European foreign policy will never be freed from the burden of high expectations so long as the European Union survives and flourishes. Yet it will always struggle with the challenges of an uncertain and difficult external environment so long as it has ambitions much beyond its immediate borders. If it has been constantly criticised over the last decade, ever since the end of the Cold War and the high-sounding language of the Treaty of Maastricht, 11 September 2001 seemed to be a particularly brutal exposée of its weaknesses, re-emphasising as it did the importance of the very instrument the EU does not command, that of organised violence. It also seemed to inaugurate a new and dangerously unpredictable era of international relations, hardly suitable to the operation of a civilian power, which is seen to best advantage in times of order and stability.

This lecture considers whether the last year or so in the history of European foreign policy making has indeed demonstrated its limits and exposed fatal flaws, or whether we should not rush to judgment. Have the Member States which comprise the sinews of European foreign policy fallen back on their own resources and separate strategies, in a form of ‘renationalisation’, or has the shock of the Al Qaeda attacks led to regrouping and a renewed determination to address the gaps and weaknesses of the collective system? Does national foreign policy still retain the confidence of the public, or is there a desire for the European superpower Tony Blair called for in his Warsaw speech two years ago? Are those countries with relatively short histories of statehood, like Italy or some of the group of ten new entrants, as reluctant to give up national freedom of manoeuvre as are the old powers of
Britain and France, or is there a commitment to further integration, extending out from the achievements of commercial diplomacy and of the Euro? I shall approach these questions by looking first at the main substantive challenges which have preoccupied Europe in the last year – the ‘war on terrorism’, Afghanistan, Iraq - then at the other foreign policy issues which could not be ignored, such as Kashmir and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and finally at the more structural issues which predated 11 September, namely the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Convention on constitutional reform, and Enlargement. The aim is a further stock-taking, of the kind that I and others have variously made over the last twenty years, on the relative position of state foreign policies and the collective operations of ‘Europe in the world’, and to gain a sense of the trends and trajectories of the process, as revealed during the most testing international circumstances – indeed, at the start of a period which – if we are unfortunate could become our own ‘twenty years crisis’, or worse a ‘thirty years war’.

The French novelist Michel Houellebecq, who predicted the Bali bomb in his book *The Platform*, published just before the Twin Towers attack, now foresees a ‘carnage which is coming in the confrontation between Islam and the rest of the world…Islam cannot win this combat. Arab genocide will be the price to pay for the inevitable remaking of Islam…’.

This may be mere apocalyptical rhetoric; but now, unhappily, our previous certainties have been dislodged and nothing can be taken for granted.

A brief preface may be in order, so as to define terms. What is meant by ‘European foreign policy?’ The broadest interpretation would be to say that it covers all actions generated officially by Europeans in relation to the outside world, although some might say it should include the wider Europe of the candidate members and non-members – Europe qua region, or civilisation. These perspectives are too vague, in my view. Foreign policy always implies some sense of coherence, if not rationality. Although I have argued elsewhere that the
combination of the actions of the EU and of the individual Member States constitutes a ‘European foreign policy system’, this is not to say that it also represents a single European foreign policy. Indeed, we are still not yet at the point where we can confidently say that a ‘common’ foreign and security policy exists, where ‘common’ refers to the same broad lines of policy, but separately expressed, and ‘single’ to one, probably federal, voice. There is still a wide degree of divergence between national foreign policies, and much unpredictability, where the notion of a common policy would require sustained and predictable convergence.

The working definition of European foreign policy employed here, therefore, is that of the ensemble of the international activities of the European Union alone, albeit including outputs from all three of the EU’s pillars, and not just that relating to the CFSP. It cannot be pretended that this mass of activity is in itself coherent, constituting effective strategic choices, but there is no doubt that those responsible for making decisions, whether in the Commission, the Council Secretariat or the Presidency foreign ministry, are aware of the need to pull the threads together and to avoid excessive inconsistency. Moreover a conscious aspiration to achieve a common European foreign exists, on the basis of a huge range of bilateral and multilateral relations with third party states and international organisations. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to talk of the European Union’s foreign policy, at least alongside those of the Member States.

The Policy Challenges

The major challenge of recent years, not simply the last twelve months, has been the staggeringly successful blow at the United States dealt by Al Qaeda. This is not only because of what it reveals about fundamentalist hostility and western vulnerability – important enough in themselves – but also because of the forces it has unleashed in international relations more
widely, with the United States now prepared to flex its muscles more than it ever has done in
the past, and already serious conflicts such as that in Israel/Palestine becoming significantly
more inflamed. In fact there are four different aspects to the challenge facing the EU to be
distinguished: the problem of the immediate reaction; the war in Afghanistan; the conduct of
a longer-term ‘war on terrorism’; and the prospect of an American/western attack on Iraq.

The immediate reaction of the European Union to the appalling images seen in real-time from
New York and Washington was one of effective solidarity. This would have been the case
had the attack been carried out in Sidney or New Delhi, but the intimate connections with the
United States across all levels of European society made the identification more direct. For
all the anti-Americanism that is to be found in parts of western Europe, and the undoubted
general hostility to the Bush administration, democratic Europeans have not forgotten
American sacrifices in two world wars and know which side they are on in any conflict
between pluralism and theocracy. Thus the language of outrage and solidarity employed by
European governments was wholly genuine. Already by the end of 12 September, apparently
on a British suggestion, NATO members had invoked Article V of the Treaty to declare their
full support for the United States, if and when it could be shown that the attacks had been
directed from abroad (by 2 October this was thought proven and the commitment declared
operational). Clearly the Union itself did not give them that facility, since Article V gives
each signatory the right to take ‘such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’. The combination
of commitment and discretion in Article V had been designed to allow states (especially the
US!) some freedom of manoeuvre, and in any case it was rusty from non-use. It was therefore
all the more remarkable that NATO members, eleven of whom are also in the EU, made such
an immediate and bold commitment. By the same point, only 36 hours after the attacks,
formal statements had been made by President Prodi, by the High Representative, by the President of the European Parliament, by the two external relations Commissioners, and by the General Affairs Council, after an Extraordinary meeting attended by all but the Portuguese Foreign Minister, despite the short notice. Perhaps most significant were Javier Solana’s immediate and straightforward words: ‘the European Union stands firmly and fully behind the United States’ – although later on some Americans probably thought that the operative word here was ‘behind’.4

These were all essentially political commitments, designed to prove to Washington that the alliance genuinely was a two-way street, and that there would be ‘no safe haven for terrorists and their sponsors’ in Europe.5 The commitment has not weakened, but matters have become more complicated as the United States has embarked upon a range of counter-measures. In the early days, however, ideological differences with the Republican administration in Washington, and particular differences over the environment and international law, were set aside. Even the merest whiff of linkage politics would have been in extreme bad taste, and the Europeans behaved with dignity – and practical effect. One significant early statement came from the much criticised Willem Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, who – well aware of the dangers to the already fragile world markets – stressed on 12 September that:

‘the European Central Bank and the national central banks are standing ready to support the normal functioning of markets and relevant operational systems, if the need arises. Indeed, the ECB has been in close contact with the other major central banks in the world since the events have unfolded’.6

One day later the Commission tabled proposals for a ‘European Arrest Warrant’, to simplify Europol’s work against cross-border terrorists, no doubt spurred by the early reports of
Osama Bin Laden’s responsibility for the attacks, and the knowledge that his cells were active throughout Europe. Despite Silvio Berlusconi’s discomfort about the possible implications for Italian politics, the warrant was agreed in December, representing extraordinary speed, practicality and decisiveness by EU standards. In these first months, indeed, Berlusconi’s cavils stood out in a general picture of unity and determination not, for once, to be founding in a crisis. The only other ominous signs for European foreign policy unity arose from the evident wish of the big three states, notably Britain under Tony Blair, to exert leadership and not to stand politely in line waiting for the Belgian Presidency to act for them. Thus Blair, Chirac and Schroeder held their own meeting before the Ghent Council on 20 October, and blithely planning to repeat the exercise despite the previous protests from the excluded, in London on 4 November. This time, however, either Blair’s nerve failed, or the pressures of collective diplomacy system were brought to bear, as the prime ministers of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Belgian Presidency, together with the High Representative, forced their way, almost literally, to the table. This was a humiliating public demonstration of the tensions between national and collective criteria, and between the stronger and weaker members of the European foreign policy system.

It was no accident that the first cracks ad started to appear at this time. For US bombers had begun the war in Afghanistan on 7 October. Concerns over military action are never far beneath the surface in the EU countries, particularly in Germany, Italy, Ireland and Scandinavia, and this was no exception. Pacifist traditions, memories of the horrors of war, and fears for civilian casualties among a defenceless population combined to produce some active opposition and a groundswell of anxiety which would have heightened in the event of a prolonged campaign. In the event military success was not long forthcoming, as Kabul fell
on 13 November and a month later the remnants of Al Qaeda escaped from the Tora Bora
cave complex into Pakistan. The latest Afghan war was effectively over.

But even had things proved more difficult it is unlikely that the support of European
governments for the US-led campaign would have seriously wavered. As William Wallace
points out, even France and Germany chose explicitly to ‘bandwagon rather than to balance:
to declare their active support for the American response, and to offer military contributions
towards it’. For the attack on Afghanistan was not a matter of revenge. It had two,
interconnected, strategic aims, both of which the Europeans shared: (1) to force Al Qaeda
from their base in a sovereign state (and, if possible, to destroy them); (2) to remove the
Taliban regime, which had harboured Al Qaeda and was therefore complicit in acts of
aggressive war. That the US did not apparently need much European military assistance –
only British troops played much part in the actual fighting alongside the Northern Alliance –
was a secondary matter. In general the Europeans could cover for US planes and troops
removed from their own theatre, and provide back-up assistance in intelligence, transport,
policing etc. It was unfortunate if the unpublicised nature of such activity meant that the
Europeans (other than the British) got little political credit in the US, but that was a price that
had to be paid. The Bush administration was aware of its debts, and no doubt took them into
account in its cautious, relatively calibrated actions during the first year after 11 September.
For all the sabre-rattling, Washington has still not yet embarked upon *actions* which the EU is
bound to oppose. Afghanistan represented far-off, difficult terrain with the possibility of
‘another Vietnam’, but if the Europeans were not being asked for front-line troops, all the
better. In this worryingly diffuse ‘war against terrorism’, Afghanistan represented, as a state,
a visible, traditional form of target, even if the Europeans could never have mounted such an
operation themselves had they been the original victims of Al Qaeda. The only significant
military contributions (some) Europeans could make was through special forces, where the US seems still not to have learned the lessons of the Iranian desert fiasco of April 1980.

Once victory of a sort had been achieved, however, European capabilities – and will – came more directly into play. Although on occasions the kind of work the EU does has been sneered at as reduced to ‘clearing up’ or ‘foreign policy as social work’, it is an indispensable part of modern international relations, and requires the commitment of resources, political capital, and long-term thinking. It is also almost inherently multilateralist and open to cooperation with civil society, through both local and international NGOs. The ‘civilian power’ approach which the EU has pioneered is ideally suited to such scenarios as that of helping reduce chaos in post-war Afghanistan, and it was no surprise that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created after the Bonn accords of 5 December which legitimised a new government in Kabul, should have been largely composed of Europeans.

The ISAF has had contributions from 19 countries, of which 13 are EU members (only Luxembourg and Ireland being not contributing). Four more are EU candidates, with only Norway and New Zealand falling outside the charmed circle. The US is notable by its absence. Of these 19 nine have sent combat troops, all but one (Turkey) from the EU. Crucially for the EU, it is UN-mandated. Its role is modest, however, consisting only of 4,800 troops and being limited to the Kabul region. At least as important are the EU commitments to long-term aid with reconstruction. The EU has pledged 2.3 billion euros over the next four years (of which the EC budget provides 43% and special national contributions the rest), which is a large sum given that EC ODA to Afghanistan in the 1990s amounted only to c500 million euros, and that the EU has taken on other heavy new commitments recently in several Balkan countries. It is clear that the EU, with an inner group of states taking the lead
(Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Finland and Sweden), has now taken on the dual political responsibility of ensuring security from warlordism and the remnants of the Taliban in the short run, and trying to build a stable, more ‘democratic’ Afghanistan in the medium term. This is a daunting challenge, not least since the USA and the UK now seem to have decided that they have other fish to fry, and it could run into serious difficulties. Fortunately the profile of the EU as such is not so high in Afghanistan as it is in the Balkans. The UN, and Turkey as the command-state of ISAF, have the more formal responsibilities.

If the war against terrorism had consisted only in overthrowing the Taliban/Al Qaeda regime in Afghanistan the events of the last year would have represented a definite success, not only for American policy but for the division of labour approach which always seems incipient in US-European relations: US firepower plus support for the Northern Alliance had broken the Taliban hold; the Europeans then picked up the responsibility for reconstruction. This seems to suggest, as Charles Grant says, that ‘Europe is always going to be predominantly a soft power………with US forces hunting for terrorists in caves, and Europeans keeping the peace on the streets of Kabul’, but the matter is not so simple. For one thing, British special forces were called in to the Tora Bora operation after the US had got into difficulties; for another, policing Kabul involves far more than the gendarmerie checking identity cards. No doubt if the situation deteriorates and requires further serious military operations, the US will come back in. But the Europeans could still find themselves facing a ‘high-end Petersberg task’ in Afghanistan – or rather, some of them might, for as was brutally pointed out to Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel in December 2001 by Britain and Germany, the ISAF is not an EU force. It is, like most of the more effective recent operations, a ‘coalition of the willing’.
The situation in this open-ended campaign against Al Qaeda and its many likely satellite organisations is unclear and dangerous. However much the EU disassociates itself from some American attitudes, and however much it tries to address the ‘roots of terrorism’ it is now locked into a long-term, multi-faceted campaign which inevitably will incur high costs on many fronts. What is more, the geographical spread of the campaign is wide, and represents a renewed global role for a possibly reluctant EU after a decade of trying to come to terms with its newly unstable near abroad. The problems of Afghanistan have turned out to be intimately connected to those in Pakistan, and Al Qaeda has proved capable of hitting western targets wherever they are vulnerable – which in the recent case of the Bali discotheques turned out to be many more Europeans than Americans.

At the practical level the EU has acted with an unforeseeable speed, range and flexibility since 11 September, and seemingly unhindered by the infamous three Pillar system. Asylum policies (Pillar I), diplomacy (Pillar II), and judicial and police cooperation (Pillar III) have been addressed in parallel and in conjunction – even if many of the complex issues involved continued to resist resolution. What is more the USA has been given privileged access to Europol and the new Eurojust system of expert legal coordination, when in the past the Europeans were always highly sensitive about US requests for a seat at their table. Measures already under consideration, like those to counter money-laundering by the freezing of suspect assets, were immediately accelerated. This positive view is, of course, with respect to international security policy; the human rights implications are more worrying, and the EU will have to strike a delicate balance between protecting its citizens from external threat and damaging their freedom internally. The area of immigration is particularly sensitive. It inherently involves considerations of both foreign and domestic policy, even disregarding
terrorism, although many are reluctant to acknowledge the fact. Once terrorism is added to the equation, however, the issue of whose movements to monitor, or restrict can itself become a political *cause célèbre*, as is currently evident in the US. Too much control of immigration from particular countries might inflame the very hostilities one is trying to control.

The combination of organised cross-border crime and the fears aroused by 11 September inevitably brings the issue of intelligence into play. The lack of anything even approximating to a common European intelligence service has always been one of the structural weaknesses of the CFSP, compounded by the fact that national intelligence services represent powerful bureaucratic interests in favour of intergovernmentalism and against integration. Even though there will now be regular meetings not only of the heads of counter-terrorist units, but even of national intelligence services, the secrecy in which they necessarily operate makes multilateralism – which is by its nature prone to leaks if not actual transparency – difficult to take beyond a certain point. It is certainly too early to talk of a European Intelligence Service. The reinforced cooperation between the UK and the United States (whose ‘special relationship’ is now mostly about defence and intelligence) opens up further cracks in European solidarity. The common interest in preventing atrocities and arresting their perpetrators will prevent any public divisions opening up, but if it comes to acts of dirty war (like the shooting of IRA in Gibraltar by the SAS in 1988), or clandestine operations like Iran-Contra, then uproar would certainly follow.

The war against terrorism thus represents a series of potentially very difficult political issues for the EU and its members, even if so far we have seen a successful programme of damage limitation (in every sense), with technical measures being agreed and cooperation extended
uncontroversially to the United States. The attempt by Robert Reid to blow up an American Airlines flight out of Paris, as well as the strong rumours of blows to be struck against Paris or London, have concentrated European minds on the need for agreement and action. All dimensions of the EU relevant to the movement of peoples have inevitably become securitized, and are likely to remain so. The external borders of the Union, for example, were already a serious problem in relation to illegal immigration and the subsequent rise of xenophobia within the EU. Now they are potentially a disastrous weakness in the struggle against Al Qaeda, as witnessed by the increased demands for a common European border guard system. Certainly the EU is likely to be pushed by events more in the direction of the closed, policed borders all too reminiscent of the just-departed Iron Curtain, or the US-Mexico border. And this will inevitably bring about new conflicts with those neighbours on the wrong side of the frontier, whether or not they are subject to sanctions for failure to control emigration. If those who still manage to enter the EU illegally then settle unevenly in the states of the Union – and they will naturally gravitate to areas where employment is fullest – this will exert further strains on European unity, just as it has already in relation to the Sansgatte camp, or Italy’s inability to patrol its long coast-line.

It was perhaps predictable that US actions would not limit themselves to Afghanistan or to quiet work behind the scenes, whether of a policing nature or to address the roots of terrorism. European fears were confirmed by Washington’s insouciance over the public relations disaster of showing bound and hooded prisoners at Guantanamo Bay to the press – a gift to those who wish to portray the United States as the great Satan. Also at the beginning of 2002, President Bush, in his State of the Union address to Congress, made his infamous remarks about the ‘axis of evil’ which confronted the world, comprising Iran, Iraq and North Korea. This unlikely triumvirate was supposedly the main sponsors of terrorist organisations.
Europeans recoiled from the language, but they were also unnerved by the definitions. For some years the EU has been engaged in constructive engagement with Iran, and in the emergence of the more pragmatic Khatami government had thought itself on the right track, just as, through the managed functionalism of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) the EU had been helping slowly to ease North Korea out of its paranoid isolationism. The EU was a factor in getting Iran to join the anti-terrorism coalition, and to accept the use of force in Afghanistan. Even in relation to Iraq, the Europeans were of the view that the combination of containment via air strikes, and the carrot of a possible relaxation of sanctions, was keeping Saddam Hussein in line. As sponsors of terrorism, European experts would have rated all three members of the ‘axis’ below Yemen, Pakistan and Chechnya.

Warning signals may have been sent by Washington to Teheran and Pyongyang but Iraq was always the only target for military action. From the late Spring of this year (2002) the war drums started to beat in earnest, to the point where the democracies of the West are now seriously considering making an unprovoked attack on a sovereign state – albeit one run by a fascistic dictatorship – in the interests of regime change. Opinion has been shifted by the sheer weight of attention, even in Europe, although without President Bush’s initiative there is no way in which the EU states, even Britain, would have raised the issue themselves. We have been witnessing a systematic campaign of propaganda, combined with coercive diplomacy, designed both to exert pressure on Saddam Hussein and possibly to distract from other activities. Whatever the purpose, it has gravely embarrassed the European Union. The Europeans were never likely to back an expansive campaign against putative terror-sponsoring states, if only because of their own lack of power and vulnerability. George Bush was aware of this, and warned in his State of the Union address that ‘some governments will
be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will.

During the Iraq crisis Europe has been ‘timid’, in that the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been almost wholly silent. The EU collectively has had the capacity neither to support the United States position nor to stand up to it. This despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of European opinion is almost certainly opposed to an attack on Iraq. Why should there be this paralysis, when so much effort is being put into the development of Europe’s foreign policy-making system, and into the acquisition of a common defence capability?

The most obvious reason for this instance of ‘Euro-paralysis’ is the divergence of the three big Member States, who make up an informal *directoire*. Tony Blair has used his dominance over Parliament and the Labour Party to insist on identifying with US policy. Without Blair’s personal conviction and determination it is highly unlikely that even a pragmatic Labour Cabinet would have gone so far out on a limb for one of its ideological opponents. On the other side of the equation has been Gerhard Schroeder, who has skilfully used public antipathy to war and to President Bush to help get himself re-elected. In the process he has apparently caused frost to descend on the US-German relationship, and has certainly made agreement with Blair over Iraq impossible – not that this prevented him making 10 Downing Street his first port of call after the election victory.

In the middle is France, traditionally with its own view of Middle Eastern politics, which is at odds with those of London and Washington. This view led President Mitterand into persistent diplomatic mediation in 1990-91, right up to the eve of the air attacks on Iraq. As a
permanent member of the UN Security Council France has not been about to give Bush and Blair *carte blanche*, but it has equally not boxed itself into the corner of total opposition to military action.

All things considered, the current pressure on Iraq has the smell of a phoney, manufactured crisis, with much more coordination behind the scenes than the public is allowed to know and deep uncertainty over the actual strategic aims of the operation. It would not surprise me to know that there had been some tacit dividing of roles up amongst the major states, and agreement on war only as a last resort, as the best means of keeping Saddam Hussein guessing and diverting attention from the real powder-kegs, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Whatever the truth of this – and we are all guessing – it is clear that the EU has been prevented from speaking with a single voice, and has apparently lacked utility for all but the smaller states, who are themselves nervous and bewildered.

Even these states, however, are subject to the structural forces which are also inhibiting an EU role. The latter would only be significant if there was a united European will to oppose US policy – in the event of agreement there is every incentive to let Washington take the risks and the potential blame. But opposing the United States is a costly business, especially in the current febrile climate, and it has been notable that Schroeder and Fischer have been content to play on the national stage alone, without trying to mobilise the EU against war. Just as over the Israel-Palestine conflict, where Europeans are even more opposed to the US position, but keep their concerns behind the diplomatic arras, there is a fear of being seen as ‘soft’ on terrorism, of raising the spectre of appeasement – an accusation which Israel and its friends are not slow to throw at Europeans, together with that of anti-semitism. It is true that the fifteen states of the EU vary in their views on the Iraq crisis, just as the big three do, with
Italy and Spain showing more sympathy for the Bush approach, and Greece and the neutrals at the other end of the spectrum. But the main fact of this new situation is that the Member States are neither regrouping, to hold to a common position, however cautious, or renationalising, in the sense of individual states having the will to assert their own distinctive positions. Instead, we are witness to EU disunity as a convenient cover for inaction, collective or national. Only time will tell if this is a shrewd and prudent inclination, allowing some flexibility as events unfold, or whether it will go down as yet another example of the Europeans freezing in the headlamps of an oncoming train, as in the Balkans or the Great Lakes.

Normal foreign policy continues

Despite the overwhelming impact of the 11 September events on public consciousness, the many important foreign policy issues which predated them have continued to occupy the EU and the Member States. Nor are these of a lesser, more mundane character. It is enough to mention the Israel-Palestinian dispute to realise both that it would be foolish to neglect these other problems, and that the terrorist attacks have inherent linkages to many of them, usually exacerbating rather than resolving. There is not the time here to evaluate the full range of the EU’s diplomacy, so I shall focus on four aspects: the afore-mentioned Middle East conflict; Kashmir; US unilateralism on the broad front; and the ‘new foreign policy agenda’ issues, of drugs, illegal immigration and national-building. It is important to get some perspective by looking not just at issues where the EU finds effective action difficult, but at those where it has a comparative advantage.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict has worsened markedly during the last twelve months, as the Israeli position has hardened and Palestinian suicide bombings have continued. The US
willingness to stand aside, which has effectively given a free hand to Israel, renders the EU attempts to engage in constructive diplomacy nugatory. It has been argued that the creation of the Quartet in May, that is of a group consisting of the US, Russia, the UN and the EU, to press for negotiations between the main parties, has at last given the Europeans a significant role in peace-making in the region, on which the activities of Special Representative Moratinos and High Representative Solana will be able to build.[17] Leaving aside the fact, however, that the EU still found it necessary to have three voices speaking for it in the Quartet (Solana, Patten and the Presidency), this is hardly a convincing picture given that Israel ruthlessly destroyed the facilities which large EU grants had helped build for the Palestinian Authority, and prevented Solana and the Spanish Presidency from visiting Yasser Arafat in a well-publicised visit during April. The Quartet looks more like yet another act of diplomatic hand-wringing, a gesture towards the involvement of the international community while events on the ground determine outcomes. From a cynical perspective it could even be said that it is a way of keeping the EU and Russia compromised – and therefore quiet – through conceding them a superficial share in US-sponsored mediation. At the same time it was being set up, during the crisis over presumed Palestinian terrorists holed up in the Church of the Holy Nativity in Bethlehem during May, the Europeans were being treated by the US as merely useful for ‘clearing up’, with Italy in particular being expected to provide exile for the Palestinians despite not having been consulted.[18]

It is not surprising that there was a considerable groundswell of opinion in western Europe which was highly critical of Israel, seeing the actions of the Sharon government as largely responsible for the ghastly cycle of slaughter that has come to be daily fare in the region. Some member States, with Spain, France and Belgium probably the most prominent, have urged that EU pressure be publicly exerted on the Israeli government, even by sanctions. But
the more cautious, or pro-US inclinations of others, such as the UK and the Netherlands, have prevented this, and therefore any united EU position. On this other great issue of the day, therefore, as on Iraq, European foreign policy is disabled and silent. In this, it has undoubtedly – although perhaps prudently - failed to speak to speak for European opinion, and has risked the perception amongst its Arab friends of having aligned itself effectively with the United States and Israel. The most that can be said is that the EU continues to be committed to assisting in the Middle East peace process, whatever the setbacks or humiliations for itself; it has been producing initiatives since 1970, and the Danish Presidency has just engaged in yet another bout of shuttle diplomacy, albeit so far fruitless.

Over Kashmir, where Indo-Pakistani tensions seemed likely at one stage to produce the first war between two nuclear powers, the EU is not expected to be a serious player. Nonetheless, because of Britain’s traditional contacts with both sides, and its own presumptions to engage in global peace-making, here too the Union embarked upon crisis diplomacy. Pakistan, of course, had suddenly moved from a peripheral to a central European concern after the realisation of Al Qaeda’s threat, and its easy movements across the frontier from Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Third Generation Cooperation Agreement, postponed persistently since 1996 because of human rights and nuclear proliferation, was rushed through in November 2001, and a new tranche of aid and trade concessions, all signalled the European wish to act so as to ensure General Musharraf’s cooperation.

At this stage the problems of Kashmir and of nuclear weapons were not in the front rank, but as 2002 wore on the linkages became evident. India had always seen Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism both in Afghanistan and Kashmir, while Musharraf was keen to exploit his new leverage with the West to pressurise India, and to distract from his own internal problems.
this situation the EU was implicated, while possessing no sticks, only carrots. Thus the
communiqué which followed the third EU-India summit of October 10 2002 did not mention
Kashmir, as a sensitive matter of internal affairs. Instead it referred flatteringly and
grandiloquently to ‘India and the EU, global actors in a multipolar world’. At the same
time the EU’s Observer Mission on the Pakistan Elections reported less than favourably on
their fairness. Realpolitik had its limits, and the European system inevitably produces
varying diplomatic outputs. This is both its strength and its weakness.

In the terms of this paper, at least the national divergences between Member State approaches
did not cause problems. Perhaps, indeed, they were not so great. French ministers took care
not to let Tony Blair and Jack Astraw have a free run, with new Foreign Minister de Villepin
visiting both India and Pakistan in the summer of 2002. President Chirac, indeed, had been
the first to support India’s claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council back in
1999, and needed to be careful to attend to Pakistani sensibilities. For his part Tony Blair
balanced the French initiative on the Security Council in his speech in Bangalore in January
2002, carefully calling India ‘a natural contender’ for a permanent seat and promising to
‘work with you to achieve it’. By and large, the issues were too important and the national
stakes not great enough for the EU states to splinter apart, and a quiet common diplomacy has
prevailed.

We have already seen how the US tendency to unilateralism has caused the EU problems in
the events deriving from September 11. But this goes back at least to the beginning of the
Bush administration and would have caused headaches regardless of the terrorist dimension.
In fact in some respects September 11 shocked a unilateralist administration into
understanding the need for multilateral coalitions. Still, while the US has made some
concessions, even over Iraq, in order to ensure the support of critical partners, on disconnected matters such as the environment or indirectly connected ones such as the International Criminal Court it has contined to plough its own furrow.

On the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases, the US withdrawal has produced uniform European disapproval, as has the evident distaste of the Bush administration for the Johannesburg Earth Summit, which Tony Blair attended and showed a personal commitment to. European influence has evidently been insufficient, although in the area of commercial policy, where the common policy has more weight, the US has been more locked in to multilateral processes – if still capable of imposing surprise tariffs on steel, and subsidies on agriculture. The singularity of the American ‘hyperpower’ has also led to its immovable opposition to the International Criminal Court, and the ability to pressure individual European governments into bilateral immunity agreements for US officials.

On environmental matters the EU pushed on regardless of the US position, and indeed because of it. Conviction mixed with the knowledge that here was an issue, like GM foods, where European opinion was firmly opposed to any significant move towards the Bush policy, and indeed where some relatively cheap political points could be scored. It is convenient for the Europeans to be able to show their unity on a question where the US seems to be behaving selfishly and short-sightedly, and where, of course, European interests – on energy, welfare and business – differ markedly. This combination of interests and values has produced an outlook on international cooperation which all EU states share, to a greater or lesser degree: they believe in a Grotian international system, broadly based on the rule of law and on intergovernmental institutions, with the UN seen as the keystone in the arch.

By comparison to the US all fifteen are ‘small states’ lacking the capacity for significant
unilateralism – that is why, after all, they value membership of the EU. They fear and distrust the exercise of unilateral power, because of its unpredictable and uncontrollable nature – even from an ally. Their memories of power politics are too painful and recent for it to be otherwise, including not just the 1930s but also the Soviet Union’s rewriting of international law through the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ and the United States’ sudden disavowal of Bretton Woods in 1971. Naturally this does not mean that European unity can be guaranteed over these broader issues. The United States is adept at exerting pressure and using the tactics of divide and rule, while the Europeans vary considerably in their own degrees of attachment to the legitimisation provided by the UN, as the British willingness to do without it over Kosovo and Iraq demonstrates. Still, this is an area where, more than most, the Europeans have found it possible to find strength in unity and in opposition to the rogue elephant behaviour of the superpower.

The last category of ‘normal’ foreign policy issues which has continued to occupy the EU is that of the so-called ‘new foreign policy agenda’ issues: drugs and other forms of criminality, illegal immigration, and nation-building. Much of this agenda has been swept up in the tide of anti-terrorist concerns, and indeed has been given greater credibility by 11 September. Who now would not be legitimately concerned with the clandestine operations of transnational criminality, or even the shoal of miserable economic refugees who pose less of threat in themselves than through the sinister individuals who may exploit them for money or for cover? Who, equally, will challenge the need to ensure that countries like Afghanistan, Lebanon or Sierra Leone do not fall, through poverty and neglect, into the war-torn conditions which favour war-lordism, domestic or international?
The ‘civilian power’ which the EU collectively possesses, supplemented by the various national capabilities, is supposed to be much better suited to doing dealing with these systemic, functional/economic, long-term questions than with short-term, political crisis-management problems. It is certainly true that the Member-States seem to find it easier to agree on these issues. They have made significant contributions, financial and administrative, to rebuilding and development in many of the world’s failing states, and showed in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Macedonia and Sierra Leone that they could move relatively quickly to increase their commitments, sometimes substantially. The Barcelona Process is a laudable attempt to take a strategic view of the problems of the Mediterranean, and to address the migration issue through boosting the economies of the Maghreb and other ports of origin states, even if its implementation leaves much to be desired. The history of the Lomé and now the Cotonou agreements reveals an ever greater focus both on the poorest countries and on political conditionality, while a rough and ready division of labour based on historical post-colonial connections has provided some flexibility, with different states taking the lead in different parts of the world.

These historically divergent links also mean, however, that when particular problems arise bilateralism can quickly supplant collective diplomacy – as was embarrassingly the case in July 2002 when the Spanish government fell into conflict with Morocco over the disputed islet of Perejil, and found itself lacking any support from CFSP, not least because of French ties to Rabat. It was particularly humiliating for Europe’s image that US Secretary of State Powell moved into the vacuum to provide successful mediation. It is equally true that attempts to deal with longer-term issues are all too easily derailed by complications from more pressing problems. There can be little doubt, for example, that the EU’s attempts to control the flow of illegal migrants on the coasts of Greece and Italy are being subtly
undermined by Turkey turning a blind eye to the voyages of Kurds and other refugees from its own territory – this as a way of reminding the EU of its own importance, and of countering Greek positions over Cyprus and the ESDP.

**Concurrent challenges**

The EU currently faces three major challenges concurrently in its foreign policy, quite apart from the dangers of the war against terrorism, and the prospect of further conflagrations in the Middle East: they are the ESDP, enlargement; and the constitutional Convention, which is articulating demands for institutional changes in foreign policy-making. These challenges are inter-linked, in theory and reality. The final part of this paper addresses them against the background of the substantive problems already discussed. This will provide a basis for a final assessment of the position, and the prospects, in relation to our question about ‘renationalising or regrouping’.

*The ESDP* was born in 1998 and is fast approaching the end of its developmental phase, with the ‘headline goal’ of a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men due to be reached at the end of 2003. Its basic aims were threefold: (i) to give the EU a limited but real military capability, especially in its own region, for peacekeeping if not peace enforcement; (ii) to allow the Western European Union (WEU) to be abolished, and thus the relationship between the EU and NATO to be made more honest; (iii) to bind the UK into EU foreign and security policy, and thus to boost the forces of solidarity. Of these three only the second has been achieved with any certainty. The WEU has disappeared institutionally if not legally, and the ‘militarisation of the EU’, in terms of the taboo subject being freely spoken about, foreign
and defence ministers meeting without inhibition, and uniformed officers strolling on the Rond-Point Schuman, has clearly begun.

The jury is out on the first aim, but the signs are not encouraging. While a lot of the logistical work has been done to put in place a Rapid Reaction Force, there will almost certainly be delays, and there are no signs of the increased defence expenditures, or serious rationalisations, which will be necessary to give it the necessary reserves, state of the art weaponry, transport systems and intelligence. The Belgian declaration at Laeken that the ESDP was ‘operational’ was slapped down by the bigger states, and even when some operational capability is reached it will only be at the ‘low end’ of the Peterberg tasks, of policing or dealing with refugee problems. What is more the United States has put a spoke in the wheel by promoting a NATO RRF whose relationship to the EU’s, especially given the stalemate over the ‘double-hatting’ procedure caused by the Turkish-Greek impasse, is deeply unclear. It is true, however, that with the US now distracted, the usefulness of EU forces in the Balkans, in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia, is now much more evident.

The last aim, of bringing the UK on board a European defence system, seemed to have been solved ab initio, in that it was Tony Blair’s volte-face at St. Malo which made the ESDP even possible. Yet events since have highlighted the structural problems, and Blair himself seems to have cooled on implementing the policy. This is partly a matter of the impact of September 11, which has forced the UK to choose more explicitly between the US and the European venture on military matters than seemed likely two years ago. But the ambivalence of the United States, and the Irish problem with neutrality have also undermined the project, while the problems of resources, of cohabitation with NATO, and of defence reform, which were played down in the first flush of enthusiasm, are now revealed as serious obstacles to any
short-term achievement. On the other side of the balance-sheet, the change in discourse has meant that Germany and the smaller countries, including the continental ‘neutrals’, are now much more ready to participate in out-of-region peacekeeping operations, even when the UN is not in the lead, while the contrast between the EU’s imminent assumption of responsibility for the Macedonian operation, only five years after its failure to mount a small intervention in Albania, shows that the days of being limited to pure diplomacy have passed.

*The Convention* and the prospect of constitutional upheaval is a sign of the general uneasiness over the functioning of the EU at present, particularly in the context of enlargement, which will impose a significant strain on decision-making. The relationship of the Convention to the CFSP was at first unclear, with foreign policy hardly appearing a priority in the process. But the opportunity to have yet another go at reforming the intergovernmental Pillar II structures was too good to pass up, and it has rapidly moved to the centre of the Convention’s concerns. Already the Working Group on legal personality, chaired by Giuliano Amato, has already reported back, recommending that the EU be given this status, which has considerable implications for the foreign policy process as a whole. The prior questions: ‘is reform of the CFSP necessary?’ and: ‘will institutional change make much difference to effectiveness?’ have been implicitly answered in the affirmative, and some quite radical measures are on the table. Perhaps more relevant now is the question: ‘is the Convention, and/or a Constitution, necessary to change the CFSP?’ , given that the ESDP was set up without Treaty amendment, and that the Seville Council decided to set up a separate Foreign Affairs Council with more or less immediate effect. Certainly the Convention process seems likely to engender further changes, if only because issues like the rotating Presidency and the Pillars involve both internal and external policy.
One serious difficulty will derive from the competing views of the Member States on how foreign policy should be made. For thirty years now there has been a difference between Britain and France, as Security Council permanent members and nuclear weapon states, and the rest, led by Germany and Italy, who have wanted to see a more communitarised foreign policy – without being wholly clear what that might entail. London and Paris have themselves differed on the role of defence in the EU, and may still do so, while the issues of more democratic accountability and of an elected President to speak for Europe in the world are sure to open up significant, and not always predictable, divisions. The problem of the ethics of European foreign policy, and its scope, are even more important in substantive terms. They will not be fixable by a Convention or Constitution, but debate will be stirred up.

Disagreements on these issues are desirable in that they have not previously been properly ventilated. What is certain, furthermore, is that they will not be confined to the current fifteen Member States. Enlargement is the third leg of the tripod of structural challenges facing the EU and it deeply affects the other two. Not only will the new, perhaps ten, states have their own inputs to make on the CFSP, and on the reforms which may be possible in relation to it, but their very presence within the EU will affect Europe’s foreign policy profoundly, especially in the longer run. This is partly because the border of Europe will change, bringing an increased size, a new geopolitical shape, and new neighbours with a heightened sense of exclusion. A whole raft of diplomatic issues – of which Kaliningrad is only the most obvious – will become suddenly more pressing for the EU and place strains on its capacity to act.

Ultimately it is unknowable as to whether the creation of this ‘big EU’ will consolidate a sense of unity and historical destiny, or whether it will prove simply unmanageable as a
foreign policy system. We may make some informed guesses on the basis of the historical record, although allowing for the fact that no round of past enlargement has involved either so many new states or such disadvantaged states. The only parallel is the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal 1981-86, all emerging from poverty and dictatorship, and lacking mature diplomatic traditions. On that basis we may hypothesise that while the new members will not fit seamlessly into the CFSP to begin with, or even in the middle term, they may, over a longer period, come to experience ‘Europeanisation’, to the extent that the variation of their policies from agreed common positions would be infrequent or minor. This would still not be an accurate description of Greek or even Spanish foreign policy, as certain positions taken in Athens and Madrid (and other capitals) simply prevent agreement on a common line in the first place, but there has clearly been movement from the 1980s, when Spanish antipathy to NATO, and Greek sympathies for the USSR, made them outliers in the European foreign policy process.

It is difficult to see how the transformation of the EU into a 25-member system, with at least eight states still enjoying the recovery of their national independence, can in the short run avoid making foreign policy coordination a looser and more competitive process. Indeed, there is some risk that in terms of international relations, the EU will become more of a framework organisation, like the OSCE, than the action organisation it aspires to. Given that in itself this would – as a classic example of the problem of collective action – please no-one, and would threaten desirable outcomes on particular policies, the almost inevitable consequence would be a strengthening of the tendency to form inner groups, particularly of the more powerful states. We have already seen the Bosnian Contact Group, (first excluding Italy then with it), occasional triumvirates of Britain, France and Germany, and – more secretively - the Quint, consisting of the big four plus the US. Whether one sees this as a
chaotic or a flexible process, as variable geometry or as a centre-periphery model, will make no difference to the prospects for deepening as well as widening. Perhaps in the long run, when enlargement has been completed, the states, whether Croatia or Latvia, Spain or Poland, will all be content to leave foreign policy to the federal government, just as Louisiana and Wyoming, or California and New York are today. Alternatively, we might end up with a form of multi-level governance where foreign policy blurs at the edges into domestic policy and all states/regions come to have some part in it, especially on economic and functional questions. This is for the remote future. For our generation, it seems highly likely that the existing fault-lines, particularly between the bigger states, the neutrals, and the smaller integrationist states, will be added to and complicated by the addition of the Baltic three (not that their unity can be assumed) the three mini-states of Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, and what used to be known as the Visegrad states, ie the newest members of NATO plus Slovakia. It takes purblind optimism to assume that all these states, plus the existing fifteen, will gravitate together on problems such as Russia, Turkey and Israel, to say nothing of more far-flung issues such as Kashmir or Cuba.

Conclusions

What then is the trend, among the foreign policy activities of the EU Member States, renationalising or regrouping? The predictable enough answer is that the events of the last year reveal elements of both at work. There are obvious enough cases of national defections from a common line, or more accurately, of preventing a common line, over Iraq and over the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Equally, there was some striking solidarity on view in the rapid responses to the 11 September events, and in the linking up of foreign policy to anti-terrorist
measures and to the Justice/Home Affairs pillar. This has been sustained over time, although a year is still a short time in international politics.

What does the coexistence of fragmentation with cooperation tell us? The main thing to note is that we are not witnessing a wholesale return to the national principle in European foreign policies. Most states may have no intention of relinquishing their own diplomacy, but equally it would not occur to them to opt out of the CFSP. While Germany, Italy and Spain have all discovered the advantages of emerging from the pack to assert distinctive concerns – after nearly fifty years of using collective action as a cover and a form of legitimacy – they have not lost their commitment to the idea of an effective European foreign policy, and are gradually beginning to commit more resources to it. On a slightly different tack, France and Britain will not even conceive of the notion that they should relinquish their separate seats on the UN Security Council, or place their nuclear weapons in trust for the EU. They remain the only two European states capable of the projection of serious military force beyond their own theatre. But at the same time, since the Bosnian crisis they have been cooperating more between themselves, militarily and in Africa, and they have both become more relaxed about such innovations as the High Representative, and the idea of an EU legal personality.

Thus a dialectical relationship exists between the national instinct and the perceived need for solidarity. It is evident partly when a foreign policy failure leads to renewed efforts at cooperation, but it occurs more subtly in the way that Member States diverge from each other within broad limits set by the tacit acceptance of common interests and outlooks. If at times hard choices mean that the concrete national need will always be put ahead of the more theoretical collective benefit, then this tends to be presented as an exceptional matter and not something to be gloried in. There is an acute awareness also of the benefits of hard-won gains
through decades of quiet cooperation, in such areas as anti-terrorist preparations (since 1975),
the Middle East (since 1980), and inter-regional diplomatic dialogues (since the mid 1980s).

September 11 sharpened the existing contradictions in European foreign policy-making, and
made them more visible, but it neither created significant new divisions nor rendered
solidarity unworkable. If true paralysis is to occur, then it is much more likely to come
through the complications of big-bang enlargement, through divisions over defence (and in
particular defence spending) or even through the Euro, which underpins foreign economic
policy but not for all Member States – perhaps not even a majority after enlargement.

Ultimately what is important in a practical sense for European foreign policy, given that a
federal centre is not close at hand, is that Europeans should manage to agree on giving out the
same message, even if through many different voices, national and institutional.

Institutional mechanisms may be a necessary condition of achieving this, but they are unlikely
to be a sufficient one, even allowing for some of the reforms which may be in the
Convention’s pipeline. The gradual convergence of values over time, partly in reaction to the
evolution of world politics, or to ‘others’ who seem threatening, but also through functional
interaction, will lead to common definitions of interest – not on all matters, but on enough to
create a critical mass which can underpin a common policy. The public must also be
convinced that ‘Europe’ is working for them in the world, and not only for a new form of
transnational elite.

The arrival of ‘superterrorism’ is a huge shock for the EU, as for every international actor. In
itself it is a shock that Europe has responded to in as effective a manner as could have been
hoped for. By contrast the major spin-off crises, of Israel-Palestine and now Iraq, have
produced the ‘silence of the European lambs’, divided, powerless, and seemingly frozen with apprehension. Nonetheless, September 11 has not destroyed the CFSP and the EU’s other external activities. Rather, it has reinforced our sense that European foreign policy is a long game, working by multiple and often indirect means to shape the structure of international relations, even if failing to live up to some particular challenges. This would be a bad time to lose our nerve.

Christopher Hill
22 October 2002

2 Interview in the Evening Standard, 16 October 2002, p51


5 ‘Declaration by the European Union’, General Affairs Council, 12 September 2001

6 Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, 12 September 2001.


8 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996. Mandelbaum was in fact criticising the Clinton administration’s preoccupation with alleviating social and economic hardship in countries like Somalia and Haiti.


14 President Bush’s State of the Union Address, Washington DC, 29 January 2002. To be found on Http://usinfo.state.gov


16 It was tactless in the extreme for the German Justice Minister Herta Daeubler-Gmelin to compare George Bush with Hitler during her country’s election campaign, but the tactic of issuing demands which it is known cannot be satisfied was certainly a Nazi tactic.


18 La Repubblica, 8 May 2002.


20 See, for example the ‘Declaration on India and Pakistan’ released after the Seville Summit of 21-22 June 2002, which appeals for various outcomes but does not even hint at sanctions if they are not achieved. The only EU action envisaged is that ‘the High Representative will pay an early visit to the region’.He does not seem yet to have made this visit.


Interview given by M. Dominique De Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the *Times of India*, 1 August 2002.


The summit took place in August 2002. President Bush sent Secretary of State Colin Powell, who predictably had to face the anger of delegates.

‘EU caves into Washington over International Criminal Court’, *Guardian*, 30 September 2002. The report noted that the NGO Human Rights Watch had accused Britain of torpedoing a unified European opposition to the US, but it seems likely that other states were content to hide behind the UK on this, as on other occasions.

Jörg Monar, ‘The CFSP and the Leila/Perejil Island Incident: the Nemesis of Solidarity and Leadership’, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.7, No.3, Autumn 2002, pp251-55. President Prodi attempted to mediate, only to cause fury in Madrid which saw the Commission as the servant of the Member-States, not a neutral body between them and third parties.

For an extended discussion of these issues see Jan Zielonka (Ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2002).


This idea is taken from the Summary Report of the Plenary Session of the Convention, 11-12 July 2002, Brussels, where Para. 13 on ‘Effective Representation’ records that ‘some proposed that a way should be found for the Union to speak with a single voice, whilst others considered that the most important objective was to ensure that it had a single message’ (CONV 200/02, p5).