



CFSP Forum

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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

This issue of the CFSP Forum takes a closer look at the EU as a 'security actor'. How has the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) worked so far? What sort of progress is the EU making in defining a security doctrine? And what are the implications of the Iraqi crisis for the EU, and the western alliance in general? The three articles here analyse these issues, noting the progress that the EU has made in giving substance to the ESDP, but also the very serious challenges it still faces.

FORNET has also compiled preliminary data regarding the troop and personnel contributions that European states have made to various peacekeeping and enforcement operations across the globe. Information is hard to come by, however, especially as the various operation headquarters resist declaring specific contributions. We hope to update the table in a future issue of CFSP Forum as more information becomes available. If our readers have additional data, we would greatly appreciate it if you could share it with us. Full acknowledgement will be given.

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ESDP in Practice: 'Effective Multilateralism' in the making?

Hanna Ojanen, Senior Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs¹

Back in 1999, the EU set a deadline of the year 2003 for assembling 60,000 troops that would be ready to undertake large-scale and lengthy crisis management operations. Many still argue that the headline goal is far from being achieved and indeed doubt that it ever will be met. Yet though 2003 is not yet over, the EU has already launched three crisis management operations – and is considering launching others.

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina started on 1 January 2003 and follows on from the UN's International Police Task Force. Five hundred police officers are engaged in a three-year operation that includes monitoring, mentoring and inspection, and establishing sustainable policing arrangements. With Operation Concordia, the 350-troop military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the EU has taken over from a NATO operation and makes use of NATO's assets and capabilities. It began on 31 March, and its original six-month duration has been extended until 15 December. The operation is to help create a stable, secure environment which allows for the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. Finally, the EU launched Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2003; its mandate was extended until mid-September. Its 1850 personnel helped to secure the town and airport of Bunia in order to improve the

humanitarian situation and prepare for a new phase of MONUC, the United Nations Mission in DRC which has existed since 1999.

This is more than one could have expected. It was thought that the EU would concentrate on its near abroad and depend on NATO resources. The Congo operation was, however, one in which the EU acted far away from its own borders, and alone, without recourse to NATO. France was the framework nation, the EU operation commander was based in Paris, and the headquarters were established in Uganda. Moreover, the operation was set up very swiftly, just two weeks after Javier Solana presented the idea to the member states. In Bunia, the EU force also gained more credibility than MONUC because it had a broader mandate for the use of force and robust equipment, including Mirage fighters.

Even more is to come. The EU is discussing future operations: the EU could take over NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and could possibly conduct an operation in Moldova.

Critics would point out, however, that these missions have hardly any deep impact at all. The EU's presence is too weak or too short, provides an illusion of peace rather than peace itself, and only temporarily postpones and transfers conflicts. In Bunia, for instance, observers say there has been no real disarmament, and rival militias might actually have profited from the operation. More adequate means should be used, including pressure exerted on the governments that are sponsoring militias, and a stricter application of aid conditionality.

Much of the criticism is, however, pre-empted by the EU having carefully limited its ambitions: it has kept the operations short, and sought to minimise the risks of failure. Moreover, the operations are safe in that they are inherited from other organisations and partly work under their protection. Joining an operation that is already successfully underway makes it easier still to achieve the modestly-set goals.

Other critics would question the motivations behind these activities. The operations seem to have been established for the sake of the EU itself more than for the sake of the people

in distress. The EU is acting only to demonstrate that the ESDP is for real: the Balkans are a laboratory for the ESDP where the EU's internal workings and coordination are tested. The EU might simply be trying to protect itself from crises spreading in its vicinity, and countering human, drugs and weapons trafficking. It might also be trying to fill the vacuum created as the US and NATO cut down their forces in the Balkans.

Perhaps the reason for the surprising rapidity of the 'operationalisation' of the ESDP is precisely that all of these factors have been pushing in the same direction. We should add one more factor to the equation, however. These operations explicitly put the EU forward as a new security political actor in international affairs. Both Javier Solana (the High Representative for the CFSP) and Michel Barnier (the European Commissioner for institutional reform) have highlighted that the general public has increasing security political expectations of the EU.

But it is here that the EU faces its greatest challenges. Some new 'EU-ish' security policy features are already emerging – but whether they can be crystallised into a coherent and credible EU approach still remains to be seen. A first such feature is the EU's willingness to maintain the longer-term commitment that is needed in most crises. In the Balkans, the reform of police and judiciary systems is just such a long-term goal – particularly given the region's expected rapprochement with the EU. In Bunia, Javier Solana has proposed a long-term civilian commitment, with engagement on political, economic and security fronts. It would be a text-book example of the EU using the entire spectrum of its external relations tools, including disarming and reintegrating armed groups, socio-economic rehabilitation, building up institutions, and preparing for elections.

A second feature is systematic cooperation with other actors: with non-EU countries, as practiced in all the three operations, and with other organisations. The UN and the OSCE have actively encouraged the EU's new undertakings. In May 2003, the UN requested that the EU provide forces for an operation in Bunia, while the OSCE, in Moldova since 1993, has asked the EU to consider sending soldiers to Transdnestr. In NATO, however, the EU's capacities have

been met with more concern, and EU plans to take over SFOR by mid-2004 have been characterised as premature. In Moldova, as in Congo, the US preference would be for the 'Berlin Plus' framework that would give it some political control over the mission.

These features might constitute the core of what Javier Solana means by 'effective multilateralism' in the security strategy (see

the article by William Wallace below). The EU, however, must now prove that multilateralism does not necessarily imply slowness and inefficiency.♦

1. The following newspapers were used as sources: *Financial Times* (4 and 28 June, 3 and 15 July, and 28 August 2003), *Le Monde* (8-9 June 2003), and *Helsingin Sanomat* (15 August 2003). I would like to thank Emmi Helle, MA, at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs for research assistance.

A Security Strategy for the EU?

William Wallace, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics

A shared sense of global responsibilities, actual and potential threats and appropriate responses to those threats is an essential foundation for a coherent foreign policy. The absence of any consensus – often, of any open discussion – on these underlying issues has been a debilitating weakness in the construction of a common foreign policy. Member governments have too often agreed not to confront these questions, for fear of provoking open disagreement or of creating difficulties for themselves in their domestic politics. In pursuing the ESDP initiative from St Malo to Helsinki, for example, no government spelt out where outside Europe the proposed Rapid Reaction Force might be used, or in response to what sort of crisis. The declared objective was to create a force without any explicit purpose, ready for deployment to undeclared lands, in response to undefined threats. Hardly surprisingly, most national parliaments felt no sense of urgency in meeting Helsinki's declared goals.

The CFSP Secretariat, under Javier Solana, has now attempted to pose the difficult questions. Its paper, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, has an uncertain status: widely circulated in Washington during the EU-US summit in June 2003, it has received limited publicity in most EU capitals. The Thessaloniki European Council approved it as the basis for a 'public debate', intended to lead to adoption at the December European Council in Rome; but few member

governments have wanted to encourage such a debate, and it's probable that a final text will be adopted at the October Foreign Ministers' Council. Unlike the wordy 'Common Strategies' of 5 years ago, however, this document challenges member governments to answer awkward questions that most would prefer to avoid; it deserves a better fate than to be buried in the appendices of the next European Council Communiqué.

Its key message is that the EU collectively punches below its weight in world politics, because its members prefer to dissipate their resources in separate efforts, and because they have failed to focus on shared threats and shared responses.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is a global actor; it should be ready to share the responsibility for global security.

The EU-25, the paper notes, currently has more than 45,000 diplomats, many duplicating each other's work in third countries. 'There is much duplication of defence assets across the European Union. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce overheads and...increase capabilities.' The EU spends some 7bn Euros a year on external economic assistance, while member states spend an additional 70bn Euros: collectively more than any other state or group of states in the world, but poorly coordinated.

Solana's staff outline a list of global threats that is in many ways similar to that of the recent US National Security Strategy, but with some significant differences of emphasis: trans-national terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (on which a separate paper has already been presented to ministers), failed states and organised crime, but also the long-run dangers that climate

change and energy dependence pose for European security. Its responses focus far more on 'nation-building' – reconstructing order within failed states, promoting economic reform and good governance – than the comparable Washington paper. An even sharper contrast lies in the emphasis placed on EU governments combining their efforts to strengthen global institutions: 'the fundamental framework for international relations', it declares, 'is the United Nations Charter.' The first priority for collective EU strategy is to 'extend the zone of security' around the EU's borders, including in the southern Caucasus and in Israel/Palestine; but it goes on to stress that 'the threats of the new era are often distant', and that political – and military – engagement at greater distances should therefore form a necessary part of a common European strategy.

Paradoxically, with the arrival of the Polish-led contingent in Iraq, a larger number of European troops are now deployed outside the borders of the EU-25 than at any point since the end of the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial wars: in Afghanistan, Iraq, Eastern Congo, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone as well as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. They include Danish and Dutch contingents, Latvian and Lithuanian, as well as German and Polish, Spanish, French and British. Yet they have not been deployed in pursuit of any coherent European strategy: rather, in response to immediate crises or to American demands. The Solana paper offers member governments a framework for developing a rather more coherent approach. But there is little enthusiasm in most national capitals to take up the challenge.♦

European Defence and the Western Alliance After Iraq

Sir Michael Quinlan

Editor's Note: Sir Michael Quinlan was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence (UK) from 1988 to 1992, where he was responsible for the development of UK policy on the use of nuclear weapons. He is currently a Visiting Professor with the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London. He gave this talk to the Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust on 17 July 2003, and they have kindly allowed FORNET to publish his remarks. The Trust aims to bring together people of different cultural, political and religious backgrounds to address European and global issues. For more information, see their website: www.wpct.co.uk.

My starting-point is that the Iraq adventure has left the Western Alliance – taking that term in a wide sense, not just a military one – in a mess. The full magnitude of the mess is not yet entirely settled – it still stands to be affected, for better or for worse, by how the continuing aftermath goes and how it is managed; the story there has a long way still to run. But the fact of the mess – the worst within the West, surely, for at least one generation if not two – is manifest. So also, I suggest, is the fact that all the major participants have problems, all have made mistakes; and all, as a result, have offsetting grievances.

I need not spell all this out in detail. But by way of shorthand, Mr. Bush's war has seen NATO damaged, the UN sidelined and humiliated, the international rule of law challenged, Europe disrupted, US relations with France and Germany at their lowest ebb for decades, difficulty with and for Turkey, the leader of America's staunchest ally politically weakened, the burden intensified on a US economy already facing massive fiscal deficits, the reputation of US forces in significant respects impaired, and hostile perceptions of the US beyond the West reinforced. (I am not sure that Saddam's removal, hugely welcome though it is, pays for all this; but that is by the way – it is not my concern today to argue about whether the war should have been undertaken, or who is to blame for this or that consequence.)

This audience will have its own view of the United Kingdom scorecard; but there is more and more ground for suspecting that for Mr. Blair, facing extremely difficult decisions, the real bottom line was not this or that justification

for action against Saddam but the combination of three judgments: first, that Mr. Bush was intent upon war; second, that nothing Britain could do would ultimately deflect him; third, that British national interest required that in the end we go along. Put another way, the question may have been not so much whether the arguments were good enough to warrant the huge step of starting a war as whether they were bad enough to warrant the huge step of breaking with the United States. I do not suggest that the assorted justifications (we heard more than one of them at different times) were nothing more than pretexts; but I find it hard to believe that if the central decision had rested with Mr. Blair he would really have pressed the war button. Anyway, we are surely seeing mounting discomfort in that regard. Domestic repercussions aside, the overall effect of the saga may, I fear, be to reduce effective freedom of international action for some time ahead; to impair our standing in important parts of Europe; and thus to make us - at least for a while and despite all the plaudits in America - a rather less effective all-round partner in the Western Alliance than we appeared to be twelve months ago.

France had, in my view, the soundest initial stance of any of the West's main four countries on the basic substance of the issue. But the way Mr. Chirac chose to play the hand seemed to make the worst of it - almost as though deliberately calculated to maximise offence to the US and comfort to Saddam, however popular it may have been at home. And Germany? Mr. Schroder ran an election campaign with a strong anti-American flavour; he undid much of the progress that had been made in the past decade towards displaying his country's willingness to take on the hard military tasks abroad - policing Kabul, useful though that is, scarcely compensates; and he in effect washed his hands of the problem - which was, let us be clear, a real and serious problem - of what to do about Saddam's continued defiance of the United Nations. My impression from a couple of visits to Washington was that anger was if anything higher there with Germany than with France, given historic differences in expectation.

In the round, therefore, the reality of major damage seems incontestable. In theory a question then arises about how much that

really matters - is it a grave worry, or just rather a nuisance? I hope this audience needs no persuading that it is the former. That is not just a matter of sentiment, though sentiment is not unimportant to policy. The fact is that even with the Cold War long past there remains a huge international agenda in which both sides of the Atlantic share a deep interest, and which will be, at best, less effectively pursued if they are at odds with one another and not working well together. Europe for its part must now intensify its efforts to make itself a weighty partner in managing this agenda in respect not only of the things - the many things - it is already good at but of those it is currently not.

It is not my remit to review all that could and should be done from the European side (still less from the American side, though there are tasks there too) by way of repair. I note that such a review, as regards the general area of foreign and security policy, was offered last week in a notably well-written report by a sub-committee of the House of Lords. My particular concern and assignment today is in the defence field - an area of comparative European weakness. Within that field, I plan to concentrate upon the European Union's ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy, though it is in practice a project rather than a policy. ESDP is by no means all there is to collective European defence business, but it is the centre-piece and the flagship; and it is ESDP rather than anything else that currently shapes both intra-European and American perceptions of the Union as a defence actor.

You will remember the background. In late 1998 Mr. Blair made a crucial shift in British policy on European defence cooperation, agreeing with France that it should henceforward be pursued under the aegis of the Union itself. During 1999 the Union both espoused and quantified a plan to give itself a coherent capability for joint action on the 1992 "Petersberg" tasks - that is, a range of conflict-management tasks short of outright war. The quantification - the "Helsinki" goals - envisaged that by 2003 there should be a capability (not, I venture to recall, a standing force or even necessarily one with specifically-earmarked components) to deploy up to 60,000 troops away from home within sixty days and sustain them for at least a year. There were to be supporting maritime and air elements, and a parallel commitment was soon added to be able to deploy police forces

of up to 5,000 personnel.

Making good on these plans matters for many reasons, including the self-confidence and credibility of the Union within Europe itself. But my focus now is upon what it can or should mean for rebuilding trust, balance and efficacy in the wider transatlantic partnership. There is in turn more than one aspect to that, but let us start with US perceptions.

There has always been recurrent unease in the United States about ESDP, especially within the right-wing segment of opinion now powerful in the Bush Administration. There are three main strands to the unease. First, a suspicion that the capability will never actually get created – that the Europeans will not get much beyond making declarations and constructing bureaucracies. Second, that the project will be carried forward in an anti-American and NATO-damaging spirit. Third, that even if the capability does get created the Europeans will be found unwilling to use it promptly and robustly. These three suspicions fit conveniently with key dimensions of the enterprise, so even though pleasing the Americans is not the prime aim we might structure our stocktaking in that way. The jury is still out, in varying degree, on all three dimensions.

On the capability side, it is plain that the Helsinki goals will not be entirely met by the end of this year, as originally advertised. I know no defence professional who ever believed they would be; General Klaus Naumann, Germany's exceptionally-distinguished Chairman of NATO's Military Committee a few years ago, estimated the end of this decade for fully-fledged status – that is, in numbers, materiel, organisation, doctrine, readiness, sustainability and training. We have to live with reality in that direction, but that makes it all the more necessary to acknowledge honestly that where we have got to today will not suffice as the terminus. I was uncomfortable when the Union declared ESDP operational in 2001, and I am relieved that Mr. Hoon stood out against attempts earlier this year to proclaim the capability as substantially complete. If the Union pretends that it is, the Americans will not be fooled but European Finance Ministers may think that the political heat is off. A lot has been done, and the achievement is not trivial; but some of the

biggest and costliest components needed are still not there or only partly there, such as heavy-lift transport aircraft, defence suppression capability, precision weapons and responsive, secure, inter-operable communications. There seems to be quite good joint machinery for addressing these deficiencies; but what there isn't is enough money. And there is ultimately no complete substitute for that.

The financial problem is most acute, or at least most salient, in respect of Germany, the Union's biggest member. One can well understand the problems posed by the continuing burdens of the Eastern Lander, a faltering economy and a fiscal deficit breaching the rules of the European Central Bank's management of the euro; but excuses, however good, do not create capability. I earnestly hope that the demands of rebuilding transatlantic confidence and European cohesiveness can earn defence investment increased weight in Berlin's tough assessments of expenditure priorities. Germany is far from the only shortfaller, but others can too easily find cover behind her.

I said a moment ago that there is no *complete* substitute for more money. The reason for the qualifying adjective is that some long-term relief can and indeed ought to be looked for from doing more things together on a truly multi-national basis, for example on the model of NATO's airborne warning and control force. But we should not deceive ourselves that that is an easy or swift way out. First, it can entail painful adjustment of national pattern or habit. Second, it often means more money up front to finance change. Third, it implies a confidence in long-term identity of purpose. Suppose there had been one common EU air transport force; would it have taken British troops to Iraq? I do not say this to dismiss the possibilities, and we must be prepared to take some risks – there are, after all, risks also in just staying in our national boxes, increasingly deficient in cost-effectiveness. But I suspect that the more promising prospects, at least in the nearer term, are ones that would bring together smaller members of the Union, or at least limited groupings of particular like-mindedness.

There is a related point about capability on which what I say may not be universally approved. Bringing ESDP capability up to full

standard will entail significant new investment in equipment of various kinds. I have the impression that ESDP processes have not yet closely grappled – understandably, for there are plenty of challenges to address even without this notably awkward one – with the issue of where and how to procure this equipment. At risk of over-simplification, the heart of the problem is that across important areas of the defence field the way to get the best military kit soonest and cheapest – the best value for money, in short – is to buy American; and that brings the added advantage of assured Alliance interoperability. That is not invariably the case – there are some things which Europe does just as well if not better. But the range of such things, frankly, is limited; and I suspect that though that range may perhaps be extended if efforts to rationalise and coordinate European defence industry prosper, the limitations will remain substantial – given that the US is a single decision-maker spending vast amounts on defence, that cannot surprise us. I have vivid memories, over my decades in the defence world, of defence-budget money occasionally being poorly spent under the political pressure of national protectionism. The risk of that is not dissolved in the wider European context. Europe cannot afford to spend its scarce defence money inefficiently on grounds of European protection, which would moreover deepen transatlantic damage. (And in this unfair world the difficulties I am indicating are not removed by pointing to the undoubted fact of US protectionism.) For provocative example, if there are good value-for-money reasons for choosing the as-yet-non-existent Airbus A400M heavy-lift aircraft rather than the US C17 already in fruitful service with the Royal Air Force under leasing arrangements, I hope others can discern them more successfully than I have yet managed to. I note with a touch of suspicion that the notion of “security of supply” is given currency in recent EU papers. If the hidden sub-text is to justify protectionism on the ground of risk that US supply might be either withdrawn or manipulated, I would want to ask sceptical questions about past evidence and future plausibility.

I have two other points about capability. The first concerns the Union’s forthcoming enlargement. From one standpoint that clearly ought to add to the Union’s weight in

defence and security matters. But whether its effect on ESDP is truly to reinforce, rather than to burden or complicate, will depend on how successfully the new members adapt their forces to the demands of the roles. In the main those forces have not been configured, equipped or trained – despite some useful experience alongside NATO forces in Former Yugoslavia and elsewhere – for expeditionary tasks of the kind that ESDP mostly envisages; and the new members will need to make, and existing members to encourage and assist, significant efforts if the dividend of their accession is to be properly harvested.

My second point is partly related to that, though it does not concern only the “accession” countries. I noted earlier that though ESDP is the flagship, it is not the whole of European defence effort. It would, I suggest, be damaging if the drive to bring declared contributions to ESDP up to standard had the effect of creating within national armed forces elite minority elements drawing resources away from a neglected remainder. It is surely important that the long-term impact of ESDP in this regard should be to encourage the whole of armed forces towards modern and common standards, not to exempt most of them from these. ESDP tasks are after all not the whole of what armed forces may have to do, whether for national purposes or for providing muscle to back the Union’s developing European Security Strategy sketched by Javier Solana at the summit meeting in Greece last month. In addition, even endeavours undertaken within the “Petersberg” sub-war compartment may not always stay tidily confined there in a way not needing heavier back-up for deterrence, for rescue or for success.

I turn now to the second area of occasional misgiving – the suspicion that ESDP might be impelled and shaped by motivations which I might in shorthand describe, with apologies to a mighty shade, as Gaulliste. It would be foolish to deny that there are divergent perceptions and aspirations, centred typically in Paris and in London, about the long-term mission for Europe as an actor in the world of international security. Mr. Blair will have known that perfectly well when he made the 1998 deal at St. Malo, and he can neither have intended to surrender the British concept to the French one nor expected the converse. The constructive reality is that the

design of better collective European military capability, and indeed also its use at least at the level of the Petersberg tasks, does not stand to differ materially according to which of the two visions is preferred, and speeches about it do not have to be identically phrased so long as they do not sound too discordant in the other capital or in Washington. The impression I have is that the development of ESDP has so far, in the main and aside from occasional second-order collision over institutional shaping and procedure, been managed successfully through sensible concentration upon practicalities. But I retain a sneaking suspicion that in dealing with the Quai d'Orsay the price of Atlanticism is eternal vigilance.

We had a tiresome if relatively minor reminder of this a short while ago, when a quadripartite gathering of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg – I cannot bring myself to call it a four-power meeting – proposed the establishment in Belgium of a new EU headquarters, quite separate from NATO or apparently from any existing major national headquarters, to undertake operational planning and similar tasks for ESDP. I do not assert that this was a deliberate finger in the eye of NATO or of the United States – it may, I am told, have had more to do with gesture to internal Belgian political concerns – but it was surely both otiose in substance, as a manifest duplication, and hugely infelicitous in timing at the height of transatlantic tensions over Iraq. I hope the notion will sink quietly back into obscurity. I ought perhaps, for completeness, to touch upon an idea that was briefly suspected of being a deliberate manoeuvre in an opposite direction: the US proposal for a new NATO Rapid Response Force. Whatever one may conjecture about motivations in some quarters in and around the Pentagon, there is in substance no reason to see this as a rival of ESDP, or an attempt to pre-empt or wrongfoot it. The concept is addressed primarily to levels of conflict different from those of the Petersberg bracket, and it seems to me that Europeans would do themselves a needless disservice in the transatlantic context if they interpreted it as a competitor. I am glad to say that so far as I know no government is now doing so.

My third area of suspicion to be allayed concerned willingness actually to use capability. I will be briefer about this. It is not difficult to think up, in the abstract,

reasons why one might suppose that the Union would not be good at making up its mind promptly to take robust action – differences of history and location, for example, or of tradition about the use of force, or of national organisation and procedure for operational decision-making; perhaps too the sheer number of members needing to agree. The proof of this pudding can ultimately be only in the eating, and it is to be hoped that EU members facing decisions will have in mind not only the pros and cons of action in particular settings but also the wider importance of establishing the Union's credibility, both internally and externally. It is early days as yet, given ESDP's immaturity, but the record is not discouraging. EU police deployment in Bosnia has been undertaken effectively, and the small military effort partly taking over from NATO in Macedonia has, I gather, worked well enough. The emergency deployment in the Congo – French-led, but under ESDP auspices – could prove a much sharper test in several dimensions. There is talk that the Union may be asked also to mount an effort in Moldova, which in a different way would be another challenge. A further and bigger candidate task would be taking over from NATO, though still within a NATO support framework, the responsibility for internal military security in Bosnia, and that would indeed be a salutary test both of willingness and of competence in operation. It is interesting that, as I hear, reluctance to see ESDP take that on comes now less from within Europe than from the Pentagon. I can for the moment only guess at reasons for that reluctance; but it would, I think, be regrettable in more ways than one if it proved either lasting or typical.

What I have suggested, in summary, is that wherever the rights and wrongs of the Iraq affair may be assigned, the West collectively has been damaged; that Europe, even if not only Europe, must attach special importance to repairing this; and that driving forward its coherent contribution in the defence field has a significant and necessary part to play in that. I have pointed to opportunities, uncertainties, risks. But perhaps the underlying theme – and no doubt you would expect this from someone of my background – is that EU leaders need to put defence higher up their list of priorities for attention and for resources than they have generally managed to do for the last couple of years. ♦

Recently-published books and articles on European foreign policy

Editor's note: Following on from the tradition set by the original CFSP Forum, this and future issues of the Forum will highlight recent books and articles on European foreign policy. Please send details of new publications to fornet@fornet.info.

Judy Dempsey, 'Follow My Leaders', *The Financial Times Magazine*, 12 July 2003 (profile of Javier Solana).

Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Polity Press, 2003).

Loukas Tsoukalis, *What Kind of Europe?* (Oxford University Press, 2003).

Wolfgang Wagner, 'Why the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis management policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 10, no. 4, August 2003.

Data on European Contributions of Personnel to Peacekeeping and Enforcement Operations

Table 1: Commitments for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)

EU member states	Commitments for EUPM	Acceding and candidate countries	Commitments EUPM
Austria	7	Bulgaria	3
Belgium	10	Cyprus	4
Denmark	14	Czech Republic	6
Finland	23	Estonia	2
France	85	Hungary	5
Germany	83	Latvia	*
Greece	11	Lithuania	2
Ireland	5	Malta	0
Italy	47	Poland	12
Luxembourg	3	Romania	9
Netherlands	37	Slovakia	4
Portugal	10	Slovenia	4
Spain	22	Turkey	12
Sweden	15		
UK	70		

*Not known at time of publication

Table 2: European Troop Contributions

	Total active forces 2002	Helsinki headline goal pledges	ISAF Afghanistan	SFOR Bosnia	KFOR Kosovo (OSCE FYROM)	Iraq operation (coalition)	Operation Enduring Freedom (coalition)	EU Operation Concordia (FYROM)	EU Operation Artemis (DRC)*	Total troops UN peace-keeping (as of 31 Aug 03)
Austria	34600			3	525					381 ²
Belgium	39260		232					10	53	5
Denmark	22700		50	4	360	464	150 Kyrgyzstan			2
Finland	31850	2000	44		820			9		196 ³
France	260400	12000	548		3000			197	1422	208
Germany	296000	13500	1830	1370	3830		730 ¹	49	300	16
Greece	177600	3500	125	53	725					
Ireland	10460		7							14
Italy	216800	6000	135			2950				96
Luxembourg	900	100	9							
Netherlands	49580	5000	37	1032	3 (5)	1198	170 Kyrgyzstan			
Portugal	43600					130				656 ⁴
Spain	177950	6000	143		1200 + 19	1300	50 Djibouti			4 ⁵
Sweden	33900		21							90
UK	210450	12500	267	1200	450	12200			150	430
Bulgaria	68450		42	34		500				2
Cyprus	10000									
Czech Republic	49450		7		403	300				1
Estonia	5510		6	1	121	43	5+2	1		
Hungary	33400		11		1000					116
Latvia	5500		9							
Lithuania	13510		2		127	30				
Malta	2140									
Poland	163000		12			2000				597 ⁵
Romania	99200		32			520				1
Slovakia	26200				100					603 ⁶
Slovenia	9100									
Turkey	514850		163							
Norway	26600	3500								

*Total number of troops deployed. Mission ended 01/09/03. UN peacekeepers assumed duties thereafter.

- 1) Deployed in Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, and Kenya
- 2) 367 deployed in UN Disengagement Observer Force (Syria) (UNDOP)
- 3) 196 deployed in UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
- 4) Majority deployed in UN Mission in of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)
- 5) Deployments to UNDOP and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL)
- 6) Majority deployed to UNMEE

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ISAF: http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_structure.htm

EUPM: <http://ue.eu.int/eupm/pdf/person.pdf>

UN: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/August2003Countrysummary.pdf>

Data for: Austria: <http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/missionen/mission.shtml> (September 2003); Germany: <http://www.bundeswehr.de/forces/einsatzzahlen.php> (04/09/03); Netherlands: http://www.mindef.nl/nieuws/media/content/180302_operatiesengels.html (20/08/03)