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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

This issue of *CFSP Forum* returns to the subject of institutional reform, with an article on the draft constitutional treaty provisions. A second article discusses institutional reform in the larger context of what has, or has not, changed in the field of European foreign policy since the Iraq war. The issue also contains two comments, one on the crisis in the Caucasus, and the other on theorising about European foreign policy.

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So who will speak for Europe? The constitutional treaty and coherence in EU external relations

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Students of EU external policy have much to speculate upon following agreement by the EU member states on a new constitutional treaty that they will sign this coming October. In the two years that it will probably take to get the treaty ratified by the current 25 member states there will be much discussion about how the new arrangements for the development and implementation of the EU's external policies will work in practice. If the treaty is ratified then the EU will be given a legal identity for the first time and the outside world will at least be spared the nonsense of having to sign agreements with the 'European Community and its Member States'.

Ratification will see the election of a President of the European Council who will undertake 'at his or her level to ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' (Article 1-21). The last sentence above refers to the fact that the President will preside over a European Council consisting of the heads of state or government of the member states, the European Commission President and the newly established Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (referred to hereafter as the European Foreign Minister), who the treaty stipulates will 'take part' in the work of the European Council.

Under the new arrangements, the European

Foreign Minister will also be responsible for organising the coordination of member state action in international organisations and at international conferences. In the UN Security Council, those EU member states who are either permanent or rotating members are required to request that the European Foreign Minister be asked to present the Union's position (assuming it has one!) on any issue under consideration by the Security Council. Over Iraq this would have presented a very interesting contribution to the debate about who speaks for Europe!

Although the identity of the first elected European Council President will remain unknown probably until 2009, we already know that Javier Solana will be the first European Foreign Minister. This summer he was reappointed for another term as Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers and High Representative of the CFSP until the new treaty is ratified and, once, or rather if, that occurs, to take up the post of European Foreign Minister. There is already a possible conflict, or at least confusion, of external roles between the European Council President and the European Foreign Minister. Solana will have a head start but much will then depend on how his administrative support shapes up and what sort of support is provided for the President. Both of them, of course, will continue to have to relate to a Commission President who will also presumably aspire to play his or her role in the Union's external representation (even though he or she is not given a specific external role in the new treaty). Already it seems as if external 'coherence' will remain a challenge for the Union and its external partners.

The European Foreign Minister will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, so that one source of incoherence in external policy should be removed as the rotating presidency will disappear for all aspects of external relations. The logic of this decision means that officials working to the European Foreign Minister will chair the meetings of the Political and Security Committee as well as the numerous working groups that feed into the CFSP/ESDP process. However the European Foreign Minister is also to be a Vice President of the European Commission responsible for **all** those aspects of external relations that fall within the Commission's responsibilities. The European Foreign Minister will therefore effectively combine the current roles occupied by Javier Solana and Chris Patten except that one reading of the new arrangements would suggest that he or she will have greater coordinating powers/authority within the Commission in respect of the other Commissioners with external

responsibilities (Trade, Development and Enlargement). In this way the treaty could be said to address the problem of coherence in external affairs within the Commission and between the Commission and the Council.

Nevertheless there remain a number of unanswered questions which raise some doubts about the clarity of the face that the EU will present to the outside world, especially during what could be a long and confusing transitional period. Even allowing for the fact that the EU institutions have got themselves this far by proving to be both flexible and innovative, one wonders what will happen to Benita Ferrera-Waldner, the new Austrian Commissioner, who has just been given Mr Patten's RELEX portfolio, once the treaty is ratified and Mr Solana automatically takes over that portfolio. In coming into the Commission perhaps in 2007, Mr Solana could find himself up against Commissioners Louis Michel (Development), Olli Rehn (Enlargement) and Peter Mandelson (Trade) who will have been in post for several years and who will probably not be accustomed to being 'coordinated' by the RELEX Commissioner. One also wonders about the fate of the new Spanish Commissioner, Joaquin Almunia (Economic and Monetary portfolio) who will be presumably pushed out by Solana's arrival in the Commission.

The job of European Foreign Minister is therefore clearly going to be an extremely demanding one and much will depend on the people that Solana is able to gather around him. Others (Christopher Hill, Simon Duke) have already commented, in previous editions of *CFSP Forum*, on the need for a European Foreign Minister to have the support of something approaching a European Foreign Ministry (meaning both a headquarters staff and a network of external delegations and special envoys) if he or she is to function effectively.¹ The treaty provides for an European External Action Service (EEAS) to 'assist the European Foreign Minister' but as Duke pointed out little else has been agreed about the make up or roles of the EEAS beyond the statement that its officials will be drawn from relevant (it does not say exactly which) parts of the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the member states. It seems to be assumed that the EEAS in Brussels will certainly include Commission officials currently working within DG RELEX and will probably also include officials from the other external DGs (Development, Trade and Enlargement, plus EuropeAid and ECHO) as well as members of DG(E) in the Council Secretariat, the Policy Unit, and possibly the Military Staff based in the Council. They will be joined by

seconded officials (not necessarily all diplomats given the growing role of 'home' civil servants in external policy-making and implementation) but how many of these and for how long remains to be decided. The task of shaping this EEAS along guidelines to be laid down by the Council will of course fall to the European Foreign Minister.

Away from Brussels, the Commission external delegations (there are currently over 120 making the Commission the fourth largest when compared with the member state diplomatic networks) will become Union delegations - though not yet embassies. The current Commission delegations are already doing a great deal more than overseeing EU development aid and monitoring EU agreements with third countries. Unlike the member states' overseas representations, the Commission delegations already provide welcome support to the EU's many special representatives and, under Patten's instruction, have also filed information reports both to the Commission and to Mr Solana's support units in the Council Secretariat.

In other words, the EU's delegations, whose organisation and working practices have also been reformed under Patten, are probably in good shape to take on extra responsibilities as part of the EEAS. If the rotating presidency is indeed to disappear from the external relations field then the job of coordinating the CFSP work of member state representations in third countries will now fall to the Union delegations. There will be those who have greater ambitions for these Union delegations especially those within the Commission who have long aspired to create an all encompassing European Diplomatic Service, trained in an European Diplomatic Academy and destined eventually to replace altogether the representational roles of the member state delegations other than for cultural matters and tourism. Needless to say the foreign ministries and diplomatic services of the member states do not go along with this scenario and the new treaty is quite clear that the EEAS is in no way to be seen as a replacement for national diplomatic services and overseas missions.

However in all the member states diplomatic services are under pressure both from the changing nature of diplomacy² and from demands for financial savings from Finance Ministries.³ There may well be a case for Union delegations taking on both EU and national representational roles for those member states

who are not themselves represented in certain third countries. As the financial squeeze is put on member state diplomatic services, there will be a tendency both to rely on other methods (mainly the internet) of information gathering and a keenness to preserve, at all costs, headquarters staff who are capable of influencing the national foreign policy process at home. It may well be that in practice, if not in principle, even the grandest of member state diplomatic services may see some value in the future in handing over consular and other work to Union delegations staffed by the EEAS. On the other hand it is clear that in some member states like Britain the new arrangements are seen as desirable mainly as a way for them to exert more control over the external activities of the European Commission in particular. In giving evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs both Jack Straw,⁴ the UK Foreign Secretary, and Kim Darroch, the UK FCO EU Director-General, made it clear that they see the European Foreign Minister and the EEAS as working to the Council of Ministers primarily - thus enabling, as they see it, the member states to exert more control (and coherence?) over the EU's external activities. Mr Straw even went as far as to suggest that at present 'you find all sorts of odd-bods from the European Union running all sorts of odd offices around the world' and that it would thus be a good thing if arrangements for the EEAS gave 'us (meaning either the Council or the UK!) more control than we have at the moment'. Despite this bravado it does seem sensible, and probably in the interests of the future of national diplomatic services, that economies of scale in EU/member state representation be achieved where possible and anything that increases the EU's coherence from an external perspective is to be welcomed. It probably is too early to anticipate the establishment of an EU Diplomatic Service by setting up an EU Diplomatic Academy, as suggested by Spanish MEP Gerardo Gelante, but a proposal from the European Policy Centre for the establishment of a European Diplomatic Certificate to be taught within the member states seems like a sensible compromise.⁵ If all EEAS members were required to study for this certificate, ideally in a country other than their own, then some useful progress towards the further 'socialisation' of Europe's diplomats might be made. National diplomats are already operating effectively on an *ad hoc* basis in each other's foreign ministries and in the Brussels institutions, and the new treaty arrangements could usefully further this tendency and would ideally prevent some member states from setting up rival arrangements to counter the growing

potential of the Union delegations.

Everybody is aware of the considerable potential for turf wars over EU external relations within and between the Brussels institutions and between them and the member states. As Solana and his colleagues seek to make sense of the new arrangements laid down in the constitutional treaty he already has to contend with the renewed enthusiasm of the Big Three (Britain, France and Germany) for a foreign policy *directoire*. Solana may well decide that his job in the future will be easier if the Big Three are at least pulling together over Iran or over the defence arrangements rather than pulling apart as over Iraq. One of the consequences of the Iraq fiasco was that Solana was cut out of virtually all negotiations; at least over the recent agreements on ESDP and Iran he might see himself as the long-term beneficiary of Big Three activity. Solana himself seems convinced that making the post of European Foreign Minister work and creating an European External Action Service is the only way that the EU can achieve the objectives laid down in its new Security Strategy of making the EU more capable and more coherent in international affairs. Perhaps all those who are currently squaring up for a fight over the new external arrangements would do well to consult Europe's partners as to who they believe 'speaks for Europe'. They might be both surprised and dismayed by the answers and might then be encouraged to do their best to make the new proposed arrangements work. However one suspects that the need to placate domestic electorates just to get the new treaty ratified will itself place limits on the way that many of the member states will approach these new arrangements at least in the first instance. ♦

¹ Christopher Hill, 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry – or with too many?', *CFSP Forum*, 1 (1) 2003, pp. 1-2; Simon Duke, 'The European External Action Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making', *CFSP Forum*, 2 (4) 2004, pp. 4-7.

² Brian Hocking and David Spence, *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, Palgrave, 2002.

³ Rob Blackhurst, 'Less is more in today's foreign service', *Financial Times*, 27 August 2004, p. 10; Dana Spinant, 'Diplomacy on the move: are EU embassies the way ahead to forge a serious Union foreign policy?', *European Voice*, 6-12 March 2003, p 11.

⁴ Jack Straw, Evidence given to House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 May 2004.

⁵ Fraser Cameron, 'Towards an EU Diplomatic Service', *European Policy Centre Commentary*, 23 July 2004. See also Simon Duke, 'Preparing for European Diplomacy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40, 2002, pp. 849-869, and David Spence, *The Commission's External Service*, paper presented at Conference on The Reform of EU Management: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, Aston University, 2 July 2004, <http://www.les.Aston.ac.uk/eureformds.html>.

Assessing the impact of the Iraq war on EU foreign policy: radical change or business as usual?¹

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At a distance of well over a year, it is a good time to look back and assess the fallout from the fallout over the Iraqi war. What has the impact been on EU foreign and security policy of the divisions within the EU, and between Europeans and the US, over US policy on Iraq?

In early 2003, the din of cries proclaiming the failure of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy was deafening. It was the end of CFSP, too many commentators said: which for some was a relief (now the EU would give up its state-like pretensions to international superpowerdom), and for others a tragedy. For others, the fact that not only were the Fifteen divided, but the Twenty-Five were as well, proved that enlargement would only deal the death blow to the EU's putative foreign and security policy. For US neo-conservatives, the European reaction (and especially that of 'old Europe'), was simply more proof that Europe was from Venus, as Robert Kagan has argued: the EU was falling apart in the face of genuine security threats, largely relying on the sole superpower to guard against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Once again, the EU's failure to live up to expectations that it would act collectively, resolutely, and coherently with respect to an international crisis dominated the headlines. The fact that the Iraq crisis was as much, if not more, about divisions over the transatlantic relationship as it was about what to do with Iraq added to the drama.

To gauge the fallout from the fallout over Iraq, I look briefly at the impact in three areas: the draft constitutional treaty; the setting out of a security 'doctrine' (perhaps too fancy a word); and policy substance.

1) Institutional reform

What is surprising is that virtually none of the reforms put forward by the Convention on the Future of Europe or in the IGC afterwards seems to be a direct response to any lessons learned from the Iraqi crisis. The foreign

minister, diplomatic service, solidarity clause, defence capabilities agency, and enhanced cooperation all appeared regularly in debates on CFSP reform before the Iraqi crisis erupted. It is also not so clear how these specific reforms could help the EU avoid another embarrassing fallout like that over Iraq – with one exception. Institutions such as the common diplomatic service may be the best way to avoid splits on crises in future. The failure to agree on EU policy in general can reflect failure to agree on what is actually happening and what needs to be done; therefore, long-term cooperation within a diplomatic service could help to build such agreement in future crises.

One reform that neither the Convention nor the IGC could agree on has often been seen as the best way to overcome divisions within an enlarged EU: the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the area of CFSP/ESDP. However, the benefits of QMV may be overstated: in the first pillar, where QMV can often be used, the member states instead negotiate until there is an acceptable consensus. We could view a consensus-based foreign policy as more legitimate and therefore effective than one based on QMV, because it is agreed by all the member states. The consensus method is admittedly risky because one state – even a very small one – could block a policy that all the other member states agree on, which has happened often in CFSP (consider, for example, the disarray over the renewal of sanctions on Zimbabwe, which took place just as the member states were differing over Iraq). But a policy approved over the clear opposition of one or more states could diminish the strength of the EU's voice in foreign affairs, prompt those states in the minority to undermine the common policy, and still give the world the impression that the EU member states were divided. To illustrate, could there ever have been a qualified majority vote over the Iraqi crisis? What would have happened if France and Germany had been outvoted, or UK, Spain and Italy outvoted? The CFSP would still have fallen apart and would have been seen to do so by the outside world.

Actual voting methods, then, may be less important than 'socialisation', fostering a commitment to work towards a common foreign policy in the first place, through institutions such as a diplomatic service. A willingness to formulate common policy arises, at least partly, out of the socialisation and identity-shaping processes that have taken place within the

institutional framework for foreign policy cooperation. But while institutions may help to foster socialisation, they are still dependent on the will of the member states to work together. And since the Iraq war began, there is no indication that the member states are less willing to work together than before, though admittedly in particular situations, that may not be saying much. In other words, the CFSP continues as usual: it is certainly not breaking up, but nor is it advancing rapidly towards a federal or more unified foreign-policy making system.

2) Strategy

What have the effects, if any, of the fallout over the Iraqi crisis been on the EU's security 'doctrine' or strategy? Here I refer to two important recent documents: the December 2003 European security strategy, and the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, approved in June 2003. Are these documents responses to agenda-setting by the Bush Administration? Yes, partly: the EU has to prove that it too is preoccupied with major threats. But even before the Iraq crisis – and before the Bush administration came to power – there had been (unheeded) calls to work out the strategic direction for ESDP: the EU needed to clarify what the Helsinki headline goal troops were to do, for example.

Do the documents prove that the EU has finally 'lost its innocence' and is more realistic (more 'American') about the real threats to international security? To an extent, again, yes, they do. The anti-proliferation strategy states that the proliferation of WMD is a threat to international peace and security, and the EU must therefore prevent it. In the European security strategy, the EU declares that it faces five key threats: terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime. Countering these threats is the EU's first strategic objective. But the strategies do not appear that vastly different from previous grand statements of EU foreign policy objectives: there has long been an emphasis on dealing with 'global threats' such as terrorism and international crime.

How will the EU address them? Here the EU's approach is more distinctive. According to the anti-proliferation strategy, the EU will use a 'broad approach': political and diplomatic preventive measures, resort to international organisations, and even coercive measures under Chapter VII of UN Charter as a last resort

(including sanctions and use of force). But '[t]he best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them.' According to the security strategy, each threat requires a mixture of instruments – military means alone are ineffective, but must be combined with political, economic, legal, police, intelligence, judicial, and humanitarian means, and aid for economic reconstruction and development. The EU will use its instruments coercively, if need be, to counter the threats and address the root causes of the threats (such as bad governance). It will also act 'preventively' (not 'pre-emptively', which comes too close to the Bush administration's strategy of pre-emption): 'We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.' Again, this approach has been seen before: the evolution of EU foreign policy cooperation is in a sense a history of efforts to create coherent, long-term policies based on the coordinated use of civilian and military policy instruments. The 2003 strategies do, however, set out the EU's approach more coherently and clearly, and do indicate that the EU will act more forcefully to counter threats.

The problem is still that in specific situations, consensus can break down precisely because the member states do not share a common assessment of what is going on and what needs to be done. It is not clear that a broad list of agreed but still rather vague objectives and threats will help in particular cases. For example, the disagreements over threat perceptions and responses were so severe before the Iraqi war that it is not clear that having had the security strategy beforehand would have changed anything – especially because we now know there were good reasons for differing threat assessments. The development of an EU intelligence and assessment capability may help to avoid such clashes in the future, but the member states must still agree on what the intelligence indicates. And member states may have taken positions less because of any objective Iraqi threat, and more because the sanctity of bilateral relationships with the US took precedence. So the security strategy and the anti-proliferation strategy are helpful but may not be the earth-shattering advance for CFSP that is hoped for – unless the member states

follow through on their commitments to make foreign policy more coherent, and can agree on the need for EU unity in the first place.

3) Policy

If we look at the empirical record, we can see that the principles set out in the security and anti-proliferation strategies have a long tradition in EU foreign relations. This can be seen in the common foreign policy objectives that have been set out in the Treaty and other declarations, as noted above. These reflect a 'liberal internationalist' approach to international relations, encompassing a belief in the benefits of economic interdependence and democracy, and the utility of international institutions.

To pursue such goals, the EU tends to prefer 'engagement' to coercion. It is quite good at engagement, though one can always criticise the resources available for it: the EU has the appropriate policy instruments: trade, cooperation or association agreements; aid; soft loans; institutionalised dialogue; and the promise of EU membership for European states. In contrast, the use of coercion is difficult, not least because the member states often cannot all agree to take a hard stance. In fact, the EU rarely says 'no' categorically to outsiders' demands.

The security strategy, however, promises more coercion (including through the increased use of conditionality), though we will have to see if the member states can agree on a more coercive approach in specific situations, particularly when the US is pushing for a tougher stance. So far, it is not apparent that they will do so: conditionality appears to have been watered down in the European neighbourhood policy, and the member states are still somewhat reluctant to punish Iran (at least for now). It appears as if the EU's more long-term approach to international relations, based primarily on persuasion and gentle steering, has not been radically altered by the experiences of the last two years.

Conclusion

Even in the wake of the Iraq war, there has been a gradual process of agreement on what the EU member state want to do collectively in international relations and how to do it. The EU seems more and more ready and willing to engage proactively, decisively and quickly with

third countries. This process is not complete, by any means – the member states can still find it difficult to reach and maintain agreement on whether to act and on how to act. But the CFSP, like the EU, is unlikely to be torn apart – the member states derive too much value from it. It is, in other words, business as usual. There also does not seem to be much evidence of a wholesale ‘Americanisation’ of EU foreign policy objectives, principles, or practice. In fact the events of the last year or so in Iraq have discredited the American approach in the eyes of many Europeans, but whether this will translate into a stronger and more influential EU approach is not clear.◇

¹ This is an edited version of talks given at Brown and Columbia universities in February 2004, and as a keynote speech to a conference on international relations held at the Middle Eastern Technical University in May 2004.

A contradictory line on the Caucasus

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Editor’s note: This editorial comment first appeared in the *Financial Times* on 6 September 2004.

Chechen terrorism has so far been contained within the boundaries of the Russian federation. Behind the immediate horror of the siege in Beslan stretches a bitter 10-year conflict, with atrocities on both sides. But Bernard Bot, the Dutch foreign minister, as president of the European Union's Council of Ministers, was entirely justified in calling for the Russian government to provide an explanation. There are worrying links between the conflict in Chechnya and instability across the north and south Caucasus, which risks spilling into neighbouring states. Moscow's handling of the region since the break-up of the Soviet Union is indicative of a dysfunctional state - one with a post-imperial determination to dominate the small nations to its south, notably Georgia, and structurally corrupt armed forces.

The 19th-century conquest of the Caucasus was one of the great achievements of the expanding Russian empire. The garrison town that is now the headquarters of the Russian 58th Army, to which some of the casualties of the Beslan siege have been taken, has now recovered its 19th-century name of Vladikavkaz, ‘Victory over the Caucasus’. It was not an easy victory. Among the mountain peoples, the strongest resistance came from the Chechens throughout the 1840s and 1850s. They also revolted against Soviet rule in the 1920s and suffered massive deportations during the Stalin era.

The sense that Russia is entitled to maintain control over its near south was provocatively spelled out in a recent article by Sergei Karaganov, the head of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, one of Moscow's most respected think-tanks. Under the headline ‘A Farewell to Georgia?’, he argues that unless the new government of Georgia co-operates more closely with Moscow, Russia should officially recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia's two contested provinces. Russian policy bitterly resists autonomy for Chechnya, while actively supporting secession for non-viable regions

across its borders. In North Ossetia, Russian troops are defending sovereignty, law and order, while in South Ossetia they protect a secessionist regime that depends on smuggling to survive.

The contradictions between Russian policy towards the north and the south Caucasus are not new. The Abkhaz revolt in 1992, which forced out more than 200,000 ethnic Georgians, was supported by armed volunteers from Chechnya. The heroes of Abkhaz independence then fought for Chechen independence the next year. Later, President Vladimir Putin threatened Georgia over its failure to seal its north-eastern frontier with Chechnya, allowing weapons and men to filter through. But with that frontier sealed, and monitored by observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia denies both Georgian and OSCE officials access to the border between North and South Ossetia, through which weapons are smuggled on a large scale.

It is the structural corruption of the Russian military in this region, and the complacency of the Kremlin about army involvement in smuggling, that is most striking. The 58th Army is responsible both for directing the war in Chechnya and for supporting secession in South Ossetia. The vast smugglers' market outside Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, trades fuel, drugs and weapons under the protection of Russian troops. Imported raw alcohol, Russian sources report, is processed into illegal vodka in the north Caucasus, to the shared profit of military and criminal networks. The weapons that circulate among militias across the Caucasus include Russian surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles. The same forces that are fighting the Chechens are involved in selling arms to non-state buyers, some of which leak through to their separatist foes.

Though Mr Putin naturally prefers to emphasise Arab involvement in terrorism within Russian borders, some Russian journalists have dared to suggest that his military forces themselves are complicit. Two well-known journalists critical of the Kremlin's official line were prevented from reaching Beslan to investigate the siege; reports suggest that one of them, Anna Politkovskaya, was poisoned en route. Ms Politkovskaya - with whom I visited Abkhazia and South Ossetia last month - made her name reporting on the conflict in Chechnya; her most recent report was on the collusion between Russian forces and the secessionist regimes in Georgia.

Russia is playing dangerous games across its borders. In the fighting that followed the Georgian government's clampdown on smuggling routes in mid-August, Russian TV reported that 'volunteers' from Abkhazia and Transdniestria, the similarly illegal secessionist regime in Moldova that is underpinned by the Russian 14th Army, had given Ossetian militias support. A creeping annexation is visibly under way.

This, then, is not a crisis in which western states should accept the Kremlin's call for solidarity in the face of international terror while at the same time respecting Russia's full sovereignty over its domestic affairs. Mr Bot should have gone further, to call for the OSCE to convene an international conference on the cross-border security issues in the Caucasus.◇

Theorizing European Security Structures in an Age of Risk

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Over the course of the last three years, the debate on the future of ESDP has been consistent and intense, both within academia and the various national foreign ministries of EU member states as well as in Brussels. Javier Solana's European Security Strategy 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' was heralded as a breakthrough in the architecture of European security. The optimism it generated, however, was shattered as the façade of a common European foreign policy slowly crumbled against the forces generated around the Iraq crisis, leaving the academy to figure out what happened. While a variety of theories have been espoused - from neofunctionalism, to neorealism and intergovernmentalism - none seem to address the changing rationality of the post-modern world, a world defined by Christopher Coker in the words of Zygmunt Bauman as 'liquid modernity'.

This period of post or liquid modernity is marked by the end of means-ends rationality as the only mode of operation that can be comprehended by social agents. Weber posited that humans determine action based upon expectations of the behaviour of other actors in their surroundings. Consequently, the expectations were held to be the 'means' for the calculated rationally executed ends of the actor.¹ Weber disavowed the notion of individual action. Actors were considered alike, their reasons for acting universal and calculable; any diversity of action was due to differences in the means to achieve the end goal. Today, sociologists like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck posit that rationality is no longer a case of simply being, but of becoming. Reflexive theory is based on the premise that 'actors monitor their own and other's behaviour, not as isolated acts but as shared understanding of how to make sense.'² Means-ends rationality no longer determines the identity of the subjects. The effect of reflexive modernity on notions of security is that we live in an international environment increasingly defined by 'risk'.³

Throughout modernity, risk has had a specific definition based on quantification and calculation. To this day, risk remains a facet of

the economic world. In modernity, the definition of risk involved the separation of risk and uncertainty. But in late-modernity this has changed. Risk and uncertainty have become partners in crime so to speak. It is uncertainty that complicates risk identification, indeed makes risk calculation impossible. Furthermore, threat is based in the present. Threats are directed from one actor against another at a specific time, for a certain duration. Deterrence exists during the same time to prevent the threat from being enacted. Unlike specific threats, which are bounded by time and space, risks are not restricted by time or space. During the Cold War, it was not difficult to calculate the damage that one Soviet ICBM could cause to a Western city. It was less difficult to discern Soviet intentions through diplomatic notes, actions in international institutions, etc. In the post-September 11 world, it is exceedingly difficult to calculate the damage that a risk might eventually inflict. (The terrorist attack on September 11 illustrated this point: even Osama bin Laden was surprised at the result.) Thus, creating a common European foreign policy based upon the assumptions of the Cold War paradigm is bound to fail. Theorists need to keep this in mind and policy-makers need to be aware of what the risk society thesis means for European security architecture.

A substantial implication of the risk society thesis for Europe is the idea that the risk community now replaces the security community. Christopher Coker writes that the risk community is predicated upon Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities' and draws upon Deutsch's conception of the security community.⁴ The community frame has been established to represent the closeness of perception, which hinges on the idea of being an imagined community, but one based upon certain shared values. This is because while an *objective* danger might exist, naming it a *subjective* risk requires a very common frame of perception. Since risk is about choice, a 'transnational discourse coalition' (to borrow from Hajer) is needed to manage risks.⁵ A transnational discourse coalition is a collective of individual states that share similar ideas regarding what presents a risk to their community - i.e. identify the dangers that they choose to act upon. Risks are constructed according to the values of a society (*Gesellschaft*) and through institutional practices.⁶ This does not mean that there will not be differences in risk

perception amongst community members. As Coker notes, it is the nature of the risk community that everything is contested. Even though such contestation might make the community seem like less of a community, a certain degree of divergence is inherent in the enterprise. This is also the case, however, in a threat based alliance (to some extent); threat relies on more concrete evidence and quantification than risk, and thus is a different entity all together. Applying the risk community concept to Europe might explain current difficulties and help prescribe inventive policy options.

The changing rationality of security, the rise of risk and the development of the risk community thesis are all ideas that have begun to appear in the security studies literature. To date, very little of this material has been applied to Europe to enlighten understandings of European security structures. While the risk society thesis cannot explain every nuance of the present situation, there is good reason to believe that it is applicable to the European case. Europe certainly represents, at least with regard to internal policies, a risk community. Perhaps one of the reasons Europeans fail to reach consensus on foreign policy issue is due to the nature of risk management in the risk community highlighted above.◊

¹ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: A Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

² Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A New Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 140.

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