CFSP Watch 2004 – Germany – by Nicole Alecu de Flers

1. What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2004? What are the key issues for your country in 2004 (after EU enlargement, after the Iraq conflict)?

- EU membership is traditionally seen as one of the most essential elements of German foreign policy and there is a broad consensus in favour of a common European foreign policy. The political elite – regardless of political “colour” – generally supports participation in CFSP/ESDP and this attitude is also widely shared by public opinion: According to Eurobarometer, in autumn 2004 80% of the respondents in Germany supported a common foreign policy of the EU member states and 87% were in favour of a common defence and security policy.

- Germany has continuously made efforts to further strengthen CFSP/ESDP and especially in the context of the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 the German government has attached great importance to reforming the institutions and procedures of the EU in order to ensure efficiency and the ability of the EU to act. Several proposals were submitted to the European Convention by Germany, which were to simplify decision-making, to facilitate further progress in integrating the CFSP and to give the EU a single “face” towards the outside. After the Convention had finished the Draft European Constitution, the German government stressed that the progress made by the Convention as to CFSP should not be diluted.

- Concerning the further development of ESDP, the strengthening of the ability of the EU to act with regard to conflict prevention and crisis management is seen to be of special importance. While it is acknowledged that situations may occur where recourse to the use of force will have to be taken, the German government has stressed that military force must always remain a last resort and be undertaken only in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Germany is particularly in favour of developing civilian and military capabilities on an equal basis. Given that the capabilities for civilian crisis management clearly do not come up to the military side of ESDP, Germany together with other partners proposed a “Consolidated Civilian Headline Goal”, which defines strategic parameters for civilian crisis management in a more systematic development of

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1 Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin.
civilian capabilities and was adopted by the European Council in December 2004. This Civilian Headline Goal, alongside the 2010 Headline Goal for military capabilities, which was approved by the June 2004 European Council, is considered to be an important step in making the European Security Strategy operational.

- Concerning the division of opinions on the question of a war against Iraq, the German government feels that events have proven the position it took to be right. Nevertheless, after the decision of the coalition to go to war it was stressed to be of utmost importance for Europe as for America that the war was brought to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible and that peace was won.

- Especially with regard to the experience in the context of the Iraq conflict, it was recognized that the EU also needs a strategic dimension and the European Security Strategy is seen as a precondition for this. In order to make a concrete contribution to implementing the European Security Strategy, in February 2004 the German government – together with the French and the British government – drew up a concept for the arrangement of so-called “Battle Groups”, which was accepted by the EU Defence Ministers in November 2004. Germany will take part in four of the 13 planned Battle Groups and it is stressed that the Battle Group concept and NATO Rapid Response Force are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

- Furthermore, Germany is actively involved in the EU operations which were launched in 2004. As far as military operation “EUFOR ALTHEA” in Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, Germany is one of the major contributors with 1,100 troops (of a total of 7,000 troops from 33 countries) and it is also taking part in the Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (“EUJUST THEMIS”).

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2. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2004

a) The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP (e.g. taking into account current developments like the Iraq conflict)

- Although it is often underestimated and even maligned by others, CFSP/ESDP is said by the German government to have developed very dynamically over the last five years.\(^5\) Given the density of consultations and the widening scope of issues, it is noted by the German government that CFSP/ESDP has constantly gained importance.

- The cooperation between the EU and NATO, which could be reached despite initial reluctance from many, is viewed as an important basis for the EU's ability to act in the security field. It is also considered to be especially remarkable that the EU successfully completed Operation “Artemis” without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and only three months after the EU had launched its very first military operation.\(^6\) As another example for the success of CFSP the EU's contribution to drawing up the “Roadmap” for solving the Middle East conflict was mentioned.\(^7\)

- Overall, it is stressed that the development of CFSP/ESDP should be seen as a process. The view is held that the EU member states might gradually move away from acting according to their old national reflexes and that despite or maybe just because of the disunity concerning the Iraq conflict, different processes of coordination have evolved. This is considered to be all the more reason to improve CFSP/ESDP still further.

- It is said that the disability for strategic dialogue with the USA after September 11\(^{th}\) and before the Iraq war was caused by a lack of strategic conscience within the EU. Thus it seems remarkable that the European Security Strategy was received positively by all member states and this is assumed to show the

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\(^6\) Closing Address by State Secretary Dr. Klaus Scharioth, 24 September 2004 (see above).

willingness to get to a common European foreign and security policy on the basis of agreed principles.\(^8\)

b) The position of your country towards NATO after enlargement (in relationship with the ESDP), as well as NATO’s role in Afghanistan and in Iraq

- NATO’s enlargement process was generally welcomed by the German government as contributing to stability and security in Europe and as strengthening transatlantic relations. Furthermore, it is stressed that the transatlantic partnership – which should be a partnership of equals on both sides of the Atlantic – remains an essential strategic priority for Europe and that it is a vitally important precondition for tackling the new challenges. NATO is viewed as continuing to be the foundation of the collective security of its members also after enlargement. However, it is also stressed that a strong NATO needs a strong European pillar, which is to be achieved through an effective ESDP. The EU and NATO should complement each other, not compete with each other, and the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO should be actively used and strengthened. According to Chancellor Schröder, so far the transatlantic partnership insufficiently takes into consideration the changes, which have occurred in the environment for transatlantic cooperation.\(^9\) As NATO is “no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies”, he proposed the creation of a high-ranking panel of experts from both sides of the Atlantic, which should deal with the reform of NATO and write a report for the heads of state and government of NATO and the EU by the beginning of 2006.

- Progress in the security situation in Afghanistan is seen as a key issue for NATO and Germany contributes more than one fourth of NATO’s forces in Afghanistan.\(^10\) However, the German government has rejected the idea of merging the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan and the US-led combat Operation Enduring Freedom into one single command.

\(^8\) “Für eine kooperative Weltordnung” [“For a cooperative world order"], interview with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In: Internationale Politik 58 (9): pp. 13-18.


\(^10\) For further information on the deployment of German armed forces to Afghanistan and on the German engagement in Afghanistan see the official website of the German Federal Foreign Office at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?land_id=1.
Although the German government was sceptical as to a direct involvement of NATO in Iraq, stressing that the risk of failure and the possibly fatal consequences for the Alliance should be carefully considered, it did not stand in the way of a consensus and agreed to a NATO training mission for Iraqi security forces, which is currently in the process of being set up. However, despite criticism from German opposition leaders, the German government has resisted to send any troops to Iraq. The German government has provided transportation vehicles and has been training Iraqi security forces outside Iraq in the United Arab Emirates since November 2004.

Generally, in the view of the German government, the development of a perspective and common strategy for the wider Middle East by America, Europe and the countries affected in the region is even more important for global security than the question of NATO engagement in Iraq.

c) The role of the EU in crisis management, e.g. in Europe and Africa

The further strengthening of the ability of the EU to act with regard to conflict prevention and crisis management is seen to be of special importance. The strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is considered to be crucial for crisis management operations and the German government especially welcomed the Berlin Plus agreement under which the EU can make use of NATO capabilities and common assets in the framework of EU-led operations.

Germany has participated and still participates in all EU operations: It contributed to operation “Concordia” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the first military operation launched by the EU, as well as to the military operation “Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. Despite initial reservations the German government perceived operation “Artemis” as a considerable success, as it showed that the EU is capable of rapidly launching autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets in difficult environments.

11 Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2004 (see above).
12 For further information on German aid for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq see the official website of the German Federal Foreign Office at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/info_irak/wiederaufbau_html.
13 Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2004 (see above).
Germany actively participates in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was launched as the first ESDP operation in 2003, and in the EU Police Mission “Proxima” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which also started in 2003. Furthermore, there is a German involvement in the EU operations which were initiated in 2004 (military operation “Althea” in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rule of Law Mission “Eujust Themis” in Georgia) and it has agreed to make contributions in kind to the Police Mission “Eupol Kinshasa” which will be launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo in early 2005.

On the whole, it is seen as an important achievement that the EU takes on more and more responsibility regarding international crisis management. Given the experience in the Balkans and in Afghanistan Germany is particularly in favour of developing civilian and military capabilities on an equal basis and sees the combination of civilian and military instruments as one of the special and chief characteristics of ESDP.

d) The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP (old versus new Europe?)

The EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 was generally welcomed as a historic chance to make Europe a location of lasting peace and well-being for its citizens and the German government views enlargement as a very effective security policy and crisis prevention of the EU. Furthermore, enlargement is seen as increasing the weight of the EU in international affairs and thus also the expectations concerning a global political role for the EU.

In order to ensure efficiency and the ability to act of an enlarged EU, the German government has attached great importance to reforming the institutions and procedures of the EU. Moreover, as the old and new member states might push ahead towards closer cooperation and deeper integration with different speeds, the German Chancellor has been in favour of considering the possibility of enhanced cooperation also for the field of foreign and security policy.

Concerning issues such as the “Letter of the Eight” and the division of opinions on the question of a war against Iraq, it has been noted that there will always be issues where Europe will not be able to speak with one single voice, especially if

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15 Speech by State Secretary Dr. Klaus Scharioth, 20 January 2005 (see above).
16 Interview with Federal Chancellor Schröder concerning the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Handelsblatt, 30 April 2004 (http://www.bundeskanzler.de/Interviews-.7716.645311/a.htm?printView=y).
questions of war and peace are concerned, but that it is important that the EU stays able to make compromises and that differences of opinion should be worked out in the framework of the Community method. The government holds the view that there is no such thing as a “new” and an “old” Europe and does not share fears of the new member states becoming a “Trojan horse” for US interests. It has been stressed that Europe does not define itself against the USA but rather through its common ground.

e) The view of the European Security Strategy (ESS) as an instrument for enhancing coherence in the EU’s security policy; how does your country view the ESS and which issues are of particular importance?

➢ The ESS is viewed as a first-rate document and as creating a basis for a coherent security policy of the EU. It is said to be a precondition for establishing the strategic dimension of the EU and for enabling the EU to engage in strategic dialogue with its partners, especially the USA. However, the German government, which had already pleaded for the drafting of such a strategy at an early stage, also stressed that the ESS needs to be put into practice and updated continuously.

➢ As far as particular issues are concerned, the German government strongly welcomed the comprehensive concept of security the ESS is based upon. As the new threats are not of a purely military nature, they require not a purely military response, but a broad range of crisis management and particularly preventive measures. Thus, diplomatic, legal and economic measures as well as environmental, social and development policy instruments should also be used. This broad approach, which puts special emphasis on civilian aspects, was especially important for the Green Party of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.

➢ Observers note that it is probably very much due to German insistence that the ESS qualifies the use of military force as an option of last resort, which can only be undertaken on the basis of the United Nations Charta. As far as the term “pre-emptive engagement”, which was used in the draft of the ESS of June 2003 and which was controversially debated, was concerned, the German Foreign Ministry pushed for changing this into the less offensive formulation “preventive

18 Government declaration by Federal Foreign Minister Fischer, 26 June 2003 (see above).
19 Speech by State Secretary Dr. Klaus Scharioth, 20 January 2005 (see above).
20 Government declaration by Federal Foreign Minister Fischer, 26 June 2003 (see above).
engagement”, which is used in the final version of the ESS.\(^2\) In accordance with its strong commitment to international law and the important role of the United Nations Security Council for international peace and security, the German government further welcomed the concept of “effective multilateralism” in the ESS, which is viewed as being essential to the EU’s approach.

Foreign Minister Fischer also pointed out that the ESS takes into account the close connection between the EU and the Middle East and mentions the creation of a zone of stability and security in Europe’s neighbouring regions as one of the strategic goals of the CFSP.\(^2\)


Generally, the German government argued for making as few changes as possible to the Draft European Constitution. Chancellor Schröder expressed hope for adopting the Draft Constitution without any changes and Foreign Minister Fischer warned not to endanger the success of the Intergovernmental Conference by breaking the consensus, stating that “the basic principle must be: who opens the consensus is responsible for finding a new consensus.”\(^3\)

a) External Representation: What is the final position of your country on the European foreign minister and the President of the European Council? Is your country in favour of double hatting?

The creation of the post of a European foreign minister, who performs the functions that are currently the responsibility of the High Representative for CFSP and of the Commissioner for external relations and who comes under both the Commission and the Council, had already been proposed in a joint Franco-German contribution to the European Convention concerning the EU’s institutional architecture.\(^4\) Accordingly, the double-hatted foreign minister, who

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Franco-German contribution to the European Convention concerning the Union’s institutional architecture, CONV 489/03, Brussels, 16 January 2003.
has a formal right of initiative in matters of CFSP (together with the member states), chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and who is supported by a European External Action Service, is considered to be one of the main achievements of the Constitution. It is said that the EU’s ability to act quickly, effectively and in a more coherent fashion will be greatly enhanced by unifying all relevant tasks under the responsibility of one person.\(^{25}\)

- Furthermore, although prior to the joint Franco-German paper Foreign Minister Fischer had opposed the idea of giving the European Council a more visible institutional presence, with respect to French interests, the German government endorsed the idea of establishing a President of the European Council whose functions in the area of external representation should, however, be limited to his level. This was advocated by the German government as another central innovation of the Draft Constitution, which further guarantees a better continuity of the actions of the EU.

b) Decision-making: Does your country opt for an extension of qualified majority voting in the field of CFSP? Did your country support the Italian Presidency proposal for qualified majority voting to be applied when a proposal is submitted in CFSP by the Foreign Minister?

- Germany pushed decidedly for the extension of qualified majority voting for CFSP decisions and wanted qualified majority voting to be the general rule, except for defence matters and those with military implications. Thus, the German government also supported the idea of the Italian Presidency of making qualified majority voting in CFSP conditional on a proposal by the European Foreign Minister.

c) Crisis management: What is the official position on expanding the Petersberg tasks and making reference to tasks that involve military resources? Which regions does your country consider as particularly promising for EU crisis management (e.g. Africa, Southern Caucasus)?

- Germany supported the expansion of the Petersberg tasks and especially the reference to the fight against terrorism. In general, the further strengthening of the ability of the EU to act with regard to conflict prevention and crisis management is considered to be of particular importance for the further development of ESDP. Therefore, at a meeting of the heads of state and state secretaries on 20 January 2005.

\(^{25}\) Speech by State Secretary Dr. Klaus Scharioth, 20 January 2005 (see above).
government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence in Brussels on 29 April 2003, a reformulation of the Petersberg missions was proposed “so that the EU can use civilian and military means in order to prevent conflicts and manage crises, including the most demanding missions”.

However, the German government stressed that military force must always remain a last resort and be undertaken only in accordance with Article 51 and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, Germany is particularly in favour of developing civilian and military capabilities on an equal basis.

- Germany welcomed the start of the Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (“Eujust Themis”) as a significant step forward in the development of the civilian crisis management capacities of the EU and is actively taking part in this mission. In general, crises in Europe and in the EU’s “neighbourhood” are considered to be of special importance, while acknowledging that there is no geographic restriction for ESDP missions. Outside of Europe, Africa is considered to be an important area for ESDP, while the Near and Middle East is also frequently mentioned as an area requiring European engagement.

d) Defence: What is your country’s position towards the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS? Was your government in favour of creating a full-fledged operational EU headquarters?

- Against the background of the division between the EU member states on how to address the Iraq crisis, Chancellor Schröder (against the advice of the foreign and defence ministry) strongly backed the Belgian proposal to establish a separate full-blown EU military operations headquarters at Tervuren, which was put forward at the meeting of the heads of state and government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence in Brussels on 29 April 2003. As the plans for creating a military headquarters to run EU operations proved highly controversial with other member states, particularly the UK, Schröder, Chirac and Blair reached a new agreement on the future of European defence in the autumn of 2003.

- At the EU Foreign Ministers conclave in Naples in November 2003 it was agreed to create a new planning division at the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

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(instead of a full-fledged operational planning headquarters). However, it was also accepted that this new planning unit will be independent and may one day evolve into a real headquarters, if everyone agrees.\(^\text{28}\) Referring to US concerns about a duplication of existing NATO capabilities, German Defence Minister Peter Struck stressed that the deal reached at Naples “would enforce the European side of NATO”.\(^\text{29}\)

- The German-Franco-British compromise further led to a paper on “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations”,\(^\text{30}\) which was introduced by the Italian Presidency and welcomed by the European Council at its meeting in Brussels in December 2003 and in which the establishment of a small EU cell of operational planners at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in addition to a civilian-military cell within the EUMS was proposed.

e) What is the official position of your country on the new provisions for permanent structured cooperation, the final wording of the mutual defence clause, and the role and tasks of the defence agency? Should the agency become the institutional nucleus for European procurement and a single budget for defence?

- The German government has generally been in favour of introducing models of flexibility/enhanced cooperation into ESDP. In the joint Franco-German proposal to the European Convention concerning the field of ESDP, the creation of a “pioneer group” in defence policy, which would be based on enhanced cooperation, was advocated.\(^\text{31}\) When the European countries could not reach a consensus on the policy towards Iraq in 2003, Germany, together with France, Luxembourg and Belgium, put forward plans for a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) (without the UK).\(^\text{32}\) In autumn 2003, Germany and France acknowledged that European foreign and defence policies cannot be built without the UK, while the UK accepted a defence group to be developed within the EU if it is open to all EU member states and if it does not undermine the role of NATO


\(^{29}\) www.euobserver.com, 2 December 2003.


\(^{31}\) Joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European security and defence policy, CONV 422/02, Brussels, 22 November 2002.

in European defence. The agreement reached between Germany, France and the UK on the future of European defence in autumn 2003 also contained suggestions for an amendment of the treaty articles on structured cooperation.

Following this, at the EU Foreign Ministers conclave in Naples in November 2003 it was agreed that the new provisions for structured cooperation would come under the political responsibility of the Council and contain reference to the operational capacities of the participants, not to their financial capacities. The new formulation which was introduced to the IGC by the Italian Presidency thereafter was seen by the German government as a substantial improvement, considering that the Convention had not been able to reach such an agreement.³³

Furthermore, in the context of the German-Franco-British compromise on European defence, Germany also agreed to change another contentious part of the Draft Constitution, which concerned mutual military assistance of the member states. Although it was generally strongly in favour of including a mutual defence clause in the constitution, Germany accepted that the words “mutual defence” were removed from the text of the Article and assertions were inserted that the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states shall not be prejudiced and that NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its member states.

However, regarding the persisting concerns of the neutral EU member states with the “automaticity” of the clause, Foreign Minister Fischer stressed that the clause should not be unnecessarily watered down and that the duty of solidarity should be kept.³⁴

The German government welcomed the creation of a European Defence Agency, which had already been proposed in the Franco-German contribution to the European Convention in November 2002. It is confident that this agency will strengthen the cooperation of the member states in the fields of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments and thus make the member states' defence efforts more coherent and more effective. According to Defence Minister Struck, the primary role of the Defence Agency – which should not be a new “super agency” but an efficiently functioning network agency – is to coordinate European defence equipment procurement.³⁵ It is further hoped

³⁵ “Perspektiven der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik” [“Perspectives of the European Security and Defence Policy”] – Opening speech by Federal Minister of Defence
that the European Defence Agency will help the member states reduce the disparity in capability with the US.
4. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

The following researchers/institutes have been dealing with CFSP/ESDP issues for a long time:

- Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), Berlin (Dr. Mathias Jopp, Dr. Elfriede Regelsberger)
- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin (Dr. Reinhardt Rummel, Prof. Dr. Peter Schmidt)
- Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP), Munich (Franco Algieri, Janis A. Emmanouilidis)
- Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK), Frankfurt/Main (Prof. Dr. Peter Schlottter, Dr. Matthias Dembinski)
- Prof. Dr. Reimund Seidelmann (University of Gießen)
- Dr. Ingo Peters (Freie Universität Berlin)
- Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Dr. Udo Diedrichs (University of Cologne)
- Prof. Dr. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (University of Würzburg)