My PhD thesis topic is the Europeanisation of Spanish Policy towards Morocco. My presentation will be a short introduction to the way in which I conceptualise Europeanisation within Foreign Policy Analysis and to how I am planning to operationalise that concept in the case of my research. This outline largely builds on my theoretical chapter, my thesis design work and the first results of my case studies. For a complete discussion of the theoretical approach I will refer the reader to my article ‘Europeanisation and Foreign Policy’ published as a Working Paper by the Observatory of Foreign Policy of the European Studies University Institute of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. For an example of the first findings of the research, I attach via e-mail the paper ‘Spain and the EC-Morocco Fisheries Negotiations’ that I will present at the Biannual ECSA-Canada in Toronto on Thursday, May 31st, 2002.

In this outline I shall shortly present in a bullet points format the main ideas of my conceptualisation of ‘Europeanisation’ within Foreign Policy and the ways in which I intend to operationalise this concept in my research. Secondly I will justify the interest of studying the Europeanisation of Spanish Policy towards Morocco. Finally, I will give some tentative examples of the sort of hypotheses that I test in my research with concrete examples.

Europeanisation and Foreign Policy

Definition:

- Intuitive idea: ‘the penetration of the European dimension into the national arena’ (Gamble 2001:1)
- First operational definition: ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994:69)
- Europeanisation of a Foreign Policy: the process of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European integration process.

Dimensions and limits:

- **Two dimensions:** In the dynamics of EU-Member State relationships, Europeanisation represents the ‘top-down’ approach or ‘reception’ (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002). This needs to be complemented by another dimension, the ‘projection’: ‘Given that the European Union has its own organisational logic, it is necessary for national political actors […] to accommodate some of that logic if the opportunities afforded by the EU are to be exploited.’ (Bulmer and Burch 2000: 4)
• **Problem**: the difficulty to isolate the ‘EU-effect’ from other changes in the global, bilateral and national spheres (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002:18); i.e. the risk of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970: 1034-1035), of attributing to Europeanisation any change we detect in the policy.

• **The limits**: We can establish the limits of the concept in three directions. *Qualitatively*, i.e. assessing the relevance of the changes be observe to see whether there has been a substantial (as opposed to just formal) change; *causally*, analysing the ways in which the supposed ‘cause’ (the European Union) has produced the observed effect; and *comparatively*, testing the explanatory power of Europeanisation against other parallel processes (globalisation, domestic change, ...).

Four themes:

• **New constraints and new instruments**: the balance between formal (legal, competence, QMV...) and informal (political *acquis*, pressure to reach agreements,...) constraints, and the new possibilities offered by the EC/EU policies qualified by the capacity of the Member State to effectively shape those policies.

• **Identity, interests and preference formation**: the evolution of the Member State’s interests in a certain area including their definition and their ranking and the changes in the identity concerning the studied area and the policy consequences of those changes.

• **Policy-making**: The effects of the institutional structure of the EC/EU in the national administrations, including administrative reform, co-ordination and changes in the relative weights of the different areas of administration and socialisation effects.

• **The domestic dimension**: Changes in the weight and orientation of the actors of the ‘politics of the policy’: national parliament, pressure groups, political parties,... Uses of Europeanisation in the public opinion debate: cover for policy shifts, alibi for inaction, more/less transparency,...

**Spanish Policy towards Morocco**

I find this case of particular interest as a case of Europeanisation of a Foreign Policy for three reasons. First, the fact that Spain entered the EC when both her and the Community already had a policy towards Morocco means that we have a good chance of isolating the ‘EU-effect’. Secondly, the relationship with Morocco is a crucial one for Spain, an area where vital and often contradictory interests are at stake. Thirdly, the relationship with Morocco involves different policy areas, some of them (immigration, trade, transport, fisheries,...) far from the traditional fields of foreign policy, which in the EC/EU are dealt with within different institutional frameworks.

I have chosen to work with four main case studies, covering four important thematic areas, and then to have a more general, all encompassing analysis. The topics are the fisheries negotiations (and in particular the negotiation of agreements to get access to Moroccan waters for the Spanish fishing fleet); the trade and economic relations (including trade rivalry, Spanish investments and official aid, the Euromediterranean partnership,...); the question of immigration (imposition of visas, re-admission of illegal immigrants,...) and the issue of Western Sahara. They cover areas of the three pillars of the European Union, they were affected by Spanish accession to the EC, and they are all crucial in Spanish-Moroccan relationships.
The four themes in the case of the Spain’s Moroccan policy

I would like to finish by giving some concrete examples of the sort of phenomena that I am paying attention to within each of the four research themes:

1. New constraints and new instruments: In the case of fisheries negotiations there is a very distinct constraint, the existence of a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that attributes exclusive competence to the European Commission in negotiating fisheries agreements with third countries, and an equally obvious set of new instruments, including the financial instruments of the CFP and other bargaining tools (like linkage with the Association Agreement). The analysis will focus on the comparison between the cost of that constraint and the benefits obtained from the instruments, and the analysis of the bias implicit in this analysis.

2. Identity, interests and preference formation: I think the case of economic and trade relations is a good one for the study of change of identity. Before accession Spain and Morocco were open competitors for the EC Market. Accession gave obvious advantage to Spain in that field, but the negative evolution of Morocco and the Maghreb in general arose serious worries in Madrid. Hence the formulation of a new identity of Spain as a defender of the interests of the Mediterranean, and particularly of Morocco, within the EC. The contradiction between trade concurrence and economic partnership in terms of identity will be analysed.

3. Policy-making: Justice and Home Affairs has been a pretty obscure part of the EC during the eighties, when it was carried on within ad-hoc agreements like the Schengen agreement. The inclusion of immigration matters in the sphere of cooperation of Interior Ministries (largely resulting from political crises in France, Germany and Belgium in the 1980es) has given them a privileged position vis-à-vis other ministries (Labour, Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs) in the formulation of immigration policy –including its important external effects- in the national capitals.

4. The domestic dimension: The debate about the fisheries agreements and its negotiation provides us with a good example of the effect of Europeanisation. The Spanish Governments have deflected some of the internal pressure for better deals and tougher positions (which would have been costly and highly problematic for the overall relationship with Morocco) and have channelled some of the anger against the European Commission, who was in charge of the negotiations (but under strict control and a direct mandate of a Council in which, in this matter, Spain had a decisive voice).
References


