

CFSP WATCH 2004 – Poland by Dr. Rafal Trzaskowski and Olaf Osica

1. What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2004? What are the key issues for your country in 2004 (after EU enlargement, after the Iraq conflict)?

The most important priorities of Poland's foreign policy, as established at the beginning of 2004, were as follows: successful conclusion of the EU accession process, strengthening of transatlantic cooperation, continuing the positive engagement in the stabilisation process in Iraq. When it comes to CFSP, the government declared that it would above all focus on: taking active part in the creation of a robust Eastern Policy of the EU and active participation in developing European Security and Defence Policy and EU crisis reaction capabilities. Poland has also set for itself other CFSP policy goals, which among others included: active participation in fighting terrorism, assisting in the process of stabilisations in the Balkans and strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.¹

2. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2004

Please describe key positions and perceptions in your country with regard to EU foreign policy, taking into account:

- The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP (e.g. taking into account current developments like the Iraq conflict);

Neither CFSP nor CESDP has ever enjoyed the respect of Polish public opinion and the political elite. Before the admission to EU, Poland's successive governments saw no particular benefits of EU common positions and actions in relation to Polish eastern neighbourhood (i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, Kaliningrad-Russia). The source of CFSP impotence was seen in the intra-European competition among main members who tended to set their national interests over Community ones (e.g. policy towards Russia) or attempted to hijack EU foreign policy for the sake of their own policies (e.g. Iraq). However, this approach has undergone a somewhat positive evolution. The role played by the European Parliament, the Commission and High-Representative along with Polish politicians in solving the presidential crisis in Ukraine was met with satisfaction, and gave a confidence boost to CFSP.

CESDP in turn for long time – since 1999 – has been regarded as a competitor of NATO and especially of the US. That was the final conclusion drawn from the Iraqi crisis. Yet, paradoxically enough, Polish military engagement in Iraq was a breaking point to the approach to CESDP. Poland regards itself as militarily capable of participating in CESDP, and has political ambitions to act as one of European leaders in the field.²

- The position of your country towards NATO after enlargement (in relationship with the ESDP), as well as NATO's role in Afghanistan and in Iraq;

With the day of its accession to NATO Poland begun actively support the next round of NATO enlargement. Yet, when the '911' brought a profound change in the US approach to NATO and its expansion, Poland was somewhat bewildered. It became clear that the rush to accept new members had little to do with their real military eligibility but more with the US's political strategy. The quiet consent of Russia was another sign that NATO had entered a new phase and was heading towards a collective model of security, at the expense of its collective defence function. In a word, the political dynamics across the Atlantic and changing priorities of the US,

¹ Information of the government about Poland's foreign policy delivered to the Polish Parliament by the foreign minister, Włodzisław Cimoszewicz, Warsaw, 21.01.2004.

² Cf. Address by the Secretary of State in MoD, Andrzej Towpik, to the conference "European Union as a security community", Warsaw, 23 March 2003.

especially in its approach to NATO yielded a delicate but discernible shift in Polish security policy. That seemed to be the moment when the approach to CESDP began to evolve positively.

Poland endorsed the invocation of article 5 of NATO in response to '911' and backed the US operation in Afghanistan. However, as majority of members it felt being neglected by the fact that the US circumvented the alliance while conducting the mission in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the government approved deployment of 300 troops for the stabilization mission in Afghanistan under the aegis of NATO. Poland has also been in favour of NATO engagement to Iraq. (As a matter of fact, the Polish-led multinational division in Iraq got logistical support from NATO HQ). The government has from the beginning argued that NATO should engage there, if not by deploying troops then in training Iraqi security forces. Concluding, it seems that NATO evolution since the '911' has had a significant influence upon Poland's perception of CESDP which appears now as a much more balanced than in the years 1999-2001.

- The role of the EU in crisis management e.g. in Europe and Africa

As the Ukrainian crisis very clearly showed, Poland is interested in a preventive political role of EU in places where potential conflicts may threaten Europe's security. Poland also supported the peace-keeping role of EU on the Balkans. Africa is also regarded as an area of European crisis management, but it seems to be beyond the scope of Polish foreign and security policy now, which is not to say that this will remain so in the future.

- The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP (old versus new Europe?)

It is fair to say that EU enlargement was seen essential for both CFSP and CESDP to become politically more relevant to Europe's security. There was a fear that if developed before enlargement, both projects might provoke a strategic split of Europe. In this sense, the Rumsfeld-speech evoked rather negative feelings as it sounded like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Though Poland was aware of the existing perception-gap between old and new EU members on such issues like Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, it tried to play it down, rather than stress it and risk creating new tensions. In a nutshell, despite the increase of the EU membership which may complicate the functioning of CFSP and CESDP, Poland regards enlargement as a new political impetus to both projects.

- The view of the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a instrument for enhancing coherence in the EU's security policy; how does your country view the ESS and which issues are of particular importance?

The reception of ESS in Poland was very limited. The announcement of the draft version of the document and the subsequent discussion on it overlapped with the climax of the debate on the EU Constitution, which dominated Polish media and public attention shifting all other issues – with the exception of war in Iraq – into the background.

In general, ESS was welcomed with satisfaction. The new Polish Strategy on National Security, from 8 September 2003³, corresponds in many regards with ESS. There is no doubt, however, that Poland's attitude depends on what EU will do on the basis of ESS, rather than on what ESS presupposes EU to do. Therefore, there are three main areas of Poland's concern. First, it wants the Union to take into account not only 'postmodern' threats but also traditional one resulting from political, ethnics or religious conflicts. Secondly, Poland did not conceal that it was dissatisfied with relative few references to the role of the US in European security. Thirdly, the ESS reluctance to refer to Russia not only in terms of a partner but also a source of potential security problems (e.g. Russia's role in the Belarus, Caucasus) was met with

³ The security strategy was approved on 23 July 2003 by the president and came into force on 8 September 2003;

http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=1000000001&obj_display_cat=11&obj_display_full=648&obj_to_display_type=21

considerable disappointment. After all, Russia's behaviour in Ukraine's presidential elections – where president Putin unconditionally backed the government's candidate responsible for election's fraud - was a good illustration of this deficiency.

3. The Results of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on the Constitutional Treaty

Have there been any official contributions or proposals brought to the IGC by your country's representatives with regard to External relations, CFSP and ESDP?

Describe (briefly) the position of your country in the following key issues:

- External Representation: What is the final position of your country on the European foreign minister and the President of the European Council? Is your country in favour of double hatting?

During the work of the Convention the representative of the Polish government Danuta Hübner⁴ accepted the idea of a merger between the posts of external relations commissioner and High Representative, as according to her it would contribute to achieving the needed synergy between CFSP and external relations. Similar views were shared by the foreign ministry.⁵ Hübner supported the idea of double-hatting, however, she emphasized the danger stemming from a possible competence overlap between the foreign minister and the president of the European Council.⁶ The representative of the opposition Zygmunt Wittbrodt, on the other hand, supported the merger, but he preferred the minister to function solely within the Commission.⁷

- Decision-making: Does your country opt for an extension of qualified majority voting in the field of CFSP? Did your country support the Italian Presidency proposal for qualified majority voting to be applied when a proposal is submitted in CFSP by the Foreign Minister?

For the past five years Poland's government, in most of its official documents, supported the need for a more efficient decision making in the enlarged EU. The Poland's stance on the issue was consistent, regardless of the changing government. The government representative to the Convention, Danuta Hübner, supported the extension of QMV to all non-constitutional provisions, provided that such move would not have grave financial consequences for Poland.⁸ Such position was fully shared by the members of the Polish parliamentary opposition, Zygmunt Wittbrodt and Marta Fogler, also present in the Convention.⁹

Poland's reaction to the Italian proposal, whereby the Minister could initiate the use of QMV on his own without the prior authorisation of the European Council, was, however, not unequivocal. In March 2003 the foreign minister Cimoszewicz summarized his view on the issue in his speech at the Ebert's Foundation: "The ESDP area, due to the indivisibility of security and the most sensitive character of issues at stake, should at least in the near future remain subject to unanimity decision-making. The implementation decisions could be an exception. They could be taken by QMV. In order to allow the EU a margin of flexibility without the need to recourse to the following IGC, the European Council could be empowered to decide unanimously on the further extension of the QMV."¹⁰

⁴ Danuta Hübner was minister for European affairs until May 2004 when she became the Polish Commissioner, from October 2004 responsible for regional policy, she was substituted by Jarosław Pietras.

⁵ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, 12.03.2003. – http://www.ms.gov.pl/file_libraries/31/352/0303-II.doc

⁶ *Europap*, 15.01.2003. www.euro.pap.com.pl

⁷ Contribution of, Zygmunt Wittbrodt, Convention session, 11-12.07.2002.

⁸ *Europap*, 06.02.2003. www.euro.pap.com.pl

⁹ Secretariat of the Convention, Reactions to draft articles 24 to 33 of the Constitutional Treaty – Analysis, CONV 609/03, Brussels, 12.03.2003.

¹⁰ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *Future of the CFSP*, (2003) op.cit.

At the beginning of the IGC, the government decided to change the tone somewhat and stress its positive attitude towards the extension of QMV, in a certain sense to counterbalance its tough stance on the system of weighted votes. The foreign minister – Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz¹¹ stressed in his text in the one of the leading Polish dailies “Rzeczpospolita” that Poland always was for the extension of QMV, as unanimity in many instances became a factor hampering the deepening of integration.¹² However, in the course of actual negotiations which followed Poland again exhibited a much more lukewarm attitude on the issue. It was due both to tactical calculation and conviction. Poland sided with the British on the issue of structural cooperation and QMV extension in exchange for the neutral British stance on the issue of weighted votes (Poland along with Spain was defending the Nice formula, whereas Germany and France were pushing for the acceptance of a double-weighting system). On the other hand, the government was well aware that agreeing to QMV extension in the realm of CFSP would have important internal repercussions - provoking the wrath of the opposition (with an exception of Civic Platform). Especially taking into account the fact that the defence of unanimity became a pet-project of many Polish Eurosceptics, some of whom claimed, even before the 2000 IGC, that the EU system relies too heavily on QMV, and that there is an urgent need for reconsideration of the *status quo*.

- Crisis management: What is the official position on expanding the Petersberg tasks and making reference to tasks that involve military resources? Which regions does your country consider as particularly promising for EU crisis management (e.g. Africa, Southern Caucasus)?

Poland's foreign policy, largely due to its history and lack of any colonial legacy, focuses primarily on Europe. When it comes to truly global challenges, Poland's aspirations are somewhat limited and usually are carried out in cooperation with the EU and NATO (Poland even in a pre-accession stage subscribed to most EU *demarchés* and common positions). Poland's government was of the opinion that the definition of the Petersberg tasks should be expanded in order to meet the challenges the EU is currently facing, such as terrorism.¹³ The limits for Petersberg tasks are imposed in practice by military assets and capabilities of EU-members. Therefore, there is a wide-spread conviction among Polish military that at the present state of development, the EU can perform all Petersberg-mission, except large operations involving a high-intensity warfare; e.g. Afghanistan. For such missions NATO assistance appears indispensable.

As the main security threats for Poland come from the eastern-southern part of Europe this geographical direction determines the Polish approach to EU crisis management. Poland envisages EU as a security provider not only on the Balkans, but also in the former Soviet Union; e.g. Moldova and Georgia. However, the decision to deploy forces to Iraq, widened the geographical and hence political scope of Polish politics. Polish troops are also present on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon (UN missions). One cannot exclude that Poland would also support a peace-keeping operation in the Middle East (Palestine), though the question remains whether the EU would be capable of such a mission. Africa occupies the last place of on the list. Yet, this does not mean that Poland is against the EU's role in this area, or that it would refuse to participate in it.

- Defence: What is your country's position towards the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS? Was your government in favour of creating a full-fledged operational EU headquarters?

¹¹ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz resigned from his function in January 2005 in order to become the speaker of the Polish Parliament, he was substituted by his deputy Prof. Adam Rotfeld.

¹² Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *We enter this river for the first time ...*, „Rzeczpospolita“ 27.10.2003.

¹³ Remarks by Mrs. Danuta Hübner, Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Conference on ‘New scenarios for European common security and defence.’ Second session: ‘Foreign policy and common defence in the future European Constitution.’ Grand Hotel Dino, Baveno, Lago Maggiore, 23.09.2003, <http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/WW/en.nsf/0/15B6287C532E596DC1256E8200544DE6?Open>

Poland is a very NATO oriented country and as such it has never supported the creation of a fully-fledged operational EU headquarters which it saw as a competition to NATO. Poland is ready to support the strengthening of all aspects of CEDP as long as it does not threaten or endanger the cohesiveness of NATO. The government is of the opinion that the Berlin Plus format is sufficient. Creating operational EU headquarters in Tervuren at this stage of the Union's policy development was seen as unnecessary duplication of NATO assets. Especially, that the issue of an operational EUHQ came up within the context of the 'chocolate summit' and against the backdrop of mounting tensions over Iraq. It was therefore seen as an ill-timed idea which could only add more fuel to the flames. Officially, however, for tactical reasons, Poland's government did not take a very clear-cut position on the issue. Poland's European affairs minister Danuta Hübner remarks testify to that calculated caution: "There is a clear need for harmonisation of efforts in the field of military capabilities undertaken by NATO and the EU. In this context, certainly more debate on the creation of a separate EU military headquarters is needed. Much remains to be done to fully implement the 'Berlin plus' agreement, which provides for EU access to NATO operational planning".

- What is the official position of your country on the new provisions for permanent structured cooperation, the final wording of the mutual defence clause, and the role and tasks of the defence agency? Should the agency become the institutional nucleus for European procurement and a single budget for defence?

During the works of Convention and the last IGC Poland accepted the idea of including a solidarity clause into the new Treaty. In the view of the Poland's government, such clause could be made operational in case of a terrorist attack, nevertheless its application would have to be limited to dealing with the effects of a given attack on the territory of a member state.¹⁴ Just like most of the other new member states, the Polish attitude towards the concept of flexible integration from the outset has been characterised by certain ambivalence. Consistently, Poland had serious reservations about the idea of closer cooperation within ESDP (referring to common defence clause). when it first appeared on the Convention's agenda. In the words of the foreign minister: 'Finding the security of all member states indivisible, Poland has serious reservations about the idea of closer co-operation in ESDP'.¹⁵ There were fears that closer co-operation in the field of defence would undermine the common defence provisions of the Washington treaty (art. 4 and 5), which for Poland would be unacceptable. Poland always feared also that if the Union's ambitions in security and defence policy were to be realized, it could be left out of it, either from political reasons or because of its rather dubious military potential. Therefore the Polish government was always against setting strict 'convergence criteria'. Structural cooperation, in its initial form, was seen in Warsaw not only as a possible tool for exclusion but also an initiative which could threaten NATO – i.e. make it irrelevant in the field of 'out-of-area operations' in Europe - and as such was assessed with a great degree of suspicion. Poland's stance on the issue changed only after an agreement was reached by the major players - France, Germany and Great Britain - just before the Naples meeting of foreign ministers in November 2003. Only after her Majesty's government took care of the controversial aspects of the whole concept, Poland chose to support the inclusion of the newly worded provision concerning structural cooperation into the Treaty. It was possible largely because in the course of the negotiations among the three the language of structural cooperation was made more inclusive and, most importantly, the draft protocol enumerating conditions which had to be met (new version of which did not preclude the participation of less technologically developed countries in the structural cooperation) was considerably watered down. In the end, Warsaw also accepted the idea of setting up the European Armaments Agency, when it became crystal clear that the participation in its work was to be open-ended. Again to quote the words of the foreign minister: 'Poland will join in all undertakings and forms of cooperation that will not weaken the North Atlantic Alliance

¹⁴ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *Future of the CFSP*, (2003) op.cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

and duplicate its functions. We intend to join the European Defence Agency and permanent structural cooperation, after it has been sanctioned by the Treaty establishing the European Constitution.”¹⁶

Once it got involved in the creation of EDA , Poland supports the idea according to which the Agency could become the institutional nucleus for European procurement, however, according to the Polish officials it is too soon to contemplate the idea of a single budget for defence.

4. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

- Please indicate major experts, universities and research institutions working in the CFSP field in your country.

Natolin European Centre

Center for International Relations, Warsaw, www.csm.org.pl

Institute for Strategic Studies, Cracow, <http://iss.krakow.pl/>

Polish Institute for International Affairs, www.pism.pl

Institute for International Relations, Warsaw University

- Please feel free to add specific remarks on your country (e.g. on the relation between national foreign and security policy and CFSP, on costs/benefits of one country's membership in the EU with regard to CFSP/ESDP)

¹⁶ Information of the government about Poland's foreign policy delivered to the Polish Parliament by the foreign minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Warsaw, 21.01.2004, op.cit.