

CFSP WATCH 2005 – United Kingdom – by Tim Oliver¹

1. *What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2005? What are the key issues for your country in 2005 (especially with regard to the negative referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands; after the recent EU enlargement and on behalf of the perspective of the upcoming accession round(s))?*

Britain will hold the EU Presidency in the latter half of 2005. The priorities of the presidency reflect the issues identified in the 'Cross-Presidency Multiannual Strategic Programme for 2004-06', published in December 2003, and the Luxembourg-UK work programme published in December 2004. The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP set out the UK's priorities in a speech he gave to the European Parliament on 23 June 2005. The priorities which relate to the EU's external policies include the following:

- Counter terrorism - Taking forward EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan including measures such as the European Evidence Warrant which will enable law enforcement agencies to quickly access important evidence from elsewhere in the EU.
- People trafficking and migration – Developing an Action Plan on people trafficking and working for greater EU-wide police co-operation. Managing migration into the EU through stronger links with the main source countries worldwide and strengthening the EU's borders.
- Enlargement – Taking forward existing commitments on enlargement including opening negotiations with Turkey on 3 October. Starting accession talks with Croatia as soon as the conditions are met and preparing for Bulgarian and Romanian entry in January 2007.
- Doha Development Agenda – For an outcome on Doha at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong that paves the way for an agreement delivering greater global economic growth, with better access to markets for developing countries.
- Africa – Developing a long-term strategy for Africa, building on the EU's historic commitment to double ODA. Centred on governance, peace and security, access to basic services, growth and trade. Pushing this forward at the UN Millennium Review Summit, New York in September.
- Climate change – Representing the EU at the UN Climate Change negotiations in December. Developing a post-2012 strategy; international engagement, particularly with the growing economies of China and India; and addressing the impact of aviation on climate change.
- Peace, stability and reform in the Middle East – Promoting peace, stability and reform in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa by supporting the Middle East Peace Process, including Israeli disengagement; increasing Palestinian security capacity; delivering EU commitments to Iraq; reform through the EuroMed process; continuing E3/EU dialogue with Iran; and delivering EU commitments to the African Union mission in Darfur.
- Peace and stability in the Balkans - Entrenching peace and stability in the Balkans through the EU's, UK-led, military mission in Bosnia; building police capacity in Bosnia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and playing a constructive role in the negotiations to resolve Kosovo's final status.
- Defence capability – Enhancing Europe's defence capability to take action through the EU battle-groups initiative and European Defence Agency. Either with NATO or, where it chooses not to take part, outside it.
- EU sugar regime reform – For a market-based, liberalising reform of the EU's sugar regime - an important element of reform of the CAP. Working with the Commission to help African, Pacific and Caribbean countries adjust.

Britain also holds the Presidency of the G8 throughout 2005. The two central priorities – especially for the Prime Minister – and which have relevance to CFSP include:

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- Climate Change - Regarded as one of the top priorities for both the UK Presidency of the EU and for its presidency of the G8. Negotiations will continue on the REACH directive (proposed chemicals regulations) and the UK will start discussions on three strategies due from the Commission on waste, resource use and air pollution. The impact of aviation on climate change and the development of a post-2012 strategy for the EU will also be addressed by the UK. Positive relations and engagement with the Bush Administration are seen as crucial for success in this area.
- Development and Africa – This is regarded as a very high profile issue – and one particularly important personally to both the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown – developing a long term strategy for Africa features on the list of HMG's priorities for action. HMG's main aims are pursuing good governance, peace and security, access to basic services, growth and trade for Africa and ensuring EU policy continues to pursue the UN's Millennium Development Goals. HMG has indicated that it will work towards a positive outcome on the issue of trade from the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO meeting to be held in December.

With regard to the rejection of the constitutional treaty:

Following the no votes in France and the Netherlands HMG announced on 6 June that it would suspend the process by which the UK was preparing to run its own referendum on adopting the treaty. HMG had earlier acknowledged that the UK would ratify the treaty by way of a referendum. Putting ratification on hold was seen as a way of allowing for a period of reflection over what course of action should be taken by Europe. This was the position taken at the European Council on 16-17 June, where it was also decided that the issue would be looked at again in the first half of 2006 and thus after the UK Presidency.

HMG had welcomed the constitutional treaty, having argued publicly in the UK that it had secured many of its objectives during the negotiations to draft the treaty. HMG welcomed the chance the constitution might provide to advance reform of the EU, something the British have been very keen to see develop further in both economic and social terms and in terms of institutional effectiveness. The UK is no longer seeking the 'status quo' in Europe due to her demands for significant reforms in many areas; in this regard the current UK position differs from that of previous eras when the UK was seen as seeking no change and stability or movement backwards in many areas of EU policy. This is in contrast to the Netherlands or in particular France who the UK now views as resisting European led reforms of their economic and social models which in turn played a part in their rejection of the treaty. Indeed HMG tried to draw to the attention of a largely sceptical British public that one of the reasons identified for the French rejection of the treaty was due to how British the treaty appeared.

With regard to the areas of CFSP, HMG views the rejection of the treaty as a setback for creating more coherent external relations for the EU. The UK is a supporter of the position of an EU Foreign Minister, External Action Service and better cooperation in ESDP. Further details of this are set out below.

The UK has long been a keen advocate of European enlargement and continues to strongly support the membership of Bulgaria and Romania, provided they continue to meet the necessary conditions. The UK also supports the membership of Turkey, viewing this as an opportunity to provide the EU with a member who can bridge differences with the wider Middle East. Britain also supports all the membership applications of the countries in the Western Balkans, provided they meet the political criteria like any other EU applicants including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. HMG supports the EU's approach of the Stabilisation and Association process based on aid, trade preferences, dialogue, technical advice and, ultimately, contractual obligations. There does not appear to be any possibility that the UK will hold a referendum specifically on enlargement issues as might occur in other states especially with regard to Turkish membership.

Terrorist Attacks in London, 7 July 2005.

The suicide bombings in London took place shortly after the start of the British EU Presidency, during the British chaired G8 meeting at Gleneagles in Scotland and the day after London had been awarded the 2012 Olympics. The attacks shared certain similarities with the attacks that took place in Madrid in that they were the work of extremist Islamic paramilitary organisations. Unlike in Madrid the police believe the perpetrators were all British or had been residing in Britain for a long time. In a video message recorded before the attacks, one of the bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, from Leeds, claimed the attacks were a response to the British participation in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, many have argued that British involvement in the Iraq War has made the UK more vulnerable to such attacks. The UK had already stated in its preparation for holding the EU presidency that it would seek progress on the Counter-terrorism action plan as set out after the attacks in Madrid. In particular, HMG aimed to agree essential measures on police and judicial co-operation, including proposals relating to the European Evidence Warrant and proposals on the retention of data on telecommunications traffic; lay the foundations of an EU strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment to terrorism; and deliver concrete assistance to partner countries outside the EU to help fight terrorism overseas. Given that many actions in the 2004 Action Plan will be completed by the end of 2005, HMG will also work to develop further the framework agreed in 2004, concluding the Presidency with a new agenda for what more EU Member States can do individually and together to fight terrorism.

Relations with Iran

The UK remains committed to working with the EU and in particular France, Germany and the High Representative in its relations with Iran in areas such as its nuclear programme, WMD proliferation, human rights and Iran's approach towards terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process. With regard to Iran's nuclear programme the UK hopes that Iran will remain committed to the November 2004 'Paris Agreement' to provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes. The UK and EU hope that the promise of further negotiations on a draft EU/Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement and a parallel political agreement will act as an incentive for Iran's cooperation. HMG will seek to take this forward, but within the wider context of Iran possibly being referred to the United Nations Security Council. The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, has appeared to rule out the use of military force against Iran.

Transatlantic relations.

HMG, and it might be said the UK in general, continue to place great importance on the transatlantic relationship, not only in terms of trade and prosperity but also in security and defence for Europe and the wider world. Following the Iraq war HMG has placed great importance in rebuilding relations across the Atlantic. All parties involved have agreed that it is important for the two sides to engage ever more closely on key areas of mutual concern, including the Middle East Peace Process and Iraq although ideas and outlooks for this area remain tense, as they do also on issues such as climate change.

HMG fully welcomed the EU-US Summit of 20 June 2005 which set forth ambitious ideas to further the transatlantic relationship. The UK is keen to see further strengthening of a trade and investment relationship worth over \$2.5 trillion a year and 14 million jobs. HMG hopes this will be advanced by dismantling remaining barriers such as regulatory approaches and standards.

British perceptions of the central role of NATO and the USA are detailed below.

Iraq and the Middle East.

HMG remains committed to its involvement in Iraq and HMG has stated that British forces look set to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

HMG is keen to point out that the EU has made a clear commitment to assist Iraq with the transitional process, security and reconstruction, consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1546. In light of this HMG has actively sought increased EU help. In June 2004 the European Council agreed a framework setting out a medium-term strategy for EU engagement with the Iraqi authorities. HMG views this strategy as bearing fruit for example with in November 2004 the EU Council presenting an EU package of assistance to then Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi. This was reaffirmed in February with the Union agreeing to such things as providing financial and technical support for the constitutional process; launching an integrated Rule of Law and Police Training Mission for Iraq with offices in Baghdad and Brussels; opening a European Commission Delegation office in Baghdad as soon as possible; a new aid package of €200m for 2005 in addition to EU humanitarian assistance which continues.

On 9 June 2005 the UK led an EU Troika delegation on a visit to Baghdad where they met the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). HMG and the Troika expressed their support for the Iraqi government and the transition process.

HMG intends that during the British EU Presidency, the EU will continue to increase its engagement with Iraq. In particular, HMG wishes to build up the current EU Rule of Law and Police Training mission, including moving towards some training being undertaken in Iraq; to lay the foundations for negotiations to commence on a Third Country Agreement to increase EU/Iraq political and trade cooperation; and to continue support for the political transition, including for the constitutional process, elections, referendum and subsequent elections. HMG hopes that it will be possible for a planned Commission Delegation office in Baghdad to open very soon.

On the issue of the Middle East Peace Process, the UK views the EU as continuing to play a significant and constructive role in promoting peace, stability, and economic and financial reform in the region. The UK Presidency has stated that it will work closely with other international partners (notably through the Quartet of the EU, the US, UN and Russia) and in a way that promotes co-operation and co-ordination between Europe and the United States.

HMG has made it clear that during the UK Presidency, the main European Union objectives will be to support Prime Minister Sharon's plan for disengagement from such areas as Gaza and continued reform of Palestinian institutions as set out at the London Meeting on 1 March 2005. In this context, HMG is keen to see the European Union work closely with James Wolfensohn, Quartet Special Envoy for disengagement, in order to help realise plans to make Gaza economically viable post Israeli withdrawal. HMG is also keen to ensure that the EU continues to support the work of the US Security Coordinator, Lt General Ward, in particular through support for the Palestinian police. HMG also looks forward to seeing the EU continue to reform donor structures to Palestine and assist the Palestinian Authority in its democracy building efforts through monitoring Palestinian Legislative Council elections.

For full details of the British EU Presidency see the website of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, www.fco.gov.uk or the Presidency website at www.eu2005.gov.uk

2. Does your country adopt a more pessimistic or optimistic stance regarding the ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty? How might the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands influence the ratification debate in your country and also have an impact on the outcome of the referendum?

Britain tends more towards a more pessimistic stance regarding the possibility of the constitution being ratified. Following the rejection by France and then the Netherlands the unofficial view from HMG and by many in the political arena was that the constitution was dead and could not be simply put back on the table for discussion and ratification. HMG, however, had been a keen supporter of the constitutional treaty; hardly surprising when many viewed the treaty as being strongly biased towards the UK. Arguments put forward by HMG initially stated that the constitution was a mere 'tidying up exercise', an argument never accepted by the opposition Conservative party or easily agreed with by many others including the pro-European Liberal Democrats.

It is also worth remembering that the United Kingdom does not possess a written constitution. A constitution is instead provided through various documents ranging from Magna Carta of 1215 to the EU treaties, from Acts of Parliament to unwritten precedents and common law. While not a major issue of discussion during the debate about the drafting or possible ratification of the European constitution, the British not being accustomed to a written constitution can at times find it a little puzzling as to why exactly it seems important that the European Union have a written constitution.

The rejection of the constitution by France and the Netherlands has officially put on hold the planned British referendum on the constitution. The decision to hold a referendum was made by the Prime Minister early in 2005. The opposition Conservative party's call for a referendum on the treaty – which they saw as a major constitutional change involving a significant transfer of power – had gained widespread publicity; a situation easily aided by the majority of the British media being eurosceptic. Both the Conservative party and the eurosceptic press saw in the idea of a referendum a means to reject the constitution, a development unlikely to occur from a vote in the House of Commons considering the size of the Labour Government's majority. With a General Election approaching and in the light of the considerable success for the devoutly anti-Europe 'UK Independence Party' during the previous European Parliament elections, some speculate that the Prime Minister agreed to the idea of a referendum in order to ensure the constitution did not become an issue in the election campaign fearing it would damage the Labour government's victory. Indeed, the European constitution did not figure highly during the election campaign which Labour won with a reduced but still sizeable majority.

Legislation was introduced to Parliament to prepare for a national referendum, the first such national referendum since the referendum of 1975 in which the British people affirmed their government's earlier decision to take Britain into the Europe Common Market. The referendum was expected to take place quite late and after the majority of other EU member states had ratified the treaty. By leaving the British decision until last it was hoped that several things would occur. First, that there would be time for a debate to emerge which would counter the anti-European feelings that held sway in the country. Second, that the ratification by all of the UK's partners would place pressure on the British people to do the same. Third, that the treaty would be rejected by somebody else before Britain did so! In light of the French and Dutch rejections some argue that it was the latter point that was the intention all along. Indeed, the decision by the UK to seek ratification through a referendum is seen as one of the key pressures which influenced the decision of the French government to do the same, albeit at an earlier date than the UK. Britain has therefore been able to avoid the stigma of rejecting a treaty which many argue was actually much to the benefit of Britain and in turn perpetuating the long standing idea that the UK is an 'awkward partner' in Europe.

The question remains as to whether or not HMG could win the referendum that was promised. The Labour government promised a large and well organised campaign to raise awareness of the benefits of the constitution. The main pro-European campaign group 'Britain in Europe' even considered changing its name to 'Yes' in order to concentrate efforts on winning such a referendum. Yet in the period before the rejection of the treaty campaigning and public support for

the constitution was somewhat lacking with the Labour government failing to lead a strong vocal campaign. Many wondered if in light of the difficulties in post-war Iraq – not to mention the unpopularity of the war from the start – the government would risk the strong chance of a rejection by allowing the British public a chance to voice their unhappiness with the Labour government. There was also some evidence that some of the debates that emerged in France – such as the infamous issue of the ‘Polish Plumber’ – might have arisen in the UK. European enlargement had already brought media headlines about gypsies flooding into the UK and something similar may well have arisen during a referendum debate; indeed it is only a matter of time before Britain – and in particular the press - engage in a ‘debate’ (for want of a better word) about Muslim immigrants gaining unrestricted access to the UK as a result of Turkish membership.

Many in government and the political arena consider the constitution to be dead. Of course, the constitution remains officially on the table and discussions continue about salvaging relevant pieces such as the parts about foreign policy coordination. However, any attempt to adopt the treaty ‘by the back door’ will be fiercely resisted by the Conservative party and eurosceptic press.

The speech given by Prime Minister Blair to the European Parliament at the start of the UK's Presidency was well received. Yet for some the UK has failed to take advantage of the opportunity created by the rejections of constitution in order to provide an alternative; especially frustrating considering the UK holds the presidency of the EU and is in a strong position to push forward new ideas.

3. *National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2005*

Please describe key positions and perceptions in your country with regard to EU foreign policy, taking into account:

- *The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP (e.g. taking into account current developments like the current ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty);*

The failure to adopt the constitutional treaty is not seen as creating a major crisis in the way the EU conducts its foreign policy with the situation remaining much as it did before. While there is disappointment at the dismissal of such ideas as the European Foreign Minister it is widely seen within government circles that such ideas, while not being implemented in full, will be implemented in some form.

The general public remains largely unaware of the existence of CFSP or ESDP, and indeed despite widespread unease with the situation in Iraq and relations with the Bush Administration there is no indication of warmer feelings towards ideas for increased European cooperation in foreign policy.

Despite this the UK remains committed to CFSP and ESDP, especially within a transatlantic context. The Prime Minister has repeatedly stressed the role of the UK as a ‘transatlantic bridge’ bringing together the USA and Europe, both of which he often seems equally committed. In an historical context it is worth noting that the current Prime Minister is one of the most pro-European prime ministers Britain has ever had (he even speaks French!).

The UK welcomes the cooperation and assistance CFSP/ESDP enables in such areas as Iran or Zimbabwe. The UK also sees CFSP as a means through which to advance policies which might not meet with the full agreement of Washington. An interesting case in this regard is the EU arms embargo with China. HMG seemed comfortable in following its European partners in reviewing the embargo despite the anger this provoked in the USA which in turn endangered British cooperation with the US in various defence related areas. The issue however did raise questions about how the EU – and its member states including the UK – think of Europe's strategic priorities. There was some realisation that the EU lacks a coherent China policy. However, whether an EU policy will emerge is questionable as the each member states, including the UK, has distinct and varied interests in its relations with Beijing.

- *The role of the EU in crisis management e.g. in Congo, Georgia, Darfur;*

The UK remains committed to ensuring the EU develops better capabilities to deal with crisis situations; in doing so it looks back to the painful lessons learnt in the Balkans where ambitions were only achieved due to US support. The UK continues to accept and pursue a leading role in crisis management. HMG makes full use of Britain's experienced armed forces. However, the desire for an independent capacity to act comes into play. If necessary the UK will go it alone in crisis management independent of both the EU and UN, e.g. its activities in Sierra Leone. Britain has also continually stressed the opportunities NATO offers the EU in terms of crisis management, sighting the Macedonia operation as a good example because it was only possible with NATO assets. The UK is not uneasy with the idea of EU operations in areas beyond the immediate neighborhood of Europe, such as the current operations in the Congo or discussion of committing troops to Darfur. The situation in Darfur remains a concern with HMG supporting the EU's efforts (mainly funding) for the African Union mission in the region. As the second largest bilateral donor in Darfur the UK has been keen to encourage the EU and other Member States to increase their funding.

As noted below, the UK presidency of the EU will further develop the rapid-response 'Battlegroups' initiative and agree a civilian capability improvement plan in November. The UK Presidency will launch a work programme on civil/military co-ordination intent on maximising the EU's potential to apply its especially wide range of security instruments coherently, including a framework to support comprehensive planning. HMG also looks forward to the EU improving its ability to contribute to disaster response, especially in light of the Asian tsunami last year; and take forward work on a concept for EU security sector reform missions. These details can also be found below.

- *The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP;*

The UK remains committed to European enlargement, including the eventual membership of Turkey. HMG views membership of such states as providing extra weight and capabilities to the further expansion of CFSP/ESDP, in particular in relations with Russia and the wider Middle East.

A tension exists in that HMG realises that enlargement will bring about an increased complexity in managing CFSP/ESDP and so some form of deepening is required, something the UK takes a very cautious approach towards despite its agreement to such ideas as a European Foreign Minister.

HMG is worried that CFSP/ESDP will be brought to a stand-still by disputes over Turkish membership, with the threat of national referendums blunting the effectiveness of enlargement as an instrument of European foreign policy. HMG has called upon – and will continue to call upon – the assistance of the United States in helping to overcome such obstructions, in particular with regard to Turkish membership which Washington strongly supports.

HMG is also keen to raise awareness of how enlargement changes the geo-political considerations for the EU. Most profoundly it asks questions about where Europe ends and in turn what should be the security and strategic considerations that should shape relations with Europe's neighbours and in turn the EU's internal security and policing concerns.

- *The view of the European Security Strategy (ESS) as an instrument for enhancing coherence in the EU's security policy; how does your country view the ESS and which issues are of particular importance?*

HMG strongly welcomed the European Security Strategy when it was launched. It was seen as a means by which Europe could begin to heal the wounds of Iraq and demonstrate the EU's willingness to adopt hard power when required. It is worth noting that the main drafter of the document was Robert Cooper, a former foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair. HMG welcomed the fact that the Strategy offers a clearer articulation of what every European Member state seeks in foreign affairs and in particular should seek through CFSP/ESDP.

There has been some discussion about the European Security Strategy amongst the UK foreign policy community. However the document generated little or no interest among UK politicians, the media or the public. HMG preferred the document to pass without comment given the sensitivities surrounding European defence issues in both the media and Parliament.

What discussion has taken place has highlighted how the strategy points to areas Europe still needs to do some hard thinking about, such as how to apply power and geo-political thinking. While the strategy is not as hard-power centred as its American counterpart (the US National Security Strategy) there is a perception that it skips over issues that the Europeans find difficult to address. For example, it is all very well to stress the importance of multilateralism, as the strategy does in great detail, but it then fails to explain how Europe should approach multilateral institutions when they fail.

For HMG there remains a key priority that the ESS or any further such documents do not undermine NATO. In part this unwillingness to challenge the centrality of NATO in itself explains why the Europeans – and indeed the UK – have failed to discuss other ideas for strategic thinking.

In early 2004 the UK set out its own quasi version of a security strategy document. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 'UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO' (available through the FCO website) set out the UK's – or some might argue the FCO's – foreign policy priorities. The strategic policy priorities are: A world safer from global terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction; Protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime; An international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts; An effective EU in a secure neighbourhood; Promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy; Sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights; Security of UK and global energy supplies; Security and good governance of the UK's Overseas Territories.

- *European Neighbourhood Policy and its implications;*

As EU President the UK is currently seeking to ensure the effective monitoring of the recently adopted Action Plans for the first wave of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan). The UK is keen to see that the plans – which identify areas for reform linked to closer co-operation with the EU – help these states progress along a process of political, social and economic reform.

The UK – in particular as EU President – is also keen to lend its support to the Commission in negotiating Action Plans for the second wave of ENP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Egypt, and Lebanon)

The UK sees great potential in closer relations with Ukraine, especially following last December's Orange Revolution. HMG is keen to see that attempts by Ukraine to develop closer relations, with some viewing membership as a possible end, are given a warm welcome by the rest of the EU. HMG notes that the Ukrainian Government has introduced a comprehensive reform programme aimed at bringing Ukraine closer to EU standards, focusing on the priorities set out in the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan. An EU-Ukraine Summit will take place during the UK Presidency and HMG believes this will provide an opportunity to demonstrate the increased depth and strength of relations between the EU and Ukraine since the Orange Revolution, and to underline EU support for the ongoing reform process.

In general HMG is keen to see the EU and its Member States develop better relations with its neighbors and in particular develop a better geopolitical understanding of the EU's priorities. In this regard the ENP must include considerations of relations with Russia and the wider Middle East.

- *The creation of battle groups and their role for ESDP.*

Tony Blair remains committed to CFSP/ESDP in a transatlantic context, emphasising the role of the United Kingdom as a transatlantic bridge. At the same time Blair is still considered to be one of

Britain's most pro-European Prime Ministers, a man who *could* commit the UK to the Euro, and who at St Malo in 1998 committed Britain to helping to build improved EU military capabilities. However, again the UK view is that this is within the context of a strong NATO and a transatlantic alliance with the United States.

The UK remains committed to an enlarged NATO as the only viable defence organisation. The approval in June 2004 of a new Headline Goal 2010 was welcomed by HMG as a means of addressing interoperability, deployability and sustainability. HMG sees an important role in this for the new European Defence Agency. HMG has repeatedly been keen to ensure that the EU improves its planning links with NATO.

The UK presidency of the EU will further develop the rapid-response 'Battlegroups' initiative and agree a civilian capability improvement plan in November. The UK Presidency will launch a work programme on civil/military co-ordination intent on maximising the EU's potential to apply its especially wide range of security instruments coherently, including a framework to support comprehensive planning. HMG also looks forward to the EU improving its ability to contribute to disaster response, especially in light of the Asian tsunami last year; and take forward work on a concept for EU security sector reform missions.

4. *The Constitutional Treaty and its future – National perceptions concerning a 'plan B'?*

Describe (briefly) the position of your country on the following key issues and the possibility of their realisation without a Constitutional Treaty as a 'plan B', 'C' or 'D':

- *External Representation: What is the final position of your country on the European foreign minister and the President of the European Council? Will / should there be a post resembling that of the Foreign Minister based on the Nice Treaty (something like an enhanced High Representative)? How could this be realised?*

The UK was and remains in favour of the position of a European Foreign Minister, and the President of the European Council. The UK has been keen to ensure that the External Action Service exists under the responsibility of the European Foreign Minister through the Council. The Foreign Minister's role of overseeing the work of the EU External Relations service was seen by the UK as a means of ensuring increased control for the council. HMG was very keen to ensure that the role of the EU Foreign Minister was carefully defined, seeking to ensure that the European Foreign Minister would be only bound by Commission procedures where this did not conflict with his or her Council mandate. Public opinion has from the start been uneasy with the title 'European Foreign Minister' or indeed the use of the word 'President' in relation to the Council. HMG remains keen to see these ideas realised in some format, but exactly how is not yet officially clear.

- *Basic structures of the European External Action Service have already been developed. Now that the Constitutional Treaty might not enter into force, is your government in favour of developing such a body in order to support the High Representative?*

HMG supports the creation of a European External Action Service. A concern does exist within some quarters that the External Action Service may present an additional layer of bureaucracy and will also seek to displace the national diplomatic services. In response HMG has made it clear that it views the External Action Service as working within a mandate that clearly states that it shall work with the national diplomatic services and not as an alternative to them. HMG has also made it clear that the service must be based within existing financial resources and therefore not present any additional cost to European tax payers. HMG also stresses that the service would be staffed by officials from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and seconded diplomats from Member State governments and diplomatic services. HMG believes this would help ensure the Service reflects the breadth of its work and improve the coherence of EU external action across the board. HMG also views the creation of the service as making operational sense and are prepared to share premises with it in third countries, provided issues of security and some physical separation of rooms and offices are met. The support the service could provide to an EU Foreign Minister or the current High Representative is viewed positively. Indeed, HMG would still like to see such a service

develop, however precise details of how this will occur without the constitutional treaty have yet to be made clear.

- *Decision-making: Does your country opt for an extension of qualified majority voting in the field of CFSP? Will the Nice provisions be sufficient for an efficient CFSP/ESDP decision-making within the enlarged EU?*

HMG remains against any moves towards QMV in CFSP and there is little prospect of change in this respect. At the beginning of the debates in the European Convention HMG did state that it would consider an extension of QMV on a case by case basis stressing that any future decision to move to QMV would have to be made by unanimous agreement in the Council. It is also worth noting that the UK was not in favour of the idea of using QMV on issues put forward by the EU Foreign Minister. HMG accepts the need for QMV in some areas of implementation if necessary, as set out under Maastricht (unanimity for foreign policy but some QMV for implementation), and thus a small amount of ambiguity exists in the British position.

- *Crisis management: What is the official position on expanding the Petersberg tasks and making reference to tasks that involve military resources? Which regions does your country consider as particularly promising for EU crisis management?*

The UK is in favour of expanding the Petersberg Tasks. HMG is very happy to see tasks that involve military resources. Having led a large number of operations the UK appreciates the lack of European military capabilities and the need for it to wield both hard and soft power instruments. HMG would like to see the EU move beyond dealing with the long run problems of crisis management and instead tackle immediate problems, which will require more immediate and effective military instruments. There is a strong desire to go beyond merely 'monitoring the situation' and being able to act effectively and decisively; this it is hoped would be well received in Washington who HMG worries views the EU as a 'freeloader' of American military power. In achieving this aid and development policy are seen as essential to playing a crucial role working in tandem with foreign and security policy. The UK supports the involvement of the EU in any region where the need arises, and the Prime Minister has mentioned the idea of involvement in North Africa, especially with regard to the situation in Darfur.

- *Defence: What is your country's position towards the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS? Was your government in favour of creating a full-fledged operational EU headquarters?*

HMG remains in favour of the establishment of a civilian-military cell at EUMS. The moves by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 to establish an EU military operations headquarters at Tervuren angered HMG. It was characterised by HMG as an attempt to subvert NATO while providing no real substance or capabilities. However, later in the year at Berlin, Prime Minister Blair was reported as agreeing to a separate planning capacity for the EU. This caused some tension with the US. HMG argues that it is willing to see such a European HQ slowly evolve out of the EU planning cell, but that this should emerge through experience. HMG has now accepted that an EU planning capability should be established, but with close links to NATO. HMG has been keen to make it clear that the EU is not creating a full headquarters but is instead seeking to enhance the EU military staff (EUMS) through a non-permanent cell with civil and military components. HMG's fears that the cell would allow the EU to act autonomously have been allayed by the cell having the implementation of military operations listed as a low ranking priority.

- *Is your country in favour of realising provisions such as the permanent structured cooperation even without the Constitutional Treaty? What measures would be preferred?*

HMG was initially sceptical of the ideas behind permanent structured cooperation. This was based on a number of fears, especially that the original idea was viewed as an example of a hollow gesture that would annoy the Americans and fail to achieve greater coherence among European forces. HMG feared it would be used to create an avant-garde group of Member States that would be incompatible with the overall workings of the EU. However, HMG's position changed following

the Franco-British-German trilateral talks in November 2003. At this meeting HMG seemed to ease its opposition to the proposals, and accepted the idea of a specifically European military headquarters, provided this was integrated with the NATO framework. This approach was confirmed at a meeting on 24 November in London between Prime Minister Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, when the British Prime Minister emphasised that, despite his desire to strengthen European defence, nevertheless 'NATO will remain the cornerstone of our defence'. This change was in part a result of recognition by all that ESDP would need to be built from the bottom up through the development of specialist contributions from EU members. HMG secured assurances that became part of the package, such as the ability of all states to join forms of structured cooperation at any stage. The UK has sought guarantees and reassurances about how member states will qualify for participation in an operation to ensure that the Council has oversight of the initiative. These reflect two of the UK's concerns: first, that the member states should be ready to develop improved defence capabilities. Secondly, in doing so member states should commit themselves to supply by 2007 (through either national contributions or multinational contribution) units to carry out crisis management missions, supported by sufficient transport and logistical capabilities. HMG has therefore appeared to recognise that US leadership in major military operations will not be put at risk by ESDP and structured cooperation. UK views ESDP as only modest in terms of desired military capabilities and the UK should therefore face no significant problems in contributing. For the UK, high intensity military operations will continue to depend on the US. The EU will therefore continue to need to look to NATO and the US to assist in major military operations in the Balkans or near abroad.

- *Would your country support the creation of core groups inside or outside the EU in CFSP/ESDP if the Constitutional Treaty finally failed?*

See answer above regarding permanent structured cooperation.

5. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

The UK has a large number of institutions, academics and experts covering European integration, international relations and defence/strategic studies. Many university departments covering politics, international relations, international law, defence/strategic studies have some expertise on CFSP. The strongest centres are LSE (European Foreign Policy Unit), Loughborough and Cambridge, although other places have very strong individuals and PhD students.

A detailed list of academic experts can be found in UACES *Directory of Expertise on Europe: European Studies Research Interests of UACES Members 2004 – 2005* which includes details of most British academic experts interested in CFSP and ESDP. Major experts listed include Professor Christopher Hill (Cambridge), Professor William Wallace (LSE), Dr Karen Smith (LSE), Professor Dave Allen (Loughborough) Professor Brennan (University of Westminster), Professor Anthony Forster (University of Bristol), Professor AJR Groom (University of Kent), Dr Jane Harrold (Britannia Royal Naval College), Professor Emil Kirchner (University of Essex), Dr Kerry Longhurst (University of Birmingham), Dr Ian Manners (University of Kent), Professor William Patterson (University of Birmingham), Professor John Peterson (University of Glasgow), Dr Alistair Shepherd (University of Wales, Aberystwyth), Professor Richard Whitman (University of Westminster), Dr Neil Winn (University of Leeds), Dr Martin Zaborowski (Aston University), Dr Geoffrey Edwards (University of Cambridge), Professor Richard Gillespie (University of Liverpool). Tim Oliver (LSE) is in the process of establishing a 'British Foreign Policy Working Group' as part of the British International Studies Association (BISA); the group will bring together a wide range of academics interested in British foreign policy and in turn touch upon CFSP/ESDP.

The leading non-academic research institutions and their associate experts include the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), the Foreign Policy Centre, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (with Dr Dana Allin), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Centre for European Reform (including Charles Grant, Steven Everts, Heather Grabbe, Daniel Keohane and Mark Leonard). On European issues, which also include discussion of CFSP, see the ESRC programme 'One Europe or Several?', UACES (University Association for Contemporary European Studies) and the British Foreign Policy Research Centre.