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Madhya Pradesh, India, 1993-2010: An
Introduction**

Crossing the "Great Divide": Does it produce
positive state-society synergy?

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PRO-POOR GOVERNANCE REFORM INITIATIVES IN MADHYA PRADESH, INDIA, 1993-2010: AN INTRODUCTION

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This working paper is one among a set of five companion working papers which arise from research on the dynamics of the pro-poor governance reforms that were undertaken in Madhya Pradesh (MP), India, during the years 1993-2003, under the leadership of the then Chief Minister, Shri Digvijay Singh.

A number of significant initiatives were undertaken in Madhya Pradesh (MP) under Digvijay Singh's leadership. Collectively, they sought to secure empowerment, participation and improved well-being for common citizens, especially for poor and relatively powerless men and women living in rural areas. These initiatives included: decentralization through the establishing of *Panchayati Raj Institutions* (PRIs), and the devolution of considerable powers and resources to these institutions to manage important rural developmental programmes; universal access to primary and elementary education through the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS); a Participatory Watershed Development Programme; a District Poverty Initiative Programme (DPIP); *Rogi Kalyan Samiti* and *Jan Swasthya Rakshak* - participatory governance systems for

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improving hospital services and health delivery system; Participatory (Joint) Forest Management (JFM); a Right to Information Act; and Citizens Charters. Through these policies and programmes, multiple institutional spaces were created in Madhya Pradesh with the stated purpose of channeling action by and on behalf of designated (mainly rural) communities. The overall aim was to bring a ‘quiet revolution’ to MP whereby successful development work would expand popular participation and (thus) greatly more responsive government.

What did this simple mantra of *popular and responsive government* give rise to? Nothing less than a revolution in participatory governance if one accepts the key claims made by the Government of Madhya Pradesh: about 3.44 lakh [one lakh = 100,000] elected representatives of *panchayats*, of whom 1.16 lakh were women, most of whom took charge of village governance and development (1999-2004 *panchayat* elections); 50,000 members of watershed committees; 1.5 million members of *Tendupatta* (tobacco leaf) plucker societies and more than 4.8 million members of joint forest management committees have been managing their natural resources; about 32,000 *Gurujis* (para teachers) selected by the community are teaching in community schools under the Education Guarantee Scheme. The Government has further asserted that participatory governance has not only deepened democracy in MP, but has paid huge dividends by ensuring improved outcomes. For instance, about 26,600 EGS Schools were established from 1997-2002, when it took MP 50 years to establish about 56,000 primary government schools, and the greater accountability of *Gurujis* to local people (since they appointed and controlled them) supposedly led to a significant increase in literacy levels in MP during the decade of 1991-2001: it rose to 64.11% (national average 65.38%). Female literacy growth of 20.94% during that decade was the best in India. The EGS innovation earned MP a “Commonwealth Innovation” award.

Similarly, the participatory watershed development programme (Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission) started in 1994 with a target of treating 1.2 million hectares, but quickly expanded to cover 3.43 million hectares by 2001 to become India’s largest such programme. Different water harvesting and soil conservation activities were completed across about 1.4 million hectares by 2001 with an expenditure of about Rs. 6.9 billion. They covered about 8,000 villages with the apparently active involvement of more than

5,000 watershed committees, about 44,000 user committees, 14,000 self-help-groups and some 8,000 women thrift and credit groups. This resulted, it has been suggested, in an increase in Kharif area cultivation of 21% and of productivity by 37%. It also led to an increase in the area under irrigation by 59%, a decrease in wastelands by 34%, and improvement in ground water table levels in more than 3,000 villages.

Impressive as these initiatives and their outcomes apparently were, they were quite extraordinary as well in terms of supposed motivation. Outcome improvements were said to be based on a vision of and strategy for pro-poor governance reform: empowering the common and poor people to take charge of development programmes for their own benefit. The MP model became widely lauded within and outside India. To many academics, however, the supposed success of MP in the 1990s and early 2000s seemed unlikely, not to say counter-intuitive. This is so because, first, the state of MP hardly inspired confidence in its developmental potential. It was widely regarded when Digvijay Singh came to power as one of India's BIMARU (poorest, under-performing, even failing) States. It was characterised by low economic growth, abject poverty, low levels of human development and high levels of gender disparity. Second, politics in MP had long been marked by elite (forward caste) control of the State's main socio-political institutions. This pattern of control essentially reflected a feudal power structure and the local prevalence of vertically organised systems of clientelistic politics. The formation of MP in 1956 from 72 erstwhile Princely States deeply reinforced this elite-dominated scenario. In such an institutional context, pro-poor reforms which are potentially threatening to the elites who colonize and control state power are (or should be) highly unlikely to be undertaken by the state itself. And, thirdly, large-scale organized movements and protests by the downtrodden for educational reforms or economic betterment were noticeable in MP prior to 1993 mainly by their absence. The other backward Castes (OBCs) in MP-- unlike their counterparts in UP and Bihar, where they had gradually emerged politically to challenge the traditional order in the 1970s and 1980s - are demographically too fragmented, and politically too easily co-opted, to emerge as a robust channel for articulating the aspirations of locally depressed (or oppressed) people.

We know, however, that a wide array of ‘pro-poor’ initiatives was mainstreamed across MP by Digvijay Singh and some of his colleagues. More so, indeed, than in either Uttar Pradesh or Bihar. Here then are our central puzzles. This research has attempted to explore: (i) how and why the State of MP acquired its initial capacity to envision and further a pro-poor governance reform agenda (henceforth ‘agenda’) in the teeth of evident political risks; (ii) under what institutional premises and logics different policies and programmes were structured for realising the agenda on the ground. How effectively (or not) did such strategies work? If they proved effective, did that result from the successful unfolding of those premises and logics, or were other unanticipated factors responsible? And if so, why? If the strategies failed or performed poorly did the premises and logic prove inadequate or faulty, or did they turn ineffective in face of countervailing forces of ground realities?; and (iii) How if at all can the answers to these questions be causally inter-connect to understand the outcomes of reforms on the ground? What fresh insights do the MP reform experiments and experiences offer to both the academic and the policy worlds for advancing the debates on and practices of pro-poor governance?

To answer these questions we studied the four most important elements of MP’s agenda for pro-poor reforms: (i) decentralization through PRIs and the implementation of a major anti-poverty programme, the *Jawahar Rojgar Yozna* (JRY); (ii) decentralization from the district to the village level with reference to the first national level ‘rights-based’ Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS); (iii) community driven development (CDD), as exemplified by the Education Guarantee (EGS); and (iv) state-society partnership, or co-production, with reference mainly to the watershed development programme.

Three districts were selected for study, with each one representing important socio-political regions in MP: Rewa in the Vindhya region with its highly feudal characteristics; Mandla from the Mahakaushal region, which is dominated by tribal communities; and Neemuch from the Malwa region, peculiar for the dominance of its backward castes and for high levels of peasant entrepreneurship. In each district, one Block, and within that Block a total of five Panchayats and 13 villages – all told comprising 2,181 households or a population of 10,076 villagers - were sites of intensive

qualitative investigations (A further three villages were also studied partially in a sixth Panchayat). A semi-structured questionnaire comprising of 182 questions spread over six parts was administered to a randomly generated sample of 218 households with a pro-poor bias in their composition (about 80% poor and 20% non-poor). The questionnaire placed special emphasis on eliciting people's voices, views, reasoning and overall understanding of the issues under investigation. About 70% of the questions were qualitative in nature, which was in line with the deep ethnographic stance of the research. 7,924 responses (in Hindi) to qualitative questions were closely studied to identify answers that were similar in content and essence despite differences in their wording. Consequently, 1,153 common answers from these were formulated in English, which helped finally to prepare 158 tables and 113 graphs to present a coherent ethnographic story of different issues studied under the research based on common villagers' accounts.

About 140 deep interviews were conducted with key respondents/insiders. Included, for example, were: the Chief Minister of MP, Ministers, opposition leaders, MLAs, principal secretaries and directors, social activists, media persons, and academicians (at the state level); district collectors, other important district level functionaries, district panchayat presidents, vice presidents, and elected members, and district level political personalities from different parties (at district level); Presidents and members of Block level PRIs, BDOs, other supervisory staff (at block level); and sarpanchs and ex-sarpanchs, panchayat secretaries, presidents and members of Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) and of Watershed Committees, teachers and para teachers, retired government personnel, other knowledgeable villagers (at panchayat and village levels). Additional insights were gained by observations made during participation in, for example: assembly sessions, district government meetings, district panchayat meetings, public meetings addressed by the Chief Minister, election campaign rallies, workshops, offices of government officers and even the homes of Ministers. These were critical to enriching the ethnographic understanding of the dynamics of the agenda.

Further, wherever relevant and feasible, this qualitative study was backed up by District and Block level quantitative analyses both to give the ethnographic findings a wider backdrop and to assess whether findings were unique to the villages studied and/or

reflected a broader pattern. Consider, for example, our work on the EAS. First, a database of 1,435 projects executed in 1,487 panchayats in all 21 Blocks of the three research Districts was prepared from the original handwritten documents collected from the district offices – this ran to 512 pages. Each panchayat's total population, and those of SC and ST communities, were then compiled for all 21 blocks from the Government of India's Ministry of Panchayat (MoP) database. Data was also collected on nine parameters of all households of 1,487 panchayats, including for example: Means of Livelihood; House type; Landholding; Income level; Migration, and a few others were compiled in 3,131 pages from the BPL database of MP. After cutting out some less relevant information from these datasets a comprehensive database for the analysis of patterns in EAS resource distribution across the three districts was prepared. This contained information on 20 key dimensions, including: district, block, panchayat names, total EAS fund panchayat-wise, population and other 9 parameters' information obtained in the aforesaid manner, as also information on *percentage deviation analysis* on additional 63 items, which led the database to cover 125,122 data-points and run into 507 pages of excel sheets. The *percentage deviation analysis* is reported in detail in WP 2, with revealing findings about how EAS resources were disproportionately distributed, privileging a few panchayat and blocks and unjustly depriving others.

Further Methodological Discussion will be provided in Working Paper 6. Working Papers 1 to 4 report on how well (or not) the agenda of reform worked in the areas of the JRY, EAS, EGS and Watershed Development. Working Paper 5 pulls the findings of WPs 1-4 together in an integrated way and discusses the collective implications of the research project –intensive fieldwork for which and data analysis were mainly carried out in 2009 and 2010, although some exploratory work was done earlier. The work has relevance for contemporary debates and experiments on decentralization, participation, CDD and state-society synergy through coproduction. All of these are widely viewed as key to seeking institutional change for securing more pro-poor, accountable and responsive governance institutions. This body of research avoids the pitfall of assuming the existence of participatory dynamics in such experiments and subjects them to an in-depth and penetrating empirical probe for confirming (or not) their causal connections to governance reforms.

Working Paper 121

CROSSING THE “GREAT DIVIDE”: DOES IT PRODUCE POSITIVE STATE-SOCIETY SYNERGY?

The Story of a Partnership between millions of villagers and Watershed Mission Officials

1. Crossing the Great Divide: Dilemmas and Debates

Times are changing. Academic and policy scholars are now arguing alike that perhaps bureaucracy is not such an evil institution, and that it is time to “rediscover it”.¹ Even provocative propositions such as: bureaucrats get a “warm glow” from doing social good; they work to achieve *missions* of public organizations, which are of value to them as well, etc. are now being advanced more clearly and forcefully.² Not so long ago, however, bureaucracy was the most maligned institution, a symbol of red tape, worse, a den of budget maximising bureaucrats³ pervasively engaged in rent-seeking.⁴ Hence, while mostly the developing countries were told to follow a *minimalist state* approach with the mantra of “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize,”⁵ the ethos of the time was such that even developed countries were asked to “reinvent their governments” by bringing in a strong management culture to turn their bureaus into more market like organizations to serve their citizens read *customers*.⁶

Few scholars, though, persistently resisted these claims and defiantly argued for “bringing the state back in.”⁷ Peter Evans, among them, sounded almost heretical when he also argued that bureaucracy is the key variable and more, rather than less, of the

¹Olsen (2005). See also: Davis and Rhodes (2000); du Gay (2000).

²Besley and Ghatak (2003:241). They also point out that this idea is not really new, since James Q. Wilson’s celebrated study (1989) of public bureaucracies had already taken it as its central plank. See also: DiIulio (1994); Grindle (1997); Grindle (2002).

³Niskanen (1971).

⁴Krueger (1974). See also: Bates (1988); Colander (1984); Lal (1983); and Gelb *et al.* (1991).

⁵Rodrik (2006: 1). Codified by John Williamson (1990), the Washington Consensus that represented this mantra aggressively pushed the view of minimalist state. However, with the increasing realisation that “Institutions matter”, the consensus stands heavily criticised and discredited (Stiglitz, 1998; Gore, 2000; Burki and Perry, 1998).

⁶Manning (2001).

⁷Evans *et al.* (1989); Wade (1990); Skocpol (1996); Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996).

Weberian type meritocratic and professional bureaucracy matters in transforming a predatory state into a developmental one. Provided it preserves its autonomy in the face of particularistic social forces while embedding to entrepreneurial elites for drawing out their developmental acumen and spirit more in the service of wider national interests than of unfettered market forces.⁸ Thus, even the ideas of coproduction between state and non-state actors and the state-society synergy, premised on the understanding that the Weberian notion of the Great Divide between the public and the private existed in abstract but not on the ground, were viewed by Evans as radical and rather threatening to the need of the insularity of the state:

Ostrom's vision of "coproduction" implies that public and private actors are enmeshed together in the process of production. Judith Tendler's recent (1995) work on "blurred public and private boundaries" makes a similar argument, emphasizing the potential benefits of networks that span the divide between state and civil society. In both cases, synergy is produced by the intimate entanglement of public agents and engaged citizens. This view of synergy flies in the face of both a market-based logic of development and traditional theories of public administration.....the idea of ongoing public private intimacy offends everyone's sense of propriety. Public administration purists see it as *threatening the insulation necessary for clear headed decisions that are in the public interest*. Market advocates see it as hopelessly muddying the logic of individual incentives and rational resource allocation [emphasis added].⁹

In the debate that followed, Ostrom, who is widely known for her pioneering works on coproduction,¹⁰ countered Evans, first, on a rather personal note when she observed that she was "delighted to be considered a radical" and if "trying to remove artificial walls [between the public and the private] is offensive," she regretted "assailing individual senses of propriety." On a more serious note, she argued that "the great divide between the Market and the State or between Government and Civil Society is a conceptual trap" and that "contrived walls separating analysis of potentially synergetic phenomena into separate parts miss the potential for synergy."¹¹

⁸Evans (1989); Evans (1995); Evans and Rauch (1999).

⁹ Evans (1996: 1036); emphasis added.

¹⁰Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for 2009 in recognition of her seminal work on the analysis of economic governance, especially the commons (co-shared by Oliver E. Williamson).

¹¹Ostrom (1996: 1073).

That a divide between the public and the private is, *a la* Migdal, untraceable in the trenches of governance, wherein grassroots public servants and private citizens invariably intermingle around workings of the everyday state, is a well known fact to students of governance.¹² Lipsky's classic study of the 'Street Level Bureaucrats' insightfully illuminated the process of the crossing of the divide,¹³ hence Evans' objections may appear puzzling. His position can be better appreciated if one recognises that the crossing of the divide can and does produce both virtuous and vicious forms of synergies. If after studying police services for 15 years Ostrom could not find a single instance where a large, centralized police department was able to provide better direct service without citizens' helpful involvement such as rapid reporting of suspicious events, post-crime intelligence, etc. (positive coproduction),¹⁴ other scholars have also found that bureaucratic corruption rarely occurs without the involvement of *dalals* (brokers or middlemen) - mostly social actors - who work as institutionalized channel between officials and citizens in matters of rent-seeking (negative coproduction).¹⁵ While Evans is worried about the possibilities of negative types of entanglements between public officers and citizens, Ostrom is anxious not to lose the positive types of engagements between them.

In academia, this debate is far from being settled. On one hand, the importance of strengthening the bureaus rather than circumventing them by alternatives such as: community-based self help, coproduction, social funds, etc. is being underlined. Reformers frustrated by failures of improving the bureaucracy may be tempted to take such recourse. However, Grindle forcefully argues that it implies keeping the poor at the end of the queue of service provision and expecting that they coproduce their shares of

¹²Migdal (1988); Migdal *et al.* (1994); Blundo and de Sardan (2006); Fuller and Benei (2001); Gupta (1995); Hansen and Stepputat (2001).

¹³Lipsky (1980). See also: Hill (2003); Walker and Gilson (2004).

¹⁴Ostrom (1996: 1073).

¹⁵For example, Corbridge and Kumar report that "the larger part of the corruption 'story' is to be found in those relationships, many of which are mediated by village-based *dalaals* [brokers], which link communities to the state by means of a network of unequal exchanges" (2002: 785). See also: Manor (2000).

entitlements (education, health, etc.), which often come to their counterpart urban citizens without making similar contributions. She also cautions against viewing these alternatives as a surrogate for the long, hard job of reforming the public sector:

[T]he sources of power and the resources controlled by government cannot be ignored. Indeed, for non-traditional service provision to be any more than haphazard and stop-gap, considerable regulation, oversight, and funding by government is required. And it is not at all clear that governments unable to provide basic services to the poor will be any better at providing and implementing satisfactory regulatory regimes for education, health, and water services by other providers or that they can do any more to protect the poor from malfeasance and inequitable provision on the part of alternative providers.¹⁶

On the other hand, new and more ambitious experiments of coproduction are also underway. At one end of its continuum, municipal budgets are being produced with the involvement of thousands of neighbourhood committees at grassroots level in Porte Alegre in Brazil.¹⁷ At the other end, highly radical policies and acts, such as the Right to Information Act, are being framed in India, not by the creativity of the government but by the National Advisory Council (NAC), a unique arrangement of coproduction that brings powerful politicians from the ruling party Congress (I) and a number of civil society activists and intellectuals of wide repute to collectively brainstorm and offer innovative policy proposals on matters of the highest national concern.¹⁸ Overall, despite increasing scepticism about the virtues of “bringing people in,”¹⁹ the balance seems to be still tilted in favour of deterring developing countries from “skipping straight to Weber” and identifying unconventional and context-specific ways of service delivery including coproduction which work.²⁰

¹⁶Grindle (2002: 9).

¹⁷Novy and Leubolt (2005); Baiochhi (2003); Bräutigam (2004).

¹⁸NAC members include the Right to Information campaigner Ms. Aruna Roy and the developmental economist and activist Jean Dreze.

¹⁹For an excellent critical review of literature on community-driven development, coproduction, state-society synergy and similar issues, see Mansuri and Rao (2003).

²⁰See the synthesis report of the findings of the Centre of the Future State, IDS, Sussex, which strongly advocates this view (Centre for the Future State, 2010).

During the 1990s, when the autonomy of the bureaucracy was more emphatically viewed as a source of evil than now, the question of any balance hardly arose. The ideas of people's participation and partnership were far more pervasive and dominant in those times. Practitioners, especially in developing countries, took to these ideas for large scale experimentations in different development sectors with a strong hope, almost a faith, that a catalysed crossing of the divide would produce more, possibly only, positive state-society synergies.²¹ In any case, waiting for a resolution of academic debates, such as the one between Evans and Ostrom, which usually remain unending and rarely converge to one clear policy view, could have implied inaction, a concept that practitioners consider discreditable and thus tend to avoid.

2. Going ahead despite Dilemmas: Experiments around the Watershed Development

It is in this backdrop of the ideas and ideologies of the 1990s, when theses on coproduction and state-society synergy appeared on the winning side and also excitingly experimental, that the State of Madhya Pradesh took to promoting them on an unprecedentedly large scale in the sectors of watershed, education, health and many more (see Table 4.1). This was in addition to a huge push towards decentralisation in the form of the constitutionally empowered PRIs.

²¹See Table 4.1 for the kinds and range of experiments that are ongoing not only in MP but in many states of India and also in other developing countries.

Table 4.1: Co-scripting the Future with the People in Madhya Pradesh

In the last eight years multiple institutional spaces have been created in Madhya Pradesh for channelling action by the community. Elected representatives of Panchayat Raj, Gram Swaraj, Mandi (agricultural marketing societies) Samitis, and Cooperatives together with other user organizations have cumulatively contributed to enlarging democratic action.

- 3,44,424 elected representative of Panchayats, of whom 1,16,410 are women, have taken charge of their villages. (figures based on 1999-2004 panchayat elections).
- 50,000 members of watershed committees, 1.5 million members of *Tendupatta* (tobacco leaf) plucker societies and more than 4.8 million members of joint forest management committees have taken charge of managing their natural resources.
- 31,000 Gurujis (para teachers) are teaching in community schools under the Education Guarantee Scheme and 2,17,000 Gurujis are volunteering to teach adult non-literates in *Padhna Badhna Andoloan* (Adult Literacy Campaign).
- 1,48,052 elected cooperative members work through 13,267 primary societies and their apex institutions (2000-2001 elections).
- 2280 elected representatives manage agricultural marketing societies (elections in 2000).
- 10,280 members of water user associations are managing and allocating water in irrigation projects.
- *Rogi Kalyan Samitis* (Patient Welfare Committees) manage 715 public hospitals having raised Rs 500 million as community contribution.
- In each of all 51,086 villages a trained *Dai* (Mid-wife) and a *Jan Swasthya Rakshak* (Community Health Worker).


The first two WPs discussed how the decentralised institutions of the PRIs played out on the ground in serving the villagers while delivering on JRY and EAS. The third WP examined how well a community-driven approach functioned in case of the EGS. This WP on the Watershed Development Programme (herein after “Programme”) now focuses on the dynamics of the pro-poor governance reform that was experimented in MP by taking the route of state-society synergy or coproduction.

2.1. Institutions of Coproduction: The Mission Structure of the State

The institutional structure and processes of the coproduction between the people and the state followed under the Programme were rather elaborately laid out by the Government (see Diagram 4.1). At the State level, the nodal body is the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission (RGWM), a registered society. It provided a holistic and an integrated vision for the Programme in the state, which is best expressed in its own words:

The Mission was premised on the understanding that the livelihood security crisis that people faced in environmentally degraded lands was the result of a distortion in the relationship between people and their natural resource support base. It recognised that techno-centric regeneration programmes that visualized picture

post-card environmental transformations could not come about except if they were worked through the people and addressed their livelihood concerns. *The Mission, therefore, adopted direct participation by the people as a key strategy* [emphasis added].²²



Adapted from Planning Commission/UNDP (2002).

²²GoMP (1998: 13); emphasis added.

The Mission coordinates various line departments in the state, pools resources, manpower and expertise and assigns them to create synergy and lend focus to interventions, and works towards building an appropriate environment for sustainable people-centred interventions.²³ Since the Mission is supervised by the Chief Minister, who is also its Chairman, this gives it the backing of the highest political authority.²⁴ A full-time Director manages the day-to-day works of the RGWM.

The Mission imaginatively pooled resources from different Central Government programmes working on watershed development disparately, such as the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP), Integrated Watershed Development Programme (IWDP) and the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS).²⁵ This strategy is especially noteworthy since it ensured the availability of a huge fund of Rs. 10.50 billion from 1995 until 2005 to ambitiously push forward a massive target of coverage of about 4 million hectares of land by the programme (the spatial distribution of the programme across the state can be seen in Diagram 4.2).²⁶ It also prevented potential suboptimal impact on the ground, had the funds been utilised disparately in a non synergistic manner under their distinct programme heads.


²³Planning Commission/UNDP (2002); GoMP (2002); Sen, *et al.* (2007).

²⁴GoMP (2002: 105); Jayalakshmi, *et al.* (2003: 34).

²⁵The guidelines for the EAS stipulated that 50% of its resources could be utilised for watershed development works (see also WP 2). The Government of MP creatively made use of this to draw down a considerable amount of EAS resources to fund the Programme in a holistic way.

²⁶Rs. 5.12 billion from the EAS, Rs. 4.01 billion from the DPAP and Rs. 1.37 billion. (RGWM, 2005).

Diagram 4.2: Share of Watershed Area under Treatment in Madhya Pradesh



Adapted from Sen, *et al.* (2007).

At the district level, the District Collector is the *District Mission Leader*, who is supported by a District Watershed Advisory Committee (DWAC) and District Watershed Technical Committee (DWTC). The latter is the key committee comprised of district level heads of different technical departments. It selects mili-watersheds spanning an area of 5,000-10,000 ha using geo-coded maps on the basis of factors such as low availability of drinking water, declining agricultural productivity, increasing fallow lands, higher *SC/ST* population and lower wage rates. These are then further divided into operational units of micro-watersheds of 500-1,000 ha.²⁷ For all practical purposes, the District Collector as the Mission Leader guides, coordinates and oversees the programme in a district.

²⁷Planning Commission/UNDP (2002: 16-17). MoRAE (1994).

2.2. Institutions of Coproduction: People's Participatory Structures and Processes


The programme implementation in a mili-watershed is managed by a Project Implementing Agency (PIA) selected by the Collector. It is normally a government department, but may also be an NGO. Each PIA is headed by a Project Officer (PO), who is a senior government servant drawn from a department such as: Forest, Irrigation, Minor Irrigation, Revenue and Administration. A Watershed Development Team (WDT) comprising of supervisory rank staff working at the block level in different line departments is constituted to assist the PIA. The PO's role is critical since the PIA is the point of interface with the village. Participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) are undertaken by POs to identify potential programme activities at the village level and individuals likely to benefit from them. These individuals are usually organised into one of three types of groups: User Groups or Committees (UGs or UCs) (beneficiary farmers), Self-Help Groups (SHGs) (marginal landholders or landless working in different income generating projects) and Women's Thrift and Credit Groups (WTCGs) (women who wish to undertake savings, credit and income-generation activities).²⁸

Village Watershed Committees (VWCs or WCs), the institution most critical to realising the community's ambition, are formed after the UCs and other stakeholder groups are formed. It comprises of: (i) elected chairmen of UCs, SHGs and WTCGs; and (ii) three panchs nominated by the village panchayat; and (iii) one government staff member from WDT or PIA. At least three members from (i) and (ii) should be women. WCs also require approval by their respective *gram sabhas*. The key activities of a WC, *inter alia*, are: preparation and implementation of village-level watershed development plans; collection of contributions from villagers for building up a maintenance fund (the 'Development Fund') for sustaining programme assets and impacts; community mobilisation; and assisting the PIA.²⁹

²⁸Planning Commission/UNDP (2002: 17-18); GoMP (1998: 13); Baviskar (2002: 1-2).

²⁹Planning Commission/UNDP (2002: 18); Sen, *et al.* (2007: 52); Jayalakshmi, *et al.* (2003: 33-34). Vania and Taneja (2004: 43).

About 75 per cent of the funds go to WCs to implement village-level plans and the remainder utilized by the PIAs in initial community mobilization and PRA works to get the WCs going. See Diagram 4.3, which is self-explanatory.³⁰



Adapted from Planning Commission/UNDP (2002).

As mentioned above, a development fund is created by certain minimum contributions by the villagers, in the form of cash, labour or material, to the programme activities in the following way: 5 per cent of the project costs of community works on public land, 10% of the cost of works on private land; and 5% when works are carried out on the lands of weaker sections (SCs and STs).³¹

Finally, this array of institutional arrangement also involves another innovative process of *Nirakh-Parakh* (Community Participatory Evaluation). Based on the principles of the social audit³² and in consonance with mission philosophy, this methodology is adopted to enable the community to undertake a participatory evaluation of the activities carried out by the WC. The WC is expected to present two maps, pre and post development for comparative evaluation by the community (see Diagram 4.4 for an illustrative post-development map). If after evaluation, which may involve physical inspections of the works, the community is satisfied, the different actions and expenditures undertaken by a WC are deemed to have been approved. With *Nirakh-Parakh*, the conventional technical checks by engineers and official inspections are not considered necessary.³³


³⁰Sen, *et al.* (2007: 56).

³¹Planning Commission/UNDP (2002: 18).

³²This concept is discussed in some detail in WP 1, section 3.v.

³³RGWM (n. d.).

Diagram 4.4: 'Nirakh-Parakh' (Participatory Evaluation) of Completed Watershed Development Works
An Illustrative Case of a Village in Mandla District, MP



Evaluation Date:
31.03.2003

Sl. No.	Description	Mark
1	Residential area	
2	School building	
3	Temple	
4	Road	
5	Farmer's fields	
6	Government land	
7	River/drainage	
8	Wells	
9	Hand Pumps	
10	Areas affected by soil erosion	
11	Developed fallow land	
12	Mono-cropped areas	
13	Double cropped areas	
14	Transformer	
15	Ponds	
16	Bunds on drainages	
17	Constructed loose boulder check dams	
18	Constructed Ponds	
19	Constructed bunds on drainages	
20	Constructed Gambian structures	
21	Constructed Dykes	
22	Constructed Percolation tanks	
23	Afforestation	
24	Fodder plantation	
25	Common property grazing land	
26	Forest area with fresh plantation works	

Watershed Development work	Unit (Ha/m3)	Expenditure amount (Rs. million)
Loose boulder check dam	104 units	0.32
Pond expansion	4 units	0.4
Bund on drainage	12 units	1.00
Percolation tank	4 units	0.73
Gambian structure	-	-
Dyke	-	-
Afforestation	0.40 Ha	0.48
Fodder development	1.00 Ha	0.050
Total	-	2.90

No. of ponds	No. of stop dams	No. of reactivated wells	No. of reactivated handpumps	Area of Fallow land	Forest Area	Non agri. land	Mono crop area	Double crop area	Irrigated area	Unirrigated area
4	10	1	1	49.85	117.32	135.00	241.88	215.00	5.00	210

Rabi crop	Cropped area	Kharif crop	Cropped area	Afforestation	Fodder plantation	Beneficiary families	Total Expen.	Development fund
Chana	27	Paddy	65	1.70	0.40	267	6.35	0.010

2.3. *The Institutional Logic of the State-Society Synergy and its Impacts: The Official Claim*

In a nutshell this arrangement of coproduction is based on the contributions by the State as a facilitator and catalytic agent that brings technical knowhow, funds, a few supporting staff, and, above all, mobilising efforts on its part to enable the community to eventually take charge of the programme. The people are expected to contribute their local knowledge in developing the village level plan, participate through their interest groups (UCs, etc.) to ensure an accountable and quality implementation of the programme, and sustain programme assets and their benefits beyond the programme period with their contributions and continued ownership and management.

Did this coproduction arrangement work? According to the government, it was a huge success. The official documents report, starting with a target of treating 1.2 million hectares, in just four years from its inception the Programme expanded to cover 3.43 million hectares and thus became India's largest programme. Different water harvesting and social conservation activities were completed in 1.4 million hectares by 2001 with an expenditure of about Rs. 6.9 billion.³⁴ They covered about 8,000 villages with the apparently active involvement of more than 5,000 watershed committees, about 44,000 user committees, 14,000 self-help-groups and some 8,000 women thrift and credit groups. This resulted, it has been suggested, in an increase in Kharif area cultivation of 21% and of productivity by 37%. It also led to an increase in the area under irrigation by 59%, a decrease in wastelands by 34%, and improvement in ground water table levels in more than 3,000 villages.³⁵

These were exceptional claims to make,³⁶ but the Government insisted that such a speedy and spectacular achievement was possible primarily because of the innovative

³⁴RGWM (n.d. a). GoMP (1998).

³⁵RGWM (n.d. a).

³⁶Some reports also echoed the Government's stance, although their impressions were based more on the case study of Jhabua district, which was showcased by the MP government as an example of outstanding works on watershed development (Agarwal *et al.*, 1999: 33-56; Rao, 2000: 3945; Shah, 2001: 3407). However, Baviskar (2002) in her highly critical study of Jhabua points out that the aforementioned reviews were not based on independent studies but had taken the government's claims at face value.

design of the programme that involved people in massive numbers - almost the entire village community - in planning and implementing the programme in partnership with the state. Why should people's participation result in positive state-society synergy in this case when, as pointed out in WPs 1 and 2, people's participation through more institutionalised and legally underpinned PRIs in programmes such as JRY and EAS had not been so successful? Possibly because of the following factors:

2.3.1. Participatory structures were out of the purview of the PRIs, thus of the sarpanchs: Various participatory structures in this programme, especially WCs, were formed outside of the PRIs and sarpanchs were prohibited from membership. State officials in their partnership role were also expected to oversee formations of UCs and WCs to ensure that they were formed in the true spirit of the Programme. With this, it was hoped that independent grassroots leaders, driven by their interests in drawing down the advantages of the Programme to their fields and villages, would get involved from the start.

2.3.2. A web of participatory structures implied better accountability: Sarpanchs were clearly the sole key players in the PRIs. Others did not matter before their material and socio-political power. Hence, their unaccountable behaviour came almost naturally and was difficult to challenge. Members in a WC, however, came from a cluster of other participatory structures, notably UCs of farmers who belonged to the landed class. Thus, *ex ante* such an arrangement precluded the possibility of the chairman of the WC, or any other key player, behaving like one of the unaccountable sarpanchs; and, most importantly,

2.3.3. A better match between interests of key players and programme incentives: As reported in the preceding WPs, many sarpanchs and other higher level panchayat representatives found their interests better served by swindling JRY and EAS funds to increase their personal political power and wealth rather than by securing good roads and schools, the collective goods on offer. This may be because, *inter alia*, most of them had the resources to ensure that their families and children lived in districts and other towns having much better infrastructural facilities.

Such a devastating misalignment between the interests of key players and programme incentives was almost ruled out in the watershed programme. Farmers, the key players, were expected to clearly realise that the Programme, through its water conservation and other measures, would lead to improved yields in their fields. Since it was the mainstay of their livelihood, wealth and status, they couldn't fail to see that they stood to *personally gain* on these crucial aspects if the Programme was effectively implemented. UCs were formed by farmers whose agricultural lands were either directly covered by a programme component, such as contour-bunding, and/or lay adjacent to proposed ponds or stop-dams and thus would benefit from their irrigation. Since elected chairmen of such self interest-defined and -driven UCs were members in WCs, thus, first, a collective enterprise in the spirit of a positive-sum game for optimizing individual benefits was strongly incentivized. Second, each of them was expected to also remain vigilant to deter the others from playing the game in a zero-sum way. Thus, *ex ante* a strong match between the interests of key players and the programme incentives appeared eminently possible and also highly conducive to solving rather hard-to-overcome collective action problems that usually plague developmental programmes.


This arrangement, it was felt, would also overcome the unlikely situation that a sarpanch somehow came through the backdoor to control a WC. As they usually came from the big landlord class, it was posited that they would still have allowed the programme to run well, since the larger the landholding, the larger the potential benefit to be accrued from the programme. In other words, it was assumed that if sarpanchs captured the programme, it would have been a benign than a brutal capture.

3. The Story of the Watershed Development Programme from the Fields

The field investigation focused on examining how well the Programme worked because of the combined force of (a) the innovative structural feature of a web of interlinked people's participatory structures formed outside the PRIs, and, (b) unlike JRY and the EAS, the robustness of the match between programme incentives and self-interests of the key players that was innate to the Programme design.

3.1. Were the People aware of the Programme and its Features?

The beginning of the exploration looked promising when, in sharp contrast to the findings about the dismal level of awareness of the JRY and EAS (WP1 and WP2), awareness of the Programme was found to be widespread. An overwhelming majority of 85.54% from the poor and 88.46% from the non-poor were aware of the Programme (see Graph 4.1; for panchayat-wise detailed responses, see Appendix I). Many of them even knew its official name *Jalgrahan Scheme*,³⁷ which for reasons discussed earlier was quite unusual.³⁸



Source: Primary data from the field research.

More surprisingly, and again quite unlike the scenario in JRY and EAS, many respondents (60.24% poor and 71.15% non-poor - see Table 4.2 and Graph 4.2) also knew of important features of the programme such as water harvesting by various measures including contour-bunding, trench digging, construction of ponds, stop dams, wells, etc. They also understood that these measures would help to improve agricultural yields and productivity by raising the ground water table and improving the moisture content of the soil.

³⁷Hindi term for watershed development.


³⁸See Section 6 in WP 1. See also f. n. 50 in the same WP.

Nonetheless, and equally strikingly, none of the respondents mentioned the pivotal feature of the programme, namely, people's participation through UCs and WCs. This of course raises an interesting question: clearly something had happened in the field that had worked well in imparting the basic awareness of the programme, i.e., its objectives and various technical activities, but it seemed to have excluded the people's participation issue from its ambit. Why this strange omission of the most critical institutional feature of the programme?

Table 4.2: Awareness and understanding of the Watershed Programme: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Have you heard of WS? What do you know about WS?	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
No	30.77%	36.36%	27.59%	18.18%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	14.46%	11.54%
Yes	69.23%	63.64%	72.41%	81.82%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	91.67%	100.00%	85.54%	88.46%
Aware of objectives/ activities, but not of community involvement	58.97%	63.64%	72.41%	81.82%	43.59%	54.55%	34.78%	55.56%	86.11%	100.00%	60.24%	71.15%
Only heard the name	10.26%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	53.85%	45.45%	65.22%	44.44%	5.56%	0.00%	25.30%	17.31%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%


Source: Primary data from the field research.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

3.2. How did the Villagers come to know of the Programme?

The study of the responses to a connected issue gives some clue on this. When asked about the source through which they came to know of the Programme features, more than one third of respondents said that they had seen those activities actually taking place (39% poor and 37% non-poor - see Graph 4.3; for panchayat-wise detailed responses, see Appendix II). This partly explains why a number of them described only the technical activities in their previous answers. But, far more instructive was the knowledge that there had also been some concerted attempts by officials to spread the awareness of the Programme through various mediums such as drama, puppet shows and films. Such meetings sometimes were attended by even Collectors of the Districts, which indicate the seriousness with which it had been pursued at the initial stages.³⁹ However, even those who mentioned such meetings as their source of knowledge had not said anything about the community participation issue. This was rather puzzling, since it indicated a possibility that while various activities and their potentials for improving the agriculture might have been explained, the community participation issue was left out or underemphasised, despite the centrality accorded to it by institutional designers of the Programme at the state level.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

³⁹Interview, Pramod Tiwari, ex-Sarpanch, Delhi, Rewa, 06.10.09

Or, was this feature also explained but seemed to have failed the memory of the people? Why? Possibly because, as it will be demonstrated in a moment, since in practice UCs and WCs had hardly stood implemented those might have remained not visible to be remembered in the way the activities were due to being physically executed in the field.

3.3. Were the Participatory Structures - UCs and WCs - formed as per the Institutional Logic?

The discussion of the findings on how UCs and WCs were formed (or not) may help to answer these questions as well as bringing out the deeper dynamics of the programme on the ground. As noted already (Section 2.3), there was a strong logic in the institutional design of the programme to have the UCs formed prior to constituting the WC. However, in none of the eight village level micro watersheds closely studied in the five research panchayats (and four more in other visited panchayats), were UCs formed before the WCs. In fact they were non-existent on the ground except in one micro watershed village (Katangi in Dongarmandla), and here it had been formed after the constitution of its WC.

Some of the official documents of action plans, completion reports and audits of the micro watershed projects that this research succeeded in obtaining (not easily shared by the officers or the WCs' chairmen and secretaries), ironically, themselves revealed incontrovertible evidence in this regard. For example, the action plan of the Delhi micro watershed in Rewa records that the Project Officer S. P. S. Tiwari (PO) first visited Delhi panchayat on 10.01.96 and organised a preliminary meeting of the villagers to explain the Programme. Then the WC is shown to have been constituted in the second meeting after a gap of only 7 days on 17. 1. 96, and approved by the *gram sabha* organised by the sarpanch on 26.1.96. There is no mention of constitution of any UC prior to it, nor is it mentioned in the entire record which describes eight different village level meetings organised by the PO over a period of about one month (10.1.96 - 4.2.96). Yet the same document subsequently lists 5 UCs with a total of 68 members formed around different

activities of the watershed development!⁴⁰ Nothing has been recorded regarding their dates and modalities of formation. The field investigations confirmed that all of them were entirely on paper.

Given this reality, a WC, if formed, was bound to be of a different structure than the one institutionally designed, since it could not have the non-existent UCs' chairmen as members, as originally planned. Subsequent exploration on whether people recognised WCs and their members and knew how they were formed confirmed this.

When people were asked about whether they knew the watershed committees of their areas and, if so, whether they recognized their chairmen, secretaries and other members, out of a total of 218 respondents, 61% professed themselves unaware of the existence of any such committee. Among the remaining 39% who said they had heard of WCs, 85% (or 33% of the total) answered that either they did not know any member, or knew only the chairman and secretary.⁴¹ A minuscule 6.42% people recognised a few other members (see Table 4. 3 and Graph 4.4; for panchayat-wise detailed responses, see Appendix III). Even this (last) set of responses, already too small to be significant, loses its relevance because some of these came from the chairmen or secretaries of watershed committee themselves, who obviously were most likely to give desirable answers being in the small but privileged coterie with having an exclusionary command over the programme along with sarpanchs and officials.

The few villagers, who could identify some of the WC members of their areas, mainly came from Dongarmandla where, even if the process was not participatory as per its design, some openness was maintained by the WDT staff and a NGO involved in the implementation. The important point to note here is that despite this difference, the WCs in tribal regions were also formed without any linkage to the UCs.


⁴⁰RGWM, Rewa (n. d.). The UCs shown therein are: contour bunding committee - 18 members; water pits construction committee - 31; drainage improvement committee - 8; earthen stop dam committee - 4; and check dam construction committee - 7. A large number of SHGs also formed around different economic activities such as: vegetable production, carpentry, pisciculture, etc. and are also shown in the action plan.

⁴¹The official records of the WCs were collected in advance from district offices or in the field. People's responses were compared with the names on the official records.

**Table 4.3: Identification of the Members of the Watershed Committees
All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Identification of the Members of the WCs		Number	Percent	Group
Total Respondents= 218	No knowledge of WC	132	60.55%	A
	Aware of WC	86	39.45%	B
Those who said they were aware of WC = 86				
No member known		23	10.55%	B1
Chairman & Secretary / or one of them		49	22.48%	B2
Know also few additional members		14	6.42%	B3
Those who either had no knowledge of committee, or did not know any member, or only knew chairman/secretary				
A + B1+B2		204	93.58%	


Source: Primary data from the field research.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

The fact that just 1.81% among the poor and 7.69% of the non-poor could say anything on the question of the formation of the WCs revealed that an almost absolute ignorance prevailed in the community on this matter (overall 3.21% - see Graph 4.5; for

panchayat-wise detailed responses, see Appendix IV). Even those who did respond mostly said that either sarpanchs or WDT staff from the higher offices, but certainly not the people, had constituted the WCs. Had they been formed through the participatory processes of prior formation of UCs and approval by genuinely convened *gram sabhas*, such a depressing scenario would have been quite unlikely.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

3.4. How were the WCs - the Pivotal Participatory Structure - actually formed on the Ground?

Detailed interviews with knowledgeable key respondents proved more informative on why such a complete collapse of the features of people's involvement had happened. The revelations were illuminating and startling.

3.4.1. Sale of WCs by officials to sarpanchs for their capture by the front door in the eastern region: In the entire Rewa region, sarpanchs made lateral entries into WCs as their chairmen despite the prohibition against this. This happened because POs, senior watershed mission officers from the district, literally surrendered the execution of the programme into the hands of sarpanchs by collecting considerable

rents (about 20-25% of the proposed funds - see Section 3.5 below).⁴² Sarpanchs were contacted by them, told about the Programme modalities and asked to pay the rent if they wanted to get projects in their areas. In return, they were practically left free to run the Programme as they desired.⁴³

As a result, sarpanchs unabashedly managed to become WCs' chairmen themselves, primarily by sabotaging the provision that *gram sabhas* should approve the WCs. Since as sarpanchs they were entitled to organise *gram sabhas*, the 'approvals' were either entirely constructed on paper, or were organised with the help of a few of their henchmen, thus guaranteeing their election as chairmen. Officials who were already well paid by sarpanchs were only too willing to turn a blind eye to this perverse misuse of this provision. To the outside world, the sarpanchs' explanation was unequivocal: if *gram sabhas* preferred them as chairmen being better candidates than others, they had no option but to accept. Once elected they could easily appoint their relatives, loyalists and subservient villagers as the WCs' other members so as to have unfettered control over watershed funds.


Thus, in Delhi panchayat (Rewa district), when the Programme started in 1996 the then sarpanch Pramod Tiwari became the chairman of the WC. He inducted his nephew Ram Krishna Tiwari as the secretary. In the second term (1999-2004), his wife ran for the office but was defeated by Pramila Tiwari, wife of Uday Tiwari who was his cousin but a political rival. Even though there was no provision for change of the chairmanship in

⁴²How could these officers brazenly indulge in corruption of such high magnitude whilst under the supervision of their seniors, such as collectors and chief executive officers of district panchayats? The answer is that they were handpicked by the "Big Man" of Rewa, Sri Niwas Tiwari, in order to control the distribution of watershed funds with their collusion. This sale of patronage greatly increased his political power base as well as allowing him to increase his personal wealth (see WP 2 for details on how he had similarly controlled the EAS).

The Programme was under implementation with a massive cost of Rs. 150.43 million in the district of Rewa (RGWM, Rewa, 2003). In all nine blocks of Rewa all nine POs were picked by him from his own *Brahman* caste (see Appendix. V for details). In the research block Raipur (K), the PO was S. P. S. Tiwari (*Brahman*). S. P. S. Tiwari had employed one Brajesh Dubey (*Brahman*) as the coordinator in the PIA he headed, who mediated with sarpanchs on his behalf to collect rents and advise them on controlling the WCs and the Programme in their areas in return.

⁴³Interview, Brijmohan Patel, ex-sarpanch, Silpari, 12.10.09

WC subsequent to the change of a sarpanch in a panchayat, Uday Tiwari, the *de facto* new sarpanch employed the same machination, i.e., showing decisions through a managed or a paper gram sabha, to remove the previous sarpanch and bring in his wife, Pramila Tiwari, the new *de jure* sarpanch, as the new chairman of the WC. Obviously in this way he remained in real control of both the panchayat and the WC. The secretary, however, continued as he was a member of the same extended family and switched his loyalty to the new master of the WC. The other members in the committee were closely connected and subservient villagers as demonstrated in Diagram 4.5 below (similar graphical presentations for other WCs are provided in Appendix VI).



In Silpari (Rewa district), the sarpanch Lakshman Patel managed to become the WC chairman in the same way, and also chose a relative, Bhaiya Lal Patel, as the secretary and continued as the chairman in the second term. Aida Bano, a woman from a minority group (Muslim), who became the sarpanch in the second term, did not have enough

social and political power to oust Lakshman who belonged to the most powerful dominant Patel caste community in Silpari.

Since it was widely heard in the field that capture of WCs by sarpanchs in Delhi and Silpari were not exceptions, but rather the norm in this region, a concerted effort was made to unearth the facts around this issue across the research block Raipur (K). The findings presented schematically in Diagrams 4.6 to 4.8 are astonishing⁴⁴: *all 16 WCs in the Block came under the direct control of exactly the same powerful persons, who were either de jure or de facto sarpanchs in the respective micro-watershed areas.* Three types of capture were detected:


Type I: In the first term of the panchayat (1994-99), the positions of chairman in nine micro watershed villages were captured by the sarpanchs of the respective panchayats, or by those powerful persons who were the *de facto* sarpanchs, when either their wives or *laguas*,⁴⁵ i.e., persons under their control, became the sarpanchs due to the reservation rule (see Diagram 4.6 for details). In this scenario, in the next term (1999-2004) the control of the panchayats in essence remained in the hands of the same powerful persons again as either *de jure* or *de facto* sarpanchs. When this happened, the control of WCs continued in their hands without any change.

⁴⁴Information received from Brajesh Dubey, a highly knowledgeable insider (*Interview*, 12.04.2003). See also f. n. 42 regarding how Dubey worked as the liaison between the PO and various sarpanchs from this block to strike deals between them.

⁴⁵*Lagua* is the local term for such a person, invariably from the weaker section (SC, ST and sometimes OBC), who is under the control of a particular powerful forward caste actor in a panchayat due to various reasons, for example: a bonded labourer; servant; highly dependent labourer or sharecropper; traditionally loyal and highly subservient; and the like.

Diagram 4.6: Capture of WC by Sarpanchs


Type I Cases: Those who controlled Sarpanchs' positions in both terms captured Chairmen's positions and continued



Type II: In three micro watershed villages, the control of panchayats shifted from one powerful actor to another, who was the rival to the former. Subsequently, the former, who occupied the position of the chairman in the first term, was thrown out and replaced by his rival. The latter then controlled the WCs directly or indirectly in the second term (Diagram 4.7). As already noted earlier, this happened in one of the research panchayats, Delhi (sl. no. 1 in Diagram 4.7).

Diagram 4.7: Capture of WC by Sarpanchs

Type II: Change in the Chairmanship of the WC when a Rival Group came into power to control the panchayat
First Term (1994-99) **Second Term (1999-2004)**



Type III: This is an interesting scenario in which the powerful actor, who controlled the WC continued in its command in the second term even when defeated by his rival (Diagram 4.8). This happened for two reasons: first, although the rival group succeeded in defeating the previous group in panchayat because of voting dynamics, it was not


powerful enough to displace him from the WC (as in the case of Silapri, another research panchayat. See sl. no. 1 in Diagram 4.8); and, second, a mutually advantageous deal was struck between them in terms of rent-sharing.

Diagram 4.8: Capture of WC by Sarpanchs

Type III: Rival Group came into power but Chairman of the WC did not change

First Term (1994-99)


A= The REAL POWER behind the sarpanch (forward caste, or Patels where dominant)



Mostly A is directly the chairman of the WC or controls through his wife

Second Term (1999-2004)

X= Rival of A. Defeats A to become the new REAL POWER behind the sarpanch (forward caste, or Patels where dominant)



A continued because was either more powerful or struck or deal with X.

S.N.	Panchayat & WC	Sarpanch	Chairman	Sarpanch	Chairman
1	Silpari WC Silpari [Research Panchayat]	Lakshman Patel (LP) (Dominant caste: Patel) <i>De jure & de facto sarpanch</i>	Lakshman Patel <i>Sarpanch himself the chairman</i>	Mrs. Aida Bano (Minority community) Husband Ahiya Khan was the rival of LP & defeated him to get his wife elected as sarpanch	Lakshman Patel <i>LP continued as the chairman because was far more powerful than the rival group belonging to a minority community.</i>
2.	Raghuraj garh WC Raghurajgarh	Babu Lal Kol (ST: Kol) <i>Lagua of SSB, who was de facto sarpanch]</i>	Surendra S. Baghel (SSB) (Forward caste: Rajput) <i>Was the chairman because he was de facto sarpanch.</i>	Devendra Pratap Singh (Forward caste: Rajput) The new <i>de jure & de facto</i> sarpanch defeated his rival SSB.	Surendra Singh Baghel <i>SSB continued as the chairman because a deal was reached between them.</i>
3.	Manikwar-1 WC Manikwar-1	Mrs. Manju S. Tiwari (Forward caste: Brahmin). <i>De facto sarpanch her husband, Harigovind Singh Tiwari.</i>	Hargovind Singh Tiwari <i>Was the chairman because he was de facto sarpanch.</i>	Mahadev Kol (ST: Kol). Relatively an independent person, not in any camp	Harigovind Singh Tiwari <i>HST continues as the Chairman, because new sarpanch, from ST caste is too weak to displace him.</i>
4.	Tiwarigawan WC Tiwarigawan	Ramawatar Patel (Backward caste: Patel) <i>de jure & de facto sarpanch</i>	Tejbhan Patel (TP) <i>Chairman a friend of the sarpanch. Both supported each other with under a pact.</i>	Tejbhan Patel (Backward caste: Patel) <i>de jure & de facto sarpanch</i>	Tejbhan Patel <i>He continued because became the de jure & de facto sarpanch in this term.</i>

Collectively, this presented the strongest evidence for an unambiguous finding that everywhere the sarpanchas (the real power controlling these positions) had laterally entered into and captured the WCs. Thus, the entire idea of the participatory processes, sequenced to give rise to the core people's committee on which hinged the fate of the

programme, was comprehensively negated not only in the case of the research panchayats, but in the entire research block⁴⁶ and possibly in the entire district.

3.4.2. Sarpanchs captured WCs through the backdoor through a collusive nexus with officials in the western region: The western region of MP, though not as brazen as the eastern region of Rewa, proved to be the same. Here also no UC was in existence. Further, Munnalal Purohit, the chairman of WC, Sandiya himself revealed that he was selected as the chairman when the project officer Kumawat, an engineer in the Irrigation Department, had hastily convened a meeting of a few villagers in a shop in Sandiya with the sarpanch Dev Prasad Patidar.⁴⁷ That this meeting was a total sham and stage-managed by the sarpanch purely to create ‘records’, about which the villagers had remained completely unaware, was confirmed by all 46 respondents and also a key respondent.⁴⁸ Purohit was selected by the sarpanch as he was known to be an opium addict and thus could easily be bought. In the Chukni village, Sandiya WC, one Ramesh Patidar was the chairman and Suresh Sharma the secretary in 1997 when the programme started. However, the then sarpanch Patidar, with the help of the officials, managed to replace the chairman with his relative Pyarchand Patidar.⁴⁹ Secretary Sharma was also replaced by Yamunalal Patidar but this was due to Sharma’s appointment as guruji in the EGS school at Chukni.

In other panchayats that were also visited during the course of the research, UCs were found to have not been formed at all and the nexus of officials and sarpanch in selecting chairmen of the WCs without the knowledge and involvement of villagers was confirmed. For example, in Ankli, it was a well known fact that Sajjan Singh, the chairman of the WC was the brother of Sarpanch Bhopal Singh.⁵⁰ None other than the

⁴⁶Incidentally, Raipur (K) block was officially viewed in district Rewa as the only Block where the programme was running comparatively well.

⁴⁷Interview, Manna Lal Purohit, Chairman, WC, Sandiya, 02.10.09.

⁴⁸Interview, Santosh Kashiram Purohit, Teacher, Sandiya, 02.10.09.

⁴⁹Q. no.-29/43, Sandiya, Neemuch: Mangu Das; Interview, Ram Krishna Gayari, Panch, Sandiya

⁵⁰From Ankli panchayat, Neemuch: Q no.-1/54: Gopalpuri, Q. no.-8/204: Bherulal Uday Ram, Q. no.-15/11: Badrilal Omkarlal.

Secretary, WC, Ankli disclosed in his interview that his and the Chairman's selection had not been made by villagers. Sarpanch Bhopal Singh had arranged a meeting with the help of officials in the block office, where 10-12 of his supporters were assembled to second the name of his brother Sajjan Singh that he had himself proposed.⁵¹ A teacher in a government school in Ankli revealed that in the other WC, Rupawas (in the same panchayat), the Chairman Ms. Kamla Bai and the Secretary were selected in a similar manner by officials and sarpanch.⁵² It was also alleged that she had paid Rs. 50,000 to the sarpanch and officials for getting her appointed as the chairman. This was protested and the matter even went to the Indore High Court, which ruled for a reconstitution of the WC in a transparent way, but officials and sarpanch still corruptly managed to retain Kamla Bai as the Chairman.⁵³ In the panchayat Dhakni, adjacent to Sandiya, Biramlal was the sarpanch and chairman of the WC.⁵⁴

In this region, an additional strange fact that came to light was that a number of panchayat representatives, even from the higher level of block and district panchayats, *also functioned as the secretary of the WCs of their areas*. For example, in Deorikhawasa, also adjacent to Sandiya, the secretary of the WCs was also the vice chairman of the Janpad (block) panchayat. Similarly, the secretary of the WC, Lodakya was also an elected Janpad (block) panchayat member. And, even more striking was the fact in Khedli panchayat the secretary of the WC was the sarpanch of the panchayat. The CEO (BDO) of Manasa in his interview revealed the logic behind this peculiar preference for lowly secretarial positions in WCs by persons holding senior elected positions in the PRIs: it was driven, first, by the expectation that as and when those were made permanent staff positions in the government, they would become permanent government employees. And, second, until then they would enjoy more direct control of WCs, especially over the funds, and would be able to maximise their monetary gains by

⁵¹Interview, Bhomilal Kanhaiyalal, Secretary, WC, Ankli, 09.10.09

⁵²Interview, Iwan Singh, Teacher, Sojawas, 10.10.09.

⁵³Interview, Devi Lal, a contestant in the sarpanch's election in Ankli panchayat in 1999, Ankli, 11.10.09

⁵⁴Interview, Biramlal, Sarpanch, Dhakini, 24.02.2004

corrupt means – the meagre salary on offer was not part of the attraction.⁵⁵ While this revealed the extent to which elected representatives would abuse the system in furtherance of their self-interests, more disturbingly, it also revealed how a new type of coproduction between sarpanchs and officials was being engineered in block offices away from villages, a coproduction which was almost the polar opposite of the crafted design.

3.4.3. Officials commanded WCs with people as their subordinate staff rather than equal partners in the southern tribal region: The situation in the tribal region was no different in regard to the UCs, which were not formed as per the spirit before the formation of the WCs. It did appear at the initial stages of investigation that the WCs were possibly based on meetings of the villagers; however, after probing the matter in some depth, it turned out not to be so. Nawal Singh Maravi, the chairman of the WC, Dongarmandla, disclosed that WDT official Ram Das Jatav from the block had readied the villagers to agree to his (NSM's) selection as chairman and his brother Roop Singh Maravi as secretary. He candidly admitted that he did not even know about his selection as chairman until his brother had asked him to complete paperwork to obtain the funds!⁵⁶ Another villager also confirmed this story in his response to the questionnaire.⁵⁷ In regard to the other WC in Katangi, because of the involvement of Centre for Advanced Research and Development (CARD), a reputed NGO, some effort was made to organize a proper village meeting, which selected members of the WC from each segment of the village.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, a villager reported that Mrs. Meera Bai Tekam, a Janpad (block) panchayat member, used her block connection with the powerful WDT official Jatav to get her husband Phool Singh Tekam selected as secretary of the WC.⁵⁹

⁵⁵Interview, CEO, Manasa Block, Neemuch, 15.02.2004. The WCs where the PRI representatives were working as the secretaries reported above were also pointed out by him.

⁵⁶Interview, Nawal Singh Maravi, Chairman, WC, Dongarmandla, 11.10.09.

⁵⁷Q. no.-14/336, Dongarmandla, Mandla: Maha Singh (Panch).

⁵⁸Interview, Phool Singh Tekam, Secretary, WC, Katangi, 13.10.09.

⁵⁹Q. no.-5/160, Dongarmandla, Mandla: Shivraj.

The interview of Basant Chaukse, a Congress party political worker, gave a detailed and clear view of the dynamics of the constitution of WCs in this panchayat in particular, and also in the tribal region in general. In brief, he said:

Primarily WDT officials from blocks, such as Jatav, manage to get those people selected as chairmen who already have close connections with them. They organise meetings of a few villagers and obtain their signatures to confirm the selection of their trusted persons. In this way, they feel confident they can effectively control the execution of the Programme from behind in their officially assigned areas of responsibility. This pattern is not only prevalent in Dongarmandla, but in many other panchayats in the tribal region.⁶⁰

This pattern could also be seen in the other research panchayat Ramhepur. Coincidentally, the WDT official Ram Das Jatav also looked after the programme in Dalkagopangi village in this panchayat. Ram Lal Baiga, the secretary of the WC Dalkagopangi, disclosed that it was Jatav who had constituted the entire WC in this village, selecting as chairman Hriday Singh Armo, who was close to him (and also to ex-sarpanch, Nadu Das). Armo had already revealed that he was known to Jatav, as he used to assist him in implementing agricultural department programmes in Ramhepur. Jatav had tested him long enough to both trust him as his man and also consider him effective in implementing government programmes in the field. Thus he appointed him as chairman of the WC, also with the consent of the sarpanch Das, even though he was not present in the panchayat when the selection was made.⁶¹ Baiga, the secretary chosen by Jatav, admitted that for two years he did not even understand what the WC did, but later slowly started working (record keeping, etc.) under the guidance of Jatav. He also confirmed that no UCs were formed either before or after the constitution of the WC.⁶² This was confirmed in another interview of a member of the watershed committee, Ram Prasad Vishwakarma:

Not only would I as the member of the WC but all other members too would say that no UCs were ever formed. Even I came to know about my membership to the WC

⁶⁰Interview, Basant Chaukse, local Congress leader, Dongarmandla, 12.10.09.

⁶¹ Interview, Hriday Singh Armo, Ramhepur, 22.09.2003

⁶²Interview, Ram Lal Baiga, Secretary, WC Dalkagopangi, 6.10.09.

after two months of its formation when one day Jatav *saheb*⁶³ told me to come to attend a meeting of the WC and sign on the proceedings, since he had already made me a member.⁶⁴

In WC, Ramhepur, its secretary Ratan Singh first tried to suggest that there had been a *gram sabha* meeting organized, etc., but after some coaxing, he admitted that another WDT official V.S. Dhurve had constituted the WC choosing Rum Lal Madhukar as chairman and himself as secretary, based on their old connections.⁶⁵

3.5. What happened to the execution of the Programme?

These patterns had a direct impact on the way the programme functioned in these three regions. In Rewa, with the coming of *sarpanchs* to centre stage, rivalries, jealousies, and serious mistrust about their intentions in taking an interest in the programmes, backed by the perceptions about their misuse of other programmes they handled through the PRIs, made other villagers suspicious and disinterested. As a result, the possibility of any further community involvement seriously dwindled. Also, sarpanchs in this region were locally very powerful personalities, which rendered the exercise of ‘voice’ by other villagers to question and challenge them redundant. Oversight by officials was out of question since they had almost surrendered the Programme, by choice rather than coercion, to sarpanchs. Thus the Programme became deeply corrupted. Huge cuts and commissions paid to officials by sarpanchs and looting of funds by them were widely heard of in this region and was authenticated in a rare candid interview of the husband of an ex-sarpanch.⁶⁶ The details revealed that not more than 20-30% of funds were actually utilised for implementing the watershed projects (see Diagram 4.9 below)


⁶³A term that is usually suffixed to a government officer’s name as a mark of authority, and is a legacy of the colonial times.

⁶⁴Interview, Ram Prasad Vishwakarma, Member, WC, Dalkagopangi, 03.10.09.

⁶⁵Interview, Ratan Singh, Secretary, WC, Ramhepur, 10.10.09.

⁶⁶Interview, Nagendra Singh, husband of the ex-sarpanch Gita Singh, Hinauti, 18.04.03.

Diagram 4.9: How were the Programme funds utilized in the real world?
Told by a Sarpanch from his real life experience



Source: Interview, Naganendra Singh, Hinauti, Rewa

Was corruption of the kind and magnitude prevalent in Rewa a norm in MP? It was certainly not, for the ground realities in the tribal region equally convincingly demonstrated that corruption was not a big issue there. People were usually highly reluctant to speak about such matters in this region, but occasionally some would open up albeit in a limited way, as Ratan Singh, Secretary, WC, Ramhepur did when he revealed that savings generated in the process of execution of projects were shared between the project officials and the key members of the WC: “In reality, the labourers produced more output than defined by the technical standards. Hence, more numbers of labourers than were actually employed were shown on the muster roll resulting in some savings.”⁶⁷ It also became clear that such a technical *modus operandi* for pilfering petty amounts was not so much driven by the WC chairman and secretary or members, who in any case hardly possessed the technical knowledge base to do so, as by the ingenuity of the project officials. This clearly explains the appointment of subservients as chairmen and secretaries. Another secretary of WC, Dalkagopangi was even more open:

90% of the funds were properly utilised in executing different programme activities. From the remaining 10%, 3% was paid to PO R. N. Srivastava, 1% to his PA Maiku Lal and 6% was distributed among WDT officer Ram Das Jatav, WC chairman,

⁶⁷Interview, Ratan Singh, Secretary, WC, Ramhepur, 10.10.09.

secretary and other members. This 10% of the fund came from the savings and also by showing certain activities as fully executed (though in reality they were not complete).⁶⁸

Thanks to the partnership mode of the Programme that helped to unlock the mystery of the machinations of making money, hitherto shrouded under secrecy within the centralised offices of BDOs and collectors, key members in WCs appeared to be gradually gaining an exposure to, and an interest in corrupt practices. Or so it was perceived by other important players in the panchayat. Competing and conflicting interests were emerging, tending to weaken the programme. This came out clearly in the anguish shared by Hriday Singh Armo (Chairman of WC, Dalkagopangi) in the interview partly discussed above. He said that the ex-sarpanch Nandu Das used to rate him as an efficient and trusted lieutenant, but later, as the watershed project progressed, Das had begun undermining his position. Repeated complaints by Das against him to the watershed officials on made-up charges frustrated Armo so much that he had even threatened to resign, but officials and others intervened to stop him. He insisted that he would eventually quit if the problem persisted. When pressed to explain this puzzling turnaround of his mentor, he finally stated:

He [the ex-sarpanch, Nandu Das] gradually realised what potential the programme had for making money. Thus, he has grown repentant over letting such an opportunity go away from his direct control, and now wants to mend his mistake by somehow getting his son to replace me as the chairman.⁶⁹

Taking all this into account, it still has to be said that corruption was extremely limited in scope in this region, and clearly negligible in comparison to that in Rewa.

In the Neemuch region, the scenario was mixed as became evident in (separate) interviews with the chairman and secretary of WC, Sandiya. The secretary revealed that except for taking a fixed amount of Rs. 5,000 from each instalment of funds, Purohit, the Chairman, did nothing else. Thus, in reality the sarpanch and the officials ran the

⁶⁸ Interview, Ram Lal Baiga, Secretary, WC Dalkagopangi, Ramhepur, 6.10.09.

⁶⁹ Interview, Hriday Singh Armo, Ramhepur, Mandla, 22.09.2003.

programme with no hindrance from his side.⁷⁰ Others also confirmed this, and also said that only about 50-60% funds were used in constructing about 7-8 stop dams, deepening of an existing pond and a few percolation tanks. Even these constructions, they pointed out, collapsed after only a year or two since they were done with substandard material and were never repaired.⁷¹

In the other panchayat Ankli, the chairman and secretary of WCs themselves admitted that not more than 50-60% of funds were actually spent on the ground. The secretary of WC, Ankli gave clear and conclusive details:

Two million rupees were received in the WC account. About Rs. 1.2-1.3 million were spent on constructing 5 ponds, 15 stop dams and a number of percolation pits. The remainder [Rs. 0.8-0.7 million] was shared between the sarpanch, chairman and officials of the Watershed Mission” *[understandably he was not including himself in this coterie, though as a secretary he was bound to have a share, even if of the lowest proportion]*.⁷²

3.6. Could the Villagers detect the defects through the Nirakh-Parakh?

But, what about the provision of *Nirakh-Parakh* (participatory evaluation)? Did it enable the villagers to detect the mis-utilisation of funds and sub-standard construction? The exploration around this aspect of the Programme presented a dismal picture. 99% of respondents from the poor and 88% from the non-poor showed complete ignorance of this provision (Graph 4.6; for panchayat wise detailed responses, see Appendix VII). Clearly not only was this provision never talked about in the initial stages of awareness building of the Programme, and the WCs appear never to have conducted it in compliance with the guidelines. Nowhere were the impressive maps as shown in Section 2.2 illustratively found to exist.⁷³ Consequently, people remained

⁷⁰Interview, Ghanshyam Thakur, Secretary WC, Sandiya, Neemuch, 03.10.09.


⁷¹Interview, Mohan Lal Ji Purohit, Block panchayat representative and ex-sarpanch, Sandiya, 02.10. 09; Interview, Santosh Kashiram Purohit, ex-teacher and a contestant in the sarpanch's election in 1999, Sandiya, 2.10.09.

⁷²Interview, Bhomilal Kanhaiyalal, Secretary, WC Ankli, 9.10. 09.

⁷³ In fact, such maps were largely only made when official completion reports of the Programme were submitted to higher officials, to dupe them into believing that *Nirakh-Parakh* had been conducted, when in reality it had not.

completely unaware of this empowering provision. The most striking dimension of this finding is that even in the tribal region, where the Programme was undoubtedly implemented well, the WCs did not consider it necessary to involve people in this important evaluative process, thus leaving them as ignorant as villagers in other regions.

Since the programme had started with sidelining different participatory processes (PRA, formation of UCs, etc.), its end with an abject disregard for the *Nirakh-Parakh*, the concluding participatory process, should not be surprising.




Source: Primary data from the field research.

3.7. Did people own and sustain the Programme?

In such a milieu of the overwhelming lack of people's involvement in the Programme, quite understandably villagers rarely came forward to offer their contributions as per the stipulated norms (Section 2.2), even though, unlike *Nirakh-Parakh*, more than 50% respondents were aware of this provision (Graph 4.7; for panchayat wise detailed responses, see Appendix VIII). When they did so, surprisingly, those who contributed were mostly labourers. The damning fact in this regard that came to light was that their contribution was not voluntary. 10% of their wages were automatically deducted and shown as their voluntary contributions, although most of them were unaware of the deduction. For example, if the then prevalent wage rate was Rs. 52.00 per day, labourers

would be paid Rs. 48 and were told that for the work in the watershed programme, this was the rate prescribed by the Government. This occurred mainly in the tribal region.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

In Rewa and Neemuch, since all major watershed activities (ponds, percolation tanks, etc.) were mostly carried out by machines, even this peculiar forced voluntary contribution by the labourers was not present. Others, especially farmers, in any case refused to contribute despite potentially being the biggest gainers from the programme, generally on the grounds that since the programme was of the sarpanchs and for the sarpanchs, they should be the ones contributing.⁷⁴ This led to the almost ludicrous situation whereby, a part of the programme funds was diverted, obviously highly inappropriately, by sarpanchs and shown as people's contributions to meet the eligibility criteria for flow of fund instalments from the district (see interview of an ex-sarpanch and related Diagram 4.9 in Section 3.5). The sufferers were mostly from the tribal region, where machines were not used and labourers found substantial employment under the programme. However, in the process they had to part with 10% of their wages, entirely unjustly though.

⁷⁴A number of farmers in Rewa region said this in their interviews, which once again reflected the serious loss of credibility of the programme in this area.

4. Summary and Conclusion

The realities of the programme across the three regions in MP tell a deeply ironic story:

- In Rewa, the idea of a positive synergy between state and non-state actors drastically mutated to become a collusive contract between the former and sarpanchs. Instead of “bringing people in”, sarpanchs were brought in from the front door, not surreptitiously but shamelessly, by the Mission officials to capture the WCs. For a price, the officials withdrew from their partnership role and let the sarpanchs run amok. Corruption, thus, was rampant, leaving not more than 20-30% funds for executing the projects and even those mostly benefited the agricultural fields of sarpanchs and their close associates. Machines were brought in from Rajasthan to dig ponds for maximising the profits of sarpanchs at the cost of the poor labourers’ earnings, even when they had the right to be employed because 50% of the funds came from the EAS that had guaranteed them 100 days of employment.
- In Neemuch, officials colluded with sarpanchs but, unlike Rewa, they allowed the latter to control WCs only from the backdoor and also did not entirely withdraw from the scene. This required sarpanchs to get their family members or henchmen appointed as chairmen, which was easily accomplished with the support of the officials. Yet the temptation of gaining a formal entry into WCs proved irresistible. Thus, they and even senior block level PRI members, stooped low to become secretaries of WCs, who were low paid petty contractual staff in these committees, even when they continued to hold positions of authority and status in the PRIs. Nonetheless, the corruption was not as brazen as in Rewa and approximately 50-60% of funds (almost double that in Rewa) reached the ground, possibly because here officials seemed not to have completely abandoned their role. Vertical oversight by their seniors from the district administration translated downwards, even if feebly, to keep some check on the situation.
- In both cases, the hope that, due to a much stronger *ex ante* fit between the self-interests of farmers and Programme incentives, even if sarpanchs came to control

the WCs they would still work to ensure good results to gain the maximum direct benefits to themselves as big landlords of the area, was belied.

- In sharp contrast, the programme appeared to work quite well in the tribal region. However, this exceptional result happened when, paradoxically, bureaucrats (Mission officials) remained the masters of the people rather than their partners. WC chairmen were social actors “chosen” by bureaucrats. They did not participate in the programme, but followed the guidelines and directions of the officials, as if they were subordinates and thus were duty bound to do so. And they did so meticulously, not only in matters of implementation, but also in calculating and passing on the savings to the officials, however meagre. In fact, as petty bureaucrats in disguise, they appeared to be on the job training under the mentorship of the Mission officials! Corruption being insignificant, an apparently good quality of large scale works was visible all round. Machines were not used at all, which allowed the labourers to gain substantial employment until the end of the projects in 2003. This had also considerably helped them in facing draught like situation in 2001 and 2002. In absence of the Programme or its fair implementation, the hardships could have been immense. Nonetheless, in the process they also had to part with 10% of their wages in compliance of a “dictated volunteerism”, of which in any case they remained ignorant.

Such an overall picture may suggest that the Programme seems to have worked best when officials directly and fully controlled it (in the tribal region), second best when they had some control despite collusion with sarpanch (in the Neemuch area), and worst when they had no control and only sarpanchs’ writ ran through the Programme. Does it mean that Evans was right in worrying about possibilities of negative state-society synergy and Ostrom’s hope for its opposite was unfounded? Is “skipping straight to Weber” not such a bad idea and does this mean that the recent trend in academia and the policy world for rediscovering bureaucracy therefore has merit?

If such implications are correct, they may seriously challenge the idea and salience of people’s participation and partnership. However, these are serious questions and the

answer is not a straightforward “Yes”, however apparent it may be from the findings emerging from the story of the partnership of million villagers and Mission officials. A more in-depth analysis is required to both unravel these counterintuitive findings and bring out their implications for the debate configured by Evans’ and Grindle’s position on the one hand, and Ostrom’s on the other.

The aforesaid issues and puzzles, as also those that have accumulated from the studies of other programmes and are reported in the preceding three WPs, would be now will be taken up together for analysis in WP 5. Unraveling them in an integrated way helps to focus on the collective implications of the research project for contemporary debates and experiments on decentralization, participation, CDD and state-society synergy through coproduction, all of which are viewed as key to seeking institutional change for securing more pro-poor, accountable and responsive governance institutions.

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Appendix I: Awareness of the Watershed Programme (directly or by other name): All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Have you heard of Watershed Scheme? If yes, by which name?	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
Yes	69.23%	63.64%	72.41%	81.82%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	91.67%	100.00%	85.54%	88.46%
Identifies by official name	20.51%	36.36%	55.17%	63.64%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	44.44%	50.00%	60.84%	69.23%
Identifies by other name/scheme activities	48.72%	27.27%	17.24%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	47.22%	50.00%	24.70%	19.23%
No	30.77%	36.36%	27.59%	18.18%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	14.46%	11.54%
Don't know	30.77%	27.27%	20.69%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	13.25%	5.77%
No scheme runs	0.00%	9.09%	6.90%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	5.77%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix II: Source of the knowledge of the Watershed Programme: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Source of Knowledge about how WS scheme started	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
No	30.77%	36.36%	27.59%	18.18%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	14.46%	88.46%
Yes	69.23%	63.64%	72.41%	81.82%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	91.67%	100.00%	85.54%	88.46%
Only heard the name	10.26%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	53.85%	45.45%	65.22%	44.44%	5.56%	0.00%	25.30%	17.31%
Came to know of the programme after the start of the works	46.15%	36.36%	31.03%	27.27%	12.82%	18.18%	17.39%	22.22%	77.78%	80.00%	38.55%	36.54%
Information spread by officials from block/district, sometimes with aid of film, puppet, drama shows, etc.	2.56%	18.18%	6.90%	36.36%	28.21%	36.36%	17.39%	33.33%	8.33%	20.00%	12.65%	28.85%
From WC chairman and/or sarpanch	5.13%	0.00%	6.90%	9.09%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.01%	1.92%
From villagers, friends, TV, radio, posters/pamphlets, etc.	5.13%	9.09%	27.59%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.02%	3.85%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix III: Identification of the Members of the Watershed Committee: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Type of Members and % of WC member identified	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
No knowledge or know only Chairman/Secretary	100.00%	100.00%	96.55%	81.82%	94.87%	90.91%	78.26%	66.67%	100.00%	100.00%	95.18%	88.46%
No knowledge of WC	84.62%	72.73%	79.31%	45.45%	56.41%	36.36%	30.43%	11.11%	69.44%	40.00%	66.27%	42.31%
No member known	7.69%	18.18%	6.90%	0.00%	5.13%	18.18%	13.04%	11.11%	19.44%	10.00%	10.24%	11.54%
Chairman & Secretary/or one of them	7.69%	9.09%	10.34%	36.36%	33.33%	36.36%	34.78%	44.44%	11.11%	50.00%	18.67%	34.62%
Know also few additional members	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	18.18%	5.13%	9.09%	21.74%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	4.82%	11.54%
Up to 25%	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	18.18%	2.56%	0.00%	17.39%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	3.61%	5.77%
25% to 50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	9.09%	4.35%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	3.85%
More than 50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix IV: Knowledge of the process of constituting the WC: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Awareness and knowledge about creation method of WC	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
No	97.44%	90.91%	96.55%	90.91%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	77.78%	100.00%	100.00%	98.19%	92.31%
Yes	2.56%	9.09%	3.45%	9.09%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	22.22%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%	7.69%
By Watershed officials	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
By the <i>gram sabha</i>	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.85%
By sarpanch	2.56%	9.09%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	1.92%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix V: The “Big Boss” and his hand-picked POs across the entire District: All *Brahman*


Block	Mili Basin no.	Coverage area (In hectare)			Project Cost (In Rs. Million)			Project Officer	Caste
		Under EAS	Under DPAP	Total	Under EAS	Under DPAP	Total		
Raipur (K)	2A7E2J	4050	2500	6550	16.20	7.50	23.70	S.P.S. Tiwari, Commissioner, Municiple Corporation, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Rewa	2A7E3V	4000		4000	16.00		16.00	- Do -	<i>Brahman</i>
Gangev	2A7E2Y	3240	2500	5740	12.85	7.50	20.35	N. P. Diwedi, S.D.O., Irrigation Department, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Sirmour	2A7E2E	1970	1000	2970	6.68	3.00	9.68	- Do -	<i>Brahman</i>
Mauganj	2A7D9E	3200	2500	5700	12.80	7.50	20.30	L. N. Mishra, Junior Engineer, Irrigation Department, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Hanumana	2A7E9J	2100		2100	8.40		8.40	Dr. J. K. Tiwari, Veterinary Doctor, Animal Husbandary Department, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Tyonthar	2A7D4G	3800		3800	15.20		15.20	- Do -	<i>Brahman</i>
Naigadhi	2A7D9L	3200	2000	5200	12.80	6.00	18.80	Dr. B. L. Tiwari, Veterinary Doctor, Animal Husbandary Department, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Jawa	2A7E29	4500		4500	18.00		18.00	K. K. Diwedi, Department of Cooperative, Rewa	<i>Brahman</i>
Total		30060	10500	40560	118.93	31.50	150.43		

Source: RGWM, Rewa (2003).

Appendix VI: Members of the WCs : Independent or Interrelated?


Watershed Committee, Silpuri, Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP

Total WC Member : 15




Watershed Committee, Dongarmandla, Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP

Total WC Member : 11




Watershed Committee, Katangi, Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP
Total WC Member : 15

Appendix VI..... contd.




Watershed Committee, Dalka Gopangi Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP
Total WC Member : 12



Watershed Committee – Tumda
Manasa Block, Neemuch District
WC Members : 5 (other members not known)

Appendix VI..... contd.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix VII: Awareness and knowledge of *Nirakh-Parakh*: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Do you know of Nirakh-Parakh? If yes, what does the Nirakh-Parakh do?	Delhi		Silpari		Dongarmandla		Ramhepur		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
No	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	81.82%	95.65%	77.78%	97.44%	81.82%	100.00%	100.00%	98.80%	88.46%
Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	4.35%	22.22%	2.56%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	11.54%
Report given in <i>gram sabha</i> on income expenses	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.85%
Was only shown on paper and not done in reality	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Progress of work evaluated by villagers	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	4.35%	0.00%	2.56%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	5.77%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Appendix VIII: People's Contribution towards the Development Fund: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)

Do you know of provision of the people's contributions? If yes, did you contribute?	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
Not Aware	74.36%	72.73%	89.66%	54.55%	12.82%	9.09%	13.04%	0.00%	58.33%	70.00%	50.60%	42.31%
Aware	25.64%	27.27%	10.34%	45.45%	87.18%	90.91%	86.96%	100.00%	41.67%	30.00%	49.40%	57.69%
Contributed	0.00%	9.09%	6.90%	18.18%	28.21%	36.36%	21.74%	33.33%	0.00%	10.00%	10.84%	21.15%
Was asked, but did not	25.64%	18.18%	3.45%	27.27%	58.97%	54.55%	65.22%	66.67%	41.67%	20.00%	38.55%	36.54%
Grand Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix IX: List of Schemes under WC, Delhi
Delhi Panchayat, Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**

Sl. No.	Schemes	No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Contour bunding	6218 cmt.	146533	✓	14
2	Gabian	-	19000	-	-
3	Stop Dam	2	250891	✓	6
4	Nursery & Plantation Exp.	1805	12493	-	-
5	Deepening of Pond	3	143183	✓	9
6	Percolation Tank	1	80393	-	-
	Total		652493		

Source: Completion Report, Watershed Committee Delhi.

**Appendix X: List of Schemes under WC, Silpari
Silpari Panchayat, Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**

Sl. No.	Schemes	No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Contour	-	300000	✓	19
2	Deepening of Pond (Mahua)	-	150000	✓	6
3	Stop Dam	-	130000	✓	10
4	Culvert	-	40000	✓	5
5	Gabian	-	90000	✓	1
6	Storage work on drainage/rivulet	-	20000	✓	4
7	Barsin	-	25000	✓	1
8	Nursery	-	7000	✓	3
9	Deepening of Pond (Mohgadh)	-	150000	-	-
	Total		912000		

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix XI: List of Schemes under WC, Ramhepur
Ramhepur Panchayat, Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

Sl. No.	Schemes	No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Trenching and Gulley Plugging	4	97309	✓	7
2	Contour bunding	4	71531	✓	5
3	Storage work on drainage/rivulet	4	144635	✓	4
4	Check Dam	3	49936	✓	7
5	Boulder Bund	3	74518	✓	7
6	Repairing of pond	1	4600	✓	8
7	CCT	1	47571	-	-
8	Dhabra-dhabri construction, CCT construction and Storage work on drainage/rivulet	1	54995	✓	1
9	Trenching	2	83729	-	-
10	Other Works	2	64842	-	-
			693666		

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix XII: List of Schemes under WC, Dalkagopangi
Ramhepur Panchayat, Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

Sl. No.	Schemes	No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Contour bunding	3	107917	✓	2
2	Storage work on drainage/rivulet	6	226684	✓	1
3	Percolation Tank	5	129121	-	-
4	Nursery work	3	3060	-	-
5	CCT	3	148393	-	-
6	Check Dam	1	39567	✓	2
7	Trenching and Boulder bund	1	10972	✓	5
8	Trenching and Gulley Plugging	7	199254	-	-
9	Gulley plugging work	3	68201	-	-
10	Gulley plugging and Check Dam work	3	67320	-	-
11	Other works	3	119940	-	-
			1120429		

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix XIII: List of Schemes under WC, Katangi
Dongarmandla Panchayat, Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

Sl. No.	Schemes	No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Contour Trench	-	18727	✓	5
2	CPW	-	36293	-	-
3	Contour bunding	-	41125	✓	5
4	Pond	-	34799	✓	2
5	Gabian	-	14795	✓	1
6	Well	-	93929	✓	1
7	Boulder Bund	-	80435	-	-
8	Afforestation	-	23100	✓	3
9	Nursery	-	34875	-	-
10	Grazing field development	-	23614	✓	1
	Total		401692		

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix XIV: List of Schemes under WC, Sandiya
Sanidya Panchayat, Manasa Block, Neemuch District, MP**

Sl. No.		No. of Schemes	Expd. Amount (In Rs. Lakh)	Projects mentioned	No. of who confirmed
1	Contour Trenching work	6040 m	77285.00	-	-
2	CPT	1200 m	38091.00	-	-
3	Afforestation	2250	30758.00	-	-
4	Contour bunding	400 m	27345.00	-	-
5	Repairing of Old Pond	1	123062.00	✓	3
6	Percolation Tank	6	639105.00	✓	8
7	Dyke	4	31377.00	-	-
8	Stop Dam	7	848331.00	✓	17
9	Deepening and expansion of Pond	4	243356.00	-	-
10	Construction of Diversion Bear	1	132809.00	-	-
	Total		2191519.00		

Source: Completion Report, Watershed Committee Sandiya.