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**THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
CONGOLESE STATE**

**AN ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE ON
STATE-MAKING**

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WORKING PAPERS

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Crisis States Research Centre

The Rise and Decline of the Congolese State¹

An analytical narrative on state-making

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Abstract:

This analytical narrative investigates the varying nature and strength of the state in Congo/Zaire from colonial times through the tumultuous years after independence, the ups and downs of the Mobutu years, the two wars at the turn of the century, the interim government and the beginning of the fourth republic in 2006.

After a discussion of the prevalent theories of state failure, this text discusses state resilience and fragility within the framework of late industrialisation and the difficulties in transforming a pre-capitalist society into a capitalist one. This unfinished transformation requires changes from a neo-patrimonial form of societal organisation towards a rational, bureaucratic state. This rational state has been and is challenged by rival actors, competing for political, military and economic power.

In order to capture these competing actors and their political coalitions, we use the concept of institutional multiplicity to explain the shifts in strength of competing groups of actors at different periods of time. Traditional authority, rational state authority, informal, illegal and violent networks and the international community all offer different 'rules of the game', presenting alternative frameworks for behaviour and survival.

At different times, state authority has manifested itself in concrete and visible ways across a number of sectors. To analyse the processes of the unravelling of the Congolese state we therefore historically trace state power in several sub-domains: political organisation, the organisation of the economy, the security system, the legal sphere and international interventions.

While the Belgian colonial state forcefully created a rational state in Congo that gained some authority over patrimonial societies, it also created a small group of people that were to become the elite in charge of the state after independence. This group, however, had no experience in political organisation and split immediately after independence. Several political and military rivals challenged the newly independent state until Mobutu was able to create an elite consensus by buying in or crushing rival groups.

This consensus resulted in nine years of state-building, but then started to crumble and eventually break down under serious economic pressure and outside intervention. State power was gradually eroded until even the monopoly of legitimate violence was lost. Unsolved questions of citizenship and land entitlements fuelled outside intervention, which eventually crushed the Congolese state altogether.

While reconstruction is partly under way, fundamental aspects of the monopoly of power, the means of 'broadcasting' power over the whole territory and the political consensus at the heart of the state remain unsolved.

¹ This title pays tribute to Young and Turner (1985), who first tried to explain Congolese politics within the framework of the state, rather than with reference to the personal characteristics of the ruler.

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PART I

What causes state collapse? An overview with reference to the case of the DRC

Why has the Democratic Republic of Congo fallen apart? Answers to this question vary substantially according to different theories; and yet the nature of the answer is expected to deliver insights about how to address the present and future reconstruction of the country, or of the state itself.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire, provides plenty of 'ingredients' for savage imagery, incredible stories, wishful thinking, conventional wisdom and the fuelling of scientific theories about politics, economics and the state in Africa. With 2.3 million square kilometres the country is huge, despite not being very densely settled; there are only around 60 million inhabitants. Valuable natural resources such as copper, gold or diamonds are abundant, but poverty and misery are abundant as well: with a per-capita GDP of roughly 100 US\$ (2006) the DRC is dirt-poor and much worse off than at the time of independence in 1960. More than 350 ethnic groups with more than 700 local languages and dialects suggest ethnic fragmentation and a lack of integration, although this is supposed to be overcome through the use of four main languages throughout the country for business and military communication.³ The country has suffered the breakdown of all aspects of statehood, and has repeatedly suffered war. An estimated 4 million people died between 1998 and 2004 (Coghlan et al 2006) as a consequence of war, malnutrition and the lack of medical services, and the dying and fighting continues. 'Warlords', child soldiers, refugees and internally displaced people are to be found as well as armies, mercenaries and rebel groups from neighbouring countries. Congo's elected president after independence, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated only months after he took office, and since then the country has seen continuous authoritarian rule. Whether this will change after the 2006 elections remains to be seen. So why is the '*mal zairois*' – the Congolese evil, as it is called at times – so persistent, and why has it translated into the collapse of the state?

Perhaps the most powerful answer in terms of its current political impact is the argument that a powerful elite or 'state bourgeoisie' managed to institutionalise theft and corruption and thus destroyed the economy, social fabric and the infrastructure. This is the perception underlying the current introduction and institutionalisation of good governance, transparency, accountability and democracy advocated and financed by the United Nations, the Bretton Woods twins and the donor community, aided by numerous non-governmental organisations. A myriad of literature deals with various aspects of this perception of a kleptocratic heritage.

The 'Kleptocratic State Class' Argument

This theoretical construct derives from Hartmut Elsenhans and the concept of what he called 'state class' and 'kleptocracy' (Elsenhans 1976; 1981), meaning institutionalised kleptomania⁴ – the urge to steal. Observing that underdeveloped countries lacked a bourgeoisie and a working class, he identified the state class as the central political and economic actor. This actor was described as corrupt and seeking self-enrichment through the achievement of control over the state. The concept depicts a situation where the coffers of the state are used for private appropriation of public resources, while in addition the state offers access to agrarian and mineral surplus, which is also appropriated for the reproduction of the state

³ Swahili, Kikong, Tshiluba and Lingala. French has to be added as the official colonial language.

⁴ The term was first used in 19th century England and adapted for Africa by S. Andreski (1968)

class. This kleptocracy is safeguarded by repression and by the cooptation of an aspiring trade bourgeoisie. It forms an economic, social and political system that is characterised by corruption and the waste of resources, thus being anti-developmental, regressive and in the end destructive for the state.

For the case of the DRC, Peter Körner (1988) has elaborated in great detail how the Mobutu regime, following colonial experience, established the Zairian kleptocracy. For him, the elite or state class, centred around Mobutu, was a group of self-enriching people – some with very tiny and some with longer time-horizons, but all nevertheless eating up the assets of the country. According to Körner, this was accelerated through IMF interventions and through the collaboration of the state class with international companies, banks and governments.

This perspective has resonated among scholars in the DRC. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argues:

The main linkage between colonial rule, Mobutu and the two Kabila (...) is that they each represent a predatory regime in which the enormous wealth of the country is being monopolized by the rulers and their external allies instead of serving the basic needs of the Congolese people. All (...) episodes of popular resistance to tyranny in search of democracy and social progress have ended in failure for lack of a political leadership that would put the people's interests ahead of the narrow class interests of self-serving and corrupt politicians. (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2006: 2)

If only the honest people who struggled so long for democracy could have their say, he resumes, Congo would have been and still could become an independent, successful strong state, with the economic potential of 'Lighting the Continent'.

A similar line of argument is followed by Muzong Kodi (2007), who diagnoses a lack of political will, lack of democratic culture and lack of commitment to fighting corruption to overcome the predation of the 'state bourgeoisie'. Using the analytical framework of Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), he writes:

The elite constituted its capital collectively through the output of state enterprise, royalties, taxes, and so on, as well as individually, for instance from exorbitant salaries, corruption and the use of state resources for personal ends. (Kodi 2007: 4)

While there is ample evidence of self-enrichment and corruption in the DRC, accentuated by the violent appropriation of resources before, during and after the two brutal wars and exercised by all factions of the Congolese political, economic and military elite, this approach has shortcomings in explaining state collapse.

Firstly, it suggests that by chance and/or with international help the only people who happened to come to power were ruthless thugs, who successfully hindered all the honest people from contributing to developmental success. This approach tells us nothing about power struggles and suggests unconvincingly that regime changes can be explained entirely by personal motivations whereby one predator replaces another by accusing them of corruption and then continues with the same practices.⁵ Secondly, this analysis offers no distinction between different phases of (corrupt) politics. Belgian colonial power, Mobutu's first years of state-building, Mobutu's last years of presiding over a collapsing state, the fighting factions during the war, and the interim government and all its leaders are each interpreted as having behaved alike. If only one had democracy, transparency and the good people in power, everything would be different.

Thirdly, this approach does not look into the social and economic reality of the country in its different phases. At any given time how is surplus production organised, and how is it

⁵ To a certain extent, this argument has been extended to all Congolese with the suggestion that there is a general lack of democratic culture (Kodi 2007). This does not, however, explain the perceived contradiction between rulers and ruled, and is based on problematic assumptions about finding the explanation for all the described atrocities in an intrinsic 'culture'.

appropriated? How are assets built or destroyed, and why does the 'state class' not even seem to have the insight or capacity to enlarge the areas of appropriation? Or, to use Mancur Olson's (2000) terms, why do stationary bandits start roving, and why is it so difficult to achieve progress by convincing and forcing roving bandits to become stationary?

The Resource Curse Argument

Another prominent explanation for why the state in the DRC has failed is the 'resource curse' argument, most recently and powerfully articulated by Paul Collier and Anke Höffler (1998; 2000). They suggest that a state's dependency on natural resources makes it very likely that a civil war will break out. In their view, opposition, when it cannot achieve its means through secession, takes the form of a rebel group, which is described as a trinity: a political organisation, an army and a business (Collier et al 2003: 56). While these organisations have some political arguments or grievances against the state, their ultimate reason for waging war and attacking the state is not to express themselves politically when all other means have been denied (Ibid: 65), but rather to create opportunities for looting resources. Ultimately, in Collier and Höffler's view there are no political reasons for war; war is not seen as a political instrument with violent means (Clausewitz 1832),⁶ but just as business. For rebel groups, running this business and financing their army is usually done by the extraction of natural resources.

This argument has become so influential that the natural resource wealth in the DRC is now seen by a wider community⁷ as an explanation for the outbreak and the long persistence of certain wars, as well as a source for fuelling wars in neighbouring countries.

However, this argument is problematic and not overly convincing for at least two reasons:

Most developing countries are characterised by little or no industry and thus by an overwhelming dependence on agriculture and/or mining. These sectors comprise the principle area of economic activity in these countries for rebels, ordinary businesspeople, national or international companies and the state alike. Therefore one would have to explain why natural resource extraction at some points in history is organised on a non-violent basis, and why that changes to a warlord mode of extraction at other times.

In the case of the DRC, copper, diamonds and other lootable and non-lootable minerals have played the most important role in the economy since the second half of Belgian colonialism in the early 20th century. The Congolese state was heavily dependent on mining earnings throughout its existence. The technical aspects of mining have changed significantly over time: while in the 1960s extraction was based on the latest technology available in Belgium, the deterioration of the sector began in the mid 1970s and it totally fell apart during the 1990s. The mode of extraction shifted to artisanal mining. This cannot be explained by the 'resource curse' argument. At the height of the war, 23 militias, 6 national armies, 3 armies of political parties and an unknown number of local Mai-Mai fighters were active, allegedly all of them living off the resources. Even UN troops are now accused of having participated in the looting of minerals in the DRC (BBC 2007; UN News 2007; Johnson 2007) although nobody so far has tried to explain this as the *reason* for UN activity in Congo.

Furthermore, there is considerable plausibility in the argument that mining and forestry could potentially contribute in a major way to economic recovery and the reconstruction of the state.

⁶ "War is merely a continuation of politics".

⁷ E.g. Human Rights Watch (2005); Global Witness (2006); IRIN (2006). In popular perception, films like *Blood Diamond* also reflect this theory.

Thus, the minerals would have to change their 'character' from being a curse to being a developmental blessing, as they are in Botswana.

There is, however, the palpable difficulty that once rebel groups get into the business of extracting resources in an area they control militarily (in order to supply their troops and/or to acquire wealth for non-war purposes), the failure to terminate that business in the absence of a state monopoly of power can prolong the war. Nest, Grignon and Kisangani argue that the initial motives in entering the war were not economic for the various actors in Congo, but rather political: to get a 'seat at the table' in a post-Mobutu-regime. Economic agendas rather emerged as a function of war, not a cause (Nest, Grignon and Kisangani 2006: 31).

Several armed groups in the country, some of which have not signed the peace agreement and were not necessarily part of the political transition process, continue to use natural resource extraction in the areas they control, in particular in the Eastern DRC (UN Security Council 2007). But in other mineral-rich areas the war has come to an end, and national and international businesses - rather than warlords - are active in mining.

Overall, this debate points to the necessity of looking into the production of wealth and how it is distributed. Non-violent alternative forms of rent-distribution have worked for periods of decades in the DRC, and could possibly work again.

Richard Snyder made an interesting contribution to answering the question of why lootable wealth leads to political order in some cases and to instability and collapse in others (Snyder 2006). For him, the character of the institutions of extraction that provide control over revenue determine the difference between stability or collapse. In a simple model, he sees four possible institutional frameworks: private extraction (which is unregulated, untaxed and includes warlord mining), public extraction (by states or rulers with full control; state owned), shared extraction (involving various forms of cooperation between state and private enterprise, sharing income) and no extraction (which implies the state's ability to prevent private extraction).

The best outcome in terms of stability and order is joint extraction: the state has enough coercive power and incentives to interest the private extractor in sharing the income, i.e. pay taxes. With a system of sticks and carrots – public actors threatening to monopolise extraction, offering protection rackets or forcing rivals out of business, or providing legalisation, to name a few – the state can bargain a deal with private economic actors, who in turn no longer need their own military forces to continue extraction.

Shifts in the balance of power will undermine this order, when for example private enterprise acquires so much wealth that their own military forces might be a preferable solution to them. The loss of the coercive capacity of the state would promote a similar outcome. In Snyder's words, which read as if designed for the DRC's Katanga crises (see below): "Loss of coercive capacity can result from defeat in war and the failure to invest revenue earned from joint extraction in maintaining the armed forces" (Snyder 2006: 954).

Another eminent problem with this sort of arrangement under circumstances of personal rule is what Snyder calls the "bequeathability problem": personal rule makes it difficult to pass the deal from one set of rulers down to the next. This passing down of existing arrangements for extraction can occur during war, but also during peaceful transitions. While the old ruler will want a pension and thus privatises the deal, the new ruler(s) might find "formidable obstacles ... looking to control lootable resources" (Ibid: 954).

The importance of Snyder's analysis for the DRC⁸ lies in its focus on the institutional framework of income sharing and the way it shifts and changes over time.

Patrimonialism and Neo-Patrimonialism

Personal rule, authoritarian rule, corruption and other related problems including state failure are often linked to the concept of 'neo-patrimonialism'. This concept originally derived from Max Weber's term 'patrimonialism' (Weber 1976), which characterises the exercise of influence and dominion in accordance with privately appropriated economic chances (Breuer 1998). The idea was modelled on certain social formations, in which societal organisation followed the scheme of family authority between father and son. People were not equal and achieved their rights by birth and status. Subordinates, both in the military and in administration, were responsible only to the patron. There was no distinction between the private (private property, for example) and the public (state office or resources, for example). This patrimonial system - an ideal type construction - in Weber's view transformed what he called the 'charismatic state', built on charismatic legitimate leaders in smaller units of society, into the 'urban territorial state'.⁹

The term Neo-patrimonialism (Eisenstadt 1973) is used to describe this personalised dominion in the modern world and modern business circumstances, and in particular to explain why 'strongmen' search to gain access to the resources of the state, which they consume as a result of the 'politics of the belly', as Jean Francois Bayart (1993) calls it. These patrons command clients, who need to be fed or paid-off by the patron in order to stay loyal and provide support.

While the original Weberian concept postulated that over time patrons who accumulate enough wealth would eventually form an embryonic capitalist class, modern neo-patrimonialism is described as having only an asset-destroying character. A wealth of literature ascribes state failure and economic decline to the prevalence of neo-patrimonialism. Richard Sandbrook (1985) claims that African neo-patrimonialism is an adaptation of colonial-inspired political institutions. Personal rule operates according to the particular political rationality that governs unintegrated peasant societies within the wider borders of a nation state – a territorial framework much larger than Weber's urban territorial state. Of particular importance here is personal rule over economic life, which Sandbrook finds to be the basis of African economic activity.

William Reno (1998) uses this concept to explain why patrons become warlords, why rulers apply 'warlord politics'¹⁰ even in the absence of war and how they exploit the fact of the sovereignty of a nation state, thus involving international actors in neo-patrimonial networks. He points out that the main objective of rulers is to win the political struggle over markets and to maintain market control, while the violence itself is exercised to redistribute wealth and build political alliances (Reno 1998: 8). In the case of the DRC, Reno explains Mobutu's shift into warlord politics as an adaptation on the part of those who challenged his rule to these warlord politics when state institutions became increasingly weak.

Rulers addressed the internal threat of warlord politics by transforming their own political authority into an effective means of controlling markets without reliance on formal state institutions. As a corollary to market without institutions, weak state rulers use new ... alliances with outsiders ... This non-institutional strategy ... fits nicely into the neo-liberal economic ideas of outsiders, who see these

⁸ His hypotheses was empirically tested in Sierra Leone and Burma.

⁹ This term refers to the development of centres or cities and the evolution of partial markets. Authority moved from the villages to cities and controlled a vaster territory and community through alliances (Breuer 1998: 71).

¹⁰ Reno uses the term coined by Christopher Clapham (1996).

strategies promoting their ideal notions of a state as a minimalist organisation, relieved of overstaffed, corrupt bureaucracies. (Ibid: 8)

In his case study of the DRC, Reno observes that “strongmen have benefited from the concentration of portable, valuable natural resources ... and have regarded formal state institutions as threatening because they fear bureaucracies acquire their own interests and power” (Ibid: 147). Reno concludes that “warlord politics is an option for state rulers who preside over almost total bureaucratic state collapse and ... who face invasion” (Ibid: 176).

Three interesting aspects of these theories ought to be kept in mind:

- The particular (and often violent) pattern of political and economic dominion exercised by personal rule in conditions of neo-patrimonialism.
- The implicit argument that in the DRC there had at one point been a bureaucratic state structure that has subsequently collapsed, or was at least weakened by the evolution of warlord politics.
- The detrimental impacts of the interplay between neo-patrimonialism, warlord politics and international (neoliberal) actors¹¹ on state bureaucracy. It is probably the outside influences in particular that make certain rulers appear so 'modern' and 'rational' in an environment which otherwise looks so pre-modern and irrational.

The unfinished transformation and its repercussions

Looking back at Weber's use of the term 'rational', it seems important to keep in mind that his 'rational' or bureaucratic state is not achieved by an individual ruler's personal decision to shift to a different pattern of dominion; in other words, it is not a matter of will. Ultimately, it is achieved through the emergence of capitalism in the economic sphere, which makes a bureaucratic state the most 'rational' form of state; the most supportive organisation to maximise capitalism's potential.¹² The new organising principle of capital accumulation replaces personal connections with impersonal economic relations, and it replaces the all-embracing personal relations between people or groups of people with functional economic relations between people.

In the same way as money gains a key role in the intermediation of economic transactions, single people step out of the so far tight enclosing living circumstances and enter new relationships, which only encompass one aspect of their personality. ... Production and consumption, until then relatively closely connected, step further and further apart and enlarge the realm of the possible compared to the real into the immeasurable. (Breuer 1998: 163-164, translated by the author)

I suggest an interpretation for processes of state-building and state unravelling in light of this paradigm, which can explain the economic *and* social transformation from pre-modern to modern or capitalist structures, but can also explain why some societies fail to make this transition or continue to shift between the two types of structures.

Max Weber, however, and others including Charles Tilly (1992) who were predominantly interested in the evolution of European societies and states, did not try to form a 'model' that could be applicable to the postcolonial state. While state collapse and state reconstruction have also happened in – even recent – European history, there seems to be something special and different about the case of postcolonial African states. Reinhard Kössler (1994) argues

¹¹ Reno goes as far as to accuse international actors of respecting state sovereignty to the extent that the outcome will be warlordism. “Outsiders – foreign firms, creditors, officials in other states – share responsibility when they act to preserve the outer form of a sovereign state. The result is warlord politics in a sovereign state.” (Reno 1998: 176).

¹² Breuer (1998), op. cit., p. 161 ff.

that because post-colonial states lack a substantive basis for social cohesion, for instance in processes of economic production and exchange, ties of 'statehood' are dependent on the presence of personalised rule. That is, these states are despotic, not so much because they are characterised by arbitrary rule, but because the despot provides and monopolises the only framework for cooperation and communication.

This lack of cohesion, or, to use a different term, the lack of institutionalised integration that seems to make a personalised framework of cooperation necessary,¹³ needs some explanation. While Kössler offers a variety of sociological explanations, for the purpose of this study the approach of Jeffrey Herbst (2000) seems to be better suited to explain the lack of integration in many African countries. Herbst investigates how African rulers have 'broadcasted' power during pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial state-building efforts, and concludes that African states have a 'non-territorial' power base (Herbst 2000: 35). He explains the reason for this with respect to pre-colonial state-building, when land was abundant and members of a political unit could make use of the exit-option – that is to escape rather than to fight or worry about political contestation. He sees the political map of pre-colonial Africa as a complexity of shared sovereignties with multiple state forms, which seldom went to war with each other over land. Instead, wars were fought over people or treasure, and the outreach of power was in concentric circles around the centre. With wars over territory largely absent, some of the critical incentives for state-building were also absent. Herbst concludes that “peace did not force rulers to rule, to collect taxes, to administer and develop” (Ibid: 112).

This situation was cemented through the creation of borders, first by the colonial powers and later by the Organisation of African Unity. Unlike European state-builders, those in Africa did not have to fortify the hinterlands in order to be able to go to war over (valuable¹⁴) land. So the task for state-builders was to transmit authority over a territory that was bigger than their actual political influence. The colonial state tried to do this by force and by building infrastructure,¹⁵ and the post-colonial state did little more.

Systems of taxation are crucial to state-building and also, according to Herbst, reflect bargains between different interest groups.¹⁶ While he concedes that the tax base in Africa is insufficient, he states that powerful groups are able to block tax reforms. This argument resembles Snyder's point on the institutions of extraction. But again, for Herbst the absence of war inhibited the pressure to collect revenues in Africa.

Following Herbst, another important issue in terms of state-building is the distribution of the population. While in some African cases the population was centred around the capital and the most economically active zones, in other cases concentrations of populations were quite dispersed (as in the DRC), and the huge distances were not easily overcome by roads. Furthermore, in those territories not under unified political control, traditional chiefs still maintained significant political power that derived from their control over land tenure. With regard to citizenship as a mechanism for boundary activation, inclusion and exclusion, Herbst concludes that post-colonial states with a difficult geography and demography are doomed to

¹³ Mahmood Mamdani (1996: 37) uses the term 'decentralised despotism'.

¹⁴ In Herbst's terms, African rain-fed agriculture without ploughs or irrigation did not add much value to the abundant land, in contrast to European historical experience.

¹⁵ Herbst uses road-building as a proxy for the reach of infrastructure in the colonial and post-colonial periods, assuming that roads do not disappear. However, in the case of Congo, as elsewhere in the tropics, roads (and railways) *do* disappear.

¹⁶ Herbst does not take note of the stagnancy of production and the difficulties of expanding the basis for taxation in subsistence economies.

fail. In his view, state failure is incomplete state consolidation or the inability to broadcast power within the given boundaries.¹⁷

Our empirical observations about the DRC can be interpreted as a manifestation of the struggles that occur when agrarian subsistence societies transform into early developers capitalist societies. What Karl Polanyi (1944) calls 'The Great Transformation' is very far from being finished in the crisis states we are observing. There are periodic moments in which capitalist behaviour and rationality have been introduced alongside bureaucratic management of the economy and society, both in colonial and post-colonial times. At other moments, however, we see the decline of capitalist production. This expansion and contraction of the capitalist sector is reflected in the expansion and contraction of the bureaucratic state, or of the ability to 'broadcast power'. Capitalism and the bureaucratic state need each other in order to become collectively stronger.

Thus, state collapse refers to the breakdown of bureaucratic structures in different sectors of the state, not to the breakdown of every aspect of the state or to state authority as such. What is important in this process of collapse is the shifting of authority from still unconsolidated rational/bureaucratic functional agencies back to personal power or neo-patrimonial networks. Likewise, state reconstruction requires the difficult and considerable shift from warlord politics or neo-patrimonial behaviour, towards more impersonal function-oriented bureaucracies.

In the case of the DR Congo, state collapse can be observed at a number of different historical moments. While the majority of Congolese people lived in agrarian, pre-modern societies, which were ruled by persons rather than by functional bodies, King Leopold and later Belgian colonists imposed bureaucratic structures in order to run the colony. While they created some pockets of an early capitalist economy, they did not transform economy and society as a whole. Congolese society at the time consisted of a number of largely disconnected communities living in different forms of subsistence economies, who experienced the state in relation to forcefully collected duties; but this exercise did not transform the agricultural systems into more productive or market oriented ones. Belgian state bureaucracy (as well as Christian missionaries¹⁸) and the tiny emergent capitalist sector created a social group that was distinct from both the peasants and the colonialists, who were known as the '*evolués*' (upward climbers). These people were to become the future elite with the coming of independence. They straddled two institutional worlds, anchored in part in patrimonial traditions and practices but also living under the rule of bureaucratic, merit-oriented and technical imperatives, as the state was largely run by the white elite in the administrative, military and economic spheres.

The first breakdown of the bureaucratic state happened immediately after independence, when most of the white elite left the country; their departure meant that the bureaucracy and the army, which monopolised power in the country, were effectively decapitated. This left the tiny elite of *evolués*, who had not come to power through a long period of united struggle against colonialism, but had always been fragmented, largely because of the colonial prohibition against political organisation allowing Congolese to organise only on regional and ethnic lines. Thus, the exodus of those who ran the rational state and the incapability of those

¹⁷ While his observations on the problems of state-making are mostly convincing, his conclusions and recommendations are less so: the re-designation of boundaries, the "decertification" of states and the international recognition of sub-national political actors do not necessarily promise favourable conditions for state-consolidation. They would, on the other hand, probably contribute massively to violent contestation. His "absence of war" argument might see such a situation as desirable.

¹⁸ The missionaries were not only important in promoting Christian beliefs, but also in the running of schools and health systems, in other words the basic social services of a state.

who tried to form a new alliance for state-building marked the first collapse of the embryonic bureaucratic state.

The second breakdown of the bureaucratic state was not so clearly marked in time and actually took quite a long time to happen. After 1965 Mobutu had re-institutionalised the state, making it more inclusive of the major political players and regions. In a sense, in Richard Snyder's terms, he had struck a joint resource extraction deal with major players. Rules were national and rational, following an almost military rationale,¹⁹ rather than ethnically based and regional, and they were more skill and merit-oriented than based on personal rule. The rise of this rational state went hand in hand with economic prosperity, deeper integration – though still on a minor basis – and the movement of people into 'rational' economic activities, or in other words out of subsistence.

The rational state framework started to disintegrate (and eventually collapsed) when capitalist activity became more and more difficult. The small political class of *evolués* was unable to maintain their initial deal of power-sharing and rent-sharing for a state-building project, and they were incapable of expanding the capitalist economy. The first economic blow to capitalist asset-building came with the decline of copper prices, and the second blow came in the form of a series of economic interventions through international organisations, collectively known as structural adjustment. Structural adjustment policy forced Zaire to sell assets in order to be able to repay debts and acquire new credit,²⁰ and one condition of the adjustment programme involved the scaling down of the bureaucratic capacity of the state. While the rationale behind this prescription was to enable private actors, perceived as rational capitalists, to accumulate faster and more successfully with minimal interference from the state, in reality it encouraged patrimonial strongmen with private authority to establish their (economic and political) dominion, which ultimately led to the use of violence to protect or expand these networks.

In the DRC, it took almost 35 years of disintegration at the national level and of the formation of rivalling neo-patrimonial networks (which Mobutu was very able to manipulate and juggle), before the little that was left of the state finally collapsed through external intervention.

One aspect of this process of collapse is that state decline and the patronage-operated networks reinforced each other. Patronage does not sit well with control by a bureaucratic state, and the lack of state control or state services forces people into patronage networks, be it for business or for mere survival.

Another important aspect is the *neo*-patrimonial character of personalised patronage. Unlike patrimonial traditional authority in pre-colonial and early colonial times, neo-patrimonial personal rule does not derive its legitimacy from the social status rulers were born into and their perceived connection with ancestors, history and the origin of the local group or tribe. The neo-patrimonial leaders in the DRC increasingly were able to connect with the outside world and to acquire wealth as a new source of legitimacy; the important thing was that they remained able to pay off their subordinates. Legitimacy in this system was based on a degree of reciprocity, but once the ability of neo-patrimonial leaders at the centre to channel resources to their clients vanished, they found themselves in trouble. When rich(er) rivals were available, the clients of leaders at the centre had no more reason for subordination and could shift loyalty to another patron.

¹⁹ The military rationale of a professional army with a clear chain of command, that is, not that of a 'rebel group' using child soldiers.

²⁰ The internal capacity for asset-building was still very limited because of the predominance of subsistence agriculture.

The problem rulers faced was therefore how to ensure a constant flow of resources to accommodate their clients. Their real dilemma was that they engaged in economic activity that was *non-capitalist* and was taking place in an environment of subsistence, which makes asset-building extremely complicated. Consumption (by clients and by rival patrons who were bought-in to form coalitions) rather than production was the outcome; this was particularly the case when 'competition' among rulers demanded the use of force against rivals.

Given that the unravelling of the Congolese rational state took so long and went almost unnoticed,²¹ the general analytical framework discussed so far (the transformation of personalised rule to bureaucratic rule or from agrarian society to capitalist society, and the idea that this is not necessarily a progressive trajectory, but can be a developmental setback as well) is too broad to explain much other than very long-term trends. We therefore face the difficulty of applying ideal types, as Weber called them, to observable shifts and institutional changes in the real world.

Institutional Multiplicity

While operating in the larger framework of societal transformation from pre-capitalist to capitalist societies, we suggest the use of a new tool for the observation of institutional changes that are not necessarily linear. In order to capture intermediate or micro-level changes within shorter time-frames, we propose a focus on the evolution of *institutional multiplicity* over time. This is based on an underlying assumption that what may appear to be anarchy and chaos could actually be a situation in which people are behaving rationally,²² considering alternatives, and using reason to decide between competing institutional options.

The bureaucratic state is thus *only one* of the various organising principles we can observe in situations, such as that which we observe in the DRC, where multiple institutions are competing. In the political sphere, such institutions might include traditional authorities, who derive their legitimacy from the status they were born into and their specific connections to collectively owned ancestral land. These are also rivalled by neo-patrimonial networks that derive their legitimacy from wealth or military power. These networks can take the form of military organisations, business networks or political parties. Furthermore, rival organising principles are also introduced by the 'international community': their multifaceted and fragmented interventions, be they through financial organisations, bilateral donors, NGOs or international business, often involve the use of powerful tools for imposing rules of behaviour and standards of legitimacy on Congolese strongmen.

Each of these organising principles operates according to rules, which can be enforced on members of the organisations concerned. The different institutions operate in the sub-sectors of the state, and often on a sub-national level. While they overlap and demand that individuals operate in different spheres simultaneously, shifts between their relative power and the relative power of the bureaucratic state can be observed in the different phases of state decline and state reconstruction.

This framework of institutional multiplicity should allow us to capture quantitative and most importantly *qualitative* shifts, that is, the process whereby one organising principle becomes

²¹ Young and Turner as an exception speak about the decline of the Zairean state, but the majority of analyses stressed corruption, kleptocracy as institutionalized bad behaviour, authoritarianism or the lack of democracy and accountability. In fact, until the very end Zaire was generally perceived as a strong authoritarian state.

²² Here we face some problems with the terminology, as 'rational' in this context has the broader meaning of a connection between plans, goals and resources, rather than being used in the Weberian sense to refer to the characteristic organising principle in a capitalist economy. Weber uses the term '*Anstaltsstaat*' and does not imply that pre-capitalist states and societies are irrational.

dominant while the other loses ground or eventually disappears. For instance, the political and economic authority of traditional chiefs has disappeared in the capitalist world, although they might still hold ceremonial titles. Institutional multiplicity is not to be confused with Herbst's 'shared sovereignty'. He assumes one set of rules in a given sub-national unit, with a different, but again single set of rules in the next. We would like to stress the idea that a multitude of rules can be experienced *simultaneously* in a given sub-national – or national – unit.

State collapse and state reconstruction can thus be understood as the contraction or expansion of bureaucratic rule and a capitalist economy, but it can also be observed in the different sub-systems of economic and political activity occurring simultaneously in a multitude of rivalling institutions.

PART II

The rise and decline of the Congolese state: the cycle of state building and state collapse

In this part of the paper we try to trace events in order to explain and analyse processes of state building and state collapse in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Zaïre, as it was known through parts of its history. State collapse in the context of this research means that a state can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that the state has no effective control over its territory and its borders; this occurs when most state functions are contested by non-state actors.

Why do parts of the state system cease to perform at times, and how does the process of state collapse evolve over time in the different areas of state activity? Coming out of Belgian Colonialism in 1960, the country went through manifold crises. While some scholars and politicians assume that there has never been a state in Congo, perhaps with the exception of the Belgian colonial state, we were able to find evidence of significant state activity after independence, and many traces of former state organisations or the ruins of them after two devastating wars. In fact, we argue that significant efforts at state building were made in Congo before the state started to fall apart.

In this narrative we try to find out what led to state collapse in Congo and what has led or might lead away from it. For this purpose, we trace the period from independence until now. We look at different areas of state action and how they have changed over time, and try to understand how a more or less functional state became dysfunctional or vice versa, and how different actors have coped with this.

We apply a framework of institutional multiplicity in order to trace processes across different areas of state and non-state activity and organisation. Given the existence of competing institutional systems and the fact that Kinshasa, from whence systems of national rule always emerged, remains distant for most Congolese communities, examining historical evolution solely through an analysis of the constitutional framework or through conventional institutional or economic theory is inadequate. Standard institutional and economic theory can explain neither the evolution of the state over time nor prescribe recipes for its reconstruction after war. It is not simply a case of setting the correct incentives and rules and the desired outcome will be the result. A central conceptual idea in our approach is that different rule systems coincide and compete: these include the formal or (written) legal frameworks or statutory law; the variety of systems that have evolved in history and that are usually applied to a defined community on a sub-national level (customary law); and rules of informal (legal or illegal) networks in communities no longer within the reach of statutory or customary law, for example certain survival techniques in cities and networks of violence (non-state armed forces) that control a part of the state's territory. In addition to all these, as explained above, there is a further competing institutional framework: the rules and regulations imposed by international actors.

It is important to note that these frameworks are all in place simultaneously, and that individual people and groups move within and between them. This opportunity to shift from statutory to customary law, or to the laws of a gang – essentially, to operate within the framework that suits best one's own aspirations – constitutes one of the characteristics of a fragile state. The respective law systems overlap, and the relations between them are negotiable or violently enforceable by non-state actors, while in more stable states all participants have a clear understanding which framework applies to which sort of transaction. Doing business in the DRC can mean, for example, producing within the realm of customary law, selling products in a reciprocal relationship within informal business structures, and

eventually selling these again either within markets governed by national or international statutory law or within markets governed by criminal violent networks. We consider it important to distinguish between these networks and their operational areas over time, in order to say something about the state of the state at a given moment.

For the purpose of tracing the challenges and processes of state building and state unravelling, we look into the following sub-domains of the Congolese state:

- Political organisation: that is, the coalitions that have come to power at different times and their organisation of *Herrschaft* (dominion) (Weber), including the organisation of administration;
- The organisation of the economy and the extent to which the state has influenced this, including the way in which the state organised its revenue;
- The security system: as well as the military and police, this involves the evolution of contesting armed forces, including external military interventions;
- The legal sphere: changing concepts and laws regulating citizenship, questions of access to public office and access to land. Through this we try to capture the main mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion of parts of the population. We also look into major constitutional changes affecting the political system.
- International interventions, and in particular fiscal and monetary measures introduced by international financial organisations, as well as official development assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International military interventions are looked into as well.

We draw on three major bodies of sources for this analysis. Firstly, we drew on the voluminous body of literature on Congolese history and the Congolese state. Secondly, we used national and international economic data to form a picture of the Congolese economy and the resources of the state. Thirdly, we conducted 98 interviews with various actors representing the state in all its dimensions, as well as non-state actors. Interviewees included businesspeople, traditional leaders, state administrators, NGO workers, academics, military officers, ministers, party representatives and spokespeople for 'civil society'.

Focussing on five areas or sub-domains of state activity (political, economic, security, legal, and international), we decided to distinguish between certain periods of state formation and state collapse in the DRC. Independence in 1960 was immediately followed by severe violent challenges to the newly founded state, which were finally overcome in 1964. We call this first period the period of state *formation*. After Mobutu took power in 1964, the subsequent years were the relatively successful years of state building and lasted until 1974, when a sharp economic shock set in. These nine years we call the period of state *building*. They were followed by exceptional and continuous economic decline from 1974 to 1990 and a number of desperate attempts at economic recovery. This period ('Things fall apart'²³) saw a great deal of adaptation to changing circumstances in various areas of state organisation and also saw structural adjustment forced upon Congo by international actors. However, things deteriorated even more between 1990 and 1997, when the international community stopped aid flows and demanded democratisation ('The road to collapse'). During this fourth period, severe external threats also had to be dealt with. The influx of roughly a million people from neighbouring Rwanda in 1994 challenged the state in many respects. After the collapse, things got even worse: two brutal wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2002) not only cost millions of lives, but also

²³ We use this famous title from Chinua Achebe in the opposite sense to that intended by the novelist. In his book, traditional society fell apart in the wake of modernization. Here, however, modernization itself falls apart.

divided the state into three separate territories ruled by different armed forces. The peace accord of 2002 marks the start of the final period, the reconstruction period, which has involved many – mostly internationally-led – attempts to re-stabilise and rebuild the country. While reconstruction is on-going, we examine the formative years up to the elections in 2006.

The colonial heritage

When Henry Morton Stanley established the 'king's authority' (1879) in the country that in 1885 became the 'Congo Free State' as the private property of Belgium's King Leopold II, he tried to introduce – like all colonisers – the political and administrative frameworks he knew from Europe, though in a minimalist and perverted form. Administrative and state structures were imposed on a population that had – depending on the region, language and historical experience – a variety of political organisations. There were those who felt themselves to be descendants of the Kingdom of Kongo, with a hierarchical form of political organisation and patterns of trade with distant lands (Iliffe 1995); there were peasants and traders who operated on a smaller regional or local scale; there were long-distance slave traders; and there were acephalous societies who lived as hunters and gatherers with little contact with the outside world.

Whatever the organisation of their society, the sources of legitimacy of their rulers or the practices and conduct of their politics, all of these groups were subjected to Leopold's will and after 1908 to the Belgian idea of imposing 'modern' state structures on the indigenous population in order to create 'civilisation' or 'development'. Some groups were eventually granted the status of a 'Native Authority' while others were not. All of them were subjugated to the rule of Belgian law that was exercised by Belgian authorities.

The borders – and thus the inhabitants – of the 'Free State' were not naturally defined. Between 1881 and 1892 the Belgians conquered Katanga,²⁴ and the Eastern Congo was wrested from control of East African Arab and Swahili speaking traders between 1892 and 1894. The Berlin Conference of 1885 broadly marked the territory within today's borders, while the definite border between Congo and Rwanda was agreed upon in a treaty between Belgium and Germany in 1910 (Turner 2007). Those who lived within the territory were considered to be subjects of the Belgian King; subjects with little or no rights, in contrast with the inhabitants of Belgium. The concept of citizenship was alien to the Congolese, as was the idea of the French Revolution that all men are equal. Even sovereignty, which theoretically lay in the hands of Leopold II, was in practice exercised by the state administration and the military as well as by missionaries and companies. It took the Belgians decades to exercise effective control over the territory and its inhabitants, and it took them even longer to create internal boundaries of prefectures and sub-prefectures as well as names – old and new ones – for the various 'tribes'. Meanwhile, the local communities themselves continued to refer to themselves and the areas they traditionally inhabited as they always had done, regardless of the Belgians' claims.

As will become clear later, citizenship, in particular in the Eastern areas of Congo, is contested even today. Back then, however, the area was seen as one colony: *'le Congo Belge'*

²⁴ Leopold's troops had to fight the Yeke kingdom, which tried to play off their efforts with their rival Cecil Rhodes. While Katanga became officially part of the Congo Free State, Leopold entrusted the administration of that area to his company 'Compagnie du Katanga' (1891). It only started effective administration in 1900 and was renamed 'Comité Spécial du Katanga', still considered separate from the rest of the colony. After the Belgian government took over Leopold's African territories, Katanga was integrated into the Belgian Congo in 1910. The province enjoyed considerable autonomy until 1933, when a major provincial territorial reform was conducted. Katanga at the time of independence was the richest and most developed province.

et le Ruanda-Urundi', with a single army, the *Force Publique*, a single governor general in Kinshasa and two lieutenant governors general in Lubumbashi and Bujumbura.²⁵

Along with economic activity throughout the vast territory, state power became more visible and more forceful; administrative personnel were accompanied by soldiers wherever they went. By 1906 the administration had tried to formally expand into areas of traditional dominion, when it created chieftaincies. Their main objective was to collect taxes and to mobilise labour for mines, plantations and road building. This system was refined over the decades and, by 1933, there was a more or less uniform structure of local administration over the entire territory (Young and Turner 1985: 36).

The Colonial economy was characterised by the export of primary commodities: in the beginning, the colony was transformed into a supplier of raw material, especially of natural rubber and other agricultural products. Forced labour, with violence serving as an 'incentive', prevailed over paid labour (Hochschild 1999). Private European companies were given 'delegated sovereignty' (Young and Turner 1985: 33) in large rubber-bearing parts of the territory, while the state imposed rubber collection as a tribute on local populations. Mining became important after 1906, especially after a railroad was built between the capital Kinshasa and the port of Matadi. The Belgian state offered huge incentives to corporate power: the *Société Générale de Belgique* was brought in to excavate gold, tin and copper, which became the backbone of the colonial economy. The company was granted huge areas of land for exploitation. While the Belgian state was not involved in the day to day running of the companies, it was a dominant shareholder in the several sub-companies of the *Société Générale*. Additionally, the Belgian state – using armed forces – provided a workforce at very low costs.²⁶

By 1959 mining, and copper in particular, counted for 60% of export revenues. Coffee and palm-oil contributed 8% each, and diamonds 7%. (Körner 1988: 9). A modest level of industrialisation had been taking place from the 1920s onwards, which gained more speed during World War II: cement, soap, chemicals for mining, textiles and beer were produced in Kinshasa and Katanga. Food production was sufficient to feed peasants, miners and the people in cities.²⁷ Congolese people, however, were explicitly excluded from owning private property in industry. While there had been attempts to grant peasants private ownership of land, this '*paysannat*' remained marginal (Körner 1988: 13).

Needing a workforce in the eastern parts of Congo and being the protector (having been granted a League of Nations trusteeship) of Rwanda after World War I, the Belgian administration shifted considerable numbers of people across what is now the border between Rwanda and Congo (Young and Turner 1985, Mamdani 2001, Turner 2007). Settlers starting to plant coffee or tea attracted migrant workers, but they also scared away communities who fled their villages in order to escape the dominance and brutality of European labour force management at that time.

In general, the Belgian colonial state did not provide what a modern state is generally expected to provide: while there was some – and at the end of colonial dominion even significant – investment in infrastructure, which was basically used for the marketing of

²⁵ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja comments on this: "As a teenager growing up in the Belgium Congo in the 1950s, it never occurred to me that these three territories were destined to become three separate nation states." (Nzongola-Ntalaja in: Mandaza (ed) 1999: 4). There is, however, the important legal difference that Congo was a Belgian colony, while Rwanda was a protectorate for which Belgium was accountable to the League of Nations and, after 1945, to the United Nations.

²⁶ For a detailed account of Belgian state-led economic activity, see Young and Turner (1985).

²⁷ The introduction of a head tax and forced cultivation (*cultures obligatoires*) were means to force peasants into market production.

mining and cash crops,²⁸ there was hardly any provision of health or education for the subjects of colonialism. This was left to missionaries or to companies. On the eve of independence, the missions “had as many expatriate personnel as the state, and more than three times as many outposts” (Young and Turner 1985: 37).

One of the particularities of the Belgian colonial system was the attempt not to produce too many '*evolués*' (social climbers) – people who became educated and trained, be it for public or private services, for the political or economic sphere.²⁹ Until 1960, education was almost entirely carried out by missionaries (Nohlen 1993: 741), and was basically undertaken as training for the big enterprises or to create subordinate workers for the colonial state. Moreover with the exception of some tiny niche markets, political participation on the part of Africans only slowly emerged during the 1950s. In 1908 the '*Charte Coloniale*',³⁰ the constitution-like document drawn up for the colony when the Belgian state inherited it from Leopold II, explicitly prohibited political activity and restricted people from organising except on a religious, cultural or ethnic level (Körner 1993: 503). Travel was restricted and with colonial permission only. These colonial decisions influenced both the small size and the lack of integration and political coherence of the political forces that were to take over after independence.

There were therefore a tiny number of capable people who were to become part of the elite in post-independence Congo. Their exclusion from political activity had also meant that the structures of the colonial state – though forcefully imposed – remained an alien and distant concept bearing little relation to the various societies within the colonial borders. While the Belgian state, as represented by the armed forces, was seen as the '*Bula Matari*'³¹ and was able to organise local chiefs as its administrators and henchmen, matters of regulation other than those relating to big companies and white settlers were left to a multitude of customary authorities: access to land and water, inheritance, the use of legitimate force, political alliances and even the declaration of war and peace continued to be handled according to customary law. The customary laws of communities varied considerably over the huge territory. While the Leopoldian and Belgian vision of the country was that of a single entity, sheer distance provided the space for a certain degree of regional autonomy. This was, however, suppressed or modified as soon as the reach of the Belgian administration enabled it to interfere.

Though the Belgian state did everything to impose itself as a veritable Leviathan,³² institutional multiplicity was not overcome during colonial rule: the central state was run by the Belgians who presided over 'citizens',³³ while at the same time 'traditional authorities' ruled over their subjects. In the economic realm, there was the duality of the plantation mode of production and industrial mining, which was distinct from the prevailing subsistence agriculture. Institutional multiplicity offered the opportunity for very few people to move between the 'rational state' and the 'archaic state' in Weberian terms, and between the “market economy” and the subsistence economy respectively. This distinction was also evident in the

²⁸ Roads and railways were built mainly for export purposes. They often connected Congolese sites with trading posts and cities across the borders to neighbouring countries, rather than integrating the country.

²⁹ There was not a single Congolese physician or engineer in 1960 when Congo became independent (Nohlen 1993: 739)

³⁰ “Loi sur le Gouvernement du Congo Belge” of October 18th, 1908, named '*Charte Coloniale*'.

³¹ This term, also referred to as '*Bula Matadi*', literally means 'he who breaks the rocks'. While this phrase initially meant the clearing of rocks for the railway, it gradually evolved to mean “breaking all resistance”. (Young and Turner 1985: 31). Eventually, '*Bula Matadi*' became the image of the state itself, characterised by taxes and prisons (Interview, April 2007).

³² Its dominion over the territory is sometimes called the 'colonial trinity': “Colonial administration and military, the catholic church and international companies formed a mutually reinforcing alliance to govern the territory and its people.” (Young and Turner 1985: 10).

³³ This is not to say that Belgium treated Congolese respectfully as citizens. The notion here refers to the concept of citizenship that was predominant in Belgium.

legal system: civil law was formally introduced, while customary law prevailed. This legacy of colonialism resulted in what Mahmood Mamdani calls a 'bifurcated state' with 'bifurcated citizenship' (Mamdani in Mandaza 1999: 44).

When in the late 1950s Belgium finally sensed that the days of colonialism were limited,³⁴ investment in education and health started to grow rapidly: the Universities of Kinshasa (1954) and Lubumbashi (1956) were founded, and government expenditure rose to around 30% of the Congolese GDP – as opposed to the previous 15% (Young and Turner: 39). An embryonic African political class³⁵ emerged, although it was not able to organise a big and unified anti-colonial movement. Instead, more than 100 political parties emerged in 1959-1960, representing different regions more than political ideas (Körner 1993: 100). The first meeting of the new party representatives, the rulers to be, took place in 1958, when the Belgian government invited them to attend the Brussels International Fair. Another important meeting was the Pan African Congress in Accra, Ghana, in 1958, which particularly influenced Patrice Lumumba. The emerging political class had roughly a year to debate and organise before independence. In this short turmoil, two major views on the future prospects of Congo emerged: 'unitarism', which was promoted by the '*Movement National Congolais*' (MNC, Patrice Lumumba) and which became linked to the Pan-African ideas of politicians like Kwame Nkrumah or Sekou Touré, versus 'federalism', promoted by the '*Alliance des Bakongo*' (ABAKO, Joseph Kasavubu), which intended to preserve the territorial integrity of the country but was seen as thinly disguised separatism, promoted by political factions from the wealthier regions like Shaba and Bas-Zaïre (Young and Turner 1985: 41). Between 1958 and 1960 a number of episodes of violent unrest eventually led the Belgians to agree to a '*table ronde*' with representatives of the newly founded parties. In March 1960 the Belgian government debated the '*Loi Fondamentale*', which effectively became the provisional constitution that led Congo into independence in 1960.

Colonial State Building

The colonial legacy left deep imprints on the country, some of which proved to be crucial in later processes of Congolese state-building and state-unravelling.

Institutional multiplicity was never overcome in the sense that the bureaucratic state, statutory law and the provision of state services never achieved hegemony over previous customary arrangements. State regulation designed for the entire territory was in the hands of the Belgian administration and army, and was to a certain extent executed by missionaries and the mining companies. The white minority – less than one percent of the population – monopolised formal rule in the vast country. They created a perverted capitalist environment and a bifurcated state, using rational, capitalist institutions for themselves in the administrative and economic sphere, while ruling their subjects with violence and forced labour. The elite bargains (or joint resource extraction deals to use Synder's terminology) of this period were between the Belgian state and its administration, missionaries and companies. They were able to expand their authority, or 'broadcast power' in the terminology of Herbst, through a combination of the use of force and the building of infrastructure. While they were ruling a

³⁴ It took Belgium much longer than other colonial powers to eventually think of granting independence. In 1954 a 30 year programme (Jeff van Bilsen: *Plan de Trente Ans pour l'émancipation Politique de l'Afrique Belge*, Brussels 1954) to educate the Congo for independence caused a scandal in Brussels, as officials thought it would take at least another 100 years before the colony was 'ready' for independence.

³⁵ The colonial bourgeoisie, predominantly Belgian and less than 1% of the population, controlled 95% of capital assets, 70% of market production and 50% of the money income by the end of the 1950s (Peemans 1997: 153).

legally divided territory – their own colony, Congo, and their League of Nations protectorate, Rwanda³⁶ – in terms of dominion and administration they treated these entities as one.

On the one hand the Belgian administration tried to use traditional authorities as outposts of their coercive rule. Tribes and chiefs were defined and appointed according to Belgian needs. These needs included some administrative control, but most importantly the chiefs served as the local basis for mobilising forced labour and tributes; for example local people were recruited into road-building and rubber deliveries, which were very basic attempts at taxation. Some traditional authorities were granted a 'native authority', which was supposed to deal with the everyday life of local communities, while others were not.

This had important consequences for the access to land. Native Congolese were not entitled to own land individually; access to land could only be achieved through native authorities, which referred to inherited ancestral rights to allocate land. This land was accessible only to members of one's own group. Congolese without a native authority thus had no access to land and were merely tolerated on the land of other groups. In post-independence Congo this did not only lead to clashes over land, but – as a derivative of landownership – to the problems of citizenship for certain communities.

Private property rights were exclusively restricted to white landowners. The same rules held for rights to other sorts of assets: mining or forest concessions were in the hands of whites, and public office was reserved for Belgians. Public office meant not only being part of the ruling authority, but was also a route to taxing the population under Belgian jurisdiction and thus financing the office directly.

While the extent of formality, bureaucracy and the rule of law was increased during the eighty-one years of Belgian colonialism, traditional authorities continued to rule the everyday life of the Congolese, on issues ranging from landownership to settling legal matters. The number of people living largely outside traditional jurisdiction was very limited: workers in companies, the small number of *evolués* in the colonial administration and low rank soldiers in the colonial army.³⁷ They were often relocated into the emerging cities, and thus were not only distant from their previous authority but subjected to the unfamiliar logic of state administration or wage labour in companies.

Education – mostly provided by missionaries – was offered only on a low level, which led to a very limited number of schooled people. The combination of political exclusion, the low level of education and the definition of identity and rights in ethnic terms might explain why no nationwide anti-colonial movement developed. The multitude of political movements that evolved a short time before independence were heavily based on regional and ethnic identities. They did not share a common vision for the future of an independent Congo and were heavily divided between 'federalationalists' and 'unitarists'. Despite this lack of integration, these people and their organisations were to become the future state-builders, the elite of an independent Congo.

The colonial army was not contested by any major military organisation inside the territory. After initial clashes with contesting neighbours at the borders of Katanga and Eastern Congo, the army controlled the whole territory. Congolese soldiers were only admitted to the lower ranks. Violent uprisings of Congolese against colonial rule did take place, but were quickly

³⁶ This means that the League of Nations, and after World War II the United Nations, were able to demand some accountability with regard to what the Belgians did in Rwanda; but the Congo was entirely their own affair.

³⁷ This refers to the modern principles ruling the organisations they worked in. When it came to family matters, inheritance etc. they were of course still subject to their traditional background.

silenced. As an alternative to fighting, in many cases communities preferred the exit option and retreated further into the forest (Turner 2007: 67).

While Belgian colonialism had some impact on the integration of the economy, this remained very limited. In the formal sector, with mining as its backbone, the shipment of minerals and rubber to European ports provided the bulk of economic activity. This largely took place in Katanga province. Industrial mining, and, in the last few years of colonialism some processing and some manufacturing, were introduced. While this had some impact on the transformation of peasants into workers and led to urbanisation in some parts of the country, this was still limited to very few areas. Vast areas of the territory were still not connected to the centre and not connected to each other. Overall, Belgian modernisation did not lead to the creation of an embryonic entrepreneurial class. Private property rights reserved for whites, and those who were seen as *evolués* did not command power either from a traditional point of view or in terms of accumulated wealth. While they provided the personnel for state-building after independence, they were very remote from political power both by being subordinates of Belgians and being restricted from forming their own organisations.

While the rural road-building programme provided some opening of the countryside to the 'modern' world, both the creation of rural markets and the integration between the agricultural sector and the modern sector remained very modest. Head taxes and forced labour were supposed to work as stimuli for surplus production and the entry of peasants into market systems. This remained embryonic, however. The modest outcome of attempts to integrate of the countryside can be explained by a combination of two factors: taxation seems to have been too high to get peasants involved in a monetary and market economy; and entry into markets was further restricted by the limited property rights conceded to Congolese.

The colonial period saw a slow diminishing of pre-capitalist forms of societal and state organisation. However, while (white) capitalist asset-enlargement happened in some areas, the overwhelming economic activity remained in subsistence agriculture.

The minimalist state that the Belgians had established was, however, able to govern the market of Congolese produce. This state provided more than a protection racket, as it not only promoted the business of big mining companies, but also tried to get the territory under unified control. There were efforts to change the way of life and the mode of production of all Congolese societies under traditional rule, but at this stage this did not result in the emergence of any Congolese plantation or mine owners.

The first republic: State formation 1960-1965

For the Congolese, midnight on June 29th, 1960, felt like a revolution. Expectations that everything would change overnight were huge, in particular with regard to the apartheid the Belgians had created. The days of hope, however, were very few. Only one week after the celebration of independence on June 30th, 1960, the army mutinied, demanding the faster 'Africanisation' of the Congolese troops and better payment. During the subsequent unrest, more than 10,000 Belgian military and administrative personnel left the country, a loss that could not be compensated for by Congolese *evolués*. Within weeks rich provinces declared their secession: Shaba (11 July, under Tshombé), South Kasai (8 August, under Kalonji) and Kivu³⁸ (under Kashamura). The first elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba (MNC), together with President Kasavubu, invited the United Nations to intervene in response to the Katanga secession and the Belgian military intervention on behalf of Tshombé on July 12,

³⁸ The Kivu secession, however, did not get beyond the stage of a political declaration.

1960. When the UN reacted hesitantly, they thought of asking the Soviet Union for help; but this was opposed by President Kasavubu (ABAKO). The two accused each other of treason and asked the newly elected parliament to sack their respective opponent, but no decision was made.

On September 14th the government was overthrown by the army Chief-of-Staff: Mobutu's first *coup d'état*. Mobutu, who had been installed and trusted by Lumumba, declared Kasavubu as president and Joseph Ileo as Prime Minister, and proclaimed the '*Collège des Commissaires*' as an interim government. However, in December the Deputy Prime Minister of Lumumba's government, Antoine Gizenga, created a parallel government³⁹ in Kisangani, which was overthrown in 1961. Patrice Lumumba was killed in February 1961, allegedly with Belgian and US complicity.⁴⁰

The Congolese state as a territorial unit and as a common project was highly contested by different parties. There was no central government authority whatsoever. However, there was also no clear-cut contesting authority in each of the various provinces, "autonomous" or not. Governments were overthrown or contested the moment they tried to establish themselves; at times there were four competing governments trying to claim authority over Congo.

Officially, the government of Cyrille Adoula was in charge from 1961. Provincial fragmentation, however, contested central government again and again. Under the pressure of UN troops, Moïse Tshombé had given up plans for a separate Katanga by January 1963. After a short exile in Madrid he formed a coalition of regional interests and gained some Belgian support, which in turn won political and financial support in other regions of the country. He managed to incorporate 18,000 of his secessionist soldiers, the '*Katangan gendarmes*', into the national army. Backed by Belgian paratroopers and the American Air Force, he recaptured the insurgent capital of Kisangani and replaced Adoula as prime minister in July 1964.

The 1964 provisional constitution, the '*Constitution de Luluabourgh*' (Kananga), split the previous six provincial units into twenty-one in order to accommodate the regional power coalitions that were expressed in the multitude of new parties, and also provided for elected provincial parliaments. This first experience of Congolese decentralisation went badly wrong. The newly created, highly ethnicised units tried to acquire control over territorial administration and the police forces (Young and Turner 1985: 41). Katanga under Tshombé created its own currency and announced a federation with Kasai and a common defence policy. A civil war and several rebellions broke loose with many armed forces, including local Mayi-Mayi fighters. About 20,000 UN blue helmets tried to 'restore law and order in the entire Congo', according to their mandate. A multitude of international actors was involved in political and military turmoil: Belgian, French, US, Miami-Cubans on behalf of the US, Ghanaian and Guinean troops, Chinese and Russian liaison officers, and mercenaries from all sorts of backgrounds (Scholl-Latour 1989).

The constitution of 1964 demanded from the 'transitional government' the organisation of national elections. Tshombé, hoping to be elected as the new president, created an electoral coalition with 49 of the 223 political parties: The '*Convention Nationale Congolaise*' (CONACO), which won the parliamentary majority. By September 1965, however, when parliament met, this coalition had become very fluid and substantial parts of it had turned against Tshombé; a significant anti-Tshombé bloc, led by Cléophas Kamitatu and Victor

³⁹ He called it the '*République Populaire du Congo*' and created his '*Armée Populaire de Libération*'. In his view, this was the legitimate remainder of the Lumumba government.

⁴⁰ While Larry Devlin, CIA chief of station in Congo, confirms the order to kill Lumumba, he claims that the actual killing was without US interference. Lumumba (and Gizenga) were seen as too Soviet-friendly in these days of the Cold War. Devlin, Larry. *Chief of Station, Congo, A Memoir of 1960–67*. New York, 2007.

Nendaka Bika of the Binza group,⁴¹ had emerged. President Kasavubu declared that the transitional leadership under Tshombé was over and appointed Evariste Kimba to form a new government. Months of political manoeuvring followed, but no consensus emerged. When the vote of confidence of November 14th 1964 failed to install the Kimba government, due to Tshombé's ability to bloc the investiture, Nendaka became presidential candidate; he, however, was opposed by Kamitatu. Kasavubu then re-nominated Kimba. This inability of the parliament to elect a president opened the path for Mobutu: on November 24th, fourteen members of the army high command decided to seize power; they declared that Kasavubu and Kimba were ousted as president and prime-minister, and designated Mobutu as chief of state.

Parliament and other constitutional institutions remained in place. Indeed, parliament accepted this power seizure on November 25th, and President Kasavubu acknowledged his demission by the coup on November 29th. Tshombé, meanwhile, declared his support for Mobutu on November 25th (Young and Turner 1985: 49 ff).

Young and Turner observe that "By 1965, pluralism had run amok...There was a widespread desire to find release from the intense insecurities and endemic communal threats which ethnic mobilization had created" (Ibid: 42). When Joseph Mobutu and other army officers seized power, not only did the national political elite accept the new situation almost unanimously, but so too did the Western⁴² and wider African world.

Nevertheless, the disintegration of Congo had serious effects on the economy: while the physical infrastructure stayed more or less intact, production and export – in particular in the agricultural sector – dropped dramatically. Between 1959 and 1966 commercial agriculture dropped by 42%. Mineral production dropped by 24% (Körner 1988: 17). This mineral production, however, was mostly concentrated in Katanga. The biggest company, *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* (UMHK), provided the financial backbone of the Tshombé secessionist state, and the financial backbone for the Congolese state after Tshombé gave up on secession and formed a coalition with other political players. While government, administration and the army had become 'Africanised' during the first republic, the mining corporations – which were the main economic cornerstones and foreign exchange earners in the country – were still in Belgian and US hands.

The scale of economic decline in the agricultural sector led to massive urban migration, unemployment and marginalisation. The 'central government' was basically unable to collect taxes or control inflation, while secessionist Katanga administered its own budget. Smuggling and the informalisation of the economy were widespread. In 1963, after Katanga's attempts at secession had ended, the government under Adoula signed up for membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Development Agency. A homemade stabilisation programme was introduced to stabilise the economy, but the results were not satisfactory enough for the IMF to grant credits.

In order to restore the economy, territorial integrity had to be restored first. This proved to be the job of the national army, the *Armée Nationale Congolaise*. This army had been in mutiny since almost immediately after independence and had split into various local groups, lacking payment, equipment or a central command. Mobutu's proved to be the strongest single organised group in the country, despite being a far cry from a hierarchical military organisation (Young and Turner 1985: 261). He managed better than others to mobilise

⁴¹ The name 'Binza' group refers to the suburb Binza in Kinshasa, where many politicians lived and met privately. According to Devlin (2007), the most important members were Joseph Mobutu, Head of the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* since August 1964, Bomboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Nendaka, the Chief of the intelligence..

⁴² The United States of America and Belgium immediately recognised the new government.

international support for his plans, in particular from the United States and Belgium (Devlin 2007). While extremely successful in negotiating these political deals, Mobutu was not a 'military man' in the sense that he had not gone through the ranks of an army, received military training, fought battles and became acquainted with military strategy and tactics.

When Mobutu came to power in November 1964, he managed to unify significant parts of the emergent Congolese elite to the extent that they were willing to contribute to a single nation-state, having learned that secession was not an option. Elite fractions from the resource-poor north became stronger, as they understood that their economic future depended on a unified country including the resource-rich south. Elites from the South refrained from further threats of secession and joined the national project, partly because the US had made it clear, both financially and in terms of their support for Mobutu, that they – unlike the Belgians, who had provided military support to Tshombé's secession – preferred a unified country as an ally during the Cold War period.

Independence, state collapse and the struggle to monopolise power

The pull-out of Belgian administrative and military personnel immediately after independence left the small fragmented Congolese elite to sort out their aspirations and programmes and their relative power to do so. The constitutional and newly built institutional framework – government and parliament – proved to be far too weak to solve conflict without military violence.

Elite factions were far away from defining a common national project. Rather, the inability to pursue ambitions on a sub-national level and the exhaustion of forces let them agree to Mobutu's power seizure. Maybe they realised that none of them was strong enough to impose its will on other political or regional actors, even with help from outside. After there had not been a military solution to the problem of fractionalisation, a fraction of the military became a solution for political stability.

The political basis of elite figures rested heavily on ethnic loyalties. They were only able to mobilise some loyalty on the basis of being part of an ethnic group or a region. None of the leaders had been able previously to acquire significant independent wealth⁴³. Financial and military support depended largely on their ability to find allies outside Congo.

The Leopoldian and Belgian exclusive and minimalist state, once removed, gave way to a fragmented country, with competing power centres and disintegrated military forces. Had it not been for international military assistance on Mobutu's behalf, Congo would have disintegrated into several entities.

The fragmentation of the political scene between 1960 and 1965 went hand in hand with economic fragmentation. While an integrated economy was far from being achieved under Belgian rule, the decline of agricultural production and even of mining in combination with the inability of the central government to tax, left state coffers empty. Nevertheless, the attempt to cut out the backbone of the economy as a separate piece, the Katangan secession, proved unsuccessful.

It took almost five years to overcome factionalism and to form a government with some operational capacity in the entire territory. The monopoly of power over the territory proved to be crucial for any further attempt at state-building.

⁴³ Moïse Tshombé's father was one of the very few businessmen who made a little fortune through trading and owned a car – but that was a far cry from wealth through mining.

While government, administration and army had become 'Africanised' during the First Republic, the main economic cornerstones and foreign exchange earners were still in Belgian and US hands: the mining corporations.

The second republic: State building 1966-1974

With Mobutu and the so-called 'Binza group' – representatives of the emerging elite from the North and Northeast – coming to power, they tried to introduce a centralised, authoritarian state that had to contain, crush or buy in the centrifugal forces of contesting elites. After first establishing a cabinet of twenty-two people from all provinces and political factions, Mobutu later declared a state of emergency, dissolved parliament and prohibited all political activity. With the help of mercenaries and military support from Belgium and the United States, he was able to 'pacify' the parts of the territory that were still in the hands of opposing powers. Slowly he gained control over a number of state functions and centralised them under his personal control,⁴⁴ only eventually 'civilianising' his military regime by appointing civilian friends to state posts. However, the strong nation-state vision he was attempting to build enjoyed a "remarkably broad consensus of approval" (Young and Turner 1985: 43; 54) both inside and outside Congo. His 'modern political project' (Willame 1992) was pursued through a number of key political and economic decisions.

Centralised control over political opposition was gained one and a half years after the *coup d'état* through the creation of the *Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution* (MPR, 1967). This party managed to gain control over lower levels of the state apparatus as well as over colonial corporations, unions, youth and student organisations (Young and Turner 1985: 43), and by 1970 had been declared the only legal party. The number of provinces was gradually reduced from twenty-one to eight (plus Kinshasa), and their previous financial autonomy was re-centralised through the presidency, which proved to be more efficient at allocating resources than the previously autonomous provincial authorities. These were no longer governed by elected governors, but by regional commissioners responsible only to Kinshasa. State representatives⁴⁵ were shifted around the country every three years and normally could not serve in their home area (Young and Turner 1985: 221 ff).

The nationalisation of the educational system, completed in 1971,⁴⁶ and its gradual improvement⁴⁷ provided a significant number of newly educated people whose main opportunities for employment were within the state administration and the big companies.

A new constitution came into being in 1967, with another following in 1970, and this was followed by additional laws to address questions of citizenship (Citizenship Decree of 1972) and land ownership (General Property Law, 1973). Citizenship was extended to people of supposedly Rwandan background, who had fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1963. 'Ancestral' land and colonially owned land was brought under the formal control of the state, which gradually released parts of it, turning some of these into a purchasable commodity.

⁴⁴ At times, he held the functions of President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Head of the Armed Forces and Head of the single party MPR.

⁴⁵ Administrators, teachers and health workers were deployed far from their home provinces. They were perceived and perceived themselves as "Zairois", not as Katangans or Kasaians. for example (Interviews, June 2005 and September 2006).

⁴⁶ The educational sector, formerly in the hands of missionaries, was taken over by the state and produced impressive numbers of school enrolment and alphabetization. By 1971, the formerly protestant, catholic and Belgian state universities were nationalized and renamed in 'Université du Zaïre' (Interview Ngoy, 31.5.2005).

⁴⁷ Primary school enrolment for pupils between 6 and 14 years was at a level of 92% in 1968/69; 8,401 students were enrolled at universities. University education had only started in 1959, and by 1960, the first eleven students had graduated. By 1968, Congo had educated 1541 graduates. (Banque National du Congo, Rapport Annuel 1968-69, p. 65).

In the economic sphere, a stabilisation programme managed to bring inflation under control, issued a new currency (the Zaire), imposed import taxes, which were meant in part to prohibit spending on luxury items, and raised export taxes – in particular on minerals. By 1968, inflation had fallen to 2.5%, while growth rates had increased to 8 %. Price stability and wage increases were felt positively, and growth continued to be significant during the early 1970s.

While there had been some minor efforts after independence to gain control over the vast mineral resources of Congo, the first serious step to extend political influence into the economy was the nationalisation of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in 1967. This was an extremely complicated matter, as this company – like others – was originally a private enterprise granted huge land concessions⁴⁸ by Leopold. Such land concessions were later transferred into shares held by Belgium, which became the majority shareholder of many companies. Theoretically these shares, inherited by the newly independent Congo in 1960, would have made the new Congolese state the dominant partner. This was supposed to be an 'intolerable danger' (Young and Turner 1985: 284), and Belgium undertook a number of company divisions with inter-nested shares, declaring that the matter would be resolved later. The Congolese ownership of formerly Belgian shares would have affected the biggest companies in Belgium itself, such as Sabena Airways. Combined with this ownership problem was the problem of the repayment of 'colonial debt', a term Belgium invented for the investments in infrastructure immediately prior to independence. Therefore, while Congo inherited the 'colonial debt', it did not inherit the assets held by the colonial state.

The UMHK empire, including its subsidiary companies, was impressive: it produced 300,000 tons of copper (two-thirds of it refined), 9,000 tons of cobalt, and 174,000 tons of tin concentrates, cadmium, germanium, gold and silver.⁴⁹ In 1965, its assets were valued at 21.3 billion Belgian Francs, and net profits between 1950 and 1959 were 31 billion Belgian Francs, with a further 16 billion Francs between 1960 and 1966 (Young and Turner 1985: 290). This company alone provided 50% of Zairian state revenues and 70% of Zaire's foreign exchange. While in the end the nationalisation of UMHK was profitable for the former owners and costly for Congo due to compensation payments, the idea of gaining economic control over the mineral wealth and over the land prevailed. UMHK was to be at the centre of a new company founded in 1967 – GECAMINES (*Générale les Carrières et des Mines*), which prevailed as the main foreign exchange earner until the next period of state collapse. In 1974 the state-owned company SOZACOM (*Société Zairoise de Commercialisation des Minerais*) was established and made responsible for selling GECAMINES' products.

Between 1973 and 1975, many private companies were nationalised or privatised in the sense that Zairians became owners⁵⁰; this was the so-called "Zairianisation" of the economy, and many new state-owned companies were founded⁵¹ in this process. Zaire attracted substantial foreign capital, and big infrastructure projects were started – including the Inga-Shaba complex, which featured a hydroelectric power plant, 2000 kilometers of high voltage lines and some industrial sites, mainly in the copper belt. Meanwhile industry expanded, especially in the areas of metal smelting, food processing, textiles, shoes, chemicals, and bicycle manufacturing (Körner 1993: 512).

⁴⁸ The Compagnie de Katanga was offered a concession one third of the land surface of the province of Shaba (Katanga) in 1891 (Young and Turner 1985: 283).

⁴⁹ Until 1960 UMHK was a major uranium producer, which provided for the first nuclear bombs (Young and Turner: 289).

⁵⁰ Loyal Zairians with the necessary means became the new owners. Members of the army, judges, state administrators and chiefs of "collectivités" and "localités" (the lowest administrative units) were legally prohibited from profiting out of Zairianisation (Körner: 69).

⁵¹ State-owned or partly state-owned companies included banks, mineral companies, refineries, a car factory, air, ship and overland transportation, hotels and insurance companies (Annual Report, p. 102).

Three main areas of the country were selected for development: Kinshasa and Bas-Congo were intended as an industrial and energy production zone, while the Katanga copper belt was designed for mining and the Kisangani area was designated as the centre of agriculturally based industries (Young and Turner 1985: 296). The first two objectives came into being, but agriculture remained the neglected stepchild of economic development. This priority given to mining and the investment in Inga-Shaba might be explained by the need to massively expand the revenue bases of the state, which could not be achieved as rapidly through agricultural growth, and by the recent threat of Katangan secession. Furthermore, foreign exchange was more easily available for big industrial projects. While the economy was growing, foreign aid decreased from 4.54\$ per capita in 1965 to 2.71 \$ per capita in 1968⁵².

This period of growth was accompanied by a relatively low intensity of violent contestation. Mobutu expanded his army, partly by trying to incorporate former rivals like the “Katangan gendarmes”, but also tried to get rid of the many mercenaries that were still in the territory. However, the army was difficult to discipline and to integrate. Two incidents tested the new national army during this period: the 1966 Kisangani mutiny over arrearages of payment combined with their fear that they would be disarmed, and a mercenary-led revolt in 1967, which started as a movement against integration into the new *Force Armées Congolaises*. The new army, with the help of the US Air Force, was eventually able to combat this revolt, though it had previously allowed these rebels to move freely and to conquer the town of Bukavu. 190,000 people from Bukavu were internally displaced and had to be relocated as a result.

While Mobutu tried to gain more control over the army through personal affiliations, there was considerable resistance within the rank and file to the supremacy of the *Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution*. The substitution of the national flag by the party banner was perceived as the provision of an alternative regime base. However, Mobutu managed this crisis by creating an elaborate system of clientelism and rivalries;⁵³ by 1972 he was able to command the creation of party cells within army units (Young and Turner 1985: 263).

At the height of his power and of state expansion, Mobutu created the concepts of “authenticity” and Zairianisation, which formed the heart of state ideology. In terms of institutional multiplicity, he attempted, to subordinate rival institutions to the institutions of the state over which he presided. He tried to abolish the influence of traditional or newly-established chieftaincies by transforming them into political-administrative cadres under the auspices of state and party. At the same time, he used the concepts and expressions of traditional Africa. This was not only about renaming the country and the river as Zaire, or the Katanga province as Shaba; by using symbols like the leopard-skin hat and the cane he was referring to African authenticity and independence from former colonial tutelage. Zairianisation involved ideological battles with the churches – the Catholic Church in particular – when the supremacy of party power and “authenticity” were proclaimed. This process of establishing the total supremacy of the party was formally consolidated in the constitution of 1974, which in Article 28 declared that “there exists a single institution, the MPR, incarnated by its president”, who *ex officio* is also president of the republic (Art. 30) (Young and Turner 1985: 70). Joseph-Désiré Mobutu dropped his Christian names and was henceforth known as Mobutu Sese Seko Wa Zabanga, Maréchal du Zaïre.

⁵² Own calculations based on Rapport Annuel, p. 126.

⁵³ Some Generals supported the subordination of the army under the party, as for example did General Molongya Mayikusa, who declared in a speech: “Now that Zaire is going through a far-reaching revolution, the soldier cannot remain outside of it; the army must be in the service of Mobutuism, because service to Mobutuism is service to the Nation” (Young and Turner 1985: 263). Others who resisted were moved to different posts, not promoted, downgraded and so on. For some of his opponents, Mobutu loosened the restriction that army personnel were not allowed to become owners of the newly nationalized companies and thus bought them in (Young and Turner 1985: 262 ff).

Plans were high-flying by 1974: growth was projected to be at least 6% per annum, at least 25% of state revenue was projected for investment – in addition to investments of the private sector – and Zaire was often referred to as '*Brésil d'Afrique*' (Körner 1988: 74).

The early second republic: nine years of state-building

The nine years after Mobutu's seizure of power outlined above formed the core effort of state building in independent Congo. Mobutu convinced, bought and forced the emergent elite into a common developmental project: the construction of a strong nation-state. His cabinet comprised all the relevant parts of the elite, representing all parts of the country. The creation of a single party, amalgamated and virtually synonymous with the state, could also be seen as an act of inclusion.

The party, however, was stronger on paper than in real life and never played a predominant role as a nationwide organisation. The different projects for modernisation were initiated from the top of the state downwards, and proved to be very uneven over the Congolese territory. Nevertheless, Mobutu's state challenged traditional law and institutions and transformed customary chiefs into state cadres at the local level.

One of the first steps of the nation-building project was vast investment in the nationalisation and expansion of the educational system, with considerable success. Furthermore, the new citizenship law was inclusive and invited all those with questionable membership of the nation into the project of modernisation. This was accompanied by a new law on land, which transformed certain parts of the territory into a commodity. While this transformation was successful in the realm of plantations and company-owned land, it did not really reach land under the control of traditional authorities, in no small part because of the regime's neglect of agriculture as a site of accumulation.

Further steps involved gaining control over the extraction of minerals; in other words, over the economic ground structure of the country. The nationalisation of UMHK and the establishment of GECAMINES were intended to be a central part of the 'Africanisation' of the economy, bringing the core of wealth production under political control. A major programme for industrialisation was the next step. While the creation of the Inga-Shaba complex gave considerable control over Katanga to Kinshasa, it can also be seen as a first attempt to integrate the economy. Further projected steps, such as transforming Kisangani into a centre of agricultural processing, never materialised.⁵⁴ Investment was very uneven between provinces and across different areas of economic activity, leaving agriculture aside.

⁵⁴ While I have no written evidence, the explanation for this neglect of agriculture lies most likely in the policies of that time, underpinned by a particular theoretical reasoning (e.g. Demele, Schöller, Steiner. *Modernisierung oder Marginalisierung. Investierbarer Überschuss und kulturelle Transformation als Grundlagen der Entwicklung*. Frankfurt am Main 1993, and Steiner, Roald. *Investierbarer Überschuss und Aussenhandel: über interne und externe Bedingungen nachholender Entwicklungsprozesse*. Marburg 1997). In a closed economy, the speed of agricultural surplus production determines the speed of growth of the industrial sector, both in terms of material inputs and the provision of labour for non-agricultural enterprises. The more and the more cheaply agriculture can produce, the lower the wages, which is the most important constraint under circumstances of capital scarcity. In an open economy, however, imported food can provide for lower wage costs in the stages of initial industrialisation. Export earnings used to subsidize wages allow for a faster growth of the industrial sector. The costs of opening the countryside and getting it into market production are tremendous, especially in a country as vast and as backward as Congo; so this was probably not seen as the first priority for modernization. While model projects for agricultural development were in place, they clearly followed the vision of a mechanised or industrialised agriculture. In terms of sequencing investment (and given the extraordinarily short time of modernisation), priority was given to fast growing industrial projects. Given the physical infrastructure in today's Congo, or rather the lack of it, state-building and modernisation efforts will face the same problem: how to feed cheaply the workers that are supposed to produce commodities for farmers, and how to build the infrastructure to allow these goods to reach the farmers.

Achieving control of inflation and raising mineral and agricultural production resulted in average growth rates of 8%, which provided grounds for very optimistic assumptions about the future and the potential of further economic planning. The nationalisations of 1973 to 1975 were further steps to deliberately create an African entrepreneurial class.⁵⁵

While the Congolese army was only able to fight with the help of the US, it was brought under the control of the party-state and thus politicised as part of the wider project of centralisation and Zairianisation. Overall, these nine relatively successful years of state-building, alongside the nation-building project and Zairianisation of politics and economics, provided a powerful enough ideology to attract and motivate all the major actors in Zaire. At the same time, while official development aid was reduced, Zaire nevertheless enjoyed significant support from the international community.

These nine years represent the only successful phase of both state-building and creating a capitalist economy. In this period the rival patrimonial institutions lost large amounts of their influence to the rational state, secular education and the capitalist economy. The attempt to control markets, both internally and externally, went hand in hand with significant shifts in terms of turning land into a commodity and subjects of traditional authority into citizens.

It should be kept in perspective, however, that despite the effect this transformation had on the elite and urban economic centres, it had very little impact on the rural areas, where 75% of the population lived. The vulnerability of the embryonic capitalist process therefore remained enormous.

Things fall apart 1974-1990

The crisis that marked the beginning of deterioration began in the economic realm with the decline of copper prices, combined with the first OPEC oil price shocks. In April-May 1974 copper prices dropped to less than half of their previous peak level. The Zairian state – in spite of some attempts to diversify the economy – was still heavily dependent on copper earnings: state revenue from copper increased sixfold from 1965 to 1974, and from 186 million Zaire in 1968 to 539 million Zaire in 1974. However, it dropped back down to 435 million Zaire in 1975 (Körner 1988: 107).

While total exports were earning 1012.82 million US \$ in 1973 and 1381 million in 1974, the sharp drop to 864.88 million in 1975 was felt bitterly (UNCTAD). At the same time, import prices between 1974 and 1975 rose by an average of 19% (Körner 1988: 99). As an economy that heavily depended on mining exports, Zaire was hit hard by these external shocks. Significant investment had been undertaken in infrastructure, particularly in relation to power generation but also to a lesser extent in industry, much of which was financed by external debt backed by the state. This modern industrial sector, still tiny as it was, was heavily dependent on imported inputs and particularly on energy, machines and spare parts. The sudden lack of foreign exchange affected the industrial sector's output immediately: in 1975 it shrank by 8.9 %. Inflation started to grow, increasing from 16% in 1973 to 29% in 1975. A downward spiral started, which was reflected in the black market exchange rate: while the official exchange rate was 1 US \$ to 0.50 Z, black market rates went from 0.75 (December 1974) to 1.11 (December 1975) (Körner 1988: 220).

As the Gross National Product shrank by 5% the state budget had to be adjusted, which in particular meant a decrease in investment. The disaster hit on all levels: in internal and

⁵⁵ The economic results of that move, however, are widely seen as counterproductive. These changes in ownership were reconsidered soon afterwards, and former owners were reinstituted.

external economics, and in the private sector as well as in state owned companies. It also had repercussions in the social and political realm.

State investment in industry and infrastructure before 1974 had been very uneven over the provinces: 31.6% went to Kinshasa and 46.3 % to Shaba (Katanga), while Bas-Zaïre received 10.38%, Haut-Zaïre 6.28%, Equateur and Kivu about 1.5% and Bandundu, Kasai Oriental and Occidental received nothing at all (Kapaji, quoted in Young and Turner 1985: 83). Furthermore, the newly founded industrial sites did not manage to take off: the steel mill in Maluku used 7% of its production capacity of 250,000 tons in the first year of production, 1975, and each year this decreased further even from that tiny level (to 4.2% in 1976 and 3.2% in 1977, for example) (Körner 1988: 81).

During the phase of relative stability and growth urbanisation was massive, as formal employment, both in the industrial sector and in administration and the military, grew considerably. For all sectors of the economy combined, aggregate formal employment was 562,134 in 1960 and 997,600 in 1970. State employment (civil service, contract personnel, teachers and the military) grew from 167,900 in 1960 to 264,700 in 1970 and 340,700 in 1975. In particular the improvement in the education sector⁵⁶ was a huge pull factor bringing young people into the cities, as was the improved opportunities for formal employment.⁵⁷

The situation in the countryside, however, worked as a push factor. The official rhetoric underlined the importance of agriculture, but little had changed in the rural areas since Belgian times. Agro-industry was not brought to Kisangani (as the promised third pillar of the economy), and only a few investments had been made in plantation economy, mainly in coffee and palm-oil. In the early seventies, only 1-2% of investment went into agriculture, in contrast to the 4-5% immediately before independence. (Young and Turner 1985: 310). The road network, insufficient for a country of the size of Congo anyway, started to deteriorate, and rural transport was affected significantly. Truck life was no more than 50,000 miles because of the poverty of road conditions.⁵⁸

Three quarters of the population lived in subsistence agriculture. The state had fixed agricultural prices and production quotas in order to subsidise food prices in cities, and farmers faced deteriorating internal terms of trade: agricultural products were unable to buy the same amounts of consumer goods as in previous years. While peasants were paid very low prices for most tradable agricultural goods,⁵⁹ the marketing of these goods was organised by parastatals, which were usually not able to collect crops efficiently, although they paid high commissions to their brokers. From 1974 to 1977, when as much as one third of the desperately short foreign exchange was spent on food imports to the city, large amounts of maize rotted in the countryside (Agency for International Development, quoted in Young and Turner 1985: 322).

The formerly Belgian system of violence was still very much in place: a fixed head tax, penal mechanisms for failing to provide the required amount and forced labour for state projects like road-building were heavy burdens on peasants shoulders.⁶⁰ In turn, state delivery in terms of services such as schools, health centres and rural roads declined.

⁵⁶ The number of teachers expanded from 37,300 to 143,400 between 1960 and 1975 (Young and Turner 1985: 87).

⁵⁷ The number of adults employed in the formal economy even at its peak never exceeded 25% of the adult population.

⁵⁸ The 'Office des Routes' was nicknamed 'Office des Troues', office of potholes (Young and Turner 1985: 311).

⁵⁹ Specifically: cotton, coffee, palm oil, maize, cassava (Young and Turner 1985: 311 ff).

⁶⁰ Young and Turner explain the degree of coercion in the villages in terms of the need for local representatives of the state to collect enough taxes and fines to fund their own salaries (Ibid: 97).

As a consequence, young people in particular generally opted to migrate to the cities, and farmers in the villages returned to mere subsistence. The countryside refused to feed the towns.

Another disaster began politically but turned into a long standing economic burden. Zaire's connections with the Angolan liberation movements reached back into the 1960s, but these relationships changed when the April Revolution in Portugal in 1974 made Angolan independence much more likely. Mobutu decided to send in troops in July 1975, and in August invaded Cabinda, while South Africa was invading from the South. But the MPLA (Movement Populaire pour la Liberation d'Angola), with the help of Zairian Katanga gendarmes and later with Cuban armed forces, defeated the Zairian army. A consequence of that military disaster was not only the waste of resources on war: it had significant impacts on regional politics and on Congo's exports. The closing of the Benguela railway through Angola in August 1975, as well as the seizure of railway transport to the Mozambican harbours of Beira and Maputo the following year,⁶¹ made it much more costly for Zairian exports – in particular from Katanga – to be transported through the South African harbours of Durban and East London. The national transport system (including the railway from Shaba-Ilebo, river transport from Ilebo-Kinshasa, and railway from Kinshasa-Matadi) not only meant a long journey but also lacked the capacity to compensate for the closure of the Benguela railway (Körner 1988: 101). This increase in shipment costs further reduced revenues from mining.

By December 1975 disaster had hit to the extent that Mobutu was ready to come to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Several export credit insurances had declared Congo credit-unworthy, and several banks followed between March 1975 and early 1976. The cooperation with the IMF started in May 1975 when Congo was allowed to draw from an oil facility with weak conditionality. In March 1976 an agreement over 47 million US \$ was reached on the conditions that the currency was devalued by 42%, wage increases were limited to 20% and then frozen,⁶² and there was a sharp reduction of government expenditure. This eventually led to agreements with the 'Paris Club' (public creditors) and the 'London Club' (private creditors) in 1976. Most of the parastatal marketing companies were dissolved, and the Zairianised companies were returned to their former owners with a maximum share of 60% (*Rétrocession*). While the IMF hesitantly provided another loan (32.8 million US \$) and another stand-by agreement (52.2 million US \$) in 1977, this reportedly happened only because of massive US pressure on the IMF.⁶³ By then the economic crisis had translated into political upheavals involving wild strikes, the sacking of employees (particularly in the 'Zairianised' companies), visible corruption and galloping inflation. This crisis did not look short-term. A 'Consultative Group' for Zaire was formed from Paris Club participants, the IMF and the World Bank. They pressured Zaire to develop an integrated program that could serve as a base for debt-rescheduling. The response in November 1977 was named the 'Mobutu Plan', which aimed to cut back corruption, reduce public expenditure, increase state revenue, restrict imports, increase production, rehabilitate infrastructure and pay outstanding interests on debt. This, however, relied heavily on external finance, which depended on another, longer term IMF agreement. The IMF insisted on another substantial exchange rate evaluation (72%), which the Mobutu regime this time refused.

While there was no new agreement with the IMF in 1977, and an unaccomplished mission by the IMF in May 1978, another crisis hit twice in Katanga, now named Shaba.

⁶¹ With the independence of FRELIMO-Mozambique the border to the former Rhodesia was closed.

⁶² This was followed by a series of strikes in the public sector, some of which ended with the arrest of striking teachers (Körner 1988: 115: 120)

⁶³ E.g. Körner 1988: 113 ff; Young and Turner 1985: 381; Interview with IMF representative, June 2005.

The Katangan gendarmes⁶⁴ had reorganised themselves in the meantime, mainly in Angola, where they helped the Portuguese fight Angolan independence. They were organised in units called the 'Black Arrows' and eventually formed an 'alliance of circumstances' with the MPLA. By 1968, the Black Arrows used the political label 'Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo' (FLNC). They invaded the Shaba province in March 1977, and the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), the national army, was initially unable to fight them. However, France helped with military planes and Morocco with soldiers, and with this assistance they fought back the FLNC. The Zairian army tried to 'pacify' the region afterwards; this turned out to be a brutal reoccupation that caused more than 200,000 refugees to flee into neighbouring Angola.

In May 1978 the FLNC attacked Shaba again and conquered the city of Kolwezi, centre of GECAMINES mining. Again, the FAZ was unable to protect the mining sites or to roll back the FLNC forces. However, this time not only France but Belgium and the United States offered their assistance. Large numbers of Congolese fled, fearing another 'pacification' by the Zairian army. Expatriate staff refused to return to Kolwezi without protection, and an 'inter-African peacekeeping force' of 1500 Moroccans plus a few soldiers from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gabon and the Central African Republic was deployed. Furthermore, "Discipline was so low among some FAZ-elements that the Zairian authorities had to disarm them" (Young and Turner 1985: 258).

These two 'invasions'⁶⁵ and the Zairian reaction not only showed the tremendous weakness of the armed forces; they also threatened the heart of the Zairian state and state revenue by attacking the mining fields. Without control over mining, the Zairian state had no hope whatsoever to repay debts or come to agreements with any creditor.

The two Shaba crises convinced external creditors to Zaire that a longer term approach with strict control mechanisms was necessary. In June 1978 a conference of creditors⁶⁶ was held in Brussels, concentrating on how to prevent a third intervention into Shaba and how to stabilise the Congolese economy. For the mid-term they demanded an austerity programme in Kinshasa, better control of financial resources and peace with Angola.⁶⁷ Progress in these areas was required in order to gain substantial financial support, which was to be decided upon in another conference in November 1979.

The control of financial resources was put under international surveillance: the IMF sent Erwin Blumenthal and a team of five to control the Central Bank, UNDP sent Ismail Hakke Battuck to control the Ministry of Finance, and Belgium sent Robert Waterinchx to control Customs. Companies were restricted by quotas for foreign exchange and imports of luxury goods were prohibited, while other imports were only restricted due to their necessity for the population (medicine, food) or the productive capacity of companies (spare parts, energy). When the Brussels Conference met again in November 1978, there was not much left of the 'Mobutu Plan'; instead the creditors had insisted on a cascade of re-valuation of the currency and severe austerity measures. It took until August 1979 before an agreement was signed.

Meanwhile Mobutu had to face serious internal opposition: parliament refused to agree to the budget, students started to protest against high prices for food and water, and riots in Kinshasa were such that the regime used the troops to 'pacify' them. The Catholic Church called outside

⁶⁴ This term refers to soldiers formerly loyal to Moïse Tshombé during the secession, who were not integrated into the national army.

⁶⁵ The term is debated: while the attacks came from across the border, they were exercised by Congolese people.

⁶⁶ Participants were Belgium, Congo, the IMF, the USA, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iran, Italy, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, the European Union, and the World Bank.

⁶⁷ The peace accord was agreed upon June 15th, 1978.

control of the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the Customs a 'recolonisation'. Strikes started at GECAMINES, in banks, breweries, hospitals and in the public transport sector. The country was in a *de facto* state of emergency. Mobutu had to rely on the army to regain control.

The previous elite consensus did not hold under this pressure. Members of the elite turned more and more to neo-patrimonial, ethnically or regionally based politics, while Mobutu presided as the top patron over these fragmenting institutions. He increasingly became the point of reference for all sorts of rules and decisions. His propaganda chief Dominique Sakombi Inongo portrayed him as god-like, floating in the clouds in a TV clip that was broadcasted daily before the main evening news (Michel 1999). All sorts of ad-hoc decisions in politics and economics were justified simply with reference to his authority.

While corruption and self-enrichment were already prevalent, the desperate lack of foreign exchange and the impossibility of living on an ordinary wage – for those lucky enough to have a formal job – led to more and more inventive practices in the informal realm. Companies and marketing boards started to deal in barter trade to circumvent the foreign exchange control of the Banque du Zaïre – that is, the IMF – and unpaid soldiers started to become a security threat, especially in the countryside. Those lacking ammunition were begging for food (Young and Turner 1985: 259). “By 1978, output was 17% below the level of 1974, and imports 50% below. The manufacturing sector was operating only at 40% of capacity, inflation was almost 100%; and real wages and salaries were one quarter of the 1970 level.” (MacGaffey 1991: 28). As a consequence, the informal economy started to take over.

While the external creditors had already imposed 'structural adjustment' on the economy, by the end of the 1970s they started to insist on 'political liberalisation'. While Mobutu was seen as an authoritarian strongman, his dominion had nearly collapsed twice with the Shaba interventions. Moreover living conditions had deteriorated so massively and so quickly that he had little political support in the cities; in fact he had to turn to the armed forces to suppress spontaneous opposition in Kinshasa.

External and internal pressure led to a number of political shifts, which were referred to as 'liberalisation'. In July 1977 the office of the Prime Minister, abolished in 1966, was re-introduced. Elections were held in 1977 for the Presidency,⁶⁸ the politburo,⁶⁹ and parliament.⁷⁰ Nguza Karl-I-Bond, known for his criticism of the regime, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Kamitatu Massamba, another critic, became Minister for Tourism and Environment. Some members of parliament sharply criticised the Mobutu regime for corruption and mismanagement and demanded the admission of parties other than the MPR. There was a short phase of lively debate, but this, however, did nothing to overcome the severe crisis or to reduce repression. While voices of discontent were frequently jailed or sent into exile, amnesties also occurred on a regular basis. Those supposedly responsible for the 'silvester unrest' in 1980 were arrested, later received amnesty, and then in 1982 founded the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS), whose leaders again were first arrested and then subsequently amnestied.

Repression was not only directed towards protesting students and staff of public administration.⁷¹ Mobutu addressed parts of the armed forces – the parts from which he feared a coup d'état. Generals were accused of high treason, and thirteen death penalties were

⁶⁸ Mobutu was the only candidate and allegedly received 98% of the vote (Körner: 132).

⁶⁹ 167 candidates competed for 18 seats (ibid).

⁷⁰ 2000 candidates competed for 270 seats in parliament (ibid).

⁷¹ Some international attention was paid to the massacre of at least 500 inhabitants of the village of Idiofa (Jan. 1978) and of more than 250 young smugglers of diamonds at the Lubilashi river (July 1979). (Körner 1988: 132)

executed. The secret services were reorganised in April 1980: the *Centre National de Documentation* was abolished and substituted by the *Centre National de Recherche et d'Information* and the *Service National d'Intelligence*. The repression and reorganisation of different parts of the armed forces was a consequence of the three conspicuous failures of the army to protect the state and of the fear that they would intervene in politics. Founding new units seemed to make fresh starts possible, while in the existing units commanders of questionable loyalty were replaced. Furthermore, in the wake of the second attack in Shaba the re-organisation and training of the army was undertaken by France, China and Israel (Young and Turner 1985: 268).

Consolidation proved to be extremely difficult. Zairian banks lost the confidence of their customers, and there was hardly any cash in the official economy, despite there being plenty in the black market. Two steps for 'demonetisation' were undertaken: in July 1979 a campaign against corruption turned out to be an organised looting of so called 'saboteurs'; soldiers searched shops, money changers and some offices and took all the cash they found. At Christmas in 1979 Mobutu decreed to abolish all old 5 and 10 Zaire notes and to substitute them with new ones, but imposing restrictions on how much individuals and companies were allowed to possess together with the demand that this money be deposited in banks. While this process was supposed to take three days, in fact it lasted well into 1980. There were not enough new bills, and police shot at large crowds of people queuing in front of banks and post offices who were unable to exchange their money.

The regime went from one crisis to the next. In January 1980 a reshuffle of the government replaced 13 of 22 ministers, while in April student protests were repressed by forcing 4000 students into the army; this was accompanied by the closure of schools and universities.

Pressure also came from conflict over land: in Eastern Congo, which had comparatively favourable agricultural land, the laws on land reform and citizenship of 1972 and 1973 had led to a situation whereby many Kinyarwanda⁷² had bought land on which they farmed cattle and produced cheese. Local communities felt expropriated of their land not so much by the state, which had turned some land into a commodity, but by these Rwandese speaking people. They were eventually able to demand the new law on citizenship of 1981, which excluded those who they perceived as strangers from voting and citizenship. Only persons who could demonstrate an ancestral connection to the population residing in the territory before 1885 would qualify as citizens (Mamdani 2001: 244). Considerable unrest followed. The Kinyarwanda minority for the first time was labelled as a single group vis à vis the 'indigenous' majority. The smashing of ballot boxes led to the result that no provincial assemblies were elected in the Kivus in the East of the country (Mamdani 2001: 245).

While bargaining with the international institutions for a rescheduling of debt continued – the World Bank by then had taken the formerly Belgian role of coordinating creditors – the day-to-day decision making in the face of manifold crises also continued. When the internal pressure of public administration seemed unbearable, a decision to raise pay was made, which in turn blew up all the calculations made by the IMF.⁷³ In April 1981, Foreign Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond did not return from a state visit to Belgium, where he demanded political asylum.⁷⁴ While the IMF was trying to reduce the budgets for the payment of perceived 'ghost teachers', real teachers protested in the streets against their income cuts. Inflation and the duality of exchange rates continued to deteriorate what was left of the formal economy. By

⁷² This term refers to people whose mother tongue is Rwandese.

⁷³ A projected pay rise of 15% catapulted the projected budget deficit from Z 501 million to Z 1416 million (Körner 1988: 143).

⁷⁴ He returned to Zaire in 1985 and later became ambassador to the United States.

1981-82 GÉCAMINES was no longer able to invest in its machinery or spare parts. No economic alternatives had been developed, and in relation to its single most important commodity, copper, Zaire was much more vulnerable than before. The percentage of manufacturing in GDP had declined from 10% (1975) to 2% (1982). The official economy was in the rapid process of disappearing. Black markets and smuggling had taken over, the control of foreign exchange had become meaningless, subsistence economy was significantly increased, and the de-industrialisation had led to a drop of one third in average private consumption between 1975 and 1982. The purchasing power of the minimum wage had dropped by 52% between 1975 and 1978 and again by 86 % between 1979 and 1982 (Körner 1988: 164). Average daily calorie and protein intakes sank, and the difference between being officially employed or self-employed, being a trader or a smuggler started to blur. Circles of smugglers were observed, for example, in Mbuji-Maji, the diamond centre of Congo. Diamond trading eventually became more important than copper.

By the mid 1980s international creditors started to realise that to just insist on the repayment of their debts was unsustainable. Zaire spent most of its revenue on the repayment of debt, not only accumulated during the short phase of heavy investment in infrastructure but also through a number of reschedulings. From 1983 the World Bank tried to enforce a longer term, more developmental approach to the negotiations between Zaire and its creditors (Körner 1988: 175). Parts of a modified “Mobutu Plan” were reintroduced in negotiations on a new public investment programme: water, electricity and means of transport were to be rehabilitated. At the same time, a significant official liberalisation – that is the abolition of import licences and foreign exchange control – was directed at drying up the black market. Gold and diamond mining was liberalised. But austerity measures on the state budget became even more rigorous: 70,000 teachers were to be sacked, and fees for water, electricity and so on were to be drastically increased. The consequences for the population was even faster emiseration; within three month in 1983 prices for manioc increased by 150%, for transport by 104%, for energy by 46%, and for medical services by 39%. By the beginning of 1984, the minimum income for survival in Kinshasa was calculated at 3037 Z. In fact, however, policemen and simple soldiers effectively earned 400 Z, customs officers had a salary of 800 Z and professors and high military officers earned 1000 Z (World Bank 1985: 46).

While the IMF in 1984 considered the Zairian success in stabilisation “spectacular” (Körner 1988: 184), social tensions started to manifest themselves in major eruptions. Bombs exploded in Kinshasa, killing and injuring many, for which two political parties in exile in Brussels took responsibility. A military *coup d'état* was attempted, but failed because of the intervention of western secret services. Mobutu reorganised the secret services again and founded an anti-terror group of 20,000 men, which was supposed to substitute the *gendarmerie*. In November 1984 rebels of the '*Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple*' of Laurent Kabila, a former comrade of Lumumba who had launched a longstanding underground war in the Kivu province, occupied the eastern town of Moba. While the Zairian Army was able to regain the town, the Kabila troupes attacked again in June 1985 and were fought back again.

This violence plus numerous riots, strikes, military repression, and the reshuffling of both the cabinet and military forces allowed for the orchestration of Mobutu's 're-election' in 1984.⁷⁵ Some strikes – such as the ONATRA transport workers strike – affected the entire country, and riots were not restricted to Kinshasa.

Negotiations with the IMF took a long time, but the Mobutu regime fulfilled – albeit unwillingly – all of its demands: public administration was cut by 13% in 1984 and by 21% in 1985. Because the regime had borrowed more money from a private creditor than had been

⁷⁵ The official result was 99.16% of the votes. (Körner: 1988 185).

agreed with the IMF, one of the two planes belonging to Air Zaire had to be sold. Finally, a Structural Adjustment Programme, which proposed a five-year plan for 1985-1990, came into being. Public investment was supposed to be boosted by 166 billion Zaire and private investment by 95.3 billion Zaire; taken together this amounts to roughly US \$ 4.5 billion.

A new, even more liberal investment code was introduced in 1987, and the IMF found “Zaire’s economic policies ... now broadly satisfactory” (IMF Survey 3.3.86: 75, quoted in Körner 1988: 197). Politically, however, it became more and more difficult for the regime to stay in power, as protests in violent and non-violent forms had become widespread and frequent and as the old elite consensus was no longer in place. Local and regional strongmen had to be satisfied by buying them into political decisions. Repression⁷⁶ and political reshuffles were the internal answers to the problems posed by criticism from unpaid workers, dissent from within the administration, political opposition inside and outside parliament, and the army. Internationally Mobutu started to use a more inflammatory rhetoric: he announced that debt repayment would be limited to 10% of export earnings and 20% of the state budget, and accused creditors of having provoked bloody riots in a number of African countries, while they misused his personal credibility and Zaire’s political stability to force debt payments out of an impoverished population. Meanwhile, the state’s inability to perform to any expectations gave rise to more organised forms of political protest (as opposed to looting & riots); these were led by the Catholic Church in particular, but former state representatives also started to seriously demand changes.

The long decay 1974-1990

To sum up, multiple crises hit Zaire from 1974 onwards and these quickly led into a downward spiral that affected all sub-systems of the state, shrinking its bureaucratic capacity and giving way to various informal institutions. The original nation-wide elite consensus was unable to manage these crises, eventually breaking up and giving way to patron-style politics.

A series of economic shocks was so significant that the expected economic ‘takeoff’ did not take place. Instead, a serious contraction of growth and investment started to lead to emiseration at a high speed the Zairian economy has not recovered from to this day.

From 1975 the IMF became a principal decision maker in the economic disaster. While convinced to contribute to sound macroeconomic stability, the intervention did not have the desired effects of stabilising the economy, not to speak of stimulating growth and capitalist transformation. It effectively resulted in the destruction of assets and in the weakening of administrative capacity.

Life in Zaire had to ‘adjust’ to changed circumstances: barter trade, smuggling, corruption and the informalisation of the economy were the results. The terrain the rational state and the capitalist sector had once gained was lost to informal, neopatrimonial groups, which competed for assets.

The Mobutu regime transformed itself in response to crisis: what had begun as a state-building project increasingly became a neo-patrimonial regime bent on holding onto power by any means possible. Mobutu himself became a patron, or a despot in the sense that he was the ultimate point of reference. From his position as head of state he was able to control the most influential patronage systems in the financial, administrative and military realm, but he faced growing difficulties in keeping all his clients satisfied.

⁷⁶ In particular UDPS members, irrespective of the amnesty of 1985, were sent to jail or detained. The army was accused of severe human rights violations. (Körner 1988: 199).

Facing all these challenges, the regime itself faced a multitude of ad hoc decisions, the pattern of which reflects the taking over of competing neo-patrimonial institutions. Trying to make ends meet went hand in hand with replacing former state capacity with loyal people, or to rely on personally trusted networks, which soon got an ethnic colouring. The organisation of life in all spheres became more and more informal, or fell into a confusing multiplicity of institutional frameworks.

The long decline of the bureaucratic state in favour of networks of patronage was mainly triggered through economic decline, which resulted in declining taxes and a massively reduced ability to promote growth and build the capitalist sector. IMF intervention completely misunderstood, or at the very least, underestimated this threat and forced a further reduction both of asset accumulation and of state capacity. On top of this, military interventions not only threatened the state, but made it obvious that it had lost its monopoly of power, which could only be restored with outside intervention.

The road to collapse 1990-1997

By 1990 Mobutu had tried to respond to and circumvent national and international pressure by creating the “Third Republic”, which was supposed to be marked by multiparty political competition. He renamed his party *Mouvement Populaire pour le Renouveau* (thus keeping the acronym MPR), abolished the central committee and the politburo and admitted competing political groups. Party and state from now on were supposed to be different things, and the independence of the legislature was also established in principle. In less than a year more than 200 ‘parties’ were founded, among which was the formerly partly underground operation *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi. Further parties were the *Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendantes* (UFERI) of Nguza Karl-I-Bond, the nephew of Moïse Tshombé, and the *Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien* (PDSC) of Joseph Ileo. Strikingly, these parties were again – like in the late 1950s – generally founded on a regional or ethnic basis.⁷⁷ They also tended to be led by people who had been active in politics before, most of whom had served as a minister or prime minister for some time and were now openly building their patrimonial networks.

The parties organised a *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* with 1860 delegates, which was supposed to decide the future of the country and which officially opened in August 1991. The big new parties agreed on a ‘holy union’ – the ‘Union Sacrée’ – the purpose of which was to form a unified opposition against Mobutu’s MPR; however, the appointment of Nguza Karl-I-Bond as prime minister split the movement.

The National Conference in reality had very little to preside over. Export earnings fell again to an historic low in 1990, when diamonds overtook copper as the main foreign exchange earner, and bi- and multilateral donors withdrew Official Development Aid (ODA) to less than 5% of Gross National Income. International support in the future would be conditional on democracy, they insisted.

One big topic kept the National Conference busy: the question of citizenship, or who was considered to be Congolese.⁷⁸ The prospects of organising the National Conference and eventually competitive political elections in a very short time led local authorities to launch a

⁷⁷ UDPS – Kasai; UFERI – Katanga; PDSC – Kinshasa and Bas-Congo (Körner 1993: 519).

⁷⁸ The topic was hot, indeed; by October 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front had started to launch military operations from Uganda into Rwanda. Many Banyarwanda from Congo joined the RPF, and the Mobutu regime responded with an on-the-ground verification of who was a Zairean and who not, depending whether his or her ancestors had lived in Congo only after the Berlin Conference. In consequence, many Rwandaphones were denied citizenship. (Mamdani 2001: 245).

campaign to identify Zairian nationals (Mamdani 2001: 249), and Mobutu made sure only 'indigenous people'⁷⁹ of the regions could be representatives at the National Conference. This step excluded a number of political campaigners from the conference, which affirmed the exclusive citizenship law of 1981.

Shortly after its beginning, the National Conference was not only split, but had to deal with severe riots that erupted in September 1991, when unpaid soldiers started to pillage Kinshasa and other urban centres. This continued into 1992 when violent clashes in many parts of the country⁸⁰ were only stopped with the help of Belgian and French soldiers, who officially had the mandate to evacuate their respective citizens. The National Conference and the Mobutu regime started to wrestle about who was actually in power. While the National Conference went ahead and formed a coalition government, many ministries and the military were officially still under the control of Mobutu. Rumours of military coups aggravated the fear that there might be intervention on the side of Mobutu. By 1993, rival pro- and anti-Mobutu governments were created, which effectively controlled hardly anything. Kongo wa Dondo was co-opted as Prime Minister, promising economic austerity policy and free market reforms.

The former economic backbone of the economy, GECAMINES, completely fell apart after a process that included the degradation of infrastructure and equipment, the collapse of the Kamoto mine and riots in Shaba. These events collectively led to a fall in production, from 440,848 tons of copper and 54,043 tons of zinc in 1989 to only 32,412 tons of copper, 2,515 tons of zinc and 3,631 tons of cobalt in 1994. The DRC found itself with a per capita income of 99 US \$ per year and an average life expectancy of 45 by the late 1990s. By that time, public administration had fallen apart. Military, health and education workers were not paid by the state and were forced to survive by cashing in privately or violently in order to survive.

In Eastern Congo, land conflicts had become violent and Mobutu sent the *Division Spéciale Présidentielle* (DSP) and the *Garde Civil* to confront this threat. As both armed forces lacked any means of sustenance, they started to live off the local population, which created further violence. Estimations are that between 10,000 and 20,000 people were killed, while some 200,000 fled the Kivu (Mamdani 2001: 253).

The ethnic aspect of conflict was aggravated by the arrival of about 50,000 refugees from Burundi into North- and South-Kivu in late 1993 and early 1994. They were fleeing the army terror unleashed in Burundi from October 1993 after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Burundian president who was killed after being in office only for three months.

From April to June 1994 the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda killed between 800,000 and 1 million people. While Mobutu had previously supported the Habyarimana regime in Kigali, he now allowed the French to launch their "operation turquoise" from Zairian territory. When the French finally had to retreat in favour of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Rwandan exodus started into Zaire. In July 1994 about one million people came across the border into Congo. These people, however, were not only the desperate refugees fleeing the killings in Rwanda; indeed many members of the former Rwandese government along with the army and militias who had organised and committed the genocide came fully armed into the villages and the refugee camps that were set up in Congo along the Rwandan border. The military brought "at least four anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank-weapons" and declared that, while it had lost a battle in Rwanda, the fight would go on (Melvern 2000: 216). Estimates are that there were

⁷⁹ Indigenous in this context does not only include the meaning of citizenship, but also the residence in a particular province. In this concept the idea of being 'Zairois' had been abandoned.

⁸⁰ In Shaba this happened in particular between two rivalling ethnicities, the Luba and Lunda (Körner 1993: 520).

some 20,000 armed soldiers and *Interahamwe* in Bukavu and 30,000 to 40,000 in Goma (Mamdani 2001: 254).

The UN system and international Northern NGOs set up camps and fed and watered this influx of a million people. They failed, however, to disarm them. On the contrary, more arms came into the camps, where more and more refugees were armed and trained, and camps became the recruitment ground for child soldiers. These giant camps became the source of deepest trouble to the population of the Kivu-provinces, who were subjected to armed robbery, mass rapes and killings. Those of a Kinyarwanda background were not only under the threat of being declared non-citizens, but their life was seriously endangered. A delegation of the Kinshasa government – the Vangu Commission – inspecting the situation in the Kivus in 1995 even came to the conclusion that all Kinyarwanda speaking people were refugees and had to be expelled from the Congo.

A regime of terror was created by the armed *Interahamwe* based in these refugee camps. When they ransacked the countryside they cooperated with the Congolese army. In response, the Rwandan RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front, who had formed the new government in Kigali) started to arm Congolese Kinyarwanda, while increasing numbers of Native Authorities created armed militias that were referred to with the generic term 'Mayi-Mayi' or Mai Mai. As Mamdani observes, life became hell both because of the dollarisation of the economy, a situation that had been created by the UN and international NGOs, and because of the fact that politics was simply reduced to a set of military options. "The effect of militarization was to reduce all credible politics to armed politics" (Mamdani 2001: 261).

The transition period between 1990 and 1997 was thus characterised by a growing ethnicisation of politics, or, as Peemans puts it, the "multiplication of multifunctional networks of autonomisation" (Peemans 1997: 94 ff), alongside a growing militarisation. As a consequence, the elites no longer focused exclusively on securing access to state-controlled resources, but instead began to look for bases for private accumulation and legitimacy at the regional and local levels. The last years of the Mobutu regime cannot simply be reduced to the endless political conflicts between the "democratic opposition" led by Tshisekedi and the 'despotic' Mobutu regime (Peemans 1997: 100). Instead, the development of increasingly "autonomised" networks undermined the shaky stability of the Mobutu regime and threatened the integrity of the state. Nonetheless, Mobutu managed to stay in power until 1997. This was due to his large, supra-ethnic clientelistic networks and the fact that he maintained control of the diamond industry, the Central Bank and the most effective parts of his military and police forces (the DSP and security services) (Peemans 1997: 98). It was only the externally sponsored rebellion by Laurent Kabila – an insider in Congolese politics since the 1960s, albeit a marginalised one – that put an end to the Mobutu regime. This time lacking the military support of the Western countries (except France), and abandoned by his army – which had been in a process of disintegration since the early 1990s (De Villers 2005: 54) – Mobutu was finally chased from power in 1997.

The collapse of the ruins of the bureaucratic state

In the disastrous period of the Third Republic, key events and decisions that accelerated the downward spiral into total collapse therefore occurred in a number of different spheres. Firstly, national and international pressure had insisted on the introduction of multiparty competition and elections in an almost unravelled country. This process, which was supposed to be a political instrument for the improvement of the situation in Zaire, turned out in fact to be a milestone of collapse. The core causes of Zaire's troubles were supposedly the authoritarian and clientelistic nature of Mobutu's rule in combination with a lack of

transparency; characteristics that are sometimes termed corruption or bad governance. According to conventional wisdom, democracy is the instrument to overcome these problems, and is even supposed to be the prerequisite for economic growth. However, contrary to these considerations, the introduction of democracy tipped the country into even steeper economic decline and gave rise to the operation of openly competitive networks, some of which turned criminal and/or violent.

Second, in 1990, the international community had decided to pull the plug on development aid. From this point onwards, money was only to be expected after a regime change. The multitude of emerging parties, however, was more rooted in ethnicity and regional connections than in coherent political programmes, and it was unable to form a unified opposition to Mobutu and unable to implement changes, and it was also unable to take over the decision-making processes in Zaire and force Mobutu out of power until 1997. Instead, the remains of the Mobutuist state presided over some state sectors, in particular the mining and the army, which were no longer centralised organisations but patronage networks with dependent clients. At the same time, the National Conference debated a new constitution and decided on renaming the country 'Democratic Republic of Congo', and also attempted to establish a narrow and exclusive definition of citizenship that would result in the exclusion of many people previously considered citizens. Decisions on citizenship were a prerequisite to the elections, which were supposed to be around the corner.

Furthermore, the National Conference, an organ of hundreds of parties and some prominent politicians who had returned from exile – like the former Deputy Prime Minister under Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié 2005) – created more confusion⁸¹ and tension about the rules and institutions of decision-making than it actually addressed. The Conference was unable to lead an orderly process of electoral preparation and was deeply split into political factions, some of which later became armed factions.

Further factors that accelerated the collapse included the violence that accompanied struggles over access to land in Eastern Congo. The excluded Kinyarwanda were deprived of their citizenship and their access to land to the extent that a government commission concluded they all had to be treated as refugees and to be expelled from the Congo. Intervening in these violent conflicts, the Presidential Guard and the Garde Civil – who were both unpaid – further fuelled the violence by living off the population. Estimates speak of 10,000 to 20,000 killed and 200,000 refugees. The army, which had always been relatively undisciplined, now no longer followed the chain of command emanating from Mobutu.

While the situation in Congo was already out of control, the inflow of refugees, first from Burundi and then in the form of a million people from Rwanda, turned life in the east into hell. Indeed, the multiplication of institutions and actors between 1994 and 1996 in Eastern Congo was extraordinary and unprecedented: it included the Mobutu government, or what was left of it; the National Conference; the Congolese army and its divisions, earning their living on squeezing money from different clientele; the ex-Rwandan army and its government, also living off the population; the UN and international community, caring for the Rwandan refugees and creating an entirely new framework; and the local Mai-Mai fighters.

⁸¹ To demonstrate this confusion: Mobutu nominated Tshisekedi as Prime Minister, but he declined (July 1991). In October, he was named Prime Minister again, accepted the position for a few days, and then resigned over disagreements with Mobutu. In August 1992, the Conférence Nationale Souveraine elected Tshisekedi as Prime Minister. On December 1st, Mobutu shut all of Tshisekedi's ministers out of their offices because he did not approve of them. Six days later he ordered that the conference be brought to an end, which duly happened on December 6th. (Nzongola-Ntalaja: 274 ff).

While the situation was certainly competitive and characterised by intense rivalry, it was emphatically not democratic; nor were there any mechanisms in place to adjudicate between rival claims politically and without violence. Instead, political aspirations were increasingly reduced to armed politics.

What finally triggered the collapse of Congo was the introduction of multiparty competition and the formation of the Union Sacr , which established a competing government but was unable to govern. This became particularly clear when conflicts over land and citizenship turned violent. The army was no longer willing or able to back the monopoly of power, disintegrating into autonomous groups and living off the population. The inability of any actor to manage the huge inflow of refugees and the inability to prevent the creation of armed mai-mai groups further contributed to the final transformation of a nation-state into an arena for open warlordism. The army that was to cross the border in 1996 was only the final coffin nail to what has once been the Congolese state.

Two brutal wars: 1996 to 2002

Laurent Desir  Kabila's campaign became famous for sweeping through Zaire and entering Kinshasa in a matter of a few months. Kabila, a former ally of Patrice Lumumba who had continued to lead a small and largely insignificant rebel group,⁸² had been waging low-intensity campaigns and at times instigating armed struggle against Mobutu's forces for decades. Rwanda, Uganda and Angola decided in 1996 to support him militarily and financially in order to overthrow Mobutu and install a new government in Kinshasa. The reasons for this move on the part of Congo's neighbours are not yet fully clear. Allegedly – and with some plausibility – Rwanda's primary aim was to get rid of the threat posed by the *Interahamwe* in the Eastern Congo and to back the non-*g nocide* Kinyarwanda population in the Kivus, which was severely under threat from both the residues of the Mobutu regime and the National Sovereign Conference. Uganda and Angola were also largely interested in their own security. There is, however, widespread conviction that Rwanda and Uganda also had a strong motive to loot the riches of the DRC and used the threat to the Kinyarwanda in the Kivus as a pretext.

In December 1996 Kabila began his military campaign, the first Congo War, which initially was largely aimed at securing the control of border cities with Rwanda and Uganda. The full blown attempt by his ADFLC (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) to gain power over the entire country began in March 1997, and his numerous victories over the Congolese army were mostly gained without fighting, as unpaid and unfed soldiers did not have the means to resist. Furthermore, he gained considerable support in Eastern Congo, including the support of the Mai-Mai, who had been fighting locally against Mobutuist troops. In April, Mobutu tried to show his willingness for reform and appointed the well-known opposition politician Etienne Tshisekedi as his new Prime minister. Kabila, however, rejected this move as insufficient and continued his offensive. Peace talks were underway, but broke down in May, when Kabila's army was in the outskirts of Kinshasa, having already secured control of the mineral rich Katanga province. On May 17th 1997 Mobutu fled⁸³ and the first war was declared to be over. Kabila established his government in the capital city and

⁸² Kabila led the "Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP), fighting for the "second independence" in the mountains of Fizi-Baraka near Uvira. (Nzongola-Ntalaja in: Mandaza 1999: 7).

⁸³ Mobutu's generals informed him on May 16th that they could no longer guarantee his security. When he wanted to use the presidential jet the next day to leave the country, the crew refused, pointing to the fact that the plane was property of the state. He eventually used a military jet (Nzongola-Ntalaya: 214).

renamed the country the 'Democratic Republic of Congo'. He attempted to balance power with the many rival groups that tried to gain influence in his new government.

During his military campaign to oust Mobutu, Kabila enjoyed “near unanimous” support both inside and outside the country (Reyntjens 1999: 247). Uganda and Rwanda were backing him, as were the 'Banyamulenge'⁸⁴ and Mai-Mai under Native Authority. Despite this, less than a year later most elements of this fragile coalition had withdrawn their support and turned against him.

When Kabila took power in Kinshasa, it was a highly visible fact that many of his supporters, who were all over the city in high political and military positions, were not Lingala or French speaking.⁸⁵ Increasingly, the presence of Rwandaphones created tensions in Kinshasa. While Kabila was dependent on his supposedly 'foreign' supporters, he was troubled with a lack of 'domestic' legitimacy: the Congolese accused him of being a puppet of Rwanda and Uganda (Reyntjens 1999: 245). This became particularly problematic when there was severe internal and external pressure to investigate massacres, especially against Hutu, which occurred during his march to Kinshasa. There had been a massive revenge taken by Kabila and his allies against *génocidaires* and against unarmed Hutu (Mamdani 2001: 261). Kabila would neither accept responsibility for this nor accuse his former allies of being liable for it. While he unsuccessfully tried to prevent an investigation by the United Nations,⁸⁶ he also distanced himself more and more from his former supporters, dismissing his chief of staff, amongst others. Moreover, Kabila then secured the help of the *Interahamwe* forces to consolidate his power and started genocidal campaigns against Tutsi.⁸⁷ By the end of July 1998, Kabila had dismissed all Ugandan and Rwandan advisers in Kinshasa and ordered them to leave the country with 24 hours.

This was considered to be an attack, and Kabila's former allies instantaneously turned against him: it was only a few days until the 'Banyamulenge' in Goma, with the help of parts of the ex-Mobutu and now supposedly Kabila army,⁸⁸ started an armed mutiny in the North-Kivu province, which was immediately backed by Rwanda. However, while armed rebel groups started to act, the political wing of this new rebellion had yet to be constituted. This happened ten days later, when on August 12th the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was founded in Goma. Its political manifesto stated: “The RCD is a democratic movement that opted for war as a last resort. For that was the only way left to bring down Kabila's dictatorial rule.”⁸⁹ Within two weeks, the RCD – after hijacking a plane with the help of Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces – had established its troops in Western Congo and controlled the Inga hydroelectric power plant and the port of Matadi. Just one more week later it was in control of the diamond centre of Kisangani and threatened to gain control over Kinshasa.

In September, another 'rebel group' was founded: the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Bemba and backed by Uganda. Its political aims

⁸⁴ This term started to be used as a collective reference to Congolese Tutsi.

⁸⁵ Furthermore, Kabila was increasingly criticized for his incompetent and very personal style of rule, appearing as a new Mobutu rather than a patriot leading Congo out of trouble. ICG: 'Scramble for the Congo', *Africa Report* No. 26, 20.12.2000.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General's Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 29th June 1998, S/1998/581.

⁸⁷ On 12th August a loyalist army major broadcasted from a radio station in Bunia, Eastern Congo: “People must bring a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones, and the like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis.” BBC News, 12.9.1998.

⁸⁸ Sylvain Mbuki, commander of the 10th battalion of the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) stated on Goma-based radio station 'Voix du Peuple' on August 2nd: “We, the army of the Democratic Republic of Congo, have taken the decision to remove President Laurent-Désiré Kabila from power” (Reyntjens 1999: 246).

⁸⁹ Political Declaration of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD/CDR), Goma, 12. August 1998, in: Mandaza 1999: 17). The first political leader was Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba.

were to “end the autocratic rule which was installed since 17.5.1997”,⁹⁰ that is, to overthrow Kabila; as Bemba writes when justifying why he took up arms: how can one be a millionaire surrounded by a million poor?⁹¹

While united in the aim to overthrow Kabila, RCD and MLC clashed at times, in particular at the battle of Kisangani.⁹² The reasons for the split at this point between Uganda and Rwanda and the movements they were backing are still being debated, but the most common explanation is that they could neither agree on the most suitable leader nor on their relative share of lootings from the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 225 ff).

Kabila’s government was seriously under threat, while his troops – or at least those that had not deserted or turned against him, having allied with the Hutu militants – were fighting all over the country. He asked for help around Africa and secured the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While there was considerable disagreement over SADC’s military involvement, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia sent troops on his behalf, with Chad, Libya and Sudan joining in later. From September 1998, a multi-faceted war therefore broke loose, which was frequently referred to as the “first African World War”⁹³ (see appendix, list VI, Armed Forces in the DRC). Marked by several broken agreements and ceasefires,⁹⁴ and a great deal of international diplomacy in an attempt to end it, the war officially continued until 2002.

The United Nations became involved in August 1999, after the Lusaka Accord. This first took the form of 90 liaison personnel to support the ceasefire, but by February 2000 the UN Mission in Congo, named after its French acronym MONUC and consisting of 5,537 troops, had been sent to forcibly implement the ceasefire.⁹⁵ Fighting continued with numerous clashes and offensives throughout the country; outstanding fights were those between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in Kisangani (May/June 2000) and the government army versus MLC forces in Equateur Province (August 2000).

In January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated⁹⁶ and his son Joseph⁹⁷ was sworn in to replace him as president. At that time Congo was *de facto* split into three vast territories: the Ugandan aligned territory, the Rwandan aligned territory, and the Government controlled territory (see appendix, map IV). In each territory, ethnic or native authority-militias were operating, and many attempts to end the violence were made unsuccessfully until – as a result

⁹⁰ Official website of the MLC: www.mlc-congo.net.

⁹¹ “Comment peut-on être un millionnaire entouré d’un million de pauvres ?” (Bemba 2001:12)

⁹² People in Kinshasa united in demonstrations in front of the MONUC headquarters. They asked MONUC for the protection of Kisangani and demanded that the RCD and MLC stop the destruction of the city and the killing of hundreds of people (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 277).

⁹³ Allegedly that term was coined by Susan Rice, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Reyntjens 1999: 247).

⁹⁴ January 1999: Windhoek ceasefire; July 1999: Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (signed by DR Congo, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda, and later by the MLC. The RCD refused to sign), April 2002: Sun City Agreement.

⁹⁵ Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo. MONUC’s mandate can be broken down into four phases: phase one involved forcibly implementing the ceasefire agreement (Lusaka Accord). Phase two involved its monitoring, and the reporting of any violations. The third phase, still underway, centres on the DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) process. Phase four, also in progress, includes facilitating the transition towards the organization of credible elections. MONUC is placed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Its mandate authorizes it to use all means deemed necessary, within the limits of its capacities and in the areas of deployment of its armed units, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions. By 2007, MONUC had 21,292 staff members in Congo, most of them military contingents, and had suffered 81 casualties (MONUC homepage: www.monuc.org).

⁹⁶ Allegedly this was done by one of his bodyguards. However, more than 40 people were later convicted guilty, though they managed to escape prison in 2006. There is also speculation that Angolan troops or ‘the West’ was involved.

⁹⁷ In public disputes in the DRC, the question of whether Joseph is in fact the son of Laurent-Désirée Kabila is frequently debated. It is furthermore contested that he is actually Congolese: in the electoral campaign 2006 he was accused by opponents of being Rwandese.

of the 19 month long 'Inter-Congolese Dialogue' – the Sun City Agreement was formalised in April 2002. While it did not stop the war entirely, violence was significantly reduced. It provided a framework for a unified, multi-party government and a timeline for elections. It was, however, unable to bring about the formation of a government or drafting of a constitution, largely because the major perpetrators of the war did not agree to the conditions it proposed; consequently, the RCD and several parties of the unarmed opposition, which included the former Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi, refused to sign. Further steps were necessary to end the war: namely a peace agreement between Rwanda and the DRC⁹⁸ and a similar agreement between the latter and Uganda.⁹⁹

It was not until December 17th 2002 that the belligerents were prepared to sign the 'Global and All-Inclusive Agreement', which set the course towards a new government and officially ended the second war. Signatories were the national government, the MLC, the RCD, the RCD-ML, the RCD-N, the 'domestic political opposition', the 'civil society' and the Mai-Mai. The agreement described a plan to unify the country, to disarm and integrate the belligerents, to draft a constitution and to hold national elections, which were projected for June 2005. In between, a transitional government under the presidency of Joseph Kabila and four vice-presidents representing the former belligerents would govern.

Except for some desperate troops of the Congolese Armed Forces and some unpaid administrators in derelict offices, hardly anything was left of a Congolese state during the war. However, what survived the war and stayed in place together with the memories and ruins of Congo after independence was the very *idea* of a Congolese state. Unpaid civil servants continued to oversee school examinations or stayed in their empty offices in case the state required their services. But *de facto* there was nobody to turn to, as the country had been split into three areas under the armed control of different factions.

This had profound effects on the economy: almost 100% of its performance became informal. This is not only true for the survival of farmers and for all sorts of informal livelihoods in the cities, but also in relation to the extraction of the countries' mineral wealth. As Filip Reyntjens puts it: "economic actors, often of a mafia-like nature, pursue short-term interests in what often amounts to plundering rather than entrepreneurship" (Reyntjens 1999: 248). Economic actors were, among others, the belligerents: four government armies, two former government armies, and at least twenty 'official' rebel groups. Warlordism had spread; that is, the armed 'taxation' of the local population, with rebel groups often making the population pay the same 'tax' twice by extracting it a second time once the previously occupying force had been chased away.

A multitude of government representatives, armies, militia and businesspeople ran an informal and mostly illegal economy in which a serious proportion of extraction was undertaken by violent means; moreover those extracting these "taxes" did so without providing anything the population direly needed.

Businesspeople who operated in Congo during the wars reported that roads were blocked, airstrips were controlled by militias, whoever crossed their way collected 'taxes', and at times commodities were confiscated. The most profitable business during the war – next to the

⁹⁸ Signed on July 30th, 2002, in Pretoria, South Africa. The agreement had two major tasks: the withdrawal of Rwandan soldiers from the DRC, and the rounding up and disarmament of the *Interahamwe* and former government troops still operating in the Eastern DRC. On October 6th 2002 the Rwandan government confirmed the withdrawal of its soldiers, and this was also confirmed by MONUC.

⁹⁹ Signed on September 6th, 2002, in Luanda, Angola. The agreement demanded the withdrawal of Ugandan soldiers from Buni, Ituri province, but its implementation faced difficulties.

extraction of minerals – was the transportation and accommodation of soldiers, though at times this was highly risky, given the ubiquity of 'bandit'.

While to a certain extent militias continued to operate businesses like mines, this seems to have been the exception rather than the rule. In general, soldiers confiscated, “taxed” and harassed the business community, on which it was to a certain extent dependent – not at least to facilitate numerous arms deals.

The Congolese GDP had been constantly shrinking both before and during the wars. As compared to 1993, total GDP had declined by 20%. Agriculture shrank by 26.9%, manufacturing by 39.87% and services by 32.91%. Only the increase in extractive mining prevented an even steeper decline (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi and Putzel 2006: 17).

No rational state, a multitude of armies

Massively sponsored from outside (Rwanda, Uganda and Angola), Laurent Desire Kabila's attempt to replace Mobutu eventually failed. After his initial success to overthrow Mobutu he turned against his allies, who then took over significant parts of the country which they ruled according to different standards, some of which are still in place these days.

The Great Lakes Region suffered intensive warfare with numerous actors involved.

It took several years of military and diplomatic efforts, both in the African and the Western sphere, to force the belligerents into ceasefires and eventually into a power-sharing agreement. While the monopoly of force was never completely re-installed, it rests with the UN peace enforcement troops.

Both Uganda and Rwanda had significant influence over political and military decisions during the war. Although they agreed to peace-treaties, it remains unclear in how far their respective interests – be it in their own border security or in a share of Congo's wealth or in influencing politics in the Eastern DRC – are met. Transition under the supervision of the UN and western powers installed a transitional government, which included President Kabila and four vice-presidents – designed to represent the major belligerents and 'civil society'.

The economic consequences of war were disastrous: between 1993 and 2002 the GDP had declined another by another twenty percent. The economy was informal, and to serious parts illegal and violent. Economic activity and war activity were inseparable.

Towards Stabilisation and Reconstruction, 2002-2006

The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement set the agenda for the 'transitional' years, with a transitional government, transitional parliament, transitional constitution and all sorts of proposed transitions in the various realms of the state.

Problematic from the starting point was the fact that there was no clear 'winner' who might have set out the rules. The second war had not been fought between two major rivals with clear aims, but between shifting coalitions that sometimes clashed over particular items, re-grouped and re-aligned and more often than not acted according to the basic rationale: 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Combatants like the RCD had themselves split into three different groups.

The process of forming a government proved to be extremely difficult. Under pressure from the conditions of the agreement itself, the United Nations and the international community, ex-belligerents found themselves bound into the '4+1' solution: under president Joseph

Kabila's leadership there were four vice-presidents, each of them responsible for several political fields. Vice presidents were Jean-Pierre Bemba (of the MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (of the former government), Arthur Z'ahidi Ngoma (of the political opposition) and Azarias Ruberwa (of RCD Goma). They presided over 35 ministers, who were carefully picked according to the political arithmetic.¹⁰⁰ Equally complicated was the process of equitably allocating places in the senate¹⁰¹ as well as selecting governors and vice-governors for the eleven provinces. Given this forced cooperation between political actors with different – though at times hardly distinguishable – political agendas, it is not surprising that they found it hard to work towards a common goal.¹⁰² Most of the parties continued to keep their respective armed forces, while in addition belligerents like the *Interahamwe* were not around the cabinet table and continued to threaten the East Congolese population and neighbouring Rwanda.

To a certain extent, however, a common goal was prescribed by the agreement itself and by the international community, which pressed hard and invested a great deal in attempting to achieve it: the drafting of a constitution, which should be approved by a national referendum, and the first national elections with competing political parties. In June 2004 an independent electoral commission was formed,¹⁰³ and its leaders became highly respected political actors through the next two years.

In this overall situation of 'No war – no peace – no confidence',¹⁰⁴ political parties had to start to campaign for elections. They could not legitimately point to anything major achieved by their leaders, vice-presidents, senators, members of parliaments or governors. They had not gained any credible profile and were perceived as 'One-Man-Shows'. However, they quickly learnt the language of the international community: in all our interviews in 2005 and 2006, as well as in party brochures and programs, the political wings of these different militaries¹⁰⁵ presented themselves as the parties of good governance, transparency, accountability and democracy.

Parties had to do the splits between gaining international credibility for funding and selling political programs to an ethnically and regionally defined support base. The 'former government' fraction, which was neither purely ex-Mobutu nor purely 'ex-father Kabila', but

¹⁰⁰ The former government controlled 8 of the 35 ministries: Interior, Decentralisation and Security, Press and Information, Finance, Industry, Small and Medium Enterprises, Energy, Health, Primary, Secondary and Professional Education, and Culture. 5 Ministries were controlled by the MLC (Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Planning, Agriculture, Public Works and Infrastructure, Youth and Sport). The RCD-ML was responsible for Regional Cooperation, the RCD-Goma held eight ministries (Defence, Demobilisation and War Veterans, Family and Women's Affairs, Budget, Economy, Parastatals, Post and Telecommunications, University and Higher Education, Labour and Social Security. The political opposition also held 8 ministries: Justice, Mines, Scientific Research, Transport, Land affairs, Social affairs, Humanitarian affairs and Social security. 2 ministries each were reserved for "civil society" (Human rights, Civil service), the RCD-N (External Trade, Tourism) and the Mai-Mai (rural development, environment). (IRIN News, 3.07.2003).

¹⁰¹ 120 members were appointed according to the following key: MLC 22 senators, former government 22, political opposition 22, RCD 21, civil society 21, Mai-Mai 4, RCD-Kisangani ML 3, RCD-National 1. (Constitution de la transition de la République Démocratique du Congo, Art. 105).

¹⁰² In fact, foreign diplomats in Kinshasa sighed that neither the ministers nor the president and the vice-presidents communicated with each other except when forced to do so. The lack of visible results of reconstruction caused many observers in Kinshasa to joke that '4+1 equals zero' (Interviews, May 2005).

¹⁰³ Loi No. 04/009 du 05 Juin 2004 portant organisation, attributions et fonctionnement de la Commission Electorale Independante. At the same time, laws were passed to create a High Media Authority, an authority for Truth and Reconciliation, a National Observator for Human Rights and a Commission to fight corruption. (Journal Officiel de la Republique Democratique du Congo, 45eme annee, Numero special, 1er aout 2004).

¹⁰⁴ Interview, 29.5.2005.

¹⁰⁵ Some political observers, while acknowledging the necessity for the transformation of military groups into political parties, were nevertheless of the opinion that "all party leaders should face war tribunals rather than run for presidential elections". Interview, May 2005.

strongly Katanga-based,¹⁰⁶ transformed itself into the PPRD, the “*Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie*”.

“We only have a theory of democratization”, some politicians sighed, “but no idea how it works. Elections are not really a Congolese initiative.”¹⁰⁷ There were no experiences in power-sharing and there was no vision or strategy for an entire country destroyed by war. Given the absence of a working administrative and legal system, and given the lack of infrastructure, transportation and communication and the sheer distance between capital city and periphery, the transitional government has achieved very little and has had to delay the planned elections again and again.

The new situation proved to be particularly unsatisfactory for the 'unarmed opposition', widely seen as represented by Etienne Tshisekedi and his UDSP (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progress Social). He had not gained one of the Vice-presidencies,¹⁰⁸ and had tried to form an extra-parliamentary opposition, which was on the one hand able to mobilise crowds but on the other hand became involved in looting and violence. He shifted his position and undertook various manoeuvres in relation to the question of whether to boycott or support the elections. When his movement finally decided to participate, the registration date had passed. Some individual members tried to get elected as 'independent' candidates, but were unsuccessful. While he was supposed to be a spokesperson for deprived Kinshois, their support seems to have shifted to Jean-Pierre Bemba during the electoral process. Given Tshisekedi's long presence in political processes as well as in the illegal opposition, however, it is worth mentioning that neither he nor his movement are represented in the new institutions.

Nevertheless, the draft constitution¹⁰⁹ passed senate and parliament and finally a referendum in February 2006. The first round of national elections¹¹⁰ followed in July 2006. The result of 45% for candidate Kabila and 20% for candidate Bemba made a second round of elections necessary; between July and October there was widespread fear and speculation about who would be the most dangerous loser, with some people even fearing that elections would lead straight into a new war,¹¹¹ given that both camps still command significant troops. Furthermore, riots and violence developed during the campaign, which was eventually brought under control by MONUC forces. Both candidates formed alliances with parties and former presidential candidates with smaller electoral results; Kabila formed the *Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle* (AMP) with 31 political parties and 29 personalities, while Bemba founded the *Regroupement des Nationalistes Congolais* (RENACO) with 23 political parties.¹¹² The second electoral round took place in October 2006, and finally, on December 6th, Joseph Kabila was sworn in as new president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, ending the transitional period and starting the forth republic. In parliament, he can count on the 'Presidential Majority'. Kabila appointed Antoine Gizenga as Prime Minister and Gizenga, now an old man who had been Deputy Prime Minister in 1960, presented his list of 59 ministers after month of troubled negotiations in February 2007.

¹⁰⁶ A wealth of interviewees pointed to that effect. May/June 2005, September 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews, June 2005 and September 2006.

¹⁰⁸ This was objected to by France and Belgium. Interview, May 2005.

¹⁰⁹ The text and implications of the constitution were not really discussed, not even among Congolese intellectuals. It is very questionable whether the Congolese voters really knew what the referendum was about. Observers pointed out again and again that the constitutional referendum and the elections fuelled hopes for peace, and this is what mobilised the voters.

¹¹⁰ The elections were basically organised by MONUC and financed by international donors, in particular the European Union.

¹¹¹ Interview Ambassador, September 2006.

¹¹² Confidential Paper, July 2006.

Survival in contemporary Kinshasa and other Congolese cities is character'ed by Theodore Trefon as follows:

People do without food, without fuelwood, without primary health services and without safe drinking water. They also do without political participation, security, leisure ... Parents are not only forced to decide which children will be able to go to school in a given year, they also have to decide who shall eat one day and who shall eat the next. ... Kinshasa's inhabitants are more dead than alive (Trefon 2004: 4).

The Congolese economy is by and large informal; that is outside the realm of the state. While there is certainly major corruption close to the centres of power, individuals are forced to live within a totally disintegrated economy:

Corruption, theft, extortion, collusion, embezzlement, fraud, counterfeiting or prostitution are the various means deployed to survive (Trefon 2004: 10).

...hustling and peddling, wheeling and dealing, whoring and pimping, swapping and smuggling, trafficking and stealing, brokering and facilitating, in short making the most of whatever opportunities arise to avoid starvation. (Lemarchand 2002: 395)

By 2003, the formal GDP had recovered and improved to 100 US \$ per capita,¹¹³ and per capita aid by the international community reached 101.23 \$.¹¹⁴ Foreign aid accounts for 55% of government revenue (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi and Putzel 2006: 16).

The transitional government worked with the World Bank and the IMF to improve the revenue of the state and to attack some of its macroeconomic problems. While inflation went from 'hyper' to 'under control' between 2003 and 2005, and there is now some vague idea of a national budget,¹¹⁵ fighting against 'Wild West approaches'¹¹⁶ is still a major challenge.

There are major economic issues still to be confronted. The establishment of economic rules requires a new legal framework, which has to address the many spheres of the national economy (banking, mining licenses, privatisation, tax laws and so forth). While some laws have been made by the interim government and some of these areas have been tackled by presidential decree, much remains to be done.

The privatisation of formerly state-owned companies still requires a detailed overview of the assets of specific companies,¹¹⁷ Most of them are intended to be privatised, but some would ideally be retained as public services, such as water and electricity¹¹⁸ (Trefon 2004). While there is still some expertise in these areas stemming from Mobutu's times, on the whole these companies lack the means for maintenance, investment and expansion.

The difficulty in increasing state revenue seems to be one of the biggest obstacles to reconstruction. While there have been some efforts to revive organised tax collection and customs, there are huge problems to overcome if this is to be achieved. Congo's Customs office, OFIDA (Office des Douanes et Accises), was able to collect 55 million US \$ in 2002 and aimed at more than 300 million US \$ in 2005. (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi and Putzel

¹¹³ From a mere 80 \$ per capita in 2001. World Development Indicators, Economic and Social Data Services, April 2005.

¹¹⁴ The bulk of this aid was spent on the elections.

¹¹⁵ Between 1996 and 2002 there was no budget. All payments of the 'government' were off budget. IMF informant, 2.6.2005.

¹¹⁶ Interview with IMF informant, June 2005.

¹¹⁷ Our interviews in 2005 provided detailed information that at the ministerial level there was no clue about these companies. There was no data on turnover, assets, staff, and liabilities, but there was a commitment to 'privatise'.

¹¹⁸ REGIDESO (Régie de Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricité du Pays) for water is hardly able to provide water for the existing pipes, let alone to invest in the extension of its network or modernization of pumps and filter system. The same is true for SNEL (Société National d'Electricité).

2006: 16). These amounts, however, are still significantly less than that which was collected during the Mobutu era.

Customs are basically collected in four places: half of the customs revenue comes from Kinshasa and Matadi, the port at the Atlantic Ocean. A further 20% is collected in Lubumbashi, and 9% comes from Kasumbalesa on the border of Zambia. Meanwhile, the mineral rich provinces in the east provide less than 1%,¹¹⁹ Congolese taxes come from an extremely limited base. In order to focus on the most important companies, a Large Taxpayers Office (LTO) has been installed. There are between 600 and 700 taxpayers in the entire country, who collectively provide 90% of domestic revenue, while the few registered with that office contribute 40% of domestic revenue. There is, however, an income tax in the DRC, although one third of income taxes are paid by expatriates.¹²⁰

Projects are currently underway to reform the Customs Office's (OFIDA) operations, in particular at the control post in Kasumbalesa, the border crossing between the DRC and Zambia, at the port of Matadi in southwestern DRC, and in Kinshasa-Est. The Kasumbalesa project, costing between 2.5 million and 3 million Euros, aims to re-organise and simplify OFIDA operations, partly through the provision of new premises, equipment and computer technology (allowing records to be computerised) and partly through training, technical assistance and capacity building. The project aims to provide a one-stop window for controls of exports and imports, and to replace the many government agencies currently operating alongside each other at the border, competing for bribes. Following positive reports of an increase in recorded trade and revenues collected at the border,¹²¹ President Kabila signed a decree on December 30th 2005 designating the customs office (OFIDA) as the sole government agency to manage and value the imports at the port of Matadi.¹²²

The banking system in the DRC had broken down, which made it extremely difficult to transfer money to soldiers and other state employees through bank accounts. Cash management still takes place in part by lorry or plane, which leaves substantial opportunities for theft and fraud. Unsurprisingly, this situation also contributes to the wider problem of the lack of data available to ministries. A further feature of the Congolese economy is that it now largely operates through US dollars: 85% of bank deposits in the DRC are in US dollar accounts.¹²³

There is no comprehensive plan or strategy in place to boost economic growth, although first steps are underway in terms of PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, supervised by the World Bank). While there is no significant investment, extraction does take place in the mining sector and some international mining companies are interested in contracts. So far, however, they have had to wait: a commission of the interim parliament, the Lutundula Commission, has been investigating the mining contracts that were given out during the war by different factions, and it remains to be seen whether any of these contracts will be re-negotiated.

The best business opportunities – apart from mining and forestry – seem to be in telecommunications (mobile phones) and air transport. The companies leading the way in these emergent industries are owned by political leaders and their close allies.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Interviews, OFIDA Kinshasa, June 2005.

¹²⁰ Interviews, Kinshasa, June 2005.

¹²¹ Global Witness interviews with official and other sources, Lubumbashi, November 2005.

¹²² IMF Staff Monitored Program.

¹²³ Interviews, Kinshasa, 2005.

¹²⁴ Interviews, Kinshasa and Goma, 2005; Kinshasa 2006.

Overall, the economy still looks very much like it did in wartime: while there is trade, this mainly connects trade centres in Congo with those across borders in Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia rather than building intra-Congolese markets. The economy is highly informalised, partly NGO-led and works within all sort of frameworks and networks. In parts of the country, economic activity is still so risky that businesspeople try to “come in for three months and then take out (minerals) for three years”.¹²⁵

Instability and insecurity are still the overarching obstacles to economic and state reconstruction. In parts of the country the war is still going on: The provinces of Ituri, North- and South Kivu and Katanga are still theatres of rebel army clashes, and week by week thousands or tens of thousands more refugees and internally displaced people flee the fighting, which is accompanied by rape and looting. The major task of the interim government, which was supposed to be finished long before the elections, was therefore not accomplished: the creation of an integrated army.

The original plan was to send all soldiers to a centre of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). There they would first be disarmed, and then offered the choice between opting for civilian life or joining the new integrated army. Those who chose the latter were supposed to go through a centre of '*brassage*' (brewing, mixing), where they would be trained for one of the integrated brigades. The original estimate was that roughly 350,000 soldiers were to be disarmed initially.¹²⁶

In reality, comparatively few went through the initial DDR process.¹²⁷ Those who wanted to join the new army came with their commanders and often stayed under their command, thus creating huge speculation about whom they would be loyal to. The process was delayed and very slow, and there was no comprehensive overview of the number of soldiers to the new army. This problem only was tackled when EUSEC¹²⁸ was able to separate the military chain of command from the chain of payment and compiled lists of individual soldiers in 2005.¹²⁹

The newly integrated brigades¹³⁰ face numerous problems: there is no adequate training or accommodation and there are problems with payments; consequently quite a large number of 'integrated' soldiers have either deserted, sold their shoes or other equipment, or 'taxed' people with the force of a gun. Reports of looting and rape follow wherever the integrated army is operating. One of the aims of the integrated army, together with the MONUC force, is to disarm the forces of the *Interahamwe* that are still operating in Eastern Congo. So far, there has been no success.

Other areas of the country are under the control of rebel forces that evolved after the war; generals who were not ready to disarm or join the integrated army occupied particular territories and continued operations. In other cases, new Mai-Mai groups have started to fight

¹²⁵ Interview, Goma, June 2005.

¹²⁶ Some informants, however, suggested that this figure was grossly inflated from the beginning: a number like this only enlarged the military budget and provided an incentive for generals to extract cash for 'ghost-soldiers'. “This is a complot ... in order to steal public money, as soldiers are seldom paid, and even when they are paid they get very little”, a UN observer stated. The official payment to soldiers is between 10 and 15 US \$ a month.

¹²⁷ This is in part due to the abhorrent living circumstances in some of these centres: “Soldiers walk through the bush for five weeks for disarmament and then they find themselves dying of cholera, as there is no safe water in the centre”. (Interview Human rights observer, June 2005). In 2005 and 2006, observers noted a tendency to create new militias in order to profit from the DDR process: a gun can be bought for 20 Dollars, then be handed in at a DDR centre for 100.

Dollars and some food, blankets and so on. (Interview, September 2006).

¹²⁸ European Union Security Sector Reform Team.

¹²⁹ EUSEC informant, September 2006.

¹³⁰ By the end of 2006, 14 brigades were integrated: the number of Congo's official troops was around 60,200 (One brigade is supposed to consist of 800 officers and 3500 soldiers). Roughly 45,000 soldiers remain to be integrated. The presidential guard was estimated to have 18,000 men, while estimates about the numbers of *Interahamwe* army place them at around 12,000. MONUC has a personnel of roughly 21,000.

either against the *Interahamwe*, against the former government army or against the newly integrated brigades. Major warfare is still going on in the Kivus, in Ituri and in Katanga. At times, compromises can be found: when the integrated army was not able to defeat General Nkunda's army in North Kivu, after a few weeks of attack they came to an agreement to combine parts of their armies; as a result, two new brigades were built, half drawn from Nkunda's people and half from the regular army (Radio Okapi). Months later, however, they started to clash and engage in fighting again.

So far, the level of violence is reduced when compared to the period of full-blown war, perhaps with the exception of the Eastern DRC. The monopoly of power, however, is far from restored. This is even true in the capital Kinshasa, where riots about the presidential election turned violent in August and September 2006. During the riots MONUC had to provide security, while the guards of the president and vice-president were themselves involved in the violence. Furthermore, state authority and customary authority still co-exist and at times fight each other in Congo. This is particularly important in relation to questions of citizenship, which are linked to access to land and access to public office.

The Constitution proposed in 2004 and formally adopted after a referendum in 2005 states that all people living in Congo at the time of independence are citizens (Art. 14), and demands a law to define citizenship beyond that. 'Loi No 4/24' from November 2004 refers to a combination of *jus sanguinis* (meaning that a citizen is a child of Congolese parents) and *jus soli* (defining a citizen as a child of members of any ethnic minority that was in Congo at the time of independence, including children born in Congo whose parents are unknown or stateless or whose home countries do not give citizenship to their children). Congolese citizenship can be acquired by naturalisation, adoption, marriage or a combination of birth and residence. Children of non-Congolese who were born in Congo and have lived there constantly can become Congolese citizens once they are over 18 years of age (Art.21).

While the text of the constitution and of subsequent laws is one thing, on the part of the people – especially in the Kivu provinces – there is a big debate as to who is a citizen and who not, and the outright answer of the 'indigenous', traditional Congolese is: "All who lived here before 1960 and their children. He who speaks Rwandese is not seriously a Congolese."¹³¹

For the purpose of the referendum and the elections, there was immediate demand for clarification about what constitutes a citizen and thus a voter. Law No. 04/028 from December 2004 specified the following procedure: potential voters can produce an identity card such as a passport, driving license, social security card or military membership card. People who cannot provide any of these need five witnesses who are on the electoral register and have lived in the same place for at least five years (Art. 10).

'Indigenous' people feared that the '5 witness solution would be an easy way for everybody from Rwanda to register. "When all Rwandans get registered, war will break out", as the Vice Governor of Kivu and member of a royal family from Masisi, Lende from the kingdom of Maunde, put it in 2005.¹³² "The Mai Mai will not watch the country being plundered and do nothing. They want to defend and liberate occupied Congo".¹³³

While it is unknown whether these informants are engaging in battle at the time of writing, these tensions and questions have certainly not vanished. According to informants from the Kivus, an unknown number of *Interahamwe* fighters have managed to register themselves as

¹³¹ Interview, traditional leader, 9.6.2005.

¹³² Interview, June 2005, North Kivu.

¹³³ Interview, June 2005, North Kivu.

voters. At the same time, underlying pressures, particularly in relation to land, will make sure the question of citizenship is not done with once and for all. During the presidential campaign Jean-Pierre Bemba accused Kabila of not being Congolese, but Rwandese; many people – especially in Kinshasa – found this accusation to be convincing, given that Kabila speaks no Lingala and little French. In these circumstances, local, regional and ethnic identity is more meaningful than competitive party politics. “We will only vote for our tribe”, as a businessman put it.

The contested frameworks of citizenship or ethnic origin are closely linked not only to access to office and state authorities, but also to land ownership. Customary authorities, which are not elected and mostly inherit their position, have some administrative power, some judicial power and the power to allocate land. In spite of the formal nationalisation of all land in 1973 and the statement of the Provisional Constitution from 2003¹³⁴ that all land belongs to the state, traditional leaders still exercise the inherited right to allocate land. “I am responsible for this land, I can decide and I can demand. The land is the property of our ancestors, the first owners, and it is my responsibility to ration it and to allocate it for agriculture, for housing etc. When the Governor wants to build something on Bukumu-land he has to ask me”, says a traditional leader in North Kivu.

Some Congolese, however, were denied traditional leadership, and thus the traditional means of occupying land. This problem will flare up again when a further stage of the political process, as designed by the new constitution, becomes reality. Inspired by the international community, which at this time is very much in favour of 'decentralisation', the constitution proposes a move in this direction. The eleven provinces will be replaced by the City of Kinshasa and twenty-five provinces¹³⁵ (see appendix, map V.), which will be created in the next three years. Apart from the lack of administratively skilled people and numerous capacity and finance problems, the really explosive element lies in the fact that the provinces are entitled to keep 40% of the revenue they collect. The exact borders of the provinces have yet to be defined, but experience in previous province-splitting shows that the attempt to divide ethnicities in this way often leads to fighting (Jackson 2006: 8).

There will inevitably be rich provinces and poor provinces, particularly given the distribution of mineral wealth throughout the country. Without redistributive measures at the level of the central state, living standards and the provision of public services will quickly drift apart. It is very unlikely that churches and NGOs, which run the majority of what are supposed to be public services, will provide adequate equalisation.

The presence of international actors in Congo and the pressure this exerts on Congolese society is overwhelming and very visible. However, it is not so easy to estimate in their relative strengths. In terms of the international military, first of all there is MONUC with about 21,000 people, most of whom are soldiers. There is, however, serious debate about the extent and content of the MONUC mandate. Second, there are international mercenaries. The number of these is unknown, but there are many different groups working for different interests, in some cases operating as private security companies (around mine concessions). Third, there are the *Interahamwe* and ex-Rwandan army, who are now partly integrated into communities in the east of the country. Fourth, there are varying numbers of troops from

¹³⁴ Article 9: « Le sol et le sous-sol appartiennent à l'Etat. Les conditions de leur concession sont fixées par la loi, qui doit protéger les intérêts des populations locales. »

¹³⁵ Article 2 of the constitution reads: « La République Démocratique du Congo est composée de la ville de Kinshasa et de 25 provinces dotées de la personnalité juridique. Ces provinces sont : Bas-Uele, Equateur, Haut-Lomami, Haut-Katanga, Haut-Uele, Ituri, Kasai, Kasai Oriental, Kongo central, Kwango, Kwilu, Lomami, Lualaba, Lulua, Mai-Ndombe, Maniema, Mongala, Nord-Kivu, Nord-Ubangi, Sankuru, Sud Kivu, Sud Ubangi, Tanganyika, Tshopo, Tshuapa. Les limites des provinces et celles de la ville de Kinshasa sont fixées par une loi organique. »

Uganda and allegedly also from Rwanda and Angola. Fifth, there are also rebel groups from Uganda and Sudan, including the Lords Resistance Army.

In terms of international financial and political organisations, there is the World Bank (all branches), International Monetary Fund, European Union and many branches of the United Nations. Furthermore, there is the presence of a number of very influential governments, partly accompanied by major programs on the part of their respective developmental agencies. This includes the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, South Africa, the United States and China (this includes Chinese business interests represented by embassies). In many cases it is very difficult to distinguish between political and business interests such as mining and forestry.

The exact number of international NGOs active in the DRC is unclear, but they are omnipresent and are currently running significant portions of the health and education services as well as all sorts of projects, from microfinance to the re-intergration of child soldiers) Many international churches and sects are also present; again the number is unclear but they seem to be omnipresent and are involved in many basic services as well as various occult practices including some aimed at providing 'hope', but others that encourage practices such as the abandonment of children. Institutional multiplicity therefore continues on all levels, accentuated by the enormous presence of these international bi- and multilateral donors and NGOs.

Appeasement or Reconstruction?

The second Congo war had no clear winner. Belligerents and the international community, first of all the United Nations, forced the Congolese actors – with exceptions - into an interim government. As this process was heavily supported by the international community, parties presented themselves as the parties of good governance, democracy, transparency and accountability. In fact, they are still very much ethnically or regionally based and led by strong men, although leaders and parliamentarians show considerable lenience to change camps.

The legal and administrative system in the DRC is still in shambles. First efforts have been undertaken to formulate new law, as e.g. the mining code, but in general rules are still very much disputed. There is still a very far way to go until law can be enforced over the territory.

The constitution has been adopted by a referendum, and general elections and presidential elections have taken place in 2006. The loser of the elections, Jean Pierre Bemba, is not head of the opposition, but has left the country, fearing for his life.

Survival in Congo is still extremely difficult. With the dollarisation and informalisation of economic activity, which is partly conducted in illegal and/or violent networks, and with international aid exceeding GDP, the reconstruction and re-integration of the economy remains a major task. Economic links to neighbouring countries are stronger than within the DRC, and Congolese minerals are often partly processed just across the borders in Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia.

The army is still far from being integrated. While these armed forces are too weak to restore a monopoly of power, they are a constant threat to the population.

While institutional multiplicity continues at a very high level, basic features for state making or state reconstruction are not yet in place: the Democratic Republic of Congo is still light-years away from a monopoly of power, from economic reconstruction and from political integration.

Conclusion

While state reconstruction and state collapse can be understood in Weberian terms as aspects of the challenging and contested process of transforming neo-patrimonial societies into capitalist societies requiring a rational and bureaucratic state, these ideal type categories make it difficult to observe specific changes over shorter periods of time. Through the concept of institutional multiplicity, the way different neo-patrimonial and rational actors overlap and coexist becomes more visible, in particular when they are looked at in sub-systems of the state.

The shifts in the relative strength of these actors over time help to explain how the country was pushed and pulled towards and away from the establishment and consolidation of a rational state at different times. In periods when the power of the state was in decline, authority was exercised in a more neo-patrimonial fashion by groups that were run as if they were private businesses, headed by patrons who sought to bolster their political, economic and military power.

When this is the given societal structure at a particular moment in time, efforts at reconstruction should not be based on misleading assumptions about the existence and potential of political competition; it would instead be more fruitful in such circumstances to focus on attempts to turn these patrons into capitalists, thus contributing to asset building. The creation and reinforcement of their horizontal and vertical links, as well as the rules they declare binding for themselves, could potentially form the basis for the building of a rational state. One might call this an elite project, or even 'elite democracy'.

Several areas touched upon in this grand sketch need further research. It has to be explained on a theoretical level why neo-patrimonial structures seem to be destroying assets, given that Weber's observation of patrimonial structures led him to detect in them the emerging nucleus of a capitalist class. On an empirical level it is not clear whether the destruction of assets is restricted to state assets; is it the case that these are being progressively destroyed while the private assets of patrons continue to grow?

Transforming patrons into capitalists requires investment in longer time frames and continuous re-investment in and expansion of the economy's productive capacity. Making this a priority would amount to a serious alteration of the predominant economic and policy prescriptions for the DRC, which are currently largely focused on questions of 'good governance', decentralisation and political competition.

Further research is also needed in order to understand the interaction between patrons. Both the horizontal linkages between them and the vertical linkages between patrons and the super-patron, the head of state, are grossly under-researched. This is particularly problematic given that the DRC is to be decentralised through the creation of more provinces with greater self-rule and financial autonomy. The creation of a multitude of sub-state entities without a centre capable of holding the place together – indeed, without even a minimalist monopoly of power – is a cause for great concern and highlights the need for future research.

Appendices

I. List of Acronyms

ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo
ADFLC	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
AMP	Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle
ANC	Armee Nationale Congolaise
CND	Centre Nationale de Documentation
CONACO	Convention National Congolaise
CONADER	Coordination Nationale de démobilisation et réintégration
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSP	Division Spéciale Présidentielle
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Team
FAC	Forces Armees Congolaises
FAZ	Forces Armees Zaïroises
FLNC	Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, (Mozambican Liberation Front)
GECAMINES	Générale les Carrières et des Mines
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IDA	International Development Agency (World Bank)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LTO	Large Taxpayers Office
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
	MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MPR	Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (1967 – 1990)
MPR	Mouvement Populaire pour le Renouveau (since 1990)
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Aid
OFIDA	Office des Douanes et Accises
ONATRA	Office National des Transports
OPEC	Organisation of Petrol Exporting Countries
PALU	Parti Lumumbiste Unifié


PDSC	Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien
PPRD	Parti du Peuple pour la Réconstruction et la Démocratie
PRP	Parti de la Revolution Populaire
PRP	Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, Congolese Rally for Democracy
REGIDESO	Régie de Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricité du Pays
RENACO	Regroupement des Nationalistes Congolais
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SNEL	Société National d'Electricité
SNI	Service Nationale d'Intelligence
SOZACOM	Société Zaïroise de Commercialisation des Minerais
UDPS	Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social
UFERI	Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendentes
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

II. Geographical Map of the D.R. of Congo



Source: >www.africanwireless.com/dr_congo_maps.htm<

III. Provinces of the DRC



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, >lib.utexas.edu/maps/Zaire.html<


IV. DRC divided into areas controlled by different militaries



Source: Wikipedia

V. New provinces according to the 2005 constitution

Carte de la RDC
représentant le nouveau découpage territorial



Source: Private Correspondence

VI. Armed Forces in the DRC

1. Militias

- ADF/NALU (Allied Democratic Forces/ National Army for the Liberation of Uganda). Ugandan rebel group active in western Uganda with rear bases in the DRC. Largely inactive by 2004.
- ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) Rwanda-Uganda backed alliance of opposition groups led by Laurent Kabila which toppled Mobutu. Disintegrated in 1998.
- ALIR (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda) Rwandan Hutu militia based in the Kivus since early 1997. A successor organisation to the *Interahamwe* and RDR they merged with FDLR in September 2000.
- ANC (Armée Nationale Congolaise) The military wing of RCD-Goma .
- APC (Armée du Peuple Congolais) or (Armée Populaire Congolaise) The military wing of the RCD-ML led by Mbusa Nyamwisi.
- Banyamulenge Tutsis in South Kivu active in the ADFL and in the ANC
- CNDD-FDD or just FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy- Forces for the Defense of Democracy) Burundian Hutu militia active in the DRC, Tanzania and Burundi. Once allied with Laurent Kabila who gave them an operational base in Katanga. Left Congo in 2001, signed peace agreement with Burundi in late 2005.
- FAPC (Force Armée du Peuple Congolaise). Formed in 2003 and led by Jerome Kakwaye Bukande. Active in Ituri.
- FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de la Libération de Rwanda). The principle Hutu anti-Rwandan group in Eastern DRC. Composed of some *Interahamwe* members, this group was backed by Laurent Kabila as a proxy force against the RCD and Rwandan Army.
- FIPI (Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri). An umbrella group formed from PUSIC, FNI and FPDC that enjoyed Ugandan support until its eventual collapse. Opposed the UPC.
- FLC (Front de Libération du Congo) Ugandan militia formed from the MLC, RCD-N and RCD-ML. Led by Jean-Pierre Bemba from Nov. 2000-Aug. 2001 to centralise control of Equateur and Orientale provinces in 2000.
- FLN or FROLINA (National Liberation Front) Burundian Hutu militia group led by Joseph Kalumba. Allegedly involved in attacks on refugees within DRC.
- FNI (Front for Nationalist Integration) A Lendu organisation in Ituri that is led by Peter Karim. Opposes the UPC and claims broad community support. Involved in several incidents with MONUC in which peacekeepers were killed or captured. Has announced it will integrate into the national army, Karim has been appointed as a colonel.
- FPDC (Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie en Congo). Ugandan backed group operating against the UPC in Ituri. Believed to have close links with Peter Karim and the FNI.

- FRPI (Force de Resistance Patriotique en Ituri). A Lendu group with links to the FNI. Started in 2002, led by Dr. Adirodo.
Rwandan Hutu militia responsible for the genocide who were forced into eastern Congo, where they were known as the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda.
- *Interahamwe* ('Those who fight together'). The Rwandan Hutu militia responsible for the genocide in 1994. Fled into the DRC as the RPF seized Kigali. Members now form part of a number of militias in Eastern DRC.
- LRA (Lord's Resistance Army). Ugandan based rebels led by Joseph Kony, have taken refuge in a national park in northeastern DRC. Operating mostly in northern Uganda, from Sudan. Currently negotiating with the Ugandan government. Kony is wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.
- Mai-Mai
An umbrella term for Congolese militia groups generally opposed to foreign occupation, originating from traditional self-defence militias.
- MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
Ugandan-backed militia led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. Created 1998 and often used as erroneous shorthand to refer to all Ugandan-backed rebel forces in the DRC. Both an armed group and political party. Bemba lost the presidential elections and is presently in Portugal.
- MRC (Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais). A Ugandan backed group active in Ituri.
- NALU (National Army for the Liberation of Uganda)
Ugandan rebel group along the border with the DRC that merged into the ADF in 1996.
- Nkunda (Laurent Nkunda Batware). Ex- RPF military and ex-RCD commander who joined the National Congolese Army under the Interim Government and was named General. He soon claimed the government's illegitimacy and withdrew with his troops (81st and 83rd brigade of the integrated army) into the forests of North Kivu (2004). After several clashes with DRC army brigades they formed "mixed brigades" to fight the FDLR. Nkunda and his soldiers withdrew from the mixed brigades in August 2007 and fighting resumed. In the area under his control he runs a radio station, a police force and courts, declared his own country ('Land of the Volcanoes') with an own flag and levies taxes, especially on trucks, artisan mining and trade. Allegedly backed by Rwanda.
- PUSIC (Parti pour la Unité et le Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo). A Hema militia led by Kahwa Mandro. Believed to have support to the Ugandan government, but also ties to the Kabila government.
- RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
Rwandan rebel group, usually refers to RCD-Goma
- RCD-Congo: Faction of RCD-Goma led by Kin-Kiey Mulumba that broke off in June 2002
- RCD-Goma: A Rwandan-backed rebel group created in the town of Goma in August 1998 to fight Laurent Kabila. Was most powerful militia in Eastern DRC with close links to Rwanda. Led by Azarias Ruberwa.
- RCD-K/ML (RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération): Refers to the RCD-K that became RCD-ML in 1999 after Wamba dia Wamba was ousted.
- RCD-K: Ugandan-backed rebel faction led by Wamba dia Wamba that broke from RCD-Goma in March 1999. Became the RCD-ML led by Nyamwisi in September 1999. Also known as RCD-Wamba.

- RCD-ML: Ugandan-backed group led by Mbusa Nyamwisi. Active in North Kivu and Ituri Province. See RCD-K/ML. Is reported to be accepting arms shipments from Kinshasa, in agreement with Uganda, that are shared with the FDLR against Tutsi forces.
- RCD-N (RCD-National): Ugandan-backed rebel group led by Roger Lumbala that split from the RCD-K/ML and is now allied with the MLC and supported by Uganda.
- RDR (Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda)
Rwandan Hutu militia, successor organisation to the *Interahamwe* in Congo that morphed into the ALIR.
- RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front. Now the ruling Rwandan political party.
- SPLA (Sudanese People's Liberation Army)
Rwandan political wing of Uganda-based Tutsi rebel group led by Paul Kagame that chased out the genocidaires in 1994
Sudanese militia
- TPD (Tous pour la Paix et le Developpement). A political party with ties to RCD-G, who are allegedly involved in distributing arms to local defence groups.
- UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola)
Angolan faction; officially demilitarised in 2002.
- UPC (Union of Congolese Patriots). Hema dominated militia group that came to prominence after taking Bunia in August 2002. Sometimes referred to as UP-FRP (Front for reconciliation and Peace).

2. Armies

- FAB (Forces Armées Burundaises). Army of Burundi (cooperated with the RCD and RDF)
- FARDC or FAC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)
Army of Democratic Republic of the Congo
- FAZ (Zairean Armed Forces)
Army of Zaire formerly loyal to Mobutu Sese Seko. Some troops adopted banditry as a means of support after Laurent Kabila's victory.
- RDF (Rwandan Defense Forces) formerly the RPA (Rwanda Patriotic Army)
Army of Rwanda
- UPDF (Ugandan People's Defense Force)
Army of Uganda
- ZNA (Zimbabwe National Army)
Army of Zimbabwe, formed from the militias ZANLA and ZIPRA

3. United Nations

- MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Roughly 21.000 personnel, mostly in Kinshasa and Eastern DRC.

VII. List of Interviews 2005, 2006

List of interviews, Kinshasa 2005, made anonymous

No.	Organisation/Function
#001	Development Agency
#002	Development Agency
#003	Development Agency
#004	Development Agency
#005	Development Agency
#006	Development Agency
#007	Independent Electoral Commission
#008	Diplomat
#009	Diplomat
#010	European Commission
#011	MONUC
#012	MONUC
#013	Diplomat
#014	Transitional Senate
#015	Constitutional Expert
#016	International NGO
#017	Congolese NGO
#018	International NGO
#019	UNDP
#020	National Assembly
#021	Electoral commission
#022	RCD
#023	RCD Member of Parliament
#024	RCD Member of Parliament
#025	Minister, Transitional Government
#026	Minister, Transitional Government
#027	Ministry of Economics
#028	CONADER
#029	University representative, member of electoral commission
#030	IMF
#031	IBRD
#032	IBRD
#033	CONADER
#034	MONUC
#035	USAID
#036	Diplomat
#037	Member cabinet Kabila
#038	OFIDA
#039	OFIDA
#040	OFIDA

List of interviews, Goma 2005 (anonymous)

	Organisation/Function
#041	Scientist
#042	Scientist

#043	Vice Governor
#044	Member of governor's cabinet
#045	Vice Governor
#046	International NGO
#047	International NGO
#048	International NGO
#049	Military person
#050	OCHA
#051	middlemen coltane/tin
#052	middlemen coltane/tin
#053	OFIDA
#054	OFIDA
#055	Businessperson
#056	OCHA
#057	International NGO
#058	Ex- Member of Parliament
#059	Member of Parliament, MLC
#060	vice governor of province
#061	Radio OKAPI
#062	Traditional Leader
#063	Traditional Leader
#064	religious organisation
#065	expert on history
#066	medical doctor
#067	Businessperson, mining
#068	businessperson
#069	Military person
#070	local NGO
#071	Businessperson, mining

**Interviews
anonymous**


Kinshasa, 2006,

Organisation/Function

#072	Development Agency
#073	Development Agency
#074	OCHA
#075	Development Agency
#076	Diplomat
#077	EUSEC
#078	Diplomat
#079	Military person
#080	Journalist
#081	MONUC
#082	MLC
#083	Scientist
#084	Journalist
#085	Vice Governor of Province
#086	UDPS
#087	Scientist
#088	Economist
#089	Journalist
#090	Journalist

#091	World Bank
#092	European Commission
#093	Human Rights Lawyer
#094	PPRD
#095	Diplomat
#096	UNDP, Scientist
#097	UNDP, Economist
#098	MONUC


VIII. GDP per capita, DRC 1980 - 2008



Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007


IX. Government Revenue DRC, 1964 - 2002

Government Revenue DR Congo, in US \$




Source: Own compilation based on IMF Government Finance Statistics, forthcoming.

X. DR Congo, Total Exports in Mio. US \$



Source: Own compilation based on UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, New York 1961 – 2003; The Economist Intelligence Unit (E.I.U): Quarterly/Annual Country Report 1978 – 2003; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Foreign Trade Statistics for Africa, New York 1962 – 1988.

XI. D.R.Congo: Gross Domestic Product and Official Development Aid, 2001 - 2006

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington D.C. 2007

XII. Basic Development Indicators, DRC

Basic Development Indicators, Democratic Republic of Congo

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	61
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	86	87	90	93
Immunisation, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	37	45	54	64	70	..
Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban population with access)	42
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	..	43	44	..
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	67
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	31
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	129	..
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	205	..
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	3	..	3	..
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	..	39	39
Roads, paved (% of total roads)	2
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	..	62	62
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	22	22
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington D.C. 2007

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