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Changing donor policy and practice on civil society in the post-9/11 aid context

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Introduction

The declaration of the so-called “global war on terror” in the wake of the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 has engendered a heightened concern with security, both globally and nationally. Governments across the world have capitalised on the climate of fear generated by the perception of terrorist threats to introduce a swathe of counter-terrorist legislation, measures and practices. In many countries, civil liberties activists, human rights lawyers and scrutinising politicians have expressed concern at the hasty introduction of these counter-terrorism structures and their actual and potential effects on citizens’ rights and liberties. In the field of development the “global war on terror regime” has highlighted the strategic relevance of aid to the pursuit of global and national security interests at a time when its ideological rationale in the post-Cold War era had almost disappeared. Concerned about the perceived threat to global markets and global security, UN leaders, politicians in Europe and the USA have articulated a discourse that links security more firmly with development. Kofi Annan, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and George Bush have all rehearsed the refrain that poverty and terrorism are inter-related. International NGOs, some aid recipient governments in the South and development activists have in turn capitalised on this refrain to lobby for aid increases.

This paper argues that the “global war on terror regime” has contributed towards the increasing securitisation of aid policy and practice. By this we understand a complex weaving of discourses, political alliances, policy and legislative shifts, institutional arrangements and practices. The trope of the “global war on terror” serves as a mobilising discourse, used by global and political leaders in pursuit of military and political objectives. It embodies a polarising vision of the world, which pits modernity against backwardness, civilisation against barbarism, right against wrong, evil against good and freedom against oppression. This in turn triggers a global political re-ordering, generating new alliances and divisions, within and across states, redrawing the balance sheet of enemies and friends. The militaristic content of the phrase and the depiction of the enemy in extreme terms rationalises extraordinary responses such as pre-emptive military intervention and the rolling-back of civil liberties and human rights. The ‘global war on terror regime’ also involves the reconfiguring of institutional and policy arrangements, as reflected in the interweaving of development and security agendas. Though the UK government and some politicians have rejected the term ‘global war on terror’, preferring

instead to use words such as ‘radicalism’, or ‘extremism’, the notion of a threat, the need for extra-ordinary measures and the gradual institutionalisation of particular rules and practices to avert terrorist attacks mean that the effects of this new regime continue to prevail.

This paper does not propose that the ‘global war on terror regime’ has singly subordinated aid policy and institutions to the security agendas of the USA or other advanced capitalist countries. Nor does it suggest that the ‘global war on terror’ has had no impact on development agendas, policies and institutional behaviour. Nor does it claim that the ‘war on terror regime’ has wholly reframed the way donor agencies engage with non-governmental public actors. We argue that the ‘global war on terror regime’ has accelerated and consolidated trends in the direction of development thinking and aid policy and practice that already were emerging during the 1990s. Specifically it argues that the ‘global war on terror regime’ has contributed in diverse and complex ways to the increasing securitisation of development and aid policy. Moreover, the securitisation of aid has affected the way donor agencies relate to non-governmental actors, though this relationship has not been wholly subordinated to or framed by security interests. By ‘securitisation’ of development and aid policy we refer to the encapsulating of global and national security interests into the framing, structuring and implementation of development and aid.

The paper explores these propositions through case studies of select bilateral development agencies. It identifies some emerging patterns and points out distinctions related to the security priorities of different governments, the bureaucratic architecture of aid and the historical backdrop to aid. The first section examines how the ‘global war on terror regime’ hastens the securitisation of aid. The subsequent sections look in turn at the various manifestations of these processes in the context of American, British, Australian and Swedish bilateral development aid. Thus, we examine the pronouncements of national political leaders and the changing mission statements and grand goals of donor agencies. We explore the changing institutional architecture of aid and particularly the closer relations between development and security agencies, the emergence of new co-ordinating groups and pooled resources. The shift in donor engagement with civil society and particularly donors’ discovery of ‘Muslim’ parts of civil society is examined. This paper also traces how agencies have responded in varying degrees to perceived global security threats by introducing checks on partners, engaging

with 'suspect communities', specifically Muslims, and demanding greater accountability from civil society actors.

Out of the shadow into the limelight: the securitisation of aid

The securitisation of development policy and practice can be observed at a number of levels. At the macro-level political leaders articulate a view that poverty, deprivation and terrorism are related, with the crudest versions claiming a direct causality. The incorporation of development policy and strategy into global security agendas is mirrored in the closer co-operation between global security, military and development agencies at the super-national level along with the creation of new co-ordinating structures and positions. It is reflected in the juxtaposition of security and development concerns in the speeches of UN leaders and in the documentation of multilateral institutions. It is also seen in the propagation of shared approaches and concepts such as the 'whole-of-government approach' or 'fragile states'. It is observed in a discursive shift away from notions of 'human security' toward a more ambiguous 'security', as well as a shift in focus away from globalisation and inequality to globalisation and security threats.

At the meso-level it can be observed in the closer interaction between aid, foreign policy and security agencies at national level. This is reflected, for example, in the setting up of new co-ordinating structures, the establishment of liaison positions to ease co-ordination and the pooling of resources of development and security agencies in support of discrete initiatives. It is seen in the direction of bilateral aid flows to 'front-line' states in the 'global war on terror' and the emphasis on 'security' in the grand mission statements and developmental plans of bilateral donors, which signifies the closer linkages made between foreign and domestic policies in general.

At the micro-level, it can be observed in development programming and operations such as in the greater interaction between civil and military agencies, in counter-terrorist assistance, in support of curriculum reform and in support to civil society.

The increasing securitisation of aid is occurring alongside several concurring trends in development thinking and aid policy. First, the increasing convergence of development and security agendas was already in evidence during the 1990s especially in the context of the so-called 'new wars' such as in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Balkans. Duffield (2001) observed how conflict as an issue was increasingly incorporated into development agendas both as an impediment to development but also as development problem that could be addressed with greater quantities and/or more

appropriate types of aid. This led to the emergence of new programming and staff positions on 'conflict' in development agencies, increasing co-operation between military and civilian actors and the seeping of conflict into development discourse, strategy and analysis. Second, throughout the 1990s there was growing recognition that global responses were required for issues such as climate change, child-trafficking and international crime. Third, national donors recognised the need to improve co-ordination in the delivery of aid, though attempts to co-ordinate at the operational level often withered through a lack of institutional commitment or poor strategy. Fourth, the rise of the 'good governance' agenda in the wake of the Cold War drew systematic attention to the potential of civil society as an agent of development. As donors discovered the virtues of civil society, they engaged with non-governmental public actors through various civil society strengthening programmes. However as donors gained more experience in working through and with civil society, they also began to have doubts and worries about this engagement. Areas of concern have included the accountability, legitimacy and transparency of NGOs, the transactions costs of working with a myriad of small, non-governmental development agencies, the balance between supporting civil society and funding government, and the most cost-effective and appropriate strategy for working with civil society. By the late 1990s donors were already beginning to reassess their relations with civil society. The heyday of civil society was about to take a new turn.

The launch of the 'war on terror' gave impetus to these trends, accelerating their progress and justifying their direction. First, concerns about global insecurity called for, amongst other things, responses from the development community. Global insecurity now accompanied other 'global issues' that demanded global responses. This led to some competition between the relative urgency of these different issues, leading one critic in the UK to suggest that the threat of terrorism was exaggerated compared to other looming dangers such as climate change. Second, the need for a global response to poverty and alienation added force to the emerging trend towards greater donor co-ordination. This trend found its most vivid expression in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which achieved consensus on the need for harmonisation and co-ordination of aid. Third, the 'global war on terror' regime hastened the increasingly critical stance that donors were adopting toward civil society. The separate threads of caution and doubt that began emerging in the late 1990s had formed a loosely woven cloth on which the events of 9/11 were to stamp their own motifs of suspicion and concern. Aware in theory that civil society constituted more than just developmental NGOs or community

groups, the gaze of the 'terror regime' on Muslim communities opened donors' eyes to a previously little noticed part of civil society. At the same time global concerns over the threat of terrorism cast a shadow over donor perceptions' of NGO actors as untainted by extremism or radicalism. Now it was suggested that charities were vulnerable to manipulation by terrorist organisations for money-laundering purposes and even worse, that some charities might be mere fronts for terrorists groups. Fourth, the 'war on terror regime' had the effect of generalising the convergence of development and security interests beyond the confines of the so-called 'new wars'. Security concerns became mainstreamed into development debates and policies, whilst development in turn became co-opted into global and national security agendas.

National games: bringing security into the development mainstream and co-opting development into security

In this section we explore the securitisation of aid through the lens of four countries, namely, Australia, USA, UK and Sweden. In each case we trace the changes in development thinking, aid policy and practice since 2001. We draw attention to how security concerns percolate into development agendas, influencing the objectives of aid and the geographic and thematic orientation of aid flows. We examine the closer interaction between foreign policy, defence and development departments and the creation of new structures to better coordinate work across the three “Ds” – development, diplomacy and defence. We look at the way security issues become routinised through programme design, through relations on-the-ground between military, security and development personnel and through the reconfiguring of relations with civil society. Below, we examine each bilateral donor in turn and draw together the common patterns as well as the differences between the countries in the concluding section.

Australia

The increasing convergence of security and development in Australian aid is set against the background of the bombing of a night-club in Bali popular with Australian tourists in October 2002 as well as the shifting global politics arising out of the September 11th attacks in New York¹. Australia has been an important ally of the USA in the ‘global war on terror’ and has provided troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The securitisation of aid in the Australian context is apparent in several respects. First, in statements by politicians and government leaders regarding links between insecurity, development and fragile states as well as in subsequent policy documentation. Second, in the closer interaction between security and development parts of government in addressing security issues. Third, in aid increases to ‘front-line’ states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth, in the increasing emphasis on security objectives by aid agencies as seen in mission statements and departmental reports justifying policy. Fifth, in the establishment of specific aid programmes aimed at enhancing security on the basis that security and development are linked.

The shift in approach of the Australian government to the linkages between security and development post-9/11 and post-Bali are reflected in the statements of politicians, departmental leaders and in policy documentation. Within a year of the Bali bombings the

government issued a report on “Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid”. This report depicts terrorism as a key challenge to the aid objective of ‘advancing the national interest by reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development’ (Australian Government/AusAID 2003). It establishes a clear link between poverty and terrorism as seen in, “[w]hile poverty provides no justification for acts of terror, entrenched poverty can create an environment in which terrorist networks may be fostered” (*ibid.*: p. 4).” Aid can then be levered in two ways to contribute to counter-terrorism efforts: first, by building the capacity of partner countries to deal with terrorist threats and second, by promoting environments that foster economic growth and poverty reduction, thereby minimising the opportunities for terrorist networks to emerge (*ibid.*: p. 5).

In a speech in 2005, the AusAid Director General, Bruce Davis, clearly set out how development and security agendas had become increasingly aligned in the millennium, “...It was not too long ago that aid and development lay firmly on the periphery of serious considerations of Australia's security and strategic interests. Aid was often regarded as a somewhat ill-defined process of ‘doing-good’, a process which had little tangible impact on the strategic environment faced by Australia and its policy makers. These times are now over” (Davis, 2005). Davis refers not only to the increasing coordination of government departments such as the AusAID, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Defence Force around security issues but also the gradual alignment of development and security objectives, a trend that he sees as continuing. Aid has now become, as Davis stated ‘one part of an integrated Australian approach to the complex security challenges of our region’. With AusAID effectively downgraded from a full department to a section of the foreign policy portfolio within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade under the previous Conservative government (O'Connor et al 2006: 176), it has been administratively and politically easier for the government to ensure that development goals resonate with Australia’s commercial and security interests.

These shifts in the Australian development agenda are reflected in the increasing prominence accorded to fragile states. Australia is portrayed as an island surrounded by a sea of fragile states that potentially threaten its security. It is thought that fragile states “have proven capable of incubating and sometimes exporting problems as diverse as disease, ...drugs smuggling...and potentially terrorism”. Davis rehearses the theme that poverty and insecurity are inextricably linked, “[t]his is because security is a pre-requisite for development. ...Conflict and instability are powerful reversers of development gains

and a primary cause of poverty. It is also recognised that underdevelopment is itself a security threat....The development challenges of our region are thus – to a significant extent – also challenges to our own security”(Davis 2005). Thus, it is significant that fragile states have moved to the forefront of AusAID’s agenda in the context of Australia’s role as ally in the ‘global war on terror’ and its self-portrayal as a developed country under threat from underdevelopment.

The increasing securitisation of aid in Australia is reflected in a rise in aid flows to fragile states, including to Afghanistan and Iraq. Indicative of this new emphasis is the government’s policy paper in 2002 on ‘Peace, Conflict and Development Policy’ and the 2003 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Policy White Paper “Advancing the National Interest”, which laid out the rationale for this emphasis. With regard to fragile states, the percentage of funding allocated to the Pacific has risen from 30 % in 1995/6 to 40% in 2005/6, with a focus being on the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (Reality of Aid 2006:2). It is also noteworthy that Iraq figures ninth amongst AusAID’s top ten recipients of gross ODA, with an allocation of Aus\$ 21 million; all the other top-ten recipients of Australian bilateral development aid are Pacific-Asian countries.² Since 1999 the volume of aid flows to the Middle East has increased, primarily to support humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though assistance to the Middle East is not a substantial part of Australia’s ODA, it is significant that this has increased since 1999 given the shift in global politics since 2001.

A concern with security has expressed itself in greater coordination across government departments in response to discrete problems, or a ‘whole-of-government approach’ in bureaucratic parlance. Aid and development are no longer significant issues exclusively to AusAID but now are of interest to a range of ministries, including the Prime Minister’s Department. The most prominent example of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach to aid is the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI); the budget for this programme increased from 2003-04 from Aus \$37.4 million to Aus \$168.5 million.³ Almost half of this amount, namely, Aus \$79 million, was contributed as ODA by other government departments such as the Attorney General, AusAID, the Department of Finance and Administration and the Australian Federal Police (Parliamentary Library 2004). Of the Aus\$ 201.6 million budget for RAMSI in 2004/2005, almost half was allocated to the Australian Federal Police to build the capacity of the Royal Solomon Islands Police to maintain law and order (*ibid.*:1).⁴

In terms of programming the growing convergence between development and security agendas has led to greater focus on governance, counter-terrorism assistance, checks on civil society partners, and closer civil-military relations. Since 2001 the percentage of funding allocated to governance compared to other sectors has more than doubled. Whilst in 1999-2000 15 % of aid was devoted to governance, by 2005-06 this had more than doubled to 36%.⁵ Most of this allocation has gone to law and justice (47%), compared to 21% for public sector effectiveness and 13% to civil society and human rights (O'Connor 2006: 177). This investment in governance reflects the growing awareness by the government that certain Pacific nations increasingly resemble fragile states that for reasons of national security can no longer be overlooked (Parliamentary Library 2004: 1). However the 2005 OECD Peer Review expressed concern that the attention given to the law and order aspect of governance, as compared with say civil society and democracy or public sector effectiveness, could undermine the stated poverty reduction focus of Australian aid (OECD 2005: 39).

Over the last seven years the Australian government has established specific aid programmes to address issues of security and terrorism. Whilst assistance to policing and border control was not new, the labelling of this as Overseas Development Assistance was. Counter-terrorism aid falls under the governance portfolio. According to the policy document 2003 'Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid' the aim has been twofold: first to strengthen local capacity to manage terrorist threats; and second, to promote an environment conducive to poverty reduction and economic growth so as to reduce the potential for terrorist networks to develop (Australian Government/AusAID 2003)⁶. The contribution of aid to counter-terrorism has focussed on developing capacity in countering terrorist financing and money laundering, and strengthening the counter-terrorist aspects of policing and border security (*ibid.*: 5). For example in 2004 AusAID began a Aus \$10 million programme to strengthen counter-terrorist capacity in Indonesia. Plans were also afoot to roll out an educational programme to improve educational standards in Islamic schools. Similarly in 2003 Prime Minister Howard launched a three year Aus \$5 million package of counter-terrorist assistance to the Philippines, including border control, policing and port security (*ibid.*: pp. 5 and 7). The government also committed Aus \$500,000 to strengthening port security in the Pacific Islands.

In July 2004 AusAID issued 'Guidelines for Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Measures in the Australian Aid Program' to provide advice on complying with UN Security Resolution

1373 (2001) on combating terrorist financing. As of 19th February 2004 sixteen organisations were listed as 'terrorist organisations' under Australia's Criminal Code (1995, part 5.3). AusAID agreements and contracts with recipient organisations now include a clause requiring aid recipients to ensure that neither they nor their funded partners are funding any terrorist organisations.

Finally, Australia's humanitarian assistance has more than doubled between 2000 and 2003, centred mainly on the Asia-Pacific region. As with other donor countries, the involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance has undermined the claims of civilian actors to be acting neutrally. It is noteworthy that a key recommendation of the 2005 OECD Peer Review of Australian aid was that 'Australia should affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in delivering humanitarian action' (OECD 2005: 21). It also highlighted the risk that Australia's security interests and its regional focus could compromise a needs-based approach and the principles of neutrality and impartiality (*ibid.*: 20).

These growing concerns with security and the sectoral shifts in funding towards governance have overshadowed the poverty focus of development policy in Australia. The OECD Peer Review of Australian aid as well as NGOs have expressed concern that the broad approach to governance had led to elements of counter-terrorism and illegal migration being included as ODA (*ibid.*: 12). Moreover, it recommended that the government make clearer the links between governance and poverty reduction in its programming, policy statements and country operations (*ibid.*). It also warned of the risk that counter-terrorism, though crucial, should not 'override the development agenda' (*ibid.*: 51) and that short-term national interests should overshadow those of its partner countries (*ibid.*: 24).

United States

Since 2001 there has been a strategic realignment of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in line with a doctrinal emphasis in US national security policy on the contribution of development to counter-terrorism. This realignment is encompassed within a wide-ranging reorientation of statecraft to counter-terrorism objectives and new security imperatives. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 marked the encapsulation of the field of development into the war on terror regime. It listed development alongside diplomacy and defence as the three central components of national security strategy, a tripartite approach designated the 'three D's'. In line with this

strategic approach, development became aligned with foreign policy priorities, key among which was the 'global war on terror'. The doctrinal emphasis on the 'three D's' was re-emphasised in the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), which defined the role of development as diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.

The newly important role attributed to development assistance in the US 'war on terror' regime was reinforced through institutional restructuring of US foreign aid in 2006. The changes were the execution of a vision of 'transformational diplomacy' pushed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Outlining the broad contours of the new diplomatic focus in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rice maintained, 'It is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in today's world. Our diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together.'⁷ The restructuring of the diplomatic corps resulted in the creation of the new post of Director of Foreign Assistance at the level of Deputy Secretary in the State Department, the foreign affairs docket in the US government. The Deputy Secretary concurrently serves as the USAID administrator.⁸ The organisational change in US foreign assistance related to worries that rising levels of overseas assistance dating back to the middle 1990s had resulted in a fragmentation of foreign aid administration and programming (Council for Foreign Relations). NGO critiques warned that the restructuring implied a greater politicisation of US foreign assistance and the subordination of long-term development to diplomatic and military objectives. Observers noted that in the years immediately after 9/11, foreign assistance programmes earned the support of conservative Republican members of the US congress if they were packaged and presented as anti-terrorist programmes.⁹ Programming and interventions by a spectrum of agencies have been rationalised according to their contribution to national security as a device to attain political support and thereby secure budgetary allocations.

The encapsulation of development into US foreign policy and security strategy has resulted in significant changes in orientation and emphasis of US development assistance. In 2004, for the first time the State Department and USAID jointly issued a strategic plan that outlined their core values and shared mission, positing a role for development that mirrors that stated in the National Security Strategy. The most recent US Foreign Aid White Paper (2004) and USAID Bilateral Aid Policy Framework (2006) also focus on the contribution of development to counter-terrorism and protecting US

national security, as given emphasis in comments by the previous USAID administrator Andrew Natsios, 'Americans now understand that security in their homeland greatly depends on security, freedom, and opportunity beyond the country's borders. Development is now as essential to US national security as are diplomacy and defense' (United States, 2004). Proposals for a new international development strategy are to enshrine the national security emphasis of US development aid and entrench counter-terrorism as its core objective.¹⁰

Since 2001 the security juggernaut has come to determine the targeting of increasing amounts of US bilateral aid. There has been a surge in funding since the mid-1990s. A significant proportion of new assistance has been allocated to fragile states, which feature to a far greater extent in the operational emphasis and central objectives of USAID. For example, in 2003 nearly a third of USAID's resources were spent in unstable or fragile areas, excluding Iraq (USAID, 2005). In 2006, six of the top ten recipients of gross US overseas development assistance (USD million) were unstable or fragile states, including Iraq (8,005), Afghanistan (1,361), Sudan (749), Colombia (588), Democratic Republic of Congo (491) and Pakistan (410).¹¹ Strengthening fragile states is one of five core operational goals of US foreign assistance. In 2005 USAID published a Fragile States Strategy, which establishes orientations for programming in states defined as 'vulnerable' or in 'crisis'. Programming in vulnerable states emphasises developing civilian control of the military, establishing capable police forces and strengthening courts. In crisis states, security efforts focus on security sector reform including deactivation, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters, establishing civilian oversight of the military and community level policing.

The contribution of US development assistance to security and counter-terrorism objectives is also evident in enhanced civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). USAID has sought to develop improved planning and liaison structures with the Department of Defense and as part of these efforts it created a Military Policy Board in 2005. It also established an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian assistance. OMA coordinates humanitarian efforts, planning and doctrine with the Departments of State and Defence and is headed by a senior military advisor (Ploch, 2007). It coordinates the posting of USAID liaison officers to the five geographic unified Combatant Commands to assist military professionals in assessing development needs and priorities. Already, USAID has been involved in military initiatives

in Africa. It has contributed to the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative, which aims to disrupt the cycle of terrorist recruitment activities in a region likened to 'Afghanistan without drugs'.¹² USAID has initiated programmes on job training and youth, reintegration of combatants, water development, training of judicial and local officials in public service and starting a radio service.¹³ USAID has also cooperated with military personnel from the Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF) stationed in Djibouti, who are engaged in counter-terrorism against armed groups with purported ties to Al Qaeda. USAID has stationed a liaison officer with CJTF and has coordinated development inputs, such as supplying texts to schools built by the CJTF. USAID has assigned personnel to liaise with the new Africa Command (AFRICOM), which includes a 'soft power' mandate aimed at pre-emptive conflict prevention and incorporates a larger civilian component than traditional combatant commands (Ploch, 2007). Civil society is a particular focus of evolving Defense Department strategy and cross-agency planning on CIMIC. A Defense Department official explained, 'We want to help develop a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved' (quoted in Ploch, 2007: p. 5). Within CIMIC structures, OMA has sought to expand cooperation between NGOs and the US military.

There has been internal dissent and debate within USAID regarding its expanding and deepening levels of cooperation with the military, revealing fundamental unease among civilian development personnel over what is perceived as military encroachment into development. There have been tensions around the balance of power in civil-military coordination structures, with USAID personnel concerned that they are subservient in an unequal relationship driven by military objectives and strategy. Other disagreements have concerned mandates and competition for resources allocated to counter-insurgency operations (USAID meeting notes). State Department and USAID personnel have voiced concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities outside its mandate (Ploch, 2007).

New security imperatives in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks have also factored in the 'freedom agenda', referring to the prioritisation of democracy promotion efforts in US foreign policy under the administration of President Bush. The opening sentence of the National Security Strategy of 2006 states, '[i]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.' US democracy promotion

policies since 2001 have become inextricably linked to the 'global war on terror'. Emphasising the developmental contribution to fighting international terrorism, promoting democracy abroad has been seen to undermine the conditions that terrorist organisations seek to exploit (Dalacoura, 2005). Funding for democracy promotion is drawn from a range of State Department and development funds. Significant sources include the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID. Taken together, US democracy assistance amounted to \$1.7 billion in 2006.¹⁴ Among bilateral donors, USAID claims to be the largest 'democracy donor' (US Democracy and Governance Framework, 2005). Counter-terrorism has become an important rationale and focus for USAID's own democracy initiatives. For example, USAID Democracy and Governance Offices have played a central role in the agency's assistance to states to pass counter-terrorism laws.¹⁵ Through the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in USAID, democracy assistance has been channelled to civil society groups seeking political change in states and areas of high strategic importance in the 'war on terror' including Iraq, Afghanistan, the West Bank and Sudan. OTI has been labelled the 'special forces of development assistance' and is explicitly tied to US foreign policy goals.¹⁶

However, Bush's democracy agenda has proved divisive, even within the Republican Party. The triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 was grist for 'realists' in the party who have doubted the ability of the US to foster democratic movements in states with weak civil institutions.¹⁷ Critics outside the party argued that the administration's commitment to promoting democracy is inconsistent and has clashed with geo-political realities and priorities in the context of the 'war on terror'.¹⁸ There are inherent contradictions between the professed commitment of the US to promote democracy movements and its persecution of the 'war on terror', which has depended on nurturing ties with authoritarian regimes in certain contexts.

These contradictions have been evident in US policy toward civil society. While non-governmental public actors are crucial to US democracy promotion efforts, suspicion of civil society is registered at the highest levels of US policy and strategy. In 2006, the State Department published ten guiding NGO principles regarding the treatment of NGOs by governments.¹⁹ These emphasise the need for governments to show regard for the rights of groups to organise outside the state and the need for governments to protect this space. However, in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, special mention is made of the risk that charitable organisations and NGOs can be used wittingly or

unwittingly for terrorist financing and recruitment. It called for government cooperation with non-governmental actors to achieve the goal of denying terrorists further sponsorship, support and sanctuary. New checks and requirements for due diligence by governmental and non-governmental grant-makers have been required on the basis that the actors and spaces of civil society are at risk of being co-opted into terrorist organising. The US Department of Treasury has issued voluntary guidelines for private grant-makers and charitable organisations to prevent their funds from being used to finance terrorism.²⁰ Although the guidelines are voluntary, in practice many organisations adapted to the more stringent regulatory context and pressures to cooperate in counter-terrorism. USAID requires its grantees to sign Anti-terrorism Certificates. Private grant-makers have introduced similar checks such as requiring their grantees to know the backgrounds and physical addresses of their trustees.

UK

As a major ally in the War on Terror it is particularly relevant to analyse the shifts in UK aid policy and its effects on aid programming, aid flows, and civil society. The UK government had already begun to weave the themes of conflict and security into aid policy since the early 1990s with particular reference to the so-called 'new wars' in Africa and the Balkans. As will be detailed further on, calls for more co-ordinated approaches to conflict reduction were already expressed in New Labour's first White Paper on Development published in 1997 and has led gradually to the formation of cross-departmental institutions. However with the launch of the so-called War on Terror, this tendency towards convergence has become generalised throughout aid policy.

In the immediate months following the attacks on the Twin Towers UK politicians were already beginning to make connections between poverty, deprivation and terrorism. In an interview for an ITV documentary in November 2004, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, for example, spoke of poverty as a 'breeding ground for discontent'. Similarly UK Prime Minister Tony Blair made a speech to the US Congress on July 17th 2003, where he juxtaposed poverty, lack of freedom and terrorism: "The threat comes because, in another part of the globe, there is shadow and darkness where not all the world is free... where a third of our planet lives in poverty...and where a fanatical strain of religious extremism has arisen... and because in the combination of these afflictions, a new and deadly virus has emerged. That virus is terrorism.." (Blair, 2003). With aid as a potential soft tool for maintaining global economic stability whilst also

counterbalancing the belligerent thrust of foreign policy, politicians such as Gordon Brown and Tony Blair have canvassed leaders of wealthy countries at key events such as the Monterrey conference in 2002, the G7 meeting and the G8 summit in 2005 for an increase in aid budgets and a commitment to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP devoted to aid. In this regard they have won support from aid officials, non-governmental organisations and campaigning groups who have opportunistically endorsed these ideational linkages to push the case for an increase in development aid.

This laid the ideological ground for a gradual shift in UK aid policy that wove together more firmly the threads of protecting national and global security interests and the delivery of aid and development. These shifts in policy can be observed in the changing language of policy documentation and the growing pre-occupation, as in Australia, with fragile states. In 2005 DFID issued a document entitled “Fighting poverty to build a safer world. A strategy for security and development”, the very title stating boldly the causal links between poverty and security. In his foreword the then Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, stated: ‘In recent years, DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. But we need to do more. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the World Economic Forum this year, “it is absurd to choose between an agenda focusing on terrorism and one on global poverty”’ (DFID 2005: 3). Importantly the document acknowledges that increasing state security does not necessarily imply improved security for poor people but it does assume that conflict and development are negatively interrelated²¹, a position that Cramer (2006) strongly contests. Though the paper highlights the fact that the casualties from international terrorism in Africa and Asia between 1998 and 2004 are almost six times the number in North America and Europe, it is noteworthy nevertheless that the strong drive towards linking security and development closely has come in the wake of the September 11th attacks in North America. Had these and later attacks in London and Madrid not taken place, it is questionable whether there would have been such a strong and rapid thrust in this direction.

The 2005 paper asserts resolutely that aid policy and practice should not be subordinated to global security objectives. Nevertheless, it does give underline the need to make development and security goals ‘mutually reinforcing’ (p.13), a desire which has fed into policy formulation, institutional arrangements and programming.

As well as these shifts in discourse reflected in policy documentation since 2001 there has been a deliberate move towards greater cross-departmental interaction to deal with the perceived terrorist threat. This in turn reflects the 'whole-of-government' approach adopted other governments such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Sweden and USA (Patrick and Brown 2007) and has to be located against a broader context of increasing co-ordination between donors as reflected in the Paris Declaration as discussed above. The seeds of a 'joined-up' approach to governing conflict had already been sown by the late 1990s with growing official concern for the impact of 'new wars'. The need for a co-ordinated approach to conflict policy-making found expression in both the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development. The 1997 Paper called in paragraph 3.50 for the coherent deployment of 'diplomatic, development assistance and military instruments' to address conflict issues²² (DFID 1997). By 2000 the government was urging greater commitment to inter-departmental coherence for effective conflict prevention through the notion of 'a more joined-up approach to policy-making' (DFID 2000: 30, paragraph 81). This called for the creation of conflict prevention pools, which drew together the resources and expertise of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), DFID and the Ministry of Defence and were supported by the Treasury and the Cabinet Office. The Global and African Conflict and Prevention Pools²³ came into operation in 2001. These focussed on supporting policing in Sierra Leone and disarmament, de-mobilisation and reintegration programmes, and providing £12 million in assistance to the African Union peace support operations in Darfur.

Also illustrative of the 'joined-up' or 'whole-of-government approach' is the formation of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004. This is a cross-Whitehall department, involving the DFID, FCO and the Ministry of Defence, with DFID being the prime funder. Emerging out of the Iraq experience the Unit was originally designed to manage the civilian component of immediate post-conflict intervention before other government departments took over longer-term development work. Recognising that there were unlikely to be any large-scale person deployments and that the concept of a post-conflict phase was problematic, the unit gradually shifted towards providing assessment and planning and operational expertise for stabilisation operations. Reflecting these changes, the unit was renamed in September 2007 as the Stabilisation Unit. At the operational level the government has fostered closer civil-military co-operation in development and humanitarian assistance through the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, an idea which was pioneered in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Recognition of the inevitability in some circumstances of humanitarian and development actors working alongside military forces, as in the recent tsunami or the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, the DFID has supported the formation of a UK NGO-Military Contact Group to provide a forum for dialogue between UK NGOs and the UK military (DFID 2005: 20). The Contact Group was established in 2000 and its creation reflected the growing operational convergence between civil and military actors in humanitarian and development work and the need for dialogue around strategic policy and thematic issues. It is currently chaired by the British Red Cross²⁴ and its participants include nine NGOs, DFID, and three sections within the Ministry of Defence.

Thus the various initiatives towards joined-up government such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the Global Conflict Pools, the Stabilisation Unit, the Counter-Narcotics Pool in Afghanistan have emerged out of the UK's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their effect has been to bring development policy and practice more closely into contact with the agendas of foreign policy and defence departments. Whilst the attempts at joined-up government may not always be effective as intended (Stewart and Brown 2007), the development of new cross-departmental institutions nevertheless points to the increasing securitisation of aid policy and practice.

The UK's close alliance with the United States and its military involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan has in turn led to a substantial increase in the volume of aid to those countries. Iraq became the top recipient of UK bilateral aid in 2003-04, amounting to £209 million, thereby usurping India from its leading position the year before. This has been achieved in part through a diversion of existing aid budgets away from middle-income countries in Latin America. In 2006 Afghanistan ranked amongst the top three recipients of UK bilateral aid at £134 million, rising from fourth position in 2005 at £121 million and seventh position in 2004 at £122 million. Iraq occupied fourth position in terms of UK net bilateral ODA at £150 million in 2004, second in 2005 at £725 million and with double the amount of aid to India, and eighth position in 2006 at £110 million (DFID, 2007: 28). In terms of DFID bilateral aid Afghanistan held fifth position in years 2004/5, 2005-06 and sixth in 2006/7, receiving £80 million, £98 million and £99 million respectively. Iraq occupied 10th, 8th and then 18th positions as DFID aid recipient in the years 2004-07, receiving £49 million, £87 million and £50 million respectively.

Whilst the amount of UK net bilateral aid going to Afghanistan seems modest compared to the sums going to Nigeria (£1,731 million in 2006 compared to £134 million for

Afghanistan), it is nevertheless significant that both Afghanistan and Iraq feature in the UK's top twenty recipients of net bilateral ODA and DFID bilateral aid in the years between 2004-07, as neither had prior to 2002. Iraq, for example, did not receive any bilateral aid prior to 2002. Recorded flows to Iraq before 2003-04 were for humanitarian assistance provided through UN agencies (to which UK govt presumably contributed and CSOs for Iraqi citizens (DFID 2007: fn 4, table 14.3). The bilateral programme for Iraq thus increased from £18.85 million in 2002-03 for humanitarian assistance to £209,313 during the next budget year, of which just over half was for humanitarian assistance. In 2005-06 Iraq was the second top recipient of gross ODA, receiving US\$760 million, with Afghanistan close behind in fourth position with US \$233million (OECD – DAC, accessed on website at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/53/40039127.gif)²⁵. Prior to 2001 Afghanistan was not a major recipient of UK aid, the key aid recipients in the 1990s being India, Sudan and others. The catapulting of Afghanistan and Iraq to the league of UK aid recipients reflects the linkages between development, security and foreign policy both nationally and internationally.

The growing concern of politicians and heads of development institutions with security issues has in turn fed into programming. This is reflected in the expansion and regularisation of programmes concerned with security, sector reforms; the refocusing of governance work on security of the poor; greater attention to conflict reduction work, prevention and analysis; the emergence of fragile states as a category for intervention; the shift in aid flows; support to civil society; greater support for educational reform in countries with Muslim populations, focussing particularly on madrassas; consultation with a broader range of donors and countries.

First, DFID has expanded the number of countries where it supports security sector reform (SSR) and safety, security and access to justice initiatives. The goal is to make these issues a standard part of programme design (DFID 2005: 24). This is significant because it involves greater interaction between development, diplomatic and defence professionals, contributing thereby to the 'whole-of-government' approach. It also contrasts with the approach outlined in the 2000 White Paper, where the call for increased support for SSR is aimed primarily at countries in conflict (DFID 2000: 30:paragraph 82).

Second, greater attention to security has led to a re-focussing of governance work to include more direct support for the security of the poor. The intention here, as outlined in

DFID's 2005 strategy paper on development and security linkages is to promote stability and reduce conflict through amongst other things support for basic service provision, defined as not only health and education but also security and justice, and support for accountable government and transparent financial management. It is noteworthy, however, that the concept of 'human security' appears only once in the 2005 strategy paper; elsewhere, the more ambivalent term 'security' is used, which embraces both the more narrow and traditional meaning of national security and potentially the broader sense of human security. It does not feature at all in the 2006 international development White Paper; instead the term 'security' is used throughout, often in conjunction with 'peace'. This is within a policy context where DFID has committed to devote half of all its direct support for developing countries to public services for the poor. Elements of a narrow and a broad interpretation of security permeate the White Paper.

Third, DFID has committed to integrating elements of conflict reduction such as support for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and for work on small arms, more firmly into its programmes. This has required strengthening its expertise in conflict-related areas and applying a conflict analysis approach more systematically across programmes (DFID 2005: 25).

Fourth and relatedly, there has been a growing emphasis on fragile states, part of the justification for which has been the assessment that '[t]hey [fragile states] are more likely to become unstable....and to be bases for terrorists. Afghanistan and Sudan are recent examples' (DFID 2005b: 5)²⁶. Echoing the UN High Level Panel's report on 'Threats, Challenges and Change' issued in 2004, the DFID endorses the view that conflict, terrorism, state failure, poverty, disease and environmental degradation are all inter-related. In this way it justifies the need for increased attention and aid resources to be directed towards fragile states and reverses the trend of the 1990s where fragile states were neglected as donors directed their aid towards relatively effective governments. In the context of fragile states, NGOs play the role of exemplifying approaches to service delivery which governments could later adopt, with no mention made of their role in facilitating key elements of 'good governance' such as accountability and citizen voice.

Bound up in the argument for greater emphasis on fragile states is the need for enhanced cooperation between development, foreign and defence ministries as epitomised by the Conflict Prevention Pools. DFID's concern with fragile states dovetails the increasing attention given to fragile states by the USA. The USA justifies directing greater resources

to fragile states in terms of 'an investment in our own security' (Weinstein, Porter and Eizenstadt 2004:3) and raises the stakes of development policy in security American security, interests and values. Whilst DFID makes its case for greater support for fragile states in terms of the links between lack of development, instability and terrorism, its language is more moderated in terms of the benefit of development for UK national security and values, reflecting the different approaches between US and UK aid policy.

Fifth, DFID has broadened its operational approach to civil society. Though DFID uses a wide definition of civil society which acknowledges that this concept includes much more than international or domestic NGOs, in practice it has operated mainly with or through NGOs, and to a lesser degree business associations and trades unions. The discursive (and erroneous) identification of terrorism with Islam has been one of the reasons for a surge in interest in madrassas, Islamic NGOs and Muslim organisations. More generally the religious convictions of both Bush and Blair have driven an agenda in the UK and US governments to raise the profile of faith-based organisations in service delivery, in community affairs and in international development. Indicative of this is the establishment in 2004 (check date) of a specialised Religions and Development Research Programme funded by DFID. As laid out in its 2005 paper on 'Fighting poverty to build a safer world', DFID views support to education reform and religious schools as a way of reducing the risk of poor countries to terrorism (DFID 2005: 12). In November 2006, for example, the UK government signed a ten-year Development Partnership Arrangement with Pakistan, which included *inter alia* support for strengthening the provision of, oversight over and the quality of education, including madrassas (DFID 2007).

Sixth, greater support for educational reform in countries with Muslim populations, focussing particularly on madrassas; This growing interest in aid for educational reform complements parallel initiatives in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to engage more strategically with the Middle East and with Muslim populations. ADD: references to various divisions on this in FCO.

Seventh, DFID has begun to consult with a wider range of donor countries and agencies, and specifically with donors that support low income countries with large Muslim populations, such as the Islamic Development Bank, Saudi Arabia and India (DFID 2005:25).

Sweden

Since the Second World War, neutrality has been the guiding principle of Swedish foreign policy and the basis of its independent stance in international affairs. Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995. Although not a NATO member it does maintain broad cooperation with NATO within an institutional framework known as the Partnership for Peace. The 'global war on terror' has tested Sweden's foreign policy principles as well as its societal values of openness and tolerance. Sweden was part of the Nordic bloc of countries that opposed the military invasion and occupation of Iraq. Former Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson criticised the US and British led war in Iraq as a violation of international law but also committed Sweden to contribute reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. The former Social Democrat-led government also challenged the US on various aspects of the 'war on terror' regime. A notable case concerned three Somali-born Swedish citizens whom the US put on the UN list of terrorists, one of whom was a candidate for the Social Democratic party in the fall 2002 Swedish elections (Zagaris, 2002). A public debate ensued concerning the inability of the government to review the evidence and appeal. Against US objections, the Swedish government insisted on reviewing the cases of the suspects and requested the means to ascertain their guilt. Following the diplomatic row, Sweden became the first country to demand changes to the UN sanctions list, including a process and procedures to provide for de-listing and removal of contested names (Norrell, 2005).

The Swedish government has cooperated in other ways in the 'global war on terror', including the introduction of a new terrorism law and formulating a comprehensive government policy on counter-terrorism. In December 2001, Sweden was involved in the CIA transfer of two Egyptian citizens suspected of terror links from Sweden to Egypt. The suspects were transferred in violation of Swedish and international human rights law that prohibits extradition of suspects to countries with the death penalty although the Swedish government sought assurances that the suspects would not be tortured in Egyptian custody or be sentenced under provisions for capital punishment in Egyptian law. It later emerged that at least one of the suspects was tortured. The United Nations investigated the incident and ruled that Sweden had violated the global torture ban [follow up].

Sweden is one of the countries to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan under the mandate of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Afghanistan was the eighth largest recipient of Swedish ODA in 2005 (US\$45 million)²⁷

and Sweden was the eighth largest bilateral donor. Sweden commitment to security and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan was unaffected by the change in government following the Swedish elections in the autumn of 2006. The new centre-right government led by Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderates Party introduced a Bill in 2007 to extend the Swedish participation in ISAF until May 2009, which was approved by parliament.

Sweden's development cooperation is guided by the Policy for Global Development (PGD), an all encompassing foreign policy that was introduced in 2003 by the previous Social Democrat-led government and endorsed by parliament. It specifies the overall orientation for Sweden's international assistance, key bilateral partners and budget frameworks. Within this framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets out the overall priorities and decides on the bilateral cooperation programmes in partner countries while the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) works independently. The PGD mandated an integrated policy for global development encompassing all policy areas of government around a central theme of contributing to equitable and sustainable global development. Compared with other major bilateral donors, the priorities and geographic allocation of Sweden's development cooperation are more clearly guided by poverty reduction criteria. Least developed and other low income countries are the target of an estimated 75% of Sweden's allocable bilateral aid (OECD, 2005). In 2005-2006, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda and Ethiopia ranked in the top five recipients of gross Swedish ODA.²⁸

New security threats that have influenced significant change in bilateral policy and practice in other countries are less important in understanding Swedish aid trends. Conflict management and security is one of eight central elements of the PGD and in many ways continues an emphasis in Swedish development cooperation since the 1990s on conflict prevention as part of human security. In 2005, SIDA developed a new policy on peace and security that replaces an earlier 'Strategy on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding' (1999) and, further, has established a Division for Peace and Security in Development Cooperation. Violent conflict, insecurity and human security are the focus of the new policy, which outlines approaches for development cooperation in conflict situations. These include attention to the threat of violence undermining development, conflict sensitivity in development action, and promotion of peace and security (SIDA, 2005). Under the latter, the sorts of interventions referred to include agricultural

programmes to address land rights disputes and good governance and democracy initiatives to provide protection and security for minorities and marginalised groups.

Another significant feature of Swedish development cooperation is its reliance on NGOs (OECD, 2005). The PGD calls for increased collaboration with Swedish organisations, religious organisations and popular movements both to implement programmes and influence Swedish public opinion on development. The perspective on poverty adopted in the PGD also implies that specific efforts be undertaken to strengthen civil society in partner countries: 'poverty... relates to a lack of power, security and the ability to make life choices.' An internal statement on SIDA's policy direction says: '[g]eneral budget aid for poverty reduction requires greater support for civil society, free debate and independent research so that the poor have opportunities to make themselves heard and so that the State is examined' (SIDA, 2006). Operationally, SIDA has a Division for Cooperation with NGOs [Follow up].

The changing political context in Sweden has so far not affected the unambiguous focus on poverty reduction in its development cooperation. In 2007, the new conservative government completed a review of Sweden's bilateral aid portfolio with the intention of focusing assistance on fewer countries as a foundation of a new development cooperation policy. The broad rationale for the most recent incarnation of Sweden's development policy tied into the Paris Declaration and the bureaucratic pressures accompanying increasing levels of ODA: '[a] smaller share of the total aid, increased concentration, greater programme aid and donor coordination mean that Sweden and SIDA have to make more and deeper strategic choices. We cannot expect SIDA's administrative resources to grow at the same pace as the aid. We therefore want Sweden to concentrate on fewer countries and fewer sectors' (SIDA, 2006: p.11). The outcomes of the 'country focus process' included a stronger focus on Africa and Europe as well as issues of peace, security, democracy and human rights. Following the policy review, the Swedish government is seeking to develop cooperation with a majority of states that are in conflict or post-conflict situations. Specific countries include Iraq, Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala and Colombia.²⁹ Already, SIDA estimates that 75% of its partner countries are affected by violent conflict (SIDA, 2005).

In the case of Sweden, an outstanding impact of the 'war on terror' has been an influx of refugees from Iraq since 2003. Nearly half of all Iraqis that fled to Europe in 2006 came to Sweden³⁰, where a large diaspora community had formed during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The 8,951 Iraqi refugees that Sweden took in 2006 compared with only 200 for the United States in the same year and 466 in total for the entire war up to the end of 2006.³¹ However, a decision in 2007 by Swedish Superior Court of Migration signalled a policy change. It ruled that Iraq is not a 'conflict zone' and that Iraqis must prove they are in personal danger of persecution before being granted asylum igniting opposition by advocacy groups and human rights campaigners.³² Seen in a broader context, the decision reflects the anti-immigrant stance of the ruling conservative coalition government, which has expressed unease with aspects of the multicultural model that has been the basis of Sweden's immigration policy.

Preliminary reflections

From the preceding analysis we can observe both common patterns across the four countries as well as important distinctions. With its long adherence to a principle of neutrality in matters of foreign policy Sweden stands out in its more measured position in relation to the 'global war on terror' and modifying its development agenda in accordance with global security concerns. This is not to say that it has not co-operated in the production of the 'global war on terror regime'. Like most other countries it has introduced a new terrorism law and formulated a comprehensive national policy on counter-terrorism. It has assisted with the extradition of terrorist suspects, sent troops to Afghanistan and established a PRT under ISAF. Yet it has maintained an unambiguous focus on poverty reduction in its development policy. Like the other countries examined here it has focussed its aid more strategically on countries 'in conflict' or 'post-conflict', though unlike Australia, UK and the USA it has not used the language of 'fragile states' to describe this.

The UK and Australia have been close allies to the USA in the persecution of the 'global war on terror', even though in recent years the UK government leaders have rejected this language. Leaders in all three countries have drawn causal links between poverty, under-development and terrorism brought development more firmly into line with foreign policy and national security objectives. The formation of joint defence, diplomacy and development working structures and the increasing engagement of government development departments in military operations has gone furthest in the USA. DFID has maintained a focus on poverty reduction, whilst concurring nevertheless in the links between poverty, insecurity and terrorism. The extent of inter-weaving between development, defence and foreign policy agencies is in part affected by their relative positioning in government architectures. DFID was separated out from the FCO in 1997 and has since then consolidated and strengthened its position as an independent government department, succeeding in regularly increasing its budgetary allocation.

As well as sharing a common 'whole-of-government approach' to addressing terrorism, Australia, UK and USA have placed 'fragile states' higher on their development agendas and increased resources to these countries in turn. All four countries have increased their aid flows to both Iraq and Afghanistan. The whole-of-government approach has at the operational level led to closer civil-military relations. Whilst Australia and the USA have

introduced counter-terrorist projects in their bilateral development assistance portfolios, the UK has expanded its support to SSR, which though not immediately 'counter-terrorist' in purpose, is clearly linked to the broader aim of enhancing security to reduce the perceived vulnerability of poor populations to terrorist recruitment. In relation to the idea of security Sweden stands out in its continued adherence to the notion of 'human security'. Whilst the concept of 'human security' gained increased currency during the 1990s, the idea has dropped out of the everyday discourse of UK development policy. However, the UK distinguishes itself from the USA by emphasising the importance of the security of the poor, though again underlying this is the fundamental notion that poverty and terrorism are somehow inter-linked.

Since 2001 donor relations with civil society have become increasingly contradictory and complex. The US case illustrates this most vividly. On the one hand the US needs to recruit civil society actors into its agenda of democracy promotion, which in turn has been mobilised in the 'fight against terrorism'. On the other hand there is growing suspicion of civil society, which has prompted the introduction of various controls such as the inclusion of NGOs in anti-money laundering regulations and the introduction of certification requirements for aid grantees. In the case of the UK, DFID has brought new parts of civil society into its programming and policy engagement. Specifically it has made efforts to reach out to Muslim groups and institutions, and Muslim youth. There are parallel efforts by the FCO and Home Office to prevent the radicalisation of Muslim youth in the UK and abroad. Australia does not have a long history of working systematically or extensively with civil society. Nevertheless, like the US, it has introduced clauses in its aid agreements requiring partners to declare they have no connections with terrorist groups.

Conclusion

This paper argues that the 'global war on terror regime' has contributed in diverse and complex ways to the increasing securitisation of development and aid policy. The securitisation of aid, in turn, affects the ways donor agencies relate to non-governmental actors. By the 'securitisation of development and aid policy' we refer to the absorption of global and national security interests into the framing, structuring and implementation of development and aid. The 'global war on terror regime' has not singly subordinated aid policy and institutions to the security agendas of the USA or other advanced capitalist countries, or wholly reframed how donor agencies conceive of and engage with civil society. Still, the 'global war on terror' has affected the formulation of development agendas as well as aid policies and practices.

Three key findings can be drawn from the cases of bilateral aid reviewed in this paper, namely USAID, AusAID, DFID and SIDA. First, the effects of the 'global war on terror regime' on development thinking and aid policy and practice are contextually specific. How much bilateral development agencies absorb the mantras, rationale and policy drives of the war on terror regime depend on the degree of independence of those agencies within government hierarchies, foreign policy relations with the USA and in particular responses to military interventions inspired by the 'global war on terror' and domestic perceptions of threats to national security. Second, it is evident that in all four cases, development and aid policy, institutions and operations have been affected in similar but also diverse ways by the shifting global politics driven and legitimated by the 'global war on terror'. Third, the 'global war on terror regime' has cast suspicion on civil society in general and on specific sub-groups such as Muslim communities. This has had contradictory effects. On the one hand it has fuelled a trend towards tidying up, tightening up and exerting control over charitable institutions, NGOs and Muslim organisations. On the other hand it has brought Muslim organisations and groups into the policy gaze of development agencies, creating opportunities for dialogue, new programming and funding. This latter point is important because it is all too easy to dwell on the repressive, negative aspects of dominant, ideological machinery such as the 'global war on terror regime'.

These findings in turn have a number of implications for development actors. The absorption of security narratives into development policy and the concomitant recruitment

of development into national security strategies should caution development actors about the utmost importance of maintaining organisational independence so as to protect the prioritisation of goals such as poverty reduction. The almost unnoticed eclipse of the notion 'human security' by the more ambivalent notions of 'security' is worrying. Not only does it sweep away over a decade of conceptual innovation and strategic thinking, but it also portends less well for addressing global problems of well-being. The 'global war on terror regime' has accelerated a process of donors seeking to tidy up their relations with civil society actors. It has also highlighted the need for the development-focused parts of civil society to re-examine their own positions in the aid process and to reflect more deeply and strategically about their location in global and national political processes.

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Notes

¹ Other factors also added to a growing concern about national security in Australia, such as instability in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, and influenced the overall context of aid and development policy. See OECD 2005:22.

² In 2003 47% of total bilateral Australian ODA went to Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands and 42% of Asia.

³ A similar project is the Enhanced Cooperation Programme directed at Papua New Guinea. For a detailed critical discussion of this see O'Connor (2006: 180-184).

⁴ The RAMSI is also interesting in that whilst the initial purpose was to restore peace and strengthen the police, within a year the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had released a report entitled 'Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy', which pronounced a shift from peace-keeping to business promotion. This report was funded by the BHP-Billiton, an Australian mining company, which clearly had an interest in one of the key recommendations, namely, to register land-holdings, a procedure which would pave the way to the commercialisation of land. This demonstrates the subtle interweaving of security, development and commercial objectives. However the OECD Peer Review of Australian ODA expressed concern that this increasing engagement of different government ministries in development could lead to a 'law and order agenda' dominating the development programme rather than an approach that fostered capacity-building, sustainability and local ownership (OECD 2005: 16).

⁵ In contrast the percentage of aid devoted to infrastructure over the same period fell from 15% in 1999/2000 to 7% in 2005/2006 (O'Connor 1976:177) and for education from 27 % to 14% (Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services: 2004: 1). Note that O'Connor puts the 1999/2002 figure for education at 18%.

⁶ This document was a statement of principle and more detailed guidelines were introduced in July 2004 in the AusAID document 'Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Measures'.

⁷ 'Realizing the goals of Transformational Diplomacy.' Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. February 15, 2006.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61209.htm>

⁸ 'Diplomats will be shifted to hot spots.' *Washington Post*. January 19, 2006.

⁹ 'Transforming U.S. Foreign Aid.' Council on Foreign Relations. March 17, 2006.

www.cfr.org/publication/10176/transforming_us_foreign_aid.html.

¹⁰ 'Foreign Aid and the War on Terrorism.' 2005. USAID Summer Seminar Series.

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¹² 'Foreign Aid and the War on Terrorism.' 2005. USAID.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ 'Democracy push by Bush attracts doubters in party.' *New York Times*. March 17, 2006.

¹⁵ 'Foreign Aid and the War on Terrorism.' 2005. USAID.

¹⁶ 'Democracy's "special forces" face heat.' *Christian Science Monitor*. February 6, 2006.

¹⁷ 'Democracy push by Bush attracts doubters in party.' *New York Times*. March 17, 2006.

¹⁸ 'The realities of exporting democracy.' *Washington Post*. January 25, 2006.

¹⁹ 'Guiding principles on Non-governmental Organisations.' US Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. December 14, 2006.

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/77771.htm>.

²⁰ Insert reference from Treasury website.

²¹ As the 2005 DFID report (p.5) states 'insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are among the biggest obstacles to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals; they also destroy development'.

²² It also urged 'better linkage of foreign, security and development co-operation policies' within the EU (paragraph 3.52, White Paper 1997).

²³ The Global Pool is chaired by the Foreign Secretary and the Africa Pool by the Secretary of State for International Development.

²⁴ It was originally chaired by the JDCC.

²⁵ Nigeria ranked top with US\$ 2,697 million, but this figure captures the one-off payment of debt relief to Nigeria and so distorts the picture given by the aid figures.

²⁶ This refrain is repeated again on page 10: "Fragile states are more likely to become unstable and fall prey to criminal and terrorist networks".

²⁷ OECD-DAC tables. 'Afghanistan.'

²⁸ 'Sweden. Gross bilateral ODA, 2005-2006.' OECD-DAC tables.

www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/51/40039148.gif.

²⁹ 'Focused bilateral development cooperation.' Ministry for Foreign Affairs. August 27, 2007.

<http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/9382/a/86595.jsessionid=a58J02FBzBgg>.

³⁰ 'Sweden tightens rules on Iraqi asylum seekers.' *Reuters*. July 9, 2007.

³¹ 'The tragically high price of helping Americans.' *Spiegel Online*. May 23, 2007.

www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,01518,484047,00.html.

³² 'Iraqi Afghan refugees face expulsion from Scandinavia.' *Oneworld News*. August 8, 2007.

<http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/152096/1/>.