The Just War tradition is concerned with limitations on the use of force, more than with the obligation to use force in certain circumstances. It was developed to curb the warlike tendencies of ambitious sovereigns, the expansionist aims of state elites, and the self-oriented nationalism of their peoples. Institutionalised Europe has, however, been successfully constructed on the basis of excluding force as an element in inter-state relations. The European Union is a ‘zone of peace’, freed since the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the retreat of the Red Army from any direct threat. The concept of ‘Just Peace’, propounded by the German Bishops’ Conference in September 2000, seems much more appropriate to this ordered region, with its references to ‘non-violence as a liberating concept’ and ‘conflict consultations...aimed at preventing the use of force.’ The challenge for European governments and political leaders in the post-cold war world is to justify to their publics expenditure on military forces and equipment, and the deployment of those forces in response to indirect threats outside the European region: the duty to intervene, The Responsibility to Protect, the obligation to contain internal conflicts, and to remain committed after immediate conflicts subside to rebuild states, societies and economies.

During the Cold War, most European governments and publics did not have to confront issues of projecting power beyond their boundaries. NATO managed security, while the EU was a ‘civilian power’. Military forces were focused on defence of Western Europe against Soviet attack: conventional forces played their part in the ‘spectrum of deterrence’ that stretched from local resistance to massive nuclear retaliation. Issues of justification for war scarcely arose when the expectation was that forces would be defending national territory, or the territory of close allies,
against attack. Questions of the appropriate application of force concentrated on the potential use of nuclear weapons as part of the spectrum of deterrence.

Britain and France, exceptionally, maintained limited capabilities for intervention outside Europe – the shrunken legacies of imperial power, now justified in terms of their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and as the contribution of ‘responsible’ powers to the maintenance of Western-led international order. Some other West governments developed extensive experience and skills in peacekeeping, through participation in UN missions. There were Swedish troops in the Congo in 1960, as well as in 2004; Danish, Norwegian, Finnish and Irish soldiers served in Lebanon, in Cyprus, in Sinai, and in smaller numbers in observer missions across the globe. The rules of engagement for such missions, however, were very restrictive, and the legitimacy of their presence established under UN mandate. Use of weapons was relatively rare, and weaponry was almost entirely light.

The end of the Cold War thus raised difficult questions about the future rationale for military forces in many West European states. As the dominant perceived threat shrank, defence establishments in Germany and Belgium, for example, faced the almost existential question of how to justify their continued existence when their national territories were no longer threatened. The Belgian government’s enthusiasm for joining both the Eurocorps and the (British-led) NATO Rapid Reaction Force was driven by the sense that multilateral engagement was the only way to provide a new role for their national military. General Naumann, the Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr, played a leading role in the domestic debate within Germany in 1991-2 on the admissibility of deploying German forces beyond national territory, for the same reason.

The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’, which had developed in the 1970s, carried comfortable connotations of moral superiority: America focused on force, which Europe spread prosperity and democracy (Duchene, 1972). It was, from the outset, an illusion; the security of Western Europe rested on the projection of American power. The European Union’s self-image, however, was constructed around this separation of ‘soft’ civilian power – the power of attraction, reinforced by trade incentives and financial assistance – from hard military power. NATO and the EU were both based
in Brussels, with substantially-overlapping membership; but there was almost no communication between the two, even between the separate missions of the same member governments. Institutionalised Europe, its proponents came to claim was (and is) a force for good, for spreading civilised values across the globe, promoting human rights and opposing the death penalty (Manners 2002; Diez 2004). It was relatively easy for Robert Kagan to portray this comfortably self-regarding Europe as believing in a Kantian world, while America coped with a Hobbesian one (Kagan 2003).

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, European governments have partly adjusted to the challenges of projecting force beyond their national territories. In 2003-4, 60/70,000 European troops were deployed outside the boundaries of the EU and NATO (Giegerich and Wallace 2004). The largest and most long-standing commitments were in south-eastern Europe – in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, where the EU was progressively taking over civilian and military responsibilities from NATO, and where European police and gendarmerie were slowly displacing heavier military forces. But contingents from a wide range of European states were serving in Afghanistan, both in the International Stabilization Force in Kabul and in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other operations elsewhere. British, Spanish, Italian, Polish, Dutch and other contingents were stationed in post-conflict Iraq; though only the British had taken part in the invasion, and in the course of 2004 first the Spanish and then other contingents began to be withdrawn. Operation Artemis, the EU’s first rapid-response deployment, deployed 1200 troops to the eastern Congo: French-led, with significant British, Swedish and German contributions, its deployment under way within seven days of the request for assistance from the UN secretary-general. British and French troops were also deployed in West Africa, on a formally national basis (but with discreet coordination, in facing untidily trans-border conflicts); Nordic troops were deployed in Liberia, under a UN mandate, though linked to the same set of overlapping conflicts.

From 1998-9, furthermore, West European governments had explicitly addressed the issue of shared security and defence policy within a European – as opposed to US-led, Atlantic – framework, with the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The British and French governments were clearly the leaders in this
process, with the German government (or, at least, the German defence and foreign ministries) a willing follower. The thrust of the 1998 St.Malo Initiative was to promote the reshaping of European armed forces around the British model, which the French had already adopted: smaller, professional forces instead of large, conscripted armies, with the equipment, transport and logistical support to operate at a distance from their home base. The 15 governments of the EU committed themselves under the 1999 ‘Helsinki Target Goals’ to provide collectively a force of 60,000 troops, deployable outside their combined territories within 60 days and sustainable as deployed for up to 12 months – which implied reserves for rotation and replacement, and a high-quality logistical chain. The target was not reached by its declared deadline, of the end of 2003, though (as has been noted) a comparable number of European forces were by then deployed on active missions. It has since been supplemented by a further British-French initiative, in February 2004, to organize for rapid deployment a series of European ‘battle groups’ (on the Operation Artemis model), some 1200-1500 troops including support for sustained deployment, challenging other European governments to demonstrate their ability to provide troops and equipment to the required standard. By December 2004 some 13 battle groups had been pledged (some on a combined basis, as between the Swedes and Finns – with Norwegian participation under negotiation), to be ready for deployment by 2007.

European governments, through the EU, are thus becoming a collective military actor, alongside NATO and to a limited degree autonomously from NATO. There is, of course, no prospect that the EU will develop into a military power comparable to the United States, let alone competitive with the United States. The pacifistic publics of democratic Europe resist increases in defence spending, in the absence of any clear and present danger; the combined defence spending of EU member states is now barely half that of the USA. Dependence on the United States for external security, and for the maintenance of global order, remains a deeply-ingrained assumption. The traditional posture of most European governments within NATO, both before and after the end of the Cold War, has been to complain about American security leadership, while reluctantly following the US lead; to hesitate over American projection of military forces, even though often providing limited support; and equally to complain when Washington failed to provide a lead or to counter a looming threat. The parallel American posture has been to call for greater European ‘burden-sharing’
in defence expenditure and force contributions, while neglecting to consult, let alone to share decision-making. This has, however, made for an increasingly unhealthy transatlantic relationship, for which there is less and less patience among politicians and publics on both sides of the Atlantic.

European governments therefore need to develop a coherent approach to the use of force, to support the role that they are gradually assuming. It has been characteristic of the indirection with which EU member states approach difficult issues of integration that ESDP was launched without an agreed strategic concept, without any open discussion on the threats to be faced or the appropriate actions to be taken in responding to them. The European Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, was drafted nearly four years after ESDP was launched. It was adopted by EU heads of government in December 2003, after months of discreet discussion among officials, with no encouragement of public debate in national capitals (Bailes 2005). It remains a largely-unnoticed document outside the small community of strategic experts in foreign and defence ministries and associated think tanks and university departments.

What European governments need, in order effectively to support the collective projection of military force outside their immediate region, is a more open debate within and among national elites, which can in turn generate support among their wider publics. That must address their preferred structure of global order, the major threats to that order, and the appropriate European contribution to meeting those threats – in military and non-military terms. It should provide a rationale for the use of force outside national boundaries, for the circumstances in which intervention in other states is justified or necessary. It should attempt to develop a consensus on the necessary process of authorization for the use of force: whether by the UN Security Council, or by other multilateral bodies (such as NATO, or the African Union), or under conditions of evident crisis by European governments themselves. Conversely, it must consider how far European governments should recognise an obligation to deploy forces under specific circumstances: in response to requests from the UN, or to strong evidence of genocide not yet officially recognised by the UN, or to significant surges of refugees across international borders, or to intelligence that transnational crime or terrorism is actively supported from within specific territories. It will also
need to address the appropriate relationship with the ‘authorities’ within territories
where European troops are deployed, and the rules of engagement when troops are
deployed: proportionality in the application of force and weapons used, willingness to
inflict and to accept casualties, instructions on the taking and treatment of prisoners.
Lastly, it needs a shared sense of responsibilities after the conclusion of conflict, in
terms of reconstruction and state-building.

In practice, European governments have gone a long way towards addressing these
issues in particular situations, without spelling out the full extent of their
commitments or the implications for future policy. The EU now exercises trusteeship
powers over Bosnia, and (much less clearly or successfully) over Kosovo. But rules
of engagement differ among national contingents, and readiness to commit or to
maintain forces (and to procure the equipment needed to commit forces more
effectively in the future) varies very considerably. Questions such as these are, after
all, deeply embedded within national ‘strategic cultures’: understandings of national
roles, responsibilities and identities, and of the place of military force within them
(Katzenstein 1996). Governments can only change national strategic cultures over
time, through active and sustained political leadership, unless the perception of acute
crisis alters the framework for national debate. There is a very large question about
whether or not it is possible for a non-state entity like the EU to develop a shared
sense of international interests and responsibilities, or a shared sense of direct and
indirect threats. The EU lacks a ‘Demos’, a political community with a common set
of myths and symbols and a shared public debate (what the Germans call a
Schicksalgemeinschaft; Weiler 1996, Wallace 2005). Some optimists have
nevertheless argued that the EU is developing a European strategic culture, seeing the
process of European integration in this field (as in others) as ‘a joint exercise in norm-
setting and institution-building’, in which the evolution of ESDP since 1998 is
creating an underlying consensus on means and ends (Andreani 2000: 83). This may
at best, however, represent ‘the beginnings of a European strategic culture’, among
the small group of professionals and specialists engaged in the construction of the
limited agreements and institutions so far established (Cornish and Edwards 2001).
Most members of national parliaments, let alone mass publics, remain largely
unaware of what has been agreed or jointly ventured.
The painful evolution of a European approach
During the Cold War, the undertones of moral superiority among progressive West European elites paralleled substantially lower levels of defence spending than the alliance’s dominant power, on which the West European allies depended for their security. France’s ambivalent relationship with NATO’s integrated military structures allowed some enthusiasts for European integration to envisage an integrated western Europe disengaged from its encompassing alliance, disregarding the heavy dependence of Germany on US forces, and the dominant role that American ships and aircraft played in policing the Mediterranean (with implications for American influence over Italian, Spanish, Greek, and Turkish domestic politics). There were internal contradictions in the stance that Belgian, Luxembourg, German, Italian and French political leaders adopted on the EU’s developing international role. These states, to one degree or another, supported the extension of cooperation in foreign policy to defence, and negotiated into the Maastricht Treaty of European Union (1992) a clause that committed the EU to a ‘common foreign and security policy [which] shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’ (Article J.4)

This clause had been carefully negotiated between the French and the Americans, with other European governments in between, in the course of redefining a new Nato ‘Strategic Concept’, in parallel to the Inter-governmental Conference that led to the Maastricht Treaty. And the US Administration then in effect challenged its European partners to demonstrate their capability. In the course of 1990-1992, the number of US forces stationed in Europe halved, from over 300,000 to around 150,000. American policy-makers made it clear that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a regional matter for which European states themselves should take responsibility; indeed, the Luxembourg foreign minister, then acting as President of the EU Council of Ministers, rashly declared, on a visit to Sarajevo, that ‘now is the hour of Europe, not of the United States.’ There followed a classic illustration of the consequences of willing the ends without the means. At one Council of Ministers meeting in September 1991, the German foreign minister is said to have insisted that ‘we must
send troops’ to protect Bosnian Muslims from Serb attack. ‘You mean, you want to send British troops’, the British foreign secretary replied.

The bitter experience of Bosnia, between 1991 and 1996, provided the painful learning experience that forced European governments and elites to confront the hard choices of deploying military power. The French, with fewest inhibitions about the projection of military force, would have sent in troops at an early stage in the conflict, which in retrospect might well have contained the conflict at a far lower level of casualties. But there was no consensus on the purposes or limits of intervention, or willingness from other governments to contribute to a joint force with robust rules of engagement. The British hesitated to intervene, partly because their experience in Northern Ireland had taught them that intervention in civil conflict risked stretching into long-term engagement in containing violence, in reconciliation and reconstruction. UNPROFOR was sent in with very limited rules of engagement, and with relatively light weapons – though within two years not only the British and French, but also the Danes, were following a more robust rule-book in containing Serb forces, with artillery and armoured vehicles. The Dutch company in Srebenica, with only light weapons, without air support or reinforcement, discovered the limits of peacekeeping operations when faced with well-equipped hostile forces, and stood by as the population it was tasked to protect were taken away to be shot. German politicians, meanwhile, were anxiously debating whether it was compatible with Germany’s limited military responsibilities for air force personnel to serve on NATO’s multinational AWACs (airborne early warning) aircraft over Bosnian territory.

While different dilemmas were being debated within different domestic political systems, officials of Europe’s weak security institutions attempted to provide some focus for inter-governmental debate. National defence ministers within the (then) ten-member Western European Union, in June 1992, agreed the Petersberg Declaration, which spelled out what became known as ‘the Petersberg tasks’:

“Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:
- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

These rapidly passed into the jargon of European policy-making, with references to ‘top-end Petersberg tasks’ acting as code for preparedness to use military force in an active as well as passive way, to ‘make’ peace as well as to ‘keep’ it. The 1997 amendment to the Maastricht TEU (the Amsterdam Treaty, new Article 17.2) incorporated these tasks into formal treaty language.¹

Operations in Bosnia were a painful learning experience also for the USA, and for the United Nations as a multilateral organization (Byers 2005). In Bosnia (and later in Kosovo) US forces had in some ways much more constricting rules of engagement than their European counterparts; force protection (the avoidance of American casualties) was ranked far more highly in their criteria than in instructions to British, French, or Danish troops.² The United States demonstrated a strong preference for the use of air power, to intimidate hostile forces into withdrawal or surrender, supplemented by training and arming local forces – an approach which it followed later in Kosovo and then in Afghanistan, as the approach was consolidated into the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and the concept of ‘Shock and Awe’. Committed European forces – the British and French, most significantly, but also some other contingents in Bosnia – placed much more emphasis on occupying the ground, and on establishing contact with the local population, combatant and non-combatant.

Here has been an emerging distinction between the American and the European approach to war, reinforced by American preoccupation with exit strategies and dismissal of post-conflict nation-building, in contrast to European willingness to move from peacemaking to reconciliation. There are, however, two limitations to this European approach. First, it is open to the American charge that the European allies are capable only of managing the more limited tasks of policing and nation-building after hard power has achieved its initial impact. The air war over Bosnia and Kosovo was overwhelmingly American, given the limited abilities of European air forces to identify targets or direct bombs accurately at them; the projection of force much above the ‘top-end Petersberg tasks’ was beyond the capacity of most European states. Second, few European states were able to mobilise and move ground forces in
sufficient numbers to occupy even the limited territory of Kosovo (the same size and shape as Northern Ireland) effectively, in spite of its geographical closeness to Western Europe. Only the United Kingdom’s promise to commit 50,000 of its own ground forces – nearly half the British army – to a ground invasion, as the core of a joint US-European force, persuaded Washington that a ground invasion was a viable option (Freedman 2004: 19).

The experience of Kosovo, confirming the immobility and inappropriate ‘legacy’ equipment of most European armed forces, set the context for the British-French initiative on ESDP. Their aim was push their partners towards reorientation of armed forces towards the more likely threats that they would face, outside their shared borders and, with increasing likelihood, outside the European region itself. It is important to emphasise how reluctant European governments and foreign policy elites have been to accept that distant conflicts may represent indirect threats, even when the spillover of refugees and transnational crime reaches their domestic territory. The UK, as well as most other West European governments, refused to recognise that the collapse of domestic order in Albania in 1996-7 represented a common threat, in spite of the spread of Albanian refugees across Europe. It was left to the Italian government to lead a limited coalition of the willing in a successful intervention, with other European governments joining in to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction. The St.Malo initiative was accepted by other governments in its initial stages on condition that its proposers did not spell out specifically where beyond Europe’s immediate borders common forces might be deployed; leaving discussions to focus on force structures and institutions, without scenarios for deployment.³ German officials, in particular, resisted the idea that common European forces should be deployed to sub-Saharan Africa, where British and French policymakers were still struggling to reconcile their different national priorities.

The intervention in Kosovo, it should be noted, was made without UN authorization. The Russian veto in the Security Council was accepted as blocking a near-consensus from the rest of the ‘international community’, with NATO authorization as the relevant regional security organization serving as a substitute. This was, however, a reluctant concession for some national parliaments; Joschka Fischer, as German
foreign minister, eloquently swung initially-sceptical German political opinion behind the case for intervention. It is, however, not at all evident that European governments or parliaments would accept future projections of force without specific authorization from the UNSC. Inclusion in the Constitutional Treaty of additional references to the use of force ‘in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter’ represents continuing reluctance to contemplate any pre-emptive actions, or the projection of force in circumstances where major states are divided about its use.

Without an open debate about strategic priorities and geopolitical interests, the restructuring of European armed forces was a procedural exercise, driven by formal commitments rather than recognition of need. Hardly surprisingly, such restructuring moved slowly between 1999 and 2003. Defence budgets stopped falling, but there was no accepted rationale for any increase. The German government repeatedly delayed committing itself to procure the transport aircraft which were key to the despatch and support of forces outside Europe, as it struggled with other demands on its budget; the Berlusconi government in Italy cancelled its order when it came into office, without proposing any alternative arrangements. Peacekeeping contingents from European states were accustomed to travelling to their missions by chartered civilian aircraft, either without heavy weaponry or with armoured vehicles transported by sea or in US or Ukrainian heavy air transport. They operated within a UN timescale which allowed at least 30 days for a force to be assembled, usually more. In practice, few defence establishments were planning to send substantial contingents much further than south-eastern Europe. National governments resisted the EC Commission’s efforts to include the Southern Caucasus within the remit of Europe’s ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ in 2002-3, for example, leaving support for the weak states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to the USA. They were more open to contingency plans for peacekeeping forces to be sent to Moldova, discussed within the NATO framework in 2003, possibly because it was possible to reach Moldova by land. When German troops were despatched to Afghanistan in 2002, a significant number were temporarily stranded in Turkey, because of the non-availability of the Ukrainian transport aircraft on which they depended.

Until the attacks of 911/2001, therefore, European approaches to war were evolving through the accumulation of experience in south-east Europe, without agreement to
apply that experience at greater distance from their borders. Within the Western Balkans, it is striking how far European governments were willing to accept the responsibilities of occupation and directed state reconstruction. In different ways in Bosnia and Kosovo, representatives of the EU assumed directing authority over domestic populations – collective trusteeship, or collective empire, depending on one’s perspective. In accordance with EU ambitions and US exit strategies, troop numbers and responsibilities have progressively been transferred from the United States (within NATO) to its European partners (within the institutional EU): a process that has culminated in the transfer of responsibility for Bosnia from NATO to the EU at the end of 2004, while military and civilian missions in Macedonia and Kosovo are now also EU-led. Alongside this long-term commitment to reconstruction, EU governments had in effect accepted that the Western Balkans, like their eastern counterparts, were part of the wider European community; the South-East Europe Stability pact offered all these weak states the prospect of eventual membership of the EU. This, in effect, implied also that military and police contingents within these states were no longer operating outside Europe’s borders; they no longer represented the projection of power, but support to neighbours who would in due time become partners.

Robert Kagan’s characterization of European attitudes to hard power as that of Venus compared to an American Mars caused outrage among European elites. It was, however, largely accurate. The evidence of European military structures and capabilities, levels of spending, and of declared strategic planning, as of the summer of 2001 – with the exception of Britain and France – indicates a group of governments deeply reluctant to address potential threats or to prepare to meet them. It is, for example, striking that there was so little linkage in national or EU-level policy between the development of intensive cooperation on internal security, including the management of immigration and asylum flows, and the development of external security policy. The Tampere European Council in 1999, which launched a five-year programme for the development of common policies for internal security (or ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’, as the EU labelled it), received a series of papers on the situation within states from which the greatest numbers of asylum-seekers came. Interior ministers agreed on the need to tackle the causes of forced migration ‘at the root’; but foreign and defence ministers appear not to have received the unwelcome
message that engagement with weak and failed states outside Europe was now a necessary response to the indirect threat to Europe’s domestic order that continued flows of desperate migrants posed.

Nor was there a consensus on the relationship between political and economic development and the provision of military support and training. Within Britain, certainly, there has since 1997 been much reorientation of policy towards the security foundations for nation-building, led as much by the Department for International Development as the Ministry of Defence. There was a singular precedent for such a linkage in the early stage of the Somalia crisis, when the Belgian government successfully negotiated reimbursement from the European Development Fund for the deployment of a battalion there, on the grounds that aid could not be distributed without military protection. But that lesson has had to be relearned in Darfur, where small contingents of European troops have attempted to support an African Union peacekeeping force, in protecting the provision and distribution of aid.

Until September 11th 2001 there was no substantial debate among European governments about the international implications of transnational terrorism, nor about the problem of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both of these were dossiers on which the Americans led, with limited consultations through NATO. National capabilities for intelligence collection and analysis were limited in most European states; Britain and France, the best-supplied in this respect, hesitated to share information with partners less careful to maintain secrecy. 911 was thus a shock to European foreign and defence ministries, as well as to wider publics. European responses since then have indicated the potential, and the limits, of the slowly-developing European approach to post-cold war disorder.

There has been a remarkable transformation in attitudes to the deployment of troops outside Europe. The German-Dutch corps has commanded ISAF; there are Danish troops in Iraq, Icelanders manning air traffic control at Kabul airport. 13 of the 15 pre-2004 EU member states have sent forces to Afghanistan, 9 to post-conflict Iraq. A great deal of this, however, has been in response to American pressure, rather than shared European analysis and agreement; the intervention in Iraq and its aftermath has been a source of sharp disagreement among EU governments. NATO, it seems, under
evidently dominant US leadership, still defines Europe’s security agenda, at least as far as Asia (west and central) is concerned. The African continent is the region in which the USA is content for European states to operate autonomously; but many European states are themselves unsure how far they wish to shoulder security responsibilities in Africa south of the Sahara.

**Is there yet a European approach?**

The development since 1999 of security and military staffs in Brussels (now including a European Defence Agency, to promote shared procurement and capabilities) has been remarkable: institutions and procedures at least, though not necessarily leading to policies and outputs. The deployment of forces outside Europe has also risen, to a level unthinkable five years before. But only in south-eastern Europe, and in the brief and modest deployment to the eastern Congo, has this been within an agreed European framework; forces in Afghanistan have operated partly under bilateral arrangements and partly under NATO, while in Iraq disagreement among European governments has unavoidably made for *ad hoc* agreements within a US framework. A cumulative learning process has however been under way, for all contributing governments. What have they learned, and what issues remain unresolved?

The ESS represents both a declaration about what foreign and defence policy-makers would like European governments to accept, and a statement of the limited consensus so far achieved. Its introduction declares that ‘Europe still faces security threats and challenges’, and that

...the European Union is inevitably a global player. ... Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

It identifies terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts among and within states, ‘state failure...the collapse of state institutions’, and organised crime as the key threats, while noting the frequent overlap between these different categories. It stresses the importance of strengthening the multilateral institutions of international order, both global and regional. It argues that it is a European interest to promote good governance and political and social reform. ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’.
This short and outline document leaves a great deal to be inferred from the evolution of practice on the ground, and from the response of EU member governments to parallel discussions in other multilateral contexts: the 2004 report of the UN High-Level Panel, with its similar emphasis on security challenges, and the March 2005 report of the Commission for Africa, *Our Common Interest*, which contains a substantial chapter (not much reported in media coverage on publication) on ‘The Need for Peace and Security’. A number of Europeans served on the UN High Level Panel, while the British Prime Minister chaired the Africa Commission; domestic sensitivities over the future development of European integration, and over its extension into defence, mean that it has been easier in some countries and political circles to promote open discussion around these other reports. The CFSP Secretariat has continued to press the expert debate forward. The EU Institute of Security Studies, in Paris, has published a series of reports and papers, while the Centre for Global Governance at the London School of Economics published *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (in September 2004) with the CFSP Secretariat’s support.

There is, as yet, no coherent or explicit European approach to the new security challenges or to the role of military force in countering them. Some indications of an emerging consensus are, however, emerging. There are, for example, significant differences in European employment of force from the American, in terms of proportionality, and relations with civilian populations: evident in Iraq and Afghanistan as in south-eastern Europe. European rules of engagement assign a lower priority to force protection, and a higher priority to protecting, and gaining the confidence of, civilian populations. These rules, it is true, have not yet been tested in such difficult conditions as counter-insurgency; the reaction of French troops in Kosovo to aggressively-hostile (but largely unarmed) crowds in the summer of 2004 suggests that most are unprepared for containing resistance that threatens to slip beyond control. There are also specific and delicate issues about European special forces – which include German, Swedish and Danish special forces, as well as French and British – and the compatibility of special force rules of engagement with European assumptions about minimum use of force. Divergences between national rules remain significant, and represent an important obstacle to joint operation.
European governments find it easiest to operate at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks. They are most comfortable with peacekeeping and nation-building, even though they have not yet agreed an approach to the deployment of forces to failed states to provide basic security while political and economic structures are rebuilt. In this respect, European approaches fit American assumptions: that hard power and heavy conflict is beyond their capabilities or intentions, while post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization are European skills. Few Europeans are prepared to admit explicitly that they continue to depend on the USA to counter direct threats from aggressive states (as in the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in the first Gulf War of 1991), but this is implicit in the scale of European military expenditure and procurement.

The small scale of deployable forces, and their limited weaponry, also raises questions about their dependence on American support in case of unexpected escalation of conflict. Shortage of transport aircraft and of rapidly-deployable reserves, and limited intelligence and surveillance capabilities, imply limitation of autonomy. In principle this should become less of a problem as ESDP develops, with shared resources making for more effective forces. But timescales for new equipment may well stretch further than currently planned, while competition for public expenditure continues to squeeze defence budgets.

European governments have not yet succeeded in defining the geopolitical context within which they wish to deploy force. Following the publication of the draft European Security Strategy, the Council Secretariat also produced a draft paper on WMD and European responses, which met a similarly-limited response from member governments. European policies towards Russia and the Middle East – the two most threatening neighbouring regions – remain hesitant, even incoherent. National interests and ambitions pull different governments in different directions; the European Council was unable even to present a united welcome to the newly-elected President of Ukraine in December 2004, and the French and German governments continued in 2004-5 to pursue much friendlier relations with Moscow than their Polish or British partners.
Linkage between the external and internal security agendas remains weak, and is also driven by divergent domestic circumstances and perceptions. Migration and asylum policies have become matters of intense domestic sensitivity, but not of combined external action. Rising opium production in Afghanistan, with a consequent increase in heroin supplies to Europe, had not lead to a significant increase in the scale of European commitment to security and reconstruction across that country.

Attitudes to the necessary authorization of force still differ. Britain and France are willing to deploy forces, if necessary, without UN (or EU) authorization, if faced with a perceived crisis in which their interests are at stake; most other governments expect and assume UN authorization. The sense of obligation to contribute forces remains contested. Nordic states, alongside France and Britain, share a sense of international responsibility for the maintenance of international order which inclines them to respond to UN requests; some other states have a notably lower sense of obligation.

The most distinctive European approach, evident within the Western Balkans, is the commitment to nation-building and reconstruction over the long-term, But there is not yet enough evidence from other deployments to support any generalization from this experience. It has proved difficult to persuade European governments to sustain a commitment to Afghanistan anywhere close to the level asked for by the UN Secretary-General. Deployment to Central Africa, into which it would be possible to deploy very large numbers of troops without succeeding in establishing and maintaining civil order, has been carefully limited both in numbers and in timespan. The integration of military forces with civilian police and reconstruction teams has moved ahead in south-eastern Europe, and in plans for the future development of ESDP, but has not yet been tested in failed states further south.

The debate on the use of force across Europe remains firmly at the national level. Tentative steps to promote a more open European debate have so far failed to arouse a response. Shared experience has, however, promoted convergence of national assumptions, and a more limited convergence of national capabilities. The search for a European approach to war, however, has to be pursued within the separate domestic debates of different European states; there is so far only the faint outline of a common approach.
References
Freedman, Lawrence (2004), ‘Can the EU develop n effective military doctrine?’, in Charles Grant, ed., A European Way of War, Centre for European Reform.
Endnotes

1 The text of the Constitutional Treaty, however, waters down these references to the ‘tasks of combat forces’, replacing them (Article I-41.1) with less explicit phrasing:

“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”

2 Information from various sources, including the contributions of professors from West Point, some of whom had served in Bosnia, to a round table at the ISA Conference in New Orleans in 2002. ‘We were firmly told there was nothing in Bosnia which was worth the life of an American soldier’ – an apparently unconsciously echo of a far earlier Prussian comment.

3 Personal experience of a seminar on ESDP in early 1999, where I gave a presentation on scenarios for deployment, and was roundly told by a senior official from a continental government that it had been agreed that this should not be discussed. Unwillingness to examine the most likely requirements for peacemaking may help to explain why the A400 aircraft, the future basis for transporting European troops on long-range deployment, has such inadequate range. Final decisions on design and procurement were made after the massacres in Central Africa (Rwanda-Burundi), with continuing conflicts stretching across several states; but the A400 (unlike the C17) lacks the range to fly from European air bases to Entebbe (the support base for Operation Artemis in 2004) without refuelling.

4 These included Somalia, Morocco, Iraq, and Afghanistan.