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DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP OR FOREIGN CONTROL? A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	iii
1. Introduction	1
2. Literature Review	2
3. Research Question.....	4
4. Methodology	4
5. Content Analysis of PRSP Participation	6
5.1 The Inclusionary Approach.....	6
5.2 The Outcome-approach	7
6. Content Analysis of PRSP Policy Choices.....	8
6.1 Key Objectives.....	8
6.2 Economic Management.....	9
6.2.1 <i>Prioritisation of Policies for Macroeconomic Stability vs. Sectoral Policies</i>	9
6.2.2 <i>Privatisation</i>	10
6.2.3 <i>Tax Policy</i>	10
6.2.4 <i>Inflation Rate</i>	10
6.2.5 <i>Economic Diversification</i>	11
6.2.6 <i>Trade Policy</i>	11
6.3 State Institutions	12
6.3.1 <i>Corruption</i>	12
6.4 Security and Conflict.....	13
7. Conclusion.....	14
 Bibliography	 16
Appendix A: Eight Country PRSP Comparison Matrix	18
Appendices B-1 to B-4.....	59

Executive Summary

Broad-based domestic ownership is now considered a necessary condition for development. Reflecting this thinking, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have moved away from Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were imposed on countries. As part of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, countries now produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that are to be the basis for development. These documents are to be drafted by governments in consultation with government structures, civil society and other stakeholders. Do PRSPs, however, facilitate domestic ownership or do they perpetuate foreign control?

Tackling this issue requires questioning what ownership means. Ownership is most meaningful when it involves participation by those affected and reflects their policy choices. With respect to PRSPs, there are at least two types of ownership issues. First there is the question of ownership between the World Bank and IMF on one side and the HIPC countries on the other. This is foreign versus domestic ownership. The second layer involves the nature of domestic ownership itself, which can be seen to be either narrow, reflecting only the views of elites, or broad, reflecting the views of a large segment of society.

To gain a greater understanding of the ownership of PRSPs, this paper analyses their content against the World Bank's *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*. This document is a guide for countries aimed at helping them produce PRSPs and reflects the interests of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). As such, the degree to which PRSPs diverge from the Sourcebook can potentially serve as an indicator of domestic ownership.

In this study the Sourcebook was compared to the first full or interim PRSPs from eight countries (Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) that vary in terms of fragility and their macroeconomic indicators. The methodology took into account several factors that could influence the results; specifically the fact that the PRSPs studied vary by year, that some were not produced as part of the HIPC process, and that Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) actually served as a model for the PRSP initiative.

With respect to participation, there were some areas of divergence between the Sourcebook and the PRSPs. This suggests that there is some degree of domestic ownership. Ironically, the World Bank Sourcebook recommends more participation than was reported in the PRSPs. While only very tentative conclusions can be drawn on the issue of narrow versus broad domestic participation, it seems that in some cases domestic participation was largely limited to government bodies, which could imply that it is difficult to impose participatory practices from above.

In terms of policy choices, while there are differences between countries, the PRSPs generally prioritised economic growth and shared similar macroeconomic policies to those recommended by the Sourcebook. This may reflect foreign control over the PRSPs, but it could also reflect the possibility that HIPC governments have come to share the same beliefs on economic issues as the World Bank and IMF, for either genuine or tactical reasons. However there are other issues, such as security and conflict, where there are substantial differences between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook. The most fragile countries and those that had recently experienced conflict gave the most attention to conflict-based security. Thus, there does appear to be some scope for

domestic ownership with regards to policy choices. It is possible that the World Bank and IMF are willing to allow for domestic ownership in some areas, but not others.

These conclusions paint a mixed and complex picture of domestic ownership. As this analysis was conducted based only on the content of the PRSPs themselves, further research should be conducted on the degree to which PRSPs accurately capture reality. In addition, longitudinal studies could examine how the scope for domestic ownership changes as countries and the IFIs gain experience of the process.

1. Introduction

Policy ownership is now believed to be central to improving the lives of the poor around the world. Rather than being told what to do by outsiders, countries and their citizens must determine for themselves what to do. In this vein, Easterly argues ‘[o]nly the self-reliant efforts of poor people and poor societies themselves can end poverty, borrowing ideas and institutions from the West when it suits them to do so’ (2006: 382). Likewise, an independent review of the Enhanced Social Adjustment Facility (ESAF) carried out for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) states ‘there is broad agreement [amongst bilateral and multilateral donors as well as recipient countries] that ownership is a necessary condition of successful policy reform and program implementation’ (Botchwey et al 1998: 20).

In 1996, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was launched by the World Bank and the IMF ‘with the aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage’ (IMF 2007). Thus, the initiative provides relief from multilateral public debt for the poorest countries. HIPC debt relief, however, does not come without strings. One of the criteria for eligibility for debt relief is that countries produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). PRSPs, which were introduced in 1999, are intended to be ‘a comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction’ (IMF 2005).

PRSPs were designed to break from the past, a time when it was perceived that the development policies of poor countries were set by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). As such, PRSPs were introduced to facilitate broad-based domestic ownership. As Fogarty argues, ‘old-style SAPs [Structural Adjustment Programs] had been developed in a top-down fashion from the IFIs and had focused on meeting general fiscal criteria. In contrast, the new programmes, which were conceived as poverty reduction plans, were to be developed by individual debtor governments themselves (in consultation with the IFIs and, significantly, civil society groups within a country)’ (2003: 243). Similarly, the World Bank and IMF state that PRSPs ‘should be prepared by the government through a country-driven process, including broad participation that promotes country ownership of the strategy and its implementation’ (Klugman 2002: 2).

Have PRSPs brought with them this intended ownership? HIPC and PRSPs have not done away with conditionality. Countries must produce PRSPs to receive debt relief, and the World Bank and IMF remain the only judges of whether or not the PRSPs satisfy the conditions for HIPC debt relief. This has, in theory, been a shift from ‘content’ to ‘process’ conditionality. Rather than imposing policy content, the IFIs require HIPC countries to produce their own policies through a process of consultation with civil society and other stakeholders. ‘Behind the PRSP initiative, there is a belief that ‘process conditionality’ may succeed where previous forms of conditionality, focused on specific policy measures, have failed’ (Booth et al 2003: 7). However, can ‘process’ conditionality and broad-based domestic ownership co-exist?

This paper addresses the question of ownership by analysing the content of PRSPs from eight countries on issues related to participation processes and policy in comparison to the recommendations contained in the World Bank’s *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*. The research does not draw upon evidence of actual participatory processes or policy choices apart from what is documented in the PRSPs themselves. While PRSPs are

political documents and may not reflect actual events or policy decisions, they do provide an official record. Thus, from such an analysis, it is possible to develop tentative conclusions about the scope for domestic ownership provided by PRSPs.

Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a review of past studies on the question of ownership and PRSPs. Section 3 distinguishes between different kinds of ownership and defines the central research question. The methodology employed as well as the eight cases are presented in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 detail the findings that emerge from the analysis of participation and policy choices, respectively. The tentative conclusions offered from this research are contained in Section 7. Further, Appendix A provides a matrix of the data collected from the content analysis of the PRSPs, which was based on a common set of questions.

2. Literature Review

Have PRSPs led to broad-based domestic ownership for HIPC countries? Have PRSPs ‘given the initiative to LDCs themselves as well as to their civil society partners (both local and international) in devising their own debt-service and poverty-reduction schemes?’ (Fogarty 2003: 246). A number of studies have looked at this issue based either on case studies or general reviews of PRSPs. These studies have generally sought to take into account the motivations and actions of various groups involved in the PRSP including the IFIs, donor governments, HIPC country governments and civil society in HIPC countries.

Offering a view from the South, the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) conducted a review of PRSP processes drawing on five case studies (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania). AFRODAD largely focused on the question of civil society participation. Their research found a high degree of similarities in the priorities of the PRSPs, leading the researchers to question ‘how the five countries came up with such identical interventions for poverty reduction in independent consultations within their own countries’ (AFRODAD 2002: 38). AFRODAD concluded that in practice, ‘ownership means that the government is responsible for writing or designing the PRSP and for commissioning technical and donor input into it’ (2002: 45). They argue that the ‘over reliance [of PRSPs] on existing plans raises questions about the extent of ownership by stakeholders outside the State’ (AFRODAD 2002; 45).

A number of Northern non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also evaluated the PRSP process. In a global review of the PRSP initiative, ActionAid concludes that ‘reform policies have not been meaningfully discussed or debated during the government-led public consultations in the PRSP processes’ (ActionAid 2004: 1). They argue that PRSPs are donor-driven because ‘all national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) must first be screened by joint-staff assessments (JSAs) comprised of staff from both institutions before they can be submitted for ‘endorsement’ by the boards of the IMF and World Bank’ (Ibid: 7). As a result, ‘governments are under tremendous pressure to constrain the public PRSP consultations to discussion of certain economic policy issues (such as budgeting priorities for health or education spending)’ (Ibid: 43). From a Swedish civil society perspective, Cash and Sanchez conduct a general overview of PRSPs. They argue that ‘the quality of the participatory process has been constrained by limited government and civil society capacity’

(Cash and Sanchez 2003: 8), while the contents ‘reflect the dominance of the IFI policy prescriptions instead of the priorities of the poor’ (Ibid: 9).

Evaluations of the PRSP initiative have been conducted on behalf of several Northern research centers as well. In a general overview of the PRSP process for Queen Elizabeth House, Stewart and Wang argue that ‘[t]he little experience with PRSPs so far would suggest that PRSPs have achieved little in the way of increasing national ownership/empowerment over programme design by national government or civil society, though the process is still at an early stage’ (Stewart and Wang 2003: 26). Based on case studies of the PRSP process in Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania, Booth et al find positive signs of local participation, writing that ‘[i]n all cases, the full PRSP will have been influenced to some degree by a national consultative process’ (Booth et al 2003: 27). However, they conclude that ‘the PRSP initiative and the incentives put in place around it have not (yet) been sufficient to generate full national ownership, even in terms of process’ (Ibid: 46). Piron and Evans analysed case studies of PRSP processes in four countries: Bolivia, Georgia, Uganda and Vietnam. On the whole, they found that PRSPs do not ‘override or derail domestic political and policymaking processes by imposing international priorities that undermine local level political accountability’ (Piron and Evans 2004: 34). They find that the PRSPs produced ‘a gradual opening of the policymaking process in each of the country cases’ (Ibid: 34).

A more critical view is presented by Woll who, in an in-depth study of the PRSP process in Bolivia, concludes that PRSP participatory processes can do more harm than good. She argues that ‘international donors’ participation programmes can raise civil society’s expectations in a way that can only be deceived by the recipient government’ and that ‘[c]ivil society participation programmes delegitimise a nascent representative democracy, without offering a functioning participatory democracy as an alternative’ (Woll 2006: i).

Finally, the World Bank and IMF have conducted their own review of the PRSP process. A 2004 study by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) concluded that ‘[r]esults in terms of ownership are mixed[.] The approach has often generated relatively strong ownership in a narrow circle of official stakeholders responsible for driving the process, but much less among other domestic stakeholders[.] The perception that the approach is overly influenced by procedural requirements of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) is widespread’ (IMF IEO 2004: 3). An internal review jointly conducted by the World Bank and IMF the following year came to a somewhat more optimistic conclusion. It argues that ‘[t]he PRS process has opened space for stakeholders to engage in national dialogue on economic policy and poverty reduction. However participation has often been broad rather than deep’ (World Bank and IMF 2005: 4).

The conclusions from this limited sample have been mixed as to whether or not PRSPs increase ownership for HIPC countries. AFRODAD and the Northern NGOs are more sceptical of PRSPs resulting in greater ownership. They also suggest that the government, as opposed to civil society, controls any space for domestic ownership that is created. Northern research groups and the World Bank and IMF themselves, while recognising the limits of the degree of ownership resulting from the PRSP process, generally reach more optimistic conclusions. They tend to view the PRSP as having created greater policy space.

3. Research Question

This paper also addresses the question of PRSPs and domestic ownership. Do PRSPs provide an enabling framework for domestic ownership of a country's development agenda or do they serve as a template for IFIs to impose a generic development agenda upon countries? More specifically, do PRSPs facilitate domestic ownership or maintain external control?

Ownership is a complex concept. At the very least it comprises notions of participation and policy choices. In the context of PRSPs, participation refers to the involvement of domestic actors and how exactly they were involved, while policy choice refers to the actual policies that were articulated. Domestic participation implies the involvement of local actors in the process and a process that is domestically defined while domestic policy choice means policies advocated by local actors. Thus, it is possible for a PRSP to be produced with local participation but without policy choices reflecting the views of those who had participated. At the same time, it is conceivable that a PRSP could be produced whose policies reflect local views, but that was produced without local participation. Only a PRSP that was produced through domestic participation *and* contains domestic policy choice can constitute meaningful domestic ownership. However, ownership is not just about the degree of domestic relative to foreign control; there is also the question of the breadth of involvement on the domestic front. If there is some degree of domestic ownership, then whose interests within a society does the PRSP reflect? Does the PRSP reflect the narrow interests of a few or the broad interests of many?

Table 1: A taxonomy of different types of ownership. The broad domestic ownership objective of the PRSP initiative is captured in the bottom right corner.

Table 1. Taxonomy of Types of Ownership					
			Participation		
			External	Domestic	
				Narrow	Broad
Policy Choices	External		External Participation and Policy Choices	Narrow Domestic Participation and External Policy Choices	Broad Domestic Participation and External Policy Choices
	Domestic	Narrow	External Participation and Narrow Domestic Policy Choices	Narrow Domestic Participation and Policy Choices	Broad Domestic Participation, but Narrow Domestic Policy Choices
		Broad	External Participation and Broad Domestic Policy Choices (unlikely)	Narrow Domestic Participation and Broad Domestic Policy Choices (unlikely)	Broad Domestic Participation and Policy Choices

4. Methodology

One way to gain insight into the ownership of PRSPs is to analyse the content of the PRSPs themselves. As political documents, the PRSPs reflect political considerations as much as they reflect reality. Thus, what the PRSPs say about either participation or policy choices may not be a true reflection of reality. For example, it is possible that there was considerable

domestic participation but this was not reflected in the PRSP. Similarly, it is conceivable that the policy choices contained in the PRSP are not being implemented. However, even with these limitations, PRSPs are crucial documents. Considerable time, money and effort were put into their production and important choices were made by their drafters about what to include and exclude. Finally, transparent and accountable policy-making requires documents that reflect the policy formulation process as accurately as possible. Thus, a content analysis of the PRSPs can provide valuable findings that lead to conclusions about ownership.

This study presents an analysis of PRSPs from eight countries: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These PRSPs were compared to the World Bank's Sourcebook which is intended as 'a guide to assist countries as they develop and strengthen their poverty reduction strategies' (Klugman 2002: v). However, does the Sourcebook offer suggestions that countries are free to accept or reject, or does it dictate to countries the types of participation and policy choices that must be included in their PRSPs?

In order to answer this question, content analysis is used to find patterns of similarity and/or divergence between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook. If either the participation or policy choices documented in the PRSPs are different from the recommendations of the Sourcebook, this is an indication of at least some degree of narrow domestic ownership. It is necessary to note, however, that this approach is more limited in its ability to assess which domestic interests are represented. Only very limited conclusions can be drawn as to whether evidence of domestic ownership reflects narrow or broad ownership.

To date, 40 countries have been designated as HIPC by the IMF, making them eligible for debt relief conditional on the production of a PRSP (IMF 2007). Several non-HIPC countries have also produced PRSPs in order to create a framework for poverty reduction and to secure donor assistance. While HIPC countries share a common trait of a high degree of multilateral debt, they differ in regard to a number of other attributes. The PRSPs compared in this study represent eight of the Crisis States Research Centre's case studies (Putzel 2006: 15), two from each of the following four categories: no major war; major war without collapse; major war, collapse and uncertain future; and major war, collapse and recovery (see Appendix B-1). This ensures variation between cases at least on the axis of state fragility. In addition, and relatedly, the countries vary in terms of macroeconomic indicators (see Appendix B-2). This variation helps extend the relevance of the findings in this study to a broader range of HIPC countries.

There are, however, certain factors that may limit the comparability of the PRSPs included in this study. Firstly, the countries have neither drafted PRSPs at the same time nor produced the same number of PRSPs. At the time of writing, some countries had produced only their first interim PRSP (for example Afghanistan) while others had produced a second full PRSP (for example Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda). This study employs a time-shifted approach, looking at the first full (or interim if there is no full) PRSP for each country (see Appendix B-3). Our strategy stresses the importance of internal country conditions in the formulation of PRSPs. An inherent weakness is that the PRSPs were produced in different years (between 2000 and 2006) and thus may have been influenced by different external factors. Most importantly, cross-country learning may take place between countries with varying levels of experience with the PRSP process. On the other hand, analysing PRSPs produced in the same year would involve comparing countries with very different levels of domestic experience with PRSPs.

Secondly, not all the PRSPs were produced by HIPC countries for the World Bank and IMF for the purpose of securing debt relief (see Appendix B-3). To date, neither Afghanistan nor Nigeria qualifies for HIPC status. However, these non-HIPC countries have produced PRSPs in order to coordinate their development efforts and secure additional donor support, and their motives are ultimately similar to those of the HIPC countries. The fact they do not have HIPC status is therefore considered unlikely to influence the results.

Thirdly, the Sourcebook was published in 2002, after some of the PRSPs included in this study had been produced. Therefore, it is possible that the Sourcebook to some extent reflects the experiences of these countries rather than the reverse. In particular, Uganda and its Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) served as a model for the participation section of the Sourcebook. The government of Uganda produced the PEAP prior to the introduction of the PRSP. However, the Sourcebook is an official World Bank and IMF document and also reflects the views of these institutions.

A team of four researchers collected data for this study. Each researcher was responsible for analysing two PRSPs (from dissimilar countries). A comprehensive matrix was constructed (see Appendix A: Eight Country PRSP Comparison Matrix) based on issues identified by the Crisis States Research Centre (see Appendix B-4). Responses for each question were extensively discussed and compared between the researchers until a consensus response was reached for each country. Data from this matrix was then used as the basis of the comparison between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook. The points of comparison between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook were selected based on the most salient features of the Sourcebook and the PRSPs themselves, as well as building upon the issues identified by the Crisis States Research Centre.

5. Content Analysis of PRSP Participation

The Sourcebook defines participation in the PRSPs as the process ‘by which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policymaking, resource allocations, and/or program implementation’ (Klugman 2002: 237). Though it emphasises that there is no blueprint, some guiding principles on how to create an effective participatory process are laid out. The two most important principles are inclusion and the adoption of an outcome-oriented approach. This section discusses the extent to which the PRSPs document a broad-based participatory process and whether or not the consultations had an effect on policy choices.

5.1 The Inclusionary Approach

According to the Sourcebook, the key stakeholders of the PRSPs include the general public, poor and vulnerable groups, organised civil society, the private sector, the government, representative assemblies/parliament, and donors (Klugman 2002: 238). In order to incorporate the views of these stakeholders, a widening of governmental and civic participation at the national and local levels is promoted.

On a governmental level, particular emphasis is given to the inclusion of local government and representative assemblies, promoting a reversal of the prevalent trend in which ‘most

policy-level decisions, including budget allocation, are made by a core group of ministries, which excludes Parliament, district and local governments, and sometimes even the line ministries' (2002: 244). As seen in section II.3 (State) of Appendix A, all of the cases gave evidence of the executive's dominant engagement and control and in most countries, the Ministry of Finance and/or Planning played the central role in overseeing the PRSP process. There are some exceptions in this regard, as specific committees responsible for formulating the PRSPs were formed in Afghanistan, DRC and Tanzania. However, as these committees were overseen by the Ministry of Planning and Finance (Tanzania) or chaired by either the President's senior economic advisor (Afghanistan), or by the the Minister of Planning (DRC), these cases are hardly outliers from the general trend. This observation suggests that there is little divergence from the past, when these ministries typically implemented IFI policies. The minimal mention of consultation with parliamentarians also represents a clear deviation from the Sourcebook. Zambia, Afghanistan and Mozambique make only vague mention of parliamentary involvement, and while Tanzania and to some extent Uganda document a more substantive role, the remaining countries did not mention parliamentarians at all.

More in line with the Sourcebook is the fact that all of the PRSPs, with the exception of Rwanda, document some degree of local government participation. This can be seen in the consultation with provincial and local levels of government through mechanisms such as national, zonal and provincial consultation workshops in all countries save Rwanda. Similarly, all of the country cases, with the exception of Rwanda and Nigeria, document some kind of civic engagement (see Appendix A: II.3c – Civil Society). On a national level, Afghanistan and Mozambique most extensively document their engagement with civil society. In Afghanistan, the Oversight Committee discussed a first draft of the I-ANDS with representatives from civil society and the document further directs readers to the I-ANDS website where the suggestions of national and international civil society groups are posted. The views of various segments of civil society (such as trade unions, the media, and students) are outlined in Mozambique's PRSP, a document that also includes the names of the organisations (and ministries) that were consulted. Regarding civil society participation on a local level, all countries, with the exception of Rwanda and Nigeria, mention some sort of consultation. For example, Mozambique documents various consultations with civil society at the provincial level, and in Uganda, a Civil Society Organisation Task Force promoted the discussion of PRSP-related issues within districts and communities (Government of Uganda 2000, 6). Also in line with the Sourcebook's recommendations, most of the country cases also emphasise the need to consult with the poor. In Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Mozambique, context-specific views on poverty were collected through surveys and/or Participatory Poverty Assessments. The case of Nigeria presents an outlier for all types of participation, as the document presents no information on the nature of the participatory process.

5.2 The Outcome-approach

The Sourcebook emphasises the need for an outcome-based approach to participatory processes. As opposed to open-ended participatory processes, considered to be vague and unable to effect anti-poverty strategies, '[o]utcome-based approaches to participation at the macroeconomic level should provide policymakers with concrete inputs into their decision-making and policy implementation' (Klugman 2002: 237). The eight country cases present little evidence of a use of such an approach. In fact, with the exception of Afghanistan and Mozambique, the PRSPs provide minimal information about the suggestions that emerged from consultations with stakeholders, and what information is provided is information about

problems rather than proposed changes to the status quo. There is consequently also little information of the extent to which suggestions had an influence on policy choices. This is particularly interesting in the case of Zambia, which indicates briefly that eighty percent of the suggestions emerging from consultation were taken into consideration, without any mention of the specific nature of these suggestions. The only evidence of a suggestion actually influencing policy is presented by Uganda: ‘The participatory work has shed light on numerous aspects of poverty in Uganda and has immediately influenced budgetary allocation on water supply and the priority given to improving security’ (Government of Uganda 2000: 27). As a consequence, improved security was added as a key objective. In conclusion, with the exception of Nigeria, all of the country cases document some kind of participatory process. These processes converge with the Sourcebook as the documentation indicates that there is a general trend towards including a wider range of stakeholders than simply the executive in policymaking. However, the inclusion of participants does not match that envisioned by the Sourcebook, as seen in the minimal documentation of parliamentary involvement. Also, there is little evidence of the outcome-based approach. Finally, on a general level, there is relatively scant discussion of the participatory process in most of the PRSPs given the extensive discussion in the Sourcebook.

6. Content Analysis of PRSP Policy Choices

This section is divided into four parts. The first looks at the macro-level priorities of the Sourcebook and the PRSPs. The next three delve into more specific policy areas and highlight similarities and divergences within the dominant issue-areas found in the Sourcebook and/or the PRSPs: economic management, state institutions, and the state’s response to conflict.

6.1 Key Objectives

Examining the key objectives of the PRSPs (Appendix A section I.4) sheds light on the relative prioritisation of various strategies to reduce poverty. Comparing the stated key objectives of the PRSPs to the Sourcebook’s priority areas for public action and strategic emphases illustrates that the PRSPs diverge from the Sourcebook and from each other to a certain degree. To more precisely capture these similarities and divergences, the relative weight given to the discussion of macroeconomic policies compared to sectoral policies in the Sourcebook and PRSPs is explored.

The Sourcebook continually emphasises the importance of growth as the key to poverty reduction. ‘Numerous statistical studies confirm that rapid economic growth is the engine of poverty reduction, using both income and non-income measures of poverty’ (Klugman 2002: 8). Economic growth is emphasised as central to the PRSP process. ‘The priority public actions to raise sustainable growth and reduce poverty constitute the heart of a poverty reduction strategy’ (2002: 16). The four priority public action areas that the Sourcebook indicates could be included in the PRSP are ‘macroeconomic and structural policies to support sustainable growth in which the poor participate, how to improve governance, including public sector financial management, appropriate sectoral policies and programs¹, [and] realistic costing and appropriate levels of funding for the major programs’ (2002: 16).

¹ The Sourcebook gives health, education, social protection, rural development and infrastructure and environment as examples (Klugman 2002: 19).

All of the PRSPs emphasise the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction and commit to creating an enabling environment for growth, though economic growth is not always quite the ‘heart’ of the PRSP. Uganda, Nigeria, and Zambia list economic growth as the first of their key objectives, and Zambia especially emphasises the primacy of this goal. However, this distinction is murkier in the rest of the cases. Rwanda emphasises institutional and legal changes, Afghanistan security, the DRC good governance and peace, and Mozambique education, health and rural development. Tanzania, while emphasising that ‘a key objective of the poverty reduction strategy will be to promote accelerated and equitable growth’ (Government of Tanzania 2000: 14), focuses on reducing income poverty and improving human capability in their key objectives. Uganda, DRC, Nigeria and Zambia include economic growth and/or macroeconomic stability above sectoral policies or poverty reduction measures. Rwanda does not explicitly mention growth as one of their six key objectives, but does emphasise prioritisation within sectoral spending. Afghanistan includes ‘economic and social development’ as the third of their three key objectives. Finally, Mozambique lists sectoral policies above macroeconomic and financial management. Essentially, there is little evidence of divergence from the Sourcebook on the level of key objectives.

6.2 Economic Management

Macroeconomic policy is often viewed as an area in which donors seek to exert significant influence, presumably because their interest as creditors in the ability of debtor nations to repay is often at stake. As noted previously, critics who view the PRSP process as significantly lacking in country ownership take pointed aim at what they perceive as limited scope for macroeconomic policies that diverge from the liberal model prescribed by the IFIs. This section examines structural reform measures in depth by comparing the Sourcebook and the PRSPs in terms of the prioritisation of macroeconomic stability and sectoral policies, privatisation, tax policy, inflation rate targeting, economic diversification, and trade policy, issue-areas figuring prominently in both the Sourcebook and many of the PRSPs.

6.2.1 Prioritisation of Policies for Macroeconomic Stability vs. Sectoral Policies

The relative prioritisation of policies for macroeconomic discipline, seen as a precondition for growth, versus sectoral policies, is often conceptualised as a choice between short-term and long-term poverty reduction. The IFIs have been criticised by developing countries in the past for promoting policies designed to foster long-term growth at the expense of harsh fiscal austerity, with dramatic sectoral implications. While less extreme, the Sourcebook indicates that while macroeconomic stability and structural policies to support growth are not sufficient for poverty reduction, these policies are a precondition for the ability to implement more expensive sectoral policies. As the overview emphasises, ‘the most commonly advocated policies in PRSPs and I-PRSPs to date are expenditure increases in spending that is important for poverty reduction [...] However, sectoral policy and program priorities will not be implemented unless countries ensure that they can afford the public expenditures they plan’ (Klugman 2002: 19). The Sourcebook emphasises that prioritisation within and between sectors, flexible fiscal targets that allow macroeconomic stability to be prioritised and a careful balance between short-term and long-term poverty reduction goals are best practices (2002: 16).

The importance of fiscal stringency and macroeconomic discipline runs through all eight documents. Appendix A sections III.2d (economic management) and III.5a (growth

strategies) highlight this trend. Commitments to preserving disciplined government spending are often combined with specific reforms. These reforms include establishing an interministerial committee on macroeconomic management (DRC), utilising computerised systems and improving auditing capacity (Mozambique), extending the use of the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) (Tanzania), and introducing an integrated financial management information system (Zambia). Uganda and Tanzania most explicitly diverge from the Sourcebook in their extensive focus on sectoral policies, specifically those relating to human capital development. Both put significant emphasis on improving the education system, exemplified by Tanzania's planned abolition of primary school fees in 2001/2002.

6.2.2 Privatisation

The Sourcebook emphasises that both sustained high levels of growth and macroeconomic stability depend upon privatisation, amongst other structural reforms (see Klugman 2002, Chapter 12). Curtailing state involvement through privatisation is included in almost all eight documents. Rwanda discusses its plans to make the manufacturing sector more competitive through privatisation, while the DRC focuses on the importance of privatisation in the mining sector and Mozambique in the agricultural sector. Afghanistan, Tanzania and Nigeria discuss their plans to privatise SOE's more generally.

Privatisation strategies are often coupled with rather vague statements about the importance of improving the business climate (both Afghanistan and the DRC use this exact phrase), and attracting foreign investment. Afghanistan, Tanzania and Zambia highlight the steps they plan to take to attract investment to their industrial sectors (Zambia to their tourism industry as well) and DRC to the transport sector.

6.2.3 Tax Policy

The Sourcebook clearly outlines revenue collection best practices, emphasising that the raising of domestic revenue levels is an important medium-term objective in many developing countries. The Sourcebook identifies the following five fundamentals typically included in the best tax systems: a broad-based consumption tax such as VAT; excise taxes on petroleum, alcohol and tobacco; minimal import tariffs with few exceptions, minimal discretion and no export duties; a personal income tax with few brackets and exemptions for the poor, and finally, a corporate income tax with a single moderate rate (Klugman 2002: 13).

There are several examples in the PRSPs of reforms being made along these lines. Most importantly, each country specifically outlines their interest in increasing government revenue from taxation, as seen in Appendix A section III.2e (revenue collection). Rwanda plans to increase their VAT tax, while Uganda highlights the success of its recently introduced VAT tax and the DRC outlines its intention to introduce such a tax. Rwanda plans to align its import tariff with the preliminary proposal for the COMESA common external tariff, while Afghanistan, DRC, Tanzania and Zambia outline plans to improve their customs systems, citing problems such as corruption and a lack of government control (Afghanistan) and leakage (Zambia). So, while, a wide variety of reforms are presented in the PRSPs, most countries do take measure in line with the Sourcebook's stated best practices.

6.2.4 Inflation Rate

The Sourcebook emphasises that maintaining a low and stable inflation rate is the most important element of monetary and exchange rate policies. 'Monetary and exchange rate policies should target those variables over which they have the most control, namely, the

long-run impact of inflation on the rate of growth' (2002: 14). The Sourcebook indicates that, 'in practice this means (1) choosing, and firmly committing to an inflation rate target within the context of the overall poverty reduction strategy [...] (2) Setting a target in the single-digit-a-year range, the precise target depending on the country's history of inflation and stage of development' (2002: 14). Appendix A section III.5c (inflation target) indicates that these instructions are carefully heeded. While Rwanda does not target a specific inflation rate (projecting a rise from 2 percent to 3 percent if they realise their first growth scenario) and Afghanistan does not provide an inflation target, all the other cases provide single digit inflation targets. For DRC and Zambia, this requires setting quite ambitious targets, with DRC targeting a drop from 23.1 percent in 2005 to 6 percent in 2008 and Zambia targeting a drop from 20 percent in 1999 to 5 percent by 2005. This lack of divergence indicates that conformation to liberal and widely held notions regarding the importance of targeting and maintaining low inflation rates may be non-negotiable, as all countries outline policies that vary within the thin band allocated for country discretion by the Sourcebook.

6.2.5 Economic Diversification

The Sourcebook indicates that diversification into new economic sectors is crucial to reducing a country's structural vulnerability to exogenous shocks (Klugman 2002, Chapter 12). Appendix A section III.5a (strategies for growth) illustrates that the PRSP's strategies designed to foster growth by changing the productive mix often focus on diversification into new, sometimes higher value-added products. Rwanda indicates their interest in diversifying away from agriculture, Afghanistan away from opiates, and Zambia away from mining. DRC and Mozambique focus on expanding their production of cash crops (such as cashews and cotton in Mozambique). Tourism is highlighted as a key growth sector in Rwanda, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zambia (Appendix A section III.4c – service sector).

Notably, the PRSPs have similar agricultural policies as well. To increase the productivity of the agricultural sector, the documents produced by Afghanistan, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania highlight the importance of strengthening private property rights through land titling campaigns (Appendix A section III.4a - agriculture). This section illustrates that, to achieve the same goal, Uganda, DRC and Zambia plan to improve access to rural finance, such as through microcredit.

6.2.6 Trade Policy

As the mainstay of the liberal economic regime, trade liberalisation figures prominently in the Sourcebook, given a separate chapter as opposed to being included with fiscal and monetary policies in the macroeconomic policy chapter. Heterodox trade models are heavily discouraged, while the important components of a liberal trade regime are outlined explicitly. The Sourcebook states that: '...the Korean model [elaborate systems that correct for bias against exports created by protectionist measures] is not recommended for most developing countries given institutional capacity constraints and the risk of capture by special interests that will obtain rents (2002: 32)'. Thus, low and uniform tariffs are recommended as the key to stimulating trade. However, there is some discussion of the importance of sequencing, namely securing macroeconomic stability and a competitive exchange rate before implementing trade reform, and mapping the potential impact of trade reform on the poor. The Sourcebook also cautions that Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) 'are likely to hurt member countries because low-priced imports from non-partner countries are replaced with

higher-priced products from partner countries (2002: 38)', unless RIAs move towards reduced external trade barriers.

Most countries conform with the expectations outlined in the Sourcebook. Appendix A sections III.5a (strategies for growth) and III.5b (trade strategies) highlight their interest in pursuing further liberalisation and export-led growth. At the very least, the PRSPs demonstrate the amount of trade liberalisation that has already occurred, and give at least a vague indication of why they are unable to further liberalise their markets. For example, Uganda argues that, as its trade openness is better than average, further liberalisation cannot lead to higher future growth. DRC indicates its inability to fulfill the requirements of the sub-regional groups it belongs to due to reliance on trade tax revenue. Zambia points out the challenge of finding a balance between liberalisation and protecting its producers from an uneven playing field. While Rwanda and Nigeria commit to further liberalisation, it is within the context of liberalisation *within* RIAs, somewhat discouraged by the Sourcebook. Rwanda indicates that its membership in COMESA will result in gradually reducing tariffs for products from these countries and eventually non-members (Government of Rwanda, 74). Nigeria commits to meeting the free trade zone agreements of ECOWAS. Afghanistan is something of an outlier, expressing interest in joining bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, including the WTO.

6.3. State Institutions

A general trend in these poverty-reduction documents is the vast scope of the stated governance reforms. While often outlined only briefly, all of the PRSPs highlight the importance of radically overhauling numerous government agencies. Appendix A sections III.1c (corruption), III.2a (military and security organisations) and III.2b (judicial organisations) outline plans to radically overhaul the judiciary, police, army, and the bureaucracy writ large to stem corruption, build public trust in the government, and overcome the legacy of conflict. The emphasis on reforming military and security organisations loosely increases with fragility, with both Tanzania and Zambia not mentioning police or army reforms. Appendix A section III.2f illustrates that decentralisation is a key component of the public reform program in Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.

To best capture the similarities between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook, and the international community's good governance agenda of this time-period more generally, this section focuses on corruption.

6.3.1. Corruption

The Sourcebook gives a broad definition of governance that is fairly open to interpretation. It defines governance as 'the exercise of power through a country's economic, social and political institutions in which institutions represent the organisational rules and routines, formal laws, and informal norms that together shape the incentives of public policymakers, overseers, and the provision of public services' (2002: 271). It indicates that, 'weak governance compromises the delivery of services and benefits to those who need them the most; the influence of powerful interest groups biases policies, programs, and spending away from the poor [...]' (2002: 271). The Sourcebook indicates that, 'corruption fostered by red tape can make it unnecessarily costly or even prohibitive to start a small business enterprise and reduces the proportion of businesses operating in the formal sector' (2002: 290).

Appendix A section III.1c (corruption) indicates that all eight countries emphasise the importance of confronting this issue. Many highlight the difficulties the state is experiencing due to deeply rooted corruption practices more explicitly than the Sourcebook. Most ambitiously, the vast majority of Nigeria's policy changes, strategies and development plans tackle the issue of corruption, calling for a national 'crusade against corruption' (Government of Nigeria 2005: 5). Afghanistan includes corruption as one of its five cross-cutting themes and gives an exhaustive list of how anti-corruption will be operationalised. DRC recognises it as a cause of poverty and claims that the culture of impunity encourages corruption and undermines peace (Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2006: 20). Tanzania and Zambia plan to implement anti-corruption measures, while the matter is given relatively little attention in Mozambique's document. Similarly, Rwanda and Uganda, while emphasising good governance, hardly mention corruption. Essentially, while there is some variation in the extent to which the PRSPs rail against corruption, the Sourcebook and the PRSPs both emphasise good governance reforms, with many of the PRSPs going above and beyond the Sourcebook in outlining specific strategies to combat corruption.

6.4 Security and Conflict

The Sourcebook defines security quite broadly: '[i]nsecurity can be understood as vulnerability to decline in well-being [...] The shock triggering the decline can occur at the microeconomic or the household level, at the meso or community level or at the national or international level' (Klugman 2002: 11). It focuses on issues like illness and macroeconomic shocks that lower living standards and are particularly detrimental for poor people less able to insure themselves against shocks. The Sourcebook suggests an assessment of 'the extent and nature of the country's vulnerability to exogenous shocks and the impact of such shocks on the poor' (2002: 11). It continuously stresses that 'public investment in effective safety net programs may well be an important element of a long-term strategy for growth and poverty reduction' (2002: 11). Most PRSPs discuss security on two fronts. Firstly, and closely in line with the Sourcebook, most PRSPs engage in broad discussions of poverty that emphasise economic insecurity (Appendix A sections I.5 – definition of poverty, and I.6 – poverty reduction target). However, considerable mention is also made of conflict-related insecurities. Appendix A sections III.1a (macro political environment) and III.1b (conflict) illustrate that general differences between the documents convey the broadest divergences between countries. Rwanda, Uganda, Afghanistan and the DRC (the countries in the first two CSRC categories – Major War, Collapse, and Recovery and Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future) mention their unique challenges. Rwanda discusses the 1994 genocide, Uganda briefly mentions conflict in the North, and Afghanistan discusses the NATO-led ISAF. Some, like Rwanda, have chosen conflict-resolution as their first key objective. Rwanda's PRSP stresses the need for reconciliation and the development of new legal commissions to deal with the legacy of genocide. Similarly, Afghanistan lists 'security' as its first key objective, emphasising the prime importance of consolidating the rule of law throughout their territory for poverty reduction. Uganda, though there is little discussion of the ongoing conflict, also lists security as a key objective, while DRC stresses the need to consolidate peace as a prime concern. Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia do not discuss conflict-related insecurity. This resonates well with the grouping of the eight countries. It appears that the countries that have recently experienced war or collapse or are currently recovering or attempting to recover from war or collapse chose to include the issue of conflict.

7. Conclusion

Overall, there is evidence of areas of the PRSPs that are different from the Sourcebook despite congruence on many fronts. With respect to the participation issue, there are differences as well as similarities and the divergences suggest some degree of domestic ownership over the participatory processes suggested by the World Bank and IMF. This finding parallels the conclusions of previous studies by Booth et al and Piron and Evans. Even if these differences are due to a lack of capacity on the part of the government – the body responsible for producing the PRSP – the World Bank and IMF did not step in and conduct the participation exercises for themselves. The irony is that the Sourcebook calls for more participation than was actually reported in the PRSPs. Had governments adhered more closely to the Sourcebook, the PRSP processes could have actually resulted in broader participation, but less domestic ownership over the participation plan.

On the issue of narrow versus broad ownership, the very nature of the methodology makes it difficult to draw any conclusions with certainty. For example, it is important to note that the PRSPs contain many more references to the role of civil society than to external actors (both multilateral and bilateral). This is somewhat surprising given the concerns raised in earlier research about the prominent role of the World Bank and IMF in the PRSPs. Given the relative emphasis in most of the PRSPs on government participation and with relatively little detailed information about the participation of other groups, this perhaps implies that participation was narrow rather than broad. This concurs with the conclusions from AFRODAD's research as well as the findings from the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office, which noted the role of the government in the PRSP process. This focus on government participation could be due to limited experience on the part of governments with PRSPs and perhaps will change over time. It could also be that executive branches of governments are designed more for policy implementation than formulation and hence may not be well suited for the responsibility of carrying out a participatory process. Finally, it could also be the case that it is difficult to impose participatory processes, which by their very nature must develop indigenously.

With regard to policy choices, on economic issues there was largely congruence between what was recommended in the Sourcebook and what was contained in the PRSPs included in the study. However, while both the Sourcebook and the PRSPs identify the agricultural sector as important for growth, the PRSPs give this much greater emphasis. There was also great deal of similarity on the emphasis placed on governance in the Sourcebook; however some PRSPs went beyond the Sourcebook and also specifically address the issue of government corruption. While most address economic insecurity, which is emphasised in the Sourcebook, the countries in the study that are most fragile and have most recently experienced conflict also gave extensive attention to conflict based insecurity, something hardly mentioned in the Sourcebook.

The relatively high degree of similarity between the PRSPs and the Sourcebook on economic issues could indicate that on this topic there is little domestic ownership and policies continue to be dictated by the World Bank and the IMF. This agrees with the findings of ActionAid, which suggested that the policy choices in the PRSPs are dominated by the IFIs. However, it is also possible that governments in HIPC countries have come to share the same beliefs as the World Bank and IMF on economic issues. Such shifts on the part of the governments of HIPC countries could be genuine or they could be purely tactical. Owusu argues, looking at

the experience in Africa, that there has been a convergence of thinking between African leaders and the World Bank and IMF; African leaders have decided, 'to turn away from a dependency approach and adopt a Western development approach' (Owusu 2003: 1665).

However, divergence on the issue of conflict between the Sourcebook and the PRSPs suggests that there is scope for policy differences between HIPC countries and the World Bank and IMF. Given that the inclusion of conflict in the PRSPs was greatest in the countries that are the most fragile and had most recently experienced conflict it is likely that these concerns were genuine. This implies that there is some domestic ownership over the policy choices in the PRSPs. However, because the PRSPs exhibited general similarities on economic issues, it may be the case that as long as countries conform to World Bank and IMF standards on macroeconomic stability and growth policies, they are relatively free to expand the scope of their PRS beyond the recommendations of the IFIs in other areas.

These conclusions paint an overall mixed and complex picture of ownership in PRSPs. Additional research is needed to understand the degree to which the PRSPs actually reflect reality. In those cases where the PRSP is relatively accurate, attention should be given to further understanding the meaning of domestic ownership identified in this paper. Where the PRSPs do not reflect reality, research should be undertaken on why these disconnects exists. Finally, the results of a longitudinal study on subsequent PRSPs produced by these countries could produce different results. Such studies could suggest either more or less domestic ownership due to increased experience with PRSPs by both countries and IFIs.

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Table I. Format of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
I.1 - Document Name	The Government of Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, June 2002	Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2000 PEAP). Summary and Main Objectives, March 24, 2000	Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction (I-ANDS), May 2006	Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PGRSP)	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-2005) (PARPA), April 2001	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, December 2005 (NEEDS)	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), October 1, 2000	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), March 31, 2002
I.2 - Is there a master document upon which the PRSP is based?	Vision 2020	The 2000 PEAP document is a summary of the revised version of the 1997 PEAP and relates to Vision 2025, which describes Uganda's longer-term national aspirations.	Vision 2020: Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2005.	Vision 26/25 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)	No	Vision 2010 (p. vii)	The National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) lays out the objectives for poverty eradication efforts through 2010. Vision 2025 lays out the long-term developmental goals against which the NPES and PRSP were formulated.	Vision 2025
I.3 - What is the time frame of the PRSP?	2002-04	2000-03	2005-20 (p. 15) with 5 year benchmarks	2006-08 (p. 50)	2001-05	2003-07	2000-03	2002-04 (p. 13)
I.4 - What are the key objectives?	The PRSP outlines six main pillars for government action: 1) institutional and legal changes; 2) the resolution of regional conflict; 3) the prioritisation of public expenditure in accordance with the Medium-Term	The PEAP sets out four major pillars: 1) creating a framework for economic growth and transformation; 2) ensuring good governance and security; 3) directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes; 4)	The I-ANDS has three main pillars: 1) security; 2) governance, the rule of law and human rights; 3) economic and social development. Cross cutting themes are gender equity, counter	The PGRSP has five pillars: 1) promote good governance and consolidate peace (through strengthened institutions); 2) consolidate macroeconomic stability and	The PARPA is based on six 'fundamental areas of action': education, health, agriculture and rural development, basic infrastructure, good governance, and macro-economic and financial	The programme has 4 main goals: 1) wealth creation; 2) employment generation; 3) poverty reduction; 4) value reorientation. The success of NEEDS rests on 3 pillars:	The PRSP has three main objectives: 1) reduce income poverty; 2) improve human capabilities, survival and social well-being; 3) contain extreme vulnerability among the poor (p. 14).	The key objective is sustained economic growth and employment creation leading to poverty reduction (p. ix). The programme has 3 main pillars: 1) diversification of the economy by enhancing the

Table I. Format of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
	Expenditure Framework (MTEF); 4) the development of sector strategies; 5) the development of decentralised and participatory structures and capacities at various levels; 6) the establishment of principles, indicators and institutional mechanisms for development monitoring (p. 10).	directly increasing the quality of the life of the poor (p.3).	narcotics, regional cooperation, anti-corruption, and environment. (Fig. 1.5 p. 25)	growth; 3) improve access to social services and reduce vulnerability; 4) combat HIV/AIDS; 5) promote local initiatives. (p. 50)	management. Complementary activities include social programmes, housing, sectoral policies and programmes to generate income and create jobs, preparation for natural disasters, and policies to support sustainable growth. (p. 5)	empowering the people, creating a legal and financial environment that enables good use of natural resources, reforming laws and the way the government works. (p. xv)		productive sectors of agriculture and tourism; 2) improving infrastructure; 3), enhancing the social sector (education and health/nutrition). Cross-cutting issues are environment, HIV/AIDS and gender. Attention must also be given to improving macroeconomic policies and governance.
I.5 - How is poverty defined?	The PRSP defines poverty as households that have a total level of expenditure of less than 64,000 Rwf per adult per annum (in 2000 prices), or if their food expenditures fall below 45,000 Rwf (p. 14).	Consumption poverty is defined as consuming 'less than what is required to meet the basic needs of life' (p. 8).	Periodic World Food Programme estimates of rural food insecurity proxy for poverty headcount ratio due to data constraints, including the absence of a population census. 'Once household consumption data is available, a national poverty line will be used for planning' (p. 47). The I-ANDS estimates that 38% of rural households 'face chronic or transient shortage of	Five dimensions of poverty are outlined based on public consultations and a national opinion poll. These include: unmet basic needs; deterioration in production factors; absence of peace; culture of impunity boosting corruption, injustice and exclusion; and poor access to basic social services (p. 18). However, poverty	An absolute poverty line of 5,433 MT per day reflects the price of a modest amount of non-food expenditure and 2,150 calories per person per day. Destitution is defined as being unable to satisfy these caloric requirements (60% of 5,433 MT per day) (p. 13). The PRSP also uses a poverty gap index, squared poverty gap index and non-consumption welfare indicators (Tables 2.1 – 2.6, pp. 22-25).	Poverty is defined as living on less than \$1 a day, currently 70% of the population.	Poverty is defined to include 'income' and 'non-income' development attributes (p. 5). Due to data problems, some studies have used 'lower lines', which cover basic food needs, others 'upper lines' that include other basic needs, and others use the absolute poverty line of \$1 per day (p. 6).	Following an elaborate discussion of different definitions of poverty the PRSP defines poverty as the amount of monthly income needed to purchase basic food to meet the minimum caloric requirements for a family of six (p. 21). Currently K32,861 is the threshold for extreme poverty and K47,188 for moderate poverty.

Appendix A: Eight Country PRSP Comparison Matrix

Table I. Format of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
			food and require varying levels of assistance' (p. 50).	threshold is based on minimum yearly household expenditures for both food and non-food goods differentiated for urban and rural households (p. 22).				

Table I. Format of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
I.6 - What is the projected target for poverty reduction?	Principal objectives: 1) to reduce by half the proportion of the population living below the poverty line by 2015 (estimated 60.29% in 2000); 2) to reduce by ¾ the infant and maternal mortality rates for the same period (p.85).	Reducing the headcount of income poverty to 10% by 2017 (from 44% in 1997) (p.9).	The goal is to meet the Afghan MDGs as outlined in Vision 2020. The goal for the first MDG is to reduce the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1/day by 3% per annum and those who suffer from hunger by 5% per annum until 2020 (Vision 2020, p. xxiv).	Reduce incidence of poverty from 71% to less than 70% (p. 50)	Reduce the incidence of absolute poverty from 70% in 1997 to less than 60% by 2005 and less than 50% by 2010 (p. 1).	The document does not give one specific target, as targets are seen as dependent on different growth scenarios. Assuming a continued growth rate of 3.5% of GDP, poverty will increase from 70% to 80% in 2030. With a moderate increase in growth to the 1980s level of 5%, poverty will stabilise at 70%. If growth increases to 7%, poverty will be halved by 2015.	Reduce basic poverty from 48% to 42% (as a benchmark toward the NPES target of 24% by 2010), food poverty from 27% to 23.5% (compared to NPES target of 14%) and the proportion of rural poor from 57% to 49.5% (compared to NPES target of 29%) (p.14).	Reduce poverty from 73% (in 1998) to 65% by 2004 (the level in 1996) (p. 14)
I.7 - At what stage is the PRSP process?	Final First PRSP.	The present Summary and Main Objectives of the revised version of the 1997 PEAP was presented as Uganda's first PRSP.	The government hopes to finalise a full ANDS (PRSP) by the end of 2007 (p. 26)	Final First PRSP	Final First PRSP	Not mentioned	Final First PRSP	Final First PRSP

Table II. Process of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
II.1 - Who oversaw the process?	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED).	The ANDS Oversight Committee, chaired by the President's senior economic advisor.	The Inter-ministerial Commission Responsible for Formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (CI-SNLCP) chaired by the Minister of Planning (p. 14).	Ministry of Planning and Finance oversaw consultations.	Nigerian National Planning Commission.	An inter-ministerial technical committee coordinated by the Ministry of Finance.	Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP).
II.2 – Describe the consultative process	The Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) was a major element of the consultative process. Under this assessment, three strategies were developed: 1) the use of the National Poverty Assessment (NPA) - a national survey conducted on the district level to gather information on issues such as characteristics of poverty, problems faced by the communities and land ownership and tenure. This survey is the overarching assessment in the PPA; 2) the use of exercises in which communities developed action plans to solve the problems they identified in terms of poverty; 3) launching a Policy Relevance Test to look more specifically	The revision process included: 1) general consultative workshops involving a wide range of stakeholders with the aim of reviewing drafts and providing detailed comments on policy issues arising from the drafts; 2) regional meetings for district officials and promotion of discussion of PEAP related issues within districts and communities; 3) donor consultations; 4) political consultations involving parliamentarians and sessional committees (p. 6).	The cabinet and President agreed upon the 'Afghanised MDG's', after which the President created the Oversight Committee of the ANDS process, chaired by his senior economic advisor. This group created and presented a first draft of the I-ANDS and then held consultations with donors, the Ulama (religious leaders), NGOs, the private sector, and civil society representatives. The consultative draft was also discussed with government ministries and donor representatives, and the External Advisory Group (EAG), comprised of donor representatives.	Participation took the following forms: 1) the organisation of sectoral and theme-based consultations and focused studies; 2) the systematic involvement of civil society organisations in the process, in particular in the organisation of participatory consultations with grassroots communities; 3) the organisation of qualitative and quantitative surveys; 4) the involvement of national experts and the sectoral ministries; 5) the organisation of capacity building workshops at the central and provincial levels; 6) the participation of the development	The report emphasises that broad consultation has been a normal part of government policymaking for some time, and includes a survey of regular activities and events organised by the government involving economic and social actors covered by Noticias newspaper between 1998 and 2000 (Annex 1, p. vi). Consultations with technicians, donors and civil society began at the sectoral level using a variety of consultation methods, described in detail for the education, health, agriculture and rural development, and infrastructure sectors. The results of these discussions informed	There is vague mention of the government consulting with ordinary Nigerians and that 'Information [was] collected from farmers, labourers, factory owners, teachers and university professors, community based organisations, charities, and other stakeholders was used to draft an I-PRSP' (p.xiii). The document was circulated nationwide and debates with government officials and stakeholders were incorporated in the final document (p.vii).	The consultation process took the following form: 1) zonal workshops to ascertain the views of the 'grassroots'; 2) consultations with Members of Parliament to establish reactions to the findings of the zonal workshops; 3) consultations with donors; 4) discussing and reviewing the final PRSP draft with regional administrative secretaries and at the National workshop; 5) review and approval of the final draft by the	The PRSP consultative process began with national level awareness seminars, the first of which was held for senior government officials (p. 140). Eight working groups were established on different poverty issues. These groups drew from 'government, business, academia, church, NGOs, professional associations, and donors' (p. 140). These working groups produced the 'zero' draft of the PRSP. In each of the ten provinces a provincial consultation was held 'comprising the administrative district head [for each district], a few sector

Table II. Process of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
	<p>at existing policies and those proposed in the I-PRSP.</p> <p>In 2001, other surveys were conducted in addition to the PPA, such as the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire, the Demographic and Health Survey and the Food Security Survey. The NPA process has demonstrated the priorities of communities. At the same time, an exercise has been undertaken to cost the ministries' needs in each of their identified priority programmes. This work, together with the National Validation Workshop and other consultations within the government, has resulted in a defined list of expenditures, as well as a revised list of priorities.</p>		<p>Community Development Council (CDC) leaders discussed the proposal in small groups, were asked their opinions and filled out a questionnaire. The ANDS website is also designed as a forum for feedback (p. 191).</p>	<p>partners (p. 10). More than 34,995 persons took part in the consultative process (p. 15).</p>	<p>consultations with technicians, donors and civil society at the provincial and central level. (p. 97). Using the PARPA (2000-04), the I-PRSP, as a consultative document, meetings were held in every province that included provincial administrators, NGO forums, religious bodies, the private sector, the media, and academics. To prepare the PARPA (2001-05), government sectors submitted suggestions, and the Ministry of Planning and Finance established a Consultation Technical Unit to facilitate further consultations with stakeholders. General meetings with the private sector, religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and donors were designed to select priorities. Participatory Rural Diagnoses took place that covered 7 provinces and 21</p>		<p>cabinet (p. 5).</p>	<p>experts like agriculture, health and education, a representative of traditional leaders and NGOs/churches' (p. 141). In addition, there was a parallel NGO process that produced its own PRSP, under the aegis of an umbrella organisation called Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR). This document was reviewed by the working groups. Lastly, a PRSP national summit was convened to discuss the final PRSP.</p>

Table II. Process of the PRSP									
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War		
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					districts, though these results will be included in a future draft (p. 100). The Ministry of Planning and Finance also held about 30 formal meetings that included around 150 participants (Annex 2, p. xxiii).				
II.3 - Who was consulted in the drafting of the PRSP and through what means									
II.3a - State	Executive	Discussions were held within Government, coordinated by the National Programme for Poverty Reduction. Most ministries and Government agencies contributed directly to the document through written submissions, corrections and comments. Ministries were also consulted regarding the policy matrix (see Annex 8), which details policy proposals for all sectors.	Ministries were involved in the two major consultative workshops (p. 7)	The President created the Oversight Committee (OSC) of the ANDS (Senior Advisors and Ministers) which presented an eight pillar outline to the international community and members of the government. Line ministries submitted Sector Strategy Outlines to the ANDS Working Group (p. 21-22).	The PRSP process was launched by the Vice-president of the Economic and Financial Commission (p. 14). Line ministries were involved in the process through the CI-SNLCP (p. 14).	Line ministries commented on the 2000-04 PARPA and provided information on their own consultations. Specific ministries are mentioned by name.	Each state drafted its own SEEDS (State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy), which is complimentary to NEEDS and identifies priority programmes for key areas of development (p.xiii). The National Planning Commission prepared a Guidance Manual and is organising training workshops for the states on issues of preparing, monitoring and evaluating state plans (p.xiii).	A committee of twelve ministers and the Central Bank Governor was formed to steer the process of the preparation of the PRSP. This committee was supported by an inter-ministerial Technical Committee coordinated by the Ministry of Finance (p.38). The Cabinet reviewed and approved the final draft (p.40).	The Ministry of Finance and National Planning was responsible for producing the PRSP. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and the Bank of Zambia are mentioned and there are vague references to the cabinet, the legislature and other government bodies (p. 140)

Appendix A: Eight Country PRSP Comparison Matrix

Table II. Process of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
Legislative	Not mentioned.	A meeting for members of all Parliamentary standing committees was held in February 2000 (p. 7).	The government plans to consult with parliament (the National Assembly) in the process leading up to finalising a full ANDS (p. 26, 192). The May 15th 2006 JSAN indicates that parliamentarians have been included in consultative meetings with stakeholders (p. 2).	Not mentioned.	Parliamentarians are vaguely mentioned as having played a role in designing the consultation plan (Annex 1, p. v).	Not mentioned.	'The parliamentarians were briefed on the concerns and priorities identified at the zonal workshops. This background information gave the parliamentarians an opportunity to indicate their concerns and priorities regarding poverty reduction efforts' (p.39).	An awareness seminar was held for ministers and selected parliamentarians (p. 140).
Other	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Bank of Mozambique.	Not mentioned.	The Governor of the Bank of Tanzania participated in the preparation of the PRSP (p.38).	Bank of Zambia (p. 140).

Table II. Process of the PRSP									
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War		
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia	
II.3b - Political Parties	Sub-National	Not mentioned.	Urban and local representatives participated in the consultative workshops and the MFPED, working with the Ministry of Local Government, undertook regional work to explain the PEAP, UPPAP findings and budget issues in regional meetings for district officials (pp.6-7)	The ANDS Working Group informally consulted with 400 Community Development Council (CDC) leaders who were in Kabul for a conference.	Local technical committees (CTLs) were responsible for consultations at the provincial level (p. 14).	Provincial government administrators were involved in various consultations (Chapter V, Annex 1, 2).	The federal ministries collaborated with the National Planning Commission and with the respective government representatives (p. vii).	In every zonal workshop, each district was represented by one district councillor, one town councillor and one district executive director (p. 38).	Provincial workshops involved administrative heads of districts, non-elected officials appointed by central government (p. 141).
		Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.

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Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
II.3c - Civil Society	Not mentioned.	NGOs, civil society and the media were represented at the consultative workshops. A CSO Task Force promoted the discussion of PEAP related issues within districts and communities (pp. 6-7). Steps are being taken to involve civil society in the consultation process of the Budget Framework Paper (p. 5).	The Government informally consulted with civil society representatives, including Ulamas (p. 191). The written comments of some of these groups (international advocacy NGOs such as OXFAM, Christian Aid and Action Aid Afghanistan and national advocacy NGOs such as Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU)) can be viewed at www.and.s.gov.af .	The Technical Committee that was set up to support the UPPE-SRP comprised government officials and representatives from civil society. The report states that civil society was systematically included in the process.	Chapter V and Annexes 1 and 2 outline various consultation strategies with civil society at the sectoral, provincial, and central levels. Annex 2 names many of the civil society groups involved in the formal consultation meetings conducted by the Ministry of Planning and Finance. These groups include national and international NGOs, religious bodies, the media, trade union federations, and youth and student groups.	Not mentioned.	For every zonal workshop, civil society was represented by five NGOs (with one person each). A total of 53 NGO workers participated (p. 38). Civil society is also mentioned as being involved in the discussion of the interim PRSP at the technical committee meeting.	Civil society in mentioned as being consulted in all phases of the process. Their involvement was coordinated by the umbrella organisation CSPR. No other groups are mentioned. A separate NGO report is referred to as being consulted during the drafting in the PRSP (p. 149).
II.3d - Private Sector	Not mentioned.	The private sector was represented at the general consultative workshops (p. 6).	The Government informally consulted with private sector representatives.	Consultations with the private sector are noted in the overview of the participation section, but there is no indication of what role they played in the process (p. 14).	Consultations in Nampula and Sofala provinces included representatives from the private sector. The Confederation of Business Associations (CTA) organised an extensive round of consultations between the government and the private sector. A list of business organisations is included.	Not mentioned.	Private sector organisations were represented at the National Workshop. The workshop had only 25 participants and had the aim of seeking further reactions to the targets, priorities and actions as outlined in the PRSP (p. 39).	Business is mentioned as being represented in the eight PRSP working groups and at a national PRSP summit (p. 149). No specific groups or individuals are mentioned.

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Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
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II.4 - What were the suggestions of those consulted?	Discussions held within the government are seen to have contributed to the PRSP. Most ministries contributed with written submissions, corrections and comments. There is no mention of what these suggestions were.	Participatory data from the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) highlighted the many dimensions of poverty. Particular concerns included the low quality of schooling, the sense of powerlessness and insecurity. The document further states that 'consultations with the poor have shown that insecurity is among their most pressing concerns' (p. 14).	Written suggestions were made by donors and civil society representatives. These were not included in the IANDS, but are available at www.and.s.gov.af). Each of the NGO and international donor reports posted on the website raise a multitude of issues. Donors often focused on the need to cost and prioritise policies. NGOs questioned how the government would implement the policies in the I-ANDS, and how the government planned to reach those most in need of health, education and infrastructure. The PRSP Resource Group (an agglomeration mostly of national and international NGOs) suggested a detailed plan for future consultations with civil society.	The only suggestions emerging from the consultative process that were captured in the PRGSP are perceptions of poverty. These are based both on local consultations and on national surveys (which were not conducted specifically for the PRGSP) (p. 17).	Generally, the consultation process emphasised the importance of good governance, saw participatory district planning as a potential step forward, and highlighted the need to develop a more effective state, fight corruption, and change the attitudes of public institutions and their workers towards citizens. There were objections to policies for 'agricultural marketing, the promotion of agro-industries, the development of a national entrepreneurial class, the development of financial services for rural areas, for the poor, and for the nascent national business class. There was a call for greater state intervention in these areas.' (p. 101). The private sector critiqued the many pieces of legislation that were not being implemented and was divided between free trade and protectionist	Not mentioned.	Results of the zonal workshops: agreement that the government should give overriding attention to education, bolstering primary school enrolment and retention rates. Various causes of income poverty, especially in the agricultural sector, were identified, and the need for new and strengthened rural credit mechanisms, improved research and extension services and rural road maintenance were suggested. Health, poor governance and gender discrimination were also stated as obstacles to	Working groups produced reports, but details of these reports are not provided. A table is provided containing summary suggestions from the provincial consultations (p. 143). Civil society compiled a report on its recommendations (p. 149). Revisions to the PRSP were also made at the National Summit (p. 149).

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Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
					<p>interests.</p> <p>The Workers Trade Union Federations enumerated the inadequacy of the HIPC process for dealing with debt or developing the country's productive capacity.</p> <p>NGOs (grouped as the Mozambican Group on Foreign Debt (GMD)) called for an institutionalisation of dialogue between the state and civil society, asked for concrete plans to combat corruption and crime, and reform of the judicial system.</p> <p>International donors focused on '(a) the relationship between the PARPA and other existing planning instruments; (b) a clear definition of priorities; (c) the introduction of a component on corruption in the PARPA; (d) greater liberalization of the economy; (e) a strategy for post-HIPC management of the foreign debt, etc'.</p>		poverty reduction (p. 12).	

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	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
					(Annex 2, p. xxv).			
II.5 - What was accepted and rejected from these consultations?	As the suggestions from the participatory process are not identified in the PRSP, it is not possible to determine whether they were accepted or rejected.	As a response to the UPPAP findings, a wider definition of poverty was accepted. More emphasis would also be given to quality education (p. 10) and to administrative and political reforms to increase poor people's control over their own lives (p.12). Security was added as a pillar in response to the security concerns. In addition, 'the participatory work has shed light on numerous aspects of poverty in Uganda and has immediately influenced budgetary allocation on water supply and the priority given to improving security' (p. 27).	The eight pillars were reduced to three 'based upon consultations within government and with key stakeholders' (p. 21).	The dimensions of poverty as identified through local consultations and national surveys are incorporated into the five pillars of the PRGSP. In some cases they are a pillar (as in the case of greater access to social services), while in others they are covered under a pillar (corruption is under 'promote good governance and consolidate peace').	The report outlines that the consultation process contributed to the final version by 'confirming the choice of the fundamental areas of action, emphasizing the importance of good governance...highlighting the need for the state to be more effective in delivering on the potions taken... [and] the fight against corruption' (p. 6).	Not mentioned.	'The government, guided by the findings from the stakeholders' workshops, will confine its financial interventions mostly to (i) education (notably at primary school level); (ii) health (primary health care); (iii) agriculture (research and extension); (iv) roads (in the rural areas); (v) water; (vi) judiciary; and (vii) HIV/AIDS' (p. 22).	The PRSP includes a table of provincial priorities and indicates that these were incorporated into the final draft (p. 142). It further states that civil society felt that 80% of its issues were included in the PRSP (p. 149). No information is given as to which points were accepted or rejected. The report notes that comments from the National Summit were also incorporated into the final draft PRSP (p. 149).
II.6 - Which donors were involved in the PRSP?	Donors participated, but are not mentioned by name.	Donors participated, but are not mentioned by name.	The government consulted with the External Advisory Committee (EAG), coordinated by the Government of Canada, to achieve success when presenting to all major donors at the London Conference in 2006.	Specific donors are not mentioned. A Consultative Committee of Partners (CCP) was established involving government and donors to evaluate the PRSGP process and to mobilise resources (p. 14).	The following donors were involved: UNDP, EU, Swiss Cooperation, DFID, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Irish, Norwegian and Swedish embassies, World Bank, IMF (Annex 2, p. xxxii).	The document states that the National Planning Commission is collaborating with donor agencies to provide technical assistance to the states in developing their SEEDS (p. vii).	The Government convened a consultative meeting with the Donor community to seek comments on the PRSP process and the draft PRSP. A	Donors were invited to attend the National Summit as invited guests (p. 149). No information is provided about which donors attended. Donors also participated in the eight sectoral working groups (p. 140).

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			The IMF, World Bank, IDB, ADB, UN, and a number of countries submitted written comments. (www.and.s.gov.af).				joint World Bank/IMF Mission also attended the meeting. Representatives of the donor community and multilateral institutions were also present at the National Workshop (p. 39).	

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II.7 - What is the envisioned role for donor?	The joint Government and donor document 'Guidelines for Productive Aid Cooperation in Rwanda' proposes concrete long-term and short-term steps for effective coordination to support the implementation of the PRSP (p. 33). The PRSP states that the 'the Government prefers to receive resources on the most flexible terms' (p. 81).	The Poverty Action Fund is expected to be funded by increased donor support. It is emphasised that 'increasing the flexibility and efficiency of resource inflows by the shift from project aid to budgetary support may be as important in achieving the government's objectives as increasing the total volume of net flows' (p. 26).	The report outlines that the strategy's success requires a commitment of US\$ 27billion over the next seven years and emphasises aid being channelled through the government to prevent the development of parallel delivery systems (p. 179).	The PRGSP is seen as a tool to strengthen the relationship between the government and donors. As such, the PRGSP 'should contribute to a significant increase in official development assistance' (p. 103). The Inter-ministerial Commission Responsible for Formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (CI-SNLCP) will be responsible for liaising with all partners (including donors) (p. 102).	The report states that the poverty reduction strategy's success requires US\$ 600 million annually (p. 77). It notes that while economic growth must come from within the country, 'international partners play a key supporting role in complementing our capacity and increasing our chances of success through the provision of aid, investment, technology, qualified workers and managers, and access to vast potential markets' (p. 31).	NEEDS will cost about \$4.5 billion through 2007, much of which has to come from external assistance. ODA in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance is being sought (p. xxi).	'Although the Government will be seeking to bring externally funded operations within the purview of the budget, a large volume of activities will probably continue to be donor driven and remain outside the budget. Because of this, the Government will involve its development partners in reviewing the sectoral strategies under preparation and the key aspects of the LGRP, with a view to enlisting strong and coherent support for the poverty reduction strategy, thereby ensuring greater consistency of donor programs	It is indicated that an initial PRSP budget of US\$4 billion for three years was determined necessary, but after consultations with donors this was reduced to US\$1.2 billion for three years. Sectoral workgroup will be used for implementation and evaluation of the PRSP. Donors will continue to be members of these workgroups (p. 128). It is also envisioned that donors will provide technical assistance in the implementation of some parts of the PRSP (in particular financial management) (p. 46).

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							with government priorities' (p.19).	
II.8 - Is there evidence of the role played by foreign 'Technical Assistance' in drawing up the PRSP?	No information is given.	No information is given.	No information is given.	No information is given. However, the PRGSP does make reference to a number of studies funded by donors (the only research for a donor acknowledge by name was commissioned by the World Bank).	An external consultant was used to develop the consultation process (p. 102).	No information is given.	No information is given	No information is given.

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
III.1 - How does the PRSP describe the 'macro political environment'?								
III.1a - What is the 'macro political environment'?	The Rwandan society is heavily influenced by the 1994 genocide. This factor is mentioned in several sections of the PRSP.	There is a very brief discussion about the armed conflict and security issues (p. 14-15).	The I-ANDS outlines Afghanistan's political history from 1978 to the present. It highlights the destruction of state legitimacy and capacity during the Taliban regime, the splintering of the army along regional and factional lines, and the ascendancy of armed groups in many areas after provincial administrations collapsed. The rising number of attacks on ISAF forces and individuals and groups seen to be collaborating with the government, and the process of adopting a constitution, is also mentioned (pp. 31-35).	The PRGSP was prepared following the National Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which led to the establishment of transitional institutions, including a government of national unity (p. 13). The PRGSP states that the DRC 'is in a situation characterized by fragile peace, insecurity, and poverty. Armed political conflicts involving local militias and foreign armies have undermined domestic and external stability and resulted in large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons' (p. 29).	No discussion.	No discussion.	No discussion.	No discussion.
III.1b - Is there discussion of conflict?	The history of conflict has left a very complex legacy of questions about the assignment of property rights (p. 8). The continued external security threats, including the	The armed conflict is seen as a decisive factor in the impoverishment of the north and the east. Conflict resolution and providing effective support to conflict-afflicted areas are	Security is identified as one of the three pillars of the PRSP. The government lacks a monopoly on the use of force with parallel structures of power related to the criminalised	Absence of peace is identified as one of the causes of poverty (p. 19). Pillar 1 of the PRGSP is to 'promote good governance and consolidate peace' (p. 50). Under the heading 'consolidate peace and	The report emphasises that economic growth and poverty reduction will only be possible with peace and socio-political/political	No	No	No

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	<p>insurgencies of 1996/7 and 2001, remain a serious obstacle to recovery. There is an acute need for political development to aim at reconciliation and to forge a new sense of national identity and social cohesion. Open debate with collective responsibility needs to replace the culture of passive obedience, which left people open to political and sectarian manipulation (p. 8).</p> <p>Promoting internal and regional security is essential to the achievement of poverty reduction. Rwanda has for defensive reasons been involved in the conflict in DRC since 1997. The PRSP states that the government wishes to improve security. As security improves, it will be possible to shift expenditures away from defence (p. 58). The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was created in March 1999 and has the task of leading national</p>	<p>seen as essential (p. 15). Good governance and security is a pillar of the PRSP, but the discussion of conflict is very brief.</p>	<p>economy, including over 1800 independent armed groups (IAGs) (p. 32). 'The PRSP highlights the importance of the NATO-led ISAF in promoting stability' (p. 38).</p>	<p>security' the PRGSP highlights the need to: 1) reunite the country and territorial administration; 2) demobilise and reintegrate the army, police and security services; 3) reintegrate internally and externally displaced person; and 4) conduct elections (p. 61).</p>	<p>stability (pp. 2, 27).</p>			

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	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
III.1c - How does the PRSP specifically address the issue of corruption?	efforts to promote unity and reconciliation (p. 59).							
	The PRSP mentions corruption in administrative and judicial bodies, but there is no further discussion of the issue.	The word 'corruption' is barely used (p.31), but the problem of poor people having to pay bribes is addressed, and reforms have been undertaken to make it harder to misuse funds with impunity (including the establishment of the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity and the design of a new regulatory structure for procurement) (p. 15).	Corruption is one of the PRSP's cross cutting themes and the report emphasises its relation to the criminalised economy. The government strategy involves creating a motivated, merit-based, performance-driven and professional civil service that does not force people to pay bribes, through the Public Administration Reform, monitoring appointments, higher wages, and creating and enforcing civil servant ethical standards. Further reforms include strengthening public accountability systems through financial management, computerised recording and management systems, specialised training for tax and	Corruption is identified as a cause of poverty and a culture of impunity as encouraging corruption and undermining peace (p. 20). Under Pillar 1 ('promote good governance and promote peace'), the PRGSP addresses combating 'rampant' corruption. The PRGSP indicates the government will: 1) conduct a public information campaign; 2) continue audits of state enterprises; 3) speed reform of judicial system; 4) adhere to a timetable for reform of public procurement; 5) create a financial intelligence unit (FIU) on money laundering; 6) simplify procedures and strengthen controls at borders; 7) improve transparency in forestry and mining sectors; and 8) complete public procurement code and evaluation of procurement staff (p. 54).	There are some vague words about the need to changing the attitudes of government institutions so that they can become more responsive to citizens (p. 6). The report outlines that corruption inhibits poverty reduction and economic growth (p. 71). The report outlines a strategy which involves strengthening the General Inspectorate of Finances, bodies linked to the administration of justice, the Administrative Tribunal, and the state's administrative inspection services, and implementing media anti-corruption campaigns (p. 75).	Corruption is one of NEEDS' most emphasised issues. This presents a break with past policies: 'Past governments in Nigeria, instead of focusing on delivering essential public services, assumed control of major sources of national income. In the process, corruption thrived in public service and gained a strong foothold in society' (p. xiii). NEEDS sets out public reforms to punish corruption. The National Orientation Agency and its state-level counterparts will be strengthened in order to lead a campaign against corruption. The Kuru Declaration, on which NEEDS is based, calls for a 'crusade against	The PRSP states that the effectiveness of the instruments of law and order have recently been eroded and that the police and judiciary are highly corrupt institutions (p. 9). The strategy aims to implement sector specific anti-corruption plans for the judiciary and ministries, make the Central Tender Board's results public through press release, and improve integrity and transparency in the accounting system (p. 47).	The PRSP states that '[a] policy of 'zero tolerance' against corruption will become one of the major pillars of good governance in the country' and a corresponding anti-corruption campaign (p. 34). Further, that the SADC regional protocol on corruption will be operationalised (p. 35). In the appendices there is mention of an improved system for prosecution of corruption (p. 151).

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			customs administrators, improving the audit system, increasing the proficiencies and professionalism of auditors, strengthening the oversight mechanisms of representative institutions and providing capacity building to the National Assembly, provincial councils and CDCs on corruption and transparency, anti-corruption awareness, and strengthening the capacity of the media. Reforms also include strengthening the legal framework and judicial system, encouraging civil society to demand transparency and accountability from the organs of the state, and conducting research on corruption (p. 106).			corruption' and labels it 'anti-social behaviour'. (p. 5 for the whole declaration)		
III.1d - Does the PRSP	No	No	No	There is no discussion of building political consensus, but it is	No	No	There is no explicit discussion of building a political	There is no discussion of building a political

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discuss anything like a strategy for building 'political consensus' for the PRSP				noted that partnership will be needed in implementation. 'PRGSP implementation will be the responsibility of each sectoral ministry concerned, each in its own area, in partnership with other development partners such as NGOs, the private sector, civil society, and religious groups' (p. 96).			consensus, but 'the strategy is viewed as an instrument for channelling national efforts toward broadly agreed objectives and specific inputs and outputs' (p.13). As such, a wide range of actors is involved in the implementation as well as in the monitoring of the PRSP.	consensus. The need for continued consultations with all stakeholders during implementation is noted (p. 149). However, the PRSP states 'the government of the day, having been elected democratically and with the full mandate from voters, will always lead these processes and take final responsibility' (p.150).

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III.2 - What reforms, if any, does the PRSP call for at the level of the state?								
III.2a - Military and security organisations	The need to support demobilisation poses a specific challenge as soldiers are seen as a valuable human resource. From 1997 to 2001, 16,125 Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) troops were demobilised and 15,000 ex- FAR (Forces Armees Rwandaises) were reabsorbed into the RPA. The objective is to demobilise another 20,000 troops (p. 59).	The poor reputation of the police will be addressed by an improvement in service delivery (p.15). Though no military reforms are planned, expenditures for the army are estimated at 2% of GDP.	Reforms include: establishing a National Assembly for oversight and accountability of security organisations, improving security sector coordination (p. 117), creating a 'nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army' (p. 119). Similar reforms are envisioned for the Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police (p. 119).	Four initiatives related to military and security organisations are included in the PRGSP: 1) the government prepared with its development partners a National Programme for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (PNDDR); 2) a new army and police force will be created that will be devoted to the nation; 3) the new army and police will be deployed across the country to ensure the security of persons and property; 4) the DRC will follow a 'good neighbour' policy with other countries in the region focused on nonaggression agreements.	Police capacity building, including making positions more lucrative and improving discipline is discussed briefly (p. 73).	Security-sector reforms will focus on retraining personnel in the security sector, improving logistics, and on more effective supervision and control of personnel. Conflict prevention will be mainstreamed to put in place structures and processes that encourage a culture of peace, in which conflicts are addressed before they degenerate into violence, and which public officers as well as civil society members have the opportunity to be trained in prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (p. 49).	Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.
III.2b - Judicial organisations	The Justice system is seen as seriously overstretched. The Government is now implementing a community- based	Introduction of a sector-wide approach in which reforms proposed for the criminal justice sector	Reforms include: Putting a legal framework in place and distributing it to the public, reforming judicial and	Judicial reform is a priority, but the PRGSP only indicates that a policy document will be published at the end of 2006 on how this will be	Special emphasis is placed on reforming the legal system's capacities with regards to the private sector (p.	NEEDS calls for a more effective criminal system, which involves lowering the cost of litigation and	Implementation of the anti-corruption plan and speeding up settlements of cases in the primary courts by	Reforms include: domestication of international conventions to which Zambia is a signatory;

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III.2c – Service delivery	process to dispute resolution in which traditional institutions - such as the Gacaca courts - are emphasised. The document also notes that the Constitutional Commission is currently coordinating a national consultation process for the development of a new constitution (p. 61).	will be costed (p.15).	legislative institutions, strengthening professional skills, building infrastructure and creating separate prison facilities for women and juveniles by 2010 (p. 125).	accomplished. The government has undertaken an audit of the judicial system with support from the European Union, UNDP, MONUC, the World Bank, Belgium, France and the UK that will help inform this new policy. An important reform that will be introduced is the establishment of a justice-system monitoring committee involving representatives from government and development partners (p. 62).	72). Reforms include potentially revising the Penal Code and the Penal Process Code, expanding the Community Courts system, establishing more Labour Tribunals, improving the Civil Registry and Notary services and the Institute for Judicial Assistance and Support (IPAJ) (pp. 72-3). Prison reform is briefly discussed (p. 73).	broadening the access to justice; reducing delays in cases; ensuring equal opportunities for litigants (p. 98). There are also measures for reforming prisons.	reducing the estimated shortage of magistrates (approximately 700) by one half (p. 20).	increased number of court rooms, judges; improved conditions of service; and introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (p. 34).
	The government aims to rehouse the families who live in extremely poor conditions and to develop a sustainable settlement policy (p. 53). The PRSP also states specific plans to improve water supply in both rural and urban areas, with an emphasis on private - public partnerships (p. 53). With regards to primary education, the curriculum is to be evaluated and reviewed in an effort to reduce the drop- out and repetition rates. The private and public	Improvements in service delivery are to be costed through the Poverty Action Fund. The use of equalisation grants is intended to make the quality of service delivery more even across districts (p. 20). As education is a priority of the PEAP, a strategy is in draft for secondary education and adult literacy is likely to be made an element of the PAF. Health care is coordinated by the new health strategic plan. In general,	The government views a partnership with NGOs as essential in meeting its health and education targets (p. 16). Also, the government sees a role for the private sector in the provision of higher education, power and water, and building upon a government-provided telecommunications backbone. Otherwise, however, the government's service-delivery plan	'Improve access to social services and reduce vulnerability' is one of the five pillars of the PRGSP. Emphasis is on education, health, access to water and sanitation; urban poverty; social protection and issues related to culture, arts and sciences. These programs all focus on expanding both coverage and state capacity. The PRGSP does call for programs to enhance the capacity of the civil service to provide social services. Attention is also given to	The PARPA outlines a plan to expand and improve service provision across a wide variety of sectors – health, education, transportation infrastructure, and disaster management (Chapter IV). Deconcentration and administrative and fiscal decentralisation to provinces and districts is viewed as vital. A role for the private sector is envisioned in the	A large number of services are listed, with emphasis on improvement in education (all levels), sanitation, access to water, health services, empowerment, housing, environmental health, employment, welfare of children, sports activities and safety nets.	'Special efforts will be made to channel the limited Government resources toward the support of key programs and social services under the poverty reduction strategy' (p.14). A national strategy for primary school education will be implemented by 2001. The government will continue to support basic costs in primary education,	A public service reform programme will be implemented to improve the quality of public service delivery (p. 34). Increased resources through the PRSP will be issued to implement a myriad of new and ongoing projects related to education, health, water/sanitation as well as to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It appears that all of

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	sectors are seen to play a complimentary role to the state in secondary education, but there is a need for quality control (p. 47). The PRSP seeks to change the limited possibilities of access to tertiary education. Access will be expanded using private financing wherever possible, but also with government support. Mass education and functional adult literacy is considered a poverty-reducing priority. A main objective is to improve the coordination between NGOs and other partners responsible for literacy and education (p. 50). The main objectives for the health sector are to prevent diseases (particularly malaria and HIV/AIDS), to provide increased access to basic health care, and to ensure improvements in the quality of health services (p. 43).	service delivery is being improved by better remuneration and training, better infrastructure, and better accountability to consumers through village committees. Water and sanitation are being supported by major public interventions, with communities paying a small proportion of the investment costs and being responsible for the maintenance of the facilities. Housing is a private sector responsibility, but the state can encourage the availability of low-cost housing (p. 17).	in each area generally involves scaling up the status quo.	enhancing the capacity of local communities and NGOs to provide services. For education the goal is to significantly expand access to primary, secondary and tertiary education (p. 83). In health, resources will focus on improving quality of care received at state hospitals and clinics (p. 87). To improve the water supply existing systems will be rehabilitated (p. 88). Sanitation efforts will centre on creating commune and territorial level sanitation squads under the National Sanitation Programme (PNA) (p. 89). Urban poverty issues addressed are urban planning and more state housing (p. 89).	management of roads and the energy and water sectors. NGOs and religious groups are seen as important in improving adult literacy rates.		especially salaries of teachers. In a reversal of past policies, it is intended to abolish primary school fees, starting in 2001/02 (p. 19). The government will place special emphasis on reducing morbidity, improving nutrition, and strengthening access to health services and safe water. Initiatives will be developed to provide quality health service and coordinate private sector and civil society activities in the health sector (p. 20).	these would be done by the state. The emphasis is on expanding coverage and improving quality in all of these sectors. There is also discussion of the creation of a formal social security system to counter the collapsed social security informally provided by extended families.
III.2d -	The government is	In order to create a	The IMF Staff	An inter-ministerial	Goals include	The overall goal of	Fiscal	Enhanced fiscal

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Economic Management	<p>committed to ensure that its expenditure programme does not lead to unsustainable imbalances' (p. 75). To achieve sustainability a deficit reduction is necessary, but also necessitates temporary increases in expenditure.</p> <p>The money supply is expected to increase over 2002- 04, reflecting increased economic activities. The increases in money supply can be accounted for mainly by increases in net foreign assets and in credit to the private sector, rather than credit to the public sector. For 2002, broad money growth has been set in line with nominal GDP growth of 9.4% (p. 77).</p>	<p>framework for economic growth and transformation, the strategy includes a commitment to maintaining macroeconomic discipline, setting appropriate macroeconomic incentives (through economic openness, encouraging exports and labour-intensive investments), equitable and efficient collection and use of public resources and removal of the constraints on private sector competitiveness (p. 14)</p>	<p>Monitored Programme (SMP) will continue (p. 36), in order to maintain macroeconomic stability, highlighted as a precondition for growth and poverty reduction (p. 41).</p>	<p>standing committee on the macroeconomic framework (CPCM) reporting to the Minister of Planning will be established. It will be assisted in its work by the Macroeconomic Research Directorate (DEME) of the Ministry of Planning with support from the APNURC project of the UNDP.</p> <p>The four themes of economic management are: increased revenues; improving the quality and composition of expenditures; strengthening management of the wage bill and civil service; and enhancing transparency of state operations (p. 56). Other priorities are public procurement reforms and improving the quality of statistics (p. 60).</p>	<p>limiting spending to the budget, not printing money and establishing financial planning capabilities (p. 76).</p> <p>Private sector economic management goals include strengthening supervision of financial institutions, reviewing and defining prudential regulations and studying options for pro-poor financial services.</p> <p>Reforms include developing computerised systems, classifying expenditures by central, provincial and sectoral expenses, improving auditing capacity, and starting to produce annual expenditure reviews in priority sectors such as health (p. 78).</p>	<p>monetary policy remains price and exchange rate stability' (p. 24). The government states that it is committed to a tighter fiscal policy. The inflation rate is expected to drop progressively over a 4 year time horizon, reaching 9% by 2007. This decline is expected to improve the macro-economic environment for planning and reduce pressures on domestic costs and real interest rates (p. 24). Interest rates will remain deregulated and market-determined, but policy will aim at rates that are above the inflation rate in order to mobilise savings. The reform programme will aim to reduce the spread between lending and deposit rates of interest.</p>	<p>accountability will be fostered through use of the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) (p.16). IFMS will be extended to all ministries, departments, agencies in Dar es Salaam and in all regional sub-treasuries by 2002 (p. 46)</p>	<p>management is a priority. The centrepiece is the introduction of an integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) to enhance the linkage between planning and budgets (p. 47). Capacity building for the Ministry of Finance and National Planning is called for, as well as its restructuring (p. 47). However, what is included in the appendices is funds to improve public service pay. It is also important to reduce the quasi-fiscal deficit incurred by parastatals (p. 46). An important focus of economic planning is improved macroeconomic statistics.</p>

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III.2e - Revenue Collection	<p>The Government is undertaking comprehensive reforms of the taxation system with a view to increasing the efficiency and equity of the tax system as well as increasing the revenue ratio. The commercialisation of small-scale agriculture and livestock will also increase the revenue ratio over time, as rural producers start to buy goods and pay indirect taxes. However, fiscal prudence dictates caution in the projection of the revenue ratio. This is not to be confused with a weak commitment to the objective of raising the tax ratio, which the Government views as extremely important.' The revenue ratio to GDP is projected to rise over the three years. (p. 76)</p>	<p>Recent tax reforms (introduction of VAT) have made the incidence of taxes more progressive, but local taxation still needs review to be more progressive. The use of the savings made available by external debt relief and the development of a sound strategy for external borrowing are seen as essential (p. 14).</p>	<p>The government expresses an interest in improving their revenue collection abilities, partially by reforming the Afghan Border Police (ABP), but admits that corruption and lack of government control in certain regions are major constraints (p. 158).</p>	<p>Enhanced revenue collection involves three bodies. First efforts will be undertaken to modernise the customs and excise office (OFIDA). With regards to the Directorate-General of Taxes (DGI) attention will be given to enhanced collection of existing taxes and the introduction of a value added tax (VAT). The DGI also commits itself to accepting a technical assistance recommendation on collecting back taxes. Lastly, the Directorate-General of Administrative and Government Property Revenue will be strengthened to enhance collection of non-tax revenues (such as on forests and mining concessions) (p. 56).</p>	<p>To increase government revenue, the report outlines reforms that include strengthening administrative capacity and reforming the system which prevents tax evasion, perhaps creating a central revenue authority in 3-5 years, computerising tax and customs systems, improving coordination between customs and tax services, assessing if tax policy requires revision, excluding extraction from Industrial Free Zones, increasing import duties to 25% by 2002, and investigating the revenue possibilities of state involvement in private companies (p. 77).</p>	<p>There is scope to increase revenue yield by aggressively pursuing tax collection in all sectors of the economy. Target areas include the oil and gas sector, personal and property taxes and indirect taxes. The practice whereby most revenue-generating state enterprises spend revenues collected on behalf of the central government will be checked. NEEDS will generally move in direction of a low, stable, simplified tax and tariff regime. (p. 114)</p>	<p>The tax effort will be intensified through measures to broaden the tax base and tax administration will be improved through a reform of customs administration and introduction of Tax-payer Identification Number.</p>	<p>Mention is made of the need to improve fiscal policy through improved taxation. Initiatives include enhanced tax compliance and removing leakage of customs duties (p. 48). It is not clear how these goals will be accomplished and funding for them comes out of the 'normal' budget (p. 154).</p>
III.2f - Elective Bodies	<p>Decentralisation is repeated as the largest reform needed to achieve the goals of</p>	<p>The process of decentralisation involves the transfer of responsibilities to district level. 'The</p>	<p>The PRSP highlights that the National Assembly has been created, and stresses that the</p>	<p>The PRGSP does not directly mention elective bodies. However, it does mention the need for election and implies</p>		<p>Reforms focus on a reduction of the autonomy that states have of tax collection, seeking</p>	<p>Fully implement the Local Government Reform Programme</p>	<p>The most important issues involve of decentralisation and the elimination</p>

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	poverty reduction.	implication of decentralization for ministries of central government have been reflected in the government restructuring, but the extent to which they are now ready to fulfil their role needs to be addressed' (p. 15)	government will facilitate training to allow members and staff to perform their duties (p. 125). A Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs will also be created (p. 125).	that such institutions were defined as part of the National Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (p. 13).		to coordinate local, state and national taxes.	(LGRP) by 2003 (p. 43).	of the appointed post of district commissioner with his/her functions being taken over by elected officials (p. 34). While not mentioned in the text, the appendices include the abolishment of the presidential discretionary fund. They also include a parliamentary reforms related to increase the transparency of the legislature (p. 151). The PRSP also states that the legislature will be given greater oversight over the budget (p. 48), but does not explain how. Related, regulations on government borrowing will be strengthened (p. 28).

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III.3 - How does the PRSP discuss the macroeconomic environment?								
III.3a - What is the portrait of the economy	<p>Economic transformation has lagged behind population growth. This is blamed on bad agricultural policies that did not do enough to encourage increased output, and on the massive trade shocks that came about when international coffee prices fell. In 2002, the country was facing the following macroeconomic structural problems: low agricultural productivity, low human resource development (literacy and skills development), limited employment opportunities, high population density and growth, high transportation costs (landlocked position aggravates this problem), environmental degradation. The failure to address these problems has resulted in an economy</p>	<p>Referring to a World Bank study that indicates which factors constrain growth, the PEAP states that some factors (such as trade openness and macroeconomic stability) are already better than average and cannot yield higher future growth (p. 13). Key constraints to economic growth are: lacking infrastructure, limitations of the road network and weakness of the financial sector (p. 14).</p>	<p>Afghanistan met all but one of the macroeconomic SMP benchmarks in its most recent review (p. 36). However, key constraints to economic growth and poverty reduction are the dominance of the opium economy, the country's massive trade deficit, and the informal and un-taxable nature of the economy (p. 43-45).</p>	<p>Relatively little mention is made of the pre-2002 period in the DRC. It is suggested that before 2002 the country experienced a long period of negative growth (p. 32). Since 2002 growth has increased dramatically (from negative to positive). Agriculture, fishing and stock farming are the most important sectors of the economy (p. 33). Despite favourable conditions, all have been in decline because of the civil war. Forestry and mining are also important sectors. Further, lack of transportation and electricity infrastructure undermine growth. 'Despite its weakness the private sector is the principle source of wealth and job creation' (p. 37).</p>	<p>'The adverse macroeconomic effects of the floods in 2000 are expected to pass, with the strong macroeconomic performance of the 1996-99 returning.' This strong performance is attributed to peace and the economic reforms begin in 1987 (p. 27).</p>	<p>Economic development is seen to have been disappointing. With GDP of about \$45 billion in 2001 and per capita income of about \$300 a year, Nigeria has become one of the poorest countries in the world. By 2000 it had earned about \$300 billion from oil exports since the mid 1970s, but its per capita income was 20% lower than in 1975. Meanwhile, the country has become heavily indebted (70% of GDP). Regional and sectoral unevenness in growth performance is high. The real sector is still dominated by the primary production sectors. Agriculture, predominantly small farmers with low and declining productivity,</p>	<p>The PRSP refers to macroeconomic problems but these are not specified. Since the 1990s, progress has been made towards restoring macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been reduced to a single digit level and fiscal imbalances are in a prudent range (p. 15)</p>	<p>Zambia is described as being wealthy at independence, but that it squandered its wealth. Expansion of the state in the 1970s and 80s undermined private investment. Reforms were enacted in the 1990s, but these have not gone far enough. Zambia still suffers from too low of a domestic savings rate and so is dependent on foreign investment. Bad governance in Africa is a disincentive for investment (but the problem is the continent not Zambia) (p. 10). Over-dependence on the mining sector and lack of attention to the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic has in recent year further undermined the economy.</p>

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	characterised by a very weak export base of US\$16 per capita, heavy dependence on agricultural products and therefore a vulnerability to external price shocks.					accounts for 41% of the real sector, while crude oil accounts for 13%. The secondary sector, especially manufacturing, has been stagnating at about 5-7% of GDP. Services have been the fastest growing sector since independence (p. 7).		
III.3b - Is there any discussion about the informal and formal economies ?	The role of the private sector in poverty reduction is central: this includes the formal private sector, the informal sector, and small scale agriculture (p. 33).	Most Ugandans are self-employed, mainly in agriculture (p.16). The expansion of formal employment is stated as a central part of the strategy (p.14).	The PRSP indicates that the informal sector, representing 80-90% of economy activity, was one of several constraints on government revenue mobilisation and yet drove the recent economic recovery (p. 44). The PRSP notes that opiates are the country's only major export, fund the country's licit trade deficit, maintain price stability and the value of the Afghani, and provide the government with some customs revenue (p. 44). Emphasis is placed	The only discussion of the informal sector is the recognition that 'the share of the informal economy is continually on the rise in respect to wealth of job creation, to the point where the informal sector now represents a dominant share of the Congolese economy' (p. 37). In order to promote the formal sector the PRGSP identifies three areas of action: improve the business climate; reform public enterprises; and promote employment (which includes strengthening and expanding social protection systems for	Not mentioned.	The informal sector is mentioned with regards to economic growth, seen as the key to the country's growth strategy: 'growth projections bear weights to different informal sector activities in order to capture the overall share of the sector in projected economic growth' (p. 16). Informal and illegal mining of mineral deposits are seen as serious problems (p. 78), creating high	The informal sector is not specifically addressed, though the strategy aims to 'ensure [an] enabling environment for micro, small and medium enterprises and informal sector activities' (p. 41).	There is little discussion of the informal sector. It is noted that the formal sector is small – that it has not exceeded 20% of the work force (p. 19). In terms of the urban sector, the PRSP notes the importance of increasing formal sector employment because wages are better than in the informal sector (p. 43).

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			on the need to replace opium cultivation with alternative livelihoods as eliminating the sector (comprising 33-40% of GDP) could have significant security and stability ramifications (p. 44).	workers in the formal and informal economies) (p. 79).		levels of smuggling.		

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III.4 - How does the PRSP discuss the productive sector?								
III.4a - Agriculture Sector	<p>The agriculture sector is the centrepiece of the economy. It remains underproductive and not utilised to optimal production capacity. The PRSP underlines the need to move from low value to high value farming, and the processing of agriculture goods such as juice. It also plans a higher degree of diversification of export goods (mainly coffee and tea). The low agriculture output reflects a tight resource base, declining soil fertility and exceptionally low usage of modern output (p. 30).</p>	<p>The Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) has a central role. The PMA identifies six core areas for public action in agriculture: research and technology, advisory services, education for agriculture, access to rural finance, and sustainable natural resource utilisation and management.</p>	<p>Licit agriculture is viewed as a source of pro-poor growth, and a sector capable of providing alternatives to opium cultivation. The government target is to increase public investment in agriculture by 30% by 2010 (p. 146). Reforms include developing a land-titling and registry system, training for farmers, extension agents, laws and regulations for quality standards, inspection and certification and infrastructure development, including irrigation systems (p. 146-147).</p>	<p>The rural sector is seen as the most important sector of the economy encompassing 80% of the population who live off of agriculture, fishing and stock farming (p. 33) and accounts for 63% of GDP (p. 71). Focus is on improving inputs, diversifying products and increasing emphasis on cash crops. Attention will also be given to improving livestock and fishery production and access to micro credit. This will be accomplished while giving attention to protecting the environment.</p> <p>The forestry sector is characterised by exploitation of biodiversity and lack of involvement of local communities. Forestry interventions will focus on: rebuilding institutions to manage forests; ensuring participation of all stakeholders in forestry decisions; promoting local forest management methods; and preserving biodiversity</p>	<p>The agricultural sector is seen as the key to both poverty reduction and economic growth (p. 62). Reforms including making land registration easier by reducing bureaucracy, facilitating access to markets (for both inputs and outputs) and the marketing of surpluses, a cashew sector rehabilitation pilot project, widening rural extension services (pp. 64-65), improving seed management by establishing and strengthening the national seed committee, improving the seed certification service, promoting private seed production and marketing, promoting the creation of agro-industries, and privatisation (p. 67). Importantly, the government aims to reform the Ministry</p>	<p>Despite the dominant role of the petroleum sector (70% of government revenue) as the major foreign exchange earner, agriculture remains the mainstay of the economy. The following targets are listed: achieve minimum annual growth rate of 6% in agriculture; raise agricultural exports to \$3 billion by 2007; drastically reduce food imports from 14.5% of total imports to 5% by 2007; develop and implement a scheme of land preparation services to increase cultivable arable land by 10% a year; foster private sector participation through incentive schemes; promote the adoption of environmentally</p>	<p>The main focus of the strategy is rural development and export growth. Efforts to raise the quantity and quality of marketed agricultural products will be key. The Land Act will ensure that related regulations facilitate the use of land as collateral for purposes of commercial transactions. Credit will be provided by crop buyers and banks rather than by government and farmers will be encouraged to organise themselves in cooperatives (p. 16-17).</p>	<p>Agriculture is a priority for PRSP expenditure (p. 126) as agriculture is seen as continuing to be under utilised, with significant amounts of land are not being cultivated and productivity remains low. However, liberalisation policies are seen as correct (p. 53) and the problem rather to have been a lack of inputs and credit. Five main areas of intervention are articulated: improve finance and investment climate; improve marketing, trade and agricultural-business climate; improve land and infrastructure; improve technological inputs; and create a support system for food security (p. 58). In the agricultural sector</p>

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
				(p. 74).	of Agriculture and Rural Development through capacity building, creating and adopting a new organisational structure, and creating a task force on institutional reform (p. 70).	friendly farming practices; protect all prime agricultural lands for continued agricultural production (p. 69).		the PRSP notes that most land tenure is customary and that property rights need to be strengthened (p. 53).
III.4b - Industrial Sector	The industrial sector is hardly described in the PRSP, although mining is mentioned, and will be encouraged as it is possibly a high value export (given mined exports such as tantalite). The political instability followed by genocide has significantly reduced investment. The operation of manufacturing enterprises is a private sector role and the Government is withdrawing from this sector through the privatisation programme (p.67). Before 1985, the mining sector represented between 10% and 38% of export receipts.	The industrial sector is only mentioned in relation to macroeconomic policies: 'The future for Ugandan industry is not reliance on a wall of high tariff protection - which encourages capital-intensive investment which does little for employment - but open competition in a market which is being expanded by rising incomes from agricultural modernisation' (p.14).	Focusing on the extractive sectors, a highlighted benchmark is to have established an enabling regulatory environment for profitable extraction by end-2006, and to improve the investment environment and infrastructure by 2010. Reforms include a restructuring of the Ministry of Mines and Industry, privatising SOEs and seeking foreign investment (p. 134).	No specific mention is made of the industrial sector. All that is stated is that the development of a private sector would be the engine of the economy (p. 79). State involvement is limited to 'putting in place incentive policies intended to improve the business climate and reform public enterprises in order to promote and support the national and international private sector' (p. 79). The DRC has significant mining reserves. GECAMINES is the main mining enterprise, but it has collapsed. 'The reconstructing and deregulation of the mining sector initiated throughout the country in 2004 have led to the expropriation of small farmer landholdings' (p. 36). The focus in the	The mining sector is identified as a potential key contributor to economic growth (p. 86). Reforms include increasing the capacity of state negotiating teams to prevent the state from making deleterious concessions to investors in the extractive sector, reviewing and rewriting mining law, and implementing measures to make prospecting easier (pp. 87-88). The report outlines that the most important manufacturing industries are agro-industry and labour-intensive export industries.	The industrial sector is discussed with regards to manufacturing. The overriding objective of industrial policy is to accelerate the pace of industrial development by radically increasing value-added at every stage of the value chain (p. 71). The report further emphasises knowledge and skill-intensive production on the basis of best practises. Targets include an increase in annual growth of the sector by at least 7% a year and an increase in the private sector's share of	Industrial growth is not the focus of the PRSP, as reforms are already been programmed under the PSAC-1. These reforms include the adoption of the Tanzania Investment Act, the privatisation of public enterprises, and the establishment of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) (p. 18)	The PRSP focuses 'on choosing winners or industries that have the best chances of export success after considering comparative advantage and existing trade agreements' (p. 13). Following liberalisation many firms closed due to lack of competitiveness. Export-based firms performed better. Manufacturing still responsible for 10% of GDP. The PRSP seeks to create linkages between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (p. 60). Focus in PRSP mostly on policy

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
				PRSP is on revitalising state mines through privatisation. Provision of training and micro credit for small scale miners is also mentioned.		investment to 70% by 2007 (p. 71). Nigeria also has abundant solid mineral deposits, which could potentially provide more revenue and employment than the oil and gas sectors (p. 77), but is constrained due to several factors. The oil and gas sector is seen as an external sector, because there is no link between it and other sectors of the economy (p. 76).		(investment promotion as well as trade and export promotion) (p. 65). Attention is also given to promoting MSMEs. However, manufacturing is allocated only 1% of the budget (p. 128). 'The mining sector has been a prime mover of economic development in Zambia for over 70 years with exports of mineral products contributing about 70 percent of total foreign exchange earnings' (p. 71). The mining sector is important for poverty reduction. In 2000, privatisation of the sector was completed. Due to lack of funds focus will be on small scale mining only and not large scale. A key element of this will be to promote diverse small private mines for agro and industrial

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
III.4c - Service Sector								minerals (p. 74).
	The PRSP makes reference to the considerable potential for tourism (p. 30).	There are vague references to structural reforms in areas including the banking system, public utilities and transport infrastructure (p. 18).	A strategic benchmark is ensuring more than 80% of Afghans have access to affordable telecommunications and more than US\$100 million per year is generated in public revenues (p. 134). Reform involves outlining the government's regulatory responsibility and building a public telecommunications system for the private sector to expand. In the banking sector, the strategic benchmark is to develop internationally accepted prudential regulations for core sectors of financial institutions by end-2007. This will involve strengthening the supervisory role of the Afghanistan Bank, and either liquidating or re-structuring state-owned commercial	'The economic recovery of the DRC involves the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure (road, river, lake and air transport) as a sector which supports growth and contributes to the mobility of people and goods' (p. 75). Focus on implementing new action plan to attract private investment and public-private partnerships in the transport sector and significant expenditures on transport infrastructure. Electricity provision for both urban and rural areas is also a priority. Emphasis will be given to attracting private providers and producing electricity for export.	The report outlines a tourism strategy involving drafting a sector strategy plan, creating Local Tourism Committees in seven provinces, establishing regulations that allow visas to be issued to tourists, and starting a Hotel Training School in Pemba (pp. 90-91). In terms of transport and communications, reforms include allowing the entry of private companies into the coastal shipping sector, rehabilitating 3 ports, restructuring Telecommunications of Mozambique, turning the institution into a public limited company, generally liberalising the telecommunications sector, and restructuring the Regulating Authority for the Communications Sector, establishing the Regulating Authority for Ports	Increase telephone density to one telephone per 25 people and make it more accessible. (p. 73). NEEDS' focus in the tourism sector is to make Nigeria the preferred tourism destination of West Africa. The target is to increase the number of tourist arrivals into the country by 10% per year.	No data.	The government's long-term vision for the tourism sector is 'to ensure that Zambia becomes a major tourist destination of choice with unique features, which contributes to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction' (p. 66). Tourism can be a source of both rural and urban jobs as it is labour-intensive. 'The government's role in the growth of the tourism sector is to facilitate private sector involvement through investment promotion, marketing, and provision of infrastructure and supportive legislation' (p. 68). Focus will be given both to development zones and national programmes. Attention will also be given to enhancing capacity

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
			banks (p. 166). Tourism is seen as an area for future growth (p. 108).		and Railways and National Civil Aviation Institute, and restructuring the postal services (pp. 92-93).			for energy generation both for domestic consumption, but also export. Limited mention of enhancing information communication technologies is made (p. 107). Strengthening road, rail and water transportation networks to reduce transport costs and to improve access to social services (p. 102).

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
III.5 - What are the proposed strategies for growth?								
III.5a - Strategies	<p>The paper acknowledges the need to find engines for growth other than agriculture and means to diversify export base. Six areas are identified as promising according to the PRSP: agro-processing, garment export (Rwanda imports cotton from neighbouring countries and processes it. This could shift towards export markets), commercial and ICT services (French and English, regional position), tourism, mining of tantalite, export of skills within the region, though Rwanda is dependent on the import of skilled workers (p.31).</p>	<p>Focus on removing the constraints on private sector competitiveness and creating a framework within which the private sector can expand. Promotion of economic openness to encourage exports and labour-intensive investments. The development of the private sector is essential as the expansion of formal employment is a central part of the strategy (p. 14).</p>	<p>Focus on improving the investment climate. In this respect, infrastructure investment (national roads, air transport, power and water, telecommunications) is highlighted as essential (p. 130). There is also focus on human capital development, strengthening the judicial system, and creating predictable, transparent and simple regulatory systems (p. 165).</p>	<p>Growth is dependent upon the right macroeconomic policies with attention to fiscal discipline; the diversification of the agricultural sector with greater attention to cash crops; and the primacy of the private sector for job creation with the state's role limited to creating the proper environment for growth. Economic growth is the key to poverty reduction.</p>	<p>'Peace and political stability, prudent macroeconomic and financial management, strong investment in education, health and infrastructure, substantial productivity gains in agriculture, particularly in the family sector...strong improvement in the functioning of market-supporting public institutions...deeper structural reforms in other sectoral programmes, continued support from international partners...phased implementation of mega-projects...a rapid growth in exports, starting from a low base, rooted in an expansion in the production of cash crops (in particular cashew nuts and cotton) a large boost from the mega-projects, and maintenance of a</p>	<p>The NEEDS propose the following strategies for growth: privatise, liberalise and deregulate key sectors of the economy; coordinate national sectoral development strategies for agriculture, industry (especially small and medium-size enterprises, and services (tourism); develop infrastructure, especially electricity, transport and water; address the problems of financing the real sector, and mobilise long-term savings and investment; create effective regulatory regimes that include environmental standards, and target programmes to promote private</p>	<p>Focus on the promotion of export-oriented expansion and diversification of the 'pro-poor' sectors, and a bolstering of private investment in the cultivation of traditional and new crops, small and medium enterprises and informal sector activities (p. 15). Structural changes: the real value-added of agriculture, which provides a livelihood for the majority of the poor, is expected to increase at an average annual rate of about 5%, compared to 3.6% (1990-98). Industrial and service sectors are expected to keep with past trends. Provided the envisaged growth in agriculture and the rest of the economy is</p>	<p>The emphasis is on diversification away from mining. PRSP stresses agricultural, tourism, transport and energy sectors to produce growth. In agriculture, support will be given to existing small farmers and commercial farming will be encouraged. In the tourism sector, infrastructure will be improved to encourage foreign investment as well as support for small local investors. More broadly, infrastructure will be enhanced to lower transportation costs in general to promote growth. Lastly, Zambia will seek to become an energy exporter through large scale energy generating projects (p. 125).</p>

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
Issue	Major War, Collapse and Recovery		Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future		Major War without Collapse		No Major War	
	<u>Rwanda</u>	Uganda	Afghanistan	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	Nigeria	<u>Tanzania</u>	Zambia
II.5b - Trade Strategies					competitive exchange rate, continued liberalization of foreign trade...' (p. 27).	sector growth and development (p. 16).	distribution-neutral, the targeted pattern of sectoral growth will be consisted with the poverty reduction targets (p. 14).	
	Mentioning that they are emerging from a period of liberalisation (especially of export taxes on coffee and tea), the PRSP indicates that Rwanda's membership in COMESA will result in gradually reducing tariffs for products from these countries (p. 74).	Uganda cites research indicating that their trade openness is better than average, and thus further opening cannot lead to higher future growth.	While most of Afghanistan's trade policy focuses on fostering regional cooperation and modernising their customs apparatus, the document's stated goal of creating an enabling environment for trade also involves pursuing trade liberalisation and getting involved in multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, such as joining the WTO (p. 124).	One of the DRC's key goals is creating 'an industrialized economy that is competitive and fully integrated into the dynamics of regional and global trade' (p. 50). However, in discussing barriers to the achievement of their poverty reduction goals, the DRC indicates that, while they have joined sub-regional groups (SADC, CEAC, COMESA), which promote the reduction of trade barriers, the document states that the 'application of these clauses would deprive the State of the bulk of its own resources in the event that the Government failed to establish a cohesive action plan for forgoing revenue from trade levies and promoting direct taxation' (p. 107).	Mozambique quickly mentions that liberalisation of the economy has just occurred, and that donors participating in the PRSP process were interested in further liberalization (Annex 2, xxv).	Nigeria mentions the liberalisation of their economy (reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers) since the 1980s. They indicate an interest in seeking deeper integration with the rest of the world and commit to deeper regional integration and meeting the free trade zone agreements of ECOWAS (p. 81).	Tanzania does not mention trade policy.	Zambia mentions the past decade of extensive trade reform, which included reducing trade taxes. They indicate the challenges of finding a balance between further lowering barriers to trade and protecting producers from imports from less-liberalised neighbours.
	III.5c -	Inflation is projected to	Maintain low inflation	No target	Reduce end-of-period	5% - 7% per year (p.	From (provisional)	Maintain domestic

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
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	<u>Rwanda</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>DRC</u>	<u>Mozambique</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
Inflation Target	rise from 2% to 3% (p. 77).	at 5% (p.18).	mentioned.	inflation rate from 21.3% (2005) to 6% (2008) or an average of 7.4%.	27).	11% in 2003 to (projected) 9% in 2007.	inflation at approximately 4% per annum (p. 15).	(1999) to 5% by 2004.
III.5d - Exchange Rate Target	The exchange rate is expected to depreciate slightly in real terms.	No target. Exchange rate will continue to be market determined, with the Bank of Uganda intervening only to dampen excessive volatility.	No target mentioned.	Devalue from average of 398.2 (2005) to 491.1 (2008).	A real depreciation of the metical is desired (p. 79).	Maintain a competitive but stable exchange rate regime (p. 24).	No specific target, but the aim is to ensure that the exchange rate will continue to be market-determined (p.15).	No target mentioned, though terms of trade are project to move from -5.7 (1999) to 3.6 (2004).
III.5e - Foreign Reserve Target	No target mentioned.	Maintain gross foreign reserves for a minimum of five months of imports of goods and non- factor services (p.18).	No target mentioned.	Increase from -18% of GDP (2005) to +6% (2008).	No target mentioned, but strong management of foreign reserves is an objective (p. 79).	No target mentioned.	No target mentioned.	No target mentioned.
III.5f - GDP	Achieve real annual GDP growth of 7-8% until 2020 (p. 77).	Real GDP growth of 7% per annum (p.18).	9% growth in GDP per year.	Real GDP growth to increase from 6.5% (2005) to 8.4% (2008).	Maintain GDP growth of at least 8% per year (p. 27).	Minimum annual GDP growth rates of 5% in 2004, 6% in 2005 and 2006 and 7% in 2007 (p. 77).	Annual GDP growth is targeted to accelerate from 5.2% to 6% per year (p. 14).	4.3% growth in Real GDP in 2004 (from 2.4% in 1999).
III.6 - What are the main obstacles identified to reaching the goals outlined in the PRSP?	Budget constraints; inefficient agricultural sector; low levels of education and difficulty in acquiring skilled workers internally; heavy dependence on commodity exports; trials after the genocide and overpopulated prisons; donors that exit fast or choose project support rather than budget support.	Low agricultural growth would constrain the poverty reducing impact of economic growth (p.16). No other major constraints stated.	The paper stresses security obstacles, a lack of physical and human capital (including governance capacity), government assistance that is limited, unpredictable and often not channelled through the government's core budget and dependence on licit	The return of peace is seen as the key to success (p. 106). All other considerations are secondary. Continuation of the stable macroeconomic policies is critical. Sufficient domestic resources, ability to absorb those resources and timely disbursement of external resources are important as well. Lack of participation in implementation would	Internal and external imbalances, which are currently financed by international funds (p. 76).	There are a number of reasons why the government lacks the resources to succeed with NEEDS: corruption and the mindset of officials to conduct business as usual; lack of trust of the people towards the government; low government revenue; inefficient oil production;	The poverty reduction programme will be constrained by available resources. Because of this, the government has opted for a slight deterioration in the fiscal balance, and will also place special emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of intended	The most serious risk is the possibility that Anglo American would sell its interest in Zambia's largest copper mine (Anglo American did pull out). Second is lack of government resources and the need for donor support to support the PRSP. Initially,

Table III. Policies of the PRSP								
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			and informal livelihoods.	undermine the progress. Capacity of the State is also critical, but can be addressed to some extent by improving wages. Lastly, externally determined terms of trade for DRC raw material exports could undermine predicted growth.		revenues fleeing the country; and low agricultural productivity. The significant debt burden is also seen as tapping the government's financial resources. Overall, the country has experienced some economic improvements after transition to democracy, but the poverty levels are daunting. There seems to be structural problems in all sectors of the economy, in every layer of the government and bureaucracy and generally a low level of social trust.	poverty reduction initiatives (p. 22).	the government sought \$4 billion, but only received \$1.2 billion. Thus, Zambia is donor-dependent and donor priorities could change. The final risk is possible insufficient organisational and administrative capacity of the state (p. 51). Beyond this, three cross-cutting issues are identified: the environment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and gender. If these issues are not also addressed they will undermine the PRSP (p. 108).

Appendix B-1

Classification of Study Countries by Fragility	
Category	Country
No Major War	Tanzania
	Zambia
Major War without Collapse	Mozambique
	Nigeria
Major War, Collapse and Uncertain Future	Afghanistan
	DRC
Major War, Collapse and Recovery	Rwanda
	Uganda

Note: This classification is adapted from the Crisis States Research Centre based on Working Paper No. 1 (Series 2).

Appendix B-2

Macroeconomic and Other Indicators for Study Countries						
Country	Population, in millions	GDP, Current US\$ Billions	External Debt, percentage of GNI	Population living below US\$1 per day, percentage	Human Development Index Ranking	Corruption Perception Ranking
Afghanistan	-	7.2	-	-	-	117
DRC	57.5	7.0	186.4	-	140	144
Mozambique	19.8	6.6	80.9	37.8	168	97
Nigeria	131.5	9.9	59.5	70.8	159	152
Rwanda	9.0	2.1	91.3	51.7	158	83
Tanzania	38.3	12.1	72.7	57.8	162	88
Uganda	28.8	8.7	72.2	-	-	117
Zambia	11.7	7.3	142.8	75.8	165	107

Sources: 'Key Development Data & Statistics' Country Profiles 2006 (www.worldbank.org); Human Development Report 2006 (www.undp.org) and Corruption Perception Indicators 2005 (www.transparency.org).

Appendix B-3

Information on PRSPs included in the Study			
Country	PRSP	Year	HIPC
Afghanistan	Interim First PRSP	2006	Non-HIPC
DRC	Full First PRSP	2006	HIPC
Mozambique	Full First PRSP	2001	HIPC
Nigeria	Full First PRSP	2005	Non-HIPC
Rwanda	Full First PRSP	2002	HIPC
Tanzania	Full First PRSP	2000	HIPC
Uganda	PEAP	2000	HIPC
Zambia	Full First PRSP	2002	HIPC

Note: Uganda produced its Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) prior to the introduction of the PRSP, however, to some degree the PRSPs were based on Uganda's PEAP.

Appendix B-4

CRISIS STATES RESEARCH CENTRE Research Consultancy Project on: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in Fragile States Draft Terms of Reference²

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are supposed to provide a ‘master plan’ not only for the eradication of poverty, but also identifying government development priorities for a significant period of time. They are supposed to promote widespread consultation in defining policy agendas and, signed by the government under the auspices of the World Bank, serve as a blue print for donor cooperation.

The consultancy will review and analyse the official documents of eight PRSPs³ and reports. The countries that will be examined are: Rwanda, DR Congo, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Zambia. These countries are in different stages of the PRSP process and some have only interim PRSPs.

Overall Objective

The Crisis States Research Centre wishes to conduct an analysis of the PRSP process in eight of our case study countries. We want to understand how the PRSP describes the challenges of development and reform in each country. We would like to know in how far the PRSP addresses the *specific* conditions and development challenges in the countries we are studying or whether the process is a uniform application of a preconceived template of the donor community. We are interested in the extent to which the PRSP has been a ‘home grown’ process, or at least has achieved the status of ‘ownership’ by the country in question, which is the stated objective of the donor community. We would like to know if there are significant differences in the PRSP (process and/or content) in countries that have experienced violence and war and those that have not. Finally, we are interested in whether the PRSP actually enhances our understanding of the development challenges faced by the countries we are studying.

Specific Areas of Investigation

1. Format of PRSP

For each PRSP the consultants will document:

- What is the time frame?
- What are the key objectives?
- How is poverty defined in the country?
- What is the projected target for poverty reduction?
- At what stage is the PRSP process? (i.e., interim paper? Core paper? Later assessment or second generation?)

² The TOR will be finalised after an initial meeting with consultants.

³ We will discuss whether the consultants feel they can manage an eight-country study or whether the number of countries should be reduced to four. We expect a review of documents available from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, bilateral donors and the respective countries.

2. Process of the PRSP

Based on a reading of the PRSP papers, alone, attempt to answer the following questions:⁴

- Who was consulted in the drafting of the PRSP and through what means?
 - Which parts of government were involved?
 - National Executive line agencies? (Finance, Agriculture, Defence etc?)
 - National Parliamentary bodies? (specific committees, etc.?)
 - Provincial or Local Government bodies? (executives, legislatures, etc.?)
 - What was the role of the Central Bank?
 - Which political organisations were involved (e.g., political parties)?
 - Which 'civil society' organisations were consulted (trade unions, farmers groups, business associations, non-governmental organisations, religious organisations): what balance between 'membership organisations' and 'advocacy organisations'?
 - Which private sector organisations were consulted (business enterprises, cooperatives, etc.?)
- What were the suggestions of those consulted?
- What was accepted and what rejected from these consultations?
- Which donors were involved in the PRSP design process?
- Is there evidence of the role played by foreign 'Technical Assistance' in drawing up the PRSP (eg, how much was done by consultants? By international NGOs?)

3. Content Analysis of PRSP

- What are the main objectives stated in the PRSP?
- How does the PRSP describe the 'macro political environment'?
 - Is the country considered to be in a condition of 'conflict', 'post-conflict', 'reconstruction', a 'Low Income Country Under Stress', 'in transition' (from what to what)?
 - Is there discussion of ethnic, religious, regional, criminal or other types of conflict?
 - How does the PRSP specifically address the issue of corruption?
 - Does the PRSP outline anything like a strategy for building 'political coalitions', 'political consensus' around the development and poverty reduction strategy?
- How does the PRSP discuss the role of the state in the poverty reduction and development process? What reforms if any does it call for at the level of the state in the following areas:
 - Military and security organisations (armed forces, police, prisons)
 - Judicial organisations and codes (courts, prosecution, laws and legal reform)
 - Administration governing service delivery, especially health and education
 - Economic management (Ministries of finance, planning, sectoral ministries like agriculture, industry, etc.)
 - Particular organisations responsible for revenue collection: taxation, especially customs
 - Elective bodies – executive and legislative organisations of the state.
- How does the PRSP discuss the macroeconomic environment?
 - What is the portrait of the economy presented: inflation, debt, growth or decline (productive capacity, sectoral distribution, trade)?
 - Is there any discussion about informal and formal economies?
- How does the PRSP discuss the productive sectors? What are plans, objectives, targets, reforms proposed in:
 - Agriculture: food crop and cash crop, food security (including import-export), export oriented production, forestry, livestock, fishing
 - Industry: especially manufacturing, mining and other extractive industries, construction,
 - Services: tourism, banking, telecommunications or others.
- What are the strategies for growth proposed?
 - Does the PRSP propose structural changes, i.e., changes in the percentages of value-added from agriculture, industry or services to overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP)?
 - What are the targets for trade: what sectors are targeted? What is said about imports and exports? Are there plans for diversification?
 - What are the targets for macroeconomic monetary policies:

⁴ We are aware that a thorough analysis of the 'PRSP process' would require much wider reading and research, beyond the terms of reference for this project. We expect you only to answer the questions in this section based on what can be distilled from the major core PRSP documents.

- * inflation
- * currency (exchange rates, dollarisation, black market, etc)
- * foreign reserves, etc
- What are the main obstacles identified to reaching the goals outlined in the PRSP?

4. Overarching Questions

- In how far are the PRSPs similar and different to the 'template' laid out by the donors (see World Bank *PRSP Sourcebook* and bilateral donor documents)
- How do the PRSPs compare one with the other?
- Are there differences between PRSPs where countries have suffered major violent conflict, state collapse, or those that did not?
- In cases where the PRSP has reached later stages, are there identifiable differences between an interim paper, final paper, second generation paper, etc?
- What influence did 'Joint Staff Assessments' play in altering the parameters of the PRSP along the way?

5. Wider Literature on the PRSP

If there is time, it would be interesting to undertake a wider review of the literature to grasp what researchers have said about the design, aims and implementation of the PRSPs. Have local scholars or journalists published commentaries on the PRSP in scientific or popular publications?

Outputs of the Project

Consultants will prepare a mid-term report to be presented on 21 March 2007 at a meeting with country researchers from the CSRC.

We encourage the consultants to take note of important dimensions of the PRSPs and the processes involved that may fall beyond the terms of reference.⁵

The end product will be a paper, no more than 20,000 words in length, plus a five page Executive summary. Wherever possible, consultants are encouraged to present information in tabular and succinct formats. The paper will be considered for publication in the Crisis States Working Paper or Occasional Paper series.

Management of the Project

The CSRC, represented by Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel, will be willing to discuss with the consultants, progress and problems in carrying out the project along the way. If the TOR appear to be problematic we can discuss modifications along the way.

Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel
London, 25 January 2007

CSRC Series 2 Working Papers

⁵ Here we are not concerned about the standard inclusion of such issues as 'gender' and 'environment', which are not the focus of this exercise, but rather about less obvious dimensions of the PRSP processes, or particularly remarkable dimensions of a particular PRSP that you notice, which may emerge in the course of investigation, but has not been asked about in the TOR.

- WP1 James Putzel, 'War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme' (September 2005)
- WP2 Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities', (June 2006)
- WP3 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel, 'Political and Economic Foundations of State making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction', (July 2006)
- WP4 Antonio Giustozzi, 'Genesis of a Prince: the rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992' (September 2006)
- WP5 Laurie Nathan, 'No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement', (September 2006)
- WP6 Niamatullah Ibrahim, 'The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984' (September 2006)
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- WP13 Anna Matveeva, 'The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: unwilling playmates', (March 2007)
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These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of all our publications including Discussion Papers, Occasional Papers and Series 1 Working Papers can be found.



The Crisis States Research Centre aims to examine and provide an understanding of processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states and to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in these processes. Through rigorous comparative analysis of a carefully selected set of states and of cities, and sustained analysis of global and regional axes of conflict, we aim to understand why some fragile states collapse while others do not, and the ways in which war affects future possibilities of state building. The lessons learned from past experiences of state reconstruction will be distilled to inform current policy thinking and planning.

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