PORTUGAL AND THE EU’S EASTERN ENLARGEMENT: A LOGIC OF IDENTITY ENDORSEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the puzzle of why Portugal has consistently supported the EU’s fifth enlargement. We argue that standard explanations, based on welfare maximisation, geopolitics, or rhetorical action, cannot persuasively account for this policy choice. Instead, we advance an alternative explanation – subsequently referred to as ‘identity endorsement’ – that is based on a logic of appropriateness where behaviour is shaped by aspects of similarity and congruence, and where the development of Portuguese identity has constituted what has been perceived as appropriate in the context of Eastern enlargement. We argue that EC/EU membership has provided Portuguese political elites with a renewed collective identity, in which a choice for membership has been equated with a choice for democracy, stability and openness. Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement has consistently been based on these concepts that originated from Portugal’s own period of accession negotiations. By fully supporting Eastern enlargement, Portugal could act together with the ‘European core’, and Portugal itself would become more ‘core’, i.e. more European. For Portuguese political elites, supporting Eastern enlargement thus constituted an act of ‘identity endorsement’.

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s Portugal has consistently supported the goal of EU Eastern enlargement. This is rather puzzling because it cannot convincingly be explained through mainstream theoretical frameworks. Welfare-related rationalist accounts do not make sense because most economists expected a moderate decrease of the Portuguese GDP as a result of the EU’s fifth enlargement.¹ In addition, explanations based on geopolitics cannot persuasively account for

¹ The terms ‘fifth enlargement’ and ‘Eastern enlargement’ are used synonymously here. The role of Cyprus and Malta are disregarded given their negligible impact on this context.
Portugal’s preferences either because geopolitically the shift of the EU’s centre of gravity eastwards can be viewed as rather detrimental for the country. Furthermore, an explanation based on rhetorical action — which would suggest that Portugal was rhetorically entrapped — does not add much to our understanding: Portuguese preferences for Eastern enlargement were formed already by the late 1980s, and these were consistently maintained. Instead, it seems that Portugal did not need to be rhetorically entrapped in order to become a staunch supporter of Eastern enlargement.

We argue that the puzzle of explaining Portuguese preferences regarding this process lies in modern Portuguese national identity, where properties of 'Europe' and 'Europeanness' play a constituting role. Portugal's Europeanness, within this context, has been consistently treated as the alternative to the totalitarian, unstable and closed political system the country had known for so many years. Having secured membership of the EU in 1986, Eastern enlargement presented an opportunity to become one of the core members of the organization, as it gave Portuguese politicians the chance to act along with the traditional European core that wished to continue the European project towards the East. For Portugal, following this explanation, supporting Eastern enlargement can be treated as an act of supporting, or *endorsing*, modern Portuguese national identity.

Apart from shedding light on the above mentioned puzzle and introducing an explanation that is informed by an alternative (and less used) conceptual underpinning, this paper also adds value in the sense that it focuses on an underexplored dimension of the enlargement literature. While much of the scholarship focuses on questions of EU enlargement politics, applicants’ enlargement politics, and the impact of enlargement, the dimension of member states’ enlargement politics has featured to a lesser extent. In addition, studies analysing EU members’ enlargement politics mainly concentrate on the larger and more influential member countries, while smaller and less influential ones – and those without any major political and economic benefits in prospect – have featured significantly less as units of analysis.

We proceed as follows: section one briefly describes the most important aspects of Portugal’s own EU experience, which provides the foundation for assessing the Portuguese debate on Eastern enlargement later on in the paper. In section two we review the most important conceptual approaches to EU enlargement and also specify our own theoretical point of departure. Section three probes rational choice explanations concerning the question of why Portugal came out in favour of supporting Eastern enlargement. The fourth section examines the relevance of ‘rhetorical action’ with regard to the Portuguese choice on the issue

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2 Cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002).
3 But on Spain, see Piedrafita (2007).
at hand. Section five probes the alternative conceptualisation, here referred to as ‘identity endorsement’, on the research question. Finally, we draw some conclusions from our findings.

1. PORTUGAL IN THE EU

In order to provide a basis for subsequent assessment of the Portuguese debate on the fifth enlargement, it is useful to sketch out the main aspects of Portugal’s own EU experience. In 1974 a peaceful revolution successfully removed the fascist regime from office. After the first free elections in 1975 and with the first democratic government taking office in 1976, Portugal began to pursue the goal of EC membership, which was realised in 1986. Portugal’s choice for Europe was essentially political, notwithstanding the impact EU membership has had on economic growth and development. Apart from making progress in catching up with the other EC economies – Portuguese per capita income grew from 56 percent to about 74 percent of the EU average during the 1980s and 1990s – and fully participating in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from its inception in 1999, EU membership has had a significant positive influence on the consolidation of democracy. One example of the influence the EC had on Portugal’s democratic development is the abolition of the Council of the Revolution in 1982, a military institution that put the new democratic government under its tutelage.

More generally, it has been argued that European integration has had a substantial positive impact on the democratisation process in Portugal, not least since the identification of the Union with liberal democracy and political freedom has had a great symbolic influence in Portugal. Membership allowed Portuguese society to identify with democracy and the positive economic effects of structural funds helped to legitimise the new political system. Studies show that satisfaction with democracy seems to be ‘the most important variable in explaining support for the EU’. Political elites in Portugal, with the exception of the Communists, have consistently linked these two variables. Overall, Portuguese experiences with the EU have been positive. For the first time in its history, Portugal experienced democracy, political stability and economic growth simultaneously.

Portugal’s main concern during the period after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the preservation of the level of Portuguese influence in the communitarian project. It stressed its

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5 Ibidem, p. 100.
concerns regarding the preferential character of economic and social cohesion politics, which was to be maintained in any future agreement, paying special attention to the EU’s ultra-peripheral regions, like the Azores and Madeira. Secondly, Portugal undertook considerable political and economic efforts to secure participation in EMU from its beginning in 1999. Thirdly, the Portuguese government favoured a deepening of the integration process and a broadening of its scope because it wanted to keep the Union from ‘relapsing into nationalist politics’. Portugal has generally supported integrationist politics and never opposed any round of enlargement during its membership. In the debate regarding the EU’s institutional functionality during the late 1990s and early 2000s, within the context of the anticipated fifth enlargement, Portugal deplored the tendency towards restructuring the distribution of power (towards the bigger Member States) ‘by taking future enlargements as a main alibi’, which would make those questioning certain institutional changes appear as implicitly opposing the accession of new Member States.

Despite a close relationship and the impact Spanish decisions tend to have on Portuguese decision-making, Portugal did not always follow Spain in EU debates. For example, when the accession of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria was about to take place in 1994, Spain threatened to block enlargement in fear of a two-speed Europe with these new members in front. Moreover, the Spaniards were apprehensive of any changes to the blocking minority in the Council of Ministers. Portugal did not support Spanish protests, because it considered Spain to have entered the European Union on remarkably favourable conditions, which it was bound to lose at some point.

In some ways the process of enlargement itself already started in December 1989, only four years after Portugal’s own accession, when the Council Regulation on economic aid to Poland and Hungary was published as the PHARE programme. Later the remaining CEECs were added to the programme and its goals were adapted to the needs of each particular applicant. In 1993, it was agreed that new members had to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of political, economic, and legislative conditions. The actual accession agreement for the first round within the fifth enlargement was signed in April 2003. Portugal was the third member state to ratify it, in October that same year, by a unanimous vote. Agreement on the

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14 The Economist (1994b).
15 The Economist (1994a).
16 Interview with Ernâni Rodrigues Lopes (2009), Minister of Finance from 1983 till 1985, and now Professor at the Institute for European Studies, Catholic University, Lisbon.
accession of Bulgaria and Romania was reached two years later and again met no resistance in the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic. This is illustrative of the low degree of controversy regarding the process of Eastern enlargement in Portuguese politics.

2. APPROACHES TO EU ENLARGEMENT AND POINT OF DEPARTURE

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeider have distinguished between the following dependent variables concerning the study of enlargement: (1) applicants’ enlargement politics; (2) member state enlargement politics; (3) EU enlargement politics; (4) the impact of enlargement. They schematised the available academic literature on enlargement, based on the above-mentioned dimensions and the type of study (single case, cross-sectional comparison or longitudinal comparison). Within this scheme, this paper is best described as a single case study within the member state politics dimension. Not only has this category generally been somewhat under-researched, analyses of decision-making processes in countries without any major political or economic benefits in prospect are strikingly absent. The next sub-sections discuss the main approaches for conceptualising enlargement (combined with more recent studies on enlargement).

Rational choice approaches

In rational choice theories expected individual costs and benefits determine a particular state’s enlargement preferences. Costs and benefits are defined in terms of three different categories: (1) transaction costs and benefits, (2) policy costs and benefits and (3) autonomy costs and benefits. Transaction costs are expenses related to the need for additional organisational infrastructure and to the fact that horizontal integration (enlargement) often implies an increase of heterogeneity amongst member states, which makes decision-making processes more difficult. For applicants and incumbent member states to accept these costs, they have to be convinced of the entailed benefits, in order to make up for these negative by-products. Policy costs and benefits are related to the institution’s ‘club goods’. In the case of the European Union these entail contributions (meaning costs for applicant member states and benefits for incumbents), and EU funds (implying the exact opposite in the example of

18 But see Tewes (1998); Hyde-Price (2000).
19 But on Spain see Piedrafita (2007).
Eastern enlargement). Finally, autonomy costs arise when incumbent member states have to grant new members equal decision-making rights, while they, conversely, enjoy a greater degree of control over applicant state policies. Here, benefits for incumbents can be seen as costs for applicants, and vice versa.21

Among rational choice theories on enlargement, one can distinguish between neo-liberal institutionalism and realism, with the former treating autonomy costs as secondary to absolute gains in terms of welfare benefits, while the latter is mostly concerned with external autonomy and power. In addition, a third type can be identified, rational institutionalism, where governments are above all concerned with their own re-election. Their first concern, then, is still their autonomy, however this autonomy is understood not so much with regard to other states as vis-à-vis their own societies. If a government’s re-election may be secured by the economic prosperity that follows from the country’s membership of an institution, autonomy costs might be put aside.22

While the aforementioned distinctions have been applied to member state and applicants’ policies, they might also be analysed at the EU level, by treating the EU as a singular actor — maximising benefits and minimising costs — that would proceed with enlargement where marginal benefits exceed marginal costs. Within this context, costs and benefits may not be equally divided amongst all member states, which is where theories on bargaining power and formal decision-making rules come into play.23 The EU’s Eastern enlargement, within this context, forms an interesting example of how bargaining power and decision-making rules influence a debate. For, on the one hand, the EU’s Eastern enlargement entails a broad spectrum of different expectations as to the distribution of costs and benefits among incumbent member states, which makes for an ideal environment for several bargaining strategies. On the other hand, EU decision-making rules, in the case of horizontal integration, demand unanimity amongst all EU member states. Theoretically, one small reluctant member state may thus block any decision concerning enlargement of the institution as a whole.24

A number of hypotheses with regard to enlargement have been specified on the basis of rationalist assumptions, although few of them consider member state politics on horizontal integration. One of the few exceptions is the work of Hyde-Price who focuses on German EU-related policies. He sees Eastern enlargement as vital to German economic and political interests, as the alternative would be a poverty border, running through the middle of Europe.

21 Ibidem, pp. 510-511.
something that would not be in the German interest. In addition, wherever enlargement would harm German interests, e.g. the agricultural sector, it would simply negotiate restrictions or block respective regulations.\textsuperscript{25}

Moravcsik and Vachudova provide a liberal intergovernmentalist account of the successive rounds of EU enlargement, stating that the logic behind past rounds is ‘hardly mysterious when viewed from the perspective of national interests and state power’\textsuperscript{26}. The outcome of bargaining rounds that preceded enlargement did not reflect idealistic motivations; in fact they were perfectly in line with expectations based on national interests and state power. Some interest groups may have opposed enlargement because of their disproportionate share of short term costs, but the enlargement process continued because of the overall net benefits. They draw on Schelling’s insights to explain countries’ bargaining power. They argue that those states that ‘gain the most by engaging in more intense interstate cooperation — more precisely, those for whom cooperation is most attractive relative to unilateral (or mini-lateral) policy making — have the most intense preferences for agreement. They are thus willing to compromise the most on the margin to further it.’\textsuperscript{27} This rationale is used to account for the relatively weak bargaining position of candidate countries and those expecting to profit most from liberalising markets.

Dardanelli, who complained that (rationalist) analyses of enlargement were dominated by economists\textsuperscript{28}, proposed his four-point approach towards a rationalist analysis to enlargement in a broader sense.\textsuperscript{29} He introduced a model regarding the optimal size of a political unit, taking legitimacy and performance as its two criteria. Dardanelli’s approach is an example of an analysis at the level of EU politics. For this reason, it is not, as such, particularly useful in explaining Portuguese preferences in EU enlargement. However, his conclusion – that regarding the enlargement debate, one should not reduce rational choice to economically inspired preferences – is valid. Section 3 will analyse the applicability of rational choice approaches for explaining Portuguese preference formation regarding Eastern enlargement.

**Rhetorical action**

The approach by Frank Schimmelfennig is partially based on neo-liberal and geopolitical (rationalist) arguments as articulated by Moravcsik and Vachudova: member states’

\textsuperscript{26} Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003), p. 43.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibidem, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{28} E.g. Breuss (2002), Baldwin et al. (1997); Kohler (2004).
\textsuperscript{29} Dardanelli (1999), pp. 2-3.
geographic positions and economic preferences determine their initial positions on Eastern enlargement. Schimmelfennig uses the mechanism of ‘rhetorical action’ (hereafter referred to as RA) to explain how certain member states were ‘shamed’ into enlargement: in a highly institutionalised environment, such as the EU, policy-makers are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their behaviour. ‘Actors whose self-interested preferences are in line with the community norms have the opportunity to add cheap legitimacy to their position. They will argumentatively back up their selfish goals and delegitimize the position of their opponents. This strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one’s self-interest is rhetorical action.’

Schimmelfennig divides the EU-15 member states into four categories. First, he makes a distinction between supporters of a limited enlargement (limited to Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia), and supporters of an inclusive enlargement (the previous five plus remaining countries of the fifth enlargement). Countries supporting limited enlargement are mostly situated around Central Europe, while countries in favour of an inclusive enlargement consist predominantly of geographically peripheral member states. The logic behind this is that Central European EU-15 member states, such as Austria and Germany, mostly do business with bordering Central European candidates, while countries like Sweden and Denmark would probably profit more from an enlargement agreement including Latvia and Lithuania. Analogously, all Southern European member states advocated an agreement including Romania and Bulgaria.

Schimmelfennig does not observe true opposition towards enlargement. Expected costs and benefits are reflected solely in the ‘degree of enthusiasm’ EU-15 member states expressed. The degree of enthusiasm is reflected in his categories of ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’. In general, EU member states bordering CEEC applicants were the drivers of EU enlargement. To explain brakemanship, the variable of ‘potential losses from enlargement’ is included. First, those EU-15 economies which, like most of the CEECs, specialise in the production of textiles, agriculture, and heavy industries are likely to experience competition from new member states. Second, ‘less developed’ member states, being net recipients, will see their share in EU structural funds drop, as new members will also become net recipients. Finally, a geopolitical variable is included: the CEECs would side

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31 Ibidem, pp. 49-51.
32 Drivers were those member states “advocat[ing] an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement”, whereas brakemen “were reticent and tried to put off the decision” Schimmelfennig (2001: 49).
with Germany for reasons of proximity and economic interdependence, causing a ‘power shift’ that could particularly affect French interests.\textsuperscript{33}

The differences between member states in terms of expected costs and benefits, according to Schimmelfennig, cannot be overcome, since ‘neither the Central and East European countries nor the ‘drivers’ among EU members [possess] sufficient bargaining power to change the balance of costs and benefits for the “brakemen” in favour of Eastern enlargement.’\textsuperscript{34} The question then rises, how were the brakemen convinced, if not by material ‘side payments’? This is where rhetorical action — the strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one’s self-interest — comes in. According to Schimmelfennig, RA worked because it gave the drivers the power to prevent brakemen from openly opposing the goal of enlargement. For example, disputing that the CEECs truly belonged to Europe was not a real option. This was anticipated by the drivers through the association agreements, which were invoked as intermediate steps to help the CEECs ‘Europeanise’. Thus, although the CEECs were perhaps not yet fully European, it was suggested that through the efforts of all member states they could be Europeanised in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{35} As an example of ‘shaming’, it has been referred to French President Mitterand’s the commitment for Eastern enlargement. Although he was ambiguous about the fifth enlargement, Mitterand felt obliged to declare his official support from the CEECs’ membership aspirations. This, in turn, was often cited by the CEECs to make sure that the French President would stick to his words.\textsuperscript{36} This sort of shaming worked, amongst other reasons, because the drivers’ credibility was not easily destroyed. To sum up, Schimmelfennig argues that possible arguments for brakemen to put a hold on enlargement had already been defused beforehand. Section 4 will examine the applicability of rhetorical action for explaining Portugal’s attitude towards Eastern enlargement.

\textbf{Theoretical point of departure}

We argue that a sociological institutionalist / constructivist approach can shed considerable light on this case. From such a perspective, institutions can take on a life of their own and – contrary to the rationalist understanding – cease to be strictly instrumental to states’ interests. As a result, interests and identities are no longer ‘exogenously given’, but are derived – at
least partially – from the institutional context itself.\textsuperscript{37} At the basis of the constructivist / sociological institutionalist approach is the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Here, ‘[a]ctors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation.’\textsuperscript{38} In this logic ‘processes of reasoning are not primarily connected to the anticipation of future consequences as they are in most contemporary conceptions of rationality. Actors use criteria of similarity and congruence, rather than likelihood and value.’\textsuperscript{39} The dichotomy between criteria of similarity and congruence on the one hand and likelihood and value on the other is based, respectively, on the distinction between what one is used to doing in a likely situation and what one would do to get maximum results, i.e.: doing what is \textit{appropriate} and doing what is likely to produce the most favourable \textit{consequences}. Whereas the latter will most likely invoke future perspectives, the former will make use of metaphors and analogies, by stating that situation X is similar to situation Y, where rule R was followed. Therefore we should likewise apply rule R to situation X.\textsuperscript{40}

This paper focuses on the role of identity. We suggest that Portuguese national identity has constituted what has been perceived as appropriate in the context of Eastern enlargement. Identity is understood here as ‘that part of the individuals’ self-concept, which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership.’\textsuperscript{41} According to Tajfel, the ‘ingroup’ is favoured even if there is no sign of a conflict between the ‘ingroup’ and a rival group. This hypothesis originated from identity theory, or C.I.C. theory (categorization – identity - comparison), according to which ‘the need to preserve or achieve a “positive group distinctiveness”’ determines this ‘ingroup’ favouring behaviour, while in turn it ‘serves to protect, enhance, preserve, or achieve a positive social identity for members of the group’\textsuperscript{.42} Identification is made up of two distinctive and necessary elements: ‘a cognitive one, in the sense of awareness of membership; and an evaluative one, in the sense that this awareness is related to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Wendt (1992); Adler (1997).
\item Ibidem, p. 4.
\item Tewes (1998, p. 124) has built on this to describe Germany’s role conflict between deepening and widening with regard to Eastern enlargement.
\item Ibidem.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
some value connotations.’ A third element that is often associated with ‘identification’ is the subject’s emotional investment in both awareness and evaluations.\textsuperscript{43}

In a globalising world, the perception of a community may be widened as certain common elements of national identities are transferred to a higher level.\textsuperscript{44} An international or supranational institutional institution may thus hold certain identity aspects on its own that national actors can, to varying degrees, make part of their self-concept. The EU, as an institution, links identities and ‘provide[s] vocabularies that frame thought and understandings and define[s] what are legitimate arguments and standards of justification and criticism in different situations.’\textsuperscript{45} Legitimacy, in this context, is often understood in terms of democratic principles which are learned, not given. Democratic governance, then, is not to be understood as a means to achieve one’s predetermined preferences. The institution serves to develop, transmit and protect democratic values. Consequently, ‘[a] democratic identity also includes accepting responsibility for providing an institutional context within which continuous political discourse and change can take place and the roles, identities, accounts, rules, practices, and capabilities that construct political life can be crafted.’\textsuperscript{46}

European identity, in Portugal’s case, is equated with the consolidation of democracy. As Portuguese politicians had defended EU membership as the (only) way to secure democracy, a logically deducible ‘rule’, in the sense of March and Olsen pointed out above, would be to grant membership to potential member states who likewise seek to secure their fragile democracies. Compliance with ‘criteria of similarity and congruence’ would thus imply defending Eastern enlargement. Nonetheless, the recognition of this ‘rule’ by Portuguese politicians is, at this stage, still no more than a hypothesis, which will be further analysed and substantiated in section 5.

As pointed out in the literature, the consistency of identities should be treated as a variable. ‘Fulfilling an identity through following appropriate rules often involves matching a changing and ambiguous set of contingent rules to a changing and ambiguous set of situations.’\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, one should first describe the existing set of collective identities within its political context. After determining that identities play any part in a given decision-making process, the next step would be to find out in what situations they matter and in what other situations a

\textsuperscript{43} Tajfel (1982), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{44} Salazar (1998), p. 123.
\textsuperscript{45} March & Olsen (2004), p. 5
\textsuperscript{46} March & Olsen (2004), pp. 6-7. One might argue that this last quote should be applied both to the EU member states and to countries aspiring EU membership. However, Fierke and Wiener (1999) argue that this ‘rule’ has not been decisive in the EU’s decision to enlarge.
\textsuperscript{47} March & Olsen (2004), p. 8.
logic of consequences may be involved. This is based on the assumption that it does not make
sense to frame the debate along the lines of ‘identity versus interests’. Instead, they may be
viewed as complementary, and it then depends on the context which logic prevails (or is
invoked).\footnote{Cf. Risse et al. (1999); Niemann (2004); Niemann and Mak (2010).} March and Olsen suggest four different ways to distinguish between situations
where one logic takes precedence over the other. Two of them are relevant for the argument(s) advanced in this paper.

Firstly, a clear logic prevails over an unclear logic. This insight has been used by Risse et al. in their research on the role of collective identities in the decision to adopt or reject the Euro. Risse et al.’s argument is similar to the argument we seek to make in this study. When
the logic of consequences is unclear — as in the cases of Germany and the UK, where there
were as many good materially infused reasons to be in favour or against the single European
currency — while the logic of appropriateness is clear, with stable collective nation-state
identities in both the UK and Germany\footnote{In the case of the UK, opposition to the Euro was facilitated by a dominant discourse in which
‘Europe’ was still construed as ‘the other’ (Risse et al. 1999, pp. 159-163). For the case of Germany, see the elaboration next page.} — we can expect the latter logic to prevail. ‘In other
words, collective nation-state identities then delineate the realm of appropriate and legitimate
political choices. Moreover, political actors are likely to frame their preferred courses of
action in those identity terms. Those who successfully manage to link their preferences to the
collective nation-state identity, will carry the day in a political discourse characterized by
identity politics.’\footnote{Risse et al. 1999, p. 158; see also March & Olsen (2004), pp. 20-21.}
Similarly, the empirical sections of this paper will argue that in the case of
Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement material gains and concerns balanced each other
out, while nation-state identities, carried by the dominant domestic discourse, were clear and
stable.

Secondly, March and Olsen suggest that the two logics can be distinguished in the way that
‘one logic is used to establish fundamental constraints for a decision, and the other logic is
used to make refinements within the constraints.’\footnote{March & Olsen (1998), p. 953.} Applied to our case this would mean to
make a distinction between the general enlargement debate, and secondary debates on the
conditions under which enlargement could take place. For our case, we hypothesise that the
overall decision to enlarge was based on arguments related to collective identities, while
refinements and issues related to the implications of Eastern enlargement, such as the Nice
Treaty and the Agenda 2000 negotiations, were dominated by the logic of consequences. This
distinction introduces a separation of ‘the enlargement debate’ and underlying debates,
something which has been ignored by most studies that seek to explain Eastern enlargement. The distinction does not contradict the first one (about a clear logic prevailing over an unclear one). Instead, they go hand in hand: we hypothesise the general debate to be dominated by clear identities, while interests were rather ambiguous. Regarding secondary debates, we hypothesise that identities are less important while interests were much more clearly defined.

However, the question of how supporting Eastern enlargement was ‘appropriate’ for Portugal still has to be further elucidated. For this purpose, it is useful to take a(nother) look at how Risse et al. account for Germany’s commitment to EMU. The way Europe is presented in the dominant political discourse in Germany is closely related to Germany’s post-war national identity. ‘Germany’s own nationalist and militarist past constituted the “Other” in the process of “post-national” identity formation whereby ‘Europeanness’ replaced traditional notions of national identity.’ In the EMU case, Germany would prove its Europeanness by enthusiastically adhering to another phase of European integration, because this step would follow the lines of German identity transformation from ‘nationalist’ to ‘integrationist’. The same logic would hold for Portugal if defending Eastern enlargement were to follow the lines of Portugal’s identity transformation. In order to substantiate this logic, one first has to analyse how Europeanness is portrayed against Portugal’s recent past.

Nonetheless Portugal’s identity issues are likely to be different from Germany’s. While Germany was historically a driving force of European integration, at the beginning of the 1990s Portugal still had to catch up. This adds another dimension to the logic of appropriateness, namely a core-periphery distinction between the EU-9 as member states with longstanding experience with democracy, stability and open economy and the young democracies of Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain and Greece. This core-periphery distinction should not be mistaken for core-periphery relations in a strict material or geopolitical sense, but should be put in the context of ‘identity politics’, understood here as linking the legitimacy of certain policies to the Portuguese identity. Portugal’s (and more generally Europe’s) ‘other’ should not only be viewed as its own nationalist past, but its

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53 Risse et al. (1999), p. 166.
54 We will not discuss Spain and Greece here, but we did mention them because of the degree of similarity between both countries and Portugal in terms of political history and economic development.
55 See Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989), and Schwartz (2000) on core-periphery effects of globalization. We will discuss core-periphery relations in a political-economical sense in section 3.
56 See for example the work of Kuus (2007) and Neumann (2000) on the peripheral status of Eastern European countries before, during and after their accession to the European Union.
'other’ can also be seen as Eastern Europe (or ‘Eastness’).\textsuperscript{58} We thus hypothesise that by facing the challenge of Eastern EU enlargement, Portugal could lose its peripheral identity and become one of the core members of the European Union. Portuguese political elites, by this, would endorse modern Portuguese national identity by speaking and acting along with the traditional core of Europe. If Portugal could act with the European core, it would become part of the core, as opposed to the new member states, which would become the new periphery.

To sum up, we argue that Portugal’s position in the EU debate on Eastern enlargement is best understood through the logic of appropriateness, since it is expected that identities indicate a clear policy choice whereas material arguments are at the very least unclear. (An amendment should be made to understand bargaining behaviour on secondary issues such as the Nice Negotiations and the Agenda 2000; these may be better understood within the framework of a logic of consequences.) The clarity of collective identities is assumed to be reinforced by the idea that Portugal could lose its peripheral status by facing up to the challenge of Eastern enlargement. In other words: Portuguese political elites would endorse their true European identity by actively supporting Eastern enlargement. We will refer to this concomitant effect of following the logic of appropriateness as identity endorsement.\textsuperscript{59}

Methodology and operationalisation

Our general methodological approach can be described as careful ‘process tracing’\textsuperscript{60}, put into practice through triangulation across different data sources such as official documentation (esp. parliamentary debates), media reports, specialist publications, interviews, as well as opinion poll and survey data.

Our conceptual point of departure (identity endorsement) and the hypotheses flowing from it will mainly be substantiated by means of discourse analysis. The relationship between discourse and identity is explained by Diez, who states that ‘identities are not simply given, but discursively constructed’.\textsuperscript{61} The existence (and persistence) of a dominant discourse building a nation-state identity, determining which norms and values are valid and which are not within EU-related debates, will be indicative of what was considered appropriate and what

\textsuperscript{58} For this point and the concept of ‘Eastness’ in this context, see Kuus (2007), p. 151.
\textsuperscript{59} We chose the term “endorsement” because it has elements of pondering, choosing and publicly supporting a certain set of political goals. Supporting enlargement was identity “endorsing” because it was a publicly voiced choice for a set of ideas encompassing democracy, stability and openness, which (as stated earlier) would result in a closer approximation of the ‘European identity’.
\textsuperscript{60} George and McKeown (1985).
was not. This point of view stems from a Foucauldian conception of discourse, in which the individual actor is not seen as an autonomous subject, but rather placed in his/her discursive context. ‘Discourse then takes up a life of its own. It is not a pure means of politics – instead, politics is an essential part of discourse’. 62 Discourses structure our thoughts, but they are not ‘tangible’, in the sense they could be treated as causes or motives. The ‘structuring’ quality should rather be seen as ‘enabling’. After all, discourses structure individual acts, but they are also dependent on individual acts. However, in the course of their continuing existence, they set limits to what can possibly be articulated. 63 ‘The language of the political discourse is the language the political actors can use.’ 64 Thus, discourses, apart from defining and enabling, also ‘silence and exclude, for example, by limiting and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified’. 65

Our analysis of the Portuguese political discourse will concentrate on the period from 1989 to May 2004 (when the first round of the fifth enlargement was realised). Written or recorded sources from May 2004 onwards could provoke bias, as the actual consequences of enlargement, whether negative or positive, could affect the data obtained. The following indicators will serve as referents for determining when we can speak of ‘identity endorsement’:

(1) References to Portugal’s own experiences with membership would be common: (a) the pre-1990 political systems in the CEECs would be compared to Portugal’s during the years of fascist dictatorship; (b) the situation in which the CEECs found themselves during the 1990s would be compared to Portugal between 1974 and 1986; (c) references to future expectations with regard to CEECs’ development after gaining membership would be made on the basis of Portugal’s own experiences with membership. This indicator goes back to the essence of the logic of appropriateness, namely that it is based on criteria of similarity and congruence. Frequent comparisons between Eastern enlargement and the Iberian enlargement of 1986 would suggest that political elites in Portugal were well aware of the implications certain stances would have with regard to their legitimacy in the existing discourse.

(2) EU-membership for the CEECs would be defended on the basis of ‘solidarity’, as this was one of the basic values under which Portugal’s own accession had been realised and

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63 Ibidem, p. 605.
64 Larsen (1997), p. 20
understood. ‘Solidarity’ can be understood as a moral concept supporting the same comparison that is described under (1).

(3) Opponents of EU-membership would be accused of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism, i.e. the values associated with the fascist dictatorship. These concepts argue the illegitimacy of certain stances following the dominant discourse. They indicate that it suffices for actors to point to these concepts as they are inherently opposed to modern Portuguese identity as constructed within the dominant discourse.

(4) The pro-European discourse would gain dominance. This would point at the clarity of identities, as a result of which Eurosceptics within the Portuguese political spectrum feel compelled to operate within this discourse to express their views in such a way that they are at least seen as ‘legitimate’.

All four indicators fit within the framework of identity endorsement: by emphasising that the carrot of EU membership can turn a former nationalist, isolationist, undemocratic country into a full grown democracy, and by linking the process of Eastern enlargement to Iberian enlargement, Portuguese political elites indirectly endorse modern Portuguese identity. The fourth indicator in particular would (also) suggest that identities were in fact more clear than interests in the debate on Eastern enlargement. While we speak of an existing ‘dominant discourse’, the very existence of it needs to be demonstrated in section 5. In addition, if the dominant discourse changed at critical junctures, e.g. the period of 1989-1991 and ± 1999, this would suggest that identities were not as clear as presumed, and that material interests might have played greater role than expected. One might see the consistency of the dominant discourse as the fifth general and essential indicator of the alternative conceptualisation. Without consistency, the basic idea behind the dominance of identities over interests would have to be dismissed.

3. PROBING RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES

This section will seek to demonstrate why rationalist approaches cannot explain the choice Portugal made in supporting the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. We argue that neither welfare-related nor geopolitical accounts can explain the Portuguese stance.

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66 We call these critical junctures because the events that took place during these years had, or could be expected to have a serious impact on Portuguese national interests with regard to EU enlargement, 1989-1991 is believed to fit this definition because of the unanticipated (speed of the) collapse of communist regimes and the fact that CEECs immediately started leaning towards participating in EU and NATO. The period around 1999 is a critical juncture in the same sense because it was the year in which the Agenda 2000 and Nice Treaty negotiations took place, EMU participation was secured by Portugal and enlargement negotiations were opened with all CEEC applicants.
(convincingly) because on both accounts Portugal was expected to be negatively affected by Eastern enlargement.

**Welfare-related approaches**

Overall neoliberal approaches, which emphasise welfare-related imperatives, have largely suggested that Portugal would be adversely affected by Eastern enlargement. The negative overall effects on Portugal’s GDP, as presented in the various macro-economic available predictions, ranged from 0.3 percent\(^{67}\) up to 1.3 percent\(^{68}\). Mateus *et al.* consider a number of different scenarios, all of them suggesting something between a GDP loss of 1.5 percent and a slight gain of 0.3 percent.\(^{69}\) The negative impact of Eastern enlargement has been explained in a number of ways.

Crespo *et al.* suggest two main effects of EU enlargement on the Portuguese economy. First there is the possibility of trade *creation*, meaning an increase of bilateral flows with the CEECs. Second, one could expect a trade *shift* as Portugal’s traditional trade partners switch their imports to the CEECs.\(^{70}\) As far as trade creation is concerned, one ought to bear in mind that trade between Portugal and the CEECs by the year 2000 did not exceed 2 percent of total Portuguese trade, and substantial effects on trade flows as a direct consequence of enlargement were not expected in any of the EU members, as trade barriers had already been gradually removed in the years before May 2004. In addition, whilst in terms of the number of countries the fifth enlargement may have been unprecedented, in terms of GDP it was quite comparable to previous enlargements.\(^{71}\) Portugal, due to its geographical position and the nature of its exports, was considered unable to increase its exports to the CEECs on a substantial scale, while it was in risk of experiencing losses as a consequence of significant trade diversion.\(^{72}\)

The anticipations presented above deal only with trade effects. However, enlargement was also to widen the European Single Market. This would increase competitive pressures, and later lead to increased competitiveness. It was forecast, however, that Portugal was to be the only the only EU-15 country to expect a decrease of competitiveness, predominantly caused

\(^{67}\) Baldwin *et al.* (1997).
\(^{68}\) Kohler (2004).
\(^{70}\) Crespo *et al.* (2004), pp. 782-783.
\(^{71}\) Caetano *et al.* (2002), p. 8, p. 65.
\(^{72}\) Breuss (2002); Emerson & Gros (1998).
by falling productivity, over the years of 2008-2010, after an initial positive effect during the first years after enlargement.\textsuperscript{73}

Portugal opposed any plans for recalibrating the EU budget, which would leave the country with lesser finances out of the structural funds. Together with Spain, Greece and Ireland the Portuguese fought for a ‘preservation of solidarity’ within the European Union. The outcome of the Agenda 2000 negotiations, in which a new financial framework for the years 2000-2006 was established, conformed to Portugal’s wishes. Portugal would annually receive approximately €656 million under the new framework, against €637 million under the previous one.\textsuperscript{74} Portugal’s contentment with the eventual results, nonetheless does not disprove the fact that the cohesion countries still had to bear, in relative terms, a greater share of enlargement costs than the net payers within the EU-15. For Portugal, enlargement costs amounted to an estimated average of 1.5 percent of GDP per year, while the EU average was only 0.17 percent.\textsuperscript{75} A recent Commission report on the consequences of enlargement shows, in Portugal’s case, relatively large trade shifts away from the old member states (around -1.2 percent), compensated only slightly by trade with the new member states (around +0.15 percent). These figures suggest that the abovementioned predictions were not far from the truth.

Following the analysis carried out in this section, in nominal terms, Portugal was predominantly expected to lose from enlargement because of its poor point of departure in terms of trade competition with the CEECs. This suggests neoliberal analyses focussing on welfare-related imperatives are highly unlikely to provide a convincing argument. And whatever Portugal may have achieved during underlying (Agenda 2000) negotiations, this does not make up for the fact that the overall balance stays negative. In addition, section 5 will demonstrate that Portugal was a reliable supporter of Eastern enlargement long before the post-enlargement budget was negotiated, thus further undermining explanations based on welfare-maximisation.

**Geopolitical approaches**

In terms of geopolitics, new member states could both be seen as potential new allies and as (economic) competitors.\textsuperscript{76} As for the former, Portugal might gain some possible new allies in

\textsuperscript{73} Breuss (2002), p. 252. Simulations based on the OEF World Macroeconomic Model were first published in Breuss (2001).


\textsuperscript{75} Breuss (2002), p. 257.

\textsuperscript{76} See Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003).
the Eastern European applicants, given the fact that most CEECs were about the same size and were, to an increasing extent, about as economically developed as Portugal. Therefore, they are likely to side with Portugal on important issues concerning questions related to ‘big vs. smaller member states’, or the need for economic solidarity. However, the fact that Portugal shows quite a lot of political and economic similarities with a number of CEECs is also a cause for many of the potential negative material consequences pointed out in the previous sub-section. The share of agriculture in the Portuguese economy is similar to Hungarian, Slovenian, Czech, and Latvian figures. The same is true of unemployment figures and the weight of the tertiary sector. The percentage of the Portuguese population between the ages of 25 and 64 that attended higher education was even lower than any of the new member states.  

More importantly in geopolitical terms, the fifth enlargement could imply a shift of the EU’s centre of gravity from South to East (or at least eastwards), a scenario that was regarded as detrimental, especially by Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. As the leader of the Christian Democratic/Conservative CDS-PP, Paulo Portas, suggested in a parliamentary debate in 2001, ‘enlargement, to us, is an extremely difficult issue, because it turns us more peripheral, since Europe is running towards the East, as is its centre of gravity [shifts].’ This suggests that Portuguese politicians did in fact fear negative geopolitical consequences on the EU level, and this anxiety has been substantiated in the literature, especially in terms of economic implications.

As for migration, another factor with geopolitical implication, some have suggested that its consequences for member states’ GDPs are unlikely to be substantial, while others have pointed out that the negative public opinion on migration might endanger future horizontal and vertical European integration. In other words, (rapid) Eastern enlargement could cause the overall process of European integration to slow down or even result in gridlock. The difficult last round of Treaty revision(s) leading to the Treaty of Lisbon could be seen as proving some support for this line of argumentation. Portugal, as one of the drivers behind vertical European integration, might thus have expected Eastern enlargement to become a threat to its preferences regarding the deepening of European integration. Seeing that the

77 Mateus et al. (2004), p. 78.
78 Diário da Assembleia da República (2001), p. 3900 (translation from Portuguese). See also Martins (1999), p. 44: “the ‘heart’ of Europe will be more Berlin than Brussels. The Atlantic will become more peripheral with the reinforcement of the EU’s continentality. We should not underestimate the geopolitical consequences of such a step.” (translation from Portuguese).
project of Eastern enlargement somewhat overlapped with the process leading to a European Single Currency, the latter being clearly in Portugal’s interest, Eastern enlargement could be considered a disturbing factor.\(^{82}\)

In geopolitical terms, for Portugal there seem to be at least as many arguments to oppose enlargement as there are to defend the process. One might thus have expected Portuguese attitudes to be moderate, reserved or even sceptical. Hence, neither welfare-oriented nor geopolitical approaches can convincingly explain Portuguese preferences regarding European enlargement. Therefore, we need to look further.

4. PROBING RHETORICAL ACTION (RA)

RA argues that countries like Portugal that did not expect to benefit from enlargement in material terms (thus constituting brake men), were ‘rhetorically trapped’ into the process, since they were unable to use legitimate strategies to halt it. We argue that, as far as one can speak of rhetorical entrapment here, it does not apply to Portugal’s position and role in the overall process. Subsequently, we advance three points in order to substantiate this claim: (1) Portugal did not constitute much of a brakeman. It did not seek to slow down the enlargement process as such (although its pursuit of other goals might have given such impression). (2) Portuguese preferences have been consistent from the very beginning and followed logically from speech acts from before the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes, meaning that Portugal did not need to be rhetorically ‘trapped’ into Eastern enlargement. (3) Portuguese preferences with regard to future EU enlargement continue to indicate general support for horizontal integration, even when fellow member states assume a much more critical attitude.

First, in Schimmelfennig’s account Portugal appears as one of the brakemen of Eastern enlargement that needed to be shamed and rhetorically trapped into it through processes of RA. He suggests that Portuguese preferences with regard to the distribution of enlargement costs or further liberalisation of trade in textiles were anti-enlargement strategies in disguise.\(^{83}\) Schimmelfennig here used preferences regarding the *constraints of enlargement* to demonstrate that certain member states were not eager for *enlargement itself*. In our view, he puts the threshold for corroborating his claim concerning Portuguese ‘brakemanship’ too low.

\(^{82}\) Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento (1995), p. 29; Seixas da Costa (2002) points to the risk of a multi-speed Europe, or ‘Europe à la carte’, which would harm solidarity between net payers and net recipients and would imply a bigger role for public opinion in EU debates (pp. 160-161); Vilar (1992), p. 12.

\(^{83}\) Schimmelfennig (2001), p. 55, 57.
Arguments regarding possible negative side-effects of enlargement cannot simply be equated with strategies to delay or avoid enlargement itself. This does not do justice to the way Eastern enlargement has been discussed in Portugal. None of our data suggests that Portuguese governments can be suspected of deploying anti-enlargement strategies.\textsuperscript{84} In addition, the subsequent analysis indicates that Portugal’s pro-enlargement behaviour has been remarkably consistent.

Overall, the evidence for Portugal slowing down the enlargement process is very sparse\textsuperscript{85}, while suggestions to the contrary are more convincing. For example, it has been argued that Portugal advocated rapid enlargement, according to some sources even without asking for compensation regarding the extra costs this may involve for Portugal.\textsuperscript{86} In a 1992 report on enlargement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal considered that a first round of Eastern enlargement would be possible perhaps as early as 1998.\textsuperscript{87} Portugal’s 2000 Presidency performance also suggests that it was speeding up rather than obstructing the enlargement process. Under the Portuguese presidency nearly all chapters were opened and a significant number of chapters were closed with Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. At the same time negotiations were started with Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania. Generally, the role of the Portuguese Presidency on the enlargement dossier has been described as ‘ambitious’, making ‘good progress’, or even ‘being unrivalled’ by prior Presidencies.\textsuperscript{88} In addition, during the IGC negotiations, Portugal did not want to focus unduly on voting weights in the European Council, as this could be interpreted as an attempt to slow down the enlargement process, something the Portuguese government reportedly did not intend to do.\textsuperscript{89}

The second and perhaps most important indication that Portugal was not ‘rhetorically trapped’ into enlargement is the fact that the possibility and also the definite desirability of an eventual enlargement towards the East was already expressed in parliamentary debates around the time of the various events that led to the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, roughly between the years of 1989 and 1991.\textsuperscript{90} Important in that respect is

\textsuperscript{84} Interview, Lisbon, 2009.
\textsuperscript{86} Torres (1999), p. 86.
\textsuperscript{89} Vasconcelos (2000), p. 12.
\textsuperscript{90} See for example the contributions of António Barreto (PS) and João de Deus Pinheiro (Minister of Foreign Affairs – PSD) in the parliamentary debate of December 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1989 (Diário da Assembleia da República (1989), pp. 746, 795-796) and Jaime Gama (PS) in the parliamentary debate of January 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1990 (Diário da Assembleia da República (1990), p. 1120). N.b.: Jaime Gama later became minister of Foreign Affairs (1995-2002), a job he had already held before from 1983 to 1985. See also section 5 for more evidence.
also the consistency of the political discourse, which will be illustrated in the next section. This strongly suggests that Portuguese politicians were not ‘silenced’ by CEECs’ and drivers’ legitimacy-based arguments in favour of enlargement, assuming that without these arguments they would have felt free to oppose CEEC membership. This observation indicates that RA was not the reason why Portugal supported enlargement.

Demonstrating the consistency of the dominant discourse would be easier if Schimmelfennig had defined specific moments in which RA occurred, reached its climax or fell back. However, this is not the case. Nonetheless, Schimmelfennig does mention that RA started as early in 1990,\(^9\) when CEECs started to emphasise their Europeanness.\(^9\) These strategies were immediately echoed by drivers’ statements.\(^9\) Further examples of RA in the article are mainly dated from the early nineties, which suggests that by the mid-nineties RA had already largely ‘fulfilled its task’. This analysis of the dominant discourse in Portugal should thus mainly be focussed on possible inconsistencies registered between the late eighties and the mid-nineties. However, in order to be as complete as possible, our analysis will cover the entire debate between the late eighties and the year 2004, including the period around 1999 that constitutes a critical juncture, as explained earlier. As section 5 will (further) indicate, the Portuguese discourse was remarkably consistent across this entire time span.

A third indication for rejecting RA is grounded in more recent discussions on horizontal integration. Portugal’s minister of Foreign Affairs has already reaffirmed Portuguese support for future enlargement towards Serbia.\(^9\) When both Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy suggested offering Turkey no more than a special partnership status, Portuguese President Cavaco Silva expressed Portugal’s full support for Turkey’s full membership, while pointing at the various similarities between his country and Turkey in terms of the respective key positions they hold in the EU’s relations with other continents.\(^9\) Even in a climate where it would be accepted to be reluctant towards Turkey's membership, Portugal is not. This might be seen as an indication of Portugal’s general commitment to EU enlargement, whilst direct material aspects are not likely to play a significant role, or may even impact adversely on Portuguese interests, as in terms of cohesion funds with Turkey’s accession to the Union. Apparently, as far as EU enlargement is concerned, Portugal does not await the positions of the majority before offering full support for a project that is not particularly in the country’s national interest. It then becomes more likely that the reason for Portuguese commitment to

\(^9\) LUSA (2009a).
\(^9\) LUSA (2009b).
horizontal integration of the European Union should be found something less variable, such as identity.

In sum, there is reason to believe that Portugal was generally committed to the fifth enlargement round and did not seek to slow down enlargement for reasons related to Eastern enlargement itself. Portugal did not need to be shamed or rhetorically trapped to support enlargement towards the East. Instead, Portuguese enlargement preferences had already been articulated before the beginning of RA and have been consistent from the start. This will be further substantiated through our analysis in the subsequent section.

5. PROBING IDENTITY ENDORSEMENT

This section explores the alternative conceptualisation of explaining the Portuguese attitude and stance concerning Eastern enlargement. ‘Identity endorsement’ will be probed along the lines of the four indicators specified at the end of the second section. As a basis for investigating these indicators, we need to assess if and how a dominant Europeanist discourse could emerge in Portuguese political life in the first place. This way, we can analyse what ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ mean in Portuguese political life and better assess/understand how horizontal integration would be reacted upon within the constraints of the dominant discourse.

Rise of the dominant discourse

Overall, a friendly climate for a strong Europeanist discourse has prevailed in Portugal. As alluded to in section 1, the birth of the dominant discourse took place in the final years of the Estado Novo (±1968-1974), when the pro-European camp emerged. It is important to notice here that the presumed birth of this pro-European discourse coincided with an unprecedented political turnover, which after 25 April 1974 demanded the construction of a new national identity. It is therefore reasonable to assume that there must be some kind of relationship between the emergence of this discourse, described below, and the quest for a new national identity. In order to rightfully assess how Portugueseness has been defined in terms of Europeanness, we have to define what Portugueseness was following Salazarist logic and how this changed around the period of the Carnation Revolution up to the moment when Portugal finally achieved EC membership.

After the collapse of the fascist regime, the Europeanists dominated the Portuguese political spectrum. As also acknowledged in the literature, Portugal’s choice for Europe was
essentially political, i.e. a choice to secure democracy.\textsuperscript{96} This choice was supported by around 75 percent of the deputies in the Assembly of the Republic. Only the communists were against membership. Within this context, the pro-European discourse was set to dominate. In order to define how this discourse is constructed, we especially analysed the parliamentary debate regarding Portugal’s official EEC-membership application that was submitted in March of 1977, combined with newspaper articles and essays by acknowledged Portuguese opinion makers. This debate shows some strong indications as to the European discourse that emerged in the years following the Carnation Revolution. The most eye-catching features of this discourse are the following:

Choice against membership = choice for Salazar

Criticism of the government’s plans to apply for full EEC-membership came from the two communist parties, the PCP and the much smaller UDP, which foremost argued that that accession would increase the ‘inequality between Portugal and its richer European counterparts’, and the supranational character of the Community institutions was undesirable.\textsuperscript{97} The mainstream of the political spectrum responded by suggesting that abstaining from membership was directly linked to the fascist past. It was pointed out, for example by Mário Soares (then Prime minister for the Socialist Party) that ‘staying isolated was precisely Salazar’s choice at the time of the Marshall Plan, something for which he was heavily criticised by the democratic opposition’.\textsuperscript{98} He later asserts that ‘we cannot, for ideological prejudices equal to those expressed by Salazar in 1945 and after, abandon Europe, however this time those prejudices point in the opposite direction.’\textsuperscript{99} Europe as a ‘sphere of democracy’, contrasted with the domestic past, thus seems to have become a recurring notion.

The minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Medeiros Ferreira, referring to the Communists’ position, adds the following slightly insinuating question: ‘to what extent could one say that the anti-European options would not go side by side with the humble and insignificant Portugal that Salazar wanted to build and to what extent would Europe’s cultural influence not be a strong factor in fighting the cadaverous kingdom of provincialism and mediocrity?’\textsuperscript{100} The expression ‘cadaverous kingdom’ (‘Reino Cadaveroso’) refers to an essay

\textsuperscript{96} See for example Fishman (2003), Costa Lobo (2003) and Royo (2007).
\textsuperscript{97} Diário da Assembleia da República (1977), pp. 3020-3021. (translation from Portuguese). All translations from Portuguese have been done by one of the authors.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibidem, p. 3022 (co-author’s translation from Portuguese).
\textsuperscript{99} Ibidem (translation from Portuguese).
\textsuperscript{100} Ibidem, p. 3031.
by the famous Portuguese author and political activist António Sérgio, in which he fulminates against the seventeenth-century spirit that destroyed the promise of Portuguese sixteenth-century secular humanism.

Choice for membership = choice for democracy:

This analogy is reinforced by historical perceptions of reality in which objection to EEC-membership is treated as equivalent to a choice for the past, i.e. a choice for authoritarianism. Diário de Notícias, one of the main quality newspapers in Portugal, wrote that ‘to admit the contrary [i.e.: rejecting EEC-membership] would be the same as accusing many, and many different politicians, of severe irresponsibility. It would be a vote of no confidence towards democracy.’

Mário Soares, the first Prime Minister of the Third Republic, put it like this: ‘the application for membership that now follows [...] represents the realisation of an ambition deeply felt by the Portuguese people. An ambition we have to realise with determination and by working hard, with reference to the essential democratic principles and values [...]. European integration is a great national project, beaconing and giving meaning to our revolutionary experience.’

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Medeiros Ferreira, subscribed to this view.

Mr. Freitas do Amaral, deputy for the Christian democrat CDS-party, one of the devoted supporters of Portugal’s EU-membership together with the Socialist Party and the centre-right Social Democrats, read the choice for integration with Europe as follows: ‘from the Portuguese point of view, we think it is Europe — democratic Europe — in which our country can and should find the institutional, geographical and cultural framework, in which our new historical destiny has to strike root and develop.’ He goes on to suggest that ‘from the European point of view, we consider it indispensable to enlarge it to every democratic country that is located in it and to strengthen its importance, its projection and its influence, so that the voice of its age-old democratic and humanist civilization can be heard and carry weight.’ This is an interesting vision within the context of this paper, as will become (even) clearer later on in this section, since it indicates the roots of the Portuguese political discourse on Eastern enlargement.

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101 Diário de Notícias (1986a) (translation from Portuguese).
103 Ibidem, p. 3016 (translation from Portuguese).
104 Ibidem, p. 3019.
105 Ibidem, p. 3019.
Hence, dominant discursive patterns explicitly linked a new Portuguese national identity to the European project, which, in its turn, is equated with openness and democratic values.\footnote{See for example Diário de Notícias (1986a,b,c).} While Portugal remained somewhat circumspect regarding political integration during the first few years of EC membership, this soon changed. This process was fostered by the first Portuguese Presidency in the first semester of 1992, which reinforced Portugal’s political assertiveness, as the country engaged more fully with EC matters. Portuguese politicians, from the beginning of the 1990’s, were eager to lose this peripheral status and act along with the traditional core of democratic and integrationist member states.\footnote{Vasconcelos (2000), p. 6; Lourenço (1994).}

Subsequently, we examine the four indicators of identity endorsement: (A) common references to Portugal’s own experiences (with EU membership); (B) the defence of Eastern enlargement on the basis of ‘solidarity’; (C) the accusation of opponents (of Eastern enlargement) of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism; and (D) the pro-European discourse gaining dominance.

\section*{A. Common references to Portugal’s own experiences (with membership)}

References to Portugal’s own road towards EU membership can be seen as examples of the ‘criteria of similarity and congruence’.\footnote{March and Olsen (2004), p. 4; cf. pp. 10-11 above.} Moreover, for Portuguese political elites to emphasise the idea that they were now passing the flame to another group of new democracies that want to become European (i.e., the new \textit{periphery}), would implicitly underline the idea that Portugal was now definitively becoming part of the \textit{core}.

On 5 December 1989, the Assembly of the Republic extensively discussed recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe. In the debate, parliamentarians made frequent reference to Portugal’s own Carnation Revolution. For example, João de Deus Pinheiro (of the centre right PSD), Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘in Hungary [...] we saw improvements, which I think, in a certain way, resemble some of those we had after the 25th of April [1974 in Portugal], in the sense of a euphoric reaction to liberty, to dazzling improvements in every field, especially in terms of human rights and plural democracy, in an immediate rapprochement towards the Council of Europe, and even towards the European Community itself’.\footnote{Diário da Assembleia da República (1989), p. 744 (translation from Portuguese).} When the Minister laid down his vision on the future of Europe, following the political changes of 1989, he recalled the 1948 conclusions of the Congress of Europe that called for a European construction open to countries of the East that reassume the
Western political legacy. Drawing a parallel between potential future accessions and earlier ones, he suggested as early as December 1989 that ‘throughout the history of the European Communities, every new membership application has been met with conservative reactions. But the spirit required by the circumstances seemed to prevail when the Communities opened to the admission of Portugal, Ireland and Greece.’

PSD-parliamentarian Pacheco Pereira, along with others, also referred to Portugal’s experience in a similar way during the debate on the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. He pointed out that ‘we are in an extremely delicate period of processes of democratic liberation in Eastern Europe. Let’s remind ourselves of the social and political revolt in Portugal, after April 25th, with its excesses, in order to understand the potential conflicts that could arise in Eastern European societies. […] Therefore, the peoples of the East need our full solidarity to carry out their democratic revolution, in order to obtain total [political and economic] freedoms’.

These statements, together with the observation that the PS, PSD, CDS and PRD agreed broadly on the welcoming attitude to be assumed by the Portuguese government, leads one to conclude that the events of the late eighties in Eastern Europe were met with familiarity and encouragement in the dominant political discourse in Portugal. Immediately references to, and linkages with, Portugal’s own experiences were made. This seems to have provided a strong source of support for the transition process and — already as early as 1989 — found its expression in solid support for the idea of Eastern enlargement of the Community.

During a follow-up debate on 16 January 1990, PS deputy and future Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama (PS) complained about a supposed lack of ambition and adequacy on the government’s part regarding its response to the recent developments in the East. He asserts that ‘the time has arrived to appreciate the role of Portugal in the Council of Europe and to promote – by means of the Portuguese example of a transition to democracy – the role of this organisation. Joining the Council of Europe has been, and will continue to be, a stepping-stone towards EC membership, which is why it is so important at this moment with regard to the Central European countries, who are initiating processes of regime transformation that are

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110 Ibidem, p. 772 (translation from Portuguese).
111 Ibidem, p. 791 (translation from Portuguese).
112 Socialist Party (Centre-left).
113 The centrist PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático) existed from 1985 to 1991 and was has know a short period of political importance when it was responsible for both the preservation and the fall of Cavaco Silva’s minority government.
This quote — characteristic of the dominant political discourse — suggests that the Portuguese political elites felt they had a moral duty to support Eastern European countries in their attempt to install democratic regimes, something which is directly related to Portugal’s own recent and successful transition to democracy.

During the parliamentary debate, Gama stated that the stance he defended would have a positive impact on Portugal’s positioning within the European Community ‘… by using its own experience as a country that changed from a single-party-regime to a plural regime, from an isolated to an open country, from a closed to a decentralised economy.’ This underscores the idea that Portugal, by supporting enlargement and offering help to new applicant countries, itself would cease to be a ‘learner’ and become one of the democratic core of the European Union. Supporting Eastern enlargement would thus help endorse Portugal’s European identity.

The 2003 parliamentary celebration of the Carnation Revolution was held in the presence of ten of the twelve candidate countries’ Presidents of parliament. Traditional pro-European parties sought to outdo each other in references to Portugal’s success story following the revolution of April 1974, while explicitly linking this experience to the situation in which their Eastern European guests found themselves after the collapse of communism. For example, João Pinho de Almeida (CDS-PP) stated: ‘I would like to honour [...] the presidents of parliament of the countries that lived under the yoke of communist dictatorships, by saying the following: you are now about to conquer something that Portuguese democracy enabled us to be part of: European integration. Your presence here adds prestige to this commemoration and, with the example of your countries — liberated at last! — [through a] heroic struggle for liberation [...] This is why the CDS-PP is pleased to honour these nations and welcome them into the bosom of the Europe of peace, cooperation and subsidiarity.’ Similarly, José de Matos Correia (PSD) suggested that ‘for such a promising encounter between high parliamentary representatives of European peoples with analogous, painful and enriching historical experiences there would certainly not have been a better framework than the festive celebration of the 25th of April, which brought back liberty to the Portuguese men and women and opened the doorway to a unified, democratic and progressive Europe for Portugal.’ In addition, Medeiros Ferreira (PS) pointed out that when addressing the representatives of the

117 Ibidem, p. 4813 (translation from Portuguese).
accession countries’ parliaments: ‘your presence at the Assembly of the Republic on this day and at this moment is a lively and noble testimony of the importance of 25 April for the development of European solidarity after the fall of the dictatorships [applause from PS, PSD and CDS-PP].’

Jorge Sampaio (PS), Portuguese President at the time, in an article on Eastern enlargement in the Portuguese daily Público, dedicated an entire paragraph to Portugal and the Carnation Revolution: ‘[I]t was the Carnation Revolution — of which we celebrate its thirtieth anniversary this year — which allowed us to re-open the way to Europe, and which marked the beginning of a new wave of democratizations in the world’, to add later on that ‘participation in the political process of European integration is an identity question.’

These debates fit well with the conceptualisation of ‘identity endorsement’. By inviting Eastern European officials within the context of both their admission to the EU and the commemoration of the Carnation Revolution, Portuguese political elites sensibly exposed the difference between the Portugal of 1986 and present-day Portugal, the positive connotations of which could only be attributed to EU membership. Now, by ‘passing the torch’ to the CEECs, Portugal symbolically concluded the process of democratisation, stabilisation and opening its borders. One should keep in mind, however, that as far as the process of economic divergence is concerned, Portugal was still far behind the traditional core countries. This simple fact was denied by neither of the main political parties as Portuguese politicians continued to position themselves as one of the cohesion countries. An analysis of the use of ‘solidarity’ as a normative concept is useful to understand how this apparent paradox was presented as a coherent story.

B. The defence of Eastern enlargement on the basis of ‘solidarity’

We argue that it is possible to separate the use of ‘solidarity’ here into two different meanings that can be attributed to the two logics (of appropriateness and consequences), and that solidarity mattered in two respects: (i) in the overall enlargement discussion, ‘solidarity’ can be viewed as an aspect of the dominant European discourse that was used to spread European democracy, stability and openness to the CEECs. From the moment when the Eastern bloc started to show signs of disintegration, Portuguese politicians verbally supported the process towards full membership, defining it as one of the EU’s moral duties under the flag of ‘solidarity’. In this use the concept can be regarded as a norm to which Portugal adheres, not

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118 Ibidem, p. 4809 (translation from Portuguese).
least because of its own experience. It thus constitutes the moral dimension of the comparison that was described under indicator A. (ii) ‘Solidarity’ can also be viewed as a tool to protect Portuguese interests in negotiations regarding the distribution of enlargement costs. Hence, we need to distinguish between the concept of ‘solidarity’ in the overall debate/decision on the worth of Eastern enlargement, and solidarity as a notion relevant in the implementation of enlargement. While the former use of solidarity is embedded in the logic of appropriateness, the latter follows more the logic of consequences. Along the lines of March and Olsen the first logic is used to establish fundamental constraints for a decision, whereas the other logic is used to make refinements within the constraints.  

Starting with the first aspect of the notion, in light of the search of Portuguese political elites for a new national identity, Eastern enlargement was the chance to prove for the first time that Portugal had moved to the European core, by taking a decision based on the same kind of European solidarity by which Portugal’s own accession was defended. In other words: the concept reflected Portugal’s full-grown ‘Europeanness’, as Portuguese politicians now acted upon the same norms as longstanding members of the EU. Solidarity in this first sense clearly constituted the dominant political discourse with regard to the overall positioning of the country in the Eastern enlargement debate. For instance, Manuel Alegre (PS), in response to a contribution by the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: ‘this is also a time for emotion and for the big question, the question that fascinates all Europe: the question of liberty and democracy in the countries of the East. You hardly touched on this question, especially when it comes to the attitude to be assumed by Portugal, as a European country, regarding solidarity towards these processes in motion.’  

Raimundo Narciso (PS) suggested that ‘the PS parliamentary group […] defends enlargement of the European Union in a spirit of solidarity with the other peoples and states of Europe. […] we are in favour of an EU enlargement policy that does not lose sight of peace, security, economic and social cohesion, civil rights, democracy and solidarity without exceptions, even though that may also imply some less beneficial consequences for our country.’ Mário Soares (PS) referring to the Portuguese enjoyment of external support and solidarity through EC accession, pointed out that ‘in the same way, we must show solidarity with those who since 1989 have launched themselves on the road to liberty, putting an end to totalitarian regimes. They deserve, therefore, stimulation and our solidarity, and we must not refuse it. This goes without saying, and not only from the Government, it is the official and
unanimous position of all the Portuguese political parties.’\textsuperscript{123} José Manuel Durão Barroso (PSD), without explicitly using the word ‘solidarity’ suggested that ‘we have always been in favour of enlargement because the contrary would be a refusal to face up to history. And how could we deny others something that we ourselves were generously granted?’\textsuperscript{124}

As for implementation of Eastern enlargement, solidarity has frequently been invoked in the second sense. Vítor Martins (PSD) suggested in the context of debates on ‘flexibility’ and enlargement that ‘we are obliged to strengthen the mechanisms of collective solidarity in the light of the future enlargements. Intensified solidarity is the natural opponent of variable geometry.’\textsuperscript{125} Jorge Sampaio (PS) also invoked ‘solidarity’ as a thinly disguised means for safeguarding Portuguese interests by asserting that ‘it seems essential to prevent the difficulties posed by the upcoming enlargement from provoking any kind of struggle between member states and from weakening [...] the economic and social cohesion within the European space, and to preserve solidarity as a basic principle of European integration.’\textsuperscript{126} Similarly, Francisco Seixas da Costa (PS) commented on the Agenda 2000 negotiations: ‘[it] is a debate on the distribution of power or, even better, on the preservation of balances within the Union that have prevailed up until today. [...] We came out with this analysis because [...] the Europe of solidarity and the duplication of funds — just to be clear, the Europe that in the end paid for the Common Market with the Economic and Social Cohesion — this Europe started to fall together with the Berlin Wall.’\textsuperscript{127} In addition, Prime Minister José Barroso (PSD), during a visit of his Czech counterpart Spidla, spoke of ‘a united Europe, respecting the principle of equality between states and recognising the basic principle of cohesion and solidarity’, referring to the kind of solidarity that would protect the interests of smaller and less developed member states.\textsuperscript{128}

These last four prominent Portuguese politicians provide a notion of solidarity that essentially comes down to this: the European Union of the 1990s was inclined towards cutting down on structural and cohesion funds, in order to keep the costs of enlargement under control. The Portuguese, together with the Spanish, heavily opposed the idea of ‘Europe a la carte’, in which member states are free to benefit from any aspect of European integration that would suit them, while at the same time being able to opt out should the EU come up with

\textsuperscript{125} Martins (1999), p. 47 (translation from Portuguese).
\textsuperscript{126} Sampaio, (2002a), pp. 3-4 (translation from Portuguese).
\textsuperscript{127} Seixas da Costa (2002), p. 141 (translation from Portuguese)
\textsuperscript{128} LUSA (2004).
something less appealing. It was in their interest to maintain internal support for structural and cohesion funds and the solidarity norm proved extremely useful to achieve this aim. The possibility for an instrumental use of the concept of solidarity, according to Jileva, stemmed from Portugal’s and Spain’s own entries, when it was used by both the Iberian candidates and the EU-10, to put a clear ‘moral stamp’ on the Iberian enlargement.

Thus, on a general level, ‘solidarity’ can be seen as a norm that fit within the dominant European discourse, which defined Europeanisation as a process of democratization. By staying within this discourse, Portuguese political elites did what was appropriate, while at the same time gaining aspects of a ‘core identity’. On the level of secondary debates, this use of ‘solidarity’ happened to be a convenient tool to further Portuguese interests, particularly during the Agenda 2000 negotiations. Portuguese politicians could use the same concept in a different way on a different level because their material interests on this level coincided with CEEC interests. For example, together with Spain, Greece and the CEECs, Portugal set up the ‘friends of cohesion’ group during the negotiations on the financial perspectives for 2007-2013.

C. Accusing opponents (of Eastern enlargement) of xenophobia, provincialism, isolationism

These concepts implicitly refer to the opposition that was created between the old regime and the modern Portuguese democracy. Eurosceptic or enlargement-sceptic stances are expected to be linked to Salazarist politics by means of these concepts. Opponents of enlargement thus constitute an ‘outgroup’ or rival group that is likely to be associated with the politics of the past, as well as xenophobia, provincialism and isolationism, notions that are associated with that past. In addition, it would not be unlikely that such accusations are used pre-emptively, something that did, in fact, occur here.

As further illustrated in the next section, with even the communists supporting enlargement there seemed to be no Eurosceptic political entity left to criticise for opposing the process of Eastern enlargement. However, policy-makers seem to have acted preventatively. For example, António Martins da Cruz (PSD), Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister

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131 Whether or not the Iberian enlargement in 1986 was clearly in the EU-10’s interest, the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the project of European integration had a clear objective: democratic and economic development. In these circumstances, the moral judgement of 'solidarity' was easily invoked. The EU-10 thus unanimously supported Iberian EU membership.
Barroso, suggested that with enlargement approaching it became important ‘to make sure that the enlarged community territory will preserve the diversities of its member states and maintain its national identities, by assuring citizens that the Union is a space created for them and not around them. Therefore, it is important to watch out for demagogic tendencies in certain populist groupings trying to demonise the entire process. The authorities of EU member states have an important task in immunising societies against those entities propagating xenophobia.’ President Sampaio used similar expressions to characterise opponents of enlargement during a conference at the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Folketing in 2002: ‘at a time of growing manifestations of xenophobia and intolerance we must eradicate the unfounded fears that cause the burden of all evils to fall on “the other”, the foreigner, he who is different [...]. We must develop a pedagogic approach to prevent our societies from shutting themselves off from the world and developing archaic and isolationist tendencies that can only worsen the problems confronting them.’

Seixas da Costa, similarly unable to point to any specific political groups that would oppose Eastern enlargement, nonetheless held that it would be of ‘an enormous historical and political blindness’ for Portugal to object to the process of enlargement: ‘it would mean that we forgot our own accession to the EEC and the development, sedimentation of democracy and culture of modernity resulting from it, that turned out to be essential for our country’s present and future. To adopt an egoistic attitude towards countries that nowadays strive for that same opportunity would be, at the very least, an act of political cynicism that a country like ours cannot risk assuming.’ Although he does not refer to concepts such as xenophobia, provincialism or isolationism, Seixas da Costa depicts Portugal’s support for the Eastern enlargement as so obvious that it would bespeak blindness, cynicism and egoism to oppose the process.

Overall, the above suggests that the Portuguese political elites pointed to certain concepts — such as xenophobia — which are inherently opposed to modern Portuguese identity, as constructed by (and within) the dominant discourse, in order to illegitimate opposition to enlargement. This is entirely in keeping with the notion of identity endorsement. By accusing opponents of Eastern enlargement to be associated with the fascist past, Portugal’s political elites emphasised and reinforced the country’s development into a modern, progressive, democratic and pro-integrationsist country at the EU’s core.

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135 Ibidem.
D. Pro-European discourse gains dominance

Should the political discourse described at the beginning of this section gain dominance over time – and thus influence which norms and values have validity – this would indicate that identities were in fact ‘clear’, as hypothesised in section 2. Actors previously operating outside of the dominant Europeanist discourse would feel to a certain extent forced to make a shift towards the dominant discourse because their stances would otherwise be disqualified as illegitimate. As a consequence, they would be very likely to remain at the margins of the political spectrum, without being able to participate in decision-making processes regarding European integration.

Three quarters of the Assembly of the Republic supported Portugal’s accession to the European Economic Community, with only the communists withholding their support. The parties supporting membership were the PS, with Mário Soares as Portugal’s most important and influential advocate of EU membership, the PSD (formerly known as PPD/PSD) and the CDS-PP (formerly known as CDS). Within this context, it should be interesting to see how the PCP, being the only communist party in Portugal to maintain representation in parliament up to the present day, developed its positions on enlargement and on secondary debates such as the Agenda 2000 and the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.

During the first decade after the Carnation Revolution, the PCP had interpreted Portugal’s accession to the EU as a counter-revolution. The PS, the communists’ traditional political rival, had committed ‘their ultimate betrayal of the working-class’, which was explicitly linked to their Europeanism. Both the communist and the dominant Europeanist discourse thus evaluated political stances on the basis of what they believed to be the principles of April 25th, 1974. However, these principles were defined differently and policies regarding European integration, in both cases explicitly linked to these principles, pointed in the exact opposite direction. Both discourses continued when the PS agreed to a proposal foreseeing election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. The PCP, again, spotted ‘plots to subvert the “gains of April”’ and opposed the proposition.

The turning point for the communists came in 1988, when the PCP ‘acknowledged some of the inherent benefits of Portugal’s accession to the EU.’ This change may of course have been inspired by the fact that the party wanted to participate in the first European elections,

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137 Ibidem.
which it had deeply reviled at first. As pragmatic as it may have seemed, this change could not, of course, go without a change of discourse. The PCP approved of the EU Association Agreement with the Czech Republic and Slovakia as ‘a deepening of cooperation between free and sovereign states’. This altered discourse also became gradually noticeable during the enlargement debate. Essentially, the PCP agreed with the pro-European parties PS, PSD and CDS-PP on the need to separate enlargement from the debate on the need for profound institutional changes. PCP-leader Honório Novo drew attention to the fact that institutional reform had not been used as an argument in any of the previous rounds of enlargement. The communists interpreted this as a strategy adopted by bigger and richer countries to impose their will on smaller and weaker member states.

The remarkable shift made by the PCP since the late eighties from profound Eurosceptics to Euro-critics that no longer opposed the European project as such becomes particularly clear in the way its party leader Honório Novo defended the PCP’s vote against the Nice Treaty: ‘we want and we wish more Portugal and more Europe. Nice will perhaps realise more Europe for some and less Europe for all. I am asking you, Prime Minister, would not this be the right time to stop this ‘steamroller’ in order to do some collective reflection on the necessary future for this European Union’?

‘The EU’, according to this statement, was no longer inherently wrong. However, ‘this EU’ did not meet communist standards of solidarity among EU member states and should thus be opposed. This can be interpreted as a considerable shift towards the dominant discourse.

In spite of this careful change of discourse, Prime Minister Guterres responded that opposing the Treaty would mean opposing enlargement, as it constituted an essential part of the overall process. He noted that ‘according to the PCP, whatever happens, even if it be in accordance with their will, everything that is European is bad’. This suggests that criticism regarding the enlargement project seem to be ‘allowed’ only when stemming from essentially pro-European parties. Profound criticism from politicians who are already known for their Euroscepticism does not appear to be taken seriously; i.e., their criticism is not legitimate within the dominant discourse. On the other hand, when the first association agreement between the EU-12 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia was submitted to the Assembly of

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142 Ibidem, p. 1210 (translation from Portuguese).
the Republic, the PCP’s vote in favour of ratification was greeted with a pat on the back from the PSD.\textsuperscript{143}

Overall, the PCP came to solidly support Eastern enlargement.\textsuperscript{144} Enlargement towards the East was promoted because it would lead to real convergence and economic and social cohesion.\textsuperscript{145} This was a severe ideological rupture with the past, when Portugal’s own membership was opposed because it would increase inequality.\textsuperscript{146} The EEC, then, was regarded as a threat to Portugal’s newfound freedom and democracy, while the resolution of the PCP’s 2006 conference on 20 years of EU membership reads: ‘we need a [...] convergence of the powers of progress and peace within Europe, with the conviction that the biggest contribution of the Portuguese people to a Europe of cooperation [...], of economic and social progress, of peace and friendship with all countries of the world, is a resumption and realisation of the project of democratic, patriotic and internationalist development that was initiated with the Revolution of April’.\textsuperscript{147} This quote defines the European project as a process of democratisation and convergence, now fully integrated with the communist story, while it used to be seen as sabotaging communist values. This apparent change of tune was defended with the argument that Portugal’s own accession had been the product of elite efforts rather than of popular demands, which, according to the PCP, was not the case with the CEECs.\textsuperscript{148}

Apart from the Communist PCP, the dominant pro-European discourse also affected the right-leaning CDS-PP. Under party leader Manuel Monteiro this traditionally pro-European party adopted a more Eurocritical attitude during parts of the 1990s in an attempt to stop the party’s electoral decline. The party leadership however realised that to be eligible for a place in government with the centrist PS and PSD, who have alternated in power since 1976, joining the pro-European discourse was indispensible.\textsuperscript{149}

In sum, we argue that the pro-European discourse became the dominant one, thus defining the boundaries of what is seen as legitimate. This also affected the (hitherto or temporarily Eurosceptic) parties, which could not afford to be marginalised in the debates and thus modified their views on the European project. This development of the dominant discourse suggests that the modern (Europeanist) Portuguese identity was unambiguous and clear.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibidem, p. 3907.
\textsuperscript{146} Diário da Assembleia da República (1977), p. 3015.
\textsuperscript{149} Cf. Costa Lobo (2007).
CONCLUSIONS

In view of the above analysis it seems that mainstream accounts cannot (adequately) explain Portugal’s support for the fifth enlargement of the European Union. First, welfare-related approaches towards enlargement were unanimous in their conclusions regarding material prospects for Portugal. Scenarios in which Portuguese GDP would grow were considered highly improbable; it has been found to be much more likely that the country would face a moderate GDP loss. This strongly undermines the relevance of material approaches towards enlargement. Second, geopolitical approaches do not suggest clear positive or negative implications emanating for Portugal from the fifth enlargement round. Although one could argue either way, perhaps most importantly in geopolitical terms, the 2004/2007 enlargement implies an eastwards shift of the EU’s centre of gravity, something that cannot be (and has not been) seen as an advantage for Portugal. Third, explanations based on ‘rhetorical action’ are also not persuasive. There is enough reason to believe that Portugal was not ‘rhetorically trapped’ into enlargement. Perhaps, most importantly in that respect, the possibility and even desirability of enlargement had already been expressed by prominent Portuguese politicians early on, before the explicit enlargement debate (and processes of rhetorical action) had even begun.

Instead, we argue that Portuguese support for Eastern enlargement is closely related to Portugal’s renewed European identity. Portugal’s own accession to the EU was essentially a political decision, made to ensure stability and democratic development. During the last decade of the Estado Novo, ‘Europe’ increasingly came to be seen as the alternative to Salazarist politics of isolation and colonialism. When Portugal officially applied for membership in 1977, a vast majority of the Portuguese political spectrum saw this as a decisive step towards democracy, stability and openness. This was an ideal climate for a particular pro-European discourse to arise, in which ‘Europe’ was defined as a project intended to spread these values. European integration has, ever since the country’s own accession, consistently been defined in terms of furthering democracy, stability and openness.

Further enlargement also had important implications for modern Portuguese identity. By fully supporting Eastern enlargement, Portugal could act together with the ‘European core’, and Portugal would become more ‘core’, i.e. more European. For Portuguese political elites, supporting Eastern enlargement therefore would be an act of identity endorsement. Several indicators have substantiated this explanation:
(A) A logic of appropriateness based on criteria of similarity and congruence suggests that references to Portugal’s own experiences with membership would be common, something that has indeed been found here. The pre-1990 political systems in the CEECs (and their experience) have been compared with Portugal under fascist dictatorship. In addition, expectations concerning CEEC post-membership development were made on the basis of Portugal’s own membership experience. As early as 1989 Eastern European demand for EU membership was linked to Portugal’s desire for accession roughly a decade earlier. In 2003, the link between the two processes was still an essential part of the dominant discourse, when Eastern European parliamentary presidents were invited to the annual 25 de Abril celebration.

(B) The ‘solidarity’ indicator constitutes another significant aspect of the dominant discourse. Eastern enlargement was defended by Portuguese politicians on the basis of solidarity because this has been held as an important value for the realisation of Portugal’s own accession. Solidarity has been an important aspect of the Portuguese political discourse throughout the entire enlargement process, from the beginning in 1989 until the end in 2004/2007.

(C) The third indicator suggests that opponents of the fifth enlargement would be accused of xenophobia, provincialism and isolationism. Although examples were hard to find in absence of real political opponents of enlargement within Portuguese politics, when members of government addressed their criticism towards opponents of enlargement in general terms, their line of argumentation was predominantly based on these concepts.

(D) A final indicator suggests that a pro-European discourse would gain dominance. This has indeed happened over time. With a solid majority of parliament already favouring Portuguese EC accession, those parties at the margins could not maintain their fundamental rejection of the EC/EU path over time. The pro-European discourse gaining further strength increasingly defined the boundaries of what is seen as legitimate. This also influenced parties, like the Eurosceptical communist PCP, or the temporarily Eurocritical CDS-PP, which subsequently adjusted their stances on European integration in order to enhance their legitimacy. This suggests that identities can be seen as constituting a clear logic.

As pointed out by March and Olsen, a logic of appropriateness can exist alongside a logic of consequences. Within this context, two distinctions are made. First of all: a clear logic precedes an unclear logic. With regard to Portugal’s stance in the Eastern enlargement debate, rationalist approaches might lead to diverging (i.e. unclear) conclusions. A rule/identity-based logic that has been advanced in this paper, on the other hand, does not seem to leave room for different interpretations, which suggests that the latter is the clear logic. The second
distinction suggests that one logic is used for major decisions, whereas the other one is used to determine the refinements. In the case of Eastern enlargement we can treat the decision to expand as the major decision, while the institutional decisions flanking enlargement at Nice, the Agenda 2000 and the conditions defined in the Accession Treaties can be seen as refinements. This distinction has proven to be a useful one because it allowed us to distinguish between the logic of appropriateness dominating the major decision, and the logic of consequences capturing more of the refinements. It also provides an alternative to Schimmelfennig’s separation between drivers and brakemen, as member states’ stances in secondary debates are no longer interpreted as attempts to accelerate or frustrate the enlargement process per se.

Finally, certain parallels with the cases of Spain and Greece — that experienced the fragility of democracy during the years before gaining membership and are generally committed to ‘more Europe’ — suggests that there is scope for further research emanating from this study.

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