Conflict, Culture and the

Muslim Menace

(very much a) working draft – comments welcome

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Abstract:

This paper looks critically at the idea that the causes of violent conflict can be explained through a focus on innate human propensities rather than contingent social considerations. It traces the origins of this premise from Darwin's motor of natural selection and socio-biological accounts of conflict causality, before going on to discuss the rise of perspectives that place a similarly immutable emphasis on cultural determinants. It argues that the renewed salience of such culturalism has been extended and developed over the last decade or so to direct attention towards the apparently peculiarly threatening nature of Muslims and Islam.

Violence, Culture and the Muslim Menace

It is necessary in order to be able to hate the Jew – for one does not hate natural phenomena like earthquakes and plagues of locusts – that [he has] the virtue of freedom. Only the freedom in question is carefully limited. The Jew is free to do evil, not good; he has only as much free will as is necessary for him to take full responsibility for the crimes of which he is the author; he does not have enough to be able to achieve a reformation.[1]

Recently, there has, as Mark Duffield notes, been a growing tendency to see the violence of the non-Western "other" as rooted in 'the reappearance of ancient tribal hatreds and other forms of biocultural determinism'.[2] Sharpened by the supposed pointlessness of "new" forms of warfare overseas and the apparently growing "religious" flavour of Muslim militancy at home and abroad over the last decade or so, attention has moved away from political and economic explanations of motive (beyond avariciousness or mere recidivism) and towards an emphasis upon culture, ideology and

atavism. Despite the considerable influence over both international and domestic policy that these types of approaches have garnered, few studies have sought to explore the theoretical underpinnings and social implications of seeing violence, in general, and terrorism, in particular, in these limited terms.[3] This paper suggests that such culturalist interpretations have their roots in (and, to some degree, derive legitimacy from) the "natural" science of evolutionary biology and its, commonly implicit, commentary on race and culture. The result, it is proposed, is a hybridised vision of social action which, following the end of the Cold War, has become of paradigmatic salience in the image of non-Western "others" and their peculiarly violence proclivities. The paper then goes on to conclude that, while this culturalist discourse continues to operate as a means of explaining such violence outside the West and its primary function has been, particularly since the attacks on Washington and New York in 2001, to construct and maintain a connection between Muslims, Islam and violence and present this as the primary threat – both internal and external – to the West "itself".

INCOMPATIBILTY *INNATUS*

As Mahmood Mamdani has observed, the post-Cold War period has been 'marked by the ascendancy and rapid politicizing of a single term: culture'. Unlike other forms of usage, though, the contemporary discourse 'assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and it then explains politics as a consequence of that essence'. It is therefore 'no longer the

market (capitalism), nor the state (democracy), but culture (modernity) that is said to be the dividing line between those in favor of a peaceful, civic existence and those inclined to [participate in] terror' and violence.[4] This section argues that the construction of such a divide and its delimiting essence is derived, and seeks legitimacy, from "biologised" accounts of "human nature". It is suggested that that evolutionary narratives and the genetic and racial endowments they bequeath have been used to substantiate a Leitmotif in which innate (i.e. inborn) factors are said to maintain a determinative influence over individuals' relational environment and thus give rise to similarly immutable cultural features – of which violence and terrorism are pertinent and preoccupying examples.

The bedrock of this "biocultural determinism" (and, by extension, the ancient hatreds account of cultural pluralism looked at in the next section) is the Darwinian precept of organic adaptation; the proposal that an organism is embedded within a process of variation, transmitted between parent and offspring, which better equips it to function within its environment. The result is situation in which some individuals survive and breed more easily than others, thereby hereditarily reinforcing and developing the representation of certain genetic, and thus behavioural, characteristics in future generations. Aggression, including the use of violence, is held to be one such characteristic. In environments where the supply of food and mates is in short supply, aggressive animals are, it is suggested, more likely to live longer and produce (and protect) greater numbers of offspring. As a result,

violent conflict, along with other strategies, such as co-operation, migration and so on, evolved in a course of natural selection.[5]

Although Darwin was careful not to include humanity explicitly in his *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859), the fact that 'in the mid-nineteenth century, science, theology, philosophy, and social theory had not yet been severed from one another to form autonomous disciplines', meant that his biological theory quickly became 'a source of both scientific insight and scientized social philosophy'.[6] Indeed, in preparing his subsequent work, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), Darwin borrowed extensively from non-biological sources, including Thomas Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) and William Paley's *Natural Theology* (1802). He was also particularly influenced by his teacher, Charles Lyell, and his views on the inevitability of supremacist violence. Darwin's prediction that 'the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the savage races' is, for instance, a paraphrase of Lyell's conclusion that, since lower-order species 'have each slaughtered their thousands, why should not we, the lords of creation, do the same?'.[7]

This cross-fertilisation of ideas between the biological and social sciences persisted within the work of writers such as Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) who extended various and often-distorted renditions of Darwin's postulates – particularly the putative links between genetic endowment and behavioural proclivity – to Europe and the

United States. The result was a "biologising of ethics" in which 'notions of economics, demographics, politics and philosophy… began to revolve around a Darwinian centre'. In this way, Social Darwinism and its 'conviction that imperialism is a biologically necessary process which, according to the laws of nature, leads to the inevitable destruction of lower races' was 'taken up at every point along the political spectrum – from laissez-faire capitalism to communist collectivism to National Socialism'.[8] A general, still widely-held, conclusion emerged that aggression and violence are fixed patterns of behaviour caused by innate motor actions that render social conflict endemic to human society and thus cannot be eliminated other than by a change in genetic processes.

Attempting to affect such a change and thereby produce a society less subject to violent conflict led some writers to suggest that, by controlling reproduction and manipulating natural selection, it might be possible to produce characteristics that, in Darwinian terms, better suit individuals to their cultural environment – the existing power relations of the social order in which they live. In 1883, Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, formulised this as the new "discipline" of eugenics which, in a speech to the Sociology Society at the University of London in 1904, he defined as 'the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race'. While in Great Britain eugenics organisations were primarily concerned with preventing the "unfit" from having children by withdrawing welfare provisions (which were regarded as a distortion of natural selection

principles), equivalents within the United States took up Galton's work as a way of dealing with domestic racial conflict. In 1906, for instance, the Committee on Eugenics was established with the expressed aim of stemming 'the tide of threatened racial degeneracy' and protecting America against 'indiscriminate immigration, criminal degenerates, and race suicide'.[9]

Supported by luminaries such as John Maynard Keynes and Julian Huxley (the first director of UNESCO), a raft of literature appeared tackling a wide range of social issues – from the distribution of intelligence within society (the infamous Bell Curve Theory) to the causes of criminality and the purported benefits of selective sterilisation programmes (imposed in 27 American states (where at least 9,000 people were sterilised) as well as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany by 1935). By 1923, research had advanced sufficiently for Fairfield Osborn (President of the American Museum of Natural History from 1908 to 1933) to conclude that, in explaining the origins of violent conflict in many American cities, 'we have learned once and for all that the Negro is not like us'.[10] Although widespread revulsion at the use of such ideas during the Second World War acutely damaged the reputation of eugenics in particular and sociobiology in general, the gradual elucidation of DNA (as the psychochemical mechanism of heredity Darwin lacked) during the 1960s led to renewed interest in the link between race, violence and order and a return to the avocation of large-scale social engineering programmes. Francis Crick, for instance, suggested

reversible sterilisation and licensing 'people with the qualities we like' to bear children.[11]

A key reason for such "optimism" was DNA research's separation of genotypes from phenotypes (traits that are expressed in only a subset of the overall population). This implied a more developmentalist or "soft" form of inheritance in which environment and innate coding interact, prompting some writers to propose that, since behaving aggressively carries acute risks, the intensity of human conflict may vary with the nature of the environmental stimulus, rather than be simply motivated by an innate and constant drive. For instance, while people may, in keeping with higher primates, engage in territorial behaviour in response to a wide range of possible stimuli, greater aggressiveness is more probable when there exists an acute threat to individual fitness – most reliant on an adequate supply of material resources and potential mates. Extrapolating from studies of primate competition, it was thus concluded that a 'high population density always leads to an increase in aggressiveness and that this also occurs in humans'.[12]

As an additional caveat, such a tendency was claimed to be both more common and more intense amongst mammals that have already mated. Squirrels, for example, were found to be more likely to fight, rather than flee, when they had offspring and a nearby home. Dubbed the "territorial imperative" by Robert Ardrey, this is held to be apparent in human society too. Although others have plausibly pointed to matters of logistics, the

maintenance of technology and morale, more pressing economic interests and the familiarity of terrain as key determinants of civil wars' supposedly greater violence intensities, these writers claim that the drive to protect the collective gene-pool can fully account for why 'we fight most strongly for what we believe in, …[which is] most likely to be closely related to our home and our family… [as a] reproductively relevant resource'.[13]

At the collective level, the affiliation to in-groups, as the modern supra family, can, it is suggested, form a basis for tribal and national identities with considerable mobilising potential as inclusive fitness maximisation. This has been used to explain the nature of political competition in sub-Saharan Africa, the efficacy of organised religion and the urge for national self-determination. Pierre van der Berghe has, for instance, developed the notion of 'ethnic nepotism' in which racist sentiments can be explained by a genetically endowed propensity 'to react favorably toward other organisms to the extent that these organisms are biologically related to the actor'. Starting from the premise that 'ethnic groups can be perceived as extended kin groups', Tatu Vanhanen extends Berghe's work to hypothesise that 'the more ethnic groups differ from each other genetically, the higher the probability and intensity of conflict between them'. Having tested various measures of ethnic categorisation, he finds that the average probability of civil conflict is 52.87 for Asia, 58.44 for Africa and only 31.58 in Europe, leading him to conclude that, while 'ethnic nepotism is a part of human nature', the main source of conflict in the 'ethnically relatively homogeneous' societies of

western Europe is 'the pressure of immigration from poor parts of the world'.[14]

This naturalises concerns about social diversity by normalising the association of non-related individuals with competition, enmity and fear. Chauvinist prejudices are thus cast as understandable concerns over the presence of strangers, thereby providing 'an alibi for racism' by concealing the notion of the majority's moral superiority behind an afflatus of cultural purity.[15] Preventing our apparently innate distrust of the "other" from expressing itself violently is said to rest on an individual's assessment of five 'recognition markers': physical appearance, descent, language, homeland and religion. Since these are held to act as a hindrance to conflict, diverse societies – particularly those in which overcrowding accentuates "the territorial imperative" – are (despite frequently exhibiting high levels of stability and declining violent crime rates) predicted to be high on tension and low on reciprocity.[16]

Plainly, it is, as with the work of Darwin, impossible to divorce these "scientific" observations from moral commentary and social policy. Thomas Jackson, for instance, writes that the 'most obvious lesson' of Vanhanen's work is that the 'white nations of the world… are only planting the seeds of conflict when they permit large numbers of aliens into their countries' (2002: 12). After all, 'to do nothing while your ethno-racial group is destroyed' is, Michael Rienzi continues, as 'unnatural… [as] to do nothing while your

extended family is threatened'.[17] A key problem for this kind of reasoning is, however, that, even for a phenotypic subset of human activity, conflict, as a proportion of human interaction, is relatively infrequent. While individuals may have disputes with others quite regularly, aggressive behaviour is, for most people, quite unusual and violence is rarer still. Indeed, as Keith Webb observes, people in many parts of the world probably spend more time watching television than engaging in conflict, yet nobody is arguing that this is born of an innate propensity.[18]

Moreover, at the state level, the majority of countries have experienced, despite considerable rises in human population, a declining rate of warfare over the last few centuries. States' involvement in collective conflict does, in fact, appear to occur in historical pockets – compare, for instance, Sweden's militarism of the ninth and seventeenth centuries with its current (relative) passivity. Indeed, across the global system as a whole, this state-level variance may produce a pattern of large-scale wars which is broadly cyclical rather than deterministically constant. Attempting to disregard such contextualism, leads to important errors at the unitary level of analysis. The vagaries of Vanhanen's dataset, for example, oblige him to conclude that Estonia and Canada are more than twice as likely to enter a civil war as El Salvador and Algeria.[19]

Indeed, once these great variations are acknowledged, it is difficult to substantiate Vanhanen's conclusion regarding the link between violence and

"human nature". Rather than referring to a self-evident aspect of the individual psyche, this association is, as Keith Webb has noted, actually based upon a confused representation of the organic environment in which the "natural" is associated with an incongruous blend of pristine simplicity and uniform regularity. Infectious disease, insect plagues, drought and violence are, presumably, to be placed within this category while homosexuality, immunisation, peace, clothes, ungrateful children and selflessness are, despite the frequency with which they are observed, to be excluded. The arrantly normative nature of such a position clearly undermines much of this kind of work's claim to "scientific" neutrality.

To ground academic research upon the supposition that 'man is "only" or "merely" a more complex kind of animal' is, in fact, to ignore the fact that the things which 'essentially characterize the human species – moral behaviour, inventiveness, symbolism etc. – are so far divorced from anything observed in the animal world that any such comparison is foolish'.[20] For instance, humans can, uniquely, overcome the fight-or-flight mechanism and, in conscientious objection, choose a non-violent response which is neither surrender nor conflict. Similarly, other apparently evolutionary imperatives can also be surmounted. Sustenance requirements can be modified by dieting, fasting or, in hunger striking, conquered altogether. Sexual behaviour has become detached from procreative functions and can also be denuded or eliminated through solitude or celibacy. In reality, the only conclusion that can be drawn with any certainty is that people are likely to eat and to

fornicate and may also, but not uniformly, seek affection and occasionally fight. These rather acute limitations mean that, even if some social attributes are endowed hereditarily, they are so heavily overlaid with culture as to be no longer genetically driven.[21]

THE CONTEMPOARY OTHER

Culture has long been regarded as a possible 'counter [to the] individual selfish tendencies which biological evolution has continued to select as a result of… genetic competition'. Commonly, the relationship between social and the biological is repositioned thus: 'culture is created by the communal mind, and each mind in turn is the product of the genetically structured human brain. …The mind grows from birth to death by absorbing parts of the existing culture available to it'.[22] In this way, variance in human behaviour in general, and conflict in particular, becomes explicable by a complex interaction between the socially acquired and the natural – a position which has the happy corollary of absorbing all forms of social learning (thereby making nature and nurture debates commensurate) and thus resisting falsification. Such elasticity facilitates a more nuanced incorporation of cultural variance into the evolutionist rubric, thereby constituting less teleological models of human behaviour and responding to the severe criticisms that more rudimentary determinism has attracted.[23]

It also helps to resolve a key contradiction: 'how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?'. To answer this, Darwin's story of selective pressures upon our ancestors is recast as a vindication of the utility of co-operation and reciprocity (initially suggested by Richard Leaky in the 1970s). Along with aggression, these cultural patterns have also apparently become 'embedded to some degree in our genetic make-up' thereby divorcing the demarcation of in-groups and out-groups from the relational environment and entrenching the 'xenophobic principle… [with]in virtually every group of animals displaying higher forms of social organization'.[24] In this way, racism and prejudice are transformed into "normal", biologically-derived aspects of delimited altruism. As Samuel Huntington notes, 'north African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased [sic] receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles'.

The idea that 'a high immigration rate means, in general, a lower relatedness between individuals, which in turn means less altruism and more competitiveness', is thus importantly moderated by cultural (or for Huntington civilisational) perceptions of group affiliation to the supra family which are, themselves, 'controlled primarily by the values, norms, or duties imposed by the sociocultural structure… distantly related to the basic propensities of individuals on which natural selection operated'.[25] In this way, culture 'reinforces human tendencies… to engage in an unusual (and unusually ferocious) group-against-group competition. …[It] alone leads

frequently to imbalances that make such all-out aggression apparently profitable'. So since conflict causality is seen as innately embedded in the cultures of the protagonists, it must be treated in isolation from political or economic concerns.[26]

Here, the maxim that 'neither a democratic nor a capitalist economy is conceivable apart from certain cultural and moral habits' has led to the view that 'the ideologies of many Third World states are more supportive of war than ideological beliefs held elsewhere'. Whereas the West has 'assimilated the social ideas and attitudes of peace... [i]n the Third World, …religious, ethnic, and political hatreds persist'. Indeed, of the 29 countries identified by Albert Somit and Steven Peterson as having successfully developed structures of protecting inclusive fitness, only four are from the South and only Botswana is from Africa.[27] By highlighting the 'vital importance of cultural closures and traditions for the accumulation of individual aptitudes, and, most importantly, the "natural" bases of xenophobia and social aggression', this, as Etienne Balibar observes, reintroduces the older idea that 'the historical cultures of humanity can be divided into two main groups, the one assumed to be universalistic and progressive, the other supposed irremediably particularistic and primitive'. As such, he continues, a 'return of the biological theme is permitted… within the framework of cultural racism' which simultaneously 'closes off any path towards real development… while directly coinciding at points with the political objectives of an aggressive neo-liberalism'.[28]

Within the sub-state groups of the Balkans, for instance, it was, according to this reasoning, all but inevitable that a shift in geo-political power, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, would release 'a scramble for turf between… the inheritors of Rome, Byzantium and Islam' motivated by 'ancient political feuds as antagonistic and passionate as ever'.[29] These were, apparently, a result not of contemporary inculcation, but of the 'defrosting' of innate animosities which Moscow-backed regimes had 'officially suppressed but never fully extinguished'.[30] Once awoken from this 'communist-inspired sleep', large-scale violence was 'inevitably resurgent given the almost genetic propensity to violence of the Balkan peoples'.[31] Despite the fact that, in 1991, 34 per cent of all Sarajevo's marriages were multiethnic and 85 per cent of Serbia's reservists refused to be called up for military action, commentators concluded that the Balkans is 'a region of pure memory' where it is 'only a matter of time' before grievances flare up. Such thinking can, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, only lead to the conclusion that 'the people of central and eastern Europe will go on living in countries… inspired by xenophobic nationalism and intolerance' (1997: 6).[32]

On a broader canvas, the logic of inherent incompatibility prompted Samuel Huntington to give expression to Orientalism's long-held fear that the subaltern may unite to create a world in which 'the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural'. While each of the nascent blocs he identifies as potential sources of contention

('Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possible African civilizations') are characterised as potentially threatening, 'his (and, arguably, the American people's) favorite future foe: Islam', as the archetypal and global exemplar of atavism, is dwelled upon the longest.[33] The widely accepted, though probably inaccurate, identity of the terrorists responsible for the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 pushed the world's media towards Huntington's paradigm which was, according to Ervand Abrahamian, 'automatically, implicitly and unanimously adopted' in the United States (thereby sending his book to the top of the bestseller list – even now, in mid-2007, it remains in *Amazon*'s top 4,000 (out of more than 2 million titles)).[34] Overlooking the fact that the attacks did not include a cultural target (the World Trade Centre, the White House, the Pentagon were chosen as bastions of economic, political and military power, but Disneyland was ignored), President Bush described the events as 'a threat to civilization and our way of life' – a sentiment echoed by Prime Minister Blair's characterisation of the London bombings of 2005 as 'an attack on our values'.[35]

Such violence is thus depicted and analysed as a product of an immutably truculent worldview which is, itself, an extension of the innate aggression of the incompatible non-Western "other". Of whom, Muslims are (in a 'view formed in the two centuries of so after 1100, and which has been modified only slowly since') seen as amongst the least able to accept the "natural" order of Western leadership – or what Darwin considered the inevitability of

the civilised races exterminating and replacing the savage races. As Paul
Kennedy explains,

> Far from preparing for the 21st century, much of the Arab
> and Muslim world appears to have difficulty in coming to
> terms with the 19th century. …If one needed an example of
> the importance of cultural attitudes in explaining a society's
> response to change, contemporary Islam provides it.[36]

Muslim participation in violent conflict is therefore to be understood not as a
consequence of material considerations, but as a 'vehement rejection of
Western culture' and its virtues of 'freedom, democracy, tolerance and
diversity' born of a retrogressive desire to denude the 'secular, scientific,
rational and commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment'.[37] It is not,
in other words, a reaction to political or economic conditions, but a product
of Muslims' singular and invariably bellicose cultural reference point – the
reactionary tents of Islam – which, as 'an archaic form of devotion [and] a
contemptible failing in sophistication and skill', inevitably leads its adherents
'to a sensation of utter futility'. Consequently, it is logical to conclude that
'terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is *Islamic* in nature'.[38] Al
Qa'eda is therefore not only viewed as a body of armed activists, but also as a
set of ideas that 'are not theological outliers' (as the vast majority of Muslim
clerics claim), but part of 'a revivalist social movement'.[39]

It is this – the immutable cultural threat to the security of the West – which
represents 'the most important narrative of "Islamic terrorism"'.[40] In an echo
of socio-biological discourses on immigration, cultural diversity is depicted as
a menace to majority values and an important cause of domestic conflict. As

before, 'the pivotal articulation of danger' is 'the decivilising representation of the enemy as "alien, subversive, dirty or sick"'. Particularly alarming for writers such as Daniel Pipes (a former director of the United States Institute of Peace) is the prospect of a 'massive immigration of brown-skinned peoples… cooking strange food… [and] not exactly maintaining Germanic standards of hygiene'. Amongst these, the most threatening is, he continues in a more recent article, 'Islamists' – all of whom share, despite a 'stubborn record of illiteracy, poverty, intolerance, and autocracy', a singular 'ambition, which is what they call the "Islamization" of America' and the wider West.[41] Since, according to Greg Austin, former Director of the *Foreign Policy Centre*, these "'*jihadists*'" can be found in almost any place that Muslim communities can be found', it is unclear how long the Western polity, once rendered 'truly multicultural and pervaded with an internal clash of civilizations, will …survive as a liberal democracy'. In its place, President Bush suggests, Muslim extremists aim to develop, through the 'demented logic of the fanatic', a cultural programme intended to 'impose a grim vision in which dissent is crushed, and every man and woman must think and live in [a] colorless conformity' where 'women are whipped, and children are schooled in hatred and murder and suicide'.[42]

Indeed, it is this shift from the subjectivist acceptance of terrorists' own claims about their motivations to the objectivist ascription of such postulates to the Muslim world as a whole which, in place of adequate evidence, substantiates the belief that Al Qa'eda is a coherent and hierarchic

organisation with a global support network of 'some 100 to 150 million persons worldwide' and a further 350 to 400 million sympathisers. Backed up by leporine birth rates (which, according to Huntington, threaten to reduce the West to 'a miniscule and declining part of the world's population'), "Islamic terrorism" is thus vaunted as 'capable of devastating destruction worldwide' in pursuit of an overall objective of 'uniting all Muslims into one state, and dominating the world'.[43] By combining demographics with the prospect of collective violence in this way, Huntington and others 'follow a long line of literature forecasting ominous consequences from Muslim fecundity'. Inter-war eugenicists, for instance, did not limit their concerns simply to the dangers of racial mongrelization' and the dilution of the 'blood of a nation', but also spoke of the cultural hazard to the West's 'Nordic spirit' from the 'strong sexual appetites… [and] slipshod, easy going existence' of the 'average Oriental'. Today, Muslim natality is, as before, said to supply 'ready recruits for opposition causes', particularly 'Islamic fundamentalism', which, since the early 1980s, has, according to the CIA, offered 'the principal ideological haven for Muslim youth'.[44]

This contrasts sharply with the fertility ratios of what Bruce Bawer calls 'native Western Europeans' which, at between 1.2 and 1.8, is insufficient to redress Muslims' current 16-20 per cent share of the continent's children. For Bawer, these 'marauding kids don't reject their parents' values – in all too many cases, they embody them.' These may be summed up as 'a primitive cult of honour' in which 'pluralism, tolerance, and sexual equality are alien

and immoral. They see Western society as the enemy, European men as wimps, European women as sluts. … [I]t's little wonder that gang violence and mayhem are a growing problem across the continent'.[45] In Britain, where, Melanie Phillips claims, 'the promotion of Islam in Britain [has] bec[o]me fused with an agenda of murder', the Muslim youth bulge has apparently produced a 'lethal and many-headed hydra' of up to 16,000 individuals who are 'actively engaged in or support terrorist activity' aimed at 'the historic core of Western liberty'. To 'halt the drift towards social suicide', the British government should, Phillips suggests, retreat from liberal multi-culturalism and expel illegal Muslim immigrants, bolster the state's executive powers by withdrawing from human and refugee rights conventions, effect the immediate repatriation of 'foreign radicals', close 'extremist mosques' under treason legislation and reintroduce Christianity into school assemblies. As Patrick Buchanan (having lauded the British National Party's success in 'concentrat[ing] British political minds wonderfully') points out, without such a 'revival of faith or a great awakening, Western men and women may simply live out their lives until they are so few they do not matter'. [46]

Clearly, then, the identification of the contemporary Muslim "other" differs from previous scapegoating exercises. The 1942 internment of 120,000 Americans of Japanese descent under President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066, for instance, owed more to Victoriana racial profiling techniques than to assessments of volitional ideological association or criminal inclination. This is also true of the United States' 'War on Drugs' which, Chrystie

Flournoy Swiney observes, has used similar methods to detain members of the Hispanic and Afro-American communities (despite yielding evidence in only 10 and 8 per cent of cases respectively – compared to 17 per cent of detained white suspects). Increasingly, the cultural has, as concerns over 'religious beliefs began to surface, thus affecting a new minority population, namely Arabs, Muslims and those perceived as either', become an equally profound marker of difference and potential criminality as race. According to Phillips, there has, for example, there has 'never been any trouble with Lebanese Christians [in Sydney.] …It was the Muslim community that for years had been giving rise to a major problem of aggression'. [47]

Unlike the concerns over Asia's "yellow peril", Hispanic "narco-gangsters" or what Chuck D called "the fear of a black planet", the immutable menace of the Muslim "other" is not easily amenable to the types of "recognition marker" propounded by socio-biologists. The arrests of John Walker Lindh (a white American), Richard Reid (an Afro-Caribbean citizen of the United Kingdom) and the overarching universalism of Islam demonstrate that the West's supposed fifth column is too diverse to be properly specified and cannot be adequately policed via established racial profiling techniques. Targeted responses have thus given way to a programme of mass incarceration (dubbed 'preventive detention' by Attorney General Ashcroft) based on denunciation and large increases in state surveillance. Especially focussed upon have been the 'the sheiks and imams in the hundreds of Wahhabi and Shi'ite mosques in America [who have, apparently,] reinforced

the incantation of jihad, and supported a community of fundamentalist believers in which the terrorists could immerse themselves'. To do this effectively, Françoise Debrix notes of the new security agenda, 'the USA will have to win the ideological battle. …[It] will require not just the destruction of "Muslim/Arab/Middle Eastern" lives, but also the erasure of Islam as an idea, an ideal and a religion'. As Michael Ledeen, a former special advisor to Secretary of State Haig, concludes, 'we [the USA] will therefore need to demonstrate that radical Islamism is a road to humiliation and defeat, not a pathway to glory'.[48] To do this (and to prevent Muslims' antithetical and immutable culture from further diversifying racially), a robust restatement of American values is deemed to be necessary – what Samuel Francis called 'the reconquest of the United States… [leading to] the supremacy of whites in a cultural sense'. After all, it is only majority culture of the United States which, Victor Davis Hanson claims, has, in the history of humanity, made any significant effort 'to ameliorate the savagery innate to all peoples at all times'.[49]

Such hyperbole is, once the 'collective fantasy of a barbaric anti-modern assailant' is accepted, grounded upon the reification of the cultural. The freedom of the "other" to specify both determinant and purpose autonomously is, as the quotation from Sartre at the start of this paper illustrates, constrained within exogenously defined limits. In this sense, the process of "otherisation" rests upon the devolvement of a circumscribed form of liberty in which the political and the economic (or what Mamdani

called the state and the market) are replaced by a reinterpretation of the "other's" cultural heritage as immutably at odds with the "self". 'For', as Fanon explains, 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. …[He] has been given two frames of reference within which he has to place himself'. Proposed as the defence of the Western "self", this bifurcation has its roots in colonisation – the period when, for Fanon, the "other's" 'customs and the sources upon which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself upon him' – but is, perhaps more pertinently, recreated the 'reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises' which marks out the era of post-colonialism.[50] The complexities of the contemporary melting pot mean that being different is not simply looking different (as an outcome of genetic endowment) but is also thinking and acting differently. Consequently, anthropological tabulation is an inadequate classificatory tool (a fact noted by Houston Stewart Chamberlain almost a century ago) and de facto inferiority therefore cannot be presented as self-evident. Rather, it must be substantiated through the construction of an incommensurate distinction between black and white, Jew and gentile, Muslim and non-Muslim. To paraphrase Sartre, then, it is necessary, in order to hate the "other", to constrain his or her actions within redefined, immutable and binary cultural boundaries.

To achieve this delimitation in the case of the Muslim "other", it is imperative to maintain an association between Muslims' behaviour and an objectified worldview that 'carries with it an image of Islam as a "conception of the world" which is incompatible with Europeanness and an enterprise of universal ideological domination'.[51] It is thus "our values" and "our way of life" which is being challenged, not "our" economic and political policies. When, for instance, *Al-Jazeera* reported Al Qa'eda's claim that their motive was the pursuit of the 'eighty-year war' in Palestine, they were advised by the White House not to broadcast such 'inflammatory propaganda' and forced to edit future pieces to bring them more in line with the idea its attacks represent a 'nihilistic subculture' leading an 'assault on civilisation'. Concurrently, 'English versions of the al-Qaida statements' which are, in Susan Bassnett's words, 'the opposite of what was intended' have been vigorously disseminated. Through the arbitrary, and sometimes ideological, use of rhetorical convention and editorial licence (as well as inaccurate translations due to a shortage of non-Muslim (Muslims are generally considered to irredeemably untrustworthy) Arabic speakers), an apocalyptic tone is created which, Bassnett continues, 'reinforces the stereotype of the fundamentalist as in direct conflict not just with a particular political enemy, but with modernity itself'.[52]

CONCLUSION

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This paper has traced the rise to prominence of what may be termed the "new culturalism". It has argued that, while accounts focussed on ethnicity continue to be embraced by the political right, the premise of the 'intractability of cultural difference[ ] now plays the classificatory role that biological difference once did'. Importantly, though, this 'is always related to a notion of biological racism to the extent that the culture of groups is naturalized in terms of some notion of inferior versus superior nature'.[53] In constituting a 'stigmata of otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices [and so on])', culture can, by 'locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy… that is immutable and intangible in origin …also function like a nature'. Grounded upon the supposition that 'the "knowledge" sought and desired by the masses is an elementary knowledge which simply justifies them in their spontaneous feelings or brings them back to the truth of their instincts', it serves to substantiate the idea 'that the metropolitan culture is different from the ethnic minorities' culture' and that this difference is best 'understood in an absolutist, essentialist sense'.[54]

Understandings of the violence of the "other" (both the internecine warfare of the "non-West" and the terrorism/civil disorder which the "other" visits upon the West) have, as a consequence, become 'explicable simply by reference to the narcissism of violence'. In some cases, this is apparent in the absurdity of presenting Africa as a place where 'torture is exciting, rape is fun, and looting is profitable'. In others, it is an assumed and un-stated given from which analysis proceeds. Micro-studies of social ritual, broader

narratives emphasising the revenge of history and economic studies of wartime commercial activity are frequently presented without giving an account of what caused the conflict at the heart of the matters under discussion. They, and other features of war, are, as Cooper continues, seen as an integral part of 'perpetually recidivist societies' that cannot be explained and from which the West must protect itself through a combination of isolationism and the 'imposition of imperial order'.[55]

Herein lays the true of efficacy of the new culturalism. In accepting that the search for successful multi-ethnic societies is futile, it offers an account of the causes of violence which does not implicate outside forces while conterminously legitimising inaction or aggression. After all, if conflicts 'are understood as no more than settled history or human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is noting that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except repress or ignore such struggles'. As Richard Jackson observes of the current war on terror:

> denying the rational political demands of insurgent groups, demonizing them as fanatics and essentializing them as violent, irrational, savage and fanatical, the 'Islamic terrorism' discourse normalizes and legitimizes a restricted set of coercive and punitive counter-terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear inconceivable and nonsensical.[56]

In their place, it is proposed that 'incentives must be introduced to foster and protect inclusive fitness priorities' and obstruct at least some of the ineludible

violence that diversity produces. It is reasoned that, 'if insurmountable cultural difference is our true "natural milieu", …then the abolition of that difference will necessarily give rise to defensive reactions, "interethnic" conflicts and a general rise in aggressiveness'. Lying at the heart of this – what Etienne Balibar calls a 'second position racism' – are thus 'not mystical heredity theorists, but "realist" technicians of social psychology' who, in 'mimic[ing] the way in which scientific discursivity [sic] articulates "visible facts" to "hidden causes"', seek to naturalise 'not racial belonging, but racist conduct' by inventing, maintaining and disseminating the idea that 'tolerance thresholds', resolutely reinforced by firm regime structures, are necessary to ensure adequate distance between society's ineluctably discrete entities.[57]

It is unsurprising, then, that a perennial preoccupation of proponents of culturalist determinants is a call for an omnipotent leviathan to mitigate humanity's 'restless desire for power'. It was, for instance, voiced by Hobbes in the seventeenth century and, in 1997, by Somit and Peterson, who called on Washington to impose 'a national policy of democratic indoctrination' aimed at alleviating a litany of American ills born of individuals' innate propensities. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong reach the similar conclusion that, at the international level, a 'world government [or] some management force' imposed by 'a conquest state' will be necessary to save humanity from its innately conflictive inclination and impose a 'truly monumental' re-education programme 'at least over the next few generations'.[58]

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NOTES

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[1] JP Sartre, **Anti-Semite and Jew** (trans. GJ Becker), New York: Schocken Books, 1976, p. 39.

[2] M Duffield, **Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security**, London: Zed, 2001, p. 18.

[3] This may be due to the racial component of this literature which, in invoking 'a history that discomfits whiteness through its provocation of responsibility and guilt', frequently tends to engender a 'determining silence' from the West's intellectual classes who are, of course, disproportionately made up of Caucasian men (U Kothari, 'An Agenda for Thinking about "Race" in Development', **Progress in Development Studies** 6, 2006, pp 20-21; S White, 'Thinking Race, Thinking Development', **Third World Quarterly**, 23, 2002, p. 407).

[4] M Mamdani, **Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, The Cold War, and the Roots of Terror**, New York: Doubleday, 2005, pp 17-18.

[5] P Bateson, 'Is Aggression Instinctive?', in **Aggression and War: Their Biological and Social Bases**, J Groebel and R Hinde (eds), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 36. As John Calvin might have put it, people are not sinners because they sin, but rather people sin because they

are sinners. The innateness of the human propensity for conflict makes, in other words, violence an inevitable aspect of social interaction – an idea that is sustained both by the seemingly intractable and barbaric nature of contemporary terrorism and warfare and the hard, "factual" aura of sociobiology's scientism.

[6] H Kaye, **The Social Meaning of Modern Biology: From Social Darwinism to Sociobiology**, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction, 1997, pp 15-16.

[7] S Lindqvist, **"Exterminate All the Brutes": One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide**, New York: New Press, 1996, pp 107, 130, 160.

[8] J P Rushton, 'Ethnic Nationalism, Evolutionary Psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory', **Nations and Nationalism**, 11, 2005, p. 491. See also G Jones, **Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction between Biological and Social Theory**, Brighton: Harvester, 1980 and J Moore, **The Post-Darwinian Controversies**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[9] B Mehler, 'Sources in the Study of Eugenics #2: the Bureau of Social Hygiene Papers', **The Mendel Newsletter**, 16, 1978. Archival Resources for the History of Genetics & Allied Sciences. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ferris edu/isar/archives/sources/bsh htm> accessed 19 June 2005.

[10] D Kevles, **In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Use of Human Heredity**, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 106; S Gould, **The Mismeasure of Man**, New York: Norton, 1996, p. 231.

[11] E Allen et al, 'Sociobiology: Another Biological Determinism', **BioScience** 26, 1976; D Fleming, 'On Living in a Biological Revolution', **Atlantic** 223, 1969; G Wolstenholme et al, 'Eugenics and Genetics: Discussion', in **Man and His Future**, G Wolstenholme (ed), Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1963, p. 295.

[12] J Van Dijck, **Imagenation** [sic]: **Popular Images of Genes**, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 150; J Freedman, A Levy, R Buchanan and J Price, 'Crowding and Human Aggression', **Journal of Experimental Social Psychology**, 8, 1972, p. 530.

[13] R Ardrey, **The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations**, New York: Kodansha America, 1997; B Bueno de Mesquita, **The War Trap**, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1981; D Barash, **Sociobiology: The Whisperings Within**, London: Souvenir Press, 1980, pp 173-174.

[14] P van den Berghe, **The Ethnic Phenomenon**, New York: Praeger, 1987, p. 217; T Vanhanen, 'Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: a Comparative Analysis', **Journal of Peace Research**, 36, 1999, pp 57-58; T Vanhanen, **Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism**, Stamford CT: JAI Press, 1999, p. 109.

[15] A Kundnani, 'In a Foreign Land: The New Popular Racism', **Race & Class**, 43, 2001, p. 50.

[16] R Shaw and Y Wong, **Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism and Patriotism**, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 110. In the United States, for instance, there have been large decreases in crime rates during the last 30 years – a period of growing social diversity (J Trumpbour, 'The Clash of Civilizations: Samuel P Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of Post-Cold War World Order', in **The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy**, E Qureshi and M Sells (eds), New York, Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 126).

[17] T Jackson, 'The Anatomy of Ethnic Conflict: Finally a Scientific Look at "Diversity"', **American Renaissance**, 13, 2002, p. 12; M Rienzi, 'What the Kurds can Teach us: Whites must Learn the Importance of Inclusive Fitness', **American Renaissance**, 13, 2002, p. 14.

[18] K Webb, 'Science, Biology and Conflict', **Paradigms,** 6, 1992.

[19] J Levy and C Morgan, 'The Frequency and Seriousness of War: An Inverse Relationship', **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, 28, 1984; R Vayrynen, 'Global Power Dynamics and Collective Violence', in **The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States**, R Vayrynen, D Senghaas and C Schmidt (eds), London, Sage, 1987; Vanhanen, 'Domestic Ethnic Conflict', pp 69-70.

[20] Webb, 'Science, Biology and Conflict', pp 79-83.

[21] M Segall, 'Cultural Factors, Biology and Human Aggression', in **Aggression and War**, p. 173.

[22] D Campbell, 'On the Conflict between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition', **American Psychologist**, 30, 1975, p. 1115; E Wilson, **Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge**, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998, pp 127-128.

[23] For example, the Seville Statement on Violence of 1986, signed by twenty scientists from twelve countries and from a wide range of disciples, underlined this basic truism and helped to modify some of sociobiology's more deterministic accounts of violent conflict. It declared that we have not 'inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors', that 'war or any other violent behavior is not genetically programmed into our human nature', that it is 'incorrect to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behavior more than for other kinds of behavior, that it is 'incorrect to say that humans have a "violent brain"' and that war is not 'caused by "instinct" or any single motivation' (J Groebel and R Hinde, 'Preface', in **Aggression and War**, p. xi). Subsequent work (such as Albert Somit and Steven Peterson's 1997 book, **Darwinism, Dominance and Democracy: The Biological Bases of Authoritarianism**, of which the first chapter is entitled 'Prologue to a Predictably Unpopular Thesis') has tended to display a greater reticence and to acknowledge the acute intellectual disrepute of much of this kind of writing (Westport CT: Praeger).

[24] E Wilson, **Sociobiology: The New Synthesis**, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp 3, 249; R Leaky and R Lewin, **Origins**, New York: Dutton, 1977, p. 125; A Somit, 'Humans, Chimps and Bonobos: The Biological Bases of Aggression, War and Peacemaking', **Journal of Conflict Resolution,** 34, 1990, p. 562.

[25] S Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', **Foreign Affairs**, 72, 1993, p. 23; Barash, **Sociobiology**, p. 174; R Hinde, 'Aggression and War: Individuals, Groups and States', in **Behaviour, Society and International Conflict Vol III**, P Tetlock, J Husbands and R Jervis (eds), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 49.

[26] U Melotti, 'In-Group/Out-Group Relations and the Issues of Group Selection', in **The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism**, V Reynolds, V Falger, and I Vine (eds), London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp 101-102.

[27] M Novak, 'Rediscovering Culture', **Journal of Democracy**, 12, 2001, p. 169; S David, 'Why the Third World Still Matters', **International Security**, 17, 1992, p. 138; Somit and Peterson, **Darwinism, Dominance and Democracy**, p. 42.

[28] E Balibar, 'Is there a Neo-Racism?' (trans. C Turner), in **Race, Nation, Class: Ambigious Identities**, E Balibar and I Wallerstein, London, Verso, 2002, pp 25-26.

[29] F Ajami, 'The Summoning', **Foreign Affairs**, 72, 1993, p. 7; C Gati, 'From Sarajevo to Sarajevo', **Foreign Affairs,** 71, 1992, p. 65.

[30] A Wimmer, 'Introduction', in **Facing Ethnic Conflict: Towards a New Realism**, A Wimmer, R Goldstone, D Hotowitz, U Jones and C Schetter (eds), Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 3; D Snow, **Uncivil Wars: International Security and New Internal Conflicts**, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 38.

[31] Robert Kaplan cited in J Mueller, 'The Banality of "Ethnic War"', **International Security,** 25, 2000, p. 44; P Finney, 'On Memory, Identity and War', **Rethinking History**, 6, 2002, p. 2.

[32] C Enloe, **Manoeuvres: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives**, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2000, p. 142; R Kaplan, 'History's Cauldron', **Atlantic Monthly** 267, 1991, p. 104; E Hobsbawm, **On History**, London: Abacus, 1997, p. 6.

[33] Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', pp 22, 25; D Welch, 'The "Clash of Civilization" Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon', **Security Studies**, 6, 1997, p. 198.

[34] E Abrahamian, 'The US Media, Huntington and September 11', **Third World Quarterly**, 24, 2005, p. 529. Of the 19 suspects named and pictured by the FBI, Ahmed Alnami is said to be working as an administrative supervisor with Saudi Arabian Airlines, Saeed Alghamdi, Waleed Alshehri and Abdulaziz Alomari are apparently still pilots and Salem Alhazmi is reported to be employed by a petrochemical plant in Yanbou, Saudi Arabia

(D Harrison, 'Revealed: The Men with Stolen Identities', **The Daily Telegraph**, 23 September 2001. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/09/23/widen23.xml> accessed 7 May 2007).

[35] G W Bush, **National Day Message to Spain**, 11 October 2001; R Cook, 'The Struggle against Terrorism cannot be won by Military Means', **The Guardian,** 8 July 2005. Online. Available HTTP:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1523838,00.html> accessed 7 May 2007.

[36] N Daniel, **Islam and the West: The Making of an Image**, Oxford: One World, 2000, p. 11. For Darwin reference, please see footnote 7. P Kennedy, **Preparing for the Twenty-First Century**, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 208.

[37] M Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', **Journal of International Affairs**, 50, 1996, p. 49; B Barber, 'Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad vs Mcworld', in **Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order**, K Booth and T Dunne (eds), Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2002, p. 247.

[38] VS Naipaul cited in R Kabbani, **Imperial Fictions: Europe's Myths of Orient**, London: Pandora, 1994, pp 134-135. R Paz, 'Is There an "Islamic Terrorism"?', The Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998. Online. Available HTTP:

<http://www ict org il/articles/isl_terr htm> accessed 12 August 2006. Indeed, so insidious and 'strong has been the rhetorical linking of Islam to violence' that British children repeatedly mentioned the word "terrorist" when recently asked, "what is a Muslim?" (SE Al-Djazairi, **The Myth of Muslim Barbarism and its Aims**, Manchester: Bayt al-Hikma Press, 2007, p. 5).

[39] Q Wiktorowicz, 'A Genealogy of Radical Islam', **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism**, 28, 2005, p. 75. M Sageman, **Understanding Terror Networks**, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 126.

[40] R Jackson, 'Constructing Enemies: "Islamic Terrorism" in Political and Academic Discourse', **Government and Opposition,** 42, 2007, p. 407.

[41] R Ivie, 'Savagery in Democracy's Empire', **Third World Quarterly**, 26, 2005, p. 61; D Pipes, 'The Muslims are Coming, The Muslims are Coming…', **National Review**, 19 November 1990, p. 28; D Pipes, 'American Islamists and Lieberman', **Jerusalem Post**, 16 August 2000.

[42] G Austin, **The Next Attack: "Know Your Enemy and Know Yourself"**, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005, p. i; S Huntington, 'If not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World', **Foreign Affairs,** 72, 1993, p. 190; G W Bush, **Speech delivered at the United States Air Force Academy**, 2 June 2004.

[43] D Pipes, Who is the Enemy? Online. Available HTTP:

< http://www danielpipes org/article/103> accessed 12 August 2006); S Huntington, **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World**

Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 307; M Sageman, **Understanding Terror Networks**, p. vii; D Cook, 'The Recovery of Radical Islam in the Wake of the Defeat of the Taliban', **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 15, 2003, p. 52.

[44] J Trumpbour, 'The Clash of Civilizations', pp 109-111. L Stoddard, **The New World of Islam**, New York: Scribners, 1923, p. 112; L Stoddard, **Racial Realities in Europe**, New York: Scribners, 1925, p. 239.

[45] B Bawer, **While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within**, New York: Doubleday, 2006, pp 32-33, 38.

[46] M Phillips, **Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within**, London: Gibson Square, 2006, pp 8, 11, 48, 279-281. P Buchanan, **The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil our Country and Civilization**, New York: St Martin's Press, 2002, pp 266, 270.

[47] C Flournoy Swiney, 'Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US: Historical, Empirical, and Legal Analysis Applied to the War on Terrorism', **Muslim World Journal of Human Rights**, 3, 2006, pp 22-23, 13. Phillips, **Londonistan**, p. 276.

[48] M Ledeen, **The War against the Terror Masters: Why it Happened, Where We are Now, How We'll Win**, New York: St Martin's Press, 2003, p. 78, 155; F Debrix, 'Discourses of War, Geographies of Abjection: Reading Contemporary American Ideologies of Terror', **Third World Quarterly**, 26, 2005, p. 1168.

[49] S Francis, 'Prospects for Racial and Cultural Survival', **American Renaissance,** 16, 2005, p. 4; V Davis Hanson, **An Autumn of War: What America Learned from September 11 and the War on Terrorism**, New York: Anchor Books, 2002, p. xvi.

[50] S Bassnett, 'Translating Terror', **Third World Quarterly**, 26, 2005, pp 395; F Fanon, **Black Skins, White Masks**. New York: Grove Press, 1967, p. 110. E Balibar, 'Is there a Neo-Racism?', p. 21.

[51] E Balibar, 'Is there a Neo-Racism?', p. 24.

[52] D Kelly, 'The Assault on Civilization', **Navigator**, 4, 2001, pp 1-4; Bassnett, 'Translating Terror', p. 403. The hand-written note attributed to Mohammed Atta (an Egyptian suspected of leading the 2001 attacks on Washington and New York) is a case in point. According to the FBI translation, it contains the ludicrously improbable phrase, 'In the name of God, of myself and of my family'. As Robert Fisk points out, no Muslim, 'however ill-taught', would seek to associate a human being with Allah. Instead, it is likely that a Lebanese Maronite translator 'whose understanding of Islam and its prayers may have led to serious textual errors' is responsible for such a gaff ('What Muslim Would Write: 'The Time of Fun and Waste is Gone'?', **The Independent** 29 September 2001).

[53] M Duffield, 'Racism Migration and Development: the Foundations of Planetary Order', **Progress in Development Studies**, 6, 2006, p. 70; R Grosfoguel, '"Cultural Racism" and Colonial Caribbean Migrants in Core

Zones of the Capitalist World-Economy', **Review: Fernand Braudel Center**, 22, 1999, p. 412.

[54] E Balibar, 'Is There a Neo-Racism?', pp 18, 20, 22. R Grosfoguel, 'Cultural Racism', p. 413.

[55] C Gray, **Modern Strategy**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 277; N Cooper, 'Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy', **Security Dialogue**, 36, 2005, pp 464-465.

[56] D Campbell, **Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, p. 84; R Jackson, 'Constructing Enemies', p. 421. In order to propound this discourse of incommensurateness, it is necessary to ignore the 'striking similarities in the political values held' in a wide range of societies and the obvious pitfalls of 'generalizing from the type of regime to the state of public opinion'. The fact that violence within groups is more common than violence between them – within families, within villages, within ethnic groups, within states and so on (there were, for instance, almost twice as many intra-civilisational than inter-civilisational wars (resulting in over three times the loss of life) between 1816 and 1980) – is replaced by a myth of a singular cohesive and national by groups and individuals who frequently stand to gain by portraying diversity as endemically conflictive (M Small and J D Singer, **Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980**, London: Sage, 1982; P Norris and R Inglehart, 'Islam and the West: Testing

the "Clash of Civilizations' Thesis', John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 2002, pp 1, 16; Online. Available HTTP:

<http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP020-15/$File/rwp02_015_norris_rev1.pdf> (accessed 30 June 2005)).

[57] Shaw and Wong, **Genetic Seeds of Warfare**, p. 110; E Balibar, 'Is There a Neo-Racism?', pp 19, 22-23.

[58] Somit and Peterson, **Darwinism, Dominance and Democracy**, p. 111. Shaw and Wong, **Genetic Seeds of Warfare**, pp 208-209. Seeing society in terms of incompatible elements kept apart by a powerful centralized power tends to reinforce the position and values of existing elites. This 'representation of the causes of violence in the Balkans', for instance, 'exactly reproduced the logic of the most extreme nationalist demagogues in the region who for their own purposes wished to declare ethnic co-existence an impossibility', thereby encouraging each of Yugoslavia's national communities 'to imagine itself as an 'endangered species' that urgently needed its own state in order to protect itself from other "species"' (P Finney, 'On Memory', p 12; V Pesic, **Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis**, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p. 11).