Research into the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has traditionally been restricted to procedural studies of cooperation taking place at an intergovernmental level within Europe and/or to case studies involving intervention (or the lack of it!) in well-known global flashpoints. As a result, there remains a gap in our knowledge about the more mundane, but arguably just as significant, cooperation between EU states at the diplomatic level in third countries - cooperation which arguably contributes to the kinds of shared identification and spillovers promoted by transactionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to integration. This paper describes and presents findings from a project which studies diplomatic cooperation in several countries of varying size. It attempts - using fieldwork conducted in Washington DC, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington - to portray and develop explanations of current progress. It explores, for example, whether enthusiasm for and the extent of cooperation varies a) according to member-state size and/or the holder of the presidency, b) with regard to particular issues, and c) according to the nature and preferences of the host country; it also looks at the role of the European Commission delegation. It concludes by looking at the obstacles to greater integration in the senses conceived of by both transactionalists and neo-functionalists in this neglected but not necessarily insignificant dimension of the CFSP.
INTRODUCTION

In June 1998, the Indonesian occupied territory of East Timor was the subject of a fact-finding mission by the EU. The mission comprised the British, Austrian and Dutch ambassadors, constituting the then *Troika* (the Netherlands substituting for Luxembourg), the European Commission’s Head of Delegation in Indonesia and a representative of the European Council Secretariat. In the same month, in Belarus in the former Soviet Union, ambassadors from several states found themselves all but locked out of their residences on the orders of that country’s increasingly autocratic and erratic President. The diplomatic objections of individual EU member states were conveyed on behalf of the EU as a whole by the UK representative in Minsk, who, living outside the compound, was not herself directly affected by the shenanigans. Just over a year before, following another diplomatic incident that provoked a recall of personnel, this time in Iran, the Council of EU foreign ministers announced that ‘Member states [would] instruct their Ambassadors, after their return to Teheran, to contribute in a coordinated way to the continual appraisal by the Council of the relationship’ between the EU and the government there.

Examples like these hint at increased diplomatic coordination and cooperation in third countries between member states and between member states and Community institutions. This paper explores the issue in more depth. It begins by providing a rationale for such an exploration and then moves on to discuss the work of those few scholars who have examined the topic previously. It goes on to lay out some of the findings from fieldwork in Washington DC, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington in the light of hypotheses derived from that work. It concludes, in looking to the
future, by stressing that while it may be true that developments in operational practice within Europe are helping to move ‘the conduct of national foreign policy away from the old nation-state national sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential’ (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p. 6), the same cannot really be said at present of operational practice outside the continent itself.

RATIONALE

Those scholars working on the theory of integration have recently been invited to revisit the work of the ‘transactionalist’ or ‘communications’ school associated most closely with Karl Deutsch (see Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet, 1998; see also Deutsch, 1966). In a manner reminiscent of neo-functionalism’s emphasis on spillover from one area of activity to another, transactionalism suggested some kind of snowball effect - in its case, however, the momentum had to do with the gradual melding of identity through the sharing of symbols and support for similar norms and values. While Deutsch and his colleagues looked for the existence and effect of such mutually-reinforcing transactions at the level of ‘peoples’, it now seems more profitable to restrict the search to particular players and the fields in which they play. One such might be the foreign policy, and the foreign policy community, of the member states.

Admittedly, studies of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) tend to concentrate on procedural studies of cooperation taking place at an intergovernmental level within Europe and/or to case studies involving intervention (or the lack of it!) in well-known global flashpoints (eg.
Regelsberger et al., 1997). However, they often hint that a great deal goes on underneath the process at the highest level that offsets - subtly and incrementally - its all-too-obvious shortcomings. Even if foreign ministers cannot always agree, it is suggested, their officials are gradually building up habits of cooperation whose eventual integrative affect will be significant. Such engrenage is, more often than not, portrayed as taking place in Brussels and the other EU capitals. Nevertheless, now and again, there is mention of it occurring in and as a result of activities in third countries. Hill and Wallace, for example, note that this ‘process of engrenage on which habits of working together [may] have gradually upgraded perceptions of common interest’ has as its root the ‘taking as given the exchange of confidential information not only about third countries but about their own governments’ intentions and domestic constraints, the sharing of tasks (and sometimes of facilities) in third countries, the acceptance of officials on secondments to their home ministry as no longer “foreign” but as colleagues’ (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p.1, p.12).

That the ‘engrenage effect’ would occur in an overseas as well as a European setting has clearly been the hope of many who have drafted Community declarations and legislation covering the foreign policy process, especially in the early years of political cooperation. It must be said, though, that anyone hoping to find mention of third country cooperation in the rather less supranational statements and Treaty revisions of recent years might be hard-pressed to come up with even a nod in that direction. In the ‘Summary of Positions of the Member States’ included in the White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/parlment/peen2.htm), for instance, mention of the matter is confined to Spain (which referred to increased cooperation in third countries as a goal), to
Portugal (which suggested that the CFSP ‘should be dynamized via such actions as the opening of joint embassies in third countries’) and more predictably, Belgium (which pointed out ‘that the diplomatic networks, expertise, personnel and resources available in each of the member states should be fully utilised in a joint approach, with the commission acting as a catalyst and co-ordinator’). This lack of interest (or at least lack of interest in mentioning the possibility of advance) in the field was also reflected in the Group of Reflection’s Westendorp Report of December 1995 and, unsurprisingly, in the Amsterdam Treaty itself. This is in marked contrast, however, to pre-Maastricht times when the risk of any state actually feeling bound by commitments made on the common foreign policy front was so much smaller.

True the first priority for the fledgling EPC in the early seventies was to encourage links between member states’ foreign ministries within European capitals. Consequently ‘these links were only gradually extended to the embassies of the member states in third countries’ and ‘it was more or less left to the ambassadors themselves to convene a meeting or, alternatively, to ignore this new dimension in diplomacy’ (Regelsberger, 1988, p. 11). However, as EPC developed this new dimension was slowly institutionalised. The London Report of 1981 (see Pijpers et al, 1988, pp. 321-327) provided for crisis procedures which, among other things, allowed for ambassadorial meetings within 48 hours at request of three member states. Acknowledging the role of ambassadors in actually delivering joint messages of support or disapproval in respect of third countries, the Report also promised (see Part II, 1) that ‘when declarations are issued by Ministerial meetings and the European Council they should as a rule be accompanied by a list of posts in appropriate counties where the local representative of the Ten will draw the declaration to the attention of
the host government.’ It went on to state (Part II, 8 ‘Procedure for Political Co-
operation in Third Countries’) that

in view of the increasing activities of the Ten in third countries it is important
that the Heads of Mission of the Ten maintain the practice of meeting
regularly order to exchange information and co-ordinate views. In considering
their response to significant developments in the country to which they are
accredited their first instinct should be to co-ordinate with their colleagues of
the Ten.

The Political Committee welcomes joint reports from Heads of Mission of the
ten. These may be prepared on response to a request form the Political
Committee, or, exceptionally on the Heads of Missions’ own initiative, when
the situation requires it. Recommendations for joint action are particularly
valuable. Where reports are made on the Heads of Missions’ own initiative, it
is for them to decide whether to draft a joint report, or to report separately on
the basis of their joint discussions. An equally acceptable alternative is for the
Presidency to draft an oral report on its own authority reflecting the views
expressed.

A couple of years later the so-called Stuttgart Declaration of 19 June 1983 (see Pijpers
et al, 1988, p. 327-333, and especially 3.2 ‘Foreign Policy’) also called for ‘closer co-
operation in diplomatic and administrative matters between the missions of the Ten in
third countries.’ Next the Single European act of 1986 (and specifically title III
article 30 which put EPC on a treaty basis, though without making it part of the wider
EC process), codified such calls, stressing the importance of the presidency in initiating, co-ordinating and representing a collective presence for member states abroad, and even going so far as to declare (see point 9) that ‘The High Contracting Parties and the Commission, through mutual assistance and information, shall intensify co-operation between their representations accredited to third countries and to international organisations.’ This vague and therefore potentially alarming declaration was, however, very quickly specified - and thereby limited - by the following decision adopted by member state foreign ministers on 28 February (see Pijpers et al, 1988, pp. 338-342):

II Co-operation of Member States’ Missions and Commission Delegations in third countries and international organisations.

1. Member States’ missions and Commission delegations shall intensify their co-operation in third countries and international organisations in the following areas:

   a) exchange of political and economic information;
   b) pooling of information on administrative and practical problems’
   c) mutual assistance in the material and practical sphere;
   d) communications;
   e) exchange of information and drawing up of joint plans in case of local crises;
   f) security measures;
   g) consular matters;
h) health, particularly in the field of health and medical facilities;

i) educational matters (schooling);

j) information;

k) cultural affairs;

l) development aid.

The Maastricht Treaty had little to add to this, simply stating in Title V, J6 that

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission
Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

These sorts of official statements - combined with the almost total neglect by academics of the question of their actuality - have given rise to what Martin Holland (who is one of the few scholars who have looked at it) calls 'a general assumption, though an untested one, that political co-operation between embassies has become a systematised, institutional reflex, leading to new behavioural norms based on co-operation rather than competition' (Holland, 1991, p. 244).
The existence of a general but untested assumption in a rapidly expanding field of EU study such as foreign policy is perhaps justification enough for more empirical enquiry (see Holland, 1991, p.240). But there is also another reason why the question of diplomatic cooperation should merit the attention of those interested in European institutions, namely the putative increase in Commission competence in the area. As yet this has been as much a subject of speculation in the Brussels-based inside-dopester media as the occasion for serious academic study. However, it is hard not to see the latter following hard on the heels of the former, particularly when it reports, for instance, that the Heads of the 128 Commission Delegations located throughout the world are meeting in Brussels to discuss their future role at a time when, despite the antipathy among member states towards such an idea, so-called ‘Euro-federalists’ are suggesting that ‘the obvious why ahead…would be for the Commission’s foreign service gradually to assume primacy in foreign relations, while national embassies restrict themselves to promoting national companies and offering their citizens a friendly face’ (‘EU foreign service a step nearer’ European Voice, 3 September 1998)!

However far-fetched such a suggestion may seem, it is tapping into some fundamental questions that those who seek either to enhance or to delay CFSP need to ask and answer. As Allen (1996, p. 303) notes, the lack of progress towards a Commission-based, encompassing foreign diplomacy is a crucial barrier to the CFSP’s making p.303 ‘a fundamental integrative leap forwards. In truth, it is hard to imagine a genuine common foreign policy without a common diplomatic service and a means of identifying and operationalizing a notion of the European interest.’ Since such a service is just as likely to come about by incremental default as by deliberate design,
the involvement of EC Delegations in diplomatic co-operation in third countries gives us another good reason to take a closer look at the process on the ground - a process which has at least the potential to change the character of CFSP from, as it were, below. Delegation Heads, for example, attend meetings on an equal footing with their member state counterparts and are by implication associated with their reports and actions, and this inevitably blurs what in Europe is still a reasonably clear distinction between the intergovernmental and the supranational: consequently, as Simon Nuttall points out (1992, p. 68), ‘[t]he move towards interaction in third countries…raises some delicate questions which need to be handled carefully.’

GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND MUNDANE REALITIES

Much of the work already done on diplomatic cooperation in non-European capitals has involved case studies. The first appears to have been that conducted in the late seventies in Washington by Philip Taylor, who used structured, open ended interviews with embassy officials of the then nine member states (Taylor, 1980). ‘Without having been directed from Europe’ to do so, Taylor found (p. 35), member state missions had initiated a range of ‘regular, routinely scheduled’ meetings. These were not just at ambassadorial level but also between those responsible in each embassy for matters such as commercial and economic affairs, and press and information. This was in marked contrast, he suggested, to other capitals where ‘meetings…range from two to six per year at most.’ This relatively high level of activity among the nine occurred despite the fact that, according to interviewees (p. 38), Washington was ‘such an open city for information…that the openness somewhat negates the necessity for political co-operation and makes it relatively less important
than elsewhere.’ However, it tended to vary with the enthusiasm of the member state holding the presidency and was limited in scope: ‘Most of the…participants,’ Taylor noted, ‘characterised their efforts in Washington as an exchange of information, rather than as co-ordination of action per se’ (Taylor, 1980, p. 37,35). He also found that enthusiasm for such an exchange - and indeed for co-operation as a whole - varied according to the size of the state: larger states felt that the smaller states gained the most because they could ‘obtain access to information that the larger states have by virtue of larger staffs or closer ties to the [host] Government’; larger states seemed to believe ‘political co-operation in Washington has evolved as far as it ought to, and they would not welcome a push to increase the process’(Taylor, 1980, p. 38, p. 39).

Taylor’s tightly-focused case study was followed by a more synoptic piece by Bot (1984), who was as concerned to point out the potential advantages of, and obstacles to, diplomatic co-operation as he was to address actual practice. Indeed with regard to the latter, Bot’s views had much in common with Taylor’s: the organisational talents and interest’ of the ambassador holding the presidency was crucial; smaller partners profited most from co-operation, much of which amounted to occasional EPC get-togethers; discussion during these meetings (portions of which were often taken up by invited speakers from host countries) varied from ‘the highly political to the more peripheral and even to outright mundane issues such as the sharing of translators, carpool and diplomatic bags’; meetings rarely resulted in drafted conclusions, let alone joint reports to the Political Committee in Brussels, whose understandable reluctance to be bombarded with relatively insignificant information from all round the globe was matched by the reluctance of those who might have filed such information to file it with anyone other than their respective foreign ministry, which
for its part world gave been alarmed by anything else (Bot, 1984, p. 154-156)! This concentration on the practical matters of diplomatic lifestyle, staff services, communications, security and consular issues, as well as ‘joint information services and cultural events such as film weeks, concerts and exhibitions’ in which embassies could (though not necessarily did) involve themselves was not, for Bot anyway, unimportant - true to the spirit of engrenage, it could be ‘the glue that holds [member states] together’ and contribute’ in the long run, to the goal of a greater harmonisation’ of policies. He did, however, however, insert a caveat: ‘concentrating on such mundane questions as the diplomatic bag or joint health services’, he warned, ‘may very well become a sign of weakness’ or ‘a substitute [rather than a symptom] of political co-operation’ (Bot, 1984, p. 158).

Bot’s other main point was that the location of the host country could be an important determinant of the extent of diplomatic co-operation among member states. For him this was mainly because he saw third country co-operation at any substantive level as both driven and limited by the enthusiasm of member states and the geographical focus of Community institutions back in Europe (Bot, 1984, p. 151, 155). For the next person to address diplomatic co-operation in print, former British Diplomat Roger Tomkys, it was the nature as much as the location of the state that mattered: working in the relatively hostile environment of Syria tended to pull representatives of EC member states together and encourage ‘a certain solidarity and sense of purpose’ - so much so in his case that he emphasises the ‘contrast between the close bonds of European Political Co-operation as felt by those engaged at a working level and the doubts about its usefulness on terms of high…policy’ (Tomkys, 1987, p. 435, 425). Despite this, and despite noting (p. 434) that circulation between foreign, domestic
and European postings often means diplomats in third countries already exhibit a ‘co-
ordination reflex’ and exploit friendships formed previously, he warned that

The limits on this community of interest should not, however, be ignored. The
governments of the EC remain competitors for commercial sales and
sometimes for political influence. Some governments and administrations,
and the French are a case in point, may be more reserved about sharing
information than others.

It was clearly the limits to diplomatic cooperation in a third country that most
forcefully struck Martin Holland when he conducted in apartheid South Africa what
remains the fullest case study of the phenomenon to date (Holland, 1991). True he
observed that, as a result of regular meetings at the ambassadorial and attaché level, ‘a
new diplomatic “norm” of consultation [had] become prevalent’ and that ‘diplomats
attitudes, if not concrete procedures, had changed’ (p. 251). But he concluded (p.244)
that ‘political co-operation as practised in South Africa [between June 1986 and
December 1987] remained rudimentary and variable.’ Interestingly, though,
Holland’s explanations for such variation differed from previous writers on the
subject in a number of ways.

For a start, he found (p. 248) that the hostile character of the relationship between the
member states and South Africa impeded rather than (as Tomkys argued) encouraged
diplomatic cooperation between Community Heads of Mission. And, unlike Bot, he
argued, not just that ‘there seems to be no be no necessary link between intensified
political co-operation and the “relative importance” of a third country’ (p. 250), but also (p. 251) that

it may well be that political co-operation at the third country level operates most cohesively where the political stakes are low…[and where Member States are not] too internally divided behind the façade of common démarches for a sharing of information and collegiate action at a practical level to prosper. In third countries where EC concerns are more commonly focused, where diplomatic resources are more equal and where they have economic rather than political objectives, diplomatic co-operation ought to be more easily facilitated.

Cooperation, then, depends partly on just what is being dealt with: since ‘the content of diplomatic activity runs parallel to, rather than in unison with, political co-operation’, the ‘specific issue involved will dictate whether a state adopts a bilateral or EPC posture’ (Holland, 1991, p. 251). Behaviour and general attitudes towards cooperation are also dictated not just by the relative size of the member state and its representation but also by its traditional links with the country in question (the UK obviously being particularly important in former colonial possessions, for example) - and both clearly override the importance of presidency in determining the extent of co-operative activity (p. 244, 249). Equally important, Holland stresses (p. 249), is the diplomatic attitude of the host country and its foreign ministry: if, like South Africa’s, the strategy of the latter is one of ‘divide and rule’, then bilateralism is likely to be the order of the day whether missions like it or it - and, presumably, *vice versa.*
The latest work which discusses diplomatic cooperation on the ground in any detail is a more journalistic piece by Buchan (1993), which concentrates on the supposedly ambivalent relationship between national diplomats and those of the European Commission - particularly in Washington, Tokyo and Moscow. Some of his findings echo familiar themes. He is told, for instance (p. 63), that unlike Washington, where apparently amongst the EU ambassadors “‘you tend to find…only princes and little kings, who are not easily disposed to co-ordinate their activities’”, in Tokyo, the feeling of fighting “‘an uphill battle against an unfair competitor…makes for considerable cohesion.’” According to Buchan, however (p.62), it is Moscow “which at present provides a model of close co-operation between the ambassadors of [the member states] and the Commission’ not least because at their weekly meetings the former have much to learn from the EC Head of Mission whose role in co-ordinating food and technical aid gives him possibly unrivalled access and contact with the Russian bureaucracy. This is a big contrast with Washington, Buchan points out, where there is clear separation between trade matters and what EC Head of Delegation there, who pursues a self-denying ordinance on such matters, calls “‘the classic confines of foreign policy’”.

This tension between the separation and blurring of the economic and the political, symbolised by the seemingly ambivalent role of the Commission and its delegations in the EU’s external relations, is of course the subject of many academic contributions on EPC and CFSP more generally. Consequently, it is not only a feature of diplomatic co-operation in third countries, but yet another feature that renders it worthy of academic attention. Simon, who has written as much as anyone on EC and EU foreign policy, mentions it explicitly when he argues (Nuttall, 1992, p. 69) for the
importance of the Commission attending ambassadorial meetings. According to him, anyway,

The agenda for [such] meetings covers both EPC and Community topics without any separation between the two: indeed the distinction is barely perceived. Practical cooperation is possible in a more relaxed way than in the formal EPC and Community bodies, particularly in the smaller countries in which not all the member states are represented….

Whether this is in fact the case is something this paper will go on to explore. Its immediate aim is to update our knowledge of what actually goes on and test that reality against assumptions of an incremental increase in cooperation and engrenage. It does this by asking similar questions to those asked in previous work, largely through the use of semi-structured interviews with diplomats serving member states in third countries, normally at the level of ambassador. Its wider aim is to supply one small part of an overall picture that tests the claim, most closely associated with transactionalism and neo-functionalism, that of such small parts is closer integration made.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS

Diplomatic cooperation among member state embassies in all four capitals has as its main formal expression a monthly meeting of Heads of Mission - a meeting organised and hosted by the holder of the six-month presidency. The meeting normally takes the form of a roundtable discussion, lasting an hour and a half or more, on a
customary agenda consisting of the domestic political situation, the domestic economic situation, and the relationship between the host country and the EU. Discussion on the latter will be led by the Head of the Commission Delegation or in his or her absence (the norm in Kuala Lumpur, where there is no Delegation, and around half the time in Wellington, whose Delegation is based in Canberra) by the holder of the presidency. Discussion on the economy tends to be limited to the macro-outlook for the host country. It avoids issues like foreign direct investment and trade promotion, which are still national concerns (although, as one Head of Mission in Malaysia pointed out, even this is beginning to change as trans-European mergers gather pace.)

Discussion on political matters - by general (although not complete) agreement - can touch on foreign policy. In Canberra, for instance, there is a great deal of interest in the affairs of the wider region and matters such as East Timor and Polynesia). Defence matters are rarely discussed, especially not in detail: they are at the moment really beyond the brief of CFSP cooperation and neither those countries which have large defence interests (some of which may meet in Washington on a WEU or Contact Group basis) nor those that are neutral have any desire to explore such questions collectively. Outside the latter, there are few issues considered taboo - although it would seem that Heads of Mission (quite understandably) try to avoid topics that provoke predictable responses (be they positive or negative) from one or more of their colleagues. Discussion is often followed by lunch, to which, after consultation, an outside speaker is invited. Typical invitees include top public servants, cabinet ministers and central bankers. The frequency of such invitations varies: in Wellington they are the norm for each meeting; in Washington they occur once per presidency,
but commonly involve the US Secretary of State. Although they may do some homework on the EU position on relevant issues, and collective discussion concerning appropriate questions to the speaker is not unknown, there is little in the run-up to such occasions that could truly be called preconcertation.

Monthly meetings vary in formality according to the size and importance of the host country. In New Zealand, for example, unless the Head of Mission holding the presidency makes it his practice to do otherwise, the meetings go unminuted. Rarely in either country are they the subject of formal feedback to Europe (say, to the capital of the presidency) - indeed this, in the opinion of some, would be both pointless and inhibiting to the free flow of discussion. In the other countries, though tabled papers are rare, minutes are always taken, even if, on the one hand, not all conclusions are so recorded and, on the other, those that are tend to be records of views and impressions rather than instructions for action. Despite this, however, diplomats, particularly in Washington and Malaysia, were keen to stress that their meetings were ‘real meetings’ - in Kuala Lumpur, for example, the meeting was used to work on the monitoring of the trial of the deposed deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim (on charges of corruption and immorality) and on a common report on that country that the Heads of Mission provided for the Political Committee (POCO) back in Europe. That said the stress in most meetings in all the capitals is very much on what one Head of Mission called ‘an exchange of views, a comparing of notes’ and another ‘a sharing of feelings and perceptions’ - an exercise, many pointed out, whose usefulness, although particularly marked when they were new in their posts, continued well beyond that point.
In Washington, Canberra and Wellington, the value of such an exercise does not lie so much in the gleaning of new intelligence - in informal and media-saturated political and bureaucratic cultures like the US, Australia and New Zealand there is little that even comparatively small embassies (traditionally the main beneficiaries of and therefore enthusiasts for such sharing), cannot get on ‘the open market’, so to speak. Instead it lies in grasp rather than reach, in the chance to get different ‘takes’ or ‘reality checks’ on familiar material - wider perspectives which, as Bot (1984, p. 149, 150,152) hoped, do indeed feed into individual ambassadors assessments prepared for their respective reports home.

The same is true for diplomats reporting home from Kuala Lumpur, only in their case there was a stronger emphasis on the possibilities of learning something genuinely new, Malaysia having a much less open society and government. However, the gleaning of new information was by no means the main added value; indeed the two things, information and views, were interwoven - something reflected in the ambiguity of one Head of Mission’s observation that meetings were about ‘confirming certain things that you otherwise wouldn’t know’. By the same token, as a number of Heads of Mission (particularly from states that had recently joined the EU) noted, it would be a mistake completely to discount the informational content of the meetings in the more open countries. This is true when it comes to matters and issues picked up on during ambassador’s trips outside the ‘political villages’ that are their respective capitals: one Head of Mission in Wellington, for instance, mentioned in this respect a visit, occasioned by an invitation to share in the celebrations of a public holiday, to a Marae, where Maori perspectives on a range of issues did provide something fresh, firstly to the ambassador himself and then to his EU colleagues. It is
also true when it comes to discussions of economic matters because different embassies often have contacts with different companies and sectors.

In the case of Australia, both a continent and a country, additional information and perspectives are also provided by those larger missions that have outposts in federal states - information which when shared with EU colleagues helps them in their efforts to, as one ambassador put it, ‘build up the mosaic’ or ‘put the great Australian jigsaw together.’ These efforts were also assisted, a number of Canberra Heads of Missions noted, by the contributions of ambassadors from member-states which, although small in size (and representation), were able to tap into their ethnic links within the Australian population (at both the grassroots and the governmental levels), the Irish being the most obvious example. As one might expect, the same is of course true - perhaps even more so - in Washington.

The other function of such meetings is clearly their role in contributing to the sense - shared even by those countries that, due to their global power or historical relationships, would appear in several circles of any diplomatic Venn diagram - of being a definite club or caucus within the wider diplomatic corps in the host country. It should also be said that, in a world where contacts are everything, it is not the interests of any Mission to be seen to operate as part of some kind of exclusive group within a group; in any case, diplomacy - especially in small countries - depends so much on personal relationships that the chances of such friendships being confined to one regional grouping or another are pretty small. In some cases as well, member states may also be part of another caucus that includes non EU countries - the Commonwealth and Nordic countries, for instance, interact quite closely on occasion.
In addition, there are now regular meetings in Canberra between the EU Heads of Mission and their counterparts from, firstly, the candidate countries and, secondly, the ASEAN caucus. And generally, notwithstanding EU cooperation, there are clearly many opportunities for bilateral contacts between member states’ missions. Diplomacy is rarely a zero-sum game in any of its aspects: combinations and permutations are pursued according to contingent and particular circumstances - a further example is provided by the very close cooperation between the EU states, acting collectively but also with other states, with regard to the full-time observation of the trial of Anwar Ibrahim.

Adding to this, of course, is the chance the meeting gives ambassadors to consult on other, practical and protocol issues. Often the latter involves ensuring that everybody is singing from the same hymn-sheet: would it, for instance, be appropriate to accept an invitation to a particular event hosted by an embassy whose relations with Europe have at times been less than cordial?

Cooperation beyond the monthly meeting of Heads of Mission - at least at the diplomatic as opposed to the consular level - is the responsibility of the holder of the rotating presidency. Common tasks - which can be logistically fairly onerous for a small embassy - include the following: the organisation of various cultural and educational events that seek to boost the presence of the EU - and not entirely coincidentally - that of member states; the distribution of relevant COREU telegrams in order to keep missions informed of political cooperation ‘back home’; and the organisation of meetings below the level of ambassador. In fact, such meetings, it has to be said, are not really a significant feature of cooperation outside
Washington. There (with the interesting exception of political counsellors whose discussions might risk cutting across those of their superiors perhaps) regular meetings take place at a variety of levels (see appendix). On the other hand, more than one diplomat interviewed was of the opinion that anyone taking the extensive timetable of meetings at all levels at purely face value could gain an inflated idea of the breadth depth of meaningful cooperation in DC. He or she would also fail to appreciate the significance of gatherings which are not on the official menu, so to speak, the best example being the so-called ‘Lunch Club’ involving the Deputy Heads of Mission from France, Britain, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands.

The presidency is also involved at a more formal political level in leading so-called Troika démarches, cooperation on which can often be a useful way - for large and small countries alike - of spreading (and thereby minimising) the discomfort felt by diplomats at having to bring to the attention of their hosts the sometimes unwelcome positions or requests of their governments back home (see Bot, 1984: 156). These, of course, are rather rare in both Australia and New Zealand because of the friendly relations that (with the occasional tiff over agricultural matters) normally exist between it and the EU: the most recent example of a démarche in New Zealand, and one made only at Counsellor level, was a request that it sign and ratify a UN narcotics convention. Similarly, there are few occasions where such a formal approach would be deemed appropriate in the US, though there are issues like trade policy (where the stakes are very high and relationships have at times been very strained) and the American’s failure to meet their financial contribution to the United Nations which have given rise to more formal action.
Recent events in Malaysia involving human rights abuses and the former deputy prime minister have, unsurprisingly, provoked strong statements of disapproval from the EU, drafted and delivered by Missions in Kuala Lumpur. On the other hand it is important to note that even in Malaysia such robust initiatives are a departure from the norm. But even if the sorts of occasion to which such initiatives are a response were more common, it is clear in all the countries under discussion that they would not be pursued on all matters. A decision by member state missions to act bilaterally or multilaterally (and for that matter publicly or privately) depends not so much on the type of issue as on its substance. Effort, in other words, is directed at that point in the host country’s government or media that seems to offer to that state, on the particular issue at hand, the most leverage or the most cover.

Another arena of cooperation beyond the monthly meeting concerns the visits of member state ministers and European Commissioners to Australia and New Zealand. In 1998, for example, the Commissioner for External Relations (and Commission Vice President) Sir Leon Brittan visited the countries to publicly announce the signing of a potentially ground-breaking type of mutual recognition agreement covering a limited number of medical, electrical, telecoms and pharmaceutical products. In Wellington, to take just one of the capitals, Brittan met with member state Heads of Mission to brief them on his meetings with New Zealand ministers and a note was prepared by the Delegation for their next regular meeting which outlined Brittan’s trip and reported on the talks he had with Prime Minister Jenny Shipley the day after he met them.
Visits by Commissioners naturally raise the question of the role that Commission Delegations (which organise such visits) play in diplomatic cooperation. As regards New Zealand, the answer, it would seem, is, as yet at least, not especially significant. This is partly because the delegation is located in Canberra, but also because member state heads of mission see the Delegation as standing on one side of a still clearly demarcated division of labour. Relations between ambassadors and the Delegation Head are good - not least because the latter is held in high personal esteem by the former. There is also little sense of his being in any way a competitor - indeed member state heads of mission in Wellington, it seems, would actually welcome a more substantive (as opposed to part-time and peripatetic) Commission presence in New Zealand. Instead he is a partner with responsibility for one side of the business, namely EU trade matters (and possibly, as in the case of spreadable butter, disputes) - things in which he, rather than member state ambassadors, is clearly the significant interlocutor.15 Michael Bruter, in his recent stimulating article on Commission delegations (Bruter, 1999: 193) divides their activities into two main areas: ‘their autonomous actions, and their actions as part of the European diplomatic “team” in the host country.’ In Wellington, certainly, the latter depend on the former: the Delegation is part of the team because it plays in a particular position.

In Canberra, the division of labour and competency is similarly clear and only occasionally blurred: the Commission Delegation, according to one Head of Mission (speaking figuratively), ‘fights the EU battles’ (most often on agriculture) and, though it had a hand in the production of the wide-ranging ‘Joint Declaration on Relations’ of June 1997, is overwhelmingly involved in the negotiation of bilateral trading agreements between the EU and Australia and New Zealand.16 It also, however,
contains a useful range of expertise, particularly on the economy, trade regulations and science and technology (see Bruter, 1999: 193). The Commission Delegation’s expertise in these areas is generally recognised as a resource by member state missions: economic counsellors are happy to receive its monthly report on the Australian economy and trade and Heads of Mission seem comfortable with the Head of Delegation leading discussion on such matters during their monthly meetings. It seems clear also that during those meetings the Head of Delegation, who has high level experience in Europe and elsewhere and is charged with sending regular political reports back to DG1A, is accepted and involved as a full participant in political discussions, not least because it is widely recognised that the divide between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics is increasingly blurred.

Outside of the meeting, however, the Delegation tries hard to avoid the misconception - common in many parts of the world (see Bruter, 1999:186) held by some in the host country that it speaks for the EU on matters beyond its brief as strictly defined. This is not always easy, of course, because a large part of its role is informational and promotional, not least in order to improve the sometimes negative image of the EU (and indeed ‘Europe’) as a whole that arises from it supposed support for subsidies and protection. Still, there is little evidence Australia or New Zealand, of the kind of ‘proliferation of areas of tension, competition and redundancy among representatives’ suggested by Bruter (ibid). This is almost certainly because, where it is proactive, the Commission Delegation concentrates (like others discussed by Bruter) on areas which complement rather than conflict with member state missions’ activities.
In Malaysia, as in Australia and New Zealand, this complementarity - symbolised by the Delegations contributions at those meetings it does attend, its written reports and its educational material - is recognised as a resource by member state missions. Indeed the absence of a Delegation in Kuala Lumpur (the responsible one is located in Bangkok and also covers Laos and Cambodia) is felt to be a hindrance to the full development of a trade agenda with Malaysia.

In other areas - though not because, as Bruter seems to imply (1999: 195), of any lack of CFSP cooperation between embassies - the Delegation is more reactive, at least with regard to Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Bruter’s suggestion that (beyond participating in meetings, sharing information and, say, sponsoring cultural events) there is much delegations ‘can actually do to reinforce, energize and develop political cooperation between European embassies’ (ibid.) may not be far-fetched when it comes to places like the Lomé countries and the CIS, where it plays an important and often leading role in coordinating aid and ‘restructuring activities’. But it has little resonance in the countries studied here. True, the Commission’s delegations are keen to, and do, play an active part in the increasingly common six-monthly political dialogues held between the EU and third countries (see Monar, 1997). But this is arguably more symbolic of the development of an autonomous ‘actoriness’ by the Commission than a contribution to cooperation that is necessarily appreciated by member states. Likewise, the idea that ‘to gain more weight in the European context, [the] delegation [could] take upon itself the task of representing the interests…of smaller member countries with no local embassy’ (Bruter, 1999: 196) seems highly unlikely to find favour with member-states.
The extent of Commission Delegation involvement is more problematic in Washington than it is in the other capitals. Although it would be untrue to call the relationship between the Commission and the member state missions conflictual, neither could it be characterised as one of seamless complementarity. While the missions are grateful for the work done on trade and economic issues and information, there would appear to be some suspicion that the Delegation is, attempting to build up competency in areas like foreign affairs and US politics that - it could be argued - takes it beyond its remit and into the realms of a ‘sixteenth member state’. At the moment, though, it is fair to say that such developments lack much of a public face - not least because the Commission Delegation is careful (perhaps off its own bat, perhaps because it is aware that to do so would quickly provoke criticism from member state missions) not to comment in the media, for example, on issues which are more political than economic or trade related.

No research into such matters is of course complete without consideration of the role that the host country’s government plays in enhancing or inhibiting diplomatic cooperation among the EU member states. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)’s European effort in Wellington is divided within one division into trade policy (the bulk of which concerns the EU) and political issues, where the predominant task is to ensure that the international environment in which New Zealand trades is as benign as possible. Within the NZ/EU context, it clearly considers bilateral relationships are of at least equal standing with multilateral diplomacy and feels that some of those bilateral relationships are more important than others. The quality of such relationships varies with events, and of course trade flows, but more often than not is based on long-lasting (and not necessarily always
obvious) historic links. In terms of what those links actually mean in practice in Wellington itself, it has to be said that, from MFAT’s perspective, the most significant contact it has in Wellington with member state ambassadors concerns overseas visits by their heads of state/government or cabinet ministers (of which there are one or two per year and five or six per year respectively) on fact-finding and commercially-linked visits. Some lobbying by ambassadors does take place but a fair amount of this will be done (some times after consultation with MFAT) with the Ministry most concerned. It is also - almost without exception - done bilaterally. The exception is of course provided by official Troika démarches, but there is little to indicate that such things are taken any more seriously than bilateral statements, requests and protests: generally it is the intrinsic significance to New Zealand of the issue - rather than the way in which MFAT’s attention is drawn to it - that determines its importance.

It is during the visits of foreign politicians to Wellington (or New Zealand politicians to European capitals) that MFAT will press the case (not always directly) for its commercial interests and trade and agricultural liberalisation. If the case is to be made via standard diplomatic channels it is (at least at a formal level) normally made - as was the case with spreadable butter and chilled lamb - via New Zealand’s own mission in Brussels and other EU capitals rather than in Wellington, or as part of the Dialogue between the EU and New Zealand (see Monar, 1997) in which, it would appear, ambassadors are not involved. There is an evolving relationship with the EC Delegation in Canberra; however, the opening of an EC Delegation in Wellington - now on the agenda - would accelerate that evolution. On the other hand, and despite the fact that the Head of Delegation is regarded as equal in rank to his Ambassadorial
colleagues (and a visiting Commissioner such as Leon Brittan regarded as a cabinet minister), that distance means that there is little likelihood of the Delegation - even if wanted to - being able to take on political as well as more narrowly-defined economic diplomacy.

Hill and Wallace (1996, p. 13) talk of third countries being left to ‘puzzle over…the duplication of national embassies by Community representations which see themselves as playing an increasingly political role’ (see also Bruter, 1999: 186). New Zealand does not, however, have a problem distinguishing competence in this area and neither does it envisage (any more perhaps than does the Delegation itself) an expanding political role for the EC Delegation in the near future. Nor - despite seeing obvious advantages in terms of time saved - does it see much likelihood of an umbrella EU embassy. Indeed it sees little substantial evidence of a trend toward EU Heads of Mission in Wellington behaving as a bloc - not least because trade promotion and investment links, now such an important part of diplomacy, are still pursued on a national rather than an EU wide basis. In any case, New Zealand would currently see no advantage in substituting its own predominantly bilateral diplomacy with EU states and/or the Commission in Brussels for some kind of multilateral approach. This is primarily because it sees that almost all the issues that most concern it (agriculture and foreign policy more generally, to name but two) are still decided on an intergovernmental rather than a supranational level. While the perception remains that the EU whole is as yet little more than the (not altogether cohesive sum) of its component parts, then relationships with those component parts - both at home and abroad - still make most sense. In short, it is clear to MFAT, first, that there are significant differences on a range of issues between Member States and, second, that
the defences of *Fortress Europe* - if such a thing exists - are better breached by using existing bilateral relationships to tease out those differences and then take advantage of them.

Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Canberra comprises three sections. One deals exclusively with the EU, concentrating mainly on economic issues, but including political consultations with the Presidency and the Commission. The second deals with the major west European bilateral relationships and the third with Russia, and the other parts of Europe. Like MFAT in New Zealand, DFAT regards its own efforts as Europe as the most important means of pursuing Australia’s interests on that continent. European diplomatic missions in Canberra, however, are seen as a useful second communication channel to European governments, not least because they are involved in visits to Australia by ministers and senior public servants for the sort of high-level intergovernmental consultations which are a significant means of pursuing policy. The Commission Delegation clearly plays a similar role if visits are by Commission staff, but when it comes to DFAT’s effort to keep abreast of EU affairs, its own mission in Brussels is seen as very much the key player. Finally, Canberra, like Wellington, has no problem in distinguishing the relative responsibilities of the Commission Delegation and member state missions. And, while it would guess that the level of cooperation between those missions (including the delegation) has increased over time - measured, for instance by requests for joint briefings[^1] - it affirms that independent bilateral action is still far and away the most common *modus operandi*. 

[^1]: Footnote text
The same appears to be true of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry. While recent difficulties - and the EU’s collective response to them - have raised the profile of the Union in Kuala Lumpur, the government continues to open in a predominantly bilateral manner. There is some feeling, indeed, that the Malaysians have not perhaps fully recognised the increasing importance of the Union as a foreign policy actor (or indeed as an actor more generally) in its own right. Interestingly, though, their reluctance to talk too openly about the Anwar case (and human rights abuses) more generally has arguably put an unusual premium on those often collective briefings for member state missions that have been given.

In Washington, too, there seems to be little or no evidence that the State Department has any illusions about either the role of the Commission Delegation or the continued bias among member state mission for bilateralism. Indeed the latter is a bias it largely shares: while the ‘one-stop-shop’, logistical, argument for collective briefings, for instance, is of course appreciated and the regular Transatlantic Dialogue is assuming more and more importance, the Americans are aware that - until Javier Solana as M. PESC/Mr CFSP proves otherwise - anyone wanting to press Europe’s buttons is still best off dealing individually with its biggest players. This bilateral bias is reinforced, as in other countries, by an organisational structure that continues to involve country desks - and by an awareness that multilateral fora do rather increase the chances of being ganged up on by otherwise more malleable interlocutors! It should also be noted that there is no pressure on the administration to treat Europe as more of a piece from the legislature: most congressmen and senators continue to see the continent refracted through the prism of their own ethnic origins and therefore see little sense in thinking about it - let alone dealing with it - on any other basis than bilateral.
CONCLUSION

There seems to be little evidence from this study to support the idea - à la Deutsch - that, at least in any general sense, increased transactions between the players in this particular field lead to a significantly more mutual identity. Indeed, it could be argued that it is precisely those symbols and norms that are expected to both generate and reflect such mutuality which help to arrest its development. Other obstacles exist in two of the areas most associated with the classical arguments of neo-functionalism: both economic and political interests are weighed against what potential there is for technical/functional spillover. There is also a range of contingent and/or exogenous factors which have to be taken into account.

The first of these is the fact that the more open and friendly the host country, the less need there is for EU Heads of Mission to pull together in the way that some diplomats in ‘friendly countries’ had clearly experienced in postings in rather more hostile environments. In addition, in friendly countries - and especially where the Commission delegation is non-resident - there is little impetus for it to become involved in political matters; instead, it will stick to a narrower trade and aid brief. Cooperation on - and even discussion of - foreign policy and security matters among ambassadors, in any case, varies with the extent to which the third country is in these areas a matter of concern for Brussels. With regard to friendly third countries, policy is characterised by its absence, as it were, so there is little emanating from Brussels for ambassadors to talk about; hence they will share views but feel no need to develop a common view.
Cooperation in friendly countries is, then, limited because there is no need - or externally imposed obligation - for it to be anything other than limited. It is true, though, that, because cooperation need only be what its participants want it to be, the more enthusiasm shown by the presidency holder, the greater the scope (though not necessarily the intensity) of cooperation in private and public diplomacy. However, as Heads of Mission themselves continually stressed, that enthusiasm does not necessarily vary with size or with the relationship that exists between a member state and the host country, or with that member state’s general attitude to CFSP. More important, according to participants, than any of these was the personal enthusiasm of individual ambassadors. Possibly such enthusiasm is correlated with youth and, more significantly, with experience of working either in Brussels (for example in COREPER) or in missions located in European member states. Significantly, of course, such experience is increasingly common as younger cohorts reach ambassadorial status. But there were plenty of individual examples volunteered of Heads of Mission who were older and/or had little EU experience, yet who were nonetheless very pro-cooperation.

Concern that one plays, and is seen to play by ones fellow diplomats, the presidential role seriously and effectively also seems to be important - so much so that it is capable of overriding the reluctance of even the least enthusiastic of Heads of Mission: as one diplomat in Washington put it ‘You just have to be keen’! Just as in Europe itself, performing well may is clearly a matter of pride and principle to all member states, big or small. Similarly, there is no doubt that a good performance can considerably enhance the esteem in which a mission and its head is held by the others.
- the performance of the Austrian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur during the tense period engendered by the Anwar trial is a case in point. A high profile presidency may in any case serve many purposes. In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, the UK High Commissions took their private and public roles seriously, seeing in them the opportunity - particularly given the thrust of the British Labour government’s Foreign Office Mission Statement - to emphasise at all levels of opinion that it was very much a European nation rather than the semi-detached ‘awkward partner’ it is sometimes portrayed as in the media.

Of course, the temporary prominence in PR terms afforded by holding the presidency is by no means detrimental to boosting the profile of the individual country concerned either; but that illustrates once again that the choice between multilateral and bilateral action is not a zero-sum game. The two approaches are more likely to be mutually reinforcing and pursued simultaneously than they are to be black and white alternatives; the choice of one or the other, or both, depends largely on the issue at hand, but is also dictated by the host country’s preferences.

When thinking of integration in the field of diplomacy in third countries, it may be useful to think of four, not necessarily evolutionary, stages, as follows: bilateral-independent where member state missions may go through the motions of meeting etc. but think and act very much according to their own lights, sensible-collective, where the co-ordination reflex is present in at least some areas and a communauté somewhere between information and vues, if not action, exists as members realise that cooperation can be a positive-sum game; multilateral, best summed up by Ruggie’s more general definition of ‘an institutional form which coordinates relations…on the
basis of “generalized” principles of conduct, and, finally, full-blown merger. In all the capitals studied here it is clear that things are at the second stage. There is little need at present to advance beyond it. The capability to do more is probably there; the low expectations of member states back in Europe, however, means that it is not.

There is little evidence, then, at least from this study, that would lead us at the moment to challenge Bot’s conclusion - made some fifteen years ago (Bot, 1984, p. 151-152) - that foreign policy co-ordination in Europe remains at the level of ‘a pragmatic form of collective diplomacy’ which in turn encourages amongst missions in third countries ‘a mainly pragmatic form of cooperation with a clear accent on regular exchanges of information rather than on joint action or a common approach to the problems facing them.’ What of the future, however?

As Bot pointed out, ‘[i]f one draws the concept of diplomatic cooperation to its logical conclusion, individual embassies are bound to disappear’ (Bot, 1984, p. 168). Clearly, however, as Bot (ibid.) also stressed, theory does not necessarily translate into practice. States have resisted and are predicted to continue to resist such a move, even if that resistance ironically leads to the increased sharing - organised intergovernmentally - of facilities and co-location with other member states (see Allen, 1996, p. 295). Some commentators see this - not unjustifiably - as one facet of a wider refusal to relinquish command of foreign policy on the grounds that it represents the last bastion of sovereignty (see Whitman, 1998, p. 204) - an argument which some Heads of Mission, not always without regret, point to as significant. But concentrating on continued attachment to ‘the symbols of sovereignty’ as an
explanation can lead us to ignore the rather more practical arguments against joint representation and in support of the logic of diversity.

One such argument is noted - though very much in passing - by Whitman himself, namely that it may be constitutionally illegal in some member states, France being the best known example after its constitutional court ruled that the French president could only be represented by a French citizen. Another - and one echoed by all those interviewed - was the ever-increasing fusion of public diplomacy and trade promotion. The job of the diplomat, particularly in liberal capitalist, friendly host countries, is increasingly one of maintaining and projecting, through holding and attending functions, monitoring and feeding the local press, etc., a national cultural presence - a role that, while going much further than salesmanship, is ultimately perhaps not divorceable from it. Collective representation might make sense in terms, say, of cost, narrowly defined. But these costs are ultimately far outweighed by the benefits that accrue from having personnel on the ground or ‘in-country’ who - metaphorically at least - fly their own nation’s flag. Substantive differences between individual products - goods or services - are now so small that purchase decisions are made on largely symbolic grounds, on a company’s brand image. Each brand continues to be associated (and to associate itself) with a particular country and its image (be it tradition, romance, sophistication, efficiency etc.), making it all the more important for each brand owner that the brand’s country of origin (even if the product in question is in fact manufactured elsewhere) is represented abroad.27

All this means that the limits on supranational development are as bottom-line as they are blimpish. And that bottom line is not simply commercial; it is to do with high as
well as low politics. Member states are fully aware that their unique historical and ethnic ties with certain third countries are a precious resource that needs to be husbanded as well as exploited for political as well as economic gain. The prospect of some kind of unified representation that would loosen these ties is consequently less than attractive. Concrete losses would be myriad, but to take just one example, an Irish-Australian or American politician, would find it even harder than his brethren back home to think of himself as ‘European’ and therefore be less enthusiastic about interacting with a ‘European’ rather than an Irish diplomat.

It is also true to say that member state missions, though they may be happy on occasions to use their EU status as ‘cover’ (see above), often feel the need to, if not disown it, then downplay it, when talk turns to topics on which the Union has a particularly poor image - which, in New Zealand and, particularly, Australia, can often seem to begin with agricultural protection and then radiate rapidly outward. Clearly this would be impossible if individual missions were to be subsumed by a unified foreign service. And to all this one is obliged to point out that diplomats - as the tenacious rearguard action fought by the British FCO against Treasury attempts to scale down its scope - are no different from any other group in the public or private sector in wanting to maintain their current position: what vested interests they do have do not lie, it seems safe to assume, in working to squeeze the quart of individual member state representation into the pint-pot of a putative European diplomatic service. Even if this were not the case, one would still be faced with the fact that, as a number of respondents pointed out, diplomats are conditioned and constrained by their representative function not to push anything further than their national governments require.
This points to the fact that the hard-headed logic of diversity is ultimately rooted in the ‘fact’ that progress abroad is to a large extent a dependent variable of progress in Europe itself. Bot, for instance, suggests that

cooperation between diplomatic missions (and the Commission) can only be a reflection of the degree of harmonisation reached between the [member states] “at home”, and…it can never develop into a *sui generis* form of cooperation. Ambassadors…, being representatives of sovereign states, have only so much political leeway as their respective ministries are willing to grant them. Their opinions and evaluations will therefore, perforce, first and foremost reflect national policies and intentions.

In none of the capitals under discussion was there anything that could accurately be described as a coordination reflex. The automaticity implied by such a term is impossible when those who might demonstrate - the diplomats themselves - rely in important matters on instructions from home first before acting in concert. For instance, fieldwork for this research in Kuala Lumpur was carried out as retailers in Malaysia and elsewhere were busy removing European food products from their shelves in the wake of the Belgian dioxin scare: Heads of Mission made it clear, however, that there would be no effort to forge a collective response to such a panic unless and until they had received advice from their individual capitals. There can, then, be no European foreign policy until there is an identifiable European interest. And without the latter - for all the expectations generated around the appointment of Javier Solana as M. /Mr CFSP - there can be no unified Foreign Service.
But just as problematic as the continued commitment among member states to intergovernmentalism in the field of foreign policy is their perceived continuation of intergovernmental decision-making in fields (like agriculture for example) which have a more indirect bearing on such policy. In short, while third countries continue to believe that it is the case that the issues they care most about are still ultimately decided - albeit by way of some collective process - by individual governments, then those third countries will continue to focus their own diplomatic efforts on the bilateral plane. Rummel (1988, p. 126) has noted that for member states it makes sense to pursue as many avenues and use as many channels as possible when negotiating with third parties since ‘[t]he high degree of redundancy in the multiplicity of duplicated relationships seems more an asset than and impediment.’

But what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. Hence, even if there is some movement towards integration in CFSP it will be insufficient to shift the preferences of the EU’s interlocutors for bilateralism unless there is at the same time a similar and simultaneous leap forward in other key areas. Given that ‘multi-level governance’, like foreign policy cooperation, can be ‘comfortably accommodated as a terminal condition’ rather than seen as ‘the embryo of a supranational state’, the chances of movement are surely slight.

On the other hand, and rather ironically, there are developments outside CFSP that may do much more than it can do to encourage cooperation in third countries. Some of these are rather contingent: for example, missions in Kuala Lumpur found themselves working together quite closely on The most significant of these is the move - given extra impetus by the Schengen Agreement’s incorporation into the
Amsterdam Treaty - toward the creation of a common visa policy for the EU. In the capitals studied here at least, consultation on the processing of visa applications - which now involves regular meetings between consular attachés - is evidently a growth area when it comes to cooperation between the various member state missions. It could be, then, that such cooperation - at least in the near future - will tend towards the *consular* rather than the *diplomatic*. Whether this will, in spite of all the obstacles analysed above, lead to the sort of technical/functional spillover still much beloved by neo-functionalists remains of course a moot point. If it does, we will at least be able to observe wryly that it would not be the first or the last time that an issue supposedly dealt with under one pillar of the European Union ends up strengthening - or, if one takes a sceptical line, undermining - the other two.
References


Regelsberger, E. et al. (eds.) (1997) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).


¹ These missions were chosen for a variety of reasons. Wellington constituted the pilot for the study and also represents a small country where formal links with the EU are limited and where by no means all countries choose to be represented. Canberra was chosen to provide an initial contrast with Wellington, Australia having stronger formal links with the EU and virtually the full range of countries represented; it also
allowed a study of the way in which a Commission Delegation operated in its home base and in the another country for which it was responsible but non-resident. Kuala Lumpur was chosen because links with certain European countries are sometimes problematic, making it possible to study cooperation in a more ‘hostile’ environment; it too had no resident delegation and was also a member of the British Commonwealth making it possible to compare and contrast with New Zealand and Australia on a number of levels. Washington was chosen to represent a city where diplomatic resources were far greater by comparison, and where clearly the strategic interests of countries were much higher; it also had the merit of having been studied beforehand, allowing an element of comparison over time. Some thought was given to including a site in Latin America and/or Africa, and perhaps a former communist country. Resources were, however, limited and it quickly became apparent that many of the diplomats interviewed in the chosen sites had served in those locations and were able to provide comparisons which were useful in any case.

The idea that smaller states have most to gain from diplomatic cooperation in third countries is of course a theme in studies of the wider EC/EU foreign policy process: Weiler and Wessels, for instance, noted a decade ago (1988, p. 252) that ‘[t]he smaller member states have an obvious stake in EPC as a platform and a forum which in normal circumstances would necessitate a huge diplomatic effort and would not guarantee the same level of success’, though they also suggested - both tentatively and tantalisingly - that common foreign policy ‘may be able to mitigate [in the case of France and the UK] or accelerate [Germany and Italy] the changing lot of certain European “powers”.’

This is confirmed elsewhere. Christopher Piening, in a passing comment on the November 1993 joint action sending observers to the parliamentary elections in
Russia (1997: 41-2), calls it ‘a good example of the genuinely “Union” dimension of a foreign policy activity’: the Commission Delegation played a central role in coordinating not just the EC but also the member states’ contributions, ‘working with various member state’s embassies to ensure that national teams were integrated into the overall Union effort’; and the embassy of Belgium (the presidency holder) ‘cooperated with its troika partners in arranging political briefings for all the incoming teams of observers.’

4 Since not all member states are physically represented in Wellington, this meeting therefore includes only the ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, the Consul-General of Greece, and any other EU ambassadors resident in Canberra who happen to be visiting New Zealand (including the Head of the EC Delegation to Australia and New Zealand who is resident in the capital of the former rather than the latter). Clearly, if the presidency holder is not resident in New Zealand then the nation that substitutes for it in Wellington will take on all such functions. Note, though, that there are standard procedures in place to avoid one nation having to form on its own the entire Troika in Wellington! For example, in the eighteen month period in 1998-1999, Germany, as substitute for Austria and Finland and also - in the middle - the holder of the office in its own right, was theoretically in this position, but in practice was accompanied by the UK and Belgium. Interestingly, Germany’s substitution for Austria was coordinated not between the German ambassador in Wellington and his Austrian counterpart in Canberra but via Bonn.

5 Though, as one diplomat from one of the smaller nations represented in Washington, the accessibility of information is not always matched by the capacity of small embassies to process it.
6 Bot suggested that, owing to cooperation providing them with both access to new information and ‘the equally important process of cross-fertilisation’, embassies could supply ‘the “raw materials” for [EPC’s] final product, the coordinated line of conduct, by informing their own authorities...about significant developments at their respective posts’ and suggested that since ‘these frequent, almost institutionalized exchanges of information’ were ‘increasingly influencing the nature and contents of the reporting to the respective capitals’, they ‘should not be belittled’.

7 Other countries’ Heads of Mission, it should be said, do caucus - the Latin Americans and the ASEAN countries are examples - but these are (or are at least perceived to be) looser arrangements based as much on social and cultural than on substantive ties. Other countries’ Heads of Mission, it should be said, do caucus - the Latin Americans and the ASEAN countries are examples - but these are (or are at least perceived to be) looser arrangements based as much on social and cultural than on substantive ties. It should also be said that, in a world where contacts are everything, it is not the interests of any Mission to be seen to operate as part of some kind of exclusive group within a group; in any case, diplomacy - especially in small countries - depends so much on personal relationships that the chances of such friendships being confined to one regional grouping or another are pretty small. In some cases as well, member states may also be part of another caucus that includes non EU countries - the Commonwealth and Nordic countries, for instance, interact quite closely on occasion. In addition, there are now regular meetings in Canberra between the EU Heads of Mission and their counterparts from, firstly, the candidate countries and, secondly, the ASEAN caucus. In addition, notwithstanding EU cooperation, there are clearly many opportunities for bilateral contacts between member states’ missions.
In New Zealand, for example, the UK High Commission organised a European film week in Wellington.

In Malaysia Deputies meet some ten days before Heads of Mission partly in order to prepare the upcoming meeting of their superiors.

Clearly, if the presidency holder is not resident in New Zealand then the nation that substitutes for it in Wellington will take on all such functions.

The EU issued statements on the Anwar case on 2 October and 27 November 1998, and on 14 April 1999.

In an interview with a Wellington based national newspaper given soon after he assumed his post, Britain’s new High Commissioner in New Zealand, after insisting judiciously that ‘the relationship between Britain and New Zealand has not been downgraded…in response to the government’s wish to improve Britain’s standing within Europe, to operate from the centre of Europe rather than a position that was somewhere outside’, stressed that ‘the dairy issue’ - a reference to the recent spats over spreadable butter and alleged infractions of butter quotas more generally - ‘was a European Union matter and ultimately had to be resolved on a European basis by a European institution’ (see The Dominion, 18 May 1998).

Tomkys considers coordination in this area as a real boon in logistical terms for ambassadors and visitors (who are of course saved from making endless calls) alike (see Tomkys, 1987, p. 435).

These MRAs will facilitate trade by allowing conformity assessment (testing, inspection and certification) of products traded between Europe and New Zealand and Australia to be undertaken in the exporting country rather than have to be carried out at destination. This means compliance with the requirements of the relevant EC Directives (or regulations) can be established in New Zealand and Australia and the
CE marking applied to the product prior to export. In this way, the product can be
placed on the EU market with no further intervention by EC authorities. Note that the
initiative was very much Brussels-driven, with a facilitative and liaison role for the
Canberra delegation’s Science and Technology adviser.

15 For the record, the EU is clearly more important a market for Australia and New
Zealand than vice versa. As the largest single trading partner of both nations, it
accounts for almost 20% of the latter’s foreign trade, though rather less of the
former’s. Looked at the other way around, things are very different. In 1995, for
instance, Australia (which has a deficit with the EU) accounted for under 1.5% of EU
trade, New Zealand (which is roughly in balance) for 0.3% (Piening, 1997: 163-4).

16 So far efforts to sign a similar agreement with New Zealand have come to nothing.
This fits a general pattern: Australia and the Commission, for example, have a high
level annual dialogue in Brussels or Canberra (see

17 In the meeting, traditionally, the current troika sit together and the Head of the
Commission Delegation sits opposite them.

18 The Commission Delegation tries not just to eliminate the negative but also to
accentuate the positive, particularly on matters such as the single currency and market,
and also (in view of Australia and New Zealand’s need to diversify exports) on the
possibilities open to host country firms wishing to take advantage of the EU’s stress
on SMEs and mutual recognition. As a result there is certainly some blurring between
this ‘defensive-cum-promotional’ role and what Bruter, in his fascinating article
(1999: 197), labels as the delegations’ ‘consumer-oriented diplomacy.’ If one were to
have any caveats with his argument, one could argue that he seems to include (ibid:
201) within the purview of the latter interaction with commercial concerns that many
embassies, distinguishing between (their) trade promotion functions and (the delegations’) trade policy advice functions, would in fact consider their territory

19 For example, a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, the EU President (at the time the Finnish Foreign Minister), the responsible Commission Vice President (at the time Manuel Marin) and the Head of the EC Delegation in Canberra was held during the ASEAN PMC meeting in Singapore.

20 Bruter suggests (1999: 196) that this may occur when a country that is part of the Troika is not present in-country: as observed, however, in a previous note, the member states make arrangements among themselves to cover this eventuality.

21 On the other hand, it could be argued - with some justification, given the implications of ongoing disputes over bananas, hormones and GMOs for relationships with the third world and consumer/environmental protection - that the distinction between trade and politics is an increasingly inconvenient fiction.

22 MFAT’s post-election briefing to the incoming government after the 1996 election (see http://www.mft.govt.nz/Guide/part2.html#2-6) reveals that it devotes some 20% of its resources to its relationship with Europe and noted that ‘The EU is our second largest market after Australia, and takes some 16% of our total exports valued at $3.2 billion. It is our largest, highest value and in many cases our fastest growing market for key products like butter, sheepmeat, apples, kiwifruit and wine.’ It went on to note that ‘the EU’s common foreign and security policy is still in an early state of development, but it is a key player in many international issues of interest to New Zealand’ not least because it ‘is one of the heavyweights of the global economy with significant influence on international trade rules.’ The liberalisation of these - and reform of the CAP are seen as MFAT’s main goals when it came to Europe.
Countries singled out for attention in the post election briefing are the UK, France and Germany. ‘Productive bilateral relationships with the[se] three key member states…can support our political and economic objectives in Europe. All are actual or potential sources of direct inward investment and transfer of technology. They are each important trading partners and provide customers for our service industries. The positions they adopt on matters of importance to New Zealand in Europe are crucial to our interests there.’

Joint DFAT briefings are sometimes requested by the EU member states and the Commission. Their value, however, would seem to be as symbolic as substantial, giving the Europeans an occasion on which to demonstrate a degree of solidarity. Bilateral briefing is still the most common course, not least because it allows for more individual interaction and tailored information sharing.

That is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence’ (quoted in Holland, 1997, p. 197).

There is perhaps a tendency to read too much into such arrangements. It is still relatively uncommon, often driven by little more - especially perhaps in the UK’s case - than the need to make a little go a longer way at a time when the end of the cold war has created so many new states, and in any case is not always as far advanced as hinted at. For example, of the list Whitman seems to have culled from an old press cutting (1998, p. 204), this author’s brief inquiries revealed that, while the British (and in fact the French) sub-let from the Germans in Kasakhstan, the two states do not ‘share’ in Azerbaijan, and, while they are indeed co-located in a purpose built embassy in Iceland and will share offices in Ecuador next year, the joint facility in
Tanzania planned for the two along with the Commission and the Dutch (who do not, by the way, share with the British in Bulgaria) is still very much at the planning stage.

27 There are of course exceptions to this rule: certain products, whilst actually manufactured abroad, continue to be associated in the Australian or New Zealand mind with traditional homegrown brands (eg Holden cars which are built by GM in Europe and elsewhere); it would not therefore be in the interests of a member state to promote itself as the country of origin.

28 It would be interesting to speculate on whether the physical presence of a Commission Delegation would have made any difference in this case.