Anti-Corruption Agencies:
Why Do Some Succeed and Most Fail?
A Quantitative Political Settlement Analysis
Nicolai Schulz
Excellent Dissertation Prize,
MSc Development Studies (2014)
Abstract
The question of why Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) have reduced corruption in some developing countries but failed in most is unresolved. Many studies identify a lack of
“political will” as the root cause, but in turn struggle to explain its source. This thesis argues that only where the distribution of power between contending social groups – the political settlement – is relatively cohesive, governments are able and willing to support ACAs. The empirical test with a quantitative difference-in-differences-method applied to 172 countries confirms the hypothesis: in developing countries with cohesive political settlements the implementation of ACAs significantly decreases corruption while it has no impact in fragmented political settlements.
Keywords
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Anti-Corruption Agencies
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Political Settlement Analysis
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Corruption Reduction
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Principal-Agent Model
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Collective-Action Problem
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Difference-in-Differences Design
Download the dissertation here.