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**COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON
CONTESTED CITIES: LENSES AND
SCAFFOLDINGS**

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Comparative Research on Contested Cities: Lenses and Scaffoldings

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Abstract

This paper describes the methodological issues related to cross-national urban research in troubled settings. It describes why we must be clear in articulating the types of cities we are studying. It advocates for the use of crosscutting, integrative themes as a way to illuminate similarities (and differences) across specific cases. It then describes how a specific analytic 'lens' can be used to gain access to wider issues of urban governance and policymaking in divided societies. Key urban ethnic conditions—territoriality/control over land, distribution of economic benefits and costs, access to policy-making, and group identity—are described in terms of how they can facilitate or impede the movement toward peaceful co-existence. The paper concludes by describing how a comparative analytic framework (or 'scaffolding') can be developed in cross-national research that will make sense of case study findings and also provide footing for further theoretical advances and methodological choices as a research program continues.

Keywords: research methods, comparative case study, conflict cities, urban planning, conflict-stability continuum

Introduction

The challenges and opportunities related to cross-national urban research in conflict cities arise because of difficulties common to qualitative case study research, but also due to attributes unique to cities that are in ethnic and social turmoil. This working paper covers many of the methodological issues I have confronted during approximately 15 years of field research, data collection involving over 220 interviews with political leaders, planners, architects, community representatives and academics, and the writing of three books (Bollens 1999, 2000, 2007) and ten scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles reporting on this work. In these studies, my emphasis has been on the role of policy and planning in contested urban environments and the effects these urban strategies have on the magnitude and manifestations of ethnonational conflict. I have explored whether there are lessons for regional and national political negotiations that come from polarised cities regarding how to produce more mutually tolerable multi-ethnic living environments. The cities that I have investigated are Jerusalem (Israel/Palestine), Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia (Cyprus), Sarajevo and Mostar (Bosnia) and Basque cities and Barcelona (Spain). Each of these cities has been, or is, politically contested

or polarised, meaning that they are characterised by deep-rooted and often historically based nationalistic group conflict. The existence of competing nationalistic allegiances can lead to violence and instability, which can eventually tear a society and the city apart.

Comparative research on contested cities increases our understanding of why some cities are peace promoting while others experience violence and instability. It also helps us identify the contribution of cities to processes of state making, crisis and collapse. These study areas—connecting the city, conflict, and state—are major emphases of the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) Phase 2 programme. In addition, this paper’s introduction and use of a conflict-stability continuum as comparative scaffolding is congruent with CSRC’s Phase 1 recommendation that we should examine states’ capacities to manage conflict across a spectrum rather than through the use of rigid dichotomised categories. Further, the use of a comparative framework allows for the discovery of crosscutting policy issues that bridge different types of cities or cities at a particular point in the analytical continuum or spectrum. The distillation of such insights for the practitioner community pursues an ambition expressed in CSRC’s phase 1 work.

The Types of Cities we Study

In order to make valid generalisable statements based on comparative research, we must be as clear as possible about what types of cities we are studying. Labels such as “divided”, “polarised”, “contested” and “violent” must not be used without clear definitions. Each of these terms alludes to difficult urban circumstances, but they place emphases on differing dimensions along which cities, and their societies, can fragment. In addition, some terms are used to describe different environments at different times. For example, cities are described as “divided” in numerous contexts, including North American cities segregated by race, ethnicity, and class. At other times, “divided” alludes to more extreme circumstances of political division and contestation. Further thickening the definitional quagmire is the prevalence of urban violence across many parts of the world—such violence can be attributed to social factors (motivated by a desire to get or keep social control), economic (motivated by material gain), and/or political (motivated by the desire to hold political power) [Moser and McIlwaine 2004]. A comparative line has also been established across cities such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, and Mexico City, which are characterised by discourses of fear and practices of extreme class segregation (Caldeira 2000.) Schneider and Susser (2003) examine “wounded cities” ruptured by sudden, unpredictable events or by more chronic problems that undermine quality of life.

I have studied “polarised”/“contested” cities where the very legitimacy of their political structures and their rules of decision-making and governance are strongly contested by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power or demand group-based autonomy or independence. Socioeconomic cleavages and urban questions become bound up with strong political claims; socially “divided” cities at this juncture become politically “polarised” cities. The case cities I have investigated are a sample of a troubling number of cities across the world that are prone to intense inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures.¹ In these cities and societies, ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy or even territorial

¹ Nationalism is a doctrine wherein nationality is the most important line of cleavage for establishing membership in societal groups, and overrides or subsumes alternative criteria such as social class, economic class, or patronage networks (Snyder 1993).

separation. Such politicised multiculturalism constitutes a “challenge to the ethical settlement of the city” (Keith 2005: 8). The political control of multinational cities can become contested as nationalists push to create a political system that expresses and protects their distinctive group characteristics. Whereas in most cities there is a belief maintained by all groups that the existing system of governance is properly configured and capable of producing fair outcomes, assuming adequate political participation and representation of minority interests, governance amidst severe and contested multicultural differences can be viewed by at least one identifiable group in the city as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate.

Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Sarajevo, Mumbai (Bombay), Beirut, Brussels, and now Baghdad have experienced inter-group conflict and violence associated with ethnic or political differences. In cases such as Jerusalem and Belfast, a city is a focal point or magnet for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict. In other cases (such as certain Indian or British cities), a city is not the primary cause of inter-group conflict, but becomes a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims involving areas outside the urban region or for tensions related to foreign immigration. In cases such as Johannesburg and Beirut, the management of cities holds the key to sustainable co-existence of antagonistic ethnic groups subsequent to cessation of overt hostilities. In other cities such as Brussels and Montreal, there have been effective efforts to defuse nationalistic conflict through power-sharing governance and accommodation to group cultural and linguistic differences.

The Comparative Dimension

The value of research on politically contested cities will increase if there is use of a comparative approach that utilises the richness of the single case study approach but also goes beyond a single case study to make comparative assessments across multiple contested cities. This *dual focused comparative approach* (George and Smoke 1974, 95-96) has the following characteristics:

- ** resembles the intensive case study approach in that it examines each case in depth.
- ** examines multiple cases and makes comparisons among them.
- ** proceeds by asking a limited number of questions, or testing a limited number of hypotheses, so that comparability across cases is enhanced.
- ** allows for additional and unique queries to be addressed in a case in order to bring out unique features of a case, in this may allowing for some built-in flexibility.

Schnabel (2001, 195) describes this comparative case study approach as able to produce two types of knowledge—that of a general nature derived from the comparative study of the dynamics of conflict societies, and knowledge of a more specific nature, linked to the specific nature of each conflict city under investigation. Comparative evaluations across cities seek to generalise findings by going beyond single case studies that, although rich and penetrating in analysis, often have limited value in terms of the extrapolation of general lessons useful to local and external actors alike. The contentious assumption embedded within the comparative approach is that the societal divisions, inter-ethnic dynamics, and possible policy responses have some universal nature to them and that these general patterns can be identified and

contrasted with the endemic and unique attributes of the cases.² At the same time, through the deliberate selection of cases that show certain similarities and the inclusion of cases that illustrate significant variation on key criteria, we can isolate key enabling and blocking factors that influence the outcomes of interest (Heidenheimer, Hecllo, and Adams 1990).

In my specific examination of urban policy and planning in polarised cities, a comparative case study approach seeks to add to the body of knowledge about the differing contexts within which urban policy and planning practice operates cross-nationally (Masser 1986; Cropper 1982). It seeks to escape the assumptions and values of much single-country urban planning studies, bound as they are to a particular context and stage in the development of planning thought (Alterman 1992). I have aimed to document the attributes and effects of policy strategies that may transcend particular urban and ideological contexts, while acknowledging the unique national and local contexts of specific cases. One of my working assumptions has been that there are aspects of city planning and policy processes that can be inherently harmful or beneficial to urban intergroup relations in ethnically polarised environments, and that such patterns and effects hold across conflict settings of otherwise diverse natures.

Essential to comparative research work is the use and development of crosscutting, integrative themes that can illuminate similarities (and differences) across specific cases. In multi-investigator, multi-site research, crosscutting integrative themes or prior theoretical assumptions provide basic parameters that can anchor and shape numerous investigators in different locations. As much as possible, concepts should be used consistently across case study locations. This will increase the credibility and dependability of qualitative findings, and the internal validity and reliability of quantitative results³. A cross-case thematic structure to provide programmatic guidance will likely be more necessary for multi-investigator studies than it would be for single-investigator investigations. In the latter case, the sole researcher has more maneuverability to develop connective themes incrementally and organically from the evolving field research while still maintaining research program coherency.

Smyth and Darby (2001) cite a recent shift in scholarship towards comparative analysis of ethnic conflicts and approaches to conflict resolution, and predict that this trend will continue and deepen because the need for practical, policy-based guidance is intensifying. Appendix 1 presents a partial inventory of the multiple-case comparative literature since 2000.

Research Methods for Studying Contested Cities

A project studying this complex and multi-faceted topic must use an interdisciplinary approach. I have utilised the insights of *political science* to examine the political and legal arrangements and mechanisms used to diffuse or moderate conflict. I use knowledge of *urban and regional planning* to study policies affecting local and metropolitan settlement patterns, the perspective provided by *geography* to explore the spatial and territorial aspects of conflict and its management, and the *social psychology* literature to deepen the analysis of group identity and how urban attributes which may facilitate or obstruct aggression.

² I have presented numerous comparative assessments of divided cities to audiences across the world, including to audiences in specific contested cities. A common critique of my work, and a resistance on the part of these local audience members, is their perception that their circumstances are radically different and unique from others and that by drawing out similarities across cases I am reducing their complexities to simplified and inaccurate portrayals.

³ See Lincoln and Guba (1985) for issues related to the trustworthiness of research outcomes in qualitative and quantitative research.

A researcher studying conflicted cities should utilise both qualitative and quantitative research in order to obtain a complete picture as possible of this multi-dimensional topic. Qualitative methods such as ethnographic observation and open-ended interviewing are particularly useful when the structures of meaning or action are complex or little understood or when the subjective experiences of actors are important to understand (Bottger and Strobl 2003). In research on contested cities and urbanism, I have focused on the motivations of bureaucratic planners and political officials and on the social-psychological states of ethnic residents as particularly salient to understanding day-to-day life amidst political division. Quantitative methods such as the gathering and synthesis of secondary data are instrumental in analysing citywide and neighborhood trends impacting upon the groups in conflict. Information on service delivery and quality, housing availability, and magnitude of development are usually accessible through public bureaucracies or nongovernmental organisations and can be categorised by city neighborhood to provide a view of whether city-building is increasing intergroup disparities and thus potentially exacerbating ethnic tension.

My main primary research tool has been the face-to-face interview, which I used to both obtain objective information and to construct a grounded, ethnographic account of urban management amidst societal reconstruction and political strife. I have interviewed, primarily during 1994-1995 and 2003-2004, approximately 220 political leaders, planners, architects, community representatives, and academics. I have been interested in the complex objective realities and influences in these cities, as well as in how the interviewees make sense of their everyday activities, professional roles, and organisational environment. I sought to understand the organisational, cultural, and historical context within which governmental and nongovernmental professionals operate.

Interviews Conducted

Phase I: 1994-95

Jerusalem	40
Belfast	34
Johannesburg	37

Phase II: 2003-04

Barcelona	55
Basque Country	15
Sarajevo	17
Mostar	22

(note: Nicosia research has not involved formal interviews, but rather participation in workshops and roundtable discussions)

Because ethnic affiliation and government employment may influence interviewees' judgments, strong efforts were made to interview individuals so that there would be a fair distribution across ethnic groups, and across government and nongovernmental officials. For example, the classification of interviewees in Jerusalem and Belfast by nationality and affiliation were as follows:

Jerusalem*Nationality*

Israeli	24
Palestinian	15
Other	1

Affiliation

Governmental (Israel) ^a	12
Academic	11
Nongovernmental organisation ^b	17

Belfast*Ethnicity*

Protestant	16
Catholic	12
Not reported	6

Affiliation

Governmental	19
Academic	7
Non-governmental organisation	8

^a Includes both current and former government officials.

^b Includes interviewees who worked for the then-emerging Palestinian National Authority.

When doing research on public policy in contested urban settings, it is important that the pool of interviewees in each of the cities represent adequately and broadly the complexities, arguments, and emotions of working and living in a politically contested city. To increase the policy relevance of our research, interviewee samples may need to be biased toward individuals in the “practical middle”—those individuals with moderate, centrist views on urban ethnic conflict and its management. This will increase our ability to identify possibilities in which urban policy can contribute constructively to urban and regional peace. Nonetheless, more extreme attitudes toward conflict management should also be included within each of the interview samples in order to understand constraints facing proposed policy changes. In addition to interviews, the use of secondary sources can help construct the more hard-line positions of right-wing interests and rejectionists.

The study of the multidimensional political, territorial, historic, economic, and social-psychological attributes of contested urban societies requires a deeply grounded, intensive case study approach utilising immersion in the city’s day-to-day culture. The depth of inter-ethnic realities, and the time-consuming nature of interview scheduling and questioning, demands that the scholar/investigator spend at least three months of research in country. In addition to allowing for face-to-face interviewing, in-country residence allows the investigator to immerse himself in the intriguing day-to-day conditions and concerns of “polarised” urban life, as expressed by public officials and people on the street, and through popular media. Collaboration with local academic institutions will likely be an essential part of the research stay and will deepen the research experience. These local institutions can provide invaluable research hospitality, an important set of initial community contacts, and an

academic base of office support that can ease interview scheduling and other logistical arrangements⁴.

I developed core interview lists, based on my primary field contacts, prior to the in-field research portion of the project. I identified additional interviewees after arrival based upon word-of-mouth referrals from initial discussants and through local media. Interviews lasted 75 minutes, on average, and about 90 percent of them were audio-taped. In about 10 percent of the cases, I used a translator to facilitate discussion. Interviews were transcribed and input into a qualitative software program that helped me to document themes and portrayals that connected across multiple interviewees, and also to note multiple, contrary interpretations or ones specific to particular types of interviewees. I used non-interview data sources in order to strengthen research validity and to “reality-check” interviewees’ assertions. I investigated published and unpublished government plans and policy documents, political party platforms and initiatives, implementing regulations, and laws and enabling statutes in terms of how they address inter-group difference. I employed quantitative data concerning growth and housing trends and budgetary spending to supplement interview-based findings.

I used interviews to construct an ethnographic account of urban policymaking amidst political strife, based on close observation of the agents' own knowledge and understanding of their actions. I was assuredly interested in the complex objective realities and influences in these cities. In addition, though, I was curious about how interviewees made sense of their everyday activities and professional roles. In particular, I observed closely the interplay between the professional norms and values of many planning roles and the more emotion-filled ideological imperatives that impinge daily upon the professional's life. The distortions, the omissions, the emphases on some issues and not others, and how urban issues and constituents are defined are all part of the story I wanted to tell of urban policymaking amidst contested ethnicities.

A set of issues should be constructed to frame and shape research on contested cities; such issues provide the structure and parameters for interview and secondary source research. The issues I developed, listed below and described more fully in Appendix 2, focused on the influence of ethnic polarisation on urban policy and the effects local policies have on the nature and level of ethnic conflict. My research program investigated the influence of ethnic polarisation on the city's institutional context, formulation of development goals, public agenda setting, decision-making, and policy implementation. I concurrently evaluated how those city policies that are enacted and implemented affect the nature and level of ethnic conflict, and explore how issues of ethnicity impact are channeled back into future policymaking efforts. Throughout, the focus has been on how ethnicity permeates the goals and processes of urban management and control, and how urban decisions in turn constrain or open opportunities for conflict alleviation.

⁴ In each case study site, I established relationships with a host academic institution—Hebrew University (Jerusalem), Queen's University (Belfast), University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), and University of Barcelona. Key contacts in these institutions helped me establish interview lists, reality check my methodologies and preliminary findings, and helped with logistical and administrative support. In the Barcelona case, this assistance extended to providing background information and contacts not only for local research, but also for research in two cities in Bosnia.

Guiding Research Issues for my Case Studies

I investigated those *contextual factors* that institutionally and legally structure the decision-making environment. Legal frameworks and city and neighborhood organisational arrangements may condone institutional differentiation or seek to integrate or unify ethnic groups within a common public domain. I examined *policy issues and goals* in each ethnically polarised city, focusing on the position that urban policymakers and administrators take vis-à-vis ethnicity—whether they accept it as a decisionmaking criterion or not. Positions can run the gamut from acknowledging explicitly the presence and effects of ethnic fractures, to one that seeks to depoliticise ethnicity by emphasising universalism and an overarching public interest. Policy goals are important to study because they articulate a state's (and city's) governing ideology. An ideology, as used here, is a comprehensive political belief system that embraces an inner logic and seeks to guide and justify organised political and social actions (Bilski and Galnoor 1980). A state's urban governing ideology can either be “ethnonationalist” and promoting of an exclusive nationalism or “civic” and promoting of a universalist ethic and inclusive nationalism. *Urban decision making* is composed of both public agenda-setting and the selection of a preferred policy. The local policy and planning alternatives that are considered can be restricted by ethnonational and political realities. I studied those decision-making criteria—functional-technical, partisan-ethnic, or proportionate-equity—used by the governing regime. These rationales underlying public decisions can expose clearly a government's role within, and position toward, ethnic polarisation.

In my research, it has been instructive to think of four options or models public policymakers and administrators can use when addressing issues of ethnic salience in contested/polarised cities. These models differ in their substantive goals, in the extent to which they address root causes or urban symptoms of intergroup conflict, and in the degree to which they incorporate ethnic criteria.

Models of Urban Policy Strategies

(adapted from Benvenisti 1986)

<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Tactics</i>
Neutral	Address urban symptoms of ethnic conflict at individual level.
Partisan	Maintain/increase disparities
Equity	Address urban symptoms of ethnic conflict at ethnic group level.
Resolver	Address root causes/sovereignty issues.

A *neutral* urban strategy employs technical criteria in allocating urban resources and services, and distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion. A *partisan* urban strategy, in contrast, chooses sides and is a regressive agent of change. The *equity* strategy gives primacy to ethnic affiliation in order to decrease, not perpetuate, intergroup inequalities. The final model—a *resolver* strategy—seeks to connect urban issues to the root political causes of urban polarisation—power imbalances, subordination, and disempowerment.

The next set of research questions, *policy outcomes*, explores the implementation of policy by administrative agents, and constitutes an important lens through which to evaluate the relationship between governing ideology and its urban operationalisation and outcomes. Here, I closely examine on-the-ground outcomes in terms of the distribution across ethnic communities

of land use planning restrictions, building permit allowances, housing development, economic activities, transportation, and urban services.

Questions focused on *conflict outcomes and mechanisms* do not evaluate the direct on-the-ground outcomes of urban policy decisions, but how particular policies affect the nature and level of ethnic conflict and tension in the city. Objective and political-psychological outcomes of policy can be significantly different in polarised cities because any extension of public authority—even one premised on a criterion of urban fairness—may be deemed as illegitimate and stimulative of resistance and conflict. Accordingly, assessment by government of policy implementation may include ways to contain conflict resulting from it, so as to avoid breakdown of the planning policy. Such mechanisms for coping with ethnic conflict during policy implementation may utilise governmental channels of inter-ethnic mediation or informal contacts between government and minority elites. Also salient within this line of questioning is the fact that public policy can not only exacerbate friction between ethnic communities, but also internally divide ethnic groups or create communities of interests that cut across the ethnic divide. The next set of issues relate to *community dynamics and organisation* and explore survival techniques used by the subordinated population ('out-group') and the forms of community mobilisation that result. Questions also concern how ethnic community groups can shift from being solely organs of protest and resistance to constructive co-participants in the creation of alternative urban scenarios. The intersection of national and local interests is also a salient point when dealing with the internal coherency of each ethnic group. Urban-based interests and initiatives may act either to reinforce or inhibit national political interests and strategies.

The final set of inquiries explores issues of actual or potential *change and evolution* in the relationship between urban policy strategies and ethnicity. Planning goals and strategies may shift over time due to changes in economic, political, or ideological factors, or due to feedback documenting previous policy's damaging, or empowering, effects on the urban out-group and inter-group co-existence. Change may be either progressive, moving the urban system closer to political resolution or at least social accommodation, or regressive, tightening further the opportunities for co-existent viability of antagonistic urban communities. In other cases where urban operationalisation of governing ideology highlights internal contradiction, I am interested in how urbanists respond in terms of policy and the arguments they use to buttress their efforts. Acting amidst such urban turbulence and uncertainty, it is significant as to whether urban policymakers and planners adopt a narrow vision of their roles or a position more conducive to change that facilitates problem re-framing and social learning.

The Use of an Analytic Lens

I have found it useful in comparative urban research to employ a specific lens through which to study wider issues of urban governance and policymaking in divided societies. The focus on a specific disciplinary culture within government helps to anchor research questions and guides the types of prospective interviewees. It is important that the investigator is explicit about the lens or frame of reference being used so that readers can ascertain what is inside and outside the boundaries of research and judge the appropriateness of using this frame as a way to study larger phenomena (Collier and Mahoney 1996).

I have employed this focused lens as one would use a key to open a door; once the door is opened, the richness and complexity of the urban governance domain is revealed. Based on my

mentorship and discussion with students about their own research in international settings, and based on my own experience, I am aware of the difficulties of getting a handle on complex and interdisciplinary subject matter without the use of an analytic lens ‘key’. It is important to note that such a lens focuses the researcher’s initial approach to the subject matter, but does not, and should not, overly constrict the coverage of the research project over time. Thus, the researcher should confront the subject matter loaded with the specific knowledge of his/her disciplinary focus in order to open doors, but also should be armed with understandings of the case from multiple and diverse theoretical and practical viewpoints. This assures that once the researcher is ‘in the door’ that he/she will be capable of developing interpretations that connect these multiple perspectives. Within my focused disciplinary area, my expectations about what I might expect in case study research resembles more traditional hypotheses. In other disciplinary and theoretical areas that are outside my primary area of expertise, my approach resembles more that of grounded theory⁵, where I use the specifics of my findings to develop ‘upward’ those propositions and models that can account for observed patterns of government behavior and individual perceptions.

I have used urban planning as the main analytical lens in my research. Planning and urbanism is at the root of my academic training and disciplinary expertise. In addition, I find that the planning function of government, through its direct and tangible effects on ethnic geography, can clearly reveal the intent and role of a governing regime. Or, as stated by Foucault (cited in Wright and Rabinow 1982), “both architectural and urban planning, both designs and ordinary buildings, offer privileged instances for understanding how power operates.” Urban planning is only one form of intervention into the cityscape and some readers may view it as unnecessarily narrow in scope and mundane in exercise. I am also open to criticism that other urban activities—such as public education and urban policing—are more salient than urban planning. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a coherent analytical focus, I focus on planning-related and often land-based policies that structure opportunities and costs in contested cities, rather than on the maintenance of societal order through police and military force.

I have used the terms ‘urban planner’ and ‘urbanist’ in a way that broadly encompasses all individuals (within and outside government) involved in the anticipation of a city’s or urban community’s future and preparation for it. These concepts are far more expansive than that defined by the city (town) and regional planning profession, specifically. Within government, these terms are intended to include town and regional planners, urban administrators and policymakers, and national and regional-level urban policy officials. Outside government, they include community leaders, project directors and staff within nongovernmental, community or voluntary sector organisations, scholars in urban and ethnic studies, and business leaders.

I have focused on urban policies that have direct and tangible impacts on cultural and built local environments. These include land use planning, real estate development, economic development, reconstruction, housing construction and allocation, refugee relocation, capital facility planning, social service delivery, community planning and participation, and municipal government organisation. Urban policies affect the spatial, economic, social, and political dimensions of urban space. I investigate whether, and how, this urban effect can intensify or lessen intergroup hostility through its impacts on objective urban conditions, social-psychological aspects of urban group identity, and place-specific forms and dynamics of political resistance and mobilisation. These policies affect four specific types of conditions—territoriality, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity—that can

⁵ “Grounded theory” is a process of systematically generating theory from data; it does not begin data gathering with a strong set of theoretical presuppositions. It is particularly useful for unexplored topics where theory is not highly developed.

exacerbate or moderate inter-group tension (Gurr 1993, Stanovcic 1992, Burton 1990, Murphy 1989; Sack 1986):

Urban Ethnic Conditions

Territoriality/control over land: Settlement of vacant lands; control of settlement patterns; dispossession from land; return and relocation of displaced and refugee populations; control of land ownership; demarcation of planning and jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis ethnic settlement patterns.

Distribution of economic benefits and costs: Magnitude and geographic distribution of urban services and spending; allocation of negative and positive “externalities” of urbanisation.

Access to policy-making: Inclusion or exclusion from political process; formal and informal participation processes; presence and influence of nongovernmental organisations.

Group Identity: Maintenance or threat to collective ethnic rights and identity; education, language, religious expression, cultural institutions.

Urban policy most concretely affects the ethnic conditions of the urban environment through its significant influence on ***control of land and territoriality*** (Murphy 1989; Yiftachel 1992; Gurr 1993). Urban policies may seek to reify power and enforce control (Sack 1986). Two common techniques of territorial control amidst ethnic tension aim to (1) alter the spatial distribution of ethnic groups and (2) manipulate jurisdictional boundaries to politically incorporate or exclude particular ethnic residents (Coakley 1993.) Control over human settlement patterns can be exercised primarily through two functions of government—regulatory and developmental. In the first case, urban governments' designation of land use locations and densities on urban plans, and their granting of building permits, influence the rate and type of growth of opposing ethnic groups, and the extent of ethnic spatial mix. At the same time, existing residents can be internally resettled through such means as demolitions and land expropriations. Government also has the direct ability to support and facilitate new growth acting in its capacity of developer. In this case, government can publicly acquire urban land and then bring to bear several financial tools to subsidise development at locations and levels that it deems desirable or necessary. The combination of a government's regulatory and developmental efforts can significantly affect in a polarised city the demographic ratios between the two sides, change the scale of focus of planning efforts, and reinforce or modify the ethnic identity of specific geographic subareas.

Urban policy substantially shapes the ***distribution of economic benefits and costs*** and the allocation of urban service benefits (Yiftachel 1992; Stanovcic 1992; Gurr 1993). Urban land use and growth policies affect such aspects as the accessibility and proximity of residents and communities to employment, retail and recreation; the distribution of land values; and the economic spin-offs (both positive and negative) of development. The planning and locating of economic activities can significantly influence both the daily urban behavior patterns and residential distributions of ethnic groups. Economic nodes have the ability to either integrate or separate the ethnic landscape. Urban service and capital investment decisions—related to housing, roads, schools, and other community facilities—may be used to consolidate

intergroup inequalities across a polarised city's ethnic geography by distributing benefits and advantages disproportionately to the ethnic 'in-group'. Alternatively, urban spending can be directed disproportionately in favor of the subordinate or disadvantaged group in an effort to remedy past inequalities.

Urban policy and planning processes can have substantial effects on the distribution of local political power and *access to policy-making* (Yiftachel 1992; Stanovcic 1992; Gurr 1993). Models of conflict regulation commonly applied at national levels (summarised by O'Leary and McGarry 1995) help illuminate different participatory and political options at the city government level. 'Hegemonic control' by one ethnic group occurs when the opposing group is fully excluded from the political decision-making process. 'Third-party intervention' removes contentious local government functions such as housing, employment and services from control by either of the warring parties and empowers a third-party overseer to manage the urban region. Sometimes, in the case of Nicosia (Cyprus) the overseer may be the United Nations; in other cases, such as Belfast (Northern Ireland) for several decades, the urban manager was intended to be a distant yet benign government—Great Britain. 'Cantonisation' can occur through the devolution of some municipal powers to neighborhood-based community councils or boroughs, which would advise the city government on 'own-community' affairs. 'Consociationalism' is based on accommodation or agreement between political elites over a governance arrangement capable of managing ethnic differences. Aspects of conflict-accommodative government—such as power sharing, ethnic proportionality within the public sector, community autonomy, and minority vetoes—have been applied in certain bicultural urban settings (Brussels and Montreal). However, it is the model's emphasis on intergroup elites' interaction that has the greater applicability to deeply polarised cities. Even in hegemonically controlled cities, urban proximity and interdependence can often require of the dominating group that it be pragmatic and compromising on urban issues.

In circumstances where access to policy-making is substantially curtailed for one urban ethnic group, pressure for change often is redirected through nongovernmental channels. The web of nongovernmental and voluntary associations that deal with urban issues such as community development, land and housing, cultural identity, social service delivery and human rights protection constitutes a polarised city's 'civil society' (Weitzer 1990; Friedman 1991; Partrick 1994). This organisational web can be an important source of glue holding together a threatened or disempowered minority, providing access to international organisations and their funding, and advocating for change in the urban system through documentation, demonstrations and protests. A city government may affect positively the development and maintenance of such a civil society through the granting of direct funding or technical assistance to minority community organisations, or negatively through intimidation and restrictions on the receipt of capacity-building international funding for organisations operating within the contested city's boundaries.

The *maintenance of group identity* is critical to the nature of inter-ethnic relations in a polarised city. Each side in an urban system looks for breathing room in terms of group-based cultural expression and identity. Collective ethnic rights such as education, language, press, cultural institutions, and religious beliefs and customs are connected to potent ideological content. Exercise of their rights is often viewed by an out-group as a critical barometer of an urban government's treatment of their collective identity. In a polarised city, such group identity is reinforced through ethno-nationalist expressions in the urban landscape. These can include symbolic buildings linked to opposition political parties; administrative centers of pseudo-state activity; or murals and other graphic expressions of resistance and territoriality. For an urban

sub-group that feels threatened, psychological needs pertaining to group viability and cultural identity can be as important as territorial and material needs and can be enhanced or disrupted through urban policy and planning actions. Public policy, for instance, can affect important forms of ethnic expression through its influence on public education (particularly dealing with language) or through its regulatory control over the urban side-effects (such as noise) of religious observances. Urban service delivery decisions dealing with the location of proposed new religious, educational, and cultural institutions, or the closing down of ones deemed obsolete, can indicate to urban residents the government's projected ethnic trajectories of specific neighborhoods and can substantially threaten ethnic group identity.

These urban ethnic conditions of land control, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity are likely important influences on the degree of urban stability or conflict. Further, because they are influenced by local government decisions and policies, I suggest that these conditions can be important gauges of the extent to which a city's policies are progressing toward peaceful inter-group coexistence. Movement toward tolerance in a city can be indicated by increased flexibility or transcendence of ethnic geography, lessening of actual and perceived inequalities across ethnic groups, greater inter-ethnic political inclusion and inter-group cooperation, and growing tolerance and respect for collective ethnic rights. In contrast, signs of urban peace impedance include ethnic territorial hardening, solidification of urban material inequalities, an ethnic group's nonparticipation in political structures and cooperative ventures, a public sector disrespect of a cultural group's identity, and most palpably a continuing sense of tension, intimidation, and potential conflict on city streets and in political chambers.

Degree of Urban Stability or Conflict

Facilitation or impedance of movement toward co-existence: Decrease or increase in organised resistance and political violence; loosening or compartmentalisation of ethnic territoriality; lessening or widening of inter-ethnic disparities; greater or lesser political inclusion of all groups and inter-group cooperation; growing or eroding of respect for collective ethnic rights.

Urban policies are capable of both producing a widely shared sense of deprivation conducive to sustained communal resistance and providing a platform for the purposeful and rational actions of inflammatory ethnic group leaders. Because material grievance and political disenchantment can both contribute to urban instability, it is important for the urban scholar to detail the effects of government policies on the material and psychological states of urban residents, as well as on the characteristics of an out-group's community organisation and coherency of its political expression.

Constructing a Comparative Analytical Framework

Essential in the carrying out of effective comparative urban research is the development of a comparative analytical framework that can provide the scaffolding for making cross-case assessments and evaluations. I have found in my own research that this scaffolding is developed over time and emerges organically after engagement in several case studies. Although existing studies by others assisted me in identifying key criteria, the analytical framework I developed came out of making sense of the differences and similarities across diverse case study cities. The framework did not emerge full fledged and resolute, but was the

result of incrementally stumbling through comparative findings and has felt consistently like a work in progress rather than the final answer. Indeed, one of the significant benefits of using a comparative framework is not only the insights it provides to case study findings, but also the further questions it provokes by it feeling not complete in capturing the rich and complex dynamics of politically contested cities.

Amongst the myriad and multiple dimensions along which cities differ, I focus on the placement of urban regions along an ‘urban conflict-stability continuum’ as a way to provide the necessary comparative context. I place cities that I have investigated along this scale depending upon whether the city is experiencing active conflict, a suspended condition of static non-violence, movement toward peace, or urban stability/normalcy. Examining cities along such a continuum provides insight into the range of possible interventions by city governing regimes amidst inter-group differences.⁶ In placing cities along the continuum, I focus on a sole overriding criterion among multiple urban dimensions—the degree that active inter-group conflict over *root political issues* has been effectively addressed.⁷

CONFLICT—STABILITY CONTINUUM ***			
[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
ACTIVE CONFLICT >>	SUSPENSION OF >> VIOLENCE	MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE >>	STABILITY/NORMALCY
JERUSALEM	NICOSIA	BELFAST	JOHANNESBURG
	MOSTAR	SARAJEVO	BARCELONA
		BASQUE COUNTRY	

*** Defined by the degree that active inter-group conflict over *root political issues* has been effectively addressed

Category [1]

In these cities, hostility, antagonism, tension, and at times overt violence, exist between urban groups. This is so because the root political issues of the broader nationalistic conflict remain unresolved. In such a circumstance, the city becomes a flashpoint, platform, and/or independent focus of broader conflict. When there is such active urban conflict and a vulnerability of the urban arena to deeper nationalistic currents, urban policy and planning approaches will likely become rigid, defensive and partisan in efforts to protect the governing group in this unstable environment.

⁶ In terms of formal research design, the study of contested cities does not use a true ‘comparative case study’ approach where all the selected cases would be similar in societal conditions and only the type of urban intervention would vary.

⁷ The use of this continuum in no way implies that there exists a simple linear progression from conflict to post-conflict. Peace making and peace building are subject to fits and starts, regressions, and great uncertainty. John Darby (University of Ulster, Northern Ireland) speaks of peace processes as not climbing a mountain, but rather navigating a mountain range with complex and unexpected peaks and terrain.

Category [2]

In these cities, there is tenuous cessation or suspension of urban strife but not much more. A city is marked more by the absence of war than the presence of peace. After the ending of overt conflict, there will likely remain deep segregation or partitioning of ethnic groups in the city, local politics may persist in parallel worlds, and there may still be tension on the streets. This is because the legacies of overt conflict live on far past the duration of open hostilities themselves. In category [2] cities, however, this potential for inter-group differences to inflame violent actions is lessened somewhat due to a negotiated agreement between nationalist elites and/or intervention by a third-party mediator. Although this is a significant advance, suspension of overt conflict is only a starting point in urban peace-building and requires important steps in the future that bring positive changes to a city in the forms of tolerance, openness, accommodation, and democratic and open participation. Without these movements toward peace on the ground, a city will stagnate and be vulnerable to regressive violent and political acts.

Category [3]

In such cities, there are efforts to transform urban conflict geographies to peace-promoting ones and to use urban and economic development policies to transcend ethnic and nationalist differences. Decisions regarding the built environment, provision of economic opportunities, and delivery of public services are done in ways that create and promote urban spaces (both physical and psychological) of inter-group co-existence. Examples may include providing flexibility in the urban landscape to facilitate mixing of different groups if and when they desire it, creation of cross-ethnic joint planning processes, establishment of economic enterprises in areas that link different ethnic communities, provision of public spaces that bridge ethnic territories, sensitive oversight of the location of proposed development projects explicitly linked with one ethnic or religious group (churches, mosques, community centers), post-war reconstruction and relocation decisions that do not solidify war-time geographies, and provision of community and youth services in ways that bring children together so they can learn from each other.

Although category [3] cities show movement toward normalcy, local peace-building efforts remain experimental in the sense that full urban stability has not yet been reached. Remembrances of trauma and conflict remain below the surface, and they can be stimulated by local public policies that are not sufficiently sensitive to these scars. Up until the time when democracy is seen as the only game in town (category 4 cities), the movement of cities toward peace can be held hostage by the threat of political violence by paramilitary groups. Even when the threat is not actualised, the potential for such violence becomes part of the political debate in that city and society.

Category [4]

These cities represent a fundamental turning point where there is the consolidation of peace-building, a beginning in the transcendence of inter-group differences, and the undertaking of fundamentally new directions in urban governance and policymaking. An important threshold is passed when nationalistic and inter-group differences take place solely within political and legislative channels with no or little threat of a resort to political violence. Regarding urban development specifically, category [4] cities are more able than category [3] cities to enact policies that fundamentally redistribute the costs and benefits of city growth, reverse growth ideologies that guided the former governing regime, and imprint on the urban landscape values such as public access, equality, and democratic participation.

The urban conflict-stability continuum, as proposed, is not intended to be a comprehensive measuring tool but rather a useful heuristic model. It enables us to think about the differences across types of contested cities and what these differences mean for urban intervention and national peacemaking. Development of such a continuum is congruent with an important assessment by LSE's Crisis States Research Centre about "the value of examining the state's capacity to manage conflict across a spectrum, rather than through dichotomised categories." (Putzel 2003: 4). The use of such a comparative scaffolding enables the undertaking of cross-cutting policy analysis.

Positioning the case study cities conceptually along a conflict-stability continuum allows one to induce from the specifics of the cases a set of broader implications for the ability of cities to be local contributors to societal peace building. I posit that cities may be classifiable in terms of their vulnerability to conflict and that the potential for political conflict is related to the degree that active inter-group conflict over root political issues has been effectively addressed. Other measures of urban life would assuredly comprise an important part of a more comprehensive urban index of stability/instability (see list below). Yet, the parsimonious nature of the single-dimension scale is also a benefit.

Other Measures of Vulnerability to Conflict/Instability

Human Development: The United Nations tracks countries in terms of their human development (United Nations Development Programme 2002). It ranks countries in terms of their capacity to protect personal security (measured by the numbers of refugees and armaments, and victims of crime) and human and labor rights. Such measurement of urban refugees, crime, and inter-group relations would likely comprise an important part of a more comprehensive urban index of stability/instability.

Probability of Urban Terror: Another aspect of contemporary urban vulnerability is the increasing ability of terrorist groups to target cities worldwide. An attempt to measure cities in terms of their potential for this violence is Savitch and Ardashev (2001). This study uses three criteria—social breakdown, resource mobilisation, and target-proneness—to assess the probability for 40 major cities of experiencing terror. In subsequent work, Savitch (forthcoming) uses the Rand-Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database that documents over 12,000 terrorist incidents in more than 1,100 cities and towns since 1968. He finds a relationship between the urbane characteristics of cities and the evolution of urban terrorism.

Risk Factors and Processes of Urban Violence: Agostini, Chianese, French, and Sandhu (2007) theorise that risk factors combine in complex ways to create (1) a crisis of governance, (2) unequal access to economic opportunity, (3) economic decline, and (4) naturalisation of fear and insecurity, and that these processes lead to violent outcomes. Violence is viewed as the manifestation of distorted power relationships.

Global Peace Index: Ranking of countries in terms of their peacefulness and the drivers that create and sustain their peace. Measurement of peace is correlated to indicators of conflict, societal safety and security, and militarisation. Sub-indicators of societal safety and security include level of distrust in other citizens, magnitude of displacement, political instability, level of respect for human rights, and the rate of homicides and violent crimes. See <http://www.visionofhumanity.com/index.php>.

Countries at the Crossroads: This relates to the measurement of fragility and resilience of democracy in 30 countries that are emerging democracies, and which are therefore neither failed states nor clear beacons of democracy. Criteria consist of four ‘touchstones’ of democracy—accountability and public voice, civil liberties, rule of law, and anticorruption/transparency. See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>

Failed States: Indicators or predictors of state ‘failure’ (defined by four types of severe political instability) include the closed nature of the economic system, high infant mortality (as proxy for quality of life), and a lack of democracy (Esty et al. 1998). A subsequent study (Goldstone et al 2000) identified the following predictive factors—quality of life, regime type (character of political institutions), international influences and connections, and ethnic/religious composition of population.

Crisis States: The Crisis States Research Centre demarcates three sets of dichotomies dealing with societal conflict. ‘Fragile states’ are susceptible to crisis and have economic, social and political institutional arrangements that embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis (vs. ‘stable states’, wherein contestation remains within the boundaries of enact institutional settings). ‘Crisis states’ have institutions that face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict (vs. ‘resilient states’ wherein institutions are able to cope with conflict). ‘Failed states’ are ones where the state can no longer perform basic security and development functions (vs. ‘enduring states’ that are sustainable). (Crisis States Workshop, London, March 2006). See <http://www.crisisstates.com>

The uni-dimensional analytical comparative framework that I have employed both simplifies and complicates. Using a single criterion—the degree to which active inter-group conflict over **root political issues** has been effectively addressed—helps us situate the cities along the continuum in a meaningful way. At the same time, such uni-dimensional placement provokes us to question whether we have it right. For example, Johannesburg's placement at the right of scale should certainly be questioned. The momentous transformation from 'white-rule' to majority-rule democracy in the mid-1990s meant that the root causes of political conflict were effectively addressed. This places Johannesburg further to the right on the continuum than Belfast, Nicosia, and Jerusalem, where political root issues remain partially or fully unresolved. Yet, difficulties surely remain, including rampant crime and gross disparities in urban opportunities across race and income, which make it arguable that Johannesburg is properly placed. However, I am not alone in this favorable comparative assessment of South Africa; Sisk and Stefes (2005) point to its political transformation as holding important lessons for places like Northern Ireland and Bosnia.

Because they are further along the path toward political peace, Johannesburg policymakers have the space to consider and seek to remedy the gross and inhuman inequalities associated with state-sanctioned racial discrimination and state terrorism, and to confront the severe psychological pains and scars that permeate black South African society. Indeed, the South African 'peace' exposes a set of damaging and dehumanising urban effects of inter-group conflict; problems that are not addressed, or are actively suppressed, in Jerusalem, Belfast, and Nicosia because root political issues are either exacerbated through planning (Jerusalem) or have been bypassed (Belfast and Nicosia). The apparent irony on the surface—that non-political criminality is much higher in Johannesburg than in Jerusalem, Belfast, or Nicosia—illustrates the severe after-effects of decades of immoral state policies and that inevitable societal dis-equilibrium will linger far after negotiated agreements start a country and city down the road of 'peace'⁸.

Another seeming anomaly is my rightward place of Basque Country on this scale. The threat of political violence amidst an otherwise progressing and normalising society is a distinguishing characteristic of the Basque Country case study and would seem to locate this case behind cases such as Sarajevo and Belfast where political violence appears exhausted. Yet, the extent of innovation, dynamism, and engagement by urbanism that I found in the Basque Country suggests that urban interventions may be out-pacing the rate of political progress in the region overall. Compared to Basque Country, urban actions in Sarajevo and Belfast remain more constrained by ethnic-nationalistic political factors.

The comparative framework also presents us with difficult moral dilemmas. Sarajevo is further along the continuum toward peace than is Mostar. Yet, Sarajevo's relative manageability is due to it being now a city having a strong ethnic majority, compared to Mostar's status as a city of approximate and competitive demographic parity between antagonistic groups. The implications of this judgment are troubling for those that wish to advance peace-building in an urban environment. I assert, contrary to such implications, that the appropriate goal of urban peace-building is to manage competing group rights within the same shared urban system. Thus, any increase in the manageability of urban governance, such as in Sarajevo, that results due to the ethnic homogenisation of a city's population is sidestepping the larger society's need to genuinely accommodate different groups in a space

⁸ Post-apartheid Johannesburg is faced with the tripartite challenges of dealing with poverty characteristic of Third World cities, deepening social and economic inequality due to post-Fordist economic restructuring, and social exclusion of population subgroups often reinforced through institutions (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002).

of shared governance. This is another reason I place the Basque Country to the right of Sarajevo and Belfast. While Basque moderate nationalists and non-nationalists share the governance of Basque cities and engage in their collective enterprises, political boundaries created by the Bosnian peace agreement initiated processes that relegated Serbs and Croats to the sidelines of Sarajevo city governance. In Belfast, despite peacemaking advances at the national level, there has yet to develop a capacitated ethnically shared local governance of the city.

In terms of theoretical and conceptual development regarding the study of politically contested cities, misfits or paradoxes when locating cities along a comparative analytical measure can shape and stimulate further inquiries into the nature and dynamics of urban and national peacemaking. In this way, a comparative scaffolding not only makes sense of case study findings, but also provides footing for further theoretical advances and methodological choices as a research program progresses. For example, this scaffolding pinpointed for me the type of cities that it would be instructive to study in my second main round of field research in 2003-2004. The inclusion of Spanish city cases in my second phase research program came about because Spain's reputed transitional success in moving from authoritarianism to a functioning democracy attracted my attention as a likely "positive" example that would contrast with, and inform, the cases of more difficult transitions investigated in my earlier work. I also expected to find in my second phase, beyond a simple contrast between Spanish and Bosnian cases, intra-state variation (that is, within each country, one city will be more advanced along the continuum than the other). To the extent this would be true, it would provide an opportunity to study those attributes, independent of national context, which have caused certain cities to be further ahead as peace builders while other cities lag in this capacity. The Basque Country 'exception' (i.e., its long struggle with political violence) within an otherwise successful national case was ripe for study because it built comparative elements into the research design.

Lessons and Generalisability

I believe that extreme circumstances born out of necessity reveal ordinary truths about the capacity and limitations of urbanism and local governance; that unsettled urban contexts illuminate the basic relationships between urban policy and political power far better than in more mature, settled contexts when these relationships become obfuscated and of greater complexity. I have sought to fill gaps in the study of conflict by focusing on the local dynamics and outcomes of efforts to reconstitute sub-state societies and cities. Emphasis on the local arena enables a level of grounded specificity not found in studies of national-level constitutional and political reform (such as found in G. Gagnon and Tilly 2001; Lapidoth 1996; Newman 1996; O'Leary and McGarry 1995; Lijphart 1968; Nordlinger 1972). It facilitates a finer-tuned analysis of the practical, on-the-ground dimensions of building peace.

In some respects, cities that have gone through major societal disruptions and transformations may be said to be outlier cases. Far from being extraneous to the study of contemporary urbanity, however, such cities are central to debates about urbanism, democracy, and cultural diversity precisely because these challenges are fundamental to their future quality of existence. Lessons from such polarised cities have wide relevance in today's urban world. Indeed, the ethnic fracturing of many cities in North America and Western Europe owing to changing demographics, cultural radicalisation, and migration creates situations of 'public interest' fragility and cleavage similar to my case studies. In studying creative practical approaches toward difficult issues of cultural management, the study of grassroots peace

building in my study cities seeks to provide guidance to the many urban leaders and professionals who increasingly are struggling to address multiple publics and contrasting cultural views of city life and function. Because comparative work on conflicted cities exhibits high and urgent policy salience, dissemination strategies should be incorporated into these research projects that target beyond the academic community, producing policy-relevant condensed reports and summary memoranda geared toward practitioners and their professional networks.

Appendix 1

Sample of Multiple-case comparative studies of contested societies and cities (since 2000)

Darby and MacGinty. 2000. *The Management of Peace Processes*. London: MacMillan.

This book examines peace processes in Israel/Palestine, South Africa, the Basque Region, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland. It identifies factors that facilitate or block political movement in deeply divided societies.

Hepburn, Anthony. 2004. *Contested Cities in the Modern West*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Historic and contemporary studies of Danzig, Gdansk, Trieste region, Montreal, Brussels, Belfast, Jerusalem.

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2006. *Global Liberalism, Local Populism: Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Press.

Global dimensions of Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine conflicts.

Oberschall, Anthony. 2007. *Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence*. London: Routledge.

Dynamics of ethnic conflict and peace-building in Bosnia, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland.

Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Comparative assessment of more than forty countries that are classified as “weak”, “failed” and “collapsed” based, in part, on the intensity, duration, and explosiveness of intergroup differences. Project of the World Peace Foundation and Harvard University Program on Intrastate Conflict.

Horowitz, Donald L. 2003. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley: University of California.

Study of the structure and dynamics of ethnic violence, examining approximately one hundred and fifty riots in about fifty countries, mainly in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union

Charlesworth, Esther. 2006. *Architects without Frontiers: War, Reconstruction, and Design Responsibility*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Design and architectural aspects of post-war reconstruction in Beirut, Nicosia, Mostar.

Roeder, Philip G. and Donald Rothchild (ed.) 2005. *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Large-case analysis of power sharing and divided governance approaches after civil war. Case studies include: Lebanon, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, South Africa.

Agostini, Guilia, Francesca Chianese, William French, and Amita Sasdhu. 2007. “Understanding the Processes of Urban Violence: An Analytical Framework.” Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Develops an analytical framework for predicting outbreak and manifestations of urban violence, using Nairobi (Kenya), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Bogota (Columbia) as case studies.

Gidron, Benjamin, Stanley N. Katz, Yeheskel Hasenfeld. 2002. *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine*. New York: Oxford.

Provides an in-depth study of thirty-three peace and conflict organisations in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine.

Samman, Khaldoun. 2007. *Cities of God and Nationalism: Mecca, Jerusalem, and Rome as Contested World Cities*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Historical analyses of these three sacred cities across time, and their transformation by nationalism in the modern world. Argues that when these sacred places engage with the modern world, global political and economic forces exacerbate nationalism and regional divisions.

Kerr, Michael. 2006. *Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Comparative assessment of governance approaches in these two divided countries.

Pullan, Wendy. 2007-. *Conflict in Cities and the Contested State*. Economic and Social Research Council grant RES-060-25-0015. Wiltshire, U.K.: ESRC.

Ongoing research project studying everyday life and possibilities for transformation in Belfast and Jerusalem, together with five “linked cities” of Nicosia, Mostar, Berlin, Beirut, and Kirkuk. This spectrum of cities exemplifies various stages and experiences of peace and conflict. Intent of study is to understand how urban arenas shape, and are shaped by, wider conflict.

Appendix 2 - Research Issues (Expanded Outline)

Contextual Factors

<i>Ethnicity and legal frameworks.</i>	To what extent are deep ethnic cleavages acknowledged within the legal frameworks of urban policy and planning? Is differential treatment by ethnic group directly legislated? indirectly facilitated?
<i>Urban institutional differentiation.</i>	Is there ethnic-based differentiation of city and neighborhood institutions and organisations, or efforts to institutionally integrate competing ethnic groups?
<i>Basic values.</i>	Within each ethnic group, to what extent are there shared (or conflicting) values concerning ethnic issues across the participants in the planning process (politicians, administrators, planners, residents)?

Policy Issues and Goals

<i>Urban ethnic issues.</i>	What are the major urban manifestations of ethnic conflict? Is it possible to classify different types of urban symptoms based on their degree of conflict and/or potential for resolution?
<i>Treatment of ethnic conflict.</i>	Is amelioration of ethnic conflict acknowledged explicitly as an appropriate role for urban planning policy? If so, through what means is this amelioration to occur? Are issues of ethnicity depoliticised at the city level and through what means?
<i>The city's interest: policy goals and objectives.</i>	How is the public interest defined: as overarching or differentiated by ethnicity? To what degree do development goals and objectives differ between ethnic/racial communities?
<i>Citizen participation: processes.</i>	What is the quality of citizen participation in the formulation of policy? Are inter-group collaborative policy processes used? What are the characteristics of community organisations within contested urban environments?

Urban Decision-making

<i>Agenda-setting.</i>	How inclusive is the identification of alternative urban policies that might further city goals and objectives? In what ways do ethnic or ideological factors limit local policy and planning alternatives?
<i>Decision-making rules.</i>	What decision-making criteria are used to allocate urban services and policy benefits? (1) functional-technical; (2) partisan-ethnic; (3) proportionate-equity? Do these criteria differ by type of urban issue?
<i>Planning/policymaking roles.</i>	What is the practicality and effectiveness of planning in a polarised city? What combinations of strategies are used, and why? Are there alternative models of urban planning?
<i>Territorial policies.</i>	Do planners assert and attempt to enforce control over specific geographical areas? If they do, through what means? Is there the identification of neutral, or bicommunal, geographic areas? If so, for what purposes?

Policy Outcomes

<i>Implementation.</i>	Are policies modified during implementation to accommodate or combat conflicting ethnic needs? What discretion do administering entities have to modify policy to address ethnic realities?
<i>Results.</i>	What is the geographic distribution of urban spending and services across ethnic subareas of the city? ⁹
<i>National -local intergovernmental relations.</i>	Degree of national-local intergovernmental friction. Are there compromises available to integrate national and municipal perspectives?

⁹ For overall urban spending patterns and within specific service categories-- Land use/ plan designations; building permit approvals; housing construction; economic activities; transportation projects; other infrastructure; noxious facilities.

Conflict Outcomes and Mechanisms

Patterns of conflict

intensification (or amelioration).

To what extent do local policies intensify or lessen ethnic conflict? In what circumstances does urban policy lessen ethnic conflict? When does it intensify ethnic conflict or produce a breakdown in planning policy process?

Formal mechanisms

for reducing conflict.

What formal governmental mechanisms are present to mediate inter-ethnic differences over urban policy issues? To what extent is there use of concessions or inter-ethnic negotiated agreements?

Informal mechanisms

for reducing conflict.

What informal channels/modes of political contact exist to deal with minority grievances on practical urban matters? These channels allow minority to access government without having to recognise its legitimacy. What is the role of minority 'notables', and the role of heads of minority institutions?

Intra-ethnic effects.

Cross-cutting cleavages.

What are the effects of urban policy decisions on intra-relations? Mass versus elite differences? Differences between classes of like ethnicity? Between neighborhoods of like ethnicity? On what issues does support (or opposition) for urban policy cut across ethnic lines?

Community Dynamics and Organisation

Intersection of national

and local interests.

Within a single ethnic group, in what ways do national issues and political leaders influence the organisation and potential effectiveness of urban interests and initiatives? Conversely, is community activism in urban settings capable of influencing national-level discussions concerning sovereignty?

Community organisation

In a controlled environment

What survival techniques are available to community groups suppressed by a controlling government? What are the more effective means of expression under conditions of subordination?

Re-structuring community.

In times when greater autonomy is granted and/or a controlling regime is ended, how can communities and their leadership transform themselves from protest organs into productive co-partners?

Change and Evolution

Changes in planning strategies.

What changes, if any, have occurred in how ethnic factors are addressed in the urban aspects above: (1) city planning goals; (2) legal and institutional relationships; (3) urban decision-making rules; (4) planning roles and strategies; (5) conflict management strategies?

Change--underlying factors.

Are changes in planning strategies due to economic, political or ideological imperatives? Have changes been locally-inspired or imposed on city from external governmental levels?

Change--effect on ethnic conflict.

How have changes in planning strategies, if any, affected the level and nature of ethnic conflict in the urban region?

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