TERRORISM AND DEVELOPMENT  
Monday 17th October 2005

Speakers:
Professor Jo Beall and Dr James Putzel are based at the LSE’s Development Studies Institute. Professor Jude Howell is Director of LSE’s Centre for Civil Society. Ian Linden is based at the Department of the Study of Religions, SOAS. Dr Ben Wisner is a Visiting Professor of the Environmental Studies Program, Oberlin College, Ohio

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Good evening and welcome. My name is Dennis Rodgers and I am with the Geography Department here at the LSE. It is my delight to be able to welcome you to this round table debate on terrorism and development. It is a very timely event, obviously with the recent bombings in London, Sharm El Sheikh and Bali, as well as the almost daily bombings that are going on in Iraq. But it is a particularly timely event because much has been said recently, a lot of which - if I may say so - is not terribly intelligent, about terrorism, about development and about the whole notion of violence between East, West, North, South. This debate is hosted by DESTIN, the Development Studies Institute here at the LSE, and the Crisis States Research Centre which is a DFID funded research centre based in DESTIN but autonomous. We’ll hopefully breakdown some of these dichotomies, some of these stereotypes which tend to sort of litter the debates which are going on in the media.

The contributors tonight are very well positioned to introduce this debate because they all stand in different ways at the crux between studies of violence, crisis and development. The first five contributors tonight are all from the LSE and have all contributed to a special issue on terrorism and development of the Journal of International Development, which is one of the premier publications in the field. First we have Professor Jo Beall, who is Director of DESTIN and who has written an extremely interesting paper on cities and terrorism, then we have James Putzel who is the Director of the Crisis States Research Centre who has written about the new imperialism of the US, which is one of the key issues undermining or underpinning the whole theme of terrorism today. Then we have Ben Wisner who will be talking, not giving a paper as such but more will be commenting on other people. Ben is an Associate Fellow of the Crisis States Research Centre and a Visiting Professor of Environmental Studies at Oberlin University in Ohio. After Ben we have Professor Jude Howell who is Director of the Centre for Civil Society here at the LSE, who will present on terrorism, globalisation and civil society and finally we have Professor Ian Linden who is Associate Professor with the School of Oriental African Studies here in London. Each speaker will speak for about 10 to 15 minutes and then will open up the floor, the debate to everybody who wants to participate. Now without further ado I will let Jo introduce the debate and introduce the main themes before opening it up to everybody else.

Jo Beall
Well good evening everybody and welcome to this evening’s deliberations hosted jointly by the Development Studies Institute at the LSE and the Crisis States Research Centre, which is one of the two major research centres that we have within the Institute. I am not going to talk to my paper on cities and development right now,
you’ll hear from me again on that, I just want to use this opportunity to introduce some of the key themes to the debate, drawing on the introduction that we wrote for the Journal of International Development Special Issue, ‘we’ being myself, James Putzel and Tom Goodfellow who is sitting over there. And I want to just start by citing two statements made by international development cooperation agencies in the last year or so, the first is from CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency. “Canadians who come from every corner of the globe understand that the life we enjoy in Canada depends increasingly on helping to make the world a better place. Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world or healthy in a sick world nor can we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, social and environmental progress in the developing world will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long term security and our prosperity. Security and development are inextricably linked.” The second is from Danish Development Aid and the statement goes something like this: “security is a necessary pre-condition for development, a contribution to the re-establishment of security and the promotion of peace in countries and regions where there was previously systematic violence, crime and terror. It is an investment in poverty reduction and economic growth.” Denmark was one of the first countries to establish clear principles for development activities against terrorism. Now what’s remarkable about these two statements is that they have both come from development agencies which have the reputation for promoting pro-poor development, human rights agendas and who have pushed the most benign of aid agendas in the world and what they point to is a growing tendency to not only link security and development but to link our security in the North with their development in the South. And this we come to in two ways, first we see it as a new and worrying trend but secondly we see it as part of a long-term process whereby development and security have always been linked. Development grew up in the era of the Cold War, the first development decades, 1950s and ‘60s saw development and security very much linked, saw development very much couched in Cold War terms and agendas and during the 1970s particularly there was a long hard battle on the part of people working in bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies to de-link development and security agendas. Of course development aid has always been linked to the interests of donor nations but by the mid-1970s the explicit aim of overseas development assistance came to be seen as something promoting Third World poverty reduction. The important thing was that these agendas of poverty reduction and economic growth came to be seen as important issues in their own right, de-linked from military and security agendas and it has been a long hard fight to keep those issues separated and yet what we are seeing now is a re-emerging development security nexus and at one level it is hardly surprising, given events of recent years since 9/11, since the London bombings, since various wars where development and security agendas have become inextricably mixed. But we also point to another tendency which is that during the 1990s there were a lot of people who mourned the failure of post-Cold War development agendas to attain the same prominence as foreign policy as other line ministries concerned with overseas issues, whether it was Trade, the Ministry of Defence and so on. So during the 1990s and in addition to pushing a development agenda, you got a strong push towards increasing development budgets, the significance of development in a joined up thinking kind of way across government ministries and in a way what we have landed up with now is a case of be careful what you wish for because as development has grown in prominence and as that has been
accompanied by increased budgets for development aid more and more other agencies, departments and ministries have had an eye on that development budget and so for example if you take the UK’s Department for International Development we had a highly successful Secretary of State for Development in the form of Claire Short and the profile has been maintained by Hilary Benn but what has happened is that the increased spending on development is something that the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are looking at, to see where joined-up thinking might equal joined-up budgets. So ironically it seems that just at the time when development funding is better than it has been for a very long time, the autonomy of development agencies administering ODA is under threat.

What we do in the paper, and I am not going to go into this in great detail, is that we look - to the extent that it is possible to discern - at the relationship between development rhetoric and aid flows. Now unfortunately the OECD figures on development aid only go up to 2003 and most of the rhetoric about the development security nexus actually begins in 2004, 2005 so one cannot systematically trace aid, aid flows versus military spending and how that has changed in response to the changing rhetoric. However what it is possible to demonstrate is that across all development sectors spending has increased towards countries that have a significant role to play in the war on terror, either as allies or as being maintained as neutral front line states or as non-Arab Muslim nations and this is the case not only with US aid, which is where you might expect this to be the case, but across the board. JIKA, the Japanese Aid, French aid, for example, all this has been strongly supportive of Algeria but this has increased since 2003 along with increased aid to Central Asia. Pakistan is now the highest recipient of aid out of all countries across a number of bi-lateral donors.

I just want to say one more thing in relation to development aid and the security development nexus and that is that it is not just about the foreign policy of bi-lateral donors but it is also about the role of multi-lateral donors in a uni-polar world. The World Bank and the UN both have quite serious hawks located there in the hierarchy by the Bush administration in the form of Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton respectively and this cannot go unnoticed and is bound to affect the relationship between security and development. What I have talked about mostly in this introduction is the war on terror and I think that is appropriate because I am going to hand over now to James Putzel who is going to talk about US imperialism and David Keen in the blue shirt who hasn’t yet been introduced, who is going to talk about the war on terror as well and I will pick up, along with our other speakers, on aspects of terrorism and development more specifically in the latter part of the debate, so thank you. [APPLAUSE]

James Putzel
Good evening everybody. I’m happy to see that the room is packed. I’m sorry about the people who are left outside, we were told that no longer can we have people sitting on the floor, this is a change in recent years but I hope that as this special issue of the Journal of International Development gets out we can disseminate some of what we want to say tonight more widely. I am talking to a paper that is coming out in this Journal entitled ‘Cracks in the US Empire: Multi-lateralism, uni-lateralism and the war on terror’. And I think this perspective is really rather important to inject into the discussion about the war on terror and about the phenomenon of political
terrorism today. In the aftermath of the bombings of the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon in 2001 where 3,000 people were tragically killed, the Bush administration
declared a war on terror and on the basis of that war on terror very quickly launched
an invasion and occupation of Afghanistan to over throw the Taliban government that
had been as you know self-professed involved in sheltering Osama bin Laden in the
Al-Qaeda network who proclaimed responsibility for those attacks on New York.
There was a fairly broad coalition behind the United States in that invasion but less
than a year and a half after that attack on New York, the Bush administration under
the banner of the war on terror, launched an invasion and occupation of Iraq, closely
supported by the Government of the UK, with a much smaller handful of countries
backing it. Since then the estimates of civilians killed, and the numbers are very bad
on this but there are at least over 125,000 Iraqis dead, as a result of the invasion and
occupation. Some 67,000 to 70,000 were civilians, another 50,000 were combatants
and some 3,000 were Iraqi police and military personnel working with the US. There
are another almost 2,000 soldiers of the invading and occupying forces who have been
ekilled up until the end of or the beginning of September, last month. The lion’s share
of those being US, since they make up the lion’s share of the forces who are operating
in Iraq. There are about 140,000 US troops in Iraq and another 23,000 from more
than 27 countries that are participating with the United States.

There is a real brutality that has come across in the context of this invasion of Iraq, a
brutal face of the United States has been revealed to us through photos of US Marines
shooting dead defenceless old men as it occupied and emptied the town of Fallujah.
The photos that have emerged from the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.
So there is an ugly side to this imperial adventure that’s begun to strike us and strike
the public around the world. I situate this argument, this analysis of what is
happening in the US, against the writings of a number of different authors in the paper
and I don’t have time to go into that but just to mention perhaps three people who I
talked about in more detail in the paper, who in a way encapsulate some of the
opposing interpretations of what is going in the US war on terror. The first is Miko
Yunatsia, many of you may know of him and his work, who essentially has argued
about a US imperial project but one that is benign, one that forms the context for
humanitarian interventions now and in the future, another is a recent book by Deepak
Lal who is an economist who launched quite a serious attack on our profession some
20 years ago, the profession of Development Studies who has written a book in
defence of Empire, and basically from an economic perspective argues that the US
again is a benign power that has the possibility of ruling over a liberalised world
economy now and in the future. The third author that I cited and one to whom I am
more sympathetic is Mahmood Mamdani who is originally from Uganda and who is
now at Columbia University. He has written a book called ‘Good Muslims Bad
Muslims’. I think it is a very important book to read if one wants to understand the
complexities of modern political terror. Mamdani argues that we have to understand
the United States action in the tradition of Western Imperialism but he thinks that
there are some very important distinctions in terms of the role the US is playing today.
Most importantly, he argues that the United States in its defence of democracy, in its
defence of liberal markets over the past few decades has actually transgressed the line
and opened the doors to political terror in its own actions around the world, its own
military interventions and we can talk about this and debate this in the discussion
period I think. In other words they pursued an intervention internationally that
violates international law and involves the application of what we know as collective
punishment to those societies and political systems with whom it disagrees. Mamdani sees in the US a knee-jerk reaction over the past three decades to any expression of militant nationalism in the developing world. I think his argument is very important but there are some ways in which I also would take my distance.

All three of these authors argue that the US position in the world today is unassailable and in a way the unilateralism of the Bush administration is unassailable and I try to argue, as I’ve written in this paper, that there are real cracks in the US empire, that the economic foundations of US power are questionable and perhaps difficult to sustain over time. Moreover I would argue in a way that some times enrages the critics of the United States that there really is a debate at the heart of the United States and it is a debate that is reflected between what the Bush administration calls old Europe and the United States, and that’s the debate between unilateralism and multi-lateralism and a multi-lateralist position that was weakly defended by the critics of the invasion of Iraq among European state leaders, the multi-lateral position offers a different trajectory for the projection of what we might all agree are imperial interests. That debate I think is the most strategic one that’s going on, it’s a debate that exists inside the United States around which the American population was polarised in the last election but so far has not emerged victorious in the United States and I would even argue has not been articulated very clearly. So there is a weak political opposition in the United States defending a position of multi-lateralism or even weak multi-lateralism that for me offers the only kind of hope to create a different kind of international context to rein in some of the more bellicose actions of the United States and perhaps begin to create a context in which the grounds for political terror can begin to be removed and that’s the argument I develop throughout the paper.

Let me very quickly sketch some of the important points that I try to make here and just lay them out for the consideration of the audience and for any debate that we have which follows. I think the first point has to do with the consolidation of the US position under the Bush administration. I would add it was a clear departure from what was being pursued by the democratic administration earlier, and this departure is marked by the publication of the National Security Strategy of the George Bush White House in September 2002, just one year after 9/11. And in that National Security Strategy there are three really crucial developments. The first was an unadulterated commitment to unilateral action, to unilateralism and a move away from multi-lateralism. The second was the doctrine advanced for pre-emptive action and the third and much less talked about was the commitment to an unconstrained proliferation … or not proliferation but rather development of nuclear weapons technology by the United States and on all three scores I would argue that this represented a departure, a kind of a consolidation of a foreign policy, of a policy for imperial projection that’s defended by those who we’ve come to know as the neo-cons or the neo-conservatives in the United States. The unilateralist’s position has been articulated by the US Department Secretary of Department of State, Condoleezza Rice, and even before the Bush administration was elected, during the campaign she talked about an international community that was illusory. Rather like, recalling the discussion of Margaret Thatcher about society, ‘there is no such thing as society’, anybody remember that? - Condoleezza Rice said ‘there is no such thing as an international community’, that was the crux of the critique of the Clinton White House and the Clinton foreign policy. A doctrine of pre-emptive action that basically declared that the US could at any time, anywhere, attack anyone who in its estimation
poses a potential threat to US national security. This stands in the face of and violates embryonic international law and opens the world to basically a world beyond law. And finally, the national security strategy celebrates the strategic Arms Agreement signed between Bush and Putin which basically removed all limits on the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal and something that I think needs a lot more attention and I hope the students at the LSE might research into this and look at it more carefully.

The second thing that I want to mention is the war in Iraq and the motivations that were involved in going into Iraq, the motivations of the United States. I don’t have a lot of time to put all the arguments I put in the paper, suffice it to say that first of all the arguments around weapons of mass destruction existing in Iraq have been totally disproven but we knew it and many of us wrote about it before the invasion occurred. There were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Secondly, arguments about human rights or the defence of human rights in the face of what was a tyrannical Saddam Hussein Baathist Party regime begin to pale and look rather sour, look rather hollow, in light of the scale of deaths and violations of rights that have occurred in Iraq since the invasion began, very difficult to defend the invasion on that score. I would argue that the Iraq War, the move into Iraq, represented a confluence of interests behind this coalition that came to power with George W Bush and we have plenty of evidence that before they even came to power that they were dead set on removing the Saddam Hussein Baathist Party regime in Iraq. I want to read one quote, even though I know I have very little time, because I think it is very striking. This comes from a strategy paper that was put together by leading interests within the Republican Party before Bush came into office and they were summing up the situation in the Middle East and the situation of Iraq and it said “The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security, while the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein”. It goes on to say “from an American perspective the value of such bases, that is bases in the Persia Gulf region, would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term Iran may well prove as large a threat to US interests in the Gulf as Iraq has and even should US Iranian relations improve, retaining forward based forces in the region would still be an essential element in US security strategy, given the long standing American interests in the region”. There was a very determined group and a determined opinion to remove Saddam Hussein from a very early stage long before 9/11 but also it is clear that the United States moved into Iraq to demonstrate its fortitude, its commitment, to the doctrine of pre-emptive action on the one hand and also as a statement to the United Nations to say that US power would no longer be constrained by worrying what happens at the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, there was a motivation that very much was driven by a particular group within and behind the George Bush administration that simply defends the power of the fist in foreign policy and I could say more about what that means in the discussion.

There is a very important point that I have no time to really get into the details of, that I make in the paper, and perhaps it is better because it is an argument based on numbers, but in terms of the strategic weakness of the United States which I think needs to be injected into this discussion, I think we can see this in two principle factors, first of all the United States lives at the level that it does and US military spending has reached the heights that it has because of the position of the US dollar in
the world economy and I would argue that that position is very fragile indeed. The United States operates on a plummeting deficit both a current account deficit that has meant that structurally it no longer is a leader in world exports, it is rivalled by Europe and Asia in that regard and that even in imports European countries, from a much more balanced budget position, are creeping up on the United States as a market for the world’s products. The US has a burgeoning government deficit that has reached $500 billion by the end of 2003 and continues to grow and the only reason it can grow and sustain its … it can continue to grow in that way and the US can sustain itself is because the dollar is the currency of deposit internationally, where all the world’s savers, all the countries of the world guard their reserves in USS. But this is a very fragile position especially now that we have the Euro, internationally we see the Euro gaining as a currency of deposit at the moment and we see the fundamentals of Europe much stronger in a way than the United States. This represents really some very basic cracks in the United States. However, at the present moment, if we look at the politics of Europe or if we look at the position of Asia, neither is in a position economically or militarily to challenge the US hegemony tomorrow and so almost by process of elimination the only hope for a change in the direction of US interventions internationally and in the doctrine of pre-emptive war at the present moment, seems to be down to what happens in the US political arena and that’s where the debate between unilateralism and multi-lateralism could influence the future direction of international politics. At the moment I don’t end on a very optimistic note because we don’t see a strategic policy articulated by the political opposition in the United States that really is believable at the present time but nevertheless I think that is where we have to look for some challenge to the US and its current strategy of war on terror. Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE]

David Keen

Ok I’m sorry I was a bit late, this is partly because I was detained under Anti-terrorist Legislation at the door [laughter]. I had a bit of trouble convincing them that I was a Speaker which tells me that although I am going grey, I’m not going grey enough. In terms of what I want to say - I have also written a paper for the Journal of International Development. One of the reviewers said he didn’t think I had anything to say about development and he wondered whether that would be a problem for the editors which is a call for Jo to make I think but Development is a broad church anyway so it may turn out to be relevant. I should say, Dennis has asked me to introduce myself, so I am David Keen and I teach Complex Emergencies here at LSE.

One of the things I try to talk about in the paper is that I think there are important lessons to be learned from attempts to combat the use of terror within a range of civil wars, lessons for example from Africa or parts of Africa, and one of these is that proliferating weapons and often times pretty deep seated anger at political and economic exclusion have fuelled conflicts that I think can’t be understood or addressed as a struggle between two teams, let alone between good and evil as we are sometimes invited to believe. Another lesson I think is that abusive counter insurgency or counter terror by extension, profoundly shapes patterns of violence in any given context, often attracting supporters to an otherwise or hitherto relatively weak rebellion. Now you know that some US administration officials have optimistically compared Al-Qaeda to a snake that will die when the head is cut off. Other analysts I think argue more plausibly that the network resembles a kind of a mould, you have to tackle the environment in which it grows, and this kind of war of
analogy often in the sense that it is analogies that are implicit rather than explicit, is quite crucial, I think it so happens in this case that the mould is a more apt analogy and also that chopping off heads or chopping off, eliminating the leadership of Al-Qaeda which has been an enterprise in which the US in particular has been actively involved, is something that in so far as it succeeds in the immediate objective tends to increase the decentralisation of Al-Qaeda and actually to help to produce an organisation which in some sense is more difficult to monitor or to control or get a handle on. There is I think an assumption which we see often also in civil wars, in the war on terror, that the troublemakers are a discrete group of essentially evil individuals whose elimination will solve the problem, and part of what we have to do, and I am probably preaching to the converted to a large extent, is to look at processes of becoming, and this I think demands a sense of history, and since that often gets lost, our willingness to face up to the damaging effects of one’s own nation, for example political and military interventions over a long period. A history in a way for Bush and Blair that has been narcissised and projected into the future. When they speak of history it is usually in terms of how history will judge their interventions but I think we need another kind of discussion.

As with civil wars in which politically and even militarily, counter-productive tactics are prevalent, it is important I think not to take the expressed aims of the war on terror as a given and to look at the functions of the violence and even the functions of the predictably counter-productive tactics in a certain amount of detail and I think that includes, I don’t really have time to get into a lot detail, but political, economic and psychological functions within the US, the UK and a whole range of governments who have been to a greater or lesser extent recruited into this so-called war on terror. What you tend to find I think with civil wars in many parts of Africa is that the designation of a particular source of unrest or rebellion or evil provides a lot of opportunities for a whole range of actors within a very diverse counter insurgency or counter terror structure for abuses of their own and the more universally despised the enemy, for example the IUF in Sierra Leone that was doing all the amputations and so on or Al-Qaeda itself, then the more likely it is that they are going to be very significant spheres of impunity which power actors are able to carve out for themselves within the context of an alleged counter insurgency or counter terror operation. So part of what I am trying to do, and I’m not the only one, is to map that complicated coalition and to question the degree to which all the actors that make up that counter terror coalition actually have a genuine interest in eliminating or weakening precisely the phenomenon which gives them the opportunity as it were to play other political and economic and psychological games that may stand them in good stead. So there’s an idea there about looking at systems rather than contests. In terms of the … there important I think shared dynamics between counter insurgency and counter terror networks. One of these is the prevalence very often of these counter-productive tactics which predictively induce support for the named opposition. I think abusive counter-intelligence and counter-terror tend to have the effect of knitting together what are often quite diverse grievances, grievances among those whose targets for violence might otherwise be resolutely local. So for example Hugh Roberts has stressed that anti-American feelings are neither natural nor of long standing in countries like Algeria and Egypt but that in some sense aggressive US actions have tended to superimpose an American enemy on top of local grievances.
Revealingly I think the idea that bad things are the responsibility of a few evil individuals has informed both the tactics in the war on terror and the official US response to revealed abuses like those at Abu Ghraib, which were dismissed as you remember as the work of a few bad apples and the use of torture in third party countries like Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia has also preserved in a sense the idea that bad things are the responsibility of “them” and not us and these denials of responsibility are closely linked I think to a persistent tendency to exaggerate the decentralisation of violence in relation to ones friends and one can see this also in terms of the Cold War period which was another war in which there was a designated and demonised enemy and another war in which very valuable opportunities for abuse and exploitation arose for those collaborating in the struggle against this named enemy so, exaggerating the decentralisation of violence among ones friends and alongside this an enduring habit of underplaying the decentralisation of violence among ones enemies, in this case the terrorists. So abuses in the counter terrorist system if they are admitted are said to reflect a breakdown in the chain of command while the enemies abuses are said to reflect a ruthless imposition of command and I think this mis-characterises for one thing the nature of Al-Qaeda, it side-steps the responsibility of the West and also widespread anger and that has informed acts of terrorism and what you have in some ways is a kind of a, I think a model which I equate with a kind of rebirth of magical thinking in the West which supposes that by eliminating a designated set of evil individuals you can solve this particular problem. This is a kind of a rebirth of thinking associated with the old witch hunts I think. It centres very much on the idea of pre-emption as James Putzel mentioned. Pre-emption in turn depends on the idea of being able to judge somebody intention which can take you into a sphere that is well beyond this sphere of evidence-based conclusions.

I’m sorry I’ve been told to finish up and I think I will, thank you. [APPLAUSE]

Jude Howell
I will be fairly brief and talk about my paper in the JID which is looking at the effects of the global war on terror, on civil societies. First of all I want to say that I take the global war on terror to be a complex term which has a range of meanings and functions which of course makes it very malleable. So I think about the global war on terror as a mobilising discourse, which global and national leaders make full use of as an expression of a polarising vision of the world which pits modernity against backwardness, barbarity against civilisation and freedom against oppression and a term that has a very militaristic content. The language itself, war, terror and its association with pre-emptive military intervention. It also embodies the idea of a global political re-ordering, the reshuffling of global alliances and divisions amongst states in the world since 2001 and also as Jo Beall pointed out, a new set of institutional and policy arrangements which gives rise to this rather disturbing nexus between development and security. And of course in terms of the world debate and development, the global war on terror has, as several of the speakers have pointed out, led to a change in the ideological justification of aid on the interconnections between development, security and foreign policy and also changes in the direction and flows of aid. So what then has been the effect on civil societies? Of course it is very difficult to demonstrate any neat direct causal effects though already there are some very visible explicit effects which I will talk about but it is difficult to establish direct neat causal relationships because in many ways the processes that the global
war on terror has kick started are about the intangible creation of climates of opinion or shifting attitudes and a semantic construction and manipulation of ‘others’ and enemies.

I am going to briefly mention three key effects of the global war on terror on civil society and development and then talk about six key challenges that arise for civil society actors that need to be dealt with. Firstly I think one of the main effects has been the constrictions of spaces in many countries, whether we are talking about the North or the South. Two things are important here, first many governments have proved very skilful at deploying the language of terrorism to undermine and oppress perceived enemies and although they may have done this a bit before now the language of terrorism gives those efforts a new resonance and a new, stronger justificatory power. I am thinking here of course of Uzbekistan, if you remember the uprising in Aberjan where some of the people who participated in that had been depicted as terrorists. Similarly in China the secessionist movements in Chin-jiang and Tibet are also cast in the mould of terrorist activities, extremist, terrorist, religious and so on. Zimbabwe is another example and more generally many governments have in using deploying the language of terror have cast a veil of suspicion over civil society actors as potential terrorist fronts. If we take the case of the US for example, the US has drawn up a list of specially designated global terrorist organisations, interestingly, it is only Muslim charitable organisations that figure in this list. In Britain there was investigation of the NGO Interpal which is on the US list of global terrorist organisations yet when the Charity Commission investigated this case they could find no evidence that Interpal was linked in any way to terrorism and so the story goes on and I think what is disturbing is that the targeting of Muslim organisations in this way creates a tendency to construct groups in which Muslims participate as having some affinity to terrorism. It creates the notion of a dangerous other and ultimately undermines the rights of Muslims to associate and organise and be part of civil society.

A second key effect has been the suspicion that has been cast upon relations between Northern and Southern NGOs and this can be seen in the crude, very crude surveillance and monitoring of links between donor agencies, foundations, bilateral agencies and so on and NGOs in the North and South. To give you a very explicit example, all US donor agencies, be they bilateral agencies, NGOs or Foundations, are expected to make sure that their partner organisations in the South do not have any any links or associations with so-called terrorist organisations yet when the Charity Commission investigated this case they could find no evidence that Interpal was linked in any way to terrorism and so the story goes on and I think what is disturbing is that the targeting of Muslim organisations in this way creates a tendency to construct groups in which Muslims participate as having some affinity to terrorism. It creates the notion of a dangerous other and ultimately undermines the rights of Muslims to associate and organise and be part of civil society.

A second key effect has been the suspicion that has been cast upon relations between Northern and Southern NGOs and this can be seen in the crude, very crude surveillance and monitoring of links between donor agencies, foundations, bilateral agencies and so on and NGOs in the North and South. To give you a very explicit example, all US donor agencies, be they bilateral agencies, NGOs or Foundations, are expected to make sure that their partner organisations in the South do not have any any links or associations with so-called terrorist organisations and for example USAID requires all its partner organisations to sign an anti-terrorist certificate saying that they have no links to any terrorist organisations or that none of their employees in their offices are associated in any way with terrorism and of course this has had knock on effects of money being withdrawn from some NGOs for example operating in Palestine because they cannot show that they are not linked to terrorism. Recently I was talking to some people in Oxfam who were telling me about another similar story about some NGOs in Palestine which have refused to take US money because they don’t feel they can be absolutely firm in signing the certificate because it is almost impossible to know. Similarly in other countries, Russia, Uzbekistan, China moves are also being taken against NGOs. Putin for example in 2003 and again in July 2005 came out strongly against Western NGOs and their strategies in the former Soviet Republics and in particular linking Western NGOs to democratisation agendas because we know that US NGOs have a big role in democratisation agendas in the
former Soviet Republics but linking it also to regime change and that they played some fundamentally … fundamental role in the colour revolutions of Kurdistan, Georgia, Ukraine and interestingly in the case of China, the Chinese government has also become quite worried about these colour revolutions and the role of Western NGOs and local NGOs in China and is very concerned that these may be playing a rather different role than they are presenting and has instigated investigations of foreign NGOs and local organisations in China during this year.

The third key effect is around this issue of humanitarian intervention and some of the issues that both Jo and David have talked about in their papers and the key issues around how to maintain the principles and neutrality, impartiality in independence. This is a very live and issue in Afghanistan and Iraq where the military are increasingly playing a role in relief and development work which is very confusing indeed on the ground, that’s a whole subject in itself but it obviously presents a lot of dangers to humanitarian, NGO humanitarian workers who are working in the field.

Ok what do the implications of all of this, some of these very immediate consequences for civil society actors? I think there are a number of challenges and I’ll briefly draw your attention to these. First of all there is a big issue like how, as a donor agency, how do you handle the monitoring of award holders and a receiver of donor money, how do you handle that and what is the effect of this on the relationship between grant givers and grantees, how do you maintain trust when there is this air of suspicion surrounding your activities? Apart from of course the administrative burden of trying to manage this, I’ve heard that various Foundations have found it a big administrative burden to try and sort out all of these anti-terrorist certificates and so on. For humanitarian workers there is a big issue about how to maintain a commitment to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. I think it is not enough to re-assert a code of conduct but in the longer term we need to look much more closely at the role of humanitarian agencies and the foreign policy agenda of the countries and devote more time to understanding the complex politics of the countries where they are operating and may be in particular to clarify the identities. Are organisations operating as nationless international organisations or national agencies operating internationally.

The third point is that NGOs, such movements and activists need to think about how to continue to organise, advocate and campaign around marginalised interests particularly where certain groups and certain issues are constructed as linked with terrorism.

My worry is, my fourth point, that development agencies which have had a somewhat benign and euphoric approach to civil society organisations in the 1990s are going to actually become much more conservative in their choice of partners to work with and that in that process the voices and interests of more marginal groups that may be seen as a bit risqué are left out and that the spaces brought by participation and inclusion that were prized open in the 1990s are going to be increasingly constricted. For advocates of particular causes I think it is very important to remain on the alert, whether we are talking about refugees, asylum seekers, Palestine Secessionist Movements or whatever and there are particular challenges here about how you continued to advocate around marginalised issues, how you keep things on the political agenda when the governments of different countries and global actors are trying to present those issues as not political but as an economic problem or as a
cultural problem. So it raises a lot of questions about how you frame your demands, how you shape your questions, how you seize the discord in this new context and linked to that I think we also have to remain alert to what is happening in countries that are the new allies of the United States or other Western powers where any human rights abuses or restrictions on civil society will be rather conveniently overlooked and I think Uzbekistan until recently was a very good example of that and therefore I think as in the Cold War period we have to remain alert to what is going on in the countries of so-called allies as well.

And, my final point is really about issues of accountability and legitimacy of civil society organisations which in any case has become an important issue of the last few years and I think in this situation NGOs actually do need to be ahead of governments and to get their own houses in order. So in a nutshell I think that civil society groups, actors, organisations need to be actually more pro-active and more organised, more strategic in defending and expanding the spaces for dialogue and engagement and for determining the rules underlying how groups within civil society, how donors and civil society relate to each other and how the states and any particular context and civil society relate to each other, so it is time to move away from defence, reactive reactions and move towards strategic thinking and positioning. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

Jo Beall
Ok, I am going to be very brief and just say something about the relationship between cities, terrorism and development. I think the history of warfare has always seen cities as sites of both protection and sites of attack. The twin towers events of September 2001 made it very clear that cities are also vulnerable to terrorism, now this was nothing that hadn’t happened before but it demonstrated this fact very, very clearly. In the burgeoning literature on the war on terror that came in the wake of 9/11 there was a lot written on cities but it was all written on cities of the North, of the global North and what I argue in my paper in the Journal of International Development is that cities of the global South are important to understand if we are going to understand anything about the urban dynamics of terror and development and yet when reference is made to cities of the global South its invariably in terms of breeding ground for terrorists or hiding places for radical Islamists. But what I try to point out is that cities of the South have themselves been targets both episodic and sustained acts of terror and I am thinking here of Mumbai and Bogotá and Karachi and Kabul amongst many others. What’s important in terms of focusing on cities is that the London bombings of July this year demonstrated just how interlinked terrorist networks are and how they span very permeable borders, so from Leeds to Karachi to Lahore and finally London the planning and execution of those bombings operated across cities as nodes, as links in international networks. Now I know that addressing issues of terrorism gets us into very tricky ground, very tricky definitional ground and I want to make it clear as to how I am using the definition of terrorism here and I am referring specifically to terrorist acts rather than terrorist actors. In order to avoid (a) the vexed question of when one person’s terrorist becomes another person’s freedom fighter and (b) to disassociate my analysis from the more essentialist analysis linked to the war on terror, I am happy to come back to this in discussion.

What’s important is that the geography of terror has moved on to the global stage by way of cities, by way of cities that represent specific urban symbols. The message of
the London bombers for example was that any war perceived to have its origins in London would come back to roost in London and this is something that makes it very difficult to challenge the development security nexus. It is important to say something about why the city is important with regard to acts of terror, one aspect is its physical, the physical environment of cities, the density of populations, the symbols of urbanism and urban life and urban power. Cities are important because they are the engines of economic growth for most national economies and addition economies of scale can be derived from cities in terms of reaching the welfare objectives of states. In other words, infrastructure, basic services and so on in a city reaches more people than if they were extended to villages. So this means that cities are important as symbols, terrorists are not going to blow up a village as no-one would notice and what this in turn points to is that terrorism is an act perpetrated on urban residents but also something of an international language itself.

The second point I want to make in relation to cities is that we need to differentiate between cities of the North and South. Cities of the South actually have experienced far more terrorist attacks than cities of the North, some of these attacks are of domestic origin but in such cases often have got caught up and translated through the discourse of the war on terror to become internationally linked whether or not they are. Secondly, the vulnerability of urban citizens differs from cities of the North and to cities of the South and within cities it is often the everyday people on their way to work on the Tube or people living in hazardous conditions in crowded slums and so on who are the innocent victims of acts of terror.

In looking at terrorism in relation to the other hazard and risks and vulnerabilities facing urban populations in cities of the South, it is important to recognise that terrorism is only one kind of urban violence that they face. Cities are also sites of political conflict and opposition and civil war as both Jude and David have talked about. There is violent conflict in cities over resources that are scant and scarce and those kinds of battles can intermesh with other forms of urban violence like criminal violence, gang warfare and other features of the brittleness of urban life for the urban poor and I think it is important that violent conflicts such as these should not be confused with internationally linked terrorism although in the rhetoric of the war on terror they often are. Here too we have to see terrorism as just one of many other risks, risks associated with environmental hazards, poor people in shacks on the sides of cliffs that suffer landslides or that live in industrial areas and face petrochemical explosions and I think one thing that is useful here is to make a distinction not only between different forms of risk but in trying to underpin what constitutes the difference between cities in developing countries and cities in the North, to make a distinction between the notion of vulnerability and risk whereas vulnerability for people in cities of the South and especially for the poor, vulnerability is far greater whereas what terrorism is doing in terms of risk is levelling the playing field.

I think the only other point I want to make in relation to cities and terror is that I include in my definition the notion of state terrorism. This is controversial and some people would argue that what I call state terrorism is in fact a violation of human rights by states, nevertheless I choose to talk about state terrorism because the kinds of acts of ethnic cleansing and urban cleansing such as we have seen in Harare where whole areas of urban settlement have been destroyed by the Mugabe government, that to me is an act of terror. But this is again something we can come back to in
discussion. In terms of the impact of terrorism on development, I think it does two things and this is to come back to this distinction between vulnerability and risk. It increases the vulnerability of poor people. It is far more difficult for cities of the South to recover from destruction - reconstruction takes longer, it diverts resources from other areas of development spending towards reconstruction rather than development. States that are seen as terrorist, or as failed states, have resources withdrawn by bilateral donors and that again reduces spending on development. When you have a situation of high risk and high insecurity you have an increase in gated communities, the better off closing down, shutting up, building walls around themselves and disengaging from development cooperation, disengaging from working with governments, disengaging from paying their municipal taxes and so you have a breakdown in governance and democracy and that is one of the biggest casualties of terrorism for development. [APPLAUSE]

Ben Wisner
I haven’t said anything yet and already half of you have left the room, I’m deeply disturbed. Thank you for all coming and thank you for being such a patient and attentive audience, hopefully we will draw this to a conclusion fairly soon and hear from you which is very important. I learned my rhetorical style from Fidel Castro, I had a seven hour presentation prepared and I have been told by my friend Dennis I only have ten minutes, so, let me try. I work in Disaster Risk Management and I work as an Adviser to the Secretary of the United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the newly founded United Nations Centre in Bonn, which is a research and training centre on environment and human security and I am going to talk about one of the additional cracks in US imperialism which is in fact a crack at home which is visible through the hurricane Katrina and the way in which the war on terrorism has actually eroded the capacity of nations around the world in fact to deal with vulnerability and with risk that is really daily and chronic and episodic and much more frequent than terrorist attacks but let me back up and make a couple of more general points. And I do so in awareness that many of you are Masters and PhD students and I always like to sort of throw out some seeds. I’m going to throw out a dozen seeds for really wonderful dissertations and studies in books and please go off and do some of these things. I think James also did that.

Terrorism and counter-terrorism have a long and complex interrelationship with development and under-development and I would say probably with mal-development. If one defines terrorism as acts intended to produce mass casualties among civilians in situations of political conflict, the history of the relationship is ancient. Caleb Carr in his book the lessons of terror proposes a broad definition of terrorism, he says this should be conceived as a contemporary name given to, in the modern terminology of warfare ‘deliberately waged against civilians with a purpose of destroying their will to support either their leaders or policies the agents of such violence find objectionable’. Now in this broad sense this definition is applicable certainly for instance to the wars of national liberation in Algeria, Vietnam and Mozambique and the struggle against apartheid and I think as such it is extremely important for us to look at the long term impacts of the form of development that those successful revolutions came to practice. In particular what you got there but as well in the Soviet Union, Cuba, China and a number of other places in where national development was emerged from the cauldron of terror and counter-terror, you got an initial centralism and commandist, modernisationist stance toward development
which in fact seriously moulded the development of five-year plans in the entire sort of project of development for in some cases decades and I think it is important to look back at that as a heritage of the relationship of development and terror and counter-terror.

But moving on to another important point, and this is just to add perhaps a gloss or a footnote to the whole notion of the seedbed, the breeding ground of terrorism that James and Jo and others have mentioned. I am teaching a seminar at the moment at Oberlin College on Security and I have been reading a wonderful book called ‘Food Wars’ that an old friend of mine Tim Lang and Michael Heasman wrote a couple of years ago and in that book they show that in many, many countries of the Middle East and Asia they have simultaneously at this moment an epidemic of obesity in children, side by side with continuing chronic stunt and wasting of children. In fact in Egypt for instance between 1978 and 1996 child obesity has quadrupled, increased four times, at the same time as you have continuing patterns of under nutrition. Now I would submit that this is for middle class and working class recruits to whatever you might call terrorist organisations, a very, very kind of offensive kind of symbol of westernisation and Americanisation and it goes hand in hand with the fact that the State in many cases such as the Egyptian State cannot in fact provide a safety net and the basic services for people who the losers in the global, economic globalisation process. In fact quite the contrary, Islamic organisations, the NGOs that other speakers were referring to are providing some of the basic health, agricultural extension and other services, educational services in these communities and I think that the conjuncture of the two actually have to be considered as part and parcel of the causal network that actually is producing what we see as this contemporary terrorism.

But turning to my own field of practice and study which is natural hazards management, let me put the question I would ask about terrorism and development this way, what impact has the war on terrorism had on the worldwide project of disaster risk reduction heralded by the media coverage of Japan in January 2005 and this in fact overlaps quite a bit and may be amplifies something that David Keene was talking about in relation to complex emergencies. In fact the world disaster approach in 2005 was just published a few days ago, I wrote Chapter 2 actually in that which is on the hurricanes in 2004 in the Caribbean, the over arching pattern shows that in the last two decades people affected by disasters has gone up by about 60%. Now it doesn’t mean there are more disasters, I mean Mother Nature is not sort of playing up in an unusual way; it is the same old mother earth with the possible exception of some increased intensity of cyclonic storms but not their frequency. But basically disasters are constant, what is increasing is the number of people vulnerable to those disasters to use the same word that Jo Beall used, and in facing up to this challenge the World Conference in Kobe actually put forward a very ambitious view of disaster risk reduction which would include in fact work, serious work, on the Millennium Development goals, management of conflict and reduction of global warming while in fact adapting to its impacts. Now this, that probably doesn’t sound like a terrible ambitious kind of final document but nevertheless you know the … the drafting committee was of course you know spending 20 hours a day trying to argue the Americans into some sensible position, I mean its very difficult as James said but nevertheless it actually is quite ambitious even though the Americans insisted that there would be no targets etc, etc, no new money, no you know but nevertheless this is an envision that disaster risk reduction is part and parcel and has to be
mainstreamed as part of sustainable human development. Now this has extremely important legal institutional and programmatic implications and the so-called war on terror actually undercuts the whole thing, and it undercuts it you know, I will be very brief I have one minute, undercuts it in two ways. First of all, over the last 15 or 20 years there has been a general move from military based disaster organisations in countries to civilian based disaster organisations. The military based organisations work on the basis of command and control and they are mostly interested in immediate response and that the general tenancy has been to civilianise them and to mandate them to work on prevention, long term prevention, mitigation of risk, reducing the vulnerability and preparedness and this has been going along really well, driven by a lot of assistance from the United Nations and by regional organisations such as CEDARA in the Caribbean and CEPREDEMAC if you will excuse the long acronym in Central America after hurricane Mitch. Now in fact the US Southern Command throughout Latin America is going around now saying let’s go back to military-centric disaster reduction organisations. In East Africa, in Kenyan Times in … the sites of two embassy bombings within the last decade … the US has provided enormous amounts of assistance for hospital triage in urban emergencies and for terrorist response in countries that don’t even have significant nationwide networks for dealing with drought and flood ok and that don’t have the public health infrastructure, even the basic primary health care infrastructure to deal with challenges such as cholera, increasing malaria as global change, global climate change changes the habitat of the anopheles mosquito or of avian flu.

The second way that the war on terror has undermined the capacity to deal with these daily disasters or at least the hazards that hang over peoples lives in a daily way and they manifest may be every five years as a major flood or major hurricane or a major drought, is that resources have been cut back. Now this brings me to hurricane Katrina and I won’t go through all the tragic and deplorable scene that you have all witnessed in various forms on television and read about, but let me say that I used to work with FEMA at a certain point and beginning with the Bush administration before 9/11 but certainly accelerating afterwards when FEMA was absorbed into what many people refer to as the Homeland Security super-agency, FEMA lost many, many, many of its experienced people, they just couldn’t take it. I mean I bailed out even before that. They also lost a significant amount of their budget to other agencies within the Homeland Security Super Department and as a result we all saw the inability of FEMA to respond to hurricane Katrina. It was known in advance, we saw it coming, we had three days notice and they couldn’t respond afterwards. Let me say in conclusion that the causes of contemporary terrorism are likely to include much more than poverty or simply the lack of development. More likely implicated are polarised development, economic development and social development in situations where the state is weak and cannot provide compensatory assistance to those at the bottom, the losers in the process and that the other way around, the current monomania and fixation on terrorism is further undermining the ability of many states to meet the needs of the majority of their citizens who are much more likely to suffer drought, flood, earthquake, blizzards and not to mention hunger, water borne disease and HIV aids than terrorist attack. The failure to protect citizens from natural hazards further de-legitimises the state and I think that is a big problem we have to concern ourselves with in relation to the Crisis States Programme. Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE]
Ian Linden

Most of my friends in the 1980s were terrorists so I take this all very personally. I think it is rather odd that in the context of 2005 we have been having a debate along the table which has been in many ways ignoring religion, in many ways marginalising religion. We’ve conflated the sort of the 1980s, the terrorism of various organisations that might or might not have been involved in nationalist activities and we’ve as it were I think largely because we are in a very secular university, we’ve sort of marginalised Islam which is, which is very odd indeed. At the very most I think we can say that we would create a very one-dimensional analysis of what’s happening, if you don’t understand evangelical Christianity and its dynamics in the States, if you do not understand Jihadist Islam in North Africa and the Middle East, Indonesia and other places, you are not you might say going to understand very much about what’s happening at the moment, that’s perhaps putting it perhaps a little strongly. It’s definitional terms, the whole story, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter is perhaps a very trivial and unimportant point though it is messed up in the United Nations definition of terrorism for a very long time because of the Arab States. On the other hand one woman’s terrorist is another woman’s holy martyr. It does seem to me of significant importance because it is vital if you are dealing with religion which involves narratives, practices, virtues, life worlds and symbols embedded in historical experiences in particular religious communities, if you are dealing with that and if you are dealing with what evolves out of that in certain abhorrent manifestations, feeding on the ambiguity of violence within all religions, then it seems to me you do have to understand the context, the meanings and the dynamics within important religious systems that are relevant at the moment and obviously evangelical Christianity, Jihadist Islam are very important. "Eamon Washeldahedis 999", second in command in what is left of the core group in Al-Qaeda spends an awful lot of time working with an apologeticist position on what is essentially just war theory, mediated into the Islamic tradition and the whole analytical definitional account of terrorism, which is all about killing of innocent civilians, though of course the agency was very important in definitional terms, was it a national group or was it a sub-national group but the core of it is the calculated deliberate killing of innocent civilians for political, economic and other goals. Now, "Eamon Washeldahedis 1009" spends a lot of time explaining of course that if you are dealing with Israel you are simply dealing with soldiers who temporarily take their uniforms off because they have a conscript army, if you are dealing with Britain and the United States you are dealing with people who vote the defence budget, who vote the collusion with the Israel government, who vote the foreign policies that evolve the invasion of Muslim lands and so on. So what is the degree to which they are innocent within the framework of a Jihad conception? Ironically a lot of this Jihadist thinking is extremely westernised because it moves from a Muslim concept of a communitarian responsibility to defend Islam, to defend the holy places, to a highly individualistic one. The move from Osama bin Laden’s statement in ‘96 through to his statement in ‘98. In ‘96 he declares Jihad on the United States of America after the failure essentially of nationalist jihadist struggles in the Middle East and North Africa. He moves from a communitarian responsibility to an individual responsibility creating in the actual idea and action of Jihad a core symbolic action orientated position within Islam turning Islam as it were into a religion of resistance focused on Jihad. In one interview he says Jihad, I want it to be like worship, it is that central in the thinking, it is that distorted in terms of the Islamic tradition. So if you are waging
a war on Islam what is more important, all those lads from Kentucky blundering around Iraq or is it somebody like Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, big speaker on Al jazeera, who says no. The suicide bombing in Israel that is different, there is a war going on, its defensive, the Palestinian people are defending themselves. The attack on the United States is totally inadmissible and he is coming out of a sort of semi-Jihadist tradition. On Al jazeera around the world into Muslim communities people are listening, that is infinitely more important in terms of a war on terror than anything that is going on by the imposition of armed force on populations in the Middle East.

As for the Evangelical Christian side I don’t think we should exaggerate its importance in the United States of America but if you look at the dynamics of American foreign policy, the sort of shifts from unilaterality to multi-lateralism to unilateralism again, you can see the period after the Second World War was strongly dominated by a multi-lateralist conception, the support for the United Nations and it had a strong kind of Episcopalian, Presbyterian support. A group of church leaders in ‘41 set up the Committee for the Restoration of, I always forget the exact title, Restoration of a Just and Lasting Peace. And we have three major things that they were going for, one being advocacy in government. One was the establishment of a solid body of international law, secondly the creation of the United Nations charter on human rights, they wanted a charter of human rights and the third which actually sort of happened as well was a Trusteeship body for decolonisation in different parts of the world. They got it, they got it in the United Nations. The evangelical Christian influence on a United States foreign policy is very different. I mean just telling you those three characteristics of that particular period you can see just how different it is.

I want to leave you with two as it were thoughts for the day, little snippets, factoids I believe they call it on Radio 1. One little factoid - Mohammed Attar, a key player in the 9/11 attacks, guess what his doctoral dissertation was on? Somebody probably knows, it was on, let me read it out for you, it was on ‘The analysis of Islamo-Christian Architectural Fabric in Alleppo-Syria’ and he was very much interested in doing an analysis of the way the sort of architecture and the town planning by bringing Christians and Muslims together was a very important and significant feature of the city. He was entirely not in favour of separation. And he wasn’t that sort of man and he certainly wasn’t within that separation tradition whereas Eamon Washeldahedis 1090> coming out of, coming out of that Egyptian tradition was. And I had one other lovely factoid for you which I don’t know whether I can find in the time, oh yes another lovely one, when they took one of the computers in Kabul and the security people grabbed a computer in an allegedly Al-Qaeda house, it had on it guess what, Menachem Begin’s 1951 autobiography ‘The Revolt’ because they were terribly interested in how the Irgun did their terrorism in that particular post-war period. I just leave you with those two factoids. [APPLAUSE]

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Thank you very much. Now we have about 55 minutes left and what I suggest is that I’ll take three or four questions, depending on how many people have some in one go, give the speakers a couple of minutes each to come back on them and then open up the floor again for a few more questions. So, questions please. I think we have a microphone just …

1st Questioner
Hello. Hi. Would the Panel think that in the history of the Middle East there is a long tradition of every country being dominated by tyrants and therefore Saddam, the Shah, Ottoman Empire, USA, is just another tyrant.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Anybody else? Over there.

2nd Questioner
Yes I have a question to Dr Putzel. I very much agree with your analysis about the cracks of the US imperialism but I have a question about your solution where you talk about the multi-national or multi-lateral solution sort of coming from within the United States. I would like to ask why you think that didn’t gain the upper hand so much and may be also a question that combines Professor Jo Beall’s introductory presentation and the comments by Dr Keen when David Keen spoke about the comparison of the snake and the mould. Isn’t the mould exactly what the EU security strategy or what the Canadian and the Danish development centres are all about, bringing development or creating opportunities for those who are marginalised but it also called draining the swamp. Thank you.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Other here and the over there. I’ll come back to you.

3rd Questioner
Hello, I just wanted to ask a question to Jo Beall about the stuff about cities whether there were any more positive sides of cities that we can look at in the context of the war on terrorism, if we can bring out some if the positive roles that cities can play, that you might not be able to see at a national level and also what the city stuff you are talking about might tell us about the kind of concepts that are developed in the developing world as two separate worlds which is obviously quite damaging in that it leads to a distinction between terror, counter-terror and those kinds of issues. For anyone really on the Panel.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Ok, last question and then we’ll come back to you two in the second round.

4th Questioner
Good evening, thank you. I want to raise a question because development, the <??? 1170> from the North to the South <??? 1170> but what, my question is a little bit not easy to ask because I want to, how do we view our <?? 1172> cooperation, how can we <?? 1173> cooperations between the law itself <?? 1173> because <??? 1173> because how do we view and we fly we <?? 1175> on the IT and the economy <??? 1177> liberty and freedom, this cannot <?? 1178>. Thank you.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Do you want to have a sort of minute or two and we’ll just go along and then we’ll come back to the questions.

Jo Beall
I’m going to be very brief because I would like to hear more from the audience. I think the last question was about the implications for development cooperation I think
and I think there are, it is very difficult to know what, what the implications are except and how we can address issue, how we can address issues in development cooperation more soundly. I think one of the things that we have to do is keep a watchdog role on development to make sure that too many resources are not spent on reconstruction as opposed to development or that development and reconstruction objectives are combined, that money isn’t funnelled out of development budgets into military spending and so on, so that would be a brief answer to what I think I understood your question to be. On the positive side of cities, that is really important. Just as cities are sites of war and terror they are also very important for reconstruction and peace building and if you just think of Nicosia in Cyprus, again the line that divided the city above the ground, the sewers and the pipes and water and drainage under the ground still had to serve both Greek and Turkish populations, so it is very difficult to unbundled cities. If you take a recent, a recent meeting between the Mayor of Taipei and the Mayor of Shanghai, they were able to engage in ways that their national governments could never have done. And in the paper I cite the example of someone who is in prison, an Hamas leader in prison who was elected Mayor of a border town on the West Bank and who despite being seen as a representative of a terrorist organisation by the Israelis was nevertheless engaged with in terms of issues of urban development because the bus is full and the trains still have to run on time so there are immense areas of potential for using cities in the urban context towards reconstruction and peace building. I’m going to hand over now so I don’t hold the line up.

**Chair: Dennis Rodgers**

You have to speak quite close to the microphone.

**Ben Wisner**

Let me just respond in a general way to a number of the things that were asked by a very perspective audience’s questions. In relation to the election of conflict and international inter-group teaching as a pre-condition for development for economic and social development, you might want to know about the existence of a website, and it is basically Disasterdiplomacy, all one word, Disasterdiplomacy.org. Now if you go there what you will find is a friend of mine, Ilan Kellman has actually begun to pull together all sort of interesting historical cases where disaster response and experiences has actually pulled countries together and actually begun to bridge complex and in fact the long civil war in Aceh in Indonesia has actually been at least hopefully successfully concluded in part, pushed on by the terrible experience of the Tsunami. I also want to call your attention to the existence in New York City of a small NGO called First Responders for Peace. These are actually a group of firefighters and emergency medical technicians who are against the war in Iraq and they’ve actually gone to Iraq and they’ve met several times with their counterparts and are campaigning together for an end to the war. So I think there are definite kind of links within civil society as well that can help direction. Finally just let me say in relation to this question of implication for development cooperation. I actually don’t think that the, I mean short of … short of some terrorist using a deadly nuclear device in a city somewhere, the actual economic cost of recovery from a terrorist attack is probably not going to be very high in relation to the cost of recovery from something like the Tsunami or a major hurricane like the super-cyclone in 1999 in Orissa in India or hurricane Katrina or hurricane Mitch or for instance the Kobe earthquake, I think though that the important point is that we do maintain this
watchdog role in relation to military and security spending and try to keep the development agenda from being adsorbed within the … or re-absorbed from within the you know inside the security agenda. In fact quite the contrary, I think we should campaign to get say 10% of all the military budget in the world, not much, just 10%, in the first instance just to retrofit and protect schools. Thousands of school children died in Kashmir just a few weeks ago ok, that was not necessary, the engineering exists, the organisation exists, pilot projects from the Agha Khan Foundation, the UN Centre for Regional Development in Central Asia, all of this exists. We know how to protect schools, we know how to train local masons to protect schools and it doesn’t cost very much, it doesn’t cost, it’s not costly. Ten per cent of the military budget could do that and could retrofit hospitals and relation them to draining the swamp, I mean how much good will would it produce to actually have schools and hospitals that didn’t fall down in earthquakes.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Thank you, James, can you be brief.

James Putzel
Yeah I think so. In relationship to this idea that there have always been tyrants in the Middle East and is the US just not another tyrant. Well I would just say that if we look at the history of the region since World War II and we that various nationalist movements emerged in Western Asia and if anything withstands taken by the United States towards them has tended to favour tyrants. So if we look at what the US did in Iran and its inspiration of the Shah of Iran or if we look at Saddam Hussein himself, who was very much empowered and emboldened by the United States, so I think that there is a diversity and there was more of a diversity in the nationalist movement in that part of the world made much more restrictive by the attitude of not only the United States but Britain and other Western powers vis-a-vis the politics there and not least the kind of endorsement they gave to specific orientations of Israel and the Israeli government in terms of securing a position in the region and I say that despite my relatives who are very much believers in the Israeli project.

The second thing I wanted to say was in answer to the, the question about multi-lateralism. Why didn’t it gain the upper hand. Well I think the first thing to say is the most important and that is that the multi-lateralist position is weakly articulated by the democratic party. That Clinton was a hesitant multi-lateralist at best and we don’t have a strong multi-lateralist position developed in the US and I think why those, we have to understand that there is a powerful unilateralist tradition in the US, in US politics and to some extent Mamdami - I really do urge you to read his book - gets in to this in a way that similar to certain things I have written in the past, some of this comes out of the settler character of the US policy which, where a whole nation was built on a genocide of indigenous people and a nation that hasn’t yet come to terms with those origins. I think it has a very illiberal foreign policy since the days of ‘manifest destiny’ and so it is an uphill struggle to win the population over to a multi-lateralist position.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Right I’m going to make an executive decision and actually stop the comments here, get the two questions there and start from the other side so you get at least three comments from the other people - so those two questions there.
5th Questioner
I have a question slightly getting away from the US because I think it was also very interesting what was mentioned at the beginning that other states also are recruited into this war of terrorism or not. Well my question is may be it is not suppose to be so unfatalistic but isn’t it just unrealistic to assume that well any kind of policy field is just going to be unaffected by these waves of public attention which are not just kind of a factor of lets say Bush manipulating the agenda, so I am not trying to say that its all, in every case justified, but is it also a case of just sitting back and waiting the thing out a little bit because for example, if you look at some policies which are at least to the European context, what actually these in general foreign policy terms, I’m not talking about specific NGOs, I just don’t know enough about this, but at least so far and to my knowledge not all that much changes and it is a lot of really just symbolic politics, is it really all that alarmist what is happening, lets talk about really you know outside from the US where undoubtedly there has been a major seed change.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
There’s question at the back over there.

6th Questioner
Hi, I’d just like to make a comment and a question. The comment is just a, there seems to me to be a risk of getting confused between the risk of a terrorist act and the risk of a terrorist campaign and it is about the risk of a terrorist campaign that I am going to ask a quick question about. Terrorist campaigns obviously would be financed and those financing would then be from a black market and the question that I have to ask is, bearing that in mind, wouldn’t it be appropriate for the military to be involved in order to deal with the proliferation of the black market because that would encourage an expansion of such things as arms and drugs and therefore there is a role for the military in dealing with developments.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Are there any other questions? Three … one over there.

7th Questioner
First I would like to agree very much with Dr James Putzel’s observation that the US has played a part in the creation of the rogue states, that it is now trying to take care of itself but the question is how would you predict the US’s military presence with huge bases in Northern Uganda and at Djibouti for the development of the whole of Africa and the sub-Saharan African region in general.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Right and before I hand over, I’m just going to ask a quick question myself which is to a certain extent this Panel has actually created an opposition between terrorism and development, almost implicitly saying one is bad and the other one is good. If we have development we’ll have less terrorism. Of course development is a very disruptive process, it comes with a lot of costs, I mean it is about social change, there are winners and losers. Terrorism of course can be possibly provoked by development in many ways so let’s start with David, David do you want to come up here?
David Keen
Ok well I’m going to talk about the, another executive decision, the comment about ‘is the US just another tyrant’ because that’s got me thinking the most in a way and I think what that does is it raises the issue which I think is very important of what are the conditions in which democracy can be established. Now in terms of British rule in Iraq and then subsequently in independent Iraq, I think you have had a situation of the predominance of a Sunni minority and this historic predominance sits pretty uneasily with democracy, so if we are talking about is there a connection between authoritarianism and terrorism, I think there is. We have to look at US links to authoritarianism, we have to look at the career path so to speak of terrorists and the role for example of torture and authoritarian regimes in propelling people along that path. Where I think we have a problem is in the rather simplistic diagnosis of the Bush administration in particular but if there is a link between authoritarianism and terrorism then the plausible removal of authoritarianism and the forceful imposition of democracy will in a sense solve the problem and I think one of the things that we are coming up against in Iraq now is the difficulty of imposing democracy very suddenly and by force on a country where there have been other traditions, other patterns of historical domination by particular ethnic and religious groups and so on. And this I think was you know something that we are interested in, very much in the crises states research programme, the idea that it may be … the imposition of democracy if it is done very suddenly can be something which precipitates various kinds of violence. The example of Rwanda comes up and the genocide there in reaction partly to an attempt to impose democracy very quickly. So I think it is something that we have to think about, what are the links between authoritarianism and terrorism but also whether the links between rapid democratisation and mass violence.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers
Ok so I think we’ll give Ian the last concluding word.

Ian Linden
Thank you. The question, that is the first question where do we go from here on, well it wasn’t the first question on development, but it was perhaps the general question. Just to tell you a little bit about what the Ministry for International Development is doing in this country, I participated in a research programme looking at the way in which Muslim organisations could participate in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Because on the whole DFID had by a sort of default position tended to support secular and Christian NGOs in that order, the work that I did was largely in West Africa and it was absolutely fascinating. It is very clear that Gellner is wrong in that lovely book on Conditions of Liberty about the incapacity of Islamic countries to create civil society. I mean that’s clear in Egypt where the Muslim brothers have moved into a whole range of different organisations, they control the Bar Association, they work very well with Christian Copts in the Pharmacists Association in what is a quasi trades union. This is equally true in West Africa where mosques form the basis of quite important social services and projects amongst aggressive Imman and even the Dowa societies are doing some good science education and other work. There is such a thing as Islamic civil society, I mean it would be preposterous if there wasn’t. So that is the first thing I want to say that I think the way forward developmentally is to understand the meanings and idioms and framework of what Muslims mean by development and in dialogue with Muslim
communities to try and promote some of the ideas of development that we may have as a “development community” which may not correspond directly with those that are experienced and expressed by Muslims on the ground around the world, and obviously that is going to be an enormously different in Indonesia to what it would be in the North of Nigeria.

The second point I want to make is that I was really amazed and delighted that what you said over there because it seems to me that all the evidence indicates that there is no connection between poverty and terrorism, that in fact all the leadership of the recent wave of international terrorism has come from people who show many different characteristics and some similar ones. Very often experience of different cultures, being a minority of a minority, inventing a religious discourse that is not embedded in the local community, these are all very much mobile people. I mean a lot of the 9/11 bombers came from pretty lowly clans in Saudi Arabia, the sort of car drivers, carpenters and maids and that, they were not sort of the top of the ranking in terms of clans but they were all very upwardly mobile and actually physically mobile and like Sayeed Patup who went to the United States of America, they had great experience of other countries and those factors are probably actually quite important but your link between crime, collapsed states and terrorism is obviously one that is acknowledge by all governments except they don’t, I don’t know whether you saw that lovely article on Jersey in the London Review of Books, 500 billion mafia money, every dirty bit of money you can think of, has gone through the beloved State of Jersey Bank, just like it goes through the Cayman Islands and various other places. Now if you are going to drain the swamp it would be an awfully good idea to drain some of the Swiss banks and some of the Jersey banks and fake front companies, that would make a very, very good start.

Somebody talked about, wouldn’t it be a good idea to sort of you know stay your hand sweet Maria a minute, when dealing with some of these very intractable problems. The answer is obviously yes and as Neil Ferguson says for a completely different reason, yes if you haven’t got a trained  within your society able to run an intelligent civil service in the country that you are supposedly going to act as a sort of a Trustee for and develop, you are going to make a hell of a mess. If you want to be a British imperialist in an American mode, create an American imperialist … a British imperialist class in which there is a long training in working in these … in these sort of imperial colonial contexts. Of course it is very difficult saying that because he actually thinks the Americans should do it, I wouldn’t actually go along with that but he’s got a point, and he’s got a point because the catastrophe of Iraq is based precisely on ignorance and lack of experience in something that wasn’t, it has to be said, shown to such a degree in Germany and Japan.

**Chair: Dennis Rodgers**

Well thank you very much Ian and that wraps up the debate for tonight, apologies for the academic terrorism of the timing but if we could have a round of applause for our speakers. [APPLAUSE]

END OF RECORDING