

## CFSP WATCH 2003

### NATIONAL REPORT SWEDEN

by *Gunilla Herolf*

#### 1. Basic views of CFSP/ESDP. What are the priorities for your government in CFSP? What are the key issues?

As to *priorities* one of the two major challenges at present are to achieve political unity among members. The other is to improve coordination among the various activities of the EU, among EU organs and between EU and other institutions. This would improve the possibilities for a united effective policy.<sup>1</sup> Other priorities concern strengthening the preparedness to prevent conflicts, post-conflict reform including reorganization of armed forces, military coordination also.<sup>2</sup> It is also seen to be of greatest importance that civilian and military crisis management capabilities of the EU are increased.<sup>3</sup>

Sweden's own security position remains favourable, whereas the international situation is problematic. Two particular and interlinked *threats* are seen to be of special importance: international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, both of which are relevant for the CFSP/ESDP. The fight against terrorism must, however, in order to maintain legitimacy and popular support, be pursued in accordance with international law.<sup>4</sup>

The Swedish-Finnish support for increased solidarity in cases of terrorist attack was expressed in December of 2002 in a joint article by the two foreign ministers. (See also under point 3). The requirement was, however, that a solidarity clause, was formulated in a way so as not be mixed up with the security guarantee of NATO's article 5.<sup>5</sup>

An initiative on weapons of mass destruction was launched at the EU foreign minister meeting in Luxemburg on April 14. It had the support of the Greek presidency, the Swedish and Greek foreign ministers publishing their thoughts in a joint article. The initiative included ideas for strengthening the NPT Treaty, disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons and measures to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles.<sup>6</sup>

#### 2a. The perceived successes and failures of the CFSP/ESDP (Iraqi conflict, Sept 11, Bosnia, Macedonia):

*September 11:* The supportive statements and the actions taken by the EU were seen as appropriate responses. No proposals were made for the EU to assume a different role, nor has

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<sup>1</sup> Försvarsberedningen, *Säkrare grannskap – osäker värld*, [Parliamentary Defence Commission, *A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World*], Ds 2003:8, February 27, 2003., p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Gemensamt EU-förslag från Sveriges och Finlands utrikesministrar: Kontrakt tvingar alla agera mot terror. [Combating new threats with deeper solidarity. An article by the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja], Dec. 18 2002, <http://regeringen.se/annalindh>, *Dagens Nyheter*, December 18, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Försvarsberedningen, *Vårt militära försvar – vilja och vägval* [Parliamentary Defence Commission, *Our Military Defence – Commitment and Choices*], Ds 2003:34, June 3, 2003, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report, Ds 2003:34, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja, December 18, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Svenskt initiativ till ny strategi mot massförelsevapen, [Swedish initiative for new strategy against weapons of mass destruction], [http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/fragor/aktuella\\_fragor/massforstorelsevapen.htm](http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/fragor/aktuella_fragor/massforstorelsevapen.htm); "No More Iraqs!", Article by Anna Lindh and Giorgios Papandreou, Foreign Ministers respectively of Sweden and Greece, *Dagens Nyheter*, April 10, 2003.

the EU been accused of failing to play a more central one. The EU military crisis management forces were not seen to have a role in the American-led operations against terrorism, particularly not after NATO had activated Article 5.<sup>7</sup>

The *Iraqi conflict* was seen as a failure for the EU (as well as NATO). Prime Minister Göran Persson deplored the fact that EU members were not able to unite on a common view. The Defence Commission report described it as a serious setback for endeavours to create a common view within the area of foreign and security.<sup>8</sup> Sweden did not exclude an eventual military attack against Saddam Hussein, but only when preceded by a decision by the UN Security Council. The view was that weapon inspectors should have been given more time. The attack, since carried out without support of the UNSC, was a breach against international law.<sup>9</sup>

The handling of the *crisis of 2001 in Macedonia* is seen as a major success and a good example of a situation in which the EU was able to use a variety of means in an integrated way and thereby prevent a full-scale violent conflict. This should be the standard method.<sup>10</sup>

Continued support to the Balkans is seen to be of utmost importance with the goal of economic and political integration with the rest of Europe. International presence is still necessary – including also military forces.<sup>11</sup>

## **2b. The position of your country towards NATO (in relationship with the ESDP):**

Security in the region and in Europe as a whole is seen as built on close cooperation between Russia, the EU and NATO. The Defence Commission, while seeing the present rifts between the US and Europe as serious, emphasizes that deep common interests and values remain. It is vital to protect transatlantic relations in order to prevent that Europe and the US grow further apart and that the gaps in threat assessments, resources and capacities increase.<sup>12</sup>

Sweden, while non-aligned, excludes no cooperation with NATO apart from that built on Article 5. Close cooperation with NATO through the PFP and the EU is possible and desirable. In its relations with NATO the EU should be strong and united and thereby better able to formulate and carry out its own policies. Transatlantic cooperation is not threatened by a strong but by a weak Europe that loses in relevance. A deeper political cooperation within the EU, strengthened European capacities and a Europe that sees itself as a global actor is central also in order to create a more equal transatlantic partnership. A stronger Europe becomes a more credible critic and a more attractive cooperation partner.<sup>13</sup>

## **2c. The role of the EU in crisis management:**

The EU is part of the multiorganisational cooperation on European and global level, primarily in cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and NATO. A strong transatlantic relation is in the American and European interest for preventing and solving conflicts. When the two act

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<sup>7</sup> *Dagens Nyheter*, October 28, 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report Ds 2003:34, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Statsminister Göran Perssons anförande i riksdagen vid den särskilda debatten om Irakfrågan, 20 mars 2003.

[Speech by Prime Minister Göran Persson at the special debate on Iraq, March 20, 2003.]

<sup>10</sup> "From Promise to Practise: Strengthening Global Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict", speech by Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Wilton Park, 3 July 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, Minister for Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Policy Jan O. Karlsson, Defence Minister Leni Björklund, "Vi måste fortsätta stötta Balkan" [We must continue to support the Balkans], *Göteborgsposten* March 27, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report Ds 2003:34, pp. 17-19.

<sup>13</sup> Anna Lindh, Answer to "Interpellation av Carl B Hamilton om Sverige och Europas försvar, 26 maj 2003" [Interpellation by Carl B Hamilton on Sweden and the defence of Europe, May 26, 2003].

together (ex. Macedonia in 2001) they will achieve good results. The future of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process depends on the international community, in particular, the Quartet (EU, USA, UN and Russia) and on the US more than any other country.<sup>14</sup> Within the area of crisis management constructive cooperation between NATO and the EU could assure that capabilities are not unnecessarily duplicated.<sup>15</sup>

On the Balkans the EUPM and the Concordia strengthen the trend that the EU takes on added responsibility in crisis management and reconstruction work but NATO continues to play an important role in the western Balkans through the overriding leadership of multinational operations in the region and the support for reconstruction of democratically controlled defence forces. Any possible changes in Kosovo's final status would require special security arrangements during a period.<sup>16</sup>

The comparative advantage of the EU is its wide number of tools (humanitarian, economic, military and so on). In order to use them all, the EU needs to develop its capability of coordination among organs, institutions, and fields of activity. It is also important that the EU increases its capabilities in civilian and military crisis management.<sup>17</sup>

The EU has a global responsibility. Its crisis management capability may be used wherever it is needed, for tasks in close cooperation with the UN. Both civilian and military assets must therefore be able to function over long distances. Much is gained by combining EU instruments with UN experience on military and civilian peace-support, Congo being the actual example of such a task.<sup>18</sup>

## **2d The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP (old versus new Europe?)**

The concept of old versus new Europe in terms of seeing certain countries as different in attitude to the EU is not a common one. The impact of enlargement is more often described in terms of added security through integration and stability. According to the Foreign Minister it should be seen as the most important step to create lasting security in Europe in modern time.

The enlargement is also seen in the perspective of a balance between Europe and the United States. Again, according to the Foreign Minister ... "it should be used to make the voice and role of the EU even stronger in global politics. It is important for the sake of Europe as well as globally. USA is today the only strong actor on the global scene. Whether we share the view of the US or not it is important to have balance, which is also a reason why the EU should strengthen its role within foreign policy."<sup>19</sup>

## **3. European Convention: Reform of EU External relations, CFSP/ESDP**

### **- Any official contributions or proposals with regard to External relations, CFSP or ESDP?**

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<sup>14</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report, Ds 2003:34, p. 24.

<sup>15</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report, Ds 2003:8, p. 105.

<sup>16</sup> Ds 2003:34, pp. 13-14.

<sup>17</sup> Ds 2003:8, pp. 98-101 and Ds 2003:34, p. 27.

<sup>18</sup> Combating new threats with deeper solidarity. An article by the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja December 18, 2003, <http://www.regeringen.se/annalindh>. *Dagens Nyheter*, December 18, 2002; Anna Lindh, "Challenges of Peace Operations", Folke Bernadotte Academy, at Krusenbergs Herrgård, May 23, 2003. See also "Press Release, Swedish rapid deployment force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo", Ministry for Foreign Affairs, <http://utrikes.regeringen.se>.

<sup>19</sup> Anna Lindh, "Security Policy and International Law – Our Challenges Today", Speech at the Annual Conference of *Society and Defence*, Sälen, Jan 19, 2003. The same views are expressed by the Parliamentary Defence Commission Report 2003: 34, p. 12

The contributions of the government representative above all concerned other areas, such as CAP, transparency, the open coordination method, institutional matters (together with other small states) and the future budget. ESDP were mentioned in contributions to the discussion.

## External representation

### 3a

Sweden initially launched a proposal of its own, according to which a chairperson would be supported by a group presidency, in which several countries shared responsibility, each of them dealing with particular questions that they had been assigned to deal with. Through strict rotation, presidencies would not need to occur less frequently than today. This was launched as a compromise proposal, designed to unite large and small countries.<sup>20</sup> The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were criticized by the Parliament and the Committee on the Constitution: the Swedish proposal had been launched without prior consultation with the Committee on EU Affairs and also lacked support in this Committee.<sup>21</sup>

The proposal failed to acquire acceptance in the Convention, however and Sweden was sometimes believed to be supporting the proposal of the major states. It did, however, participate in the majority of meetings among the smaller states and was invited to all. Sweden was among the authors of the small state initiative, *Contribution 288*, to the Convention on March 28, 2003.

The result of the Convention is on the whole positive according to the prime minister. All institutions are strengthened while at the same time the balance between them has not been changed. An elected president of the European Council with a limited mandate will contribute to the efficiency and continuity of the Council.<sup>22</sup> The Convention proposal also opens up for several different models of group presidencies, which will contribute to continuity. At the same time it is very important that the rotation among members for chairmanship of the Council remains.<sup>23</sup>

The appointment of a foreign minister is seen to contribute to increased efficiency and a more visible external representation of the EU. The double hatting of the foreign minister is, however, seen as problematic. It would not be suitable for him to chair Council meetings when decisions are taken on issues where he himself is responsible for initiative and implementation.<sup>24</sup>

### 3b

Sweden endorses the Convention proposal, keeping unanimity as the main principle but opening for increased qualified majority voting when implementing the agreed policies and the possibility to use the veto right when proposals are seen to be against national interests. Retaining unanimity for military and defence related issues is important as well. Sweden sees the CFSP as an area in which it is important to have the full endorsement of all members and

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<sup>20</sup> Information to the Riksdag giving the Government's views on the future of the EU, presented by Prime Minister, Göran Persson, 19 February 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande 2002/03:KU30 [Report by the Committee on the Constitution]

<sup>22</sup> Statsministerns redogörelse för EU-nämnden om Europeiska rådet möte I Thessaloniki 19-20 juni, 18 juni 2003.[The Prime Minister: report to the Committee on EU Affairs on the meeting in Thessaloniki June 19-20, 2003]

<sup>23</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ds 2003:35, p. 44

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, the Lena Hjelm-Wallén in Convention plenary discussion December 20, 2002 and, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid. Resultat och utgångspunkter inför nästa regeringskonferens* [The European Convention and the Future of Europe – Results and Starting Points in View of the Next Intergovernmental Conference], Ds 2003:36, July 18, 2003, p. 97.

therefore wishes to preserve the present rule that all countries must endorse the goals for areas included in enhanced cooperation.<sup>25</sup> (See also 3d).

### 3c

The ESDP should be developed in accordance with the changes of global threats and security problems. Development of the Petersberg tasks is therefore seen as natural in this connection. The idea of structured cooperation, while based on an idea of using the full potential of the EU, is, however, seen as risking future tensions between member states and thereby a weakening of the ESDP. The ambition should instead be to involve all members. The proposal should therefore be adjusted to include all countries in formulating criteria for cooperation and to give possibilities for those not participating to have access to all information. All members should furthermore participate in decisions on undertaking missions and maintain the overriding political control.<sup>26</sup>

The Defence Commission considers that the extent of Swedish participation in peace support operations in Europe and its vicinity, but also globally, over the whole scale from civilian preventive actions to military peace enforcement tasks, should increase. The single most important factor is the possibility to engage in armed combat. The capability to participate in international actions, including peace enforcement is an essential asset and coincides with national demands. In order to meet potential demands it is seen as essential that Sweden deepens its engagement and cooperation with other member states within every area of the common foreign and defence policy, with the exception of a common European territorial defence.<sup>27</sup>

### 3d

Sweden sees the proposal for a voluntary Defence Equipment Agency, as positive. This coordination will give added possibilities for each country to improve its resources and make them more cost effective. The Defence Commission considers it important to promote the European defence industry, but this industry must not have an exclusive nature or lead to a closed European market. Continued cooperation with the United States must be possible.<sup>28</sup>

The proposal for solidarity is strongly endorsed, but on the condition that it does not get mixed up with any defence obligations. The envisaged clause should express the wish of member States to coordinate law enforcement measures as well as judicial and economic instruments. It should also refer to coordination of military resources under civilian leadership in the context of emergency tasks designed to protect civilian populations and democratic institutions. Primarily the issue is to help a member state that has become a target of international terrorism.<sup>29</sup>

Flexibility in terms of the proposal of the four, according to the foreign minister weakens the common foreign policy, for which it is important to have a single European voice. Initiatives such as these are particularly damaging at a point in time when the EU is already divided on the Iraq issue.<sup>30</sup> Prime Minister Göran Persson in an article before Thessaloniki

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<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, *Dagens Nyheter*, June 7 2003 and plenary discussion in Convention 15-16 May 2003. See also Ds2003:36, p. 98.

<sup>26</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ds 2003:36, pp. 98- 99.

<sup>27</sup> Parliamentary Defence Commission Report, Ds 2003:34, pp. 27-29.

<sup>28</sup> Ds 2003:36, p.99; Ds 2003:34, pp. 73-74.

<sup>29</sup> Gemensamt EU-förslag från Sveriges och Finlands utrikesministrar: Kontrakt tvingar alla agera mot terror. [Combating new threats with deeper solidarity, An article by the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja), <http://www.regeringen.se>. *Dagens Nyheter*, December 18 2002.

<sup>30</sup> *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 April 2003.

meeting remarked that the EU voice becomes weaker when countries do not appear together.<sup>31</sup>

Flexibility in terms of common defence: Sweden when entering the EU promised not to hinder others from former closer relationships in terms of common defence but deplors actions like these, which lead to unnecessary dividing lines between EU states and thereby impair possibilities to formulate a common policy towards other countries. It may also cause transatlantic tensions.<sup>32</sup>

#### 4. Mapping of activities in CFSP-related research

Swedish National Defence College: Dr Magnus Ekengren: [Magnus.Ekengren@fhs.mil.se](mailto:Magnus.Ekengren@fhs.mil.se), Professor Bo Huldt: [Bo.Huldt@fhs.mil.se](mailto:Bo.Huldt@fhs.mil.se), Dr Jan Hallenberg: [Jan.Hallenberg@fhs.mil.se](mailto:Jan.Hallenberg@fhs.mil.se)

University of Göteborg: Professor Rutger Lindahl: [Rutger.Lindahl@pol.gu.se](mailto:Rutger.Lindahl@pol.gu.se), Dr Hans Andersson: [Hans.Andersson@pol.gu.se](mailto:Hans.Andersson@pol.gu.se), Professor Ulf Bjereld: [Ulf.Bjereld@pol.gu.se](mailto:Ulf.Bjereld@pol.gu.se)

Lund University: Professor Ole Elgström: [Ole.Elgstrom@svet.lu.se](mailto:Ole.Elgstrom@svet.lu.se), Dr Annika Björkdahl: [Bjorkdahl@svet.lu.se](mailto:Bjorkdahl@svet.lu.se); Maria Strömvik: [Maria.Stromvik@svet.lu.se](mailto:Maria.Stromvik@svet.lu.se), Professor Magnus Jerneck: [Magnus.Jerneck@svet.lu.se](mailto:Magnus.Jerneck@svet.lu.se)

Malmö University: Dr Magnus Ericson: [Magnus.Ericson@imer.mah.se](mailto:Magnus.Ericson@imer.mah.se), Dr Rikard Bengtsson: [Rikard.Bengtsson@imer.mah.se](mailto:Rikard.Bengtsson@imer.mah.se)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Director Alyson Bailes: [Bailes@sipri.org](mailto:Bailes@sipri.org), Dr Renata Dwan: [Dwan@sipri.org](mailto:Dwan@sipri.org)

Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut – FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency): Pär Eriksson: [perik@foi.se](mailto:perik@foi.se); Dr Mike Winnerstig: [mike.winnerstig@foi.se](mailto:mike.winnerstig@foi.se)

Swedish Institute of International Affairs: Professor Olav Fagelund Knudsen [knudsen@ui.se](mailto:knudsen@ui.se), Dr Jonas Tallberg: [Tallberg@ui.se](mailto:Tallberg@ui.se); Dr Jan Joel Andersson: [Andersson@ui.se](mailto:Andersson@ui.se), Dr Elisabeth Corell: [Ecorell@ui.se](mailto:Ecorell@ui.se); Dr. Gunilla Herolf: [Herolf@ui.se](mailto:Herolf@ui.se)

Stockholm University: Dr Ulrika Mörtz: [Ulrika.Moertz@statsvet.su.se](mailto:Ulrika.Moertz@statsvet.su.se), Dr Kjell Engelbrekt: [Engelbrekt@statsvet.su.se](mailto:Engelbrekt@statsvet.su.se)

#### 5. Country specific remarks

There is no conflict between national foreign and security policy and CFSP tasks. Lars Danielsson, State Secretary for European Affairs at a hearing of the Committee for EU Affairs underlined the fact that CFSP tasks might actually be easier for a non-aligned country since there is no conflict between NATO and EU tasks.

The discussion on NATO has during the last half year been less vivid, probably due to the ongoing discussion on the EMU. As previously two political parties, the Moderates (conservatives) and the Liberal Party are positive towards NATO membership. The leader of the Christian Democrats has also during the summer demanded new talks on security and defence policy, declaring that the doctrine from early 2002 is already antiquated and non-

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<sup>31</sup> Artikel av statsminister Göran Persson inför EU-toppmötet i Thessaloniki den 19-21 juni [Article by Prime Minister Göran Persson before EU meeting in Thessaloniki June 19-21], *Göteborgsposten* June 18, 2003.

<sup>32</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ds 2003:36, pp. 99-100.

alignment in the new Europe is far from given.<sup>33</sup> Public opinion has remained stable for a number of years, around 27 percent being positive to NATO membership, many expressing no opinion.<sup>34</sup>

Attached to the report of the Parliamentary Defence report 2003:8 are the dissenting views from representatives of the opposition parties. Concerning Swedish relations to NATO they mirror the views of the parties, as described above, in which the Moderates and the Liberal Party see Swedish membership as natural and the Christian Democrats want to discuss this possibility. The Left Party and the Green Party, on the other hand, see the expressions of the report as signalling too close cooperation.

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<sup>33</sup> Dagens Nyheter, July 12, 2003.

<sup>34</sup> Svenska Dagbladet, January 19, 2003