broadly based strategies for achieving goals and managing risk and include the attraction of doing so with fewer resources.

The key problem in the discussion about soft power is that it has become a grab-all notion. Anything and everything are seen as components of this vaguely identified and amorphous concept.

The leading architect of the substantial edifice built on soft power argumentation, Joseph Nye, has recognized this danger and has refined the core premise (the significance of the power of attraction, and persuasion as opposed to coercion) in the two decades since he first discussed the idea. Soft power, for example, has not replaced hard power; the two are often interwoven in specific international contexts, the use of one sometimes determining the efficacy of the other. Soft power can support the exercise of military and hard economic powers, and arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power (Nye 2004).
Box 3.2

Keen to jump on the soft power bandwagon, world leaders have been alluding to new soft power approaches with increasing frequency – be it in Turkish President Abdullah Gül’s media interviews, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mullen’s speeches, or even communiqués from the Central Committee of the Communist Party in China. As a growing number of governments commit themselves to soft power approaches, there is an overwhelming sense of enthusiasm outpacing competence. For governments to effectively leverage their soft power assets, they need first understand what exactly those assets are, whether they can be mobilised by the state, and, if so, where they might be deployed. In short, policy makers are in danger of rushing to answer the question ‘how can we use our soft power?’ before understanding ‘what soft power do we actually have?’


Whilst this is a reasonable argument, it does not provide a template for developing public diplomacy strategies, as it does not explain how soft power works in terms of transnational socialization processes. The soft power-hard power debate avoids the issue of how soft power is created in the framework of collaborative transnational relationships. This requires policy makers to understand their potential soft power assets and how these are relevant to specific objectives. Any attempt to develop a soft power index runs into a range of methodological and other problems, as the Institute for Government’s (IfG) global ranking of soft power acknowledges. But such indices have a magical attraction for national governments, as well as regions and cities. The question is: how to interpret and use them?

Take Sweden as an example. According to the IfG index (based on 50 indicators), Sweden, ranks sixth in the list of 30 countries surveyed (see Box 3.3). What is more revealing – and potentially useful to policy makers – is the breakdown of this ranking by five sub-indices:

- Government
- Culture
- Diplomacy
- Education
- Business/innovation
Box 3.3

Top 10 countries by five soft power sub-index scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Business/Innovation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Using these criteria (see Box 3.3), Sweden ranks first in the government category (adherence to political values such as democracy and human rights together with the effectiveness of political institutions and processes); second in the business/innovation category (the attractiveness of a country’s economic model as measured by such criteria as openness, reputation for innovation and regulatory regimes) and fifth in the diplomacy category (policies and diplomatic resources that allow a state to reach international audiences).

Clearly, these are very broad-brush indicators of soft power assets but they begin to offer some guidance as to the kinds of soft power assets that a country can exploit in framing its public diplomacy strategies. What they do not do, however, is to explain how these potential power resources can be converted into influence since this can only be understood in the specific circumstances in which influence attempts occur.

Evans and Steven make a move in this direction. In arguing the need for a ‘theory of influence’ they make a case for differentiated public diplomacy strategies (Evans and Steven: 2008). This requires a more systematic appreciation of what many governments have already found out: that public diplomacy is tailor-made, i.e. it assumes different forms and requirements in different contexts. A number of countries have incorporated their own public diplomacy lessons in MFA public diplomacy guides that are disseminated to their diplomats and locally engaged staff in foreign missions. Practical experience teaches that public diplomacy can be open and consensual or covert and controlling. What suits the agendas of global terrorism is hardly likely to work in the context of tackling climate change or trade promotion.

Evans and Steven identify four categories of public diplomacy strategy related to context and which move from collaborative to conflictual:
• **engagement strategies** – are intended to mobilise new thinking on issues where attention to an issue is lacking through promoting dialogue and coalition building

• **shaping strategies** seek to promote solutions where progress is stalled by reframing the debate

• **disruptive strategies** are needed where a government sees an emerging consensus as opposed to national or global interests

• **destructive strategies** come into play where it becomes necessary to undermine adversaries by means of subversion

Admittedly this does not provide policy makers and diplomats with a detailed roadmap for utilizing public diplomacy. Nevertheless, it does begin to cut through much loose thinking that surrounds it. **In short, it highlights the need for strategic thinking about public diplomacy** and analysis of how soft power works rather than generalized debates about what constitutes soft power. In doing so it helps to integrate ‘public diplomacy’ into diplomacy – and invites the question as to whether we should abandon the term recognizing that it is now part of the lifeblood of 21st century diplomacy.

**Who to collaborate with – and how?**

Whilst not all public diplomacy centres on engagement and collaboration. Nevertheless, working with a variety of stakeholders in different contexts remains an essential component and poses its own problems. The main issues are: who should be involved, for what purposes and how should stakeholder engagement be managed? The central challenge here – and one that impacts on fundamental rules and norms of diplomacy – is moving from a mindset dominated by more traditional, hierarchical modes of public diplomacy with their implicit unidirectional communication patterns to multidirectional information flows. There is a vast literature rooted in management studies, public relations, strategic communications and organizational behaviour that can be drawn on here. It is beyond the scope of this report to explore it but a few practical pointers can be identified.

For example, Hudson in his overview of collaboration and partnership between government, business and civil society identifies four basic principles that diplomats can and should utilise in their thinking about engagement with others:

• **clarity** with any interlocutor about what, in principle, we can and cannot discuss and how any contribution might be developed

• **curiosity** about other perspectives, ideas and possibilities

• **commitment** to make a process of engagement work

• **courage** to take the risk of reaching solutions, including taking personal responsibility for one’s part in building the relationship

Using these criteria as guidelines should help to minimize the dangers of engagement without purpose and – equally problematic – generating expectations about the outcomes of working with others that are unlikely to be met. Pursuing these principles leads Hudson to identify a set of design and implementation guidelines for government working with business and civil society (Box 3.4).
**Box 3.4**

*Engagement Guidelines*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection</strong></td>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choose the right NGOs, not your friends or the ones who have a soft opinion in what you want to avoid doing. Choose the strong-minded NGOs that work seriously in the sector and can advise you on long-term solutions — even though you may disagree with their advice. Strong NGOs will get their opinion across to the public and so you are better off working with them to improve your policies rather than disregarding them and having to face them in the media.</td>
<td>Integrate plans and processes with government plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engagement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage NGOs throughout the process: design, planning and implementation. Have the NGOs write a business plan/strategy — even a short one. You and they need to be clear how they intend to achieve their goals, no matter how celebrated the cause. Have the NGOs state their terms of reference and management structure. Ensure activities are monitored, and commission reports and minutes.</td>
<td>Ensure activities are monitored, and commission reports and minutes. Have clear key performance indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td><strong>Communication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure agreement on key deliverables, timeframes and financial management accountabilities. Have clear ownership and accountability for the project. Spend enough time consulting NGOs and ensure NGOs have enough time to consult local communities. Ensure participation of local communities to give establish ownership.</td>
<td>Consult through workshops and regular meetings to ensure that there is shared understanding as well as the building of relationships. Ensure effective communication, both vertical and horizontal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess that objectives have a last effect. Make sure that collaboration is organised as a serious sustainable consultative process and is not just for show.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alison Van Rooy, a Canadian NGO practitioner with experience of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade asks what the implications of ‘engaging with others’ are for those working in overseas diplomatic posts. Based on work undertaken for UNDP, she suggests developing tools for ‘walking a diplomatic tightrope’ in managing civil society relationships in other countries. This has two aspects:

- a **legitimacy assessment** that helps the diplomat to ask questions about both the credentials of a civil society organization and the appropriateness of the mission in engaging with it
- a **capacity assessment** addressing issues regarding the capacity of the post to work with a CSO in terms of skills and resources at its disposal

### Box 3.5

*Legitimacy Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Legitimacy of Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy of Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder</td>
<td>• Who might be affected (positively or negatively) by the concern to be addressed?</td>
<td>• What stake does the post have in the process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who are the ‘voiceless’ for whom special efforts may have to be made?</td>
<td>• Does the post’s intervention affect how the organization represents or serves its members? Negatively or positively? (i.e., how onerous are its reporting requirements?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who are the representatives of those likely to be affected?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who is responsible for what is intended?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who is likely to mobilise for or against what is intended?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who can make what is intended more effective through their participation or less effective by their non-participation or outright opposition?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who can contribute financial and technical resources?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Whose behaviour has to change for the effort to succeed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continues on next page.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Legitimacy of Organization</th>
<th>Legitimacy of Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Election/Selection        | • Is there a process whereby leaders in an organization are chosen which satisfies the membership?  
• Does the organization respond to the needs of its constituency or membership? | • How will the post’s involvement affect the perceived legitimacy of the proposed partners? |
|                           |                                                                                           |                                                                                  |
| Comprehensive membership  | • Does the organization represent all those who could be members? Are there competing forces? If so, does that division help or hinder the chances for desired change? | • Has the post reviewed the work of others in this field? Has a coordinated approach been tried? |
|                           |                                                                                           |                                                                                  |
| Multi-sectoral respect    | • Does the organization have the respect of key players in other sectors or issue-areas, even if they hold opposing views?  
• Is it relevant whether the organization holds registered status? If so, does it hold that status? If not, why? |                                                                                  |
## Capacity Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Organization Capacities</th>
<th>Post Capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Experience** | • Has the group done exactly this kind of work before? How have they managed the work? the administrative load? The financial load?  
• Has the group undertaken similar work before? | • Do the relevant post staff members have experience in this area?  
• Are they able to draw from experience elsewhere? |
| **Recommendation** | • What do other peer organizations say about their work? About their stake in the project?  
• What do other donors say about their work? About their stake? | • Is the post able to gather peer assessments? |
| **Qualifications** | • Are formal qualifications necessary to the project? If so, are they held by the group’s members? Can they be acquired?  
• What informal qualifications seem necessary? Are they held by the group’s members? Can they be acquired? | • Does the post have the appropriate skills to transfer? to learn from the organization concerned? |
| **Longevity** | • How long has the organization been doing the kind of work envisaged? What was it doing before? Does the work envisaged build on previous experiences? | • How long has the post been involved in the host country? What networks has it developed? |
| **Sustainability** | • How has the group managed to stay together to date?  
• Financially (noting that reliance on external funding is not necessarily a sign of weakness.)  
• Organizationally (how has the organization changed to reflect its needs? niche?)  
• Within the sector (how does the organization fit within its network – is it likely to remain an important component?) | • What commitments is the post able to make to the given problem? Its individual project-solutions? The organizations which are broaching them? |

As she points out, these are questions that diplomats habitually ask in terms of their dealings with representatives of other governments. Applying them to CSOs in this sense is nothing new but demands more research and in a different direction. Doing so will form an increasingly significant aspect of the diplomat’s work in an era of integrative diplomacy.

**Developing E-diplomacy**

Alongside the nature and content of the message, the means of communicating it has been central to diplomacy. Responding to new technologies – the telegraph, typewriter and telephone – has been as much a part of the shaping of the diplomatic milieu as have the shifts in policy agendas and global power equations. But over the last decade, the growth of digital communications, social media and mobile communications devices poses challenges to diplomats in responding in terms of adapting practice as well as organizational capacity.

**Consider the following:**

- There are **5.9 billion mobile subscribers** (87 percent of the world population). Growth is led by China and India, which now account for over 30 percent of world subscriptions.
- There are now **1.2 billion mobile Web users** worldwide. Many mobile web users (79 percent in Egypt; 25 percent in the USA) are mobile-only and rarely or never use a desktop or laptop to access the web. In 2012, over 85 percent of new handsets can access the mobile web.
- 8 trillion text messages were sent in 2011.
- There are some 895 million active Facebook users.
- There are **465 million Twitter accounts** with 1 million added every day. 175 million tweets are sent each day.

The difficulty lies in making sense of this and its implications for diplomacy (Box 3.5). Recently most attention has been paid to the (sometimes exaggerated) role of social media in the Arab Spring and the potential for this phenomenon (as with the ‘CNN effect’ in an earlier era) to revolutionize the conduct of international policy. Nevertheless, diplomats in foreign ministries and multilateral organizations seem to recognize that something significant is occurring here even if they are not quite sure of its dimensions or how they should handle it.

**Box 3.6**

*Most ministries have or are developing an active web presence targeted at domestic audiences. Increasingly these platforms are highly interactive and include social media connectivity primarily via Facebook and Twitter. The goal of these efforts is to create new channels to citizens and, where feasible, cultivate dialogue with them. In the pre-conference survey participants rank ‘new communication tools/social media/next generation public diplomacy’ second in terms of importance. Nevertheless, while some MFAs are very active in the use of social media, the discussion highlighted the extent to which the current efforts of most MFAs in these areas are fairly cautious and experimental, focused on enabling informal communication versus substantive policy articulation.*

In terms of public diplomacy strategies the opportunities for reaching huge audiences more effectively seem obvious (see Box 3.6) but the points regarding the linking of resources to policy goals applies here as do the arguments concerning the need to recognize the importance of using new modes of communication for one-way information distribution as distinct from a tool for engagement.

**Box 3.7 Social Media and public diplomacy in the US State Department**

Social media has dramatically shifted the ground rules of public diplomacy. In the past a competent diplomat might have been able to reach hundreds and possibly thousands of individuals through external engagement. For a rare few, it might have been possible to occasionally reach hundreds of thousands or millions of people via newspapers, radio and television, but that required going through gatekeepers. Social media has changed this old dynamic. State now effectively operates its own global media empire reaching more than eight million people directly through its 600 plus social media platforms. To provide a sense of the scale of this operation, this reach is as large as the paid subscriber base of the ten largest circulating daily newspapers in the United States, combined (although the impact and influence of the two platforms is likely quite different).

From: F. Hanson, *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy*, Sydney, Lowy Institute, March 2012: p. 17

Web 2.0 offers scope for developing interactive websites (an area where the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has led the way). Taking the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one example, it runs 255 websites which include the FCO’s corporate site, country sites in multiple languages, special subject sites, and campaign sites. It has official YouTube, Flickr and Twitter channels, and in 2008 became the first UK central government department to open its blogging platform to all staff who could establish a legitimate case to blog (FCO 2010).

However, it is the US State Department which is leading the way in the use of new information and communication technologies. E-diplomacy now employs over 150 personnel located in 25 different ‘nodes’ with in excess of 900 staff using it at overseas posts. It permeates all areas of the Department’s activities, including consular, disaster response and policy planning.

But in many foreign ministries — and in other government departments — adaptation is slow, uncertain — and the subject of controversy amongst diplomats. Recent reports from the Lowy Institute on e-diplomacy and Australia’s ‘international policy infrastructure’ note that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has been slow to adapt to change in this area when compared to the more innovative MFAs. For example, DFAT has resisted allowing its diplomats freedom to express government views online whilst the adoption of the principle of ‘assumed competence’ in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office gives ambassadors latitude to express what are labeled as their own views in blogs — to date without disastrous consequences.

In sum, the impact of the 21st century communications revolution on diplomacy is still uncertain and requires further analysis. As with developments in earlier eras, responses are likely to be uneven and hesitant as the potential of new technologies are evaluated and existing practices adapted to new demands. What seems clear, however, is that e-diplomacy offers the potential of new ways of working at all levels of diplomatic activity and, at the national level,
this requires that it be mainstreamed into the organizational structures of international policy-making. In other words, it entails much more than responding to the rise of social networking and mobile computing.

Conclusion

As in earlier phases in the evolution of diplomacy, changing communication patterns are crucial factors determining the shape of diplomatic interaction as well as its organizational forms and procedures. Operating within an integrative diplomacy environment brings with it several interrelated challenges:

- **Integrating policy networks and stakeholder thinking** into the practice of diplomacy. Networking is not a new activity for diplomats but the forms and scope it is assuming demands new ways of thinking and acting.
- **Integrating public diplomacy** into the mainstream of diplomatic practice and organizations. Partly, the challenge here is to disaggregate the component elements of public diplomacy and to recognize which dimensions suit which objectives. Additionally, the attractions of soft power require careful evaluation of those assets relevant to specific contexts and desired outcomes.
- **Integrating information and communications technologies** into the mainstream of diplomatic activity and recognizing the importance and potential of e-diplomacy for the ways in which the structures of diplomacy are required to function in an era of exponential change.
4  Actors and Roles

Non-traditional foreign policy issues are given greater scope in governments’ international policies – and are becoming increasingly intertwined with more traditional areas. Similarly, increasing numbers of national or domestic problems must be dealt with and resolved together with other countries. Challenges and solutions are cross-border and policy areas are interconnected. Mutual dependence is growing and Sweden’s voice is needed in many multilateral projects. Policies must be created and international alliances built with countries and with other actors. EU cooperation is being strengthened and developed, and Sweden’s ambition is to be at the heart of this cooperation. At the same time, global issues and disputes need a legitimate and efficient world organization, the UN, for successful resolution…Both Swedish foreign policy and its foreign service must be designed to be in a strategic position to meet the cross-border challenges of tomorrow. The fundamental objective of foreign policy…is not expected to change. However, the administration that is to implement this policy needs to be constantly adapted to new circumstances

It has become a truism to suggest that the diplomatic environment is marked by a proliferation of actors. Integrative diplomacy goes beyond this observation in stressing the importance and complexity of the relationships between actors in the context of enhanced interdependencies. If changing patterns of diplomatic communication emphasize the significance of international policy networks, then the nature of the actors within these networks is vitally important. Moreover each actor within a given diplomatic milieu has an interest in the other actors in terms of their:

- Policy objectives and strategies
- Diplomatic resources
- Organizational capacities

Taken together, these comprise the diplomatic ‘actorness’ of each stakeholder. At the global level, national governments have an interest in the resources and capacity of, for example, the G20 and the WTO just as the EU and its member states have a mutual concern with each other’s capacity as international actors. The UN’s need to develop closer relationships with both business and civil society is reflected in the Global Compact which also underscores the growing mutuality of interest between the latter two sectors as increasingly important global actors. Progress on key global issues demands the creation and management of multistakeholder coalitions (see box 4.1)
This mutuality of interest reflects a fundamental feature of the contemporary diplomatic environment; namely that a key strategy for all actors – whether governmental or non-governmental – is to persuade other actors to devote more resources and/or political will to manage global problems.

As analyses of diplomatic network dynamics suggest, utilizing collaborative strategies is not only about persuading others to adopt one’s own goals but achieving your goals by helping others to achieve theirs. In short, this reinforces the importance of understanding the basis on which others are engaged in a given policy area.

An integral element in this picture of diplomatic actorness is the roles that collective and individual participants play in diplomatic processes. These are partly determined by the collective rules and norms (see chapter 4) which have evolved around the practice of diplomacy and partly reflect the nature of the institutions involved in it. At national level, a predominant theme in the narrative of diplomatic change is the need to adapt roles to new demands. But role adaptation is as much an issue for multilateral institutions confronted by changed patterns of diplomatic communication as well as NGOs whose role as co-deliverers of government policy in aid and humanitarian spheres may clash with policy advocacy work.

Logic, of course, points to the need for in-depth analyses of each and every actor engaged in a set of diplomatic interactions – something clearly beyond the scope of this report. Rather, the focus here is the state as actor and, more specifically the challenges confronting the mechanisms through which it engages in the management of a complex international policy environment. In doing so, we suggest that the impact of a confluence of domestic and international forces require us to extend the discussion outside the comfort zone provided by discussions relating to the ministry of foreign affairs and towards a broader construct – that of the national diplomatic system (NDS).
Challenges to national diplomacy

In July 2011 the Netherlands Permanent Representation to the EU hosted the second meeting of officials from 22 foreign ministries (the so-called ‘Toronto Group’ which had first met in that city in 2009). Unsurprisingly, the focus of the discussion was the challenges confronting the foreign ministry as a diplomatic actor, the growing pressures on resources alongside enhanced demands and the need for ‘adaptive evolution’ if it is to respond to these demands.

However, the report of the meeting reflects a tension between two positions. First, it acknowledges that framing international policy now involves the ‘whole of government’ and is no longer (if it ever was) the preserve of MFAs (this extends to the diplomatic network which is now regarded as a ‘flexible presence platform’ for a range of government departments). But, second, having conceded this point the report assumes that there is a continuing role for the foreign ministry in this changed environment.

This assumption (or assertion) needs careful thought if it is not simply to reflect a set of self-interested strategies generated by an organization whose purpose is unclear and culture is in some respects unsuited to the needs of international policy management. That is not to say that the foreign ministry is irrelevant to these needs but that its role should be viewed in the context of:

a) national and international diplomatic demands and policy imperatives
b) a clear analysis of how and where a foreign ministry can contribute to meeting these requirements

Doing this requires us to reformulate our perspective on the nature of the national diplomatic environment from one which privileges the role of the MFA to one which places it within a broader construct – that of the national diplomatic system (NDS).

This term reflects, firstly, the fact that the twenty-first century policy environment does not match the ‘command and control’ assumptions on which the conduct of Cold War foreign policy institutions was based. Second, that the enhanced complexity of governments’ international policy agendas has resulted in a growing involvement of agencies outside the MFA. Rather than assuming that one government department has a dominant role in managing foreign affairs, the concept of the national diplomatic system sees this as involving increasingly complex networks, recognizes the implications of issue linkages and the need to establish close working relations between a range of ‘domestic’ government departments in specific policy areas such as the environment and global health.

A significant factor in this development has been the growth of regulatory diplomacy. In part this reflects a growth in highly technical agendas as seen in the on-going international conflicts over civil aviation issues. It is not simply that such agendas are highly complex but that they cut across national governmental structures and designated roles and responsibilities. One consequence is to challenge central assumptions as to who within national governments are the effective diplomatic actors in a given policy domain. Additionally, the picture is further complicated because regulatory diplomacy has eroded the distinction between the public and private realm in the generation of rules for, and management of, global governance. This carries with it clear implications for the nature of the state and its agencies – not least in the management of an increasingly diffuse international policy environment.

Consequently, the delineation of the NDS and the relationship between its component elements needs to be re-examined. For example, the increasingly critical link between diplomacy and development poses questions of organizational form and the degree to which development and foreign policy need to be linked. Whilst most...
governments integrate their aid programs and their foreign ministries, in the US and the United Kingdom (since the late 1990s), the trend has been to separate them.

Thus the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is not fully integrated into the State Department, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is separate from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Reinforcing the link between diplomacy and development through the strengthening of what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has termed ‘civilian power’ is a central theme of the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

**Aims and structure**

The broad purpose of the NDS is to promote a country’s international policy objectives. A recent review of Sweden’s international policy management typically defines this in terms of defending Swedish security, prosperity and societal interests internationally. From a UK perspective, Evans and Steven portray this in terms of managing global risks through the promotion of resilience at both the global and national level (Evans and Steven 2008).

The precise form of the NDS will depend on the character of a country in its global and regional setting, the demands placed upon it and the constraints and opportunities open to it for shaping its international environment. At one extreme, a global player such as the United States is characterized by a high ‘domestic department’ NDS profile together with a pronounced military security component reflected in the prominence of the US Department of Defence whose international policy resources are frequently regarded as greater than those of the State Department. Whilst generalizations are misleading, developing countries are likely to have a more narrowly constructed NDS in which domestic government agencies play a lesser role thereby limiting their participation in complex transgovernmental diplomacy – such as banking regulation.

Particular national requirements are likely to result in a specific configuration of tools within the NDS. Take China as an example. A recent study finds that the power of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declined for two reasons: first, the changing global environment has increased the number of domestic foreign policy actors in the country and, second, the foreign minister’s power base in the Chinese Communist Party has lessened since 1998.

More specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confronts strong rivalry from key bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance. The consequences can be important – and not just for the country itself. Thus the highly significant position of China in the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen has been explained in terms of bureaucratic conflict over China’s stance on fixed targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission.

Similarly, Japan has experienced significant tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments. The desire to overcome differences in Japanese policy on free trade agreements has resulted in the creation of a bureau centralizing policy-making in the MFA and preventing other ministries such as MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) and METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) from exercising an effective veto on policy in the area.
The NDS profile

Bureaucratic/political conflicts in international policy management such as these are part of the profile of the contemporary NDS. Two broad trends have marked the NDS as it developed in the latter part of the twentieth century:

- fragmentation
- concentration

**Fragmentation** indicates the diversification of the NDS as line ministries found their responsibilities acquiring enhanced international dimensions, and trans governmental patterns of diplomacy developed as a result. This could be seen as early as the latter part of the nineteenth century with the rise of international agencies such as the International Telegraph Union and multilateral conferences such as the International Aerial Navigation Conference of 1910 involving specialists and domestic government agencies but, obviously, has developed exponentially over the last few decades.

**Concentration** denotes the enhancement of the foreign policy capacity of central agencies, particularly prime ministerial and presidential offices. Whilst this is partly a reflection of the growing significance of heads of state and government in diplomacy, it is also recognition of the potential costs of lack of coordination in the management of international policy and the desire to minimize its costs by centralizing policy-making functions. Densely textured policy arenas such as that of the European Union (EU), with its multi-layered diplomatic environment, demonstrate these developments to a high degree. Consequently, the demand for **coordination** at member state level is high, although the means by which this is achieved varies.

The MFA and the NDS

- Whilst the MFA has emerged as a characteristic element of the structures associated with state-based diplomatic processes, it is a component of a broader bureaucratic system, the national diplomatic system.
- The purpose of the NDS is to provide a ‘toolkit’ for national governments in their interactions with their international environments and in the pursuit of their international policy goals. Its form is conditioned by both international and domestic environmental factors and is responding to the changing demands of the post-Cold War order.

What role for the MFA?

In one sense, foreign ministries represent a major bureaucratic success story, as their presence in countries large and small testifies. Nevertheless, there are differences, one of the most obvious being size and funding.
From: Daniel Markey (2009), ‘Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software’, Asia Policy, 8, July: 73-96. Copyright © The National Bureau of Asian Research

As figure 4.1 demonstrates, the funding of the MFA and its diplomatic service varies hugely, reflecting the demands of the international environment and the resources available to governments.

However, the changing shape of the NDS redefines the key issues regarding role of the MFA. Rather than perceived – or actual – challenges to its role and perhaps survival, the issue becomes one of the shifting character, composition and tasks of the NDS and how the MFA relates to them. The primary issues are the requirements for the effective management of international policy and what added value the MFA brings to this.
As a first step, consider a checklist of the broad features required of the contemporary NDS:

- **Intelligence capacity**: how governments perceive and make sense of their regional and global environments
- **Analytical capacity**: the ability of governments to identify and anticipate patterns in international policy
- **Policy transfer capacity**: the capacity to tap transnational knowledge networks in developing domestic policy
- **Surge capacity**: the ability to deal with sudden and unexpected demands from the international environment such as human and natural disasters
- Capacity for developing flexible cross-departmental structures able to operate in uncertain and ambiguous environments
- **Coordinating capacity** for developing holistic policies and focusing resources on strategies rather than individual departments

Now compare these with the traditional functions associated with the MFA:

- **A key node in a diplomatic communications system** through which information gathered from the international environment is analysed and disseminated
- **A policy analysis and advice function**, providing expertise to politicians, other parts of the bureaucracy, and to non-governmental actors with interests in international policy
- **A memory bank**, gathering and storing information
- **Service functions** directed at the overseas needs of specific domestic constituencies: for example, trade promotion/commercial diplomacy and consular services
- **Administrative functions** relating to the management of the overseas diplomatic network, relationships with the resident diplomatic corps and associated diplomatic protocol matters

The debate about the status of the contemporary MFA largely turns on the match between these two profiles and the extent to which it is able to meet the needs of the broader NDS. On the one hand, there are good reasons supporting the need for a department possessing high levels of global awareness and diplomatic skills. Certainly, a combination of institutional memory and the capacity to offer policy analysis and advice on complex issues is invaluable.

Four broad trends are seen as undermining the claims for the MFA as central international policy agency:

- The growing fusion of domestic and international policy leading to enhanced politicisation of the MFA’s operational environment
- Challenges to the MFA’s role as dominant information system from other government departments and non-state actors, particularly large NGOs
- Resource pressures both at the home and overseas network levels
- Demands that the MFA adopts the procedural norms applied to domestic government departments

More specifically, it is the first two of the MFA functions listed above that are most commonly regarded as being challenged. As a communications system, the rapid dispersal of information through the electronic media is frequently viewed as rendering the diplomatic network redundant. Similarly, the emergence of rival sources of policy advice and expertise, both in other government departments and outside them, in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for example, are seen as threatening the value of the MFA in an environment where specialist rather than generalist, diplomatic expertise is valued.
Reform and adaptation

Set against this background, foreign ministry change has two dimensions: preservation of the organization against the threats from its operating environments and adaptation to the changing demands of the national diplomatic system. How successfully foreign ministries are doing this provides the core of their change agendas.

We can gain a sense of this by taking two very different examples: the US (State Department) and India (Ministry of External Affairs). The MFA in both countries has been criticized in terms of failing to respond adequately to the changing global environment and the needs that this imposes on the NDS. The MFA is portrayed as:

- lacking key skills and training strategies appropriate to the changing international environment
- failing to develop linkages with other parts of the bureaucracy and with the private sector critical to the management of international policy
- inadequate policy capacity
- failing to absorb the implications of the importance of access to overseas domestic constituencies

More generally, the websites, annual reports and related publications of MFAs are replete with descriptions of how the organization is responding to a range of environmental pressures. These are summarised in table 4.1 together with the perceived requirements and adaptive strategies that flow from them.

It is common for these changes in MFA operations to be set in the context of benchmarks, as does the German Federal Foreign Office which has adopted the following criteria:

- presence; competence; efficiency

These qualities are defined in terms of

- the capacity to project an overseas presence in response to changing demands (especially emergencies)
- organizational capacity to marshal resources
- an ability to act speedily and ‘cut through’ red tape

Set against such benchmarks, the reforms identified in the third column of the table are intended to respond to requirements imposed by changes in the organizational environment. Some of these can be viewed as reform in a normative, sense – in the form of social change for example. Here the demands are for the MFA to reflect changes in the demographic profile of a country but also in social values. The majority of ‘reforms’, however, are determined by developments in the international and domestic environments requiring a redefinition of what the foreign ministry is and what its role should be.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental pressures</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Reforms/adaptive strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changing security agendas</strong></td>
<td>Enhanced presence in multilateral organizations. Flexible response in emergencies Protecting the overseas network</td>
<td>Human resource policies: recruitment and training Crisis management procedures Enhanced ‘consular’ capacity ‘Securitization’ of posts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globalization and regionalization</strong></td>
<td>Broader skill sets to respond to new issues Provide policy consistency in complex policy arenas (global and regional) Promote intercultural dialogue Redefining functions of representation</td>
<td>Redefine ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ balance Lateral entry Build relations with other government departments Recalibrate geographical -functional structures. Use of ‘task forces’ to deal with overlapping issues Enhancing policy planning capacity Training policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social change</strong></td>
<td>Reflect changing composition of society due to changing demographic patterns and values.</td>
<td>Recruitment and training Career structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational environment</strong></td>
<td>Respond to public service management reforms. Emphasis on ‘whole of government’ requirements Redefine ‘customer base’: • Business • Public • Other government departments</td>
<td>Adopt targets and strategic priorities Review and redefine relations with stakeholders; internal and external mechanisms for managing stakeholder relations Growing emphasis on commercial diplomacy Increased attention to ‘public’ diplomacy and redefining meanings of PD; linking internal and external public strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Environmental pressures | Requirements | Reforms/adaptive strategies
---|---|---
Resource management | Matching capabilities to commitments. | Framework of strategic priorities
 | Defining ‘areas of concentration’. | Reviewing the structure and operation of the overseas network
Technological change | Adopting appropriate communications systems. | Ensuring that communications systems are ‘fit for purpose’ and adopted throughout the MFA

| Table 4.1: Reform Agendas in the MFA
Developing adaptive strategies casts a different light on change processes since they are concerned not simply with what is changing – the ‘reform agenda’ – but how change occurs. The focus is on institutional learning, whether organizations are able to learn and the analysis of why and how they adapt their behaviour in response to changing environments.

Two models for the MFA

The character of these debates has been role-oriented, focusing on the requirements for a ‘modern’ MFA and the contribution that it can make to a more broadly configured NDS embracing the ‘whole of government’. In broad terms two images or models for the 21st century MFA emerge:

- A ‘core function’ model

  This sees the role of the MFA in terms of its traditional activities – running the diplomatic network, providing consular and commercial services and offering a geographical perspective on government policy utilizing the resources of the network and home-based desks.

- An ‘expanded function’ model

  This not only assigns a much greater policy-focused role to the MFA but also sees it as assuming a key strategic policy synthesis and coordinating role in managing the global policy agenda.

Perspectives on the choices that these two models suggest come from three different settings: Norway, the UK and the USA.

In the Norwegian case, it has been argued that the organizational problems presented by the internationalization of domestic policy can best be managed by enhancing the role of, and strengthening the links between, international officials in sectoral or line ministries combined with upgrading the international policy capacity of the prime minister’s office.

In the UK (see box 4.2), precisely the opposite argument has been made, making the case for enhancing the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in strategic policy synthesis, transferring critical global functions (and staff) from other government departments into the FCO and establishing a new Cabinet committee on global issues with the
Foreign Secretary (foreign minister) as deputy chair. Any attempt to do this would, of course, be likely to generate powerful bureaucratic and political resistance.

Box 4.2

[The Foreign and Commonwealth Office] must be prepared to consider far-reaching steps to secure its future, developing a strategic role at the heart of the government’s response to globalization’s long crisis. This means that at least 50% of the mid-level and senior staff working on policy issues at its London headquarters should be seconded from other government departments – making the FCO less like other Whitehall line departments and more like the Cabinet Office. This shift would both ensure an effective mix of issue and geographic expertise, and begin the process of transforming the FCO into a department able to use its geographic network to respond effectively to global issues.


A third snapshot comes from one analysis of the perceived weaknesses of the US State Department where, it is argued, cultural failings have resulted in a migration of foreign policy to the Department of Defense (see box 4.3). Here, however, part of the solution is seen not as developing an enhanced policy role but capitalizing on a core function – consular work.

Box 4.3

Protecting Americans at home and abroad through excellence in consular service should be the primary function of America’s diplomats…Yet they are also the activities least valued by the State Department. Consular service is the lowest priority ‘cone,’ or specialization, in the Foreign Service. Talented diplomats are not tracked into that branch. It is as though the Army and Marine Corps did not consider ground combat their principal function. This needs to change if the State Department is to build a strong institutional base as the lead agency for U.S. foreign policy. State needs to clearly embrace consular activity as its essential function and realign the incentives and thereby the culture of the institution. Doing so would bring the State Department significant advantages, both in the operation of the organization and in its support by the public and Congress.

K. Schake, ‘State of Disrepair’ Foreign Policy, 11 April 2012.

Unsurprisingly there is little obvious support from within MFAs for retreating to the comfort zone of the core function model. Organizational survival is rarely served by such a strategy. Much more common is the development of some expanded role model as that adopted by the report of the Toronto Group in 2011 (see Box 4.4). As the report points out, the reality is that foreign ministry functions will be determined by elements of both models as each MFA seeks
to establish its place in the more broadly configured NDS and makes a case for the added value that it can bring to the management of international policy.

**Box 4.4**

*The Foreign Ministry of the Future – Characteristics of a 21st Century Model*

While the essence of diplomacy must and will endure, its institutional form must evolve. Foreign ministries that cannot meet these new requirements risk being left behind in terms of both perceived relevance and actual effectiveness. Those that can create effective new models necessarily will do so in ways appropriate to their specific circumstances. However, the conference yielded a set of widely applicable characteristics and roles that together suggest how a 21st Century model for foreign ministries might look. These include the following:

- **Operational** – Engaging Beyond the State: The ability to deploy a broader range of policy instruments in a wider array of environments and a greater focus on resources and results on the ground versus at headquarters.

- **Expertise-Ready** – Capable of Accessing New Domains of Expertise Demanded by New Challenges: This attribute combines developing appropriate internal levels of new expertise in emerging domains and being able to locate and tap expertise rapidly across the government and elsewhere as needed.

- **Network and Partnership Oriented**: The ability to optimize the productivity of networks and develop targeted partnerships with the wide range of non-governmental actors, for example through public-private partnerships.

- **Capable of Creating Whole-of-Government Alignment**: The ability to maximize unity of effort in global affairs across all ministries of the government.

- **Skilled in Economic Statecraft**: Capable of deploying expertise in political economy, geo-economics and finance across all foreign policy domains — both in partnership with Finance Ministries and via strengthened internal reserves of expertise and experience.

- **Aligned Across Development and Diplomacy**: Capable of balancing and aligning diplomatic and development priorities and resources.

- **Domestically-Engaged**: This attribute is a function of the growing importance, as emphasized by the participants, of communicating the purpose, value and legitimacy of the work of the foreign ministry to domestic stakeholders.

- **Flexible and Resilient**: The ability to anticipate change, manage risk and allocate financial resources and deploy people rapidly to meet changing priorities and address crises.

- **Results-Driven**: An increased ability to set objectives, achieve results and demonstrate effectiveness.

- **Technology-Enabled**: Capable of leveraging emerging social and connection technologies in support of all aspects of its work.

Quite clearly this set of requirements poses a number of organizational issues, not least the basic structure of the MFA. To a greater or lesser extent, foreign ministries have adopted a two-pronged structure based on geographical and functional sections. Although there are clear variations in precise form, the tendency has been to favour the latter in response to an environment in which issues and areas are ever more closely linked.

The Italian MFA has recently announced that its structure ‘will no longer hinge on geographic areas but on macro-sector themes: the three pillars of security, European integration and the outward reach of the Country System’. Similarly, the Danish MFA has moved from a vertical pillar structure focusing on geographic divisions to a thematic and horizontal structure based on eleven centres as this is regarded as better suited to a more complex international order and enhances policy coordination.

Taking a broader perspective on the position of the MFA, the challenge of developing and maintaining the linguistic, geographic and functional capabilities essential to the integrative diplomacy environment is complicated by the difficulties in predicting international developments over even short time scales. The globalization of business, and the threats of the new international security agenda, means that all states must have some capacity to operate at a global level.

Identifying a single future global configuration and designing a diplomatic deployment is high risk. But building in the redundancies necessary to anticipate all possible futures is unrealistic, especially given the current fiscal pressures. Technology, including ICT, as such is not the answer. Over the last decade the deployment of ICT has in many cases tended towards increasing micromanagement of overseas missions and reinforcement of hierarchical structures rather than enhanced operational effectiveness. Organizational innovation will be essential.

Two possibilities aimed at strengthening ‘surge capacity’ are ‘swarming’ and developing a ‘diplomatic reserve’. Both ideas have been developed to some extent by the UK, although not to their full potential:

- **Swarming**: Swarming has been developed theoretically by the Rand Organization, although it is not a new idea. Capabilities are dispersed throughout a network to be pulled together when and as needed. It recognizes that actors can have multiple capabilities, and can be deployed to use differing capabilities according to circumstances. The British Foreign Service has used the concept to redesign their emergency consular response following the Asian Tsunami. On that occasion consulates in the tsunami region were reinforced from headquarters, stripping from headquarters badly needed resources and significantly damaging its performance. Subsequently the Foreign Office has created a database of the skills and capabilities of all officers dispersed throughout the diplomatic network. In the case of future consular emergencies, support teams can be assembled and dispatched from throughout the network, leaving the headquarters capabilities untouched.

- **Diplomatic Reserve**: The concept of a diplomatic reserve is based on the idea of the military reserve – officers and men who remain on the army’s books after their service and can be called up in times of emergency. This is particularly valuable for the British armed forces with doctors, engineers, lawyers or other specialists who enhance their capabilities in civilian life. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office has followed a similar model in establishing a database of civilian experts who can be called upon for peacekeeping, nation building
or other humanitarian operations. It is thus able to maintain a broad range of expert capabilities against future emergencies, but without the cost of keeping them permanently in-house. A diplomatic reserve would differ from a military reserve in that the members would not necessarily have served as diplomats in the past. Rather the reserve would exist of a network throughout the academic, business and media worlds of individuals with specific skills and capabilities (linguistic, geographical or functional) that could be called on as the international situation, and national interests/needs, evolve. Membership of the reserve could no doubt be reinforced by periodic workshops or online training. Even without ‘call-up’ the reserve would be permanently available to offer information or analysis.

A combination of swarming with a diplomatic reserve, reinforced by developing IC and social media technology could offer powerful and adaptive structures for confronting the diplomatic challenges of the 21st century. Specifically, it would allow:

- Rapid adaptation to changing international environment and the emergence of new issues, international configurations and geographical priorities.
- Affordable maintenance of the necessary knowledge and skills to help navigate and manage rule-set conflicts.
- Reinforcement of civil society links, enhancing diplomatic entrepreneur capability.

**Adapting the Diplomatic Network**

*We look upon the mission network as the raison d’etre of the foreign ministry: that is what makes us different from any other ministry.*

This comment in the Toronto Group report reflects a dilemma for the MFA. From an organizational dimension, ‘owning’ the diplomatic network can be seen as its key distinctive asset around which a case can be made for the expanded functions model. But two problems are immediately apparent and need to be addressed:

- in age of growing austerity, maintaining the network will become increasingly challenging;
- the network has ceased to be the ‘property’ of the MFA as it serves the need of the broader NDS.

Looked at in this light, the MFA confronts the problem of increasing demands on the network in the face of (in most cases) diminishing or static resources and questions of control and ownership. Meanwhile, diplomatic posts have to respond to the logic of ‘flexible presence posts’ servicing the interests of the whole of government.

**Re-framing the diplomatic network debate**

The traditional debate on diplomatic representation – stretching back to the nineteenth century – focuses on the utility of maintaining a network of overseas posts in the light of enhanced modes of communication and alternative, instantaneous, sources of information available to policy makers. But despite the cost, governments maintain extensive diplomatic networks (see figure 4.2). Even small states maintain a network reflecting their core areas of interest. Responding to the requirements of an effective diplomatic network involves the juxtaposition of three factors which facilitates the framing of decisions on the size and shape of the network:

- **Function**: what purposes is the network intended to serve?
- **Access and participation**: which policy nodes do countries need access to in performing these functions? What level of participation is required in each case?
- **Presence**: what modes of presence best serve the needs of function, access and participation?

Latest available information, provided either directly by the relevant governments or from information in the public domain such as embassy websites, annual reports and press releases. Count includes embassies, high commissions, consulates-general, consulates and multilateral missions with separate ambassadors/heads of mission. It excludes trade and cultural offices and consular sections of embassies. For Australia, Austrade manages 13 additional consular offices. If these were included, Australia would share equal 20th position with Austria.

**Figure 4.2**


Effective integrative diplomacy requires the alignment of the three factors and for each NDS to establish a ‘**representational matrix**’. This in turn needs the adoption of broad principles for diplomatic presence such as those recently suggested for the Swedish Foreign Service which prioritizes representation in:

- leading geopolitical centres of power, both political and economic
- emerging geopolitical centres of power, both political and economic
- important EU countries
- **places where the headquarters of multilateral organizations** which are key to Swedish policy are located, and where the designing and monitoring of new multilateral structures requires our presence
• **countries or regions** of particular interest for Sweden

The outcome of any such exercise will be determined by judgments on the degree to which functional requirements and the need for access demand a physical presence and what form this should take. Historically, establishing access to key centres of policy activity came to be associated with permanent presence in the form of resident ambassadors in bilateral and multilateral missions. These tended to replace an older model of managing access, namely, the use of mission diplomacy for specific purposes. The 21st century model embraces a mix of the two.

Currently the access-presence linkage is being re-examined as the functions of diplomatic networks and their sheer cost have come under close examination. Increasingly, the form that diplomatic presence assumes is being re-evaluated as small, flexible and quickly deployable posts are often better attuned to contemporary needs than the traditional embassy. Significant changes are occurring at three interrelated levels:

• a redefinition of functions
• a rebalancing of the structure of overseas posts reflecting change in the NDS
• a continuing review of the size and distribution of networks

There is a continuing debate as to the precise functions to be served by the network and how these should respond to the broad environmental changes noted earlier. A major theme here is the reduced importance of traditional diplomatic reporting as opposed to well-focused policy advice enabled by the creation of secure email systems. In some MFAs, this has brought diplomatic posts more directly into central policy formulation, compensating for the reduced geographic expertise that a more functionally-oriented structure might create.

One of the most consistent demands in both developed and developing states is that diplomats respond to the demands of a competitive and crisis-beset global economy by assuming a more active role in **commercial diplomacy**. This is nothing new. It runs as a leitmotif in reform proposals for the British diplomatic service over the last sixty years, re-emerging as a key theme of the British coalition government elected in May 2010, which proposed to appoint businesspeople as ambassadors.

Another functional theme, affecting the work of both the MFA and the diplomatic service, has been the enhanced significance of **consular work**. This reflects the intersection of commercial diplomacy, the demands from more mobile populations, and the expectations that the NDS (for this involves a range of domestic departments alongside the MFA) should actively respond to the needs of their citizens caught up in natural and man-made international crises. The establishment of crisis management units at home is balanced by enhanced capacity in the field, often by means of regional ‘crisis hubs’ linking missions in specific geographic regions.

These activities are closely related to the second dimension of change, namely, the **changing structure of diplomatic posts**, reflecting the reconfiguration of the NDS. The trend for many embassies to be staffed by members of departments other than the MFA is now a familiar one but in some larger posts has reached the point where professional diplomats are in a minority. The diffusion of bureaucratic interests at missions abroad poses issues of responsibility, communication with central government and the conventions determining the ‘tasking’ of posts and, ultimately, policy coordination.
Refocusing and managing with less

The problem of diminishing resources has to be viewed alongside the need to respond to the redistribution of global power in the 21st century. This theme was reflected in the ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ initiative announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006 where a major shift in the distribution of US diplomatic posts away from Europe and toward the emerging economies was proposed.

Against this background, diplomatic services around the world are being rationalized and this has involved more than simply closing posts. Since 1990, Sweden has closed 59 missions and opened approximately 40. Denmark announced the closure of five missions in 2010. But national needs differ. Thus the size of the Indian foreign service is regarded as inadequate for a rising economic power with 669 diplomats distributed between the ministry in New Delhi and 119 missions and forty-nine consulates around the world, and is being expanded. In the EU the creation of the European External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty (see box 4.5) poses interesting questions regarding its impact on member state diplomatic services. One feature of the emerging EU diplomatic landscape is a growing trend among member states to reduce the resources devoted to intra-EU diplomatic representation.

Box 4.5

Developing the European External Action Service (EEAS)

The EEAS was established by the Lisbon Treaty, in part to rationalize the external activities of the EU. Lady Catherine Ashton was appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). In theory the development of the EEAS should be crucial to the national diplomatic systems of both EU and non-EU states. However, despite considerable discussion among academics and practitioners, the role of the EEAS and its impact on the diplomatic environment remain unclear. It is hampered by the continued divisions within the EU over foreign policy, with several Member States determined to maintain autonomy in the formulation and implementation of policy. Given the greater consensus within the EU over the issues of the new international security agenda, the EEAS could develop into an institution focused on NISA style diplomacy. However, it has so far showed no signs of moving in this direction. Much will depend on the outcome of the Eurozone crisis, and the resultant power geometries within the EU.

K. Schake, ‘State of Disrepair’ Foreign Policy, 11 April 2012.

Doing more with less has encouraged experiments with a range of structural reforms such as seeking economies of scale through greater use of:

- **areas of concentration and ‘core’ embassies** which are given high priority in the network and assigned special functions;
- **multiple accreditation** of diplomats to two or more countries;
- **regional geographic hubs** assigning specific functions to key posts sometimes as a replacement for local presence. Administrative hubs may be used to aggregate functions such as human resources on a shared services basis;
• **co-location**: in the EU, there have been limited experiments, particularly amongst Nordic countries, with co-location of EU missions in third countries involving a sharing of premises;

• **non-resident ambassadors**: whilst by no means restricted to smaller states, these have obvious attractions for a country such as Singapore, which has used them to supplement its forty-three overseas missions;

• **‘virtual’ presence**: the US State Department has engaged in several experiments, including small scale American ‘presence posts’ first deployed in France and often staffed by one foreign service officer, mobile diplomats (‘circuit riders’) operating from a mission and regularly visiting cities or regions, and ‘virtual presence posts’ in the form of websites targeted at a geographic area and maintained from an embassy.

### Roles and skills

Role definitions are important. They reflect fundamental cultural features of organizations and serve to explain their objectives to those working in them. Responding to a changing diplomatic environment poses a set of fundamental questions as to how states manage their international policy profile and the organizational roles of the component parts of the NDS, not least the MFA. They also give rise to a related set of issues focusing on the role profile of the professional diplomat and the qualities and skills appropriate to working in the integrative diplomacy environment.

One of the characteristic qualities of state-based diplomacy has been a culture of exclusivity. Diplomats are defined in terms of their role as representatives of national governments; at the international level, their presence and activities reflect practices that emphasize a sense of community enshrined in codes of behaviour and protected through conventions of diplomatic immunity.

In short, they can be regarded as a guild, sharing responsibilities deriving from the twin roles of diplomacy as statecraft and as an institution of the international system. Integral to this image is the proposition that diplomacy is separated from other spheres of activity, not least that of domestic politics. This separation is expressed in the concept of the diplomat as gatekeeper, or primary mediator between domestic and international environments.

As we have seen, a fundamental premise of integrative diplomacy is **inclusiveness** and **partnership** in policy processes, rather than exclusiveness, bringing together major stakeholders in new forms of decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on particular issues. One consequence of this has been the ‘deforeignisation’ of the MFA not simply because of the growing fusion of domestic and international agendas but because of the trend towards regarding it as a ‘normal’ component of the bureaucracy and thus subject to public sector reforms applied to other government departments from the 1990s onwards. This challenges in part the rationale of the guild-like characteristics of traditional diplomacy, the roles performed by a much broader cast of players – and also the definition of the role of the professional diplomat.

If the MFA is to maintain a central place in the emerging NDS, it is important that it develops a narrative reflecting the changing international policy environment and capable of explaining to its members (and to relevant constituencies) what its purpose is and the roles and skill sets relevant to the practice of contemporary diplomacy. In this context, the integrative diplomacy model does not imply a diminished role for the professional diplomat. Indeed, that role might be enhanced, but, at the same time, redefined.

Rather than that of gatekeeper, an alternative image more suited to the contemporary environment might be termed that of the **‘boundary-spanner’**, recognizing that boundaries between organizations and policy arenas, far from being irrelevant, are fluid and continually reconstituting themselves, thereby becoming sites of intense activity which
demand a special role for those capable of acting as linkage points. In such an environment, diplomats can assume significant roles as mediators or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs.

**Revisiting ‘generalists’ and ‘specialists’**

These issues are linked in turn to the skill sets seen to be required of modern diplomats and how such skills can best be developed. The most familiar expression of this problem is the on-going debate about diplomats as ‘generalists’ or ‘specialists’. The broad trend during the twentieth century was towards the emphasis on specialist skills reflecting the nature of the changing international agenda. This has posed two questions for the MFA:

- how to acquire and deploy such specialist skills;
- how to respond to the claims of specialists in functional departments to ‘act internationally’ on behalf of their governments.

Whilst not denying the continuing significance of this issue for the MFA and the NDS in general, there is a strong case to be made for the continuing importance and necessity of those traditional ‘generalist’ diplomatic skills that are essential to fulfilling the tasks presented by integrative diplomacy. These derive from the challenges of a global environment characterized by conflicts over agendas as well as, more fundamentally, the rules governing shifting patterns of world politics. In functional terms, these roles include:

- developing a strategic vision of global agendas and the domestic-international linkages on which these increasingly rest;
- understanding conflicts over rules, as well as the cultural differences and strategic objectives that drive them;
- developing strategies for convincing partners and rivals of the value of specific rules even when they don’t share them or the underlying values;
- identifying and cultivating a broad range of governmental and non-governmental allies to help in promoting strategies to deal with global agendas;
- global network facilitation, creating international networks for the exchange of information and ideas;
- liaison with NGOs and other non-governmental actors – acting as a contact point between them and other parts of government, and between government and multinational organizations;

These roles provide a gloss on what is ‘new’ in the ‘new diplomacy’ by highlighting the significance of familiar attributes and skills associated with the practice of diplomacy applied to a changing global environment. In particular, it is notable that one weakness highlighted in several recent MFA reports is the decline of language skills – a critical resource in the contemporary global environment.

To the extent that a government wants to be a serious player in international relations, it will need to perform a complex range of functions. This does not mean that all functions will be carried out by the same diplomats, or even by the same government organization: the inherent contradictions between the functions of ‘entrepreneurial diplomacy’ on one side and ‘geopolitical diplomacy’ on the other may require the creation of differentiated diplomatic structures within the NDS. Against this background, we may consider functions and key capabilities of those diplomats dealing with geopolitical agendas – ‘foreign service diplomats’ – on the one hand and ‘entrepreneurial diplomats’ on the other (table 4.2).
Foreign Service Diplomats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Representation: managing relations between states – maintaining formal relations and communications between governments of states;</td>
<td>• Formal negotiation skills;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing and maintaining diplomatic information and influence networks;</td>
<td>• Language skills and specialist cultural, political and historical knowledge;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic analysis of intentions and interests of other states;</td>
<td>• Ability to think strategically;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understanding the different rule sets, as well as the cultural differences and strategic objectives that drive them;</td>
<td>• Futures modeling capabilities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Navigating between the different rule sets – developing strategies that are robust and adaptable across different rule sets (as well as different possible futures);</td>
<td>• Capacity to mount large scale and multi-country influence campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understanding the implications of rule set conflict for existing strategies, and existing and future assets;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing strategies for convincing partners and rivals of the benefits of our rule sets in specific cases on the basis of self-interest, even when they don’t share them or the underlying values;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying and cultivating a broad range of governmental and non-governmental allies to help in promoting strategies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 ‘Foreign Service’ and ‘Entrepreneurial’ Diplomats
Entrepreneurial Diplomats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity to operate at home as well as abroad, stitching the domestic together with the foreign;</td>
<td>• Functional abilities: conference/event organization, network maintenance etc.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying opportunities to put together civil society actors, including developing relations with opposition and other non-government groups in authoritarian regimes;</td>
<td>• Capacity for dialogue and empathy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Global network facilitation, creating international networks for the exchange of information and ideas;</td>
<td>• Specialist knowledge of different issues of NISA;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaison with NGOs and other non-governmental actors – acting as a contact point between them and other parts of government, and between government and multinational organizations;</td>
<td>• Mastery of new social media;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing a strategic vision of the NISA, the interrelationships between its various elements, and its implications for policy making.</td>
<td>• Independence of mind – ability/willingness to be critical of official policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matching these functions and capabilities will involve rethinking the training needs appropriate to integrative diplomacy beyond the more traditional agendas common to foreign service institutes and diplomatic academies. More specifically, meeting the demands of integrative diplomacy requires:

» Articulating clearly the objectives and requirements of staff within the MFA and broader NDS and considering how training programmes can best further them.

» Developing training programmes focused on capacities to ‘bridge worlds’ in terms of geographical and functional knowledge and awareness as well as familiarity with the worlds of other diplomatic actors. This may well mean strengthening areas such as language training which have been relatively neglected in some MFAs over recent years (see box 4.6).

» Consideration of who is involved in delivering training, balancing input by serving (and retired) diplomats with that provided by specialist institutes, academics, the business community and civil society organizations.

» Collaborative training opening MFA programmes to staff from other government departments (as the Netherlands MFA has done) and to business and NGOs. This can best be done through specialist workshops focused on specific agendas to which a range of participants can contribute.
Box 4.6

One in 40 UK diplomats fluent in language of country in which they work

In India, whose government this year declared France the preferred bidder over the UK to build 126 fighter jets in a £7bn deal, just one UK diplomat can speak Hindi. In Pyongyang, five British diplomats are posted and are encouraging the regime to drop its nuclear programme. Just one can speak a beginner’s level of Korean…some 1690 staff, or 90 per cent of the Diplomatic Service, have no recognised language abilities for the country where they are posted.

From: The Daily Telegraph, 10 April 2012

Conclusions

• The profile of actors and their qualities (actorness) are central to the character of contemporary diplomacy and its future development. Each actor has an interest in the nature and capacities of other actors with which it has to deal in managing issues on the global agenda.
• Given the continuing importance of the state, the capacities of national governments as diplomatic actors have particular significance. The need to adapt these capacities to the demands of contemporary international policy is reflected in the emergence and reshaping of national diplomatic systems.
• The status of MFAs should be viewed in terms of their place as subsystems within the NDS. Their future role – and that of the professional diplomat – will be determined by their success in identifying the value added they bring to the broader NDS.
• Actor participation in 21st century diplomacy demands a re-evaluation of its requirements alongside the roles that institutions and those working in them need to develop if they are to maintain their place as relevant participants in increasingly complex policy processes.
• Despite self-doubt and external critiques, MFAs are likely to remain part of the diplomatic landscape for as long as states remain central diplomatic players. There are two reasons for this: first, because it is not obvious that alternative structures at national level offer significant advantages over present arrangements; second, because foreign ministries are capable of providing significant functions even if they do not always do so.
Futures for Diplomacy: Key Conclusions

• Will diplomacy be a significant feature of global politics at the end of the 21st century?
  » Yes. The functions that diplomacy provides will be in greater demand in managing increasingly intractable policy agendas and the pressures generated by globalization and regionalization. How successful it will be in doing so is another matter.

• What will diplomacy look like in twenty years time?
  » Many familiar landmarks will remain. States will still be central actors on the world stage and essential contributors to global governance. But this will disguise profound and far-reaching change – particularly to the sovereignty-based rules that have provided the framework for diplomacy over the last four centuries or so.

• How will diplomatic processes develop?
  » They will become increasingly fluid and uncertain as policy agendas and arenas become more varied and interrelated. Traditional distinctions between, for example, bilateral, multilateral and summit diplomacy will fail to capture much more complex patterns of diplomatic interaction.
  » More areas of international policy will involve the engagement of a range of stakeholders in policy networks. Understanding the dynamics of network management will become a key diplomatic skill.
  » Informal engagement as opposed to international cooperation in formal organizations and alliances will increase in importance.
  » More attention will turn on shaping and managing diplomatic spaces. Successful diplomacy will increasingly involve influencing agendas and framing debates. Consequently, governments will want to maximize their knowledge assets and capacity to persuade others.

• How will communication patterns evolve?
  » The public diplomacy debate will mature. From being a sometimes marginal add-on to the diplomatic effort, public diplomacy strategies will become more closely attuned to policy objectives. Ultimately, the term will become less common as virtually all diplomacy assumes a ‘public’ dimension.
  » E-diplomacy will grow in significance amidst exaggerated claims as to its importance and uncertain responses in MFAs regarding its implications and how to use its technologies effectively. Along the way, much effort – and money – will be wasted in experimental ventures into ‘Web 2.0’ and ‘virtual’ diplomacy.

• How will governments organize themselves in pursuing their international policy goals?
  » In broad terms, they are likely to continue to reflect two broad trends: fragmentation as more government departments and agencies develop international interests and concentration, as more responsibility is transferred to central agencies – such as prime ministers’ offices. The result will be a fluid and evolving ‘national diplomatic system’ compromising a range of departments and attuned to the needs of each state.
• **Does this mean the demise of the MFA?**
  > No. At the minimum, governments will need a department to provide policy analysis, officials skilled in negotiation and a means of managing the diplomatic network. To date, suggested alternatives to the foreign ministry’s traditional role have tended to recreate the MFA in some other guise in another part of the government apparatus.

• **So what is the future for MFAs?**
  > This will be largely what they make of it. They will need to adapt their cultures and working practices to the changes outlined in this report. In particular, they will continue to find that claims to special status rooted in a culture of ‘foreignness’ are rejected. They will need new narratives to justify their role. They will also need to consider where their skills lie and how these can be adapted to the needs of government as a whole. In the present climate, it is certain that consular work will form a greater part of the MFA profile and it is very likely that the demands for more attention to commercial diplomacy will grow.

• **Will professional diplomats be part of the landscape?**
  > Certainly. For as long as states are key players on the world stage, they will need agents to advance their interests. These agents will need to possess traditional skills – such as familiarity with other cultures and language competence – that have unfortunately been downplayed in favour of specialist skills. At the same time, diplomats will need to develop their capacity to work with others in policy networks and to develop their roles as ‘enablers’ and ‘facilitators’. All this carries implications for diplomatic training programmes that will need to be more innovative than in the past.

• **How will the diplomatic network adapt to a changing diplomatic environment?**
  > Quite radically. Change will come from three directions. First, money – or lack of it – will be a determining factor in the shape of the diplomatic network. This will focus attention on the longstanding debate regarding the relationship between the requirements for access to centres of international activity and the form that presence might assume to achieve it. Large-scale closure of missions is unlikely, but resources will be redeployed. In the EU, for example, bilateral representation will continue to be scaled down. The EEAS may offer some solutions to the resources problem. Second, re-deployment will be reinforced by the need to respond to the emergence of new centres of political and economic power. Third, as missions become platforms for other government departments, tensions over ownership and operation will need careful handling.
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The diplomatic environment has changed radically: new technologies, new actors, new media and new agendas. This report, commissioned by the Finnish Government, argues that these trends are set to continue and accelerate, even as more traditional geopolitics re-emerge. Governments will remain the key players in international relations, even as they struggle to understand a world of fragmenting norms and emerging new powers. Economic realities will increase the pressure to deliver more for less, forcing radical innovations in organization, mindsets and working practices. This report examines how diplomacy must reinvent itself to meet the ever increasing demands of governments and citizens alike.

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Colophon

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