Community Policing and Community Security: Theory and Practice in Timor-Leste

Svetlana Djurdjevic-Lukic
(Public Policy Research Centre, Belgrade)

June 2014
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Scope and purpose

- This paper offers an appraisal of The Asia Foundation's (the Foundation) Theory of Change on Community Security Practice that was developed to capture the reasoning for specific programming in support of community policing in Timor-Leste.

- The analytical focus is on the formulation and use of this Theory of Change by the Foundation, the evidence provided for a specific claim within it, and its contribution to the change they hoped for at both community and national level.

- Specifically, regarding the local level dynamic, the assessment focuses on a claim that the Foundation’s intervention produces more responsive policing that better meets community needs and the evidence needed for such a change.

- At the national level, the Foundation’s focus on the institutionalisation of community policing is analysed against the background of massive international involvement in police reform in Timor-Leste since 1999, the Foundation’s partnerships with the New Zealand police force and cooperation with the Australian Federal Police.

- Building on the fieldwork undertaken, the paper proposes a number of proxy indicators for strengthening the evidence base and for monitoring change, and offers insights about different actors’ narratives related to the Foundation's contribution to the institutionalisation of community policing.

Methodology

- The research was based on fieldwork conducted in Timor-Leste between February and May 2013, in the capital Dili and in the four districts included in the Foundation's programme at that time, as well as on documents and a literature review, and two large surveys which examined Timorese perceptions about safety, security and policing in Timor-Leste.

- The field work included key informant interviews, focus groups discussions and participant observation. The key informants are current and previous Foundation staff and the programme’s implementers and consultants; Timor-Leste Police (PNTL) officers in districts and at headquarters; community leaders from the communities participating in the programme; national and international experts engaged in police reforms or security sector oversight.

- Methodological challenges included the limited time-frame and the scope of the implementation of the Foundation’s community policing programmes, difficulties in reaching any end-users beyond the level of the senior community leaders, and
complexity in assessing a specific contribution, due to the Foundation’s close partnership with the New Zealand Police.

Key findings

• The ToC is based on lessons learned from previous projects and on programme planning, capturing the three layers influencing the dynamic of change, and demonstrating the Foundation’s understanding of the complexity of an intervention that has to be implemented on various levels for a cumulative effect.

• A very small number of senior managers and consultants were engaged with formulating the ToC and in using it in practice, since its primary purpose is to provide a long-term vision for the Foundation’s work in Timor-Leste. However, a prominent role of the ToC in this case is knowledge management.

• The Foundation’s local model of community-police interaction contributes to more responsive policing if this is defined as an increase in the availability and regularity of the police’s interaction with a community, and a broadening of the range of roles of community policing officers.

• The Foundation’s initial presentation of evidence is focused on activities and steps undertaken with and by the PNTL within a broader range of influences for policy change in that institution. There is space for building a stronger evidence base focused on testing and proving specific claims within the ToC.

• The tendency in the Foundation to orient itself further toward the police presents a slight departure from the focus stressed in the ToC title, the concept of ‘community security’, and from the three levels of engagement outlined in the ToC. Furthermore, it might widen a gap in the perception of the Foundation’s role between the two key bilateral actors supporting police reform in Timor-Leste and the programme’s management.

Implications for further research/policy implications

• ‘Community Security’, ‘Community Policing’ and ‘Police-Community Relations’ are concepts with a wide but vague use as they can have a broad range of meanings. Formulating a Theory of Change without defining the key terms reduces its value and the possibilities for evidence gathering and monitoring change.

• There is a need to engage more deeply with the concepts of ‘end-users’ of security and ‘Hybrid Political Orders’ in order to problematise security provision, as well as with issues of social inclusion for vulnerable and marginalised groups.
• The establishment of new hybrid institutions (i.e. Community-Policing Councils) might have unintended consequences such as an increase in the range of available options for obtaining security and justice. This might be beneficial but also bring about an increase in complexity and confusion when addressing grievances and seeking justice.

• The different organisational cultures of professional security services and of developmental actors with regard to security provision could be explored. Police officers’ perceptions of the role of developmental organisations should be taken into account and various narratives of the division of work, even within effective partnerships, should be regularly explored.
Table of Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Structure of this paper ...................................................................................................................... 4

2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Methodological Challenges ............................................................................................................. 7

3. The Foundation’s Theory of Change and Programming in Timor Leste ...................................... 8

3.1 Assumptions and Use of Theory of Change .................................................................................... 9

3.2 The Foundation’s Community Policing Programming in Timor Leste ...................................... 13

4. The Local Level Interaction Model and Evidence ........................................................................... 18

5. National Level Changes and the Institutionalisation of Community Policing ............................. 30

5.1 The National Level Security Context: survey results .................................................................. 31

5.2 Partnerships, Competing Narratives and Ownership .................................................................. 33

6. Conclusion: Strengths, Weaknesses, and the Way Forward ......................................................... 38

References ............................................................................................................................................... 42

APPENDIX 1: Background to field research ......................................................................................... 49

APPENDIX 2: Background on the Timor-Leste Context and Community Policing.............................. 52

The Country Context .......................................................................................................................... 52

The Concept of Community Policing .................................................................................................. 57

The Development of Community Policing in Timor Leste ................................................................. 61
COMMUNITY POLICING AND COMMUNITY SECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN TIMOR-LESTE

1 Introduction

International engagements in ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’ over the past two decades – by multilateral and bilateral, governmental and nongovernmental actors - have been conducted and assessed under multiple frameworks: post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, state-building, nation-building, and various forms of developmental assistance. Behind these overarching approaches, a myriad of parallel processes have taken place, guided by explicit or implicit assumptions about the pace and causal logic of change in various sectors. There is a wealth of literature, both in critical scholarship and gray publications, pointing to various shortcomings in these efforts, up to the “belief that contemporary interventions are engendering a ‘virtual reality’ of post-conflict peacebuilding” and that “the process of pursuing [stated] goals and simulating their achievement constitutes an international development industry which flatters to deceive”. Developmental agencies cannot be responsible for various practices, events and processes that are simultaneous and tangential to their intervention, but beyond their control. Nevertheless, there is a rising expectation for such agencies to gain deeper understandings of the processes leading to change in specific socio-political contexts and to provide an explicit underpinning of the actions undertaken based on accumulated knowledge, as well as using evidence to develop and refine policy and practice.

In that context, donors have increasingly placed emphasis on the use of Theories of Change to better articulate the underlying rationales for aid programming. The Theory of Change approach has been developed from the initiatives for improving evaluation theory and practice in the field of community initiatives; in the development field it also grew out of the tradition of logic planning models such as the logical framework approach. There is no widely accepted definition of the Theory of Change tool, but the experts stress participation of a wide range of stakeholders in its articulation, the importance of rigorous evidence, including local knowledge, past programming and social science theory. It locates a programme or project within a wider analysis of how change comes about; draws on external learning about development; articulates organisations’ understanding of change and challenges them to explore it further; and it acknowledges the complexity of change: the wider systems and actors that influence it. It is a process and a product.

2 Danielle Stein and Craig Valters (2012), Understanding ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development, JSRP Paper 1, LSE, p.3
5 Isabel Vogel (2012), ‘Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development’, UK Department for International Development, p.4
A recent Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) assessment stressed the insufficient quality of evidence-based research from both scholars and practitioners with regard to the positive or negative impacts of interventions on the everyday lives of people at the receiving end – the ‘end-users’. End-users are individuals, or collectives, who should be safe and secure in their everyday life, but whose notion of benefitting from security arrangements is contextual and dependent on each individual actor’s preference. The JSRP research and series of papers privileges an end-user, or people–centred approach focusing on hybrid governance systems that exist outside of, overlap, or subvert formal state structures.

This paper is part of the JSRP ‘Theories in Practice’ series developed in collaboration with The Asia Foundation and focused on the Theory of Change tool. The Asia Foundation (the Foundation) developed a Theory of Change to capture its reasoning for specific programming in support of community policing in Timor-Leste. This paper looks into the formulation and use of Theory of Change by the Foundation, the evidence provided for a specific claim within it, and its contribution to the change they hoped for at both community and national level. Building on the fieldwork undertaken, it proposes a number of proxy indicators for strengthening the evidence base and monitoring change and offers insights about different actors’ narratives related to the contribution of the Foundation to community policing institutionalisation.

The Theory of Change (ToC) studied for this paper is labelled the Community Security Practice Theory. Community security is one of the seven dimensions of human security elaborated in the 1994 Human Development Report in relation to the security that people derive from the groups they belong to and that provide a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the contemporary concept of community security includes both group and personal security, focusing on ensuring that communities and their members are ‘free from fear’, or, in broader definition, to ensure “freedom from want”. It supposes to bridge the gap between a focus on the state and on the individual, and to promote a multi-stakeholder approach that is driven by an analysis of local needs. ‘A key focus is on developing inclusive political processes to

---

9 The Asia Foundation (TAF) is a non-profit, nongovernmental organization committed to the development of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. TAF support wide-ranging programming across fragile and conflict-affected states in Asia.
10 Although the provision of a more elaborated and evidence-based Theories of Change is an overarching goal of the Foundation’s partnering with the Justice and Security Research Programme, the primary interest of The Asia Foundation in Timor-Leste regarding this exercise was on the assessment of the practical implementation in the field, and the pace of community policing institutionalization, according to the specific recommendation given to this researcher.
11 *Human Development Report 1994*, UNDP, p. 31
manage state-society relations’.\textsuperscript{13} Community policing is an appropriate entry point into the process of enhancing community security, but is a narrower approach, i.e. it is not the same as Community Security.

While the Foundation in general uses a political economy approach,\textsuperscript{14} this Theory of Change has not been explicitly situated within the broader academic and/or policy literature.\textsuperscript{15} The Foundation’s Theory of Change did not define community security or community per se but focused on the weakness of the national police force (the PNTL) and their ‘ineffectiveness at responding to safety and security needs’. The community is understood as a traditional local unit – a suku or village - and is taken as being represented via its elected leaders – the Suku Council– and by customary authority figures. The point of departure – the key assumption for the Foundation in Timor-Leste - was ‘low crime but high insecurity’ and ‘responses to the security and safety issues facing most communities’ as being ‘often driven by local leaders rather than the State security apparatus’. The Foundation is focused on ‘interaction between the police and communities’ and considers community policing as ‘a potentially important tool through which to improve police-community relations, develop a model of interaction between the state and traditional leaders, strengthen accountability of the police to the citizens, and generally improve the safety and security environment in Timor-Leste. In turn, improved policing should help strengthen the police as an institution and position it to respond in a proactive way to security threats and limit insecurity nationwide.’\textsuperscript{16}

The Theory proposes that the ‘establishing of state-community security models at the suku level, and building those examples into institutional reforms to develop proactive safety and security approaches, will contribute to strengthened state-society relations, and a more stable environment in Timor-Leste’.\textsuperscript{17}

The Theory and its implementation are based on a multi-level approach, with specific sub-theories:

**Sub-theory 1 - Collaborative security:** If we can establish space and mechanisms for cooperation between law enforcement and leaders at the local level, then they can be led through a series of steps to jointly provide effective security from which practical experience-based community policing results can be integrated into higher institutional reforms.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Deborah Cummings, Adviser, TAF Timor-Leste
\textsuperscript{15} There are no such references in the ToC; however, its key author’s comment is that he included a three levels approach using Conflict Resolution and Peace Building theory and practice literature
\textsuperscript{17} The Asia Foundation (2012), *Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste*, DFID PPA Year 1, op.cit., p. 375
\textsuperscript{18} The Asia Foundation (2012), op.cit. p.390. This is a modified version of USAID Theory of Change aimed at Peace Process Support by creating peace mechanisms/space: “If we can establish space, trust and mechanisms for negotiation between the belligerent parties, then a mediator/facilitator can lead the parties through a series of steps to cease violence and negotiate peace” quoted in the Theory of Change Catalogue prepared for JSRP by Stein and Valters, 2012, p.18.
Sub-theory 2 – Key Actors: If we can connect verifiable community policing results to higher level security and political actors, as well as reform initiatives, policies will be adopted which support community-level cooperation and community-oriented security.19

Sub-theory 3- Citizens Action: If we can connect collaborative security results with expectations by the wider population through the media and outreach, the political environment will become more conducive for adopting institutional reforms, as well as changing practical responses by [the national police] PNTL officers working at the community level.20

There are numerous proposed typologies of the Theories of Change related to the levels addressed, actors, goals and timing. This is a direct engagement theory and a combination of retrospective and prospective theory. 21 It was formulated in March 2012, when the Foundation’s substantial experiences of working on community policing related issues in Timor-Leste from 2008 onwards were available, and thus captures lessons learned. At the same time it is an aspirational theory, with long-term goals of institutional reform and improved state-society relations.

Furthermore, the ToC in question is a combination of an active citizenship and elite-driven change approach, and an implementation theory that details the specific change process behind a specific programme.22 According to the typology presented by Shapiro, this ToC is focused on changing the attitudes and perceptions of those individuals directly involved as well as changing relationships; it underlines new cooperative relationships and, with the establishment of new mechanisms, aspires to provide institutional changes.23

1.1 Structure of this paper
This introduction is followed in Section 2 by a description of the methodology used in the research process, including methodological challenges and limitations. In Section 3, the assumptions and claims of the current explicit Community Security ToC used by the Foundation office in Timor-Leste and their elaboration is discussed. The sources for its formulation are traced back to the period from 2008 onward by analysing how the Foundation’s community policing programming was developed and its adjustments to the changing political context in Timor-Leste.

Section 4 presents the local level interactions between communities and the police and the practices that have been developed due to the Foundation’s intervention. Section 5 looks at the Foundation’s contribution to the institutionalisation of community policing within the

---

19 The Asia Foundation (2012), op.cit. p. 390
20 Ibid.
21 Designed from the beginning of the programme as against being carried out at the time of the evaluation to understand what has underpinned practice
23 Cf. Stein and Valters, 2012, p. 9
ongoing process of the strengthening of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) by various actors. It includes the key findings of the Foundation’s 2013 Survey of Community-Police Perceptions; the narratives of the Foundation’s role relating to community policing at the national level, and an examination of the issue of ownership.

Section 6 provides a conclusion about the strengths and weaknesses of the Foundation’s Community Security ToC and suggests a possible way forward for enhancing evidence-based theories of change and their practical implementation.

The paper provides a background on the country context, and the debates about community policing in academic literature, as well as the early implementation of community policing in Timor-Leste by external actors and the national police. The background is placed in an appendix, and might be read before Section 3.

2. Methodology

The research was based on a mixed methods approach utilising documents and a literature review, key informant interviews, focus groups discussions (FGD) and participant observation. Desk research included academic and grey literature related to external support for improved security, specifically to community policing. The Foundation’s programme documents and related commissioned research, as well as relevant materials from donors and other stakeholders involved in community policing in Timor-Leste were also reviewed. Evidence supporting selected claims within the Theory was sought from the available data related to monitoring and evaluation, and from the results of two national Community-Police Perception Surveys conducted in 2008 and 2013, which provide quantitative indicators related to the opinions and perceptions about safety, security and policing in Timor-Leste.

The field research was conducted during the period February-May 2013 in the capital Dili and in four districts where the Foundation’s programme was implemented: Aileu, Baucau, Bobonaro, and Manatuto. The interviews included the following:

a) Foundation staff and the programme’s implementers and consultants;24
b) PNTL officers in districts and at the headquarters;25
c) community leaders from the communities participating in the programme;

24 Alongside staff currently at the programme, and several other Foundation senior figures who were the key contributors to the programme’s development, interviews were conducted with locally recruited coordinators in the districts, representatives of NGOs involved in the programme as Trainers of Trainers (ToT), and the author of the Baseline Assessment.
25 High level police officers in the PNTL HQ, the PNTL Deputy Commander, Operations Commander, Policy Planning Director, Community Policing Unit Head, PNTL commanders in districts Aileu, Baucau, Manatuto, Bobonaro, Liqisa, and community policing officers in the districts included in the programme were interviewed.
d) other informants, both national and international, engaged in police reforms or security sector oversight.  

In sukus, focus group discussions were held with members of Community Policing Councils (CPCs), and/or interviews with individual xefe suku (village chiefs). A number of related events were observed to gain a deeper insight into the PNTL’s relations with communities and donors, as well as into the Foundation’s communication with the PNTL and with communities. These included CPC meetings, the PNTL district commander’s meeting with a rural community, a stakeholders meeting of the PNTL leaders and civil society representatives, and the PNTL officers’ promotion ceremony. In Dili, the researcher attended the partner’s high level Management Meeting, the Community Policing Unit Head’s meetings with the Foundation and other donors, and a meeting of the participants in a study tour from New Zealand. Due to the heavy involvement of various international stakeholders in PNTL reform, international police officers (New Zealand Police, Australian Federal Police), in-country donor representatives (USAID, New Zealand Aid Programme), several diplomats, the UN and UNDP officers were interviewed as well.

Two surveys commissioned by the Foundation in Timor-Leste in 2008 and 2013 are important sources of data. The surveys examined Timorese perceptions about safety, security and policing in Timor-Leste by: a) the population at large, b) community leaders, and c) police officers. The 2008 survey was the first of its kind undertaken in Timor-Leste and was extensively used for the programme design. The objective of the second survey was to track progress in perceptions of policing and security through key indicators, in order to establish a baseline for evaluating the effectiveness of the community policing support being provided to the PNTL by the Foundation as well as by the New Zealand Police (NZPOL) in four target districts. This was in order to gauge perceptions of security sector performance and the overall security environment after UNPOL’s departure, and to gather information that could inform approaches to community policing support.

---

26 The informants included the chair of the parliamentary Committee for security and foreign affairs, a member of the National Security Council, an oppositional MP, and an adviser in the ministry. Details about all interactions are provided in the Appendix.
27 i.e. ‘community leaders’, as this term in this paper refers to suku chiefs and the members of the Community Police Councils at suku level. Ten sukus were included in the field research (out of 36 villages involved in the programme).
28 District Ailelo
29 District Baucau
30 District Bobonaro
31 Including PNTL, TAF, NZ Police, USAID, NZ Aid
33 According to three interviews with senior TAF staff – with Silas Everett, Liam Chinn, and Mark Koening.
34 Quantitative Study of Community-Police Relations, internal TAF paper prepared to guide the survey implementation
2.1 Methodological Challenges

While many steps were taken to gain deeper insight, there are still methodological challenges and limitations remaining. One substantial problem for identifying linkages between the Theory of Change formulation and its development in the field was the limited time-frame and the scope of the implementation of the Foundation’s community policing programmes. In 2008, the Foundation started a pilot programme that lasted only 18 months and was conducted in only two sub-districts; it included the formation of community police councils in 11 villages (sukus). A significant gap of 18 months occurred before the current, expanded project started in 2011, and a substantial period of time during 2012 was used for activities focused on the prevention of election-related violence. This led to a very short time frame of suku-level community policing-related activities confined to a small area (less than 10% of the total number of villages in Timor-Leste). Thus, the research undertaken captured an extremely limited life time of the Community Policing Council as the model of local engagement with the police established by the Foundation. There was little time for information about, and results from, the Foundation’s model spreading through a snowballing effect within selected districts.

The four districts which were included in the Foundation’s community policing programme were oversampled in the 2013 Survey, but without an attempt to target specifically the thirty six villages which implemented the Foundation’s model of community-police interaction and to gain deeper insights about possible changes of perception in these villages. While capturing some dynamic of change during the period 2008-2013, the 2013 Survey is actually interpreted by the Foundation as a baseline for the districts currently included in the programme, with the possibility of tracking national changes in attitudes towards proactive policing and justice seeking in future.

There have been many actors involved in support of community policing in Timor-Leste over the period from 1999 onwards. Their goals have been very similar to the Foundation’s aim of the institutionalisation of community policing. Additionally, the Foundation’s current programme is being implemented in intensive partnership with the New Zealand Police. All these elements make it extremely difficult to assess the Foundation’s specific contribution along the pathways of change established by its Theory of Change. This problem was addressed by collecting different narratives about the key actors’ perceptions of their role and the Foundation’s role in supporting community security and the institutionalisation of PNTL community policing.

35 Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing, Handover note by Liam Chinn, Programme Manager, The Asia Foundation
36 At the time of the researcher’s arrival it was less than 12 months since the signature of a MoU with the PNTL.
37 It included National Electoral Violence Prevention Forums, sensitisation training, support for dissemination of information related to voting procedures and rules during the lead up to, and in the period after, the presidential and parliamentary elections.
38 Explanation by the TAF programme manager. The limited time frame is the reason why the Foundation considers the 2013 Survey as a baseline for the 4 districts in which the programme was implemented intensively only as of the end of 2012.
The concept of community security implies specific concerns about the security of minorities and vulnerable persons and groups. The process of gaining knowledge about security needs within the communities themselves, including the needs of vulnerable persons, is a challenge in itself. The sensitive nature of security-related issues, the involvement of traditional rituals in handling them, and the specific sources of authority within a traditional society, as well as the language barrier, make attempts to reach any end-users beyond the level of the senior community leaders extremely difficult for an outsider. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of community leadership limits the space for different opinions to be heard from all Community-Police Council members.\(^{39}\) A limited insight was gained at separate women-only focus group discussions, and via questions about the position and problems of members of other religions, newcomers and other potentially insecure persons and groups that were raised during the interviews with suku chiefs. Perceptions about security issues and priorities from a large number of citizens have been captured in the national surveys, although there is always a danger that respondents have different understandings of the questions, or opt for socially desirable preferences, or neglect personal problems in favour of stressing broader community issues as being the most important, in line with a tradition that emphasises the value of societal harmony.

Other methodological issues include the multiple donor engagements in the Foundation’s support for community policing, each with different reporting and supporting documentation,\(^{40}\) a lack of internal evaluations, and general problems regarding an evaluation in the area of security-related assistance, since there are few instances of successful evaluations that could provide examples of how to proceed with monitoring and evaluating police reform.\(^{41}\)

3. The Foundation’s Theory of Change and Programming in Timor Leste

The Asia Foundation’s community security (i.e. specifically community policing) intervention was developed in the context of a country that has been the showcase of massive international engagement since 1999. The United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), subsequent missions, and bilateral donors have all heavily influenced the

---

\(^{39}\) When the dominance of suku chiefs during focus groups discussions was noted, focus groups discussions were organised without their presence, and suku chiefs were interviewed separately.

\(^{40}\) The Theory of Change was developed for a relatively small part of the programme funded by DFID, with no ambition to include in its elaboration all key terms, definitions and conceptual frameworks used in previous programme design and in earlier reporting.

development of security structures. The establishment, re-establishment and support for the national police service have been a common thread of most of the missions involved up to the end of 2012. Hence, substantial background elaboration regarding the structural problems in the development of security institutions in Timor-Leste is needed in order to position the Foundation’s engagement in this area and the development of its related Theory of Change. The background on the country context, an overview of the concept of community policing, and international support for community policing in Timor-Leste are provided in the Appendix.

In this section the Foundation’s community policing programming and the development of the assumptions that were integrated into its Theory of Change, as well as its use within the organisation are analysed.

3.1 Assumptions and Use of Theory of Change

The Asia Foundation’s Community Security Theory of Change (ToC) is the following:

Establishing active state-community security models at the suku level, and building those examples into institutional reforms to develop proactive safety and security approaches, will contribute to strengthened state-society relations and a more stable environment in Timor-Leste.  

The term ‘community’ is not defined, but is understood as a village level grouping - suku.  
The expected outcome is ‘expanded community-level efforts to improve local security and relations with security forces’, and the impact as ‘improvements in state-society relations necessary for sustainable peace and stability’. 

As discussed in the introduction, the ToC uses a multi-level approach, with specific sub-theories to provide a framework for the activities. Namely, the pathways of change are envisioned at different levels:

a) At a local level –the establishment of space and mechanisms for cooperation between the police and local leaders will provide models of community policing and effective security, 

b) Engagement with the key political and security actors to build acceptance of community policing approaches and adopt supportive policies at national level.


43 Security also was not defined, and it is frequently used together with safety. 

44 The Asia Foundation (2012) DFID PPA 1, p. 376 

45 Sub-theory 1 - Collaborative security: If we can establish space and mechanisms for cooperation between law enforcement and leaders at the local level, then they can be led through a series of steps to jointly provide effective security from which practical experience-based community policing results can be integrated into higher institutional reforms. TAF (2012) DFID PPA, p. 390

46 Sub-theory 2 – Key Actors: If we can connect verifiable community policing results to higher level security and political actors, as well as reform initiatives, policies will be adopted which support community-level cooperation and community-oriented security. PPA, p. 390.
c) At the wider citizenry level - building on the community policing results, and communicating messages learned through media and outreach to the wider population, expectations would be raised for institutional reforms and changing practical responses by PNTL officers.\textsuperscript{47}

Although not explicitly positioned in discourses of bottom-up versus top-down approaches to security provision, such an approach envisages a synergy of active citizenship and buy-in at the top level as being pathways to change.\textsuperscript{48} It emphasises the power of ‘learning by doing’ and the impact of localised results on policy decision-making. By stressing the low crime rate but high insecurity in Timor-Leste as a point of departure, the ToC implies a broader understanding of security, while in the elaboration it prioritises state strengthening. The ToC refers to Security Sector Reform to explain the understanding of “State Security Apparatus”, but in a way that indicates a narrow interpretation of the concept.\textsuperscript{49} However, by characterising the current situation as a ‘lack of an effective model of interaction between informal and formal security management actors’,\textsuperscript{50} the ToC acknowledges ‘the wider range of both formal and informal security actors’, including suku councils, religious leaders, customary authorities, gangs, ritual groups and martial arts groups as being security providers.\textsuperscript{51}

A key starting assumption for the ToC was that there were limited positive interactions between the Timorese public and the state security forces. This was verified by the results of the 2008 National Survey on perceptions of the police and justice conducted by TAF.\textsuperscript{52} It was attributed to the weakness of both the PNTL and the state, i.e. weak institutional penetration.\textsuperscript{53} Hence, a weak state framework is understood in terms of a dichotomous view of state and society; a strong yet fragmented society – as in Timor-Leste where power/authority is located within individual sukus - that is difficult to penetrate by a weak state whose institutions and administration have limited reach.\textsuperscript{54} Intervention in the form of community policing and national policing reforms is deemed necessary for the state’s

\textsuperscript{47} Sub-theory 3- Citizens Action: If we can connect collaborative security results with expectations by the wider population through the media and outreach, the political environment will become more conductive for adopting institutional reforms, as well as changing practical responses by PNTL officers working at the community level. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} ‘Local-level interventions to both develop models for community policing in Timor-Leste as well as to improve policing in many locations directly, will be combined with national-level efforts to build support for these reforms and increase capacities to implement them within the PNTL.’ PPA 1, p.375. Regarding the ownership, the baseline section noted ‘politicized and undisciplined officers who have had intense engagement with international actors and exposure to international policing concepts, but remains disjoined in terms of its own governance and coordination, and distanced in many ways from the communities.’ PPA 1, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{49} Quote: ‘State Security Apparatus in this document refers to a wider selection of actors than is typically defined in security sector reform circles (i.e. the military and the police service).’ PPA 1, p. 374, fn 1.

\textsuperscript{50} TAF (2012) DFID PPA, p. 374.

\textsuperscript{51} TAF (2012) DFID PPA, p. 375, fn.4. The Foundation ‘decided to focus work on the PNTL and local leaders and to build out other actors in the future.’


penetration.\textsuperscript{55} The outreach of, and trust in, the police is taken as the proxy for state strength, since the police is understood as a branch of the state, and one of the most visible ones outside the urban areas, although not actively engaged.\textsuperscript{56} By orienting the PNTL towards cooperation with communities, it will be seen to have greater legitimacy because it will contribute to meeting the needs of citizens.\textsuperscript{57} The sub-theories complement each other in addressing challenges on different levels, i.e. targeting different actors, to result in the following: “\textit{More responsive policing better meets community needs, therefore improving overarching state-society relationship and strengthening the state}”.\textsuperscript{58}

The ToC framework and its focus are externally driven and the final scenario is expressed in terms of state-society relations in line with partnership agreement between the Department for International Development’s (DFID) and the Foundation’s Regional Office.\textsuperscript{59} The term state-society relations was not explicitly defined, nor was DFID’s or any other policy framework paper cited in the elaboration of the ToC. However, there was a feeling amongst Foundation staff in Timor-Leste that the presentation of the Theory, the contribution analysis and the use of Theory of Change in practice came about through an internal initiative; it was felt that a ToC could help to capture the governance and conflict dynamics better than a traditional logical framework due to the problem of assigning activities to complex changes/impacts.\textsuperscript{60}

The desired outcomes of the intervention are envisaged as the following:

- Improving police-community relation;
- Developing a model of interaction between the state and traditional leaders;
- Strengthening the accountability of the police to the citizens; and
- Generally improving the safety and security environment in Timor-Leste.\textsuperscript{61}

Community policing is described as an important tool for these outcomes, but was not defined within the Theory of Change.\textsuperscript{62} There was no understanding that a full elaboration of

\textsuperscript{55} The reach of police is also seen as a prerequisite for developmental work.
\textsuperscript{56} TAF (2012): DFID PPA 1, p. 374-375.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview, Todd Wassel, TAF Programme Manager
\textsuperscript{58} Instead of the stability mentioned earlier, here a stronger state is the goal, although these two are not necessary synonymous.
\textsuperscript{59} Improved state-society relations as a long-term goal is characteristic for many programmes supported by DFID, as it is a key framework within a DFID approach to the security/development nexus. It is defined as “interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people.” See: \textit{Building Peaceful States and Societies}, DFID Practice Paper, 2010.
\textsuperscript{60} Building on a given state-society framework. According to Todd Wassel, TAF Programme Manager, the use of Theory of Change is internally driven but needed to conform to the purpose of the programme. Interview with Todd Wassel, Dili, 14 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{61} The model of a state’s interaction is here reduced to ‘traditional leaders’, without an attempt to go beyond that layer of community. “Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste”, The Asia Foundation, \textit{Programme Component Reports, DFID PPA Year 1}, May 2012, p. 375
\textsuperscript{62} The reason offered for that is the internally agreed format of the ToC document which did not include such requests, while a definition existed in an earlier TAF document: ‘Community-Oriented Policing is both a philosophy and an organizational strategy that enable the police and the community to work together in new ways to solve problems of crime, disorder and fear in order to improve the quality of life for everyone in that
the concept based on social science approaches would be needed. However, had it been requested, it would have been arguably difficult to produce due to insufficient time and expertise.\textsuperscript{63}

The Community Security ToC includes multiple claims which envisage relational and institutional changes: trust and collaboration developed between communities and the police; policing practices are enacted that are both responsive to community needs and respectful of human rights and local culture; the police show greater accountability to the citizens they serve; the PNTL transitions into a reformed force playing a greater role in Timorese society; and customary justice mechanisms develop a sustainable role in the security and safety sector.\textsuperscript{64}

The ToC reflects the Foundation’s long term approach to police development; hence, it is formulated with more aspirational goals that in other programme-related documents, including those written for the key donors.\textsuperscript{65} Such an approach partially explains the very limited engagement of the programme staff and collaborators in its formulation, and the lack of wider knowledge about its claims. At the time of the field research, apart from the programme manager, current programme associates were not familiar with the Theory’s development,\textsuperscript{66} nor were its potential adjustments substantially discussed among them. Its purpose was to present a vision and to serve as a reference point, ‘to look back and check we are keeping on track, reminding us that the focus has been shifted from one level to three, or that we are deviating from the Theory’.\textsuperscript{67}

The ToC has been written to capture the broad scope of the programme and its past and ongoing developments, and to keep options open for future directions. In the following section the Foundation’s community policing projects since 2008 are analysed to trace the basic assumptions presented in the ToC about various elements of previous TAF programming, the evidence collected in support of the programme and the experiences gained through the process of implementation.

\textsuperscript{63} Comment from Todd Wasell, TAF Programme Manager: “That is why cooperation with LSE JSRP is considered as useful.”

\textsuperscript{64} The Asia Foundation, \textit{Programme Component Reports, PPA Year 1}, May 2012, p. 392. The role of customary justice mechanisms and their sustainability are complex issues, which were not further elaborated in the ToC. Discussion on justice is beyond the scope of this research.

\textsuperscript{65} Comment from Todd Wasell, TAF Programme Manager.

\textsuperscript{66} Interviews with the project officers, field coordinators, and trainers from civil society revealed that they are not aware of Theory of Change as a concept and its formulation. Only the programme deputy manager is familiar with the assumptions and sub-levels, and expressed an interest in evidence collection. The programme’s Communication Officers frequently changed and were regarded as technical staff.

\textsuperscript{67} Interview, Todd Wassel, TAF Programme Manager.
3.2 The Foundation’s Community Policing Programming in Timor Leste

The Community Security ToC was developed according to concrete programmatic experience, primarily as a ‘lessons learnt’ exercise used to distill the various levels where intervention is needed and to construct a long term vision of their cumulative effect. Hence, for this ‘theory in practice’ paper it is necessary to trace back the process of formulating and implementing the programme, with particular reference to the research and evidence used, and how the programme has been adjusted to the changed context in Timor-Leste.

Interviews with current and previous staff and an analysis of the Foundation’s programme descriptions, reports to donors, and internal documents reveal that the decision by its Timor-Leste office to engage in and formulate an initial project in support of community policing was founded on the following key elements: local knowledge and lessons learned from other TAF programmes implemented in Timor-Leste; utilisation of the Foundation’s experience in other countries in the region; the community police perceptions survey and the law and justice survey designed to provide a baseline assessment and for outreach to key political and security structures; and initial cooperation with important bilateral actors for community policing support (New Zealand Police) and for general support to strengthening the PNTL (Australian Federal Police).

The first element was local knowledge and lessons learned from other TAF programmes implemented in Timor-Leste. The Foundation had been engaged in supporting NGOs in the fields of human rights, access to justice, and community legal services in Timor-Leste for 7 years at that time. It was noted that the community security field in Timor-Leste was crowded with mediation-based conflict resolution approaches, but that the police was not active in providing security. The problem seemed to be that people needed more security (prevention), not more dialogue after the conflict had occurred, and that the police was not active in providing security. One reason why the police had not been engaged was concern over its poor human rights record from the previous period.

The second source used in the formulation of the programme was the Foundation’s experience in other countries in the region. Benefitting from knowledge sharing within the Foundation, internal consultations were undertaken about TAF’s role in community policing. TAF’s office in Bangladesh provided documents on their community oriented policing programme. Initial consultations were undertaken with stakeholders in Timor-Leste and a “learning exchange” tour to Bangladesh was organised for selected members of the PNTL and the State Secretary for Security office in 2008. Much of the pilot project design was based on Bangladesh’s experience about the police lacking the resources needed to serve communities.

---

68 E-mail communication with Silas Everett, the then Head of Office TAF Timor-Leste
69 E-mail communication with Silas Everett, the then Head of Office TAF Timor-Leste
70 Interview with Liam Chinn, pilot project manager, 18 February 2013, Dili; e-mail communication with Silas Everett
71 Interview with Liam Chinn, pilot project manager
The third element was data collection: the key evidence and identification of the proper entry point for security and policing were found in the community police perceptions survey and the law and justice survey designed in 2008 to provide a baseline assessment of the situation. The results provided for a more nuanced understanding of related problems. The key features of the survey were infrequent contact with citizens, the underreporting of crimes to the PNTL, the substantial abusive behavior of the PNTL, and the perceptions of the police’s ability to maintain security. The survey, and related focus groups discussions organised by TAF at that time, revealed that citizens had a strong willingness to work with the police and this provided important encouragement for the project. The data collected was used for the Theory of Change assumptions.

The fourth pillar was the collaboration established with New Zealand’s Community Policing Programme in Timor-Leste (TL CPP) and the Australian Federal Police’s Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TL PDP). The Australian Federal Police, who provide substantive programmatic support to the PNTL, supported TAF’s 2008 survey. An additional follow-up survey was prepared in cooperation with the New Zealand police as part of their initiative to pilot community policing ideas under the aegis of UNMIT. TAF established Community Police Councils in areas where the New Zealand police officers were present.

The fifth element was the experience of the Foundation’s senior staff in spotting a window of opportunity for the intervention and in using the data collected to gain the trust of national level stakeholders. As was noted earlier, there was a rise in confidence in the national authorities after the 2007 elections and pressure for a quicker transfer of executive powers from the UN to national institutions. The survey was used for outreach to key political and security structures, explaining its implications for relations between citizens/communities and the PNTL, and for the further development of the PNTL. The pilot project was undertaken

---

72 E-mail communication with Silas Everett
73 TAF concluded that: 1. The communities did not trust the police due to a history of police being the instrument of Indonesian military occupation; 2. Police were scared of reprisals and therefore didn't want to go out of their stations; 3. Citizens had little contact with the police: only 12% of the national public & 33% of community leaders said that they had contact with the police in the previous year; only 58% of citizens who experienced a crime sought assistance from police; 4. The police were often abusive. When asking for assistance from the PNTL, more than 1/3 citizens were treated in an abusive manner, verbally (15%) or physically (19%), while almost half were treated with minimal respect and professionalism (47%). 5. Community authorities were deemed by citizens as responsible for community security and making the rules that govern people’s lives - only 15% of respondents assigned primary responsibility to the PNTL. 6. Community authorities only needed the police to help mitigate and respond to serious conflicts in communities. The 2008 Survey results and e-mail communication with Silas Everett.
74 Comment, Todd Wassel.
75 Interview with Liam Chinn, pilot project manager and the survey’s co-author; 18 February 2013, Dili
76 According to the first manager of TAF’s programme, that partnership with the New Zealand Police was critical for the Foundation. Interview with Liam Chinn, 18 February 2013, Dili.
77 The institutional reform literature that stresses the critical junctures for building new/changing existing institutions is beyond the scope of this paper.
78 A high level PNTL official during the interview mentioned how very appreciative he was for an opportunity to hear directly from TAF a more elaborate version of findings than was in the published results; it was important for gaining trust.
at a time when the national authorities were frequently raising concerns over the quality of UNPOL officers.  

Against a background of a limited number of police officers having some understanding of the key elements of community policing, such as foot patrols and a village presence, and with the inclusion of community policing in the law as a philosophy if not an operational reality, the Foundation started piloting its community policing project in 2008.

It is plausible to argue that the process of developing the Theory of Change - sometimes considered to be as much of an important objective as the product itself - was grounded in an accurate analysis of the context. The available materials and the arguments put forward during the interviews confirm that efforts were made to adapt the programme according to changes in the political and security context. For example, as the 2009 Law on the PNTL underlined the role of district commanders, the district level gained prominence in planning and the engagement was increasingly viewed as critical. The current ToC’s level of key persons’ engagement includes this dynamic. Additional research was undertaken for further knowledge-building about the evolving political context: a study ‘Institutionalizing Community Policing in Timor-Leste: Exploring the Politics of Police Reform’ clarified the national-level political aspects of police reform, providing information on levels of understanding of, and support for, community policing among key groups and actors. Explorations of the political landscape, including possible spoilers and supporters of reform, provided for more nuanced discussion on the limitations and opportunities for scaling-up the project. It led to the conclusion that previous international support to the PNTL tended to practice technical approaches unsuited to the context, and that building and sustaining political will for community policing is necessary. This means that forging favourable coalitions for, and ownership of, community policing reforms at various levels - within the PNTL, with policy makers, and within communities - is essential for the programme’s sustainability, a finding that resonates with the experience of reforms in other localities covered in the peace building scholarship. The necessity of simultaneously targeting different levels is integrated in the three sub-theories within the current Community Security ToC.

80 Detailed background is available in Appendix 2.  
81 An example of pragmatic adjustments to accommodate national security priorities was the shifted focus on electoral violence prevention during the electoral year 2012. It contributed practically to community security, although it meant a delay in support for Community Policing Councils and training in problem solving.  
82 Interview with Liam Chinn, 18 February 2013; interview with Mark Koenig, 23 April 2013, E-mail communication with Silas Everett  
83 Interview with Todd Wassel, CMCOP programme reports  
84 The authors are Nelson Belo, leading independent security analyst in Timor-Leste and Mark Koenig, senior expert in governance and law with the Foundation. The research started late 2010, and the study was published in December 2011 as TAF Occasional Paper No 9.  
86 It can be traced back to an internal document prepared for the scaling-up the programme in 2011, entitled Approach, provided to the author by Mark Koenig.
The eighteen months long TAF Timor Leste pilot project on community policing (2009-2010) was placed in the conflict mitigation framework supported by the key donor, USAID. Such a framework is considered in the literature a useful adaptation of the democratisation template in fragile states, since many drivers of intrastate conflict concern relations between state and society. The objective of the pilot project was: mitigating violent conflict by strengthening community-police relations through research, policy dialogue and forging partnerships between police and communities. To mitigate the threat of violent conflict in Timor-Leste, increased trust and cooperation between conflict-affected communities and the police was deemed needed. There was no ‘Theory of Change’, but “if there was one it would have been if the trust between police and community were strengthened through dialogue and positive forms of contact, the community and police together would be able to better mitigate conflict and provide security.”

An increase in positive contacts, the strengthening of community-police relations and the gaining of trust for the development of partnerships and cooperation are the key goals of the programme’s conceptualisation from 2008 onwards. The main activity, common in all phases, has been the formation of Community Policing Councils (CPC) at suku level to discuss potential security issues with a community policing officer on a regular basis. The Foundation provided training and logistical support for the villages and community policing officers involved in the project, and facilitated initial discussions about security concerns and possible solutions. Such interactions have been the Foundation’s core model for increasing positive contacts and gaining trust at the suku level.

However, even after the pilot phase, the Foundation was convinced that work with communities is the easiest part of the task, as local solutions for various problems had been present for a long time. Timor-Leste had community self-rule based on cultural tradition,

---

89 According to the TAF Timor-Leste Head at that time, Silas Everett. Here the focus is on security provision, the formulation is far clearer and focused when compared with the current Theory of Change. However, the current ToC is aspirational, and in that sense it is expected it might be loosely elaborated. This formulation was not chosen for analysis within this paper as the current focus of the Foundation is on the institutionalisation of community policing, which did not figure in the early phase.
90 Buying snacks and water, small allowance for transportation of the CPC members from the community, provision of transport for the police.
91 The Community Policing Council was an original idea, introduced for the first time in Timor-Leste. However, it was influenced by similar Forums in Indonesia, as stressed in an interview with Liam Chinn, 18 February 2013. Similar forums or councils are present in different parts of the world. See SEESAC, 2003. In Timor-Leste, the Foundation was modelling the Bangladesh programme, using the legal aid organisations to serve as a respected third party to facilitate community-police engagement. Later the Foundation overtook the implementation directly via its district coordinators, using local NGO staff only for training. With the increase of districts involved in the project, implementing parties are once again needed. This issue is relevant from the aspect of use of the Theory of Change; i.e. the conceptualisation of the process of change to be presented to associates.
92 Mark Koenig, TAF, interview 23 April 2013. There was no external evaluation of the pilot phase of TAF TL support to community policing, nor an overall report, just an extended final quarterly report for the period 15 May – 31 August 2010. There was an external evaluation of the New Zealand Police engagement: Sue Emmott,
and as a mechanism for distancing themselves from the Portuguese colonisers and the Indonesian occupation. The *suku* is a traditional political community with longstanding internal mechanisms, and the Community Policing Council structure mirrored the existing structure of the *Suku* Council. There was an understanding that for scaling-up, more substantive work through institutions would be necessary. To the Foundation it appeared that for future implementation of the programme it would be unlikely that the police would take directions from local civil society on how to go about their job. At the same time, the PNTL Community Policing Unit recommended an extension of the pilot project. To make the facilitation model feasible and sustainable, the Foundation therefore began thinking about how to *institutionalise* Community Policing within the PNTL. This has become the leading aspiration of the Foundation, with the extended programme being “designed to further institutionalise community oriented principles (COP) and approaches within the PNTL, while improving the safety and security environments in targeted communities.” This institutionalisation is understood as “the ability of police to resource and undertake COP activities themselves in concert with civil society.” It was framed as a sustainability issue, with national ownership being implicit. Civil society is understood as being everybody who is not officially paid by the state, including *suku* chiefs and *Suku* Councils that are elected according to the law but are *de facto* hybrid institutions. In terms of a state-society framework, such institutionalisation would regularise state outreach and presence, provide a consistent service approach from the police, and increase the willingness of communities to consider the police as being responsible for maintaining security.

Scaling up the pilot has been conducted in a different, more stable environment, but a focus on conflict mitigation has been kept, at least partially, due to the main donor’s framework. It appears that the USAID understanding influenced project changes: if the purpose is for the PNTL to lead community oriented policing, then the focus should be on the police. For USAID, the current approach is to teach the PNTL district commanders and other senior officers which tools are available, how to structure meetings with communities in a more

---


93 It included representatives of the hamlets, one elder, two representatives of youth (male and female), two women, and the chair – *suku xefe*. It was envisaged that the designated police officer is a co-chair, and in some CPCs there is a representative of the business community.

94 E-mail communication with Silas Everett, TAF Country Representative in Timor-Leste at that time.

95 Joao Belo, who was Head of Community Policing Unit at PNTL at that time, stressed he recommended the pilot project to the PNTL General Commander, who asked TAF to expand the project. Interview, PNTL HQ, Dili, 5 April 2013.

96 E-mail communication with Silas Everett, TAF.

97 E-mail communication with Mark Koenig, TAF.

98 E-mail communication with Silas Everett. The Head of Community Policing Unit stressed the need to have a common understanding of community policing. Interview with Boavida Ribeiro, PNTL HQ, 30 April 2013.

99 ‘In order for the project to be sustainable, the PNTL had to take the lead. This led to increased focus on the PNTRL and institutionalization’. Comment by Todd Wassel, programme manager.

100 The bulk of funding for the current community policing programme, which has changed name into HAKOHAK, is provided by USAID and New Zealand Aid, who are represented in the highest managerial body, together with the PNTL representatives. Funding from DFID is used in a flexible way for additional research needed and urgent requests related to the implementation. Details in PPA Year 2 Component Report.

101 Interview with the USAID programme manager in Dili, 23 April 2013.
effective way and how to use Community Policing Councils as resources, even without requests from the senior levels of the police.\(^\text{102}\) In this understanding, institutionalisation is about spontaneous acceptance of the practice at an operational level, building on successful examples provided by the Foundation’s model and opening up space for the PNTL to create policies and practices to reinforce this.\(^\text{103}\)

However, such a focus on institutionalisation is not present in the Theory of Change-like statement in the current USAID-funded community policing programme: *If communities develop norms and practices for effectively regulating police conduct while helping police prioritize key safety and security issues and identify causes of local conflict, the police will both be less likely to be a source of conflict, and more effective in contributing lasting resolutions to the causes of conflict.*\(^\text{104}\) It is, in essence, an elaborated version of the previous statement, still prioritising communities and their role in making the police more effective. Thus, rather than an initial increase in positive contacts, the stress is on the norms development.\(^\text{105}\)

This section presented the development and implementation of the Foundation’s community policing programme’s previous phases, since this was the core source for the formulation of a Theory of Change. The experience gained during the pilot phase, additional research on internal security and political dynamics and the social and political context, as well as the key donor’s framework, led to a scaling-up of the programme. The Theory of Change is used to describe these processes, to integrate partnership options and the other donor’s view, and to provide a long-term projection of a desirable path for the development of policing in Timor-Leste.

How the Theory of Change keeps up with the reality is further explored by interrogating evidence related to the local level dynamic between communities and the police, as well as the national level perceptions and narratives about the TAF intervention’s contribution.

### 4. The Local Level Interaction Model and Evidence

In this section the analytical focus is on the local level interactions between communities and the police, and on village-level practices and narratives related to the Foundation’s approach in supporting the establishment of Community-Police Councils as a state-community security

---

102 Interview with the USAID programme manager in Dili, 23 April 2013.
103 Comment, Todd Wassel. According to the first sub-theory: *If we can establish space and mechanisms for cooperation between law enforcement and leaders at the local level, then they can be led through a series of steps to jointly provide effective security from which practical experience-based community policing results can be integrated into higher institutional reforms.*
105 The project for USAID and NZAID was formulated in 2010, while the Theory of Change relating to community policing was formulated in 2012, so that progress towards more ambitious goals is also related to the time-frame and the new programme management.
model at the *suku* level. Firstly, the evidence provided by the Foundation and findings from local level field work will be analysed to assess the Foundation’s claim that its intervention results in *more responsive policing that better meets community needs, leading to the police playing more important role in the society*. Secondly, the introduction of new proxy indicators will be proposed, to build an evidence base for both responsive policing and for the impact of Community-Police Councils at *suku* level. Finally, perceptions about the initial benefits of Community Policing Councils are systematised and reviewed.

It is necessary to reiterate three points. First, there is a general problem of what exactly constitutes “evidence” in a Theory of Change and how to evaluate a hypothesis in the light of the evidence available, as there is no consensus of what is its acceptable strength.\(^{106}\) Second, the short period of implementation of the Foundation’s current programme in support of community policing limits the space for an interrogation of the evidence for certain claims in the ToC. Third, contribution analysis is highly complex in this case due to the fact that external assistance to community policing in Timor-Leste has been present in some form ‘practically from day one’\(^{107}\) of the international interventions in late 1999, and the fact that the Foundation’s programme is run in close partnership with the New Zealand Police. Hence, fieldwork was focused primarily on the establishment of a model for evidence gathering, and on collecting different narratives about the partners’ goals and roles, as well as on the understanding of community policing by senior PNTL officers. Taken together, those findings provide proxy indicators and fill the gap in existing analysis and assessments.

A core pillar of the Foundation’s approach is the establishment of a local model of community-police interaction centered on Community-Police Councils (CPCs). According to the Theory of Change, it was expected that the Foundation’s establishment of *‘active state-community security models at the suku level,’* i.e., facilitation of greater consultation between the police and community leaders via CPCs, would lead to expanded community-level efforts to improve local security and relations with the police, resulting in *more responsive policing that better meets community needs* and improved state-society relations; a goal deemed necessary for sustainable peace and stability.\(^{108}\)

The Foundation considers community policing as a tool for the improvement of police-community relations, the strengthening of police accountability to citizens, the development of interactions between the state and traditional leaders, and the provision of improved safety and security in Timor-Leste.\(^{109}\) However, specific indicators tied to these claims have not been developed. Reporting on the programme’s development in the context of the Theory of Change in the first year after its formulation is based on activity reports, documents such as the TAF-PNTL Memorandum of Understanding, the PNTL Community Policing Manual and the National Strategic Plan, Perception Surveys, and several commissioned studies. With regard to changes attributable to the programme, a list of seven events related to the

---

106 Stein and Valters, op.cit, p.11.
107 Interview, Mark Koenig, TAF, Dili, April
development of community policing in Timor-Leste is offered, some of which are activities, or documents at the drafting phase, or are difficult to relate directly, and mostly, to the Foundation’s engagement.\textsuperscript{110} Whilst change is a long term process and a full accounting of proving the theory of change is not expected on a yearly basis, the report related to the ToC is examined to establish a framework for evidence gathering.

The Foundation’s assessment is built on the assumption that there are four main macro level factors contributing to instability in Timor-Leste: both the customary and formal security systems were ineffective in meeting security needs; citizens saw local leaders as the main authority to manage safety and security; there was a lack of state penetration, and a lack of an effective model of interaction between informal and formal security management actors.\textsuperscript{111} As their contribution to a reduction of these negative consequences, the Foundation summarised certain changes. Firstly, the increased percentage of people that choose to seek assistance from the PNTL is taken as an indication of ‘an improvement in the relationship between customary justice and the established laws in a liberal democracy’.\textsuperscript{112} The ‘deepening the level of pre-existing Community-Policing Councils (CPCs) implementation as a tool to address security problems’ is cited as ‘the most significant result for the Foundation’ with the key impact being ‘the increased level of engagement between communities and the PNTL’.\textsuperscript{113} The PNTL’s decision to establish \textit{Suku} Police Posts in villages is considered as an improvement in state penetration.\textsuperscript{114} The Foundation sees these developments as substantial evidence, keeping in mind that long-term objectives require time to progress.\textsuperscript{115}

From a methodological point of view, there are some weak spots in such an argument. An increase in seeking police assistance does not \textit{per se} represent straightforward evidence of the successful coexistence of ‘traditional justice and implementation of the laws in a liberal democracy’.\textsuperscript{116} The results of the 2013 Survey do show an increased percentage of people that choose to seek assistance from the PNTL, but the results are improved at a country level and not just in the area where the Foundation’s programme was implemented. As mentioned previously, the programme at the time was implemented in less than 10% of \textit{sukus}, which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} These are: Supplementary budget approval for community policing; Adoption of Community Police Council as National Priority; Development of National Community Policing Model; Development of PNTL National Strategic Plan based on Community Policing Principles; Approval, training and development of Suku Police Posts; PNTL officers assigned to CPCs, Engagement of community leaders and police in joint-problem solving activities. \textit{TAF Timor–Leste, PPA Year 2 Annual Component Report: Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste, 2013 (TAF-DFID PPA Year 2)}. Issues related to national-level institutionalisation will be discussed in the next section.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Interaction between informal and formal security management actors is more precise than interaction ‘between the state and traditional leaders’\textsuperscript{112}
\item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{TAF (2013) ‘Annual Component Report: Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste’, DIFD PPA Year 2, pp.20-21.}
\item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{TAF (2013), ‘Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste’, PPA Year 2 Annual Component Report, p.3}
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{TAF (2013), PPA 2, pp. 20-21. The Foundation had not previously advocated Suco Police Posts as the model of interaction.}
\item \textsuperscript{115} \textit{Comment from Todd Wassel.}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, it is problematic to consider a society a liberal democracy if it is not based exclusively on the rule of law and individual freedoms and rights. Timor-Leste should be considered as a hybrid political order, but such an approach was not explicitly introduced.
\end{itemize}
were not specifically targeted in the survey. The establishment of Suku Police Posts was integrated into the PNTL 2009 Organic Law, and was in place during the UNMIT period and for a short while after their withdrawal. Thus, the PNTL’s decision to (re)introduce it might be considered as a step in the direction of the institutionalisation of a form of community policing, but the Foundation’s current contribution is specifically related only to its programme being ‘directly involved in co-funding and training of Suco Police’ which is yet to produce a change.

The Foundation’s support was initially framed as a contribution, i.e. without the intention to claim full credits for a change. The Foundation claims two key direct contributions at the local level. The first one is that ‘in target areas Community and Police are engaged in joint problem solving and crime prevention’. However, it was noted that ‘the success of the CPC’s ability to prevent crime is yet to be determined’, particularly keeping in mind that the CPCs were established only at the end of 2012. Additionally, there is the issue of who represents a Community in the process of defining and solving problems, i.e. the ‘end-users’ of security. As noted by the critics of community policing, social and legal inequalities embedded in the society being policed in fact might be reinforced in the process. Security tends to be unequally distributed, and insecurity tends to fall disproportionately upon particular categories of end-users: the poor, vulnerable, excluded, and marginal. That is the reason why the level of representation of vulnerable and minority individuals and groups is a key concern for community policing as a concept. However, it was not raised in the Foundation’s ToC, with a community implicitly being understood as homogenous. While there were some attempts to include more people in the Problem Solving Training and to support visits to outlying villages to hear their security problems, it is questionable if the problem was sufficiently addressed in the programme’s implementation. ‘The low attendance rate of women, and reluctance of those that do attend to participate’ was stressed as a basic challenge for the events leading to the establishment of a CPC, making it a likely

117 It leads to problems of having two baseline surveys – in 2008 and 2013.  
118 PPA Year 2 Annual Component Report: Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste, TAF, 2013, p.20. As mentioned earlier, TAF did not advocate Suku Police Posts as the model of interaction, and the existence of 118 Suku Police Posts were confirmed in the interview with Jose Belo, at that time Head of Community Policing Unit, currently PNTL Policy Planning Director. The training for the police officers to be posted in sukus is designed by TAF, New Zealand Police and PNTL.  
120 Robin Luckham and Tim Kirk, JSRP, p.11  
121 As noted in the previous section, the most oft-cited problem is its failure to incorporate all sections of the community – the poor, certain social groups and women are marginalised or excluded. Clegg, Hunt and Whetton, (2000), Policy Guidance on Support to Developing Countries, Center for Development Studies. Community participation often only mobilises small segments of the local population and therefore does not necessary reflect broader values and concerns. Brogden, op.cit. In many case studies of traditional societies it was found that local community boards are dominated by influential elders and educated members, which might lead to particular interests being represented as communal. Backer, 2008, ‘Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign import or local solution?’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 23-42.  
122 For example, a step in that direction might be the sensitisation of the TAF programme’s district coordinators to pay attention and monitor issues related to representativeness and inclusion. The coordinators in the interviews about their work prioritised issues related to logistics alone.  
challenge in the CPC meetings as well. Also, ‘engaging youth in a manner that prevents them from sliding into negative patterns, remains to be appropriately addressed. While the Foundation structured CPCs to include representatives of women, youth and the elderly, keeping in mind the small number of CPCs in the programme and the presence of locally recruited staff as district coordinators for the Foundation’s programme, additional efforts could have been made to encourage women to speak and to explore the presence of other marginalised groups such as the poor, newcomers, or non-Catholics and to promote their participation. The diversification of community representation also seems needed due to the fact that Suku Council members are elected from closed lists submitted by a leader, and that members of a CPC are in the majority of cases precisely the very same members of the community who are already on the Suku Council.

The second claim of a direct contribution to change is the following: ‘Request by Community Leaders in target areas to provide the police was accepted and officers assigned to each CPC in consultation with communities’. Such a claim credits the Foundation with stimulating demands from community leaders for having the police present, whereas there are claims that such requests were raised at the inaugural meeting of suku chiefs with the Prime Minister as far back as 2009. Also, the formulation might imply that one police officer was assigned per village, especially as the total reported number of PNTL officers engaged through the Foundation’s CPC programme was 345. However, the number of police officers engaged with communities might be as low as two for the entire district, covering all ten sukus involved in the programme in a district. The number of officers involved in training is not evidence per se of their actual full-time engagement in community policing, and particularly in the Foundation’s model of interaction via Community Policing Councils.

While this type of evidence signals an increase in community policing related activities supported by the Foundation, it does not represent strong evidence of a process of change, with the caveat that the time frame and the scope of the programme were limited i.e. time is needed for a change to be traced. The Foundation’s Theory of Change does not elaborate

---

124 During the all CPC meetings observed by this author there were no discussion points by female participants, and it was a substantial problem to hear their voices during focus group discussions for this field research.

125 PPA Year 2 Annual Component Report: Community Security Sector in Timor-Leste, TAF, 2013, p. 24. For example, during a meeting with a rural hamlet in Aileu district, the PNTL District Commander spoke about the necessity to have younger persons at such meetings. However, youth was criticised for being interested only in their rights, not in their obligations.

126 For example, it was known from the commissioned Baseline Report that a house purchased legally by a group from a small protestant community was burned by leaders in Holsa suku but no attempts were made to reach these people when organising training for the establishment of a CPC in Holsa.

127 There is an internal recommendation, after the pilot phase, to involve more non-Suku Council members in the CPC as stated in a Handover note by Liam Chinn, CM COP Programme Manager. The Foundation has another programme related to governance issues at suku level which noted that there are cases of the chief of the suku ‘leading with impunity, favouring individual or group interests at the expense of the larger community’. “State-Society Relations at the Suku Level”, Programme Component Reports, DFID PPA Year 1, The Asia Foundation, 2012, pp. 68-112.


129 Focus group discussion, Macalaca, Baucau, 13 March 2013.


131 There are 13 districts in total in the whole of Timor-Leste
what is ‘responsive policing’ and what are the forms and limits of police officers being assigned ‘in consultation with communities’, for example, in the concrete environment. In the relevant literature, it is noted that grounding ToC in the ‘perceptions and behavior of local individuals and organisations’ is important in ensuring desired programme outcomes. To provide tangible evidence it is necessary to define the concepts and terminology more precisely and to design indicators.

The change envisaged – that the Foundation’s supported state-community security cooperation model at local level contributes to more responsive policing that better meets community needs - was selected as the key claim to be tested at the local level and is presented in this section. More responsive policing is at the core of both the ToC and the practice of the Foundation’s approach to developing a local level model of effective interaction between formal security sector actors – the police - and informal actors – community leaders; a tool to increase trust and to provide direct improvement of policing in selected locations.

To capture micro-level change and to expand the very short time-frame of the ongoing programme implementation, field research included a suku that had been involved in the pilot programme (Samalari) and a suku that was included in the baseline assessment conducted in August 2012, before the establishment of the Community Policing Council (Holsa). The illustrative sample for the field research included villages and community policing officers in four districts, all of which were included in the programme. The key informant interviews included suku chiefs, the police officers designated to work with the communities, and district commanders, as well as the trainers and the Foundation’s local coordinators working directly with both community leaders and local level police. Focus group discussions were conducted with CPC members, and a number of related events were observed.

The author has devised proxy indicators to offer a framework for the Foundation to collect evidence of a possible change. Four indicators for responsive policing are proposed: a police officer’s availability to the communities, regularity of community policing officers’ interaction with the community, community policing officers’ role in the interaction with communities, and the possibilities for holding police officers accountable. These aspects were tested against the perceptions and the attitudes of the participants in the field research, representing limited qualitative evidence about subjective beliefs and practical experiences with security arrangements under constructions by the Foundation, the police, the Timor-Leste government, and the communities themselves.

Regarding the availability, an important novelty related to the Foundation’s support for the police-community interaction has been that CPC members have the mobile phone numbers of

---

133 The following sukus were included: Malacao, Fatulia and Samalari in district Baucau; Malere and Airsimou in district Aileo; Holsa, Manapa and Oeileu in district Bobonaro; Naturalan and Laleia in district Manatuto.
134 The list of interactions is provided in the appendix.
the designated police officers, making them potentially available at the first instance. This introduces a sense of predictability as it reduces the necessity to reach out to informal networks, such as calling a cousin working with the police, or approaching a police officer living in the suku but working on other tasks with the PNTL. For example, in suku Manapa, the attached police officer is praised as being available even when off duty and as always showing up when there is a problem. CPC members are not very demanding: in Bobonaro district, interviewed members of Community-Policing Councils were pleased with the contribution of their designated police officer when he is present, but they are familiar with his other obligations, including studying, and do not expect him to be a regular at the CPC meetings. In Aileu, community policing is delegated to a single officer, who is required even to cut short his leave when necessary. In cases where a community policing officer is in charge of several sukus, if living in one of them, he rarely visits the other(s).

In terms of regularity of the interaction, there are divergent opinions and slightly different practices across the sukus included in the field research. Generally, “before the presence of police was possible to count on fingers, and they were present only after the problem; now there are frequent visits as they are part of CPC, 2-3 times per week.” Specifically for villages near the road, there is a substantial difference: ‘before the CPC police was just at the main road high speed without asking anything. Now, they come at least for five minutes almost every day.’ This contrasts with the Manatuto district where the community policing officers in a sub-district police station have very limited possibilities to travel.

In sum, the key elements influencing the availability and regularity are constraints related to human resources and country infrastructure, although in some cases the key issue is

---

135 It was stressed at all focus groups discussions.
136 These solutions were listed in the focus groups discussion organised as a baseline assessment prepared by Bu Wilson 2012.
137 Manapa suku chief, interview 18 April 2013. The statement that he missed one meeting as he was on training indicates a close relationship, and the obligation of the police officer to excuse himself. However, it signals that there is a need for further improvement of communication so that the date and time of meetings are mutually agreed.
138 Interview in Manapa suku, 18 April 2013. The officer in charge of community policing is burdened with other obligations, including for example being the organiser of the district PNTL promotion ceremony observed by the researcher on 19 April 2013; additionally, according to the CPC members, he was a part-time student, hence unavailable for some meetings.
139 Interview with the community policing officer Liliano Moskit, who does preparation, planning, implementation, reporting. He claims there are 4 COPs appointed by the District Commander. Interview on 4 April 2013, Aileu. According to the Malere suku chief, there are two community policing officers in Aileu. Interview 03 April 2013. It might be partially compensated by the willingness of the PNTL District Commander at that time to travel and visit communities regularly himself, and the low crime rate in the small district in question.
140 Interview with community policing officer in Manatuto, 24 April, focus groups discussion in suku Salamari, Baucau, 26 April 2013.
141 Manapa suku chief, interview 18 April 2013.
142 Manapa suku chief, Bobonaro
143 With a vehicle being available only to the station commander. Separate interviews with the CPU head and CPO in Manatuto, 24 April 2013.
insufficient motivation. Logistical reasons such as the availability of PNTL transportation and communication are very important with regard to regularity and responsiveness.\textsuperscript{144}

In terms of \textit{accountability}, the Foundation has not collected information about possible suspensions, transfers, or expulsions from the PNTL at the request of the communities participating in the programme as evidence for the impact of its intervention on accountability. The District Steering Committee meetings, run by both the District Administrator and the PNTL District Commander, provide an opportunity for community leaders to raise complaints, to request that the designated community policing officer be replaced, or to complain about other police unit members.\textsuperscript{145} However, there is no obligation for such a request to be granted or to provide feedback: ‘We do not know about the sanctions as the authorities do not pronounce officially; if an officer is moved to another place it might be the result of complaints, or it may be a regular procedure to transfer officers from time to time; we can only guess.’\textsuperscript{146} There is a case of a designated police officer being inactive, and subsequently being replaced at the request of the CPC. However, the explanation of the suku chief was worrisome: he told the District Commander to send a male officer, claiming that designated officer Isobel as a female, was not an appropriate person “as women are not good in communication with CPC.” A women-only focus group discussion in the same village confirmed that Isobel was there only for the introduction, later did not show up, was not involved in communication but stayed in the office.\textsuperscript{147} The lack of response from the PNTL was stressed in regard to another request, where a designated police officer did not speak the local dialect, but this was outside the territory of the Foundation’s programme implementation.\textsuperscript{148} The Foundation is eager to see some evidence of superior officers evaluating the performance of officers based on community policing principles or requirements,\textsuperscript{149} which is in line with its institutionalisation approach.

The \textit{role of the community policing officers} varies across sukus/districts, and also with regard to the nature of problem. A broad range of roles exists. One of them is to serve as \textit{a guard and/or as a witness} in the process of attempted dispute resolution.\textsuperscript{150} As witnesses, the police officers are ‘present when written statements of the terms of agreement are produced.

\textsuperscript{144} Majority of interviewed PNTL officers and many suku chiefs stressed that the police officers do not have enough vehicles and radio stations for communication, that remote villages are not covered by mobile signals and that there is no funding for the officers’ mobile phones. However, it is related to asset management also. According to the leading security analyst and member of the National Advisory Board for Security, Nelson Belo, 80\% of the police is deployed in districts, while 80\% of resources are in Dili. Interview with Nelson Belo, 23 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{145} ‘If there is a mistake on police, I would mention it to District Commander at the meeting. If there is no meeting with the commander soon, we will mention to District Administrator’ Malere suku chief, Aileu, 3 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{146} Malere suku chief, Aileu, 3 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{147} Interview and focus group, suku Holsa, 17 April 2013. This xefe suku is also a Victims Assistance Network referral person, but obviously not sensitised enough to accept the possibility of a woman being an active and committed community policing officer.

\textsuperscript{148} Nelson Belo, security analyst and a member of a national Security Council, interview, Dili, 23 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{149} Comment, Mark Koening, TAF

\textsuperscript{150} ‘So far police involvement as a guard, only when we expect high tensions, not in the process of mediation’. FGD Aileu 4 April 2013.
We have an archive of declarations and statements; one copy goes to police so that they know
the history and step in next time. If violence occurred and the parties agree to go with the
solution found through mediation, in future if occurs again, then police will immediately inter
into the matter.¹⁵¹

The designated police officer acts as a buffer zone – a protector of the community members
from aggressive task force units within the PNTL.¹⁵² The most valuable role is as a
moderator, or provider of information, knowledge and solutions. ‘Before, we called the
police just to be present as a guard to calm the situation, now a police officer participates in
finding the best ways of a solution, as a member of communities. We have deterrence of
violence, but not only by providing security but through active involvement.’¹⁵³ One
important role of the police officer is to socialise laws;¹⁵⁴ however, this is a part of the PNTL
agenda that is not necessarily related to the TAF programme, and not all police officers are
familiar enough with legal details.¹⁵⁵

However, there are implicit differences in the nature of the collaboration. Observation of the
PNTL officers’ presentation during the CPC or community meetings reveals pressure on the
communities for self-regulation and on community leaders regarding their responsibilities.
For example, a higher police officer explained to CPC members that he does not know all
laws well, urging them: “You have to be informed, do not tell them you do not know as then
you will lose confidence from community in that way”.¹⁵⁶ Although CPC members are
volunteers, more work is expected from them than is from the police.¹⁵⁷ One of the key
supporters of community policing at the highest level within the PNTL claimed that
ownership lies with communities and that the key is ‘communities prove that they do
something for themselves and contribute’.¹⁵⁸

A Community-Policing Council in itself is not a new idea, as it is present in various similar
forms worldwide. However, its formation and development in Timor-Leste has been solely
the initiative of the Foundation, and hence is a key area for assessing the TAF intervention’s
contribution to change. The field work has provided material about CPC members’

¹⁵¹ Suku chief, Manapa, 18 April 2013
¹⁵² Interview with the community policing officer in Lailea, district Manatuto; 24 April 2013.
¹⁵³ Example: “March 25, Kotabauru confrontation regarding land, aldea chief member of CPC called Mr.
Lilianu and he arrived after 10-15 minutes. Yesterday we managed to settled the issue, he was involved,
providing stationary and helping to copy statements.” Malere, 3/4/13.
¹⁵⁴ Interview, community policing officer, Aileu, 4 April, 2013.
¹⁵⁵ ‘PNTL needs more capacity at the area of handling cases, more training to know what is referral case which
is not. A good expert is needed to train them about the attitude: they think they are right, but actually against
human rights. Human right training is needed for all police units.’ Manapa suku chief, 18 April 2013.
¹⁵⁶ Community policing officer presentation at CPC meeting, Macalaca, Baucau, 13 March 2013.
¹⁵⁷ ‘You are here to support police work when police could not come to identify the problem.’ Community
policing officer presentation at CPC meeting, Macalaca, Baucau, 13 March 2013. Related to this is the question
of the status of CPC members, raised in a focus group – there was a request for some symbols, documents,
uniforms, to verify their membership of the CPC. The point of legal status in terms of risks and costs the CPC
members are exposed to was raised by the PNTL district commander in Bobonaro, at the interview on 19 April
2013.
¹⁵⁸ ‘For police it is beneficial as it gets reduction of costs as small problems are dealt with communities their
own initiatives, resources, knowledge.’ Joao Belo, currently Director of Planning, interview 05 April 2013.
perceptions and attitudes regarding the factors for **possible improvement of the security situation**, specifically on **the results of the CPC and the training which precedes its formation**, and this model’s **advantage when compared with other solutions** in the context of the security needs of communities in particular and of broader security development in the country.

All the *suku* chiefs and CPC members interviewed believed that the general security situation in the country and in their district was better than five years ago. Their explanations are primarily related to the **national ownership** of the security dynamic, and political aspects of security. The arguments put forward are: that improved security is the result of people’s awareness that after the UN’s departure security is their responsibility alone; conflict fatigue – people want to contribute to peace and stability, and particularly that improved security is a precondition for development. The reasons are found in a maturing of the national leadership – ‘high level people treating communities more fairly,’ and improved cooperation between politicians in Government and Parliament. To a lesser extent the stable security situation in recent years is explained as the result of improved cooperation between the police and the Army; as well as specific measures such as the banning of martial arts organisations and the legal definition of domestic violence as a public crime.

The training organised by TAF was praised as providing new knowledge, even a new way of thinking. It was linked to security needs by opening up a possible way to channel problematic youth behaviour towards non-violence. Anecdotal evidence of improved police-community (i.e. state-society) relations due to the Foundation’s intervention was the astonishment of a *xefe suku* at being given the opportunity to enter the premises of the Police Academy: ‘it was strange for us civilians as perception was that the police is to be approached only if there is a problem, not out of the blue. It transformed our mind, our perception of what is actually police, not traditional way of thinking.’ However, there were complaints not only from members of the community but from trainers as well, that the

---

159 The year 2008 is important for a number of reasons: 1. after the attempted assassination of high level officials in February 2008, there have been no major security incidents or disturbances and it is generally taken as the period of improvement; 2. Previous TAF survey was organised in 2008; 3. The Foundation started with the pilot programme design and later implementation. Such an open question was used in order to delineate potential later specific places and impact of CPC–related training and activities.

160 ‘After the UN withdrawal, communities alone were aware that we are governing our state’. “We feel safe, we are proud with the situation”. Focus group discussion, Macalaco CPC, Baucau 13 March 2013.

161 Local authorities and communities work to maintain peace’ FGD Aileu.

162 This is carefully fostered by the government. As one *suku* chief explained, the Government’s motto is: “goodbye conflict, welcome development” as they do not go together. Another motto is: being a good citizen, you are the next hero for this country; no need to fight for being hero. Malere *suku* chief interview, 03 April 2013, Aileu.

163 Oeleu, 18 April 2013. This is partially related to recent frequent visits of state officials to districts and extensive media coverage of such events.

164 ‘Before enemies, now more as brothers the PNTL and the military’, Oeleu suku, Bobonaro, 18 April 2013.

165 The last point was raised by participants in two women’s focus groups.

166 A female student stressed that training organized by the Foundation was better than anything at the University. Women FGD Holsa 17 April 2013.

167 FGD Oileo, Bobonaro, 18 April 2013. The Foundation-supported training was praised by the PNTL Community Policing Head Boavida Ribero 30 April 2013.

168 Malere *xefe suku*, interview, 3 April 2013.
training was too complicated and a simplified version and/or regular refresher courses were requested.\[169\] From that point of view, the training is not addressing adequately the needs of communities; training that is too complex might further negatively affect the participation of under-represented persons/groups in the Community Policing Councils, and contribute to further marginalisation of certain members of a community and to representation of their security needs.

The results of CPC meetings with community policing officers are primarily explained as an opportunity for having a good flow of information,\[170\] and for more interaction between the PNTL and the CPC,\[171\] both of which are potentially relevant for meeting security needs. There are also more in-depth understandings of the novelty of the model, such as revealing that ‘without community there is no police’,\[172\] and ‘earlier, we were pointing the finger at each other about responsibilities’.\[173\] A merging of earlier divergent agendas of communities and the police has also been noted: “Earlier, PNTL had their work on their own; now we are actively working together.”\[174\]

The period after the establishment of Community-Police Councils is described by the members of the CPC as a period of improvement at the local level. Enhanced security is explained as a consequence of the mere existence of the CPC;\[175\] the result of more frequent visits from the police and their availability;\[176\] of specific achievements of the CPC;\[177\] and the implementation of a traditional mechanism – a tara bandu ceremony.\[178\] The suku chiefs and CPC members who were interviewed claim there are visible changes in violence and a

---

\[169\] Interviews with Krispin Malik, Baucau, and three trainers from NGO Belun. It is SARA training – Scan, Analyze, Response, Assess, which is part of the Western policing agencies routine. SARA methodology is quite advanced, especially keeping in mind the low level of literacy in Timor-Leste. It might further negatively affect the participation of under-represented persons/groups in the Community Policing Councils.

\[170\] Regularly raised point, sometimes stressed: ‘presence of police necessary to guarantee mutual info exchange’ suku Malere, 3 April 2013.

\[171\] Oeleu xefe suku, Bobonaro.

\[172\] Malere xefe suku, Aileu, 03 April 2013.

\[173\] Manapa, xefe sukuBobonaro, 18 April 2013.

\[174\] Manapa xefe suku, 18 April 2013.

\[175\] The spread of information about the establishment of a body which is in charge of security had influenced behaviour: ‘everybody knows that the CPC is here to resolve problems’, Manapa xefe suku, 18 April 2013. In Haturalan there is a poster explaining the structure and stating the names of their CPC ‘for everybody to know’. Interview with Haturalan xefe suku, 24 April 2013.

\[176\] ‘police more present, training and info sharing – three elements providing for calming down the community with the CPC’, Haturalan xefe suku, 24 April 2013.

\[177\] Such as the involvement of previously problematic youth in training organised by TAF and membership of the CPC. “Now I can sleep overnight, there are no longer problems every night,” Haturalan xefesuku interview 24 April 2013.

\[178\] Tara Bandu is a traditional ceremony when commitments are pledged for certain behaviour identified as beneficial for the community. The ‘hybrid community oriented policing’ – tara bandu - ceremonies from the pilot phase were praised in the Foundation’s CMCOP Quarterly Report 15/5 – 31/8/2010. TAF undertook additional research to explore its applicability Tara Bandu: Its Role and Use in Community Conflict Prevention in Timor-Leste, Belun & The Asia Foundation, June 2013. Available at: http://belun.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Tara-Bandu-PB-English.pdf
reduction in crime: examples include a resolution to the problems of youth violence and Martial Arts Groups, land issues, or generally not being ‘a hot spot’ any more.

The security of any one community is frequently impacted by external factors, whether it be related to land issues, thefts, or the security of a school located in a neighbouring village for example. Since the security needs of a community cannot be resolved by the establishment of a CPC in a sole suku, there is a need for the model to be more widely distributed and, as stressed in the interviews, with particular regard to problems with neighbouring communities, these should be included in the programme as soon as possible.

The local ownership of the Foundation’s model in those villages studied during field research appears high. The meetings of locally elected members of the Community Policing Councils with community policing officers are without exception embraced and assessed as useful, and strong demand for their continuation has been expressed. In several cases, suku chiefs have already informed the PNTL district commanders that they want to have a permanent CPC, and have been reassured that the PNTL will try to keep a CPC in existence for longer. ‘It is good to pass on information to the Government to be aware that CPC is important for safety and security and to allocate some budget for it to continue.’

A proxy indicator of a limited value might be the examination of a CPC as an ‘active state-community security model’ meeting security needs in comparative perspective. The participants of the focus group discussions and the suku chiefs interviewed did not express such strong support for having a police officer permanently based in each suku – the Suku Police Post - as it was the case with the CPC. The reasons stated appeared to be practical ones: there is a military unit not far away, so it is safe; the police sub-station is nearby, so if a police post is about to be established better to have it in a hamlet which is more isolated; some police posts are abandoned and would be costly to renovate when there are

---

179 Focus groups discussion with CPC members in suku Holsa, Bobonaro, 17 April 2013, TAF local coordinator, Bobonaro.
180 TAF local coordinator, Bobonaro
181 Haturalan xefe suku, interview 24 April 2013.
182 However, there is a possibility that the PNTL seek to transfer too much responsibility to the CPC. For example, a situation occurred related to a school in the territory of another suku and was discussed at a CPC meeting with interested community members and a Community Policing Unit officers that was observed by the author on 24 April 2013 in suku Haturalan, Manatuto. The CPU Head did not offer to approach the school management himself, but suggested the CPC members do so. TAF’s programme officer suggested that visiting schools lies within the remit of Community Policing Units.
183 It is important to mention that the Foundation pre-selected villages for this phase of the project according to several criteria, including that of leadership.
184 Manapa xefe suku, Bobonaro, 18 April 2013
185 Oeleu suku chief, Bobonaro, 18 April 2013
186 The official position of the Foundation is that it does not have a specific model, as its strategy is not to impose one but to assist the PNTL to develop their own. However, support for the formation of Community Policing Councils is the key common feature in all phases of the Foundation’s community policing programming. The Foundation tried to gain deeper knowledge about other specific local initiatives related to the community policing concept by commissioning case studies from a national expert, but final versions were not available at the time of writing.
187 Oeleu suku chief, Bobonaro, 18 April 2013
188 Holsa suku xefe, 17 April 2013
more urgent issues. However, there was a claim that suku police posts were requested at the inaugural meeting of the then elected 442 suku chiefs in 2009, and that the Prime Minister promised to consider it seriously. The findings from the fieldwork undertaken for this paper are not typical, as general support for a suku police post is overwhelming and stands at ninety-seven per cent according to the 2013 Survey. It is useful to stress that female respondents were interested in having a police officer i.e. suku police post permanently in the village, ‘as there is no light in the evening, and it would be safer’.

In sum, there is strong evidence that ‘the state-community security model’ supported by The Asia Foundation contributes to more responsive policing – if this is defined as an increased level of police engagement with communities in terms of availability, regularity of interaction, and diversification of roles of the police in communities that have a CPC. However, there is room for more evidence gathering about the added value of the Foundation’s ‘active state-community security model’ of local level interaction in the context of the security needs of local inhabitants, especially women and marginalised groups.

5. National Level Changes and the Institutionalisation of Community Policing

The indicators proposed in the previous section might provide an opportunity for monitoring not only the micro-level dynamic, but also the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste. Namely, alongside the establishment of state-community security models at a local (suku) level, the Foundation’s ToC aims for the model to be the base for institutional reform of the national police (PNTL) for the development of a proactive police force. Such reform is understood as the institutionalisation of community policing, and specifically as an expectation for the PNTL to have a comprehensive strategy on the operationalisation of community policing, including a specific list of actions and the provision of resources needed for its continuing implementation. The bulk of the Foundation’s contribution analysis stresses specific new actions to be undertaken by the Timor-Leste central authorities, such as supplementary budget approval for community policing and the development of PNTL National Strategic Plan based on Community Policing Principles. However, evidence of the Foundation’s contribution to national level reforms related to community policing is more difficult to establish. This next section analyses the national level dynamic captured by the 2013 Survey, and the role of major bilateral actors in supporting police reform including

---

189 Oeleu suku xefe, 18/4/2013.
190 Macalaco CPC coordinator, focus groups discussion with CPC members, Macalaco, Baucau, 13 March 2013.
191 Women focus group, suku Holsa. Distance from the sub-district police station was raised as an obstacle for women experiencing domestic violence to report the problem to the police, in Deborah Cummins, Ami Sei Vitima Beibeik: Looking to the needs of domestic violence victims, USAID and TAF, Dili 2012, p. 17.
192 Interview with Todd Wassel, TAF. As stressed earlier, the Foundation has changed the focus of its programme from one more oriented towards communities, to one oriented 60 percent or even up to 70 percent oriented towards the police, the District Commanders and higher levels officers in the PNTL HQ and specifically to working towards the institutionalisation of community policing.
specifically community policing, against which the specific contribution of the Foundation’s programming might be placed.

5.1 The National Level Security Context: survey results

The Community Police Perception Survey conducted in 2008 provided the Foundation with a deep insight into perceptions of security issues from citizens, community leaders and the police, about each actor’s role in security provision, and about the level of trust.\textsuperscript{193} It also served as a base for formulating assumptions in the process of planning the Foundation’s programme and in communicating its results to the PNTL.\textsuperscript{194} The nationwide Community Police Perception Survey that the Foundation commissioned five years later in 2013 served to expand the evidence base for its programming. From the perspective of Theory of Change, its results are important in providing an insight into the security needs of citizens, which are otherwise difficult to assess, and as an indicator of the recognition of certain elements of community policing practice that are crucial for its nationwide adoption in future. The 2013 Survey included 3,106 respondents across all 13 districts and across three target groups: the general public (1,891), community leaders (467) and the PNTL (748).\textsuperscript{195} It oversampled the four districts where the Foundation’s programme was implemented at that time; however, specific sukus participating in the programme were not targeted. Hence, on this account, it is more accurate to say that the Survey’s findings capture the general internal dynamic within Timor-Leste, but this is not necessarily related to the Foundation’s intervention, bearing in mind the small number of sukus and general population involved in TAF’s programme activities and the short implementation period of the CPC model at the time of the survey.\textsuperscript{196}

Over the five year time frame between surveys, the 2013 Survey indicates a huge change regarding the security situation, with the general public’s perception being that their locality is safer than previously (74 percent as against 53 percent in the 2008 survey), or the same (21 percent). There is a rise in those having no concerns about safety in their locality from 25 percent to 38 percent.\textsuperscript{197} The 2013 Survey generally shows an increased engagement by the PNTL in the resolution of crimes, an increased trust and confidence in the PNTL and a perception that it has raised its professionalism. This is tempered by continued low rates of interaction between the general public and the PNTL.

\textsuperscript{194} See chapter 3.1.
\textsuperscript{196} See section on methodological challenges. The results available at the time of writing are not conclusive, partly due to the fact that the survey was implemented to help develop a baseline at the district level, as all districts were included, while it was not used to assess the possible difference in perception in villages included in the programme versus the rest.
\textsuperscript{197} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, General population, question 11.
Specifically, there is a marginal increase in the general population’s contacts with the PNTL to 13 percent and this is mostly by calling or visiting the station.\textsuperscript{198} Overall, the PNTL are seen as a more reliable partner in the provision of security; however, citizens still feel more comfortable accessing local mechanism for most crimes. The exception to this is crimes that involve physical assault, murder and intimidation. It is very important to note that that abusive police treatment dropped from 34 percent in 2008 to only 4.5 percent in 2013. Moreover, the performance of the PNTL according to the general population is substantially higher, with 72 percent reporting it is much better, 4 percent that it is somewhat better and 18 percent that it is the same as previously.\textsuperscript{199} An illustration of the increased trust and confidence in the PNTL is the very high 97 percent of respondents claiming to feel safer if the station is closer to them.\textsuperscript{200} However, even if a PNTL station or officer was in their suku, a majority of 50.45 percent of the general population would report incidents to a community leader first.\textsuperscript{201}

Regarding the outcome of requesting assistance from the PNTL, 69 percent of general public respondents and 76 percent of community leaders indicated they were satisfied with the resolution. This represents an increase from the 2008 Survey when 63 percent of the general public and 56 percent of community leaders indicated they were satisfied.

There is a substantial difference when it comes to working together to address security problems in the community - between 4/5 community leaders claiming the PNTL and citizens are cooperating, and only 2/5 of citizens being aware of such cooperation.\textsuperscript{202} It illustrates a hierarchical structure - strengthening community leaders’ position in cooperating with the police as an institution, but that broader population is not strongly affected by the changes, and needs intermediary in its contacts with the police. To facilitate better dialogue and cooperation between members of the community and the PNTL, suku chiefs (97%) and aldeia chiefs (90%) should play role, i.e. community leaders in general (57%), and also religious leaders (34%), NGOs (24%) and women’s organisations (12%).\textsuperscript{203}

The police seek assistance from suku chiefs (96% national level average) and aldeia chiefs (87%), as well as from NGOs (62%) and religious associations (60%), with no visible differences between districts included into the Foundation’s programme and the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{204} The PNTL officers participating in the survey see citizens dominantly as a partner

\textsuperscript{198} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, General population, questions 20 and 21.  
\textsuperscript{199} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, General population, question 16  
\textsuperscript{200} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, General population, question 15E. However, 61 percent of participants need more than 30 minutes to reach a police station.  
\textsuperscript{201} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, General population, question 17.  
\textsuperscript{202} 89 percent of the PNTL and 80 percent of community leaders claim police and citizens are cooperating, while only 42 percent of the general population do so, where 41 percent responded ‘No’, and 16 percent ‘Do not know’. Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, p.113  
\textsuperscript{203} Community Police Perceptions Survey, Timor-Leste 2013, draft, p.114. It would be interesting to know whether TAF is considered as a NGO in this context, as the percentage of respondents including NGOs is lowest in the control district Viqueque where TAF was not engaged (leaving aside Dili as a specific, distinct, urban environment with a high level of NGOs (32 percent)  
\textsuperscript{204} 2013 Survey – initial results, question 26, pp. 106-107.
in combating crime (84%) or someone to serve and protect (14%), as 89% claim that citizens and police are working together to address security problems in the community, confirming the dominance of the discourse of cooperation. However, the 2013 Survey documents that citizens are still mostly concerned if a police officer was to approach them on the street: plurality of general public (48%) and almost 2/3 of community leaders (63%) would be concerned. Only 18% of citizens and 15% of community leaders see maintaining security as primarily the responsibility of the PNTL.

Both the field work and the Survey document the perception of local community leaders that security in longer terms has been improved due to their own engagement as citizens, and other reasons, with the PNTL role not figuring prominently. Security needs of the general population are still primarily fulfilled (if at all fulfilled) by other actors then the police. Survey results illustrate the PNTL is still seen as lower ranked actor in security provision, but there is a readiness to have it in neighborhood. Hence, there is substantial space for the police to work with citizens and communities, but the institutionalisation of community-police interaction as envisaged in the Foundation’s Theory of Change is still a distant goal.

5.2 Partnerships, Competing Narratives and Ownership

The plausibility of achieving the goal outlined in any Theory of Change is substantially affected by other actors, be it international, national or local. In the context of a fragile state, dynamic among various governance actors is particularly important.

As it has been stressed in the literature, ‘the key tension facing development practitioners is observing correlation and demonstrating causality, attributing impact and establishing contribution made by one among several actors in complex and not entirely controllable contexts.’ The problem is further exacerbated when there is a need to determine policy impacts and evaluating the effectiveness of ‘partnership’, which is itself an elusive term. The Foundation’s intervention in supporting the community policing institutionalisation is unfolding in the country in which numerous multilateral and bilateral partners have been active, and the Foundation’s programme itself is undertaken in partnership with the New Zealand Police (TLCPP). An attempt of establishing separate contribution is beyond the scope of this paper, but identifying areas where different contribution stories exist within and

---

205 Within the PNTL 8% of respondents claim they do not work together.
206 2013 Survey – initial results, question 22, pp. 102-103. However, there are substantial differences among districts.
207 Community leaders see this as the responsibility of citizens 67.81%, community leaders 15.45%, military 1,29%. Among the general population 52% see this as the responsibility of citizens, 22% of community leaders, 18% of the PNTL, and 4% of elders, with the important difference being notable only regarding elders, whose role is declining in the eyes of general population.
between organisations is considered as critical in the context of a Theory of Change.\footnote{Van Stolk and al, 2011, cf. Stein and Valters, 2013, op.cit.} In this section the key actors’ narratives of the Foundation’s role and contribution to supporting community policing in Timor-Leste will be presented, and followed by a discussion about evidence of the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste, as presented in the Foundation’s progress report related to the practice of its Theory of Change implementation.

The institutionalisation of community policing is not a separate programme unit to be introduced, but an approach affecting the entire police organisational set-up - a comprehensive reform related to the philosophy, organisational structure, management policy, and operational strategy for implementation. Hence, the institutionalisation of community policing cannot be performed without affecting other elements within the policing domain, and, consequently, all stakeholders supporting other dimensions of police reforms and the broader security sector. Interviews conducted with senior PNTL officers indicated that their understanding of community policing was primarily in the context of pressing issues of logistic and human resource management, including the insufficient number of police officers, the limited number of ranks that were available until recently, and the issue of housing for officers being transferred.\footnote{Interviews with the PNTL district commanders in 4 districts participating in the programme} Civilian actors stress the ongoing challenges related to disciplinary measures and polices of promotion that can sometimes develop into thorny political issues.\footnote{The political dimension of human rights violations, disciplinary measures and the selection process leading to promotions in the PNTL were stressed by the Parliamentary Committee Chair, an MP, and an advisor in the Ministry, in interviews in Dili.}

The arena of international support for different aspects of Timorese police reform is quite crowded; the donors involved in the network of ‘Friends of the PNTL’ included Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, USA and the UN/UNDP.\footnote{Interview with a donor representative in the network, 23 April 2013, Dili. A recent paper listed Australia, Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal and Turkey as “Friends of the PNTL”, stressing the problems of donors’ coordination. “R2P Ideas in Brief” (2012) Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 2, No 6} All of these donors are projecting their influence and pushing for different aspects of the PNTL institutional strengthening. The consequence of this is that there are numerous priorities being put forward and limited space for a single actor to influence decisively such a massive, incremental and long-term process that may include various setbacks.

The organisational set-up within which the Foundation’s programme operates includes a partnership with the New Zealand Police and New Zealand Aid Programme, as the lead donor for community policing in Timor-Leste, and contacts with the Australian Federal Police’s large Police Development Program (TLPDP). The interviews established that those institutions have distinct narratives about their own and the Foundation’s role. Although the variations in narrative might be a result of varying purpose, including playing to donors and the public at home, their existence is relevant for any assessment of the ongoing institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste.
The Government of New Zealand was approached by the Government of Timor-Leste in 2008 to assist the PNTL with developing capacity in community policing. A Community Policing Pilot Program (CPPP) was initiated by the New Zealand Police (NZPOL), within the wider United Nations Policing component of UNMIT. The goal of the programme was “to support the PNTL in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in the police, and to create an environment conducive to all aspects of community policing”.\textsuperscript{214} Cooperation with the New Zealand Police was initiated under UNMIT at the time when TAF started its own pilot project. This led to the Foundation’s scaled-up programme being co-funded by New Zealand Aid Programme and to the fact that the new bilateral New Zealand TLCPP and the Foundation’s programme are being run by a joint Management Committee.

The desired impact for the Foundation’s key partner, New Zealand Police Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) is “safe and secure communities”.\textsuperscript{215} The TLCPP and the Foundation’s Programme (HAKOHAK) have aligned their reporting, but from the point of view of the New Zealand Police the partnership is viewed as a clear division of work: the TLCPP works with the PNTL and the Foundation works with communities.\textsuperscript{216} There is a different organisational culture in professional security services and in developmental actors related to security provision, in other words in the police officers’ perception of the role of developmental organisations with respect to security structures. This was echoed in a statement by the first programme manager at the Foundation: “the partnership with the New Zealand Police was critical. We give them credit for the police, they credit us for communities”.\textsuperscript{217}

The New Zealand Police’s assumption is that offering possibilities for higher level PNTL officers to see community policing in practice in New Zealand, providing advice at district level in Timor-Leste through having New Zealand police officers available for a certain period of time and working with the PNTL specifically on training design and improvement, will all eventually lead to more secure communities. The Foundation’s work with communities is seen as a part of restoring community trust and confidence in the police. The perceived advantage of the Foundation as an NGO is that it is not so bureaucratic and hence is capable of being flexible and reacting quickly to provide legitimacy and intimacy for civil society.\textsuperscript{218} For New Zealand Aid Programme, the key focus is to introduce the practice of community policing, for it to be present right across the police force, and for the budget to


\textsuperscript{215} Interview with Anna Mosley, First Secretary (Development), New Zealand Embassy Dili, who represents a key donor to the New Zealand Aid Programme in Timor-Leste. The TLCPP Programme stresses the identification of 'community issues and expectations in relation to [both] personal and community safety and security.' TLCPP Programme Design Document 2011-2015.

\textsuperscript{216} Interview with TLCPP Commander in Dili, 3 May 2013

\textsuperscript{217} Interview with Liam Chinn, TAF, 18 February 2013, Dili. The representative of the New Zealand Aid Programme also stated that ‘civilians work with communities, the police officers with the police’, but clarified in electronic correspondence that such a generalisation, while broadly reflective of the division of work between TLCPP and the Foundation, does not reflect fully the complexities of the work being undertaken.

\textsuperscript{218} Interview with TLCPP officer in Dili, 23 April 2013
reflect a reduction in allocations to paramilitary task forces. Nevertheless, a top-down approach is also critical as changes are driven by politics as there is an understanding of a political imperative for the Government to reduce the complaints against the PNTL that are present in the media.

The biggest support to the various departments of the PNTL comes from the Australian Federal Police, via their Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP). Its mission objective is “building the foundations of a more effective and more accountable police service for the people of Timor-Leste”, and the areas of support are: a Police Training Centre, Leadership and Management, Governance, Investigations, Operations, and Gender Equity. Although community policing is clearly missing from the named areas of support, the TLPDP leaders are in fact providing key inputs into drafting the PNTL community policing strategy. The explanation is that there is no need to have community policing as a distinct focus since it is a cross-cutting issue. The end result is an institutional change, with accountability, professionalism and improved service, leading to community confidence.

While there is a kind of subtle battle between ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Latino’ styles of policing for influencing the Timorese model, it is clear that within the English-speaking camp of supporters of the PNTL, community security is the goal. Both the New Zealand and Australian police forces express an orientation towards the police service and work ‘for the people of Timor-Leste’ and ‘safe and secure communities’; although they define their goals in relation to communities they are focused solely on the PNTL. They see a difference between a developmental organisation such as the Foundation working with communities in

---

219 Interview, New Zealand Embassy, Dili, 1 May 2013.
220 Interview, New Zealand Embassy Dili, 1 May 2013.
221 This capacity-building programme started in 2004; the current programme is worth 74.7m Australian Dollars, runs from July 2010 to June 2014, and includes 58 personnel. Australian Federal Police, TLPDP Overview, April 2013 – a presentation by the TLPDP Commander Graham Waite.
222 The form of the Strategy drafted by the PNTL that was available at the time of writing is to a substantial extent based on TLPDP recommendations, as it includes items characteristic only of the AFP. The PNTL Strategic Plan 2014-2018 (30 November 2013) that was subsequently adopted underlines the contribution of two leading representatives of the AFP – the TLPDP with ‘their ideas and time to support production’ of the Plan, as well as another three people from AFP-TLPDP and Superintendent Kevin Brennan from NZ POL.
223 Interview with a TLPDP officer, 3 May 2013, Dili
224 For AFP there are three key streams: community engagement, visibility of the police (patrols), and professional responses.
225 Interview with an advisor in the state administration, 2 May 2013
support of community policing, and actual community policing. For them, it is clear that community policing is done by officers in uniform, and thus needs to be integrated into professional police conduct. In that sense, the everyday expression of the Foundation that it ‘does community policing’ is not supported, since community policing is seen as a police matter.228

The interviews with both senior PNTL officials and community policing officers in districts reveal that, within the PNTL, narratives related to community policing and knowledge about a particular model are divergent. This may be related to their own experience in Timor-Leste itself, placing the concept into a familiar body of knowledge, such as a conviction that community policing is based on the legacies and practices of the Timorese resistance to occupation of their country;229 or to an old issue such as the well-known BIMPOLA Indonesian system for control of rural areas.230 There are also claims that the practice of establishing Community-Policing Councils and ‘official points of contact in the PNTL’ for selected villages was an independent initiative of the police in several locations in 2011.231 Such framing of the concept by the police officers themselves indicates substantial ownership.232

In relation to foreign models, there are references to the place of origin and to the mode of engagement. Japan, Singapore and New Zealand were cited as good examples of local models;233 as well as the experience gained from a visit to Bangladesh organised by the Foundation.234 Although there is a massive literature on the problems of UN attempts to introduce community policing in Timor-Leste, some police officers reported positive experiences related to the UNPOL mentoring system. They found it very useful as it opened paths for communities’ participation in identifying problems and giving support.235 However, it is unclear whether the search for a national model of community policing is completed, and it is arguable whether there is an assessment of the current capabilities of the PNTL to implement it.236 For example, the Head of the Community Policing Unit believes that the best

---

228 TAF Timor-Leste has no staff or consultants with a background in the police.
229 Nelson Belo, interview, 23 April 2013; Joao Belo: based on experience of war with Indonesia to work together at times of resistance, interview, 5 April 2013.
230 ‘Similar with Indonesia BIMPOLDA and BAMPISA’; PNTL District Commander Manatutuo, interview 24 April 2013.
231 It refers to the period between the TAF pilot and the current programme, to the area where the PNTL commander at that time was the key proponent of community policing, and where there is no official justice i.e. court in the district, so that the initiative was seen as ‘an alternative for justice’. Nelson Belo, ‘Practice of Community Police in Mailana-Aileu’, draft case study for the Foundation, April 2013.
232 However, the field research did not include police officers from other PNTL units and higher ranks who might not be familiar with or support community policing
233 Aileu District Commander Lay, interview, Aileu, 4 April 2013
234 Joao Belo, Director of Planning, PNTL, interview PNTL HQ, 5 April 2013.
235 Joao Belo, interview 5 April 2013. Specifically, the useful mentoring by Philippines UNPOL was mentioned by a female officer in Baucau (VU/CPU); the positive effect on communities was mentioned in the baseline study, which quotes an older female from Holsa suku.
236 At the time of the field work. Later the PNTL Strategy 2014-2018 was promulgated by the PNTL Commander (30 November 2013), defining five strategic objectives as priorities: legislation, training, administration, discipline and operations. The Strategy stresses that ‘our community policing model embraces the community policing philosophy by adopting the VIP doctrine’: Visibility – high visibility of police creating
approach is to have *suku police posts* supplemented by security volunteers.\(^{237}\) One of the district commanders of the PNTL is concerned about sustainability as the PNTL has no resources to implement proper community policing at this stage, and the protection of CPC members is not regulated.\(^{238}\)

The different narratives presented in this section illustrate the difficulties of assigning the contribution of a particular external actor to the improvements and institutionalisation of community policing, as well as the difficulties for the PNTL in reaching a common understanding of the best possible model. How these differing views might come together to shape a state-community security model that the PNTL can take forward, and use to develop more proactive community policing that would improve state-society relations, will ultimately depend on the PNTL itself and even more so on the national political leadership.\(^{239}\)

From the point of view of the Foundation’s ToC, it also presents a problem for evidence gathering and for the Foundation to claim a substantial contribution to the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste, since change is incremental, not necessarily irreversible, and a result of the cumulative effect of many separate and intertwined interventions, as well as internal political dynamics.

**6. Conclusion: Strengths, Weaknesses, and the Way Forward**

The Asia Foundation developed a Community Security ToC to capture the reasoning for specific programming in support of community policing in Timor-Leste. It is an aspirational theory which acknowledges a shift in the implementation phase from working mostly with communities to primarily working with the PNTL and aspiring to institutionalise community policing as a way of improving state-society relations. The ToC is based on lessons learned from previous projects and on programme planning, capturing the three layers influencing the dynamic of change, and demonstrating the Foundation’s understanding of the complexity of an intervention that has to be implemented on various levels for a cumulative effect. While the ToC is formulated to fit within the donor’s high level strategic narrative, DFID’s state-

---

\(^{237}\) PNTL Community Policing Unit Head R. Boavida, interview 30 April 2013, Dili.

\(^{238}\) PNTL District Commander Bobonaro, interview, 18 April 2013.

\(^{239}\) In the context of continuing uncertainties regarding forthcoming decentralization, and about allocations within the PNTL budget, there is always a possibility for a change of direction at a time of new high-level appointments.
society framework does not hinder the Foundation’s genuine understanding of the change process as the central pillar of the ToC and its programming goal through all phases is *improved community-police relations*.

There are several factors influencing any conclusions about the claims made in the ToC. The short implementation period of the Foundation’s current programme in support of community policing and the design of their 2013 survey, which did not specifically target the localities in which the Foundation’s CPC model of community-police interaction was implemented, have limited the space for an interrogation of the evidence for certain claims in the ToC. Furthermore, the contribution analysis in this case is complex due to the fact that external support for community policing in Timor-Leste, although inconsistent and characterised by discontinuities, has been present for more than a decade, as well as due to the fact that the Foundation’s programme is being run in close partnership with the New Zealand Police.

The issue of the complexity of contribution analysis in a crowded donor space is particularly relevant for the broader development community, and the Foundations is aware of an ongoing challenge to find an effective middle ground between exhaustive and expensive analysis to prove contribution, and a simple acceptance of an assertion. The Foundation’s initial presentation of evidence is focused mostly on activities and steps undertaken by the PNTL within a broader range of influences for policy change in that institution, stressing the elements identified as leading towards the institutionalisation of community policing. In this case, there is a possibility of building a stronger evidence base that would consist of a combination of quantitative and qualitative data focused on testing and proving specific claims within the ToC. A weaker element of the ToC is the inclusion of key terms without defining them, and the use of different terms interchangeably. This limits the possibilities for formulating indicators and for strong evidence collection.

The fieldwork undertaken indicates evidence that the implementation of the Foundation’s local model of community-police interaction contributes to more responsive policing if this is defined as an increase in the availability and regularity of the police’s interaction with a community, and a broadening of the range of roles of community policing officers. It is plausible to claim that in villages included in the programme the police have a bigger role in the everyday life of the local community by contributing to community security. A new role for communities as both subjects and objects of security is now emerging, if community leaders are taken as a proxy for communities. However, there are possible unintended consequences such as an increase in the range of available options for obtaining justice and security. Having a CPC, in addition to traditional and formal justice systems and other mechanisms for mediation, means that police officers assigned to the CPC need to work in different roles on a case-by-case basis, both with traditional structures and with the official justice system. Thus, the introduction of a CPC might be beneficial but also bring an increase in complexity and confusion in addressing grievances and seeking justice.

The Foundation’s implementation ToC rests on a combination of active citizenship and an elite-driven approach. The Foundation is the only agency involved in supporting Timor-
Leste police reforms that works directly with communities. It is in a unique position and has a distinct advantage and the Foundation has been credited by other international actors for its contribution at that level. One possible recommendation is for the Foundation to focus primarily on elaborating evidence for specific processes of change at the local level. To that end, a number of proxy indicators for strengthening the evidence base and monitoring change are proposed in this paper based on the fieldwork undertaken.

The tendency in the Foundation to orient itself further toward the police would present a slight departure from the focus stressed in the ToC title, the concept of ‘community security’, and from the three levels of engagement outlined in the ToC. The current focus on ‘the key actors’ level - understood as the PNTL district commanders and senior management in the PNTL HQ - risks neglecting the ‘political decision-makers’ and ‘ordinary citizen’ levels. If all the key actors supporting community policing in Timor-Leste are focused fully (as with the New Zealand Police and the Australian Federal Police) or primarily (as with the Foundation) on the police, and if getting past community leaders to reach individual members of the community in order to assess their needs is difficult, this might affect knowledge about ‘end user’ insecurities and whether the assumed changes in terms of improved security at the deepest level are really happening. In other words, it is important to maintain the programme’s focus primarily on policing – the delivery of safety and security – rather than being focused on the police.

Specifically, the Foundation’s understanding of the ‘key people’ as being primarily police commanders, who are already supported by the New Zealand Police and Australian Federal Police, in practice reduces the attention necessary to follow not only local level changes, but also the power dynamics and influence of other national actors in the security arena, the potential supporters and spoilers. The institutionalisation of changes within the police is not only a matter of the technique of policing, but a political issue per se, as documented in the security sector reform and governance literature and in an earlier study prepared by the Foundation. It is unlikely that the perceived key elements of institutionalisation - strategic documents and budgetary allocations - would be decided only by the professional police officers themselves. The need to promote a stronger understanding of community policing within the Timorese parliament and government, where communication about the programme is not so prominent, was highlighted by the Foundation’s own office.

To avoid slipping into a more state-centric and top-down understanding of security, the proposed way forward is to focus on the security perspective of the end-user and on the content of interaction at and within suku level. The lived experience of the poor, vulnerable, excluded, and marginal might differ substantially from the dominant priorities of ‘the

240 For example, there is not enough communication with Parliament, which was stressed as the key institution in interviews by the author with senior national advisors, both in government and out of it, as well as in the interviews with two members of the Parliament.

241 Interview with Adelio Timan, Deputy Programme Manager (the highest ranking Timorese in the programme); 3 May 2013. It is important to note that there are several other programmes of support for mediation and conflict prevention, including those within the same ministry in charge of the PNTL, under the State Secretary for Security, as well as another supported by the Ministry of Social Solidarity.
community’. By implying common interests and goals for people living in a particular area while there are social and legal inequalities embedded in the society being policed, community policing might serve to reaffirm existing social inequalities. The practice of problem-solving should be set in the context of social divisions within the community and is an opportunity for non-discrimination or seeking positive discrimination.

The Foundation has offered a successful model for an increased level of engagement between communities and the PNTL, but more extensive use of the lens of social inclusion, and synergy with other Foundation programmes in Timor-Leste, could be explored as part of the practical implementation of the ToC on Community Security.

The ToC captures well the knowledge gained from a variety of the Foundation’s sources because the community policing support programme in Timor-Leste was well researched and planned, and adjusted to the changes in the political context. However, there are important points that could be considered in relation to social science theory aspects of the ToC, such as the concept of Hybrid Political Orders. Does the Foundation really see Timor-Leste as a liberal democracy? Is such an order the only possible one, or should prolonged hybridity be accepted? By raising such complex issues and terms (explicitly or implicitly) without clear definitions and without expressing any reservations, that aspect of the ToC is weakened.

Keeping in mind the limited resources of developmental agencies, there is a case to be made in favour of a theory of change that is elaborated on a contextual power analysis and on ‘lessons learned’ from programming, and not necessarily one that uses a social science approach beyond a definition of the terms used.

The primary purpose of the Foundation’s Theory of Change on community security is to provide a long-term vision for their work in Timor-Leste and to keep the management conceptually on track. This partially explains why a very small number of senior managers and consultants have been engaged with formulating the ToC and in using it in practice. However, a prominent role of the ToC in this case is knowledge management, since it serves both to capture existing knowledge by creating an understanding of how change occurs, and to provide a learning tool by encouraging a culture of learning and analysis, particularly with regard to monitoring programmes and providing evidence of change. Thanks to this joint JSRP/TAF research collaboration and to the incentives provided by DFID for elaborating a Theory of Change, additional space has been created for reflection and re-interpretation of the process of change, as well as for evidence and knowledge building. This gives the ToC process an added value per se.

---

242 It should start with the sensitisation of TAF local staff regarding gender equality. Two small examples: In suku Samalari (involved right from TAF’s pilot programme) there are women’s groups and active women members of the CPC, but the TAF district coordinator attempted to organise a women-only focus group by notifying only the suku chief and not the women themselves. In another instance, when the CPC meeting was finished and there was a need to leave a fee for transport, the TAF officer gave the money to a man even though a woman clearly identified herself as the CPC treasurer.

243 The Foundation might consider further discussion regarding the level of generalisability of theories related to similar programmes in several other countries in the region, as well as using a range of applicable definitions from key academic and policy concepts in a future elaboration of the ToC.
References


Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2012), ‘Pillar II in focus: the responsibility to assist’, R2P Ideas in Brief, Vol. 2, No.6, University of Queensland


International Crisis Group, (2006), ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report No. 120.


Suhrke, Astri (2001), ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No.4, pp.1-20;


UNDP/SEESAC and Saferworld (2003), Philosophy and Principles of Community-Based Policing, SEESAC Report: Belgrade

UN Security Council Resolution 1246 of 11 June 1999

UN Security Council Resolution 1410, 17 May 2002


**Documents provided by The Asia Foundation**

Case studies on local initiatives on community policing in Timor-Leste, I, II, III, drafts by Nelson Belo, TAF, April 2013

Community Oriented Policing Program II (HAKOHAK), Baseline Study, by Dr Bu V.E. Wilson, TAF, October 2012.


Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing, Handover note by Liam Chinn, Programme Manager

Country Strategic Plan Timor-Leste, The Asia Foundation


Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK), Workplan 1 January – 31 December 2013, Aligned reporting Model, Prepared by The Asia Foundation

Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK), Annual Report October 2011 – September 2012, prepared by The Asia Foundation
Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK), DRAFT Year 2 Action Plan October 2012-September 2013, prepared by The Asia Foundation

Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK ), quarterly reports for 2012,and from March 2013


Quantitative Study of Community-Police Relationships, Background paper for the survey to beheld January-April 2013, TAF internal document


TAF unpublished background paper on police policy development in Timor-Leste by Todd Wassel, April 2013.


Other references:

Australian Federal Police – Timor-Leste Police Development Program, Overview by Graham Waite, April 2013


New Zealand Timor-Leste Community Policing Program, Quarterly Report, 1 January 2013 – 31 March 2013, for Presentation and Acceptance by the Programme Management Committee, 20 March 2013, Dili.

PNTL Strategic Plan 2013-2017, Draft V5, PNTL Dili

PNTL Strategic Plan 2014-2018, 30 November 2013, PNTL Dili
APPENDIX 1: Background to field research

The field research was conducted during the period February-May 2013 in the capital Dili and in four districts where the Foundation’s programme was implemented: Aileu, Baucao, Bobonaro, and Manatuto. The techniques used were interviews (semi-structured and open-ended on background), focus groups discussions (FGD) with Community-Policing Council members in villages (suku), observations, and written correspondence.

The field research included interactions with the following persons or groups:

1. **The Asia Foundation:**
   Susan Marx, Country Representative, Timor-Leste;
   Silas Everett, Country Representative Cambodia, previously Country Representative Timor-Leste (e-correspondence);
   Mark R. Koenig, Assistant Director, Governance and Law
   Deborah Cummings, Academic Advisor, TAF Timor-Leste
   Liam Chinn, TAF Consultant, previously Community Policing Program Manager in Timor-Leste
   Todd Wassel, HAKOHAK Program, Chief of Party and the lead author of the Theory of Change
   Adelio Tilman R. Goncalves, HAKOHAK Deputy Programme Manager
   Fernando Mota, HAKOHAK Program Officer
   Cesar T. F. Gaio, HAKOHAK Program Officer
   Jaqueline Belo, HAKOHAK Baucau District Coordinator
   Eliasda Silva, HAKOHAK Aileu District Coordinator
   Rui Narciso Lopes, HAKOHAK Bobonaro District Coordinator

2. **The programme’s implementers and consultants at the programme:**
   Bu Wilson, PhD, author of the Baseline Study for HAKOHAK
   Gobie Rajalingam, TAF Survey and reporting consultant
   Luis da Costa Ximenes, Director, NGO Belun, Dili
   Crispin Caca Malic Cardoso, ToT, NGO ECM, Baucau
   Maria Marilia Oliveira, Fernando da Costa, Izalde Correia Pinto, ToT, NGO Belun – focus group

3. **PNTL officers at headquarters and in districts**
   Afonso de Jesus, Second Commander (Deputy Commander) of the PNTL HQ
   Armando Monteira, Operations Commander, PNTL HQ
   Joao Belo, Superintendent, Policy Planning Director, PNTL HQ
   Boavida Ribeiro, Community Policing Unit Head, PNTL HQ
   Aileu PNTL District Commander Rugerio Lay
   Baucau PNTL District Commander, Chief Superintendent Faustino
   Manatuto PNTL District Commander Miguel Soares Marques
Bobonaro PNTL District Commander Chief Superintendent Hermengildo Da Crus
Liqisa PNTL District Commander Nartecia (Kiki) E Martins

*Community policing officers in the districts included in the programme:*
Adilson Salamao Freitas (Baucau),
Camis M. Mendonaca (CPU Commander, Baucau) and
Norbertha X. Belo (PNTL Vulnerable persons Unit Baucau),
Liliano Moskit (Aileu),
Dante da Kosta, CPO, and CPU Head (Manatuto)

4. **National and international informants engaged in police reform or security sector oversight.**
Nelson Belo, Director, Fundasaun Mahein, Member of the Security Council of the President of Timor-Leste
Hon. Lourdes Bessa, Chair of Parliamentary Committee B, Timor-Leste Parliament
Anna Mosley, First Secretary (Development), New Zealand Embassy Dili
Bret Saalwaechter, Democracy and Governance Team Leader, USAID Timor-Leste
Steve Christian, New Zealand Police, Assistant Commissioner, Timor-Leste Community Policing Program
Kevin J Brennan, New Zealand Police, Superintendent, Timor-Leste Community Policing Program
Steve Bullock, New Zealand Police Advisor to PNTL in Bobonaro District
Graham Waite, Australian Federal Police, Program Manager Timor-Leste Police Development Program
Jose Marcelino Cabral Belo, Assistant Country Director, Head of Crisis Prevention, UNDP Timor-Leste
Arsenio Bano, member of the Parliament from FRETILIN oppositional political party
An adviser in the Ministry of Internal Security (national)
A diplomat from a country involved in support for the PNTL reform
High-level military official previously involved in the intervening forces in Timor-Leste
A UN officer involved in criminal investigations related to past misconduct of security forces in Timor-Leste

5. **Suku level interactions:**

*District Baucau:*
suku Macalaco - observation of the CPC meeting and focus group discussion,
suku Fatulia - CPC focus group,
suku Samalari - 2 focus groups - separated male (7) and female (3) with CPC members;

*District Aileu:*
Malere suku chief interview;
Aisirimou suku - CPC focus group;
Fatubosa suku - observing discussion with the PNTL District Commander and community policing officer with inhabitants of remote aldeas Likulaukan and Hoholete (50+ participants);

*District Bobonaro:*
Manapa suku chief interview;
Oeleu suku chief interview and CPC focus group;
Holsa, suku chief interview, and two focus groups – separated male (3) and female (3) CPC members;

*District Manatuto:*
Haturalan suku, observation of a CPC meeting with citizens (17 F and 14 M) and suku chief interview.

6. **Related events attended and observed:**
Stakeholders meeting of the PNTL leaders and civil society representatives, in district of Baucau;
PNTL officers’ promotion ceremony in district of Bobonaro;
High Level Management Meeting of the HAKOHAK programme, including high representatives of the PNTL, TAF, NZ Police, USAID, NZ Aid, in the PNTL HQ, Dili Community Policing Unit Head’s meetings with TAF and other donors;
Meeting of PNTL participants in a study tour to New Zealand upon their return with TAF and NZ Community Policing Programme.

The villages were selected in such a way as to visit all four districts included in the programme at that time, both the more distant ones and those close to town locations, taking into account the ongoing activities of the Foundation i.e. transportation and availability of a translator. Additionally, one village included in the pilot phase (Samalari) and one village included in the baseline assessment (Holsa) were also visited in order to gain additional insights when compared with existed written notes. The interaction at village level included focus groups with all CPC members (usually 10 M +3F, including two youth representatives – male and female, and two women representatives), except in Holsa and Salamari, where separate discussions were held with men and women to gain more information on the gender perspective. The time provided for focus groups was up to two hours and for interviews with suku chiefs up to one hour (with consecutive interpretation). All interactions were held in the local environment in the space provided for suku level meetings and other events. The interpreter was contracted by the author, with TAF staff providing translation in exceptional cases.
APPENDIX 2: Background on the Timor-Leste Context and Community Policing

The Country Context

Timor-Leste is located in Southeast Asia, northwest of Australia, in the eastern part of Timor Island, and includes an enclave, Occussi, in the western part. Its society is characterised by subsistence agriculture and a low literacy level. While the overwhelming majority of the population is Christian, and the Catholic Church is influential, Timorese local socio-political structures are based on the kinship and marriage system. The indigenous system is based on the hierarchy of “Houses”, tracing back to a common ancestor, and on the division of power between ritual and political issues. The newly established state is characterised as a 'hybrid political order', since it combines elements of the Western model of governance and elements stemming from its local indigenous tradition. A wide variety of customary practices guide social order, and conflicts are viewed not at an individual but at a communal level, requiring enforcement within a family. There was no tradition of accountable policing with the consent of the citizenry. Due to the absence of infrastructure in remote rural areas, substantial parts of the territory were - and some still are - practically beyond the permanent reach of the state.

The country proclaimed its independence for the first time in November 1975, after centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and a brief civil war. Indonesia reacted by annexation, proclaiming it as its twenty-seventh province. As the country’s status was kept alive on the international agenda, a UN-monitored ‘popular consultation’ was held on 30 August 1999. Overwhelming support for independence (78.5 percent) resulted in widespread violence from Indonesia-backed militias and the dislocation of the population. An Australia-led international mission (INTERFET) was engaged in the restoration of order and security. This

---


247 Hohe (2002), op.cit. The Asia Foundation defines lisan and the system of uma lisan in Timor-Leste as ‘a system of local governance that has spiritual, political, economic and social dimensions and which holds many practical implications for people’s lives,’ with customary authority figures ‘impacting on individuals and families’ access to land, corps and inheritance rights, and playing a strong role in maintain correct relationships between individuals, families, and larger groups’ in State-society relations at suku level, The Asia Foundation Programme Component Reports (May 2012), DFID PPA Year 1, pp. 68-112.

248 Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1246 of 11 June 1999, and according to the arrangement the UN made with Indonesia and Portugal.

was followed by subsequent UN missions that had a presence in the territory almost constantly until the end of 2012.

International engagement in East Timor has been carried out and assessed under multiple frameworks: post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, state-building, and nation-building. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2002) was the mission with the broadest state-building mandate, exercising the functions of a sovereign state, and assuming full legal sovereignty, representing ‘a kind of apotheosis of global governorship’. Not unlike similar cases of international interventions in post-conflict countries, the UN administration considered East Timor to be a territory empty of any social structure. The prolonged neglect of existing traditional local governance structures and culture was even more pronounced in this case, bearing in mind the fact that the final status of the territory – becoming an independent state - was clear from the outset. The focus on central government by international state-builders inadvertently marginalised both local culture and rural communities. An imbalance between formal and informal power at various levels was created.

Early mistakes made by the UN in the process of demobilisation and in the establishment of the national police and army resulted in a crisis of legitimacy and the politicisation of the security sector as well as non-transparent oversight. While in other sectors the country was treated as a tabula rasa, continuity was used in the formation of the new Timorese police

---


255 The only other UN DPKO executive peace operation that assumed wholesale jurisdiction for a post-conflict territory was UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), but in a completely different context where the status of the territory was not resolved, the entire Western Balkans region was recovering from conflicts, and organized crime represented a major issue. Edward Rees (2005), ‘Public Security Management and Peace Operations – Kosovo and UNMIK: Never Land’ in Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp H. Fluri (eds), After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Vienna and Geneva, pp. 199-232.

256 Boege at all (2008), op.cit.p. iii.

257 Goldstone (2012), op.cit.

structure, in that UN officials opted to value the experience of policing practices gained under Indonesian occupation (POLRI). Such an imposed ‘technical’ approach resulted in 370 police officers who had previously worked with POLRI receiving only a four-week Intensive Transitional Training Course and then obtaining higher ranks than new recruits to the police. This decision cast a long-lasting shadow on the perception of the PNTL, its standing vis-à-vis the army, veterans and other influential ‘security groups’. Problems were noted in the formation of a national army as well. The Forcas de Defensa de Timor Leste (FDTL, frequently Falintil, F-FDTL), was created in 2001 after initial hesitation, in a biased process and without a clear mandate. The army and veterans were marginalised, causing ‘faltering cohesion and discipline’ which ‘soon posed a potential security threat.’ Interventions by international actors demonstrated a haphazard approach to postulates of security sector reform related to THE clear mandates of each security force and the importance of a framework for oversight of security forces.

The subsequent UN mission (UNMISET) had the explicit task ‘to provide interim law enforcement and public security’ and ‘to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police’. UN police officers tested and selected recruits, focusing on training, while leaving institutional development, administrative, budgetary and procurement mechanisms aside. On completion of training, cadets underwent six months of on-the-job training from UN police officers in the relevant police stations. The local counterparts worked together with UN officers but with the UN officers in charge. These roles were later reversed as a way of transferring responsibilities, i.e. both ‘local ownership’ and an exit strategy for the UN.

The issue of local ownership in relation to international interventions, specifically in the context of security sector reform, is a major problem in practice due to its significance and

260 There was no consideration of the sensitivity of the issue and the scope of possible resentment, keeping in mind that 12,000 candidates applied for 350 places at the first round of training, for example. Cf. Goldstone (2012), op. cit.
263 However, it is important to note that the bulk of literature and the entire UN approach to security sector reform have been developed at a later stage, building substantially on experiences from the Timor-Leste case, among others. See, for example, Rees,(2006), External Study: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace, Operations: ‘Improvisation and Confusion’ from the Field. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, p. 6.
264 The UN Mission of Support to East Timor; the mandate included the contribution to the maintenance of the new country’s external and internal security. UN Security Council Resolution 1410, May 2002, para 2 (b).
266 Hood, op.cit, 64.
complexity. The numerous challenges of transition from interventionist peace-keeping to local public security management have been discussed in the literature, including questions of the appropriateness of the concept of transferring it, to which local owners, what kind of ownership, and what is the political and developmental legacy of various facets of the relationship between insiders and outsiders in a specific context.\textsuperscript{268} From the viewpoint of the intervening actors, it is primarily seen in the context of an exit strategy for the international security forces, frequently dictated by imposed deadlines and financial considerations. At a practical level, and specifically for local police forces established by external actors, it was noted that it was frequently a question of the force being not only undertrained, but remaining tribal or clannish in its approaches and interests.\textsuperscript{269}

In the case of Timor-Leste, the UN proclaimed its role in state building as a great success in May 2004, and prepared for an exit in 2005.\textsuperscript{270} Several key laws were passed, including ones on the police and on village-level governance, that regulated the composition and election of 442 Suku Councils, or community authorities, which link communities with government and external actors and lead suku as an established political community dating back to pre-colonial times.\textsuperscript{271} Lingering problems within the security sector in Timor-Leste at the time of its reclaimed independence were elaborated by several international experts including the absence of local ownership over policing,\textsuperscript{272} insufficient efficiency and capabilities,\textsuperscript{273} improper involvement of the army in internal security provision,\textsuperscript{274} and a politicised and militarised national police,\textsuperscript{275} who were noted as being ‘by far the most important perpetrators of Human Rights violations in Timor-Leste’.\textsuperscript{276} The structure was further weakened by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Ebnöeter and Fluri, ‘Introduction’ in Ebnöeter and Fluri (eds), op.cit, 2005, pp.7-9.
  \item UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), according to the Security Council Resolution 1599 of 28 April 2005. After that, only a handful international advisers were left in Timor-Leste.
  \item Mobekk, 2005, op.cit.
  \item Mobekk, 2003, p.3.
  \item Rees (2003), op.cit.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
differences in resources invested in the police and the army, insufficient cohesion within the army, the slow establishment of procedures for consultation and coordination within the security sector, and weak parliamentary and ministerial oversight.\textsuperscript{277}

Already in 2003, Rees was warning about the ‘possibility of a disintegrating state divided along political lines drawn by divisions in the resistance/veterans community and supported by their control of various state agencies’.\textsuperscript{278} A micro coup d’état in the eastern district of Los Palos in January 2004 was performed by the FALINTIL-FDTL’s First Battalion in response to a dispute with the police.\textsuperscript{279} Larger scale clashes unfolded in 2006 after a dispute initiated by the ‘Petitioners’ movement within the Army rapidly became intertwined with other grievances and cleavages.\textsuperscript{280} A break out between eastern and western ethnic groups, and between various groups within the Army and the PNTL, escalated into full-scale street battles in Dili and a major political, humanitarian, and security crisis in April-May 2006, including casualties, the destruction of up to 6,000 houses and the displacement of over 140,000 people.\textsuperscript{281}

A new UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established to restore order and to undertake a comprehensive security sector review and subsequent reforms.\textsuperscript{282} However, the new government elected in 2007 took over decision making in that area by forming the ‘Group for the Reform and Development of the Security Sector’ among the highest state officials.\textsuperscript{283} Challenging UNPOL’s executive authority, the PNTL established a one hundred strong Dili-based task force.\textsuperscript{284} It contravened the UN mandate, but demonstrated a robust exercise of nationally legitimate authority over the public security apparatus. After the attempted assassinations of key state officials in early 2008, the Joint Command between F-FDTL and PNTL was put in place by the Council of Ministers - contrary to the liberal

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{277} Anthony Goldstone (2012), op.cit, pp.209-229.  
278 Edward Rees, ‘UN’s Failure to Integrate Falintil Veterans May Cause East Timor to Fail’, Australia e-journal of social and political debate, 2 September 2003.  
282 UN Security Council Resolution 1704 25 August 2006. The UNMIT Supplemental Arrangement on Policing from 1 December 2006 authorised the mission to work “in close cooperation and consultation with the Ministry of Interior, and other relevant authorities, to prepare a draft plan for reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the PNTL”. PNTL Organizational, Strategic Plan for Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding, UNMIT, 2008. See also Security Sector Reform Monitor, Timor-Leste, CIGI, No. 1, December 2009. Details about the UNMIT at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/Specific reemts given to UNPOL were negotiated between UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Government, leading to a poorly conceived mandate, with the same responsibilities, such as management and administration, being granted to both the international and local authorities. Cf. Lemay-Hébert, op.cit.  
283 TAF unpublished background paper on police policy development in Timor-Leste by Todd Wassel, April 2013.  
284 Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, UNPOL and Police Reform, op.cit. The special Portuguese police, the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), was a key player in the restoration of security and order in Dili. It influenced thinking about the police role and policing in the following period.}
democracy principles of a clear delineation between the roles of the army and the police. The government proceeded to introduce an intensive legislative agenda related to security structures and issues. The PNTL Organic Law recognised community policing as a central philosophy, but did not elaborate the concept and its practical implementation. The same law stressed ‘military style’ training and discipline, and kept a substantial number of paramilitary style taskforces. The military role ‘in other operations in support of civilian authorities’ was retained in the law, and security was generally approached “from a ‘crisis management’ perspective rather than identifying an overall framework to regulate actual and potential forms of insecurity that may challenge the safety and wellbeing of society and the state.”

Hybridity within formal security structures is even more pronounced in governance and justice provision. Formal and informal processes of security and justice provision coexist and overlap, with civic cases being resolved within communities. Informal processes are used in some criminal cases as well, although there is the intention for assaults involving blood to be reported to the formal justice apparatus, itself highly underdeveloped. The result is a distinctive syncretism between old and new forms of authority. The local-level governance structure of the Suku Council is a hybrid type of institution; a public association but not an official part of the administration, since it does not have the power to collect local taxes or to make contracts, and is not regularly provided with financial and equipment resources from the government. It is the key point of departure for all bottom-up endeavours and, notably, for the Foundation’s piloting of community policing through the formation of Community Policing Councils.

The Concept of Community Policing

The rise of community policing was a product of the need to improve the police’s public image following the increase in large-scale public disorder and the policing of mass events, which had exposed the police as a paramilitary force in a number of countries of the global

285 The military had an internal security role, and joint operations of the police and the army were conducted to overcome animosities which were among the sources of the 2006 Crisis. It contravened Resolution 1704 mandating UNPOL executive policing, and it was externally assessed as counterproductive in terms of the advancement of the PNTL reform process and the rule of law. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, UNPOL and Police Reform in Timor-Leste, op.cit; Bu Wilson, Joint Command for PNTL and FFDTL Undermines Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste, East Timor Law Journal, 20 February 2008. Similar practice was present in Indonesia for many years.


287 Sahin and Feaver (2013), op.cit.

288 Bu Wilson (2010), Smoke and Mirrors, op.cit., section 2.6.1.


290 Cummins and Learch, 2012..

291 The composition of its members is important for the Foundation’s ongoing support to community policing as its model of police-community interface. The Community Policing Council mirrors the functions, age and gender structure of the Suku Council. The members of a Suku Council are suku chiefs, aldeia (hamlet) chiefs, one elder recognised as a lia nain, two youths (male and female) and two women.
North. It was a reaction to rising levels of crime, despite increased resources being devoted to the police, a way to increase the visibility of the police in a friendly role, to re-establish confidence among those groups particularly hostile to the police and to provide a practical approach to crime prevention. Additionally, it was enabled by the large number of graduates in the police force who could combine policing skills with some social work and social science knowledge.

While the police is a civil institution of a state, policing is a broader term defined as ‘the activities carried out by policing actors in order to protect life and property, prevent and detect crime, and preserve and enforce law and order.’ Alongside core state agencies such as the police, military and border guards, policing actors might include ‘local providers who have constitutional and legal authority and non-state actors who have no legal authority to carry out policing but do so nevertheless.’

Structurally and programmatically, community policing is most frequently equated with problem-oriented and problem-solving policing and with foot patrol policing. It might be cast in ideological terms as providing ‘the means to step away from reactionary styles of law-enforcement toward a style that embraces and encourages informal community-based social control and empowers those alienated from the process.’ The core of the approach is to clarify the scope of problems within a community and attempt to solve them. It should deliver direct services and challenge the community to do its share. It requires the decentralisation of authority and patrol strategies designed to promote communication between police and citizens. Hence, it requires substantive changes within the police to restructure and refocus officer selection, training, evaluation, and promotion.

There is no single uniform model or agreed definition of community policing. Assessments of its value range from seeing it as the embodiment of all the positive dimensions of policing, to characterising it as merely a public relations exercise, only affecting perceptions and with no tangible results. Skeptical approaches toward the concept stress that it refers to loosely related ideas, such as ‘glad-handing’, ‘showing the flag’, shifting responsibility to ‘the

---

293 Smith, op.cit, pp.54-55..
295 Policing the context: Principles and guidance to inform international policing assistance’, What Work Series, Stabilisation Unit, London, March 2014, p. 10
296 Ibid.
300 Robert C. Trojanowicz, ‘Community Policing is not Police Community Relations’, at http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/law/pol_com.txt
It might end up as a public relations exercise on behalf of the police, which is not the same things as community policing from the point of view of mission, organisational strategy and operational goals. As elaborated by Trojanowicz, community policing requires a department-wide philosophical commitment to involve average citizens as partners in the process of reducing and controlling crime, fear of crime, and to improve their overall quality of life, while police-community relations is a limited approach aimed at reducing hostility toward the police. In terms of organisational strategy, community policing means that everyone carries out the mission through their actions on the job; the police must permanently deploy a portion of its patrol force as community officers so they can maintain direct, daily contact with average citizens. Police-community relations are located in an isolated unit with limited outreach to the community and no mechanisms to effect change within the police department itself. Regarding operational goals, a department-wide commitment to community policing means that everyone’s job must be reassessed in light of the new mission, and those officers have freedom to experiment with problem-solving techniques. Police-community relations officers can just advise the police command.

There are also claims that no hard evidence exists that community policing actually reduces crime, and that it produces only marginal positive consequences in job satisfaction for police officers, in communities’ fear of crime, and in communities’ perceptions of the police. Community policing suggests harmony between people living in one area having common interests and goals, while there are numerous differences between them. Flexibility and sensitivity might lead to wide discretion and even the toleration of types of law-breaking or disorder that are acceptable to ‘the local community’, which contrasts with the idea that the law must be enforced impartially. There is also a risk of enforcing the existing power structure of the community at the expense of the rights of the powerless.

Building on the various case studies, the experts underline the influence of the local context and history in shaping the development of community-policing programmes and in the eventual success of each application. There are substantial differences in its operationalisation, related to local traditions, and differences in urban, rural and sub-urban environments; i.e. the policing model can vary by the type, size and geographic location of the police organisation. Hence, there are warnings against the export of a Western policing

---

301 Smith, ‘Community Policing and All That’, op. cit, pp. 55-58.
302 Trojanowicz, ‘Community Policing is not Police Community Relations’, op.cit; Robert C. Trojanowicz, ‘Police -Community relations: Problems and Process’, Criminology, Vol. 9, No.4, February 1972, pp. 401-425. This distinction is important as the Foundation understands police-community relations in a far broader way. As elaborated in the Introduction, in the Foundation's ToC community policing is considered as ‘a potentially important tool through which to improve police-community relations’.
304 David J. Smith, op. cit, p. 55-56.
model into ‘failed’ and transitional societies without tailoring the schemes to local needs.\textsuperscript{307} Efforts to introduce community policing into such an environment frequently run into difficulties due to the low levels of professionalism of police agencies, the public disrespect for law enforcement, a lack of community organisation, and other contextual factors.\textsuperscript{308} According to Brogden, community ownership appears to be the primary criterion for success, including ‘the strategy of utilising and organising traditional and customary structures to establish local systems of security and crime prevention’.\textsuperscript{309} It is especially the case where social control has been provided for by the local communities through social institutions such as family, clan, village.

While in Western democracies community policing is understood mostly as state-initiated and controlled (i.e. top down), in many other parts of the world it denotes various practices of informal policing as community self-rule contributing to local safety.\textsuperscript{310} There is a vivid discussion in the literature about the ideology of, and research on, policing, including assessments of ‘imperial’ Webersian state normative model policing as being irrelevant, and calls for more bottom-up research on the usefulness of informal policing that is anchored in a system of local traditional governance and provides the public good of security for communities in weak states.\textsuperscript{311}

A post-conflict context frequently results in a ‘policing gap’, a state being unable to act as a sole guarantor of security, delegitimisation, a high degree of distrust in the statutory police, including perceptions of inefficiency and corruption, and sometimes presence of various forms of non-state policing.\textsuperscript{312} The nature of a conflict and of the state shape the challenges for policing, including the possible reluctance of the central state to de-centralise security provision. A nuanced understanding of how security is produced locally and of the nature of daily interactions between civil society and the state, as well as how it relates to the characteristics of the state in question, is highly relevant to external support for community policing.\textsuperscript{313} Such an understanding is difficult for international actors to gain, and to renew, within an ever-changing internal and external environment.

\textsuperscript{307} Mike Brogden (2005), “‘Horses for Courses’ and Thin Blue Lines’: Community Policing in Transitional Society”, \textit{Police Quarterly}, Vol.8, No. 1, pp. 64-98.


\textsuperscript{309} Brogden, (2005), p. 91, quotes DFID report from Malawi, Raleigh at al, 2000, p.7


\textsuperscript{311} For an overview, see: Wisler and Onwuidiwe, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{312} Non-state policing includes vigilantes groups autonomous from the state police using violence, active citizens’ groups cooperating with the police, and different private security groups. See: Bruce Baker (2008) Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leona: Foreign import or local solution?”, \textit{Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding}, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 23-42.

\textsuperscript{313} Wisler and Onwuidiwe, op.cit.
The Development of Community Policing in Timor Leste

There has been an exponential growth of international policing assistance and deployment in areas of conflict, and an understanding of the central role of the police in protecting human life, fostering stability and building political institutions after war.\(^{314}\) A general trend toward peacebuilding as institution-building has led to a recognition by the UN that police reform is not only technical training but a political and managerial challenge.\(^{315}\) However, the outcomes of international police reform in fragile settings have been assessed by experts as generally disappointing,\(^{316}\) or at least that the UN ‘police components have had far less impact on capacity and integrity in host-state police services than the international community had hoped.’\(^{317}\)

The applicability of community policing in the context of a UN mission having a law enforcement mandate – executive policing - is even more complex. While \textit{per se} a top-down enterprise, international executive policing has faced problems in harmonising all the elements of intervening actors and the different traditions, standards and approaches of those national police officers contributing to a mission.\(^{318}\) Introducing community policing as a partnership with the population, or as a philosophy throughout UN police missions, is fraught with difficulties, resulting in the possibility that only certain tools of community policing will be used.\(^{319}\) The limited period of engagement of international police officers, language barriers, and a lack of cultural sensitivity and knowledge about local societies represent obstacles to establishing the trust that is fundamental for community policing.\(^{320}\)

The introduction of community policing in Timor-Leste has been inconsistent and characterised by discontinuities, when it comes to both international actors and the national authorities. In the UNTAET phase of international intervention, the UN Police (CivPol) was tasked with providing “a professional, modern, democratic and \textit{community based police service} to the people of East Timor.”\(^{321}\) District Level Community Police Units were established in 2000. While the use of community policing was a declared goal,\(^{322}\) external analysts credited such decisions as being based on the popularity of the concept in certain

---


\(^{317}\) Rotmann (2012), op.cit.

\(^{318}\) The interviews from an early phase of community policing implementation: ‘CIVPOL officers in the different districts sometimes argued that a high degree of community policing existed, and that the mandate was being carried out according to community policing principles, while other officers in the same districts, who had different definitions of community policing, felt that it had been completely abandoned.’ Møbekk, p. 60

\(^{319}\) Some experts consider it even impossible. See Møbekk, p. 63.

\(^{320}\) Møbekk, op.cit., p. 58.


circles, not on an analysis of the potential advantages or limitations. \(^{323}\) A lack of definitional clarity and an absence of policies for implementation, \(^{324}\) the constraints of limited time and resources, and an extensive use of traditional methods of justice provision, were stressed as factors limiting the possibilities for community policing practice by international forces in Timor-Leste. \(^{325}\)

Alongside PNTL officers who were practicing a form of community policing while receiving on-the-job training from the CivPol officers on patrol, in 2003 a National Community Police Unit was established and started to develop ‘Suku Police Posts’. This was based on the KOBAN model of community policing, originating in Japan, with elements added from Singapore model, and was believed by the UN to be culturally closer to Timorese society than ‘a Western model’, and would thus fit very well with the existing socio-political structure. \(^{326}\) There is some criticism that the UN decision to implement it was not reached through public consultations and that at the time this model was not sufficiently explained to UN CivPol or to the PNTL. \(^{327}\) Nevertheless, the police presence was established in 118 villages in Timor-Leste. \(^{328}\) However, with the formation of specialised police units in 2005, PNTL officers were removed from the districts to fill these new units. The concept of suku police posts was almost totally abandoned during the turmoil in 2006 when the focus switched to riot control.

In 2004, in the first law regulating the PNTL, a Community Protection Unit was charged with “keep[ing] public peace and order in collaboration with the community structures and the local population”. \(^{329}\) The preamble of the Decree-Law in 2009 stressed that ‘while maintaining community policing as the guiding principle in the PNTL approach to policing, where proximity patrolling is given preference, an effort is also made now to ensure that PNTL acquires a more robust organisation, discipline, training and staff status. In these domains the nature of PNTL will be identical to that of a military institution.’ The Community Policing Unit was constituted, but broad operational autonomy was given to the PNTL District Commanders, including (implicit) responsibility for operationalising community policing at the local level. \(^{330}\)

---

\(^{323}\) Mobekk, op.cit, p.56  
\(^{324}\) The introduction course given by the UN prior to deployment included only 17 PowerPoint slides related to community policing. UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, Introduction, Training unit, cf. Mobekk, p. 65  
\(^{327}\) Mobekk, 2002, op.cit, 64.  
\(^{328}\) i.e. in almost one quarter of sukus, according to the PNTL Policy Planning director, Joao Belo. Interview 5 April 2013, PNTL HQ, Dili.  
The development of the national police in Timor-Leste has not been confined to UN CivPol/UNPOL, but represents a broader ‘transnational police building’ as it includes a range of internationally assisted police-related activities and variations over time and over concrete regions. For example, a ‘military style’ of training and a number of special units, reflected the strong influence of the Portuguese gendarmerie (Guarda Nacional Republicana, GNR) advisors and its unit’s role in restoration of order in Dili and in the suppression of gangs. While a military style was prioritised due to the legacy of failure of the regular PNTL in the 2006 crisis, the inclusion of a community policing philosophy, a unit, and ‘suku police posts’ in the 2009 Law left space for support for community policing. Such a duality might also be explained as a deliberate vagueness designed to leave all options open. This argument is supported by the Timor-Leste Government’s simultaneous invitation to the Government of New Zealand for its Police to assist in the further development of community policing.

---

331 UN CivPol changed its name to UN Police, UNPOL, in 2005.
333 Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, UNPOL and Police Reform, op.cit. cite Prime Minister’s explicit reference to GNR as a model
334 Practically, the Law was written without consulting the PNTL specifically about community policing. Interview with a long-time international supporter of community policing in Timor-Leste, 23 April 2013, Dili.
335 TAF unpublished background paper on police policy development in Timor-Leste by Todd Wassel, April 2013.
336 It was followed up by a visit to New Zealand by the President of Parliament, Secretary of State for Defence and other officials in August 2008. TAF unpublished background paper by Todd Wassel, April 2013.
The Justice and Security Research Programme is an international consortium of research partners, undertaking work on end-user experiences of justice and security in conflict-affected areas. The London School of Economics and Political Science is the lead organisation and is working in partnership with:

- African Security Sector Network (Ethiopia)
- Conflict Research Group, University of Gent (Belgium)
- Social Science Research Council (USA)
- South East European Research Network (Macedonia)
- Video Journalism Movement (Netherlands)
- World Peace Foundation, Tufts University (USA)

Contact details:
email: intdev.jsrp@lse.ac.uk
Web: lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/jsrp.aspx
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631