Europeanisation and German foreign and security policy – the case of Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

Summary
Germany has been portrayed as a Europeanised state *par excellence*. There has been manifested in a predisposition in both the foundation and constitution of (West) Germany towards a European and Europeanised approach and solution to the issues facing CFSP and the problems of EU- and NATO-Enlargement and the stabilisation of the Balkans. This was supplemented by the Franco-German axis. Despite this, Germany remains singular in a number of aspects, which will be examined in this paper. Germany has consistently pushed for greater foreign and security policy co-ordination in an attempt to place its imprint on this policy-area. This presentation will examine one instance where a discernable German imprint on the development of foreign and security policy within Europe can be detected – the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

Singularity of German foreign and security policy within the EU

Europeanised from the beginning – Germany established its foreign policy within an already existing multilateral framework

Preamble to the Basic Law stipulates Germany should work towards European integration as a means to bring about regional stability.

Key actor in tandem with France in pushing for greater co-ordination

Multilateralism as a causal belief

Impact of the EU on German security policy – Dynamics of Europeanisation

Difficulty of isolating European dynamics and impacts from wider international dynamics in foreign and security policy. - NATO/UN etc. e.g. Nato’s New Strategic Concept and the model of NATO rapid reaction forces. Recent Europeanisation of NATO – inclusion of Russia

Europeanisation as reciprocal process - Projection and Reception / Uploading and Downloading (Bulmer & Burch 2001)

Aim is to create an overall institutional fit between domestic and EU level policy-making processes in order to lessen adaptational pressures on Germany. This has
been conducted through a policy of *Interessendurchsetzung* – promotion of German interests on the EU level.

Institutional developments – the role of the Foreign Ministry / Defence Ministry / Kanzleramt / Finance Ministry. – Growing assertiveness of the Chancellery in foreign affairs. Defence Ministry has become more involved in issues of achieving the Headline Goal requirements and implementing important reforms to the German Armed Forces. Ideational change – role of the armed forces – need for a more global diplomacy. (Kanzleramt)

Public support for the development of EU security and defence policy is generally strong and in some cases is often more pro-integrationist than the German government itself. – Europeanising defence is seen as a positive goal (Eurobarometer data)

**Stability Pact – transferring German ideas to the EU level**

Many of the main aspects of how Germany seeks to influence the Europeanisation of national foreign and security policies within the EU can be seen in the development of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

The Stability Pact / Fischer Plan was an integral part of a strategy to bring an end to the Kosovo war and to provide a solution to the problems of the region. Came about due to the failure of the Rambouillet Conference and the bombing of Serbia. The German Presidency (WEU/EU/G8) was an important Agenda Setter in time of crisis – consequently it had important diplomatic tools at its disposal. Further strengthened by the opportunities opened up due to the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1st May 1999.

Stability Pact / Fischer Plan an example of domestic pressure / preferences being translated onto the international level (the up-loading and down-loading of Europeanisation) Red/Green Coalition agreement (September / October 1998) had committed both parties to strengthening CFSP in order to strengthen the EU’s capabilities in Civilian Conflict Prevention and peaceful conflict management.

Means to reduce domestic pressure on Joschka Fischer – anti-war sentiment – imperative to suggest a medium to long-term solution to the region’s problems.

Role of Germany in the Balkans – Recognition fiasco Croatia/Slovenia – caused major resentment among Germany’s EU partners. – Limits of Europeanisation in 1990/91. Importance of the Contact Group in re-establishing trust and cooperation in the former Yugoslavia.
Thorny issue of offering Membership of the EU as long-term ‘carrot and stick’. Opening up prospect of Membership to South Eastern Europe – this was not agreed upon initially among the EU 15 – strongly backed by the UK and Germany however.

Reflects Germany’s interest in ‘joined-up’ Crisis Prevention

Mirroring Helsinki Final Charter – Three Working Tables: Democracy and Human Rights; Regional Security, Economic recovery and development

The Stability Pact is a prime example of the institutionalising of German preferences as means to strengthen European stability. –See also EU & NATO enlargement.

Germany was determined to hold on to a large degree of influence on the development of the Stability Pact through campaigning to have Bodo Hombach as its first Special Co-ordinator.

**How Germany pushed for the implementation of the Fischer Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Level</th>
<th>Stability Pact/Fischer Plan</th>
<th>Kosovo War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Level</td>
<td>Framing of proposals within the Federal Ministries in Berlin (mainly the Foreign Office) – contributions were invited from several departments, including the Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance department under Gerd Poppe. Wieczoreck-Zeul also had an important role to play at the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. Government need to prove it is making up for bombing by offering stability and hope to the region.</td>
<td>Framing of German involvement in the operation in terms of Nie Wieder Völkermord statt Nie Wieder Krieg – importance of discourse. Intensity of the imagery used intensified during the conflict to Nie Wieder Auschwitz. Involvement was framed in terms of Germany acting as a reliable partner and having special responsibility to act in these cases due to the legacy of the Second World War. Restrictions placed on the involvement by the Bundestag.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| International Level | Consensus building among Germany’s major allies in order to have the Fischer | Desire to put conflict prevention at the top of the list – military capabilities |
Plan accepted – vital to shoring up the German domestic consensus. Inclusion of the Russians in deliberations and the support of the work of Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin in reaching a diplomatic solution with Serbia – desire to involve the OSCE to have a Europe-wide solution to the problem. Use of ‘Helsinki model’ with this in mind. Stability Pact and linkages to future of EU integration as a whole – enlargement etc. and Bundeswehr involvement important in light of the overwhelming support of the USA, but only as a last resort. Using the stability Pact as a blueprint for negotiations over the future of the CESDP.

Methods/Mechanisms of German influence

- **Ideational Export**: Promoting German ideas on the EU and international level in conjunction with its key partners.
- **Example Setting**: Pledging considerable funds and resources to establishing the Stability Pact. (Pledged 1.2 Billion DM) Co-operation between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. Financing Conference in Brussels 29/30 March 2000 started the so-called “Quick Start Package”.
- **Strengthening Co-operation**: involving other international organisation to construct a web of complimentary institutions to back the Stability Pact. (G8, NATO (i.e. USA), UN, OSCE, World Bank, IMF etc)
- **Discursive influence**: Emphasising the need for Europe to deal with its own back yard to establish regional stability and prosperity

*Exaggerated Multilateralism*: Continually seeking to find multilateral solutions to international challenges.

Conclusions

The example of the Fischer Plan which became the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe is a clear illustration of how states are able to influence the process of Europeanisation. This is in stark contrast to explanation which posit that states pacifly comply with EU directives.
Germany’s diplomatic offensive to promote the Fischer Plan was successful in combining the efforts of a wide array of actors around the aim of bringing stability to the southern Balkan region.

Whilst the Stability Pact is not explicitly fall within the moves to develop CFSP/CESDP it does prove illuminating in highlighting the policy preferences within the German Foreign Office, the main ministry within Germany for handling CFSP policy.

Is the development of the Fischer Plan and the solution to the bombing of Kosovo and example of a Two-level game?

German views this sort of multilateral institutional solution to be in its best interests – suits German preferences. In addition, Germany seeks to exert more influence despite not having the material capabilities in place which are available to France and the UK.