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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

This issue of *CFSP Forum* contains three articles, one on the member states and the CFSP, and two on the ESDP. In the first article, Lynne Dryburgh uses the concept of 'adaption' to analyse the relationship between the member states and CFSP. Then Stephanie Anderson considers the strategies that EU policy-makers have used to 'sell' the ESDP to the public. Finally, Miguel Medina Abellan analyses Turkey's often problematic relationship with the ESDP.

This is the last issue I will edit. Many, many heartfelt thanks to all those who have contributed to *CFSP Forum* over the last five years (some of you more than once!). It has been a pleasure to read your work, and I have learned a great deal from it (and I trust our readers have as well). The next editors of *CFSP Forum* are a team from the University of Bath, UK: Richard Whitman, Ana E. Juncos and Emma Stewart. Undoubtedly, *CFSP Forum* will be in very good hands!

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Adaptation? The CFSP and the Member States

Lynne Dryburgh, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College London, UK*

There can be little remaining doubt that the EU has a role to play in many areas of world politics. It is now a body representing 27+ member states sharing common positions on the world stage, is the world's main provider of humanitarian aid, the world's largest trading bloc, and is developing a strong reputation in the field of policing and civilian crisis management missions. These developments represent a challenge to the foreign policy structures and policies of the individual member states. Relationships between the two levels have evolved, which have become the subject both of speculation and of study, with a particular emphasis on the minor and post-neutral states. The findings of these analyses indicate that EU-level developments have had far-reaching consequences for the scope, structures, and habits of the minor member states, in some cases to the extent that the CFSP *is* their foreign policy. Where there is a limited degree of research, however, is in in-depth empirical examinations of the major¹ member states. Instead, there is an implicit or explicit assumption that the major member states will adapt less, 'simply because the "European" dimension [of their foreign policy] is relatively smaller'.² This article aims to demonstrate that the major member states have a more subtle and nuanced relationship with European foreign and security policy than commonly assumed.

The focus here is on the concept of adaptation,

and on that process in the UK, whose status as a major member state and reputation as the Union's 'awkward partner'³ and one of NATO's strongest proponents makes it a particularly interesting case to examine. The article concentrates on the period prior to 11 September 2001, in order to ensure the comparability of the research with existing work done on the minor member states, and to compare and contrast adaptation under John Major's Conservative government with that of Tony Blair's New Labour. In addition to considering UK attitudes and adaptation to the process of institution-building occurring at the European level, the research outlined here also examined UK adaptation within two policy areas: Iran and Cuba. It therefore offers not only a comprehensive overview of UK adaptation, but, given the opposing stances taken by the EU and the US in these policy areas, also highlights the impact of the UK's much heralded pro-Atlanticism on that process.

Perhaps most importantly, the article employs a more differentiated understanding of the term 'adaptation' than is commonly found in the literature. Adaptation is often termed Europeanisation, and the two terms are frequently used interchangeably. However, Europeanisation is used so widely and in so many different senses that its utility is doubtful. Additionally, it brings with it an assumption of convergence around the EU norm or median. Using the term adaptation instead allows for a wider and more nuanced examination of the relationship between EU and member state-level developments and policies. It is argued that adaptation can take one of three forms: convergence, diversion, or leadership.⁴ The article will therefore begin by outlining the UK's preferences relating both to European integration in general and to the CFSP and ESDP in particular, before highlighting some of the key areas of convergence, diversion and leadership, and finishing with some conclusions on UK adaptation, and the way in which that relates to the minor member states.

UK adaptation

European integration has long been a contentious subject for the UK. While it has vacillated between indifference, opposition, and support, there are certain key preferences which have developed in UK attitudes towards European integration. Amongst these are opposition to integration for its own sake and to federalism, leading to the development of the concept of subsidiarity and efforts to minimise

the role of the Community institutions. To that end, both the Conservatives and Labour pushed for further enlargement, emphasising widening rather than deepening. At the same time, however, the UK's pragmatism fostered efforts to push for further integration where it was felt both practical and desirable. These preferences translated through to the CFSP and ESDP, where the UK insisted on intergovernmental structures and unanimous decision-making for both policy areas, and on curbing the powers and role of the Community institutions. The UK also retained a clear commitment to NATO as the foundation of European defence, showing a strong aversion to the idea of the EU as a collective defence organisation. Notably, although Blair's government was instrumental in the development of the ESDP, NATO primacy was as central to Labour policy as it had been to the Conservatives, with the St Malo declaration recognising that NATO was the 'foundation of the collective defence of its members'.⁵ In policy areas, the UK maintained bilateral relations with both countries, and indeed increased its political contacts with Cuba and Iran under Labour.

Despite these preferences and the boundaries they established for UK adaptation, there was some convergence apparent in the UK's relationship with the CFSP and ESDP. The UK gradually accepted an expansion of the scope of the CFSP to cover a wider range of policy areas. External representation of the Union by a party other than the Presidency gained increasing acceptance, and the UK also eventually agreed to the use of qualified majority voting within the CFSP, albeit on the implementation of decisions already taken by unanimity. Within defence, there was convergence on the idea of the EU as a security organisation, with military structures and peacekeeping and crisis management capabilities. The folding of the WEU into the EU gained gradual agreement on the part of the UK, with the exception of Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Within the individual policy areas, although there was ongoing, and to some degree increasing, bilateral activity, there was nevertheless an important degree of convergence apparent, particularly through the 'reflex response'. This term, developed for this analysis, relates to occasions where the UK Government responds to questions on UK policy with reference to EU policy and action. In policy towards both Cuba and Iran, the reflex response was much in evidence, with the Government commonly responding to questions on human rights issues, political or social reform in either country, and even on British bilateral relations with reference to EU policies or coordinated EU

action. What was perhaps even more significant, however, is that there were also occasions where the UK allowed the EU to act on its behalf in response to issues raised by British subjects directly with the UK government. One example being concerns regarding the execution of a prominent member of the Bahá'í Community in Iran, raised by members of the Bahá'í Community in the UK. Questioned on the subject in the Commons, the Government replied that it was hoping that the EU Presidency would soon make a demarche 'on behalf of the Twelve'.⁶ Also of note within the individual policy areas was the UK's reaction to US attempts to impose extra-territorial legislation on companies and individuals from third countries, which would have significantly affected EU economic interests. The UK acted with the other member states not only to implement legislation against the US legislation, but also in condemning the US embargo on Cuba at the United Nations General Assembly.

The diversion form of adaptation, which relates to efforts to divert attention away from the EU to other organisations/initiatives, was most apparent in the UK's attitude towards the development of the ESDP, particularly under the Conservatives. The key diversionary tactic, in response to suggestions regarding a security and defence capability for the Union, was to put forward proposals to strengthen the WEU. The aim was both to prevent the EU from gaining capabilities to which the UK was opposed, and also to strengthen the WEU as the European pillar of NATO to ensure continued US involvement in European security. In addition, the Conservatives promoted the ability of the WEU to utilise NATO assets in European-led operations, hoping to avoid the need for 'elaborate separate structures' and aiming to reinforce NATO's importance in Europe.⁷

The final form of adaptation – leadership – was a form particularly favoured by Blair and the Labour Government, but was also evident under the Conservatives. Consistent with the preferences identified above, the UK put forward a number of proposals aimed at strengthening the intergovernmental structure of the CFSP, including 'upgrading' the CFSP Unit of the Council Secretariat, and creating the Political and Security Committee, made up of senior officials from the member states. The UK also attempted to take the lead within the two individual policy areas, trying to shape the policy developed by the EU. Its efforts in policy towards Cuba generally went unnoticed, but both EU and UK sources confirm that the policy

of the UK towards Iran largely drove that of the EU during the 1990s, and continues to do so now. Perhaps the clearest example of leadership was Labour's initiatives in the area of security and defence, with Tony Blair initiating a renewed debate which resulted in the St Malo declaration, leading to the creation of the ESDP. Blair acknowledged the UK's motivation, arguing that the UK faced the choice of engaging with the debate on security and defence and 'shaping it in a way that is fully consistent with NATO' or 'opting out once again'.⁸ To that end, the UK put forward a number of proposals aimed both at strengthening the ability of the EU to undertake security operations, and at linking European structures more firmly with those of NATO, including measures allowing the use of NATO assets to carry out EU-led operations in support of the CFSP.

This brief summary of a number of indicators of adaptation on the part of the UK reveals some interesting trends. In moving away both from the term Europeanisation and the expectation of convergence, the understanding of adaptation employed here allowed for a fuller exploration of the relationship of the UK with the CFSP and ESDP. That relationship has been more complex, widespread and pragmatic than both the literature on the minor member states implies and the UK's reputation as an 'awkward partner' would suggest. The findings demonstrate that the process of adaptation in the UK was bounded by certain consistent preferences, and ongoing bilateralism was apparent. Significantly, there were also striking similarities between the Conservatives and Labour, with similar preferences, but slightly different approaches. There was, nevertheless, evidence of convergence, diversion and leadership, demonstrating that adaptation on the part of the UK was more extensive and complex than its status as a major member state would suggest. Also of note is the impact of the UK's pro-Atlantic preferences on its adaptation. These preferences very evidently played a strong role in both the diversionary and leadership strategies employed by the Conservatives and Labour within the security and defence debate. However, within policy towards Cuba and Iran, it is apparent that the UK preferred to act with the other EU member states, to the extent that they acted *against* the US and publicly condemned US policies at the UN. From this, it is possible to conclude that at the day-to-day level of individual policy areas, the UK's pro-Atlanticist preferences have a lesser impact on its policy and relationships than at the level of institution-building. It is also a sign that the UK has a

stronger commitment to the role of the US in European defence and security, as opposed to at the level of foreign policy.

Where these findings are of particular interest, however, is in comparison with the minor member states. As discussed above, it is commonly assumed that adaptation will be less apparent amongst the major member states than amongst the minor, implying that the degree of adaptation amongst the minor member states is reasonably significant. Certainly it is clear that the development of the CFSP has had an impact on the foreign policy agendas of the minor member states, widening the range of issues which they have to consider.⁹ There is also an argument that the growing competence of the EU in foreign policy has led to the development on the part of practitioners of a reflex that leads them to consider what their EU partners will think in response to any new foreign policy initiative, and coordinate accordingly.¹⁰ However, when specific policy areas are analysed, the findings reflect a situation amongst the minor member states which is as complex as the analysis of the UK above demonstrates. Although the CFSP has undoubtedly had an impact on the minor member states, that impact varies according to the policy area under investigation. Interviews concerning the rules and expectations among practitioners working within the CFSP and ESDP also indicate that adaptation among the minor member states may not have been as far-reaching or convergent as the literature assumes, and that the size of a member state may not necessarily correspond to its behaviour within the CFSP. Just as the UK retained certain consistent preferences and attempted leadership and diversion, so too do the minor member states. Officials interviewed in Brussels argued that the minor member states can be as intractable and awkward on issues of specific interest to them as can the major member states, and that there is an expectation that certain member states, whether major or minor, will push and attempt to take the lead on certain subjects.

What these findings demonstrate, then, is that the nature and degree of adaptation amongst the member states cannot be predicted by size, status, or attitudes towards the institution-building process. Instead, both major and minor states adapt through convergence, leadership and diversion, but also maintain individual preferences which establish the boundaries of their adaptation, suggesting that, on a spectrum of adaptation, both major and minor member states lie closer to the middle than commonly

predicted.◇

* This is a summary of the paper 'Understanding Adaptation: UK Foreign Policy and the CFSP 1990-2001', presented at the GARNET Conference 'The EU in International Affairs' at the Palais D'Egmont in Brussels in April 2008 and the 49th ISA Annual Convention in San Francisco in March 2008.

¹ The terms major and minor member states are employed here following the arguments put forward by Ben Tonra. See B. Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 46-7.

² K.E. Jørgensen, 'PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe', in K.E. Jørgensen, ed., *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 177.

³ S. George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁴ Diversion refers to attempts to divert attention away from EU initiatives and towards alternative organisations or proposals, while leadership relates to efforts to take the lead in the debate within the EU in order to shape outcomes in line with national preferences.

⁵ Joint Declaration on European Defence (St Malo Declaration), issued at the British-French Summit. St Malo, France. 3-4 December 1998.

⁶ House of Commons Debate (Session 1992-93) Volume 207, column 193. Douglas Hogg, Reply to Oral Question, 14 May 1992. Available from Hansard (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm>).

⁷ House of Commons Debate (Session 1992-93) Volume 208, column 518. Douglas Hurd, Oral Debate, 21 May 1992.

⁸ House of Commons Debate (Session 1998-99) Volume 332, column 473-4. Tony Blair, Oral Debate, 8 June 1999.

⁹ Tonra, pp. 258 & 263.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 261.

Selling the ESDP*

Stephanie B. Anderson, Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming, US

In response to a request from the European Council, Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP, and the European Commission published a paper in March 2008 on the impact of climate change on international security. The first line asserted that the threat was 'real'. The thaw in the Arctic meant that Europe might well clash with Russia in the future.¹ As a result, the EU needed to respond by increasing its capability for monitoring its borders, and early warning, especially with regard to 'state fragility and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, border disputes, impact on human rights, and potential migratory movements'.² The report concluded the EU needed to increase both its civil and military capabilities for crisis management and disaster response, and '[f]inancial implications for such responses should be identified and also be considered in the EU's budget review'.³

In other words, increasing the ESDP's capacity for action was a logical response to climate change. Although the paper also stressed the need for multilateral cooperation and solutions for global control of carbon emissions, it was pessimistic as to the potential success of that route: 'The multilateral system is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats outlined above. Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it ... The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure'.⁴ Therefore, the EU needed to increase its independent 'capacities for research, analysis, monitoring and early warning', and to bolster the Institute for Security Studies, the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU Network of Energy Correspondents (NESCO), the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Joint Research Centres.⁵ No mention was made of NATO despite the fact that it is the organisation tasked with the monitoring of Europe's borders and already has the infrastructure in place.

Five years earlier, the Pentagon commissioned a report on the effects of climate change on international security.⁶ The authors, Peter

Schwartz and Doug Randall, recognised similar threats and disturbances as the EU report, but ended with different conclusions. No military recommendations were made; rather, the report emphasised the need for diplomacy, 'Diplomatic action will be needed to minimize the likelihood of conflict in the most impacted areas.' To ensure US national security, the report offered seven recommendations: improve predictive climate models; assemble comprehensive predictive models of climate change impacts; create vulnerability metrics; identify no-regrets strategies for ensuring reliable access to food and water; rehearse adaptive responses to shortages of food and water, etc.; explore local implications; and explore geo-engineering options that control the climate.⁷

Although both the US and EU documents recognise the same devastating consequences of climate change on international security, they propose very different policy recommendations. As one journalist put it, the Solana/Commission paper concludes the 'EU must boost military capabilities in face of climate change',⁸ whereas the Pentagon paper recommends diplomacy and improved predictive climate models. The difference is a bit ironic considering that the EU normally criticises the US for using military solutions to tackle non-military problems.⁹ Also, considering how anti-war most Green parties are, the conclusion that the EU must augment its military capabilities may not seem 'environmentally friendly'.

Why the different conclusions? To help understand, one must first determine the audience: in the US case, the Pentagon hierarchy and the Bush administration. The Pentagon is a military organisation with plenty of money for guns and tanks: the authors' goal was to wake it up to the need to address climate change. The Bush administration went so far as to suppress the report because of its denial of such a threat.¹⁰ While President Bush was happy to beef up the military budget, he was not interested in working to combat climate change. Therefore, the emphasis in the report was on what the US was not doing: multilateral diplomacy and research into preventing, or at least minimising, the impact of global warming.

What was the goal of Solana/Commission paper? Was it to bring the issue of climate change to the member-state governments? No, on the contrary, it was in fact the European Council who commissioned the report. Was it to promote the importance of climate change to the people? No, the people are very aware. They see it as one of the most important issues and threats today.

According to a German Marshall Fund poll, of all the threats proposed, 85 percent of Europeans queried said that global warming was the threat most likely to affect them personally.¹¹

The threat assessments given in the EU document were not new: 'For the most part, however, much of the climate-change-based security risks mentioned in the report have been listed elsewhere. What is new is the proposal of the incorporation of risks resulting from climate change into European defence policy thinking.'¹² The significance of the report is not its assessment of the security ramifications of global warming, but rather the incorporation of climate change into European defence policy. This new focus on the environment is the most recent in a long line of attempts to justify the need for an ESDP and to get the public to support the project financially. While the ESDP is popular, people do not want to spend money on it, and therefore, its success, either as a tool of integration or as a policy, is in jeopardy. The recent Irish referendum demonstrates this phenomenon: while the people generally support Europe, they are often not willing to make sacrifices for it.¹³ As a result, the EU is on a constant campaign to justify the need to fund the ESDP.

What is the ESDP for?

Much hyperbole surrounds the ESDP. Really, it is rather small. Most ESDP missions are civilian in nature, and not military; approximately 20 missions have been launched, including rule of law missions, border crossings, as well as military missions in Bosnia and Africa. To date, no ESDP mission has included all the EU member states; rather they are de facto coalitions of the willing often including non-EU members such as Turkey, Norway, and Canada.¹⁴ Perhaps most impressively, the CFSP/ESDP has functioned on a budget of, for the most part, well under 100 million euros a year.¹⁵

Nevertheless, politicians and academics alike have purported that the ESDP will be able to defend the EU,¹⁶ will allow it to become a 'power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror, and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices',¹⁷ will allow the EU to balance the power of the United States,¹⁸ is a sign of the EU's coming of age on the world stage,¹⁹ will augment the power of the United Nations,²⁰ and will help fight terrorism.²¹

These estimations may be too optimistic. The ESDP suffers from a lack of capabilities, a lack of money, and a lack of political will. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni argued that the ESDP is 'bad' for

Europe as it wastes resources and is divisive.²² Sten Rynning characterised the development of the ESDP as puzzling for three reasons. First, NATO continues to have tremendous military advantages over the EU. Second, a European pillar could have been developed within NATO (there was no need for it to be developed within the EU per se); and, 'finally, because the usual suspects, the French, simply cannot have masterminded the EU development single-handedly.'²³ All the member states must have some reason to support the creation of a foreign, security, and defence policy for the EU: what is that reason?

The answer may well lie in Leo Tindemans's 1975 Report of European Union: the ESDP can combat feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability among the people. Tindemans opened his report with a question, 'What do [the people] expect from a united Europe?'²⁴ He remarked that, while doing research on the subject, he 'was struck by the widespread feeling that we are vulnerable and powerless.' At the same time, 'Our peoples are conscious that they embody certain values which have had an inestimable influence on the development of civilization. Why should we cease to spread our ideas abroad when we have always done so?' His solution was a European foreign and security policy. Presenting a united front in world discussions would offset public malaise: 'our vulnerability and our relative impotence are in the thoughts of everyone.' As a result, 'external relations are one of the main reasons for building Europe, and make it essential for the European Union to have an external policy.'²⁵

Public opinion polls reflected Tindemans's understanding of the situation. In 1974 and 1975, an average of over 80 percent of those polled believed that the member states should act jointly through the 'Common Market' rather than individually if they were to 'make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans or the Russians.'²⁶ In *Eurobarometer* surveys from 1976 to 1985, an average of 57 percent across the continent agreed that decisions about security and defence should be taken by the member countries of the European Union acting together, even in the United Kingdom where many citizens were sceptical of the integration process.²⁷

The new 21st-century generation of European politicians are following the same logic as their predecessors. As Solana explained, the CFSP is 'also part of a specific project, to know the ambition to promote a model of integration and cooperation.'²⁸ EU Military Committee Chairman General Moschini believed 'The ESDP was ... the main catalyst for the general process of European

integration.²⁹ In its White Paper on European governance, the Commission explained how international action could be translated into citizen support:

The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectively attained at both European and global level. This responds to citizens' expectations for a powerful Union on a world stage. Successful international action reinforces European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union.³⁰

Chris Patten, former Commissioner for External Relations concurred: 'the EU's credibility will be greatly enhanced if it can demonstrate its contribution to the safety and security of its citizens'³¹ He continued, 'I am confident this debate will be one of the most appealing to European citizens, one which will make them feel more and more "euro-activists"'.³²

But despite very high public support for the CFSP/ESDP, the devil is in the details. The problem politicians face is that, despite the popularity of the idea of an ESDP, the people are extremely reluctant to fund it. Public support for an ESDP drops significantly once asked whether they are willing to pay for it. In 2004, although 71 percent of Europeans wanted the EU to become a superpower like the US, 47 percent of the 71 percent withdrew their support if that ambition meant an increase in military spending.³³ In other words, the people want the prestige of an EU force, but not the cost.

Therefore, shoring up public opinion for the ESDP has been a key objective for the past Belgian, Spanish and Luxembourg presidencies. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt wrote an open letter to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac stating '[n]ow, we must act' to make the Union more credible in this area or lose public support for Union defence spending.³⁴ The Spanish presidency actually went so far as to list a group of 'public opinion objectives' for the ESDP: 'In order to obtain the people's support, it is necessary to inform them and make them participants in our achievements and, likewise, in our failures. Only in this way will we gain their trust and support.'³⁵

Luxembourg, while holding the EU presidency in 2005, made the issue of ESDP promotion a main talking point:

The ESDP has become part of everyday

*life and it is important to underline its indispensability in a globalised world becoming more and more dangerous. To achieve the goal of an improved and enhanced communication strategy, there is no secret: explain, popularize, envelop it in common language at the same time as debating its objectives and concepts in order to spread it among the public [emphasis added].*³⁶

The goal is to increase the visibility of the CFSP/ESDP among the people, even if it means underlining to the public how dangerous the world is becoming although this contradicts the opening line the European Security Strategy: 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.'³⁷ However, peace and prosperity are not as practical for rallying support for a security and defence policy which could be such a useful tool for integration.

In any case, Solana's office took the Luxembourg recommendation to heart. Nine months later, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers produced the first ESDP newsletter. Its purpose was to create an emotional connection between the ESDP and European citizens: 'Beyond the structures and the acronyms lie people, faces and stories. Above all, there is a European ambition. I hope this newsletter will give you an insight into them.'³⁸ At the same time, the Commission's DG RELEX and the Council commissioned the European Service Network to create a pan-European public relations campaign to promote the ESDP with large billboards in every member state saying 'Your Choice is Peace: The European Union is working for peace, security, and stability.'³⁹

In 2006, the UK Parliament hosted a two-day seminar on 'Building a secure Europe in a better world: parliamentary responsibility and action in shaping public opinion on security and defence.' As WEU Assembly President Jean-Pierre Masseret (France, Socialist group), explained, national parliaments 'must address the security concerns of European citizens and at the same time educate public opinion on security and defence issues. Parliaments must explain that Europe's future position in the world was at stake if its common foreign, security and defence policy stagnated.' He even suggested that *Eurobarometer* ask a new question in its polls: 'how much more are you prepared to pay for your security?'⁴⁰ Rob de Wijk, director of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, argued that parliamentarians needed to 'convince public opinion that the stagnation of Europe would inevitably lead to its marginalisation.'⁴¹

Conclusion: Selling the ESDP

To elicit citizen support, the politicians use hyperbole to capture the public's imagination and whatever issue is at the forefront of the public's mind. As a result, many different justifications have been given to support the EU's security and defence policy. First, politicians used the ESDP to show that the EU was a mature power that had developed enough to be a force on the world stage. After 9/11, politicians argued the ESDP could be used to combat terrorism, although EU defence ministers retracted the statement four years later.⁴² During the Iraq war, the ESDP was sold as a way to counter the power of the US. Most recently, the ESDP has been sold as a way to combat the consequences of climate change. Politicians have no choice but to pander to the public if they are garner popular and financial support for this policy. ♦

* This essay draws on material from Stephanie B. Anderson, *Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

¹ Ian Traynor, 'Climate change may spark conflict with Russia, EU told', *The Guardian*, 10 March 2008.

² 'Climate Change and International Security', paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, 14 March 2008, p. 9.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

⁶ 'Pentagon downplays report identifying climate change as national security threat', *Associated Press*, 27 February 2004.

⁷ Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, 'An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security', October 2003,

www.ems.org/climate/pentagon-climate-change.pdf

⁸ Leigh Phillips, 'EU must boost military capabilities in face of climate change', *EUobserver.com*, 10 March 2008.

⁹ Ed McCullough, 'Summit May Favor Tackling Causes of Terrorism Over Military Response', *Associated Press*, 7 March 2005.

¹⁰ Indeed, the lack of focus on the military as well as its implicit condemnation of the Bush administration's policies (or lack thereof) on climate change, along with its doomsday character may explain why the report was suppressed. Mark Townsend and Paul Harris, 'Now the Pentagon tells Bush: climate change will destroy us', *The Observer* 22 February 2004. See also Andrew C. Revkin, 'The Sky is Falling! Say Hollywood and, Yes, the Pentagon', *New York Times*, 29 February 2004.

¹¹ German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends* 2007, p. 9 <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=54>

¹² Phillips, op cit.

¹³ 82 percent of Irish polled in 2008 believed their country had benefited from membership, the highest percentage in the Union; the Irish who voted 'no' did so because they were not willing to sacrifice an Irish Commissioner, sovereignty in their tax system, or possibly dilute their neutrality in security and defense matters. See Eurobarometer 69 (2008), p. 28, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb_69_first_en.pdf, and Flash Eurobarometer 245 (2008): Post referendum survey in Ireland, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_245_en.pdf, p. 7.

¹⁴ Generally, ESDP operations have been de facto coalitions of the willing. Both ALTHEA and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not include all the EU member states, but do include many others. ALTHEA had troops from

twenty-two out of twenty-five EU member states and troops from Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey. Only five EU member states contributed officials, along with Canada and Turkey, to the EU Police Mission to Kinshasa. The EU's response to the crisis in Darfur cobbled together personnel from Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. These coalitions of the willing are a result of the veto national governments hold in this area; not all member states have been willing to contribute to any or all EU interventions. See the fact sheets on ALTHEA, EU POL, and the EU response to the crisis in Darfur, available on the Consilium website.

¹⁵ See

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/index.htm.

Member states pay for the bulk of any military missions out of their own pockets because Article 28.3 of the Treaty on European Union forbids the spending of CFSP money on operations with military implications.

¹⁶ At a defense conference in Sälen, Sweden, Gustav Hägglund argued that Europe should bear its own defence burden because it was uncertain whether the United States would continue to have either the resources or the political will to defend Europe: 'The American and the European pillar will become responsible for their respective territorial defence and co-operate in crises situations outside their own territories. My prediction is that this will happen within the next ten years. . . . There are no threats against Europe now that the EU cannot handle on its own.' As quoted in Lisbeth Kirk, 'Europe Must Defend Itself, Says Military Chief', *EUobserver.com*, 19 January 2004.

¹⁷ European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, Belgium, 14–15 December 2001, Annex I.

¹⁸ According to Jacques Chirac, 'To become a real power, the EU must, in their eyes, define itself as a 'balance' against the United States. An independent defence force is a primary condition for confirming Europe's identity as more than an economic bloc.' As quoted in Charles Bremner, 'Paris and Berlin Prepare Alliance to Rival NATO', *Times*, 28 April 2003.

¹⁹ François Bujon de l'Estang, French ambassador to the United States, explained, the 'Franco-German defense concept is not in contradiction with Transatlantic commitments, quite to the contrary. If you read it carefully, it is full of references to the Transatlantic partnership and to NATO as well as to European defense. But it is an expression of the fact that Europe is coming of age, and that coming of age in the international arena entails taking over defense responsibilities.' François Bujon de l'Estang, 'The French-German Relations, Europe and the Transatlantic Partnership', joint conference with the French and German ambassadors, University of California at Berkeley, 26 February 1998, and Stanford University, 27 February 1998, at <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/1998/buj2702.asp>.

²⁰ Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair Shepherd, *Toward a European Army* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003) p. 5.

²¹ 'Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting', Brussels, Belgium, 21 September 2001, part 3.

²² Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 'Why a Common Security and Defense Policy Is Bad for Europe', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 4, 2003–04, pp. 193–206.

²³ Sten Rynning, 'Why not NATO? Military planning in the European Union', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, 2003, pp. 53–4.

²⁴ Report on Europe Union in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1976, supplement 1, 11–35, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Richard C. Eichenberg 'Having It Both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 4, 2003, pp. 627–8.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ 'Mais, [la PESCE] fait aussi partie d'un projet spécifique, à

savoir l'ambition de promouvoir un modèle d'intégration et de coopération.' Javier Solana, 'CFSP: The State of the Union', Annual Conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1 July 2002. Translation is my own.

²⁹ Assembly meeting with the EU PSC Ambassadors, the Chairman of the EU Military Committee and the Head of the European Defence Agency: improving the link between ESDP and public opinion, WEU Assembly Press and Media, Paris, 10 February 2006.

³⁰ European Commission, 'European Governance: A White Paper', DOC/01/10 25 July 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/01/10&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.

³¹ Chris Patten, 'A Security Strategy for Europe'. *Oxford Journal of Good Governance*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2004, p. 15.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³³ German Marshall Fund of the United States, 'Transatlantic Survey Shows Continued, Significant Split in U.S.-Europe Relations', 9 September 2004, http://www.qmfus.org/press/article.cfm?id=12&parent_type=R.

³⁴ Letter from H.E. Mr Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium to the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair and H. E. Mr Jacques Chirac, Brussels, 18 July 2002. He wrote: 'There is, however, no doubt that public opinion in our countries is convinced of the need for a European defence. Indeed, all opinion polls confirm this. Now we must act. The total defence budgets of the member states of the European Union add up to approximately 150 billion euro. Our citizens will no longer accept a situation in which we spend so much money on our defence effort without making our Union any more credible or more operational in this area ... I consider it of utmost importance to develop the solidarity between the member states of the European Union. This could be done by means of a mutual security guarantee in the event of an attack calling for a collective response....'

³⁵ Speech by Mr Federico Trillo, Spanish Minister for Defence, 'Presentation of the EU Spanish Presidency's Objectives for ESDP', Madrid, 10 January 2002.

³⁶ Luxembourg Presidency, 'Working document relating to point 5 of the agenda: Presidency non-paper - Promoting the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)', 11 March 2005, http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/03/18definfo/index.html.

³⁷ European Security Strategy, p. 2.

³⁸ Javier Solana, 'Forward', *ESDP Newsletter* (December 2005), 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/051214_NewsletterFinal.pdf

³⁹ See the European Service Network, 28 November 2006, http://www.esn.be/index_en.cfm?page=tools%7Cnews. The poster version is on display at the EU's information office on Rond-Point Schuman in Brussels, Belgium. On Europe Day in 2007, an open day for the public, the billboard was the centerpiece of a huge display advertising the ESDP.

⁴⁰ WEU assembly seminar on the role of parliaments in shaping public opinion on European security and defence: parliamentarian should lead public opinion, WEU Assembly press release, Paris, 28 April 2006.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² 'Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting', Brussels, Belgium, 21 September 2001, part 3. However, less than four years later, at a meeting of EU defence ministers, the conclusion was the opposite: 'All defence ministers believe that ESDP does not have a crucial role to play in combating terrorism, but rather a back-up role.' 'EU/DEFENCE: Defence Ministers admit ESDP does not play 'crucial role' in combating terrorism', *Europe* (Brussels) 22 March 2005, p. 6.

Turkey and the ESDP: Anatomy of an Uncomfortable Relationship

Miguel Medina Abellan, PhD candidate, University of Cambridge, UK

The status of non-EU NATO members within the ESDP framework is one of the thorniest issues in the development of this policy.¹ In this regard, understanding the Turkish position in relation to ESDP and the wrangling that ended with the European Council decisions in Copenhagen (December 2002) is vital for analysing the dynamics of the ESDP project and its relationship with NATO. Turkey has followed a hard line position concerning the development of the ESDP, which reflects other aspects of its bilateral relations with the EU, exactly in the same way that the EU has been strict and sometimes inflexible with Turkey. Turkey has based its objections concerning ESDP on its privileged relations with NATO (and the United States) and on its disputes with Greece and Cyprus. For its part, the EU has been reluctant to offer Turkey a more accurate status inside ESDP for institutional-political reasons. The EU has been struggling to reach consensus on common security and defence policies, and its relations with NATO are still uncertain. Adding Turkey to this mix makes the situation even more complex. Yet multiple questions are open: Would Turkey's participation enhance or weaken the ESDP endeavour? Can the EU build a robust strategic partnership with NATO despite the Turkish blockade? This article sketches out the main issues concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP, in particular in relation to the institutional mechanisms, the decision making and decision shaping procedures and relations with NATO.

Setting the stage: Turkey as a peculiar ESDP associate

As a key NATO member, Turkey is the only non-EU NATO ally which is also an official EU membership candidate; it has been the main problem concerning the participation of third countries in the ESDP decision-making structures and operations/missions; it is a country with huge military capabilities and the most important non-EU contributor to ESDP (they are 'excellent students'²); it is located in an extremely important geo strategic enclave; and its bilateral disputes with Greece and Cyprus crucially affect the development of ESDP and its relations with NATO. Turkey's participation in ESDP puts on the

table more questions than answers about ESDP and, in practical terms, seems to add more difficulties to this policy instead of providing some solutions, contrary to the official Turkish discourse.

Turkey was concerned about ESDP but, from the very beginning, wanted to participate.³ Although the official Turkish discourse is of strong support, Ankara's initial reaction to ESDP was fierce, inspired both by an assumption that the EU was seeking to challenge NATO and by the fear that Turkey would be excluded from a key component of Europe's emerging security architecture.⁴ Ankara's security culture, its national and nationalistic sensitivities, and its mistrust of the EU led it to the conclusion that the ESDP represented a wilful determination to marginalise NATO and exclude non-EU members.⁵ The main problem was a dispute over the EU's links to NATO, and more precisely the involvement of non-EU contributing states to the ESDP, provisions set out in the conclusions of the Brussels (October 2002) summit (the so-called 'Nice Implementation Document' or NID).⁶ In addition, Turkey feared that an EU force could potentially operate in its areas of interests, without it having the right to decide or intervene. The fact that Turkey was not likely to join the EU anytime soon did not make the negotiations easier. These fears of exclusion pushed Turkey several times to veto any agreement that would give the EU access to NATO military assets and planning capabilities.

Turkey blocked the adoption of EU-NATO arrangements ('Berlin Plus') for three years, 1999-2002. But its position was based on an asymmetric starting point: since it thought that both the WEU legacy and its huge military capabilities gave it the right to talk to the EU on equal basis, and this proved to be a strategic mistake. First, Turkey argued that ESDP should be based on the WEU *acquis* (concerning decision-making, strategic planning and implementation) and the special status that non-EU NATO allies had therein. Turkey and the other Associate Members had a privileged position in the WEU, and this status was certainly stronger than that of the non-NATO countries, which were Observers.⁷ But the qualitative shift from the WEU to ESDP was not fully taken into account by Ankara. Secondly, the NID clearly lay down a comprehensive set of rules for the participation of non-EU members in ESDP, but Turkey considered it an insufficient document.⁸ Thirdly, Turkey believes that its NATO membership entails some natural rights concerning its

participation in ESDP, and this again proved to be the wrong assumption.

During the three crucial years between 1999 and 2002, Turkey was the non-EU European ally with the strongest sense of grievance. Turkey's basic expectation from Brussels was the adoption of any necessary provision that would enable the participation of non-EU European allies in EU operations (including preparation and planning, political control and strategic direction) if the operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities, if these countries raised their concerns that the envisaged operation was in their geographical proximity or might even have an effect on their own national security interests.⁹

The EU's response was that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and management of operations when Turkish forces participate; but since Turkey was not a member of the EU, it could not claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Ankara.¹⁰ Given this situation, Turkey's opposition to an autonomous ESDP made EU-NATO cooperation impossible, and Ankara used its NATO membership to block the Berlin Plus process. This was a double-edged sword since while Turkey stopped EU plans to mount military missions before the EU was autonomously equipped to do so, it also gave an incentive to the EU to precipitate a move towards total autonomy from NATO.¹¹ This formal blockage in practice delayed the start of any ad hoc EU military operation with NATO support, although it did not prevent the EU's proceeding to build up its own ESDP structures and capabilities.

The final breakthrough came at the end of 2001 in a context of significant movement in Turkey's general relationship with the European institutions. The solution was finally found, but not before the presentation of a joint UK-US-Turkish document, known as the Ankara Document, which promised that a potential ESDP force would never be deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. The document assured that, whatever the crisis, the ESDP would never be directed against an ally and would always respect the obligations of EU member states vis-à-vis NATO members.¹² The document included a reverse clause (i.e. if an EU member is concerned, NATO assets cannot be used either) and is believed to provide Turkey with the assurances it sought regarding ESDP and to assuage Ankara's concerns regarding the EU force's operations in areas vital to Turkish

interests.¹³ According to the new arrangement, Cyprus remained outside the area of responsibility of ESDP, while Turkey lifted its veto on the EU's assured access to NATO assets. On the whole, the document appeared to be a viable basis for a final deal. There remained a few grey areas – especially the interpretation of 'geographic proximity' and the boundaries between political and military control of a given operation – but these were probably inevitable, even indispensable, elements of the constructive ambiguity that often drives policy formulation at the multilateral level.¹⁴

The bargaining process that lasted for two years illustrated the linkage between the EU plan, a solution for the Cyprus division and the clearing of the last remaining obstacles to the development of the ESDP.¹⁵ On the one side, Berlin Plus was possible only after some reciprocal concessions were granted to Turkey (the December 2002 Copenhagen summit opened the way for accession negotiations for Turkey only three days before the EU-NATO strategic partnership was announced) and after the above mentioned Ankara document was endorsed by the EU at the Brussels European Council (October 2002), when the UK included the text in EU negotiations.¹⁶ The end of the blockade over Berlin Plus opened the way to the launch of ESDP military operations in 2003, and on 31 March 2003 the EU-led operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in Macedonia.

Turkish demands concerning ESDP and the EU's position

Turkey wants full and equal participation in decision-making processes of EU-led operations and on the usage of NATO assets in general.¹⁷ Turkey was worried, from the beginning, about a basic question concerning ESDP: How do the non-EU actors participate in this project? For its part, the EU has offered Turkey full participation in the *decision-shaping* process and the operational planning, i.e. the day-to-day management of an EU-led operation. The EU is willing to engage in deep consultation with Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the Berlin Plus agreements. In particular, the EU draws a distinction between operations using NATO assets, in which non-EU NATO members would participate automatically in preliminary discussions 'if they so wish', and EU-only operations when the invitation to participate would be decided by the Council of Ministers on a case-by-case basis. It is also willing to accept Turkey's involvement in the *operational planning* stage, provided it assigns forces to the EU.

However, Turkey, as a non-EU member, has *not* been offered participation in *decision-making*. Turkey has no say at the critical juncture in which the Council would decide on where, when and how to intervene.¹⁸ The Committee of Contributors, through its bi-monthly meetings, provides the political platform where third contributing states are informed about ESDP. Therein Turkey is invited and entitled to participate and to have its say as much as it wants, but Turkey does not consider this Committee as the appropriate framework for political/strategic discussions concerning ESDP – given its different interpretation of the NID¹⁹ – and, consequently, does not play an active role during the meetings.²⁰ Turkey's official discourse in relation to ESDP is based on three major claims: the WEU legacy (and the status that non-EU NATO members enjoyed), the Washington summit communiqué (concerning the involvement of third actors in ESDP) and the Cyprus issue (which is at the top of Turkey's worries concerning ESDP). And this discourse in translated politically into the blocking of EU-NATO cooperation, but to a certain extent is also a tactical exercise to put its real foreign policy preferences on the table: it does not consider ESDP a relevant endeavour and is willing to participate in it as long as it does not affect the 'serious stuff'²¹ – NATO.

The EU, paradoxically, acknowledges Turkey's participation in ESDP for pragmatic and political reasons. On the one side, Turkey's military capabilities and its contributions to ESDP missions serve to meet some of the capability challenges of the EU – as is the case on the participation of Turkey in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Turkish C130 plane and its crew helps to overcome the strategic transport deficit of the mission – and to improve the EU's legitimacy in some scenarios, such as the Balkans, given the historical relations of Turkey with most of these countries. On the other side, Turkey's involvement in ESDP is supposed to make Ankara 'feel part of the family'.²²

The present situation

Although the end of the Turkish blockade made Berlin Plus possible, the problem with Cyprus continues and nowadays this bilateral dispute still affects EU-NATO cooperation, both at the political level ('both organisations cannot sit together and have a coffee'²³) and in the theatre of operations, Kosovo and Afghanistan being the two clearest examples. Turkey, defending what it considers its legitimate interests, maintains

that 'European broken promises'²⁴ need to be counterbalanced by blocking not only some operations, but also the whole EU-NATO strategic partnership. Nowadays EU-NATO cooperation is restricted to Berlin Plus type operations, given that Turkey only allows EU-NATO cooperation on this topic and refuses to allow non-NATO members which have not concluded a security agreement with NATO and/or are not members of the Partnership for Peace programme (in other words Cyprus) to access classified information.²⁵ EU-NATO cooperation on anti terrorist policy or WMD is, therefore, impossible.

On the positive side, we must mention that one of the best instruments in creating confidence between the EU and Turkey has been the involvement of Ankara in ESDP missions up to now, especially in the Balkans. Turkey has participated in six operations undertaken by the EU, either under the Berlin Plus arrangements or autonomously. In fact, in many operations Turkey has contributed more than most EU partners.²⁶ In addition to ESDP operations, Turkey has declared it would make important contributions to improve EU capabilities under the Headline Goal 2010 and intends to provide both troops and capabilities to the Italian-led battle group which will be assigned to the EU for the second half of 2010.²⁷

Concluding remarks

The EU decision to create an independent ESDP but with connections to NATO and to rely sometimes on its capacities is a crucial step forward. ESDP was in the doldrums for some years: it faced problems over capabilities but also was ensnarled in Greco-Turkish rivalries. The ESDP project has entailed a process of rethinking the relationship between the EU and NATO, and here the 'Turkish factor' appears as crucial. Member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952, official candidate for EU membership since 1999, a country participating in six ESDP military operations, and with considerable military assets and capabilities, Turkey represents a unique challenge to ESDP. The problem of Turkey has been explained by the fact that one of the parties had what it considered national interests at stake during the negotiations between the EU and NATO, and therefore it decided to block the entire process for a long time.²⁸

The EU accession process and its involvement in ESDP have left Turkey with the dilemma of how to reconcile its internal and external policy challenges.²⁹ Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to impose restrictions on NATO-EU

cooperation when it believes its interests are at stake.³⁰ But it is important to point out that Turkey's initial position concerning ESDP was wrong, for four reasons. Firstly, although Turkey enjoyed a privilege status in the WEU, this organisation was not operational, and Ankara has not yet assimilated the shift from the WEU to ESDP nor fully understood that European security has been transformed over the last two decades. Secondly, Ankara's reliance on the Washington and Nice summits conclusions as its main playing card ignores that ESDP has evolved since then and new situations require new policies and attitudes. Thirdly, Turkey believes that its NATO membership and military capabilities automatically mean equal rights to EU members, and this is a basic wrong assumption. Fourthly, Turkey does not properly consider the fact that ESDP is growing, despite all the difficulties, and it is growing in most cases autonomously from NATO.

Given this awkward situation, the EU is suffering from a notorious contradiction: it has to value participation of Turkey in ESDP as very positive, given its experience, its well-equipped army and its present and future contributions to ESDP, but it has to consider at the same time the institutional and political problems that Turkey – and Cyprus – still represent. Another important aspect to take into account is the different political interpretation of the same legal documents. The documents adopted at the Washington, Cologne, Nice or Feira have been interpreted in sometimes contradictory ways by Brussels, Ankara and the member states, and this is one of the main reasons to explain the ESDP impasse and 'the participation issue'. Turkey usually refers to the lack of the EU's compliance with the 'agreed framework between the two organisations' as the political explanation of this legal controversy, although it does not recognise this position publicly.³¹

ESDP is, in the end, just one more part of the whole picture of EU-Turkey relations: we cannot understand this relationship without paying due attention to the bilateral dispute with Cyprus, to the frozen accession negotiations, to the discourse that Turkey will also import insecurity problems to the EU,³² to Turkish nationalism, and clearly to some parallel events: the French EU Presidency and the US pressure.◇

¹ Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, 'Accommodating Turkey in ESDP', *CEPS Policy Briefs* No 5, May 2001, p 1

² Interview with an official at the Council General Secretariat, Brussels, April 2008

³ Interview at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, May 2008

⁴ William Park, 'The Security Dimensions of EU-Turkey Relations', in Michael Lake, ed., *The EU and Turkey. A Glittering Prize or a Millstone?* (London: The Federal Trust, 2005), pp 127-140.

⁵ Ibid., p. 134

⁶ NID is the name of the document concerning the participation of third contributing states to ESDP, which was endorsed by the Brussels European Council (October 2002). This document was based on the conclusions of the Nice European Council (December 2000) and the subsequent negotiations between Turkey, the US and the UK, which resulted in the Ankara Document (2001). The Ankara Document, with two minor changes, was integrated into the multilateral EU framework as the NID

⁷ Associate Members could participate fully in the meetings of the Council, its working groups and subsidiary bodies and, by virtue of NATO membership, they were entitled to be consulted and informed on WEU operations in which they were interested, and to be directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were used. However, after the virtual abolition of this organisation, the possibility for Turkey to sit in EU Council meetings was no longer given. Turkey also attempted to negotiate a seat at the EU's defence and security table – in effect membership of the new PSC.

⁸ Interview with Turkish diplomats, Turkish mission to the EU, Brussels, April 2008

⁹ Omur Oymen, 'The Place of Turkey in European Security and Defence Identity', in Çigdem Nas and Muzaffer Dardan, *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey* (Istanbul: Marmara University European Community Institute, 2002).

¹⁰ Charles Grant, 'A European View of ESDP', *IISS/CEPS European Security Forum*, 10 September 2001, p 2

¹¹ Jolyon Howorth, 'Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of the ESDP', *Notre Europe Policy Papers*, no. 7, November 2003, p. 9.

¹² Jean-Yves Haine, 'ESDP: An Overview', *EU Institute for Security Studies*, Paris, 2004, p 3

¹³ Harry Dinella, 'The Growing Influence of Brussels on Turkish Policy', *Woodrow Wilson International Center, Documents and Papers*, February 2002, p. 2.

¹⁴ Antonio Missiroli, 'EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', *Security Dialogue*, 23, 2003, pp .9-26.

¹⁵ Thanos Dokos, 'Turkey and ESDP. Seminar Report', *SIPRI, International Conference*, 20 September 2004, p. 5.

¹⁶ Interview with a retired Turkish Admiral, who negotiated the Ankara Document on behalf of the Turkish Government, Ankara, May 2008

¹⁷ Elif Özkarağöz, 'Turkey's Role in the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU', in TURKSAM, Turkish Centre for International Relations & Strategic Analysis, 7 March 2005.

¹⁸ Tocci, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Interview at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, June 2008.

²⁰ Interview with a Council General Secretariat official, Brussels, April 2008.

²¹ Interview with a Foreign Policy Adviser to Recep Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister, Ankara, June 2008.

²² Interview with a Commission official, Brussels, April 2008.

²³ Interview with a NATO diplomat, Brussels, April 2008.

²⁴ Interview with a retired Turkish Diplomat, Istanbul, May 2008.

²⁵ Interview with an official at the Greek Mission to the EU, Brussels, April 2008.

²⁶ Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), and to the two ESDP missions on Macedonia,

CONCORDIA and PROXIMA. Turkey also contributed one police officer to the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and participated in the EU's EUFOR RD Congo mission. Finally, Turkey plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS Mission in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah/Palestine. Moreover, Turkey decided to contribute 32 police officers to EULEX-KOSOVO.

²⁷ Data concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP missions facilitated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal document *European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P)*, March 2008.

²⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p 161

²⁹ Gülnuer Aybet, 'Turkey and the EU After the First year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges', *Security Dialogue*, 37, 2006, p. 529.

³⁰ Morton Abramowitz and Richard Burt (co-chairs), 'Turkey on the threshold: Europe's Decision and US Interests', Atlantic Council of the United States, Policy Paper, August 2004, p. 18.

³¹ Interview at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, June 2008.

³² Interview with a member of the European Parliament, Brussels, April 2008.

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