

Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

Elfriede Regelsberger opens this issue of *CFSP Forum* with a survey of the development of the EU as a foreign policy actor. The article also has several tables, which I hope readers will find very useful.

Three articles on the ESDP follow: Andrea Ellner focuses particularly on battle groups; Eva Gross then assesses the new ESDP mission in Afghanistan; and Tomáš Weiss looks more closely at the issue of 'duplication' in the ESDP.

Finally, Ludovica Marchi analyses Italy's role within EU foreign policy.

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The EU as an Actor in Foreign and Security Policy: Some Key Features of CFSP in an Historical Perspective¹

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Inspired by recent debates, along with the 50th anniversary of the signature of the EC Treaties, this article focuses on the evolution of the 'second pillar'. Attention will be paid to what started prudently as early as 1970 as an attempt of the then six EC member states in European Political Cooperation (EPC) to prepare the EC 'to exercise the responsibilities which to assume in the world is both its duty and a necessity on account of its greater cohesion and its increasingly important role,² and what turned into a legally binding comprehensive commitment of the EU to 'define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas' in 1992.³ Since then the CFSP has constantly⁴ been renewed and adjusted to new internal and external challenges, most recently in the 2004 constitutional treaty, which might materialise in the form of the reform treaty in 2009 (see Table 1).

Permanent interest of member states in collective policies

From the beginnings of the EPC until today's CFSP participation in the 'club' has become central to the member states. None has ever questioned its membership or left the group. Though the attractiveness of collective foreign policy may be higher among the smaller countries which dispose of only limited diplomatic resources of their own, the bigger ones also wish to profit from CFSP in times of growing interdependencies and

globalisation. This 'shield' or 'umbrella' function of EPC/CFSP has also worked at the domestic political level: it has helped governments to change foreign policy with reference to 'constraints' at the European level.⁵ Furthermore EPC/CFSP has been helpful on certain occasions when specific national concerns could be made European ones. The UK successfully called for European solidarity in the Falklands War of 1982, Portugal strongly and successfully advocated the issue of East Timor, while Spain did so with regard to Central and Latin America and even France gradually realised that its 'domaines réservés' in former colonial Africa could be served through joint European initiatives.

Over time, the general intention of the 1980s that the member states 'should seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them'⁶ was translated into a legally binding obligation to formulate and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas including defence matters. The preservation of peace and security in the world, the protection of human rights and respect for the principles of the UN Charter have been defined as the common objectives of the CFSP. More than in previous times the EU has claimed to be a 'power'⁷ willing to foster its own values and interests in the world. The 2003 European Security Strategy⁸ reaffirmed these ambitions against the background of new challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or failed states.

Contrary to what several observers⁹ had assumed with regard to EU enlargement, the 'newcomers' in CFSP are well aware of the advantages that membership offers.¹⁰ In fact, no new member state has ever followed the example of 'enfant terrible' Greece, which had pains familiarising itself with EPC after its 1981 entry. This negative experience was among the arguments for a more solid basis for EPC. With the 1986 Single European Act, a 'legal regime',¹¹ though in rather general terms, replaced the earlier foreign ministers' reports. The creation of the Single Market, German unification and political changes in Eastern Europe called for something qualitatively new in the late 1980s: the CFSP. Further adaptations became necessary in the course of new external challenges, for example in the Balkans, and due to shortcomings in the existing rules and procedures. The EU's failure to speak with one voice in the Iraq war in 2003 did not produce a standstill in CFSP. On the contrary the conviction grew that another 'plateau'¹² had to be reached through legal reform. The somewhat 'hidden' constitution

building¹³ of the 1990s was to be transformed into an 'open' one through the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004 which might be revitalised in its substance during 2007/08.

EPC/CFSP governance at the political and administrative levels

As EPC/CFSP issues are by nature the domain of the foreign ministers and their diplomatic staffs, they have always been the key players. However, their numbers and the frequency of the meetings of today have nothing more in common with those of the 1970s and 1980s and even throughout the CFSP of the 1990s the growth of actors continued.¹⁴ Similarly the 'environment' in which CFSP decisions are prepared and implemented differs from former practices and has implications for the behavioural patterns of those involved.

'Institutionalisation'¹⁵ and 'Brusselisation'¹⁶

As is obvious from Table 2 the institutional set-up has been enlarged. The rather selective agenda of EPC – the Middle East conflict and the CSCE (today's OSCE) were among the first topics – steadily grew as a result of successful European concertation. The inclusion of foreign policy experts from the national capitals turned out to be vital for the preparations of the ministerial meetings and those of the Political Committee. Apart from new regional and functional topics, security and defence issues gained ground from 1999 and were further accentuated from 2003 with the start of the civilian and military crisis management operations. Furthermore both the legalisation of CFSP decisions and the recourse to Community instruments and finances made it necessary to install specific coordination mechanisms such as the group of Relex Counsellors.

At the top administrative level, the Political Directors, fundamental changes have taken place. Institutional differentiation followed from the constant overload of the Political Committee and led to the creation of today's Political and Security Committee (PSC) – a new actor designed to be subordinate to the Political Committee in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy but which evolved to the central body in daily CFSP business. In contrast to previous practice when the Political Committee met only once a month or even less in the 1970s, the PSC ambassadors gather twice a week and if necessary more often. What had been unthinkable in EPC days became real from 2000 onwards: not only do PSC meetings take place in Brussels but PSC members are located within the member states' representations to the EU. This applies also

to the CFSP levels below such as the relatively recent Nikolaidis group whose main task is to prepare the PSC meetings or the Relex Counsellors responsible for the legal aspects of CFSP decisions and their implications for Community issues.

This trend towards the 'Brusselisation' of traditionally capital-based CFSP actors is visible inside the Council framework. The most 'revolutionary' change was probably at ministerial level, when the Council of External Relations (an EC organ) became the main CFSP decision-making body. While EPC was marked by the famous and rather inefficient travelling circus of the foreign ministers, from the 1990s they met at the EC sites (Brussels and Luxembourg). The force of events – a credible EU foreign policy calls for a comprehensive interpillar approach – worked in favour of a more unitary institutional set-up. Not surprisingly this process was not tension-free. PSC ambassadors had to find their role vis-à-vis the other body traditionally in charge for the preparations of the Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper).

Commission participation in ESDP-related bodies such as the EU Military Committee raised concern among the governments and competition was strong in areas of overlapping competences such as civilian crisis management. Suspicions were and are strong inside Community circles that the intergovernmental CFSP might interfere with the supranational arena. 'Theological' debates promoted separation instead of cooperation and coordination. But even in daily business 'everybody sees the need for coordination but nobody wants to be coordinated', as an insider put it.

This lack of 'institutional consistency'¹⁷ slowed down EU decision-making and multiplied the 'voices' speaking on the EU's behalf. The creation of the post of a High Representative for the CFSP in 1999 raised considerable concern on the part of the Commissioner for External Relations. Similarly the Policy Unit¹⁸ met with reservations from Commission circles but even inside CFSP and in particular in the Directorate General E of the Council Secretariat suspicions about the 'newcomers' existed. Furthermore the numerous Special Representatives worked largely separately from the Commission delegations in third countries. The appointment of E. Fouéré as both Special Representative of the EU to Macedonia and Head of the Commission Delegation in Skopje in 2005 might serve as a model to reduce these frictions. Other recent proposals¹⁹ suggest more intense communication and regular meetings

between first and second pillar actors at both political and administrative level but real progress must await the fusion of the posts of High Representative for the CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations.

'Socialisation'

As is well-known the guiding principle for decision-making in both EPC and CFSP has been the consensus rule. Majority voting, though applicable since the Amsterdam Treaty in very rare cases, has remained only on paper. CFSP practitioners argue that the nature and sensitivity of CFSP issues require an atmosphere of negotiations in which each participant is taken on board instead of being excluded and outvoted. The key factor which facilitates consensus building and concrete policy outcomes even in such a large group as the EU-27 has to do with specific behavioural patterns of the participants, the 'concertation reflex' or 'socialisation'. What was a novelty in the days of EPC is normalcy today: taking the views of other partners into account before defining one's own position has become 'a naturally done thing' according to insiders.²⁰ The high degree of institutionalisation and Brusselisation has reinforced this trend of 'Europeanising' national foreign policies. The work of the Council Secretariat and the increasingly political functions of the Policy Unit plus the successful performance of the High Representative have also promoted the emergence of an *acquis politique* which is far more than the lowest common denominator. Admittedly history has shown us that socialisation does not work 100 per cent of the time. When the question of peace or war arises and transatlantic relations are at stake, or in situations when issues are already highly politicised at the national level, CFSP decisions are difficult if not impossible to achieve. Also in EU consultations at the United Nations and possibly elsewhere in the world where the positive effects of 'Brusselisation' are felt less immediately, the concertation reflex has remained underdeveloped.²¹ Here much depends on the skills and personalities of the respective presidency speaking on the EU's behalf and the complexity of the UN proceedings is said to work against greater cohesion. This is not to say that CFSP has failed to produce results in New York. On the contrary and compared to previous periods when unanimous voting was below 50 per cent in the 1970s and even declined in the 1980s, the EU member states today cast collective votes on UN resolutions in around 75-80 per cent of all the submitted texts.²²

Instruments: growth in quantity and quality

Despite the well-known failures to speak with one

voice, the CFSP policy output is impressive both in terms of quantity (breadth of agenda) and quality (differentiation according to substance and instruments).²³ While EPC fell short of instruments other than traditional diplomacy (such as declarations, demarches, Presidency fact-finding missions), CFSP added a set of legal instruments (common strategies, common positions, joint actions) which can take ambitious forms such as the EU's civil and military crisis management operations. The latter²⁴ require enormous capabilities in terms of technical equipment, personnel and money and adequate structures for planning and implementing the operations.²⁵ Though the EU is still far from closing the 'expectations-capability gap',²⁶ progress has been achieved since 2003 in a trial and error process which has not been tension-free, as the controversy over an independent EU Operations Centre or the dispute over arrangements for EU-NATO relations which resulted finally in the 'Berlin plus' agreement revealed.

The progress achieved in ESDP with the 'speed of light' – as the High Representative for the CFSP puts it frequently – reflects itself also in the use of the CFSP instruments and in particular those established with the TEU. The growth of CFSP joint actions is largely due to the crisis management operations carried out since 2003 and the need to establish new structures expresses itself in the numerous institutional decisions of the Council and the PSC. Similarly the more frequent use of agreements with third countries has to do with the growing interest of non-EU member states to participate in ESDP missions. As the graph below illustrates, the rise in CFSP acts of 'non-territorial subjects' over the past years is also partly ESDP-driven. Other issues of this category refer to non proliferation and to the EU's measures – normally in the form of common positions – to combat international terrorism after 11 September 2001.

The instrument of common positions is also frequently used to define the EU's approach towards third countries or regions outside the immediate neighbourhood, such as the ACP countries, while joint actions usually address relations with the Balkans, the Middle East and more recently Central Asia and the South Caucasian region. The former are also applied in case of sanctions, while the mandates of the Special Representatives – another successful approach to be more operational and present on the ground – are defined through joint actions.

All these activities have financial implications and as such clearly differ from the old, 'cheaper', EPC

instruments. The financing of the CFSP²⁷ caused severe controversies between diplomats and Community bodies and in particular the European Parliament since the latter tried to improve its competences inside CFSP through its rights as part of the budgetary authority in the EC. However, even strong intergovernmentalists voted for the application of the Community procedures for the CFSP finances in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) either because national budgets fell short of money or the government representatives were not aware of the concrete EC mechanisms these rules would entail. Another source of tensions between the Council and European Commission arose from the fact that CFSP expenditure fell constantly short of the policies pursued.²⁸ Consequently CFSP still has to seek additional funding from other sources of the Community budget which, however, belong to the Commission.

As table 3 illustrates the use of the more 'traditional' instruments of collective foreign policy-making has gone down. Nevertheless CFSP declarations may prove to be at least an additional tool to express the views of the EU-27 on a particular issue. Despite the harsh and often unjustified criticism of 'mere' declaratory policy, reactions from third parties indicate that even words may have a significance in foreign policy. More than before CFSP declarations today often contain a 'conditionality clause', that is in case the addressee aligns with the policy of the EU-27 it may profit from specific EU support (aid, trade concessions, etc) or lose it in case of deviation.

Interventions against the violation of human rights²⁹ are usually high on the CFSP agenda. They can take very different forms and it seems that the instrument of the diplomatic – and by its nature confidential – demarche has lost importance while meetings in the framework of political dialogues are used more intensively. This holds true for the specific human rights dialogues the EU has established with China, Iran and Russia even though insiders admit that they have produced only 'mixed results' so far. But in other regular gatherings between the EU and third countries or regional groupings human rights questions have been addressed more often.³⁰ Generally political dialogues have served the EU well to 'export' its own successful model of integration to other parts of the world (ASEAN; Gulf Cooperation Council) and through them the EU has offered its services as a mediator and partner (as in Central and Latin America, or the Barcelona process). Since this instrument requires excessive preparation inside the EU and involves a great number of participants in case meetings

take place in full format (EU-27) adaptations have been made to 'economise' the dialogues: to reduce the number of participants (Troika; High Representative), to streamline the agenda, or even to reduce the number of meetings. The fewer dialogues conducted since 2003 (see Table 3) only partly reflects this trend. The massive decrease between 2003 and 2005 has to do with the 2004 enlargement: before accession, the EU briefed future members about the CFSP results in separate dialogue meetings which were then no longer necessary.

In a historical perspective the output of CFSP - and to a lesser extent its precursor EPC - has been impressive. Even though it is difficult view to measure the international impact of CFSP policies, the permanent interest of the EU member states to use CFSP and adapt the framework to new challenges indicates its value, as do the recognition and growing demands for a European foreign and security policy from outside. Imperfect as it may be with regard to cross-pillar coordination, military capabilities and institutional shortcomings such as the rotating presidency, the 'phenomenon' of CFSP will remain of high relevance for both the political world and academic research. ♦

¹ This paper summarises what the author presented to the UACES Conference on 'Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome', in London, 23-24 March 2007, and is based on earlier work: E. Regelsberger, *Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU (GASP)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).

² First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the European Community of 27 October 1970 (Luxembourg Report), point 9.

³ Title V Art. J, Treaty on European Union (Maastricht version).

⁴ Title V Art. 11, Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam version of 1997 and Nice version of 2001).

⁵ For example, Germany preferred to use EPC to adapt its Middle East policy in the 1970s. For the 'shield effect' in the UN framework, see K. Smith, 'Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at the United Nations', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006.

⁶ Report on European Political Cooperation, 13 October 1981 (London Report).

⁷ This was the wording of the 2001 Laeken Declaration of the European Council which kicked off the European Convention.

⁸ Designed by the High Representative for the CFSP and adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

⁹ See *CFSP Forum*, vol. 3, no. 3, May 2005.

¹⁰ E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels, 'The Evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. A Case for an Imperfect Ratched Fusion', in A. Verdun and O. Croci, eds, *Institutional and Policy-making Challenges to the European Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement*, (Manchester University Press, 2004).

¹¹ M. E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹² This notion was introduced to describe the various stages of the EPC. See C. Hill and W. Wallace, 'Diplomatic Trends in the European Community', *International Affairs*, 1979, pp.

47-66; E. Regelsberger, 'EPC in the Eighties: A Qualitative Leap Forward?' in A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger, and W. Wessels, eds, *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988). Another term used was 'periods'; see S. Nuttall, 'Two Decades of EPC Performance', in E. Regelsberger, P. de Schoutheete, and W. Wessels, eds, *Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond* (Lynne Rienner, 1997).

¹³ Regelsberger and Wessels, 'The Evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy'.

¹⁴ For an overview, see S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, 'Administrative Governance in the CFSP: Development and Practice', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no.11, 2006.

¹⁵ M. E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*.

¹⁶ Among the first: D. Allen, 'Who speaks for Europe?', in J. Petersen and H. Sjørnsen, eds, *A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? Competing Visions of CFSP* (Routledge, 1997).

¹⁷ S. Nuttall, 'Coherence and Consistency', in C. Hill and M. Smith, eds, *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁸ Its official name in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit - is no longer used since it does not correspond to its factual role.

¹⁹ European Commission, 'Europe in the World - Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility', COM (2006) 278 final; Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 15/16 June 2006, Doc. 10633/06 CONCL 2.

²⁰ A. Juncos and K. Pomorska, 'Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialisation in the CFSP Council Working Groups', *European Online Papers*, vol. 10, 2006.

²¹ K. Smith, 'Speaking with One Voice?'

²² E. Sucharipa, 'Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen', in *Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel* (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institut, 2003). Research in the field of the UN is underdeveloped at present.

²³ For further details see 'Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities', Doc. 10314/06 PESC 562 FIN 234 PE 192.

²⁴ As for first assessments see among others: A. Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, Chaillot Paper no. 90 (Paris: EU ISS, 2006); H-G Ehrhart, 'EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment', *European Security Review*, no.32 (Brussels, 2007); C. Gourlay, et al., *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, Chaillot Paper no. 90 (Paris: EU ISS, 2006).

²⁵ J. Howorth, 'From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP', in C. Hill and M. Smith, eds, *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: University Press, 2005).

²⁶ Introduced by: C. Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', in S. Bulmer and A. Scott, eds, *Economic and Political Integration in Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

²⁷ The funding of CFSP measures having military or defence implications is excluded from the Community budget (art. 28 TEU) and depends on national contributions.

²⁸ In 2005 the CFSP budget was only around €62 million. For the period 2007-13 a rise from €150 to 340 million is foreseen, not least because of the insistence of the High Representative. A. Bendiek, 'The financing of the CFSP/ESDP: "There is a democratic deficit problem"', *CFSP Forum*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2006.

²⁹ More information is available through the annual Council reports on the human rights situation.

³⁰ See, for example, during the 2007 German Presidency the ministerial meeting between the EU and ASEAN concerning the issue of Burma.

Table 1: CFSP construction dates





Table 2: The growth of actors in EPC/CFSP

	1970	1986	1993	1996	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Heads of State/Government/ European Council												
Foreign Ministers (until 1993; from 1989 onwards meetings on fringe of) Council External Relations												
Foreign + Defence Ministers/ Council External Relations												
Defence Ministers (informal)												
Steering Board EDA (Defence Ministers + others)												
Political Committee (PoCo)												
Political and Security Committee (PSC/ COPS)												
Expert groups/Council working parties												
European Correspondents												
Relex Counsellors												
Nikolaidis Group												

Graph Legislative Acts in CFSP



Developments in ESDP

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During the first half of 2007 the implementation of plans developed over the preceding years for ESDP seemed to make substantial progress, not least in the provision of military capabilities, but there are caveats. The following discussion takes its starting point from some significant events in the provision of EU military capabilities and will touch upon aspects of the wider context, including the relationship with NATO, of developments in ESDP. It can only provide a snapshot, but the themes discussed are symbolic of the aspirations, long-standing problem areas and/or actual engagement of the EU in security and defence matters in the immediate and wider global environment.

Operation headquarters, Brussels and battlegroups

The new EU Operations Centre within the EU Military Staff was opened and the EU Battlegroups (BG) declared fully operational on 1 January 2007. The former provides a third option for running missions of a limited size from Brussels, after the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in one of five member countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom) for so-called autonomous operations, and resources sharing with NATO under Berlin Plus with the use of SHAPE facilities for HQ purposes. The establishment of BGs had been decided by the Council in 2004 with the aim of pooling European military capabilities into relatively small units for rapid reaction operations which could be conducted without the assistance of NATO. BGs are not specifically associated with one service, but are currently focused on land forces. Although a multinational Maritime Task Force was made available in the first half of 2007, a Maritime Rapid Response Concept and a Rapid Response Air Initiative are only expected to come to fruition later this year. There are also plans for revising the EU Military Rapid Response Concept to enhance the ability to conduct joint, that is integrated, air, sea and land operations and to implement the comprehensive approach to crisis management.¹

Each BG consists of forces supplied by one or more member states and two BGs are on stand-by for six months on rotation through the currently thirteen available BGs. BGs are intended to provide the EU with military forces

that can be deployed quickly for a relatively short period into a broad spectrum of crisis situations up to a medium level of conflict. They are intended to function as a stand-alone force in a limited (by time and scope) contingency, which may include bridging operations until another international organisation such as the UN takes over, or a 'spearhead' or pre-deployment force in contingencies that are likely to require a greater military effort at a later stage. For the latter cases they are intended to be backed up by a 'Strategic Reserve'. In principle, BGs are one of the EU's signals that it is prepared to put weight behind its claim to being a global actor who can become independently engaged in crisis management and stabilisation operations with a military component. There are, however, a number of problems; some, if only very few, shall be discussed here.

Possible resource competition with NATO

The designation of forces to BGs is a matter of national decision-making. BGs are conceptually very similar to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and therefore require broadly the same capabilities. The national capabilities which can be usefully contributed to these forces are limited, either because the overall size of the national armed forces has been reduced during the 1990s, they have not yet been successfully transformed from the Cold War configuration – often these two factors go together, although in some cases the creation of a BG has aided transformation – or they are committed in operations and already thinly spread. Hence there is, in essence, competition over national contingents to constitute either the EU BG or NATO RRF. This competition over physical assets could impair either NATO or EU operations, if their missions overlap or coincide, or if both organisations choose at the same or at similar times to implement their plans to undertake more than one mission simultaneously. Not only might this impose uncomfortable choices on members of both organisations, but also challenges remain for operations in which the EU and NATO are engaged in parallel and which involve members of one but not the other organisation. The future of BGs is quite intensely tied up with: the political context of CFSP; transatlantic relations; potential or real rivalries between the two institutions, still palpable at the institutional, though not the operational (for example in Bosnia), level; the scope of the EU to live up to its own aspirations for an integrated crisis management approach, which can co-ordinate and use effectively as well as efficiently the multiple civilian and military assets available

in principle; and the expectations of third parties of the EU's ability and legitimacy to act globally.

Usability of battlegroups

There is also the question of the utility of BGs in general. Since Initial Operational Capability had been declared in January 2005 no BG has been deployed, although conceivable missions might have been in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of the elections in July 2006 or in Lebanon in the same year. In both cases the EU chose to apply an ad hoc approach to force generation. Germany, which also had a BG on standby at the time, had indicated that it was prepared to lead the mission in Congo or at least act as a leading contributor. These intentions were scuppered by domestic opposition. This and the EU's reluctance both to activate the machinery in Brussels necessary to manage the deployment and to consider the Congo mission an appropriate contingency for a BG deployment, even if it only a 'test case', does cast some doubt over the utility of BGs as well as their *rapid* deployability, which depends on a rather time-consuming, multi-level decision-making process. It should also not be overlooked that the results of European public opinion polls, which suggest strong support for EU involvement in defence and security matters, are not necessarily transferable to EU global interventions with a military component. Here domestic support is both more differentiated and much lower than is sometimes suggested.² To what degree BGs can become the ESDP tool intended thus depends on a wide array of factors, which will be difficult to line up for adequate implementation. There is little literature on the subject, but a useful examination of the background, current state of play and potential future development can be found in Lindstrom's Chaillot Paper.³

Of course, as Lindstrom also suggests, whether BGs can be, or are required as, tools for EU operations envisaged under ESDP will have to be assessed over time. Their future will also depend on the future security situation overall, the relative importance of the military component in ESDP missions and domestic attitudes to defence spending. For more complex military contingencies the EU would require the capacity to augment BGs with adequate 'follow-on' forces and concepts for joint and combined, that is multi-national, military operations. It will also need to enhance its capacity to integrate closely civilian and military elements during the different stages of crisis management as well as

co-ordination with other actors.⁴ Of course the future of the EU's military capability also depends on the development of an industrial base in Europe, which can provide the hardware Europeans expect to require at a price they can afford and in a manner that allows them to be at least in some areas independent of military technology and arms producers outside Europe.

The wider defence planning context

The European Defence Agency's 'Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs', endorsed by the Steering Board on 3 October 2006, forecasts more opaque threats to security in a Europe surrounded by regions struggling with the negative effects of globalisation, and an economically and demographically less pre-eminent Europe, where defence would compete with pensions in public spending, recruitment would become much more difficult for the armed forces, societies are more concerned about the legitimacy of the use of force and prefer spending on 'security' over 'defence', and media scrutiny would increase.⁵ The vision foresees defence tasks, or the use of force, forming only one, not even necessarily a large, part of an integrated approach to conflict prevention and management which co-ordinates and accommodates a wide range of civilian, military, state and non-state actors. On the defence industrial base the EDA published its vision of the potential and need for such an industrial base in May 2007.⁶ Its main themes address the familiar challenges of arms procurement in a financially-constrained, fast-moving and increasingly globally-competitive technological and industrial environment, which have historically driven arguments for, and still inform the EDA's rationale of, advocating greater European arms co-operation. It does, however, emphasise the importance of advanced technology development in Europe not only vis-à-vis the US, but also new competitors emerging from the Asian defence industry.

Civilian focus of current missions

Another salient aspect impacting on the future role of BG and the EU's military capabilities in general will be the development of operations it chooses to conduct. Currently the EU is engaged in missions that only require a limited military component, such as Operation Althea in Bosnia, whose personnel was reduced from 7,000 to 2,500 in early 2007, or EUSEC RD Congo, whose mandate was extended in May 2007 until July 2008 and which includes a contribution to

Security Sector Reform. This is of course partly because military assets have only been under development. However, as stated above, BGs were not deployed even when they were available and might have been useful. In addition to this, and in some ways commensurate with its self-image of being a particularly suitable actor in operations that require a strong and long-term civilian element, the predominant types of missions involve, apart from reconstruction, policing and rule of law operations. In other words, the EU is acquiring valuable operational experience in missions with a strong emphasis on Security Sector Reform for which the Council had developed a concept in the ESDP context in 2005,⁷ which was complemented by a Commission concept in May 2006⁸ to facilitate a more integrated approach.

Especially notable here are the 'youngest' civilian and police missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo; other police missions are conducted in Congo (EUPOL Congo took over from EUPOL Kinshasa on 1 July 2007), in the Palestinian Territories (scaled down soon after its launch and aligned with the Quartet following the elections in 2006), in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they are included in the EU's civilian-military support to the African Union in Darfur; border support missions are ongoing in Georgia, Moldova/Ukraine and at Rafah and a rule of law mission is in Iraq (EUJUST Lex).⁹ The EU Police Mission (EUPOL) to Afghanistan, launched officially in Kabul on 17 June 2007, consists of 160 police, law enforcement and justice experts, who will engage in mentoring, monitoring, advisory and training tasks at the level of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, regions and provinces.¹⁰ It 'aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards'.¹¹

A civilian 'Rule of Law' mission for Kosovo is in preparation and will deploy once a settlement on the status of Kosovo had been achieved in the UN. It has been described as 'the most difficult ESDP mission so far'; with 1,750 personnel it is also significantly larger than EUPOL Afghanistan. Under the leadership of the International Civilian Representative, who will also act as EU Special Representative, it will oversee the implementation of the settlement and prepare the transfer of power to Kosovo authorities and for a future international presence. The EU 'Rule of Law' mission will focus in particular on the judiciary, police, customs and correctional services. Unusually, as they are not normally linked to matters of security, this will include the

implementation of property rights, certainly relevant to security in Kosovo. Successful co-ordination between the EU and NATO at the political-strategic level as well as co-operation on the ground between the EU mission and KFOR are essential, as the situation in Kosovo is, and is likely to remain, volatile and NATO will be responsible for the security of the EU deployment. In Bosnia NATO-EU co-operation on the ground has an excellent reputation, but challenges still remain at the institutional level and particularly in the co-ordination of an integrated civilian-military operation, which was not part of the Berlin Plus Agreements.

The Kosovo mission has particular significance. This is partly for symbolic reasons, as the Kosovo crisis of 1999 triggered ESDP, but more importantly because, as the 'sixth ESDP mission in the Balkans, its success can no longer be assessed according to "learning by doing principles"; instead, EU decision-makers will be challenged to show that 'the policy is coming of age'.¹² It may therefore not only be a test case for the EU's own ambitions, but also provide scope for the resolution of long-standing frictions with NATO.

Conclusions

It is difficult not to conclude that the EU and NATO would be well advised to develop a more coherent, co-ordinated and sustainable partnership at the very least in order to use their assets for crisis management more effectively. Existing difficulties in developing a common strategic outlook are not likely to go away, but improved communications between the two institutions might open doors for more effective planning and conduct of the types of operations in which both are likely to engage. They depend on each other in the planned Kosovo operation, for which co-ordination is apparently proceeding well, and Afghanistan. In future, should conflict prevention elsewhere fail, missions may well be at least as complex and demand a highly integrated civilian-military approach. Effective planning and implementation of such an approach is likely to require a long-term commitment and the application of the greatest possible expertise in, as well as close co-ordination of, civilian and military aspects of conflict management until the operation is concluded. The EU has made progress in generating military capabilities for ESDP operations, but it appears to be more confident in applying its civilian capabilities. In the latter area it has thus gained substantially more valuable operational experience than in the former. Until it

restores this balance, if it indeed chooses to continue on the route set out so far, NATO is the most likely partner to provide military security in future operations at the higher levels of the conflict spectrum. The EU's and NATO's areas of expertise are complementary, but institutionally separated. If they bridged this divide, they could enhance their planning and operational effectiveness. Considering the US's experiences in Iraq, the most influential – and at times most controversial – NATO partner may value more highly the EU's experience in civilian areas of conflict management than in the past. In view of this and the nature of prospective operations, the EU could certainly claim the degree of influence in decision-making and planning that used to be associated with an ally's military capability. One can of course think of a myriad of obstacles standing in the way of such a development. The pending Kosovo operation should shed some light on whether these can be overcome. ♦

¹ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Report on ESDP*, 10910/07, Brussels, 18 June 2007.

² Klaus Brummer, 'Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy', *European Security*, vol. 16, no. 2, 2007.

³ Gustav Lindstrom, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, Chaillot Paper No. 97 (Paris: EUISS, February 2007).

⁴ For a discussion of BG in the wider context of EU crisis management, see Christian Moelling, *EU Battlegroups – Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die EU* [EU Battlegroups – State of Affairs and Problems of Implementation in Germany and the EU; in German], Discussion Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 5 March 2007.

⁵ European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, Brussels, 3 October 2006, available at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/webutils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=106> (last accessed on 7 July 2007).

⁶ European Defence Agency, *A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base*, Brussels, 14 May 2007, available at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=211> (last accessed 9 June 2007).

⁷ Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*, 12566/4/5 REV4, Brussels, 13 October 2005 available at http://www.eplo.org/documents/SSR_ESDP.pdf (last accessed 8 July 2007).

⁸ Commission of the European Communities, *Communication to the European Council and the Parliament – A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, (COM 2006) 253 Final, 25 May 2006 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0253en01.pdf (last accessed 8 July 2007).

⁹ For a report on all current operations see the *Presidency Report on ESDP* of 18 June 2007.

¹⁰ EU Council Secretariat, *Factsheet – EU Police Mission in Afghanistan*, 10939/07 (Presse 140), Brussels, May 2007.

¹¹ Council of the European Union, *EU Police Mission to Afghanistan Starts*, 10939/07 (Presse 140), Brussels, 15 June 2007.

¹² Thomas Zehetner, 'Waiting in the Wings – The Civilian ESDP Mission in Kosovo', *European Security Review* (ISIS-Europe) No 33, May 2007, pp.4-7 available at <http://www.isis-europe.org/> (last accessed 7 July 2007).

Europe's Growing Engagement in Afghanistan: What Success for ESDP?

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For the past six years, Afghanistan has been a key arena in the war against terror, and for the past four has been a test case for NATO. At the same time, and certainly no less importantly, the country has posed a challenge for international actors concerned not only with post-conflict reconstruction but also economic development. Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to its policy-making structure and the lack of visibility of its policies, the EU's involvement in Afghanistan has not been the focus of analysis to date: this despite the fact that the EU has deployed several of its foreign policy instruments, including the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the release of a substantial amount of financial development and reconstruction aid. This relative neglect on the part of analysts and academics does not mean, however, that the EU's engagement in Afghanistan has been without criticism: only recently an early observer and participant in the EU's policy towards Afghanistan has attested a lack of lessons learned by the EU on how to improve coherence and visibility.¹ But, despite or perhaps even in spite of these criticisms, EU efforts are currently expanding with an ESDP civilian crisis management operation that was launched in June 2007.

This article aims to analyse the evolving EU effort, particularly that of ESDP, in Afghanistan. It does so from three separate vantage points: first, in the context of the development of the EU as a security provider in its own right and the conceptual implications of this development; second, the potential for pitfalls (but perhaps also opportunities) for improving international coordination; and third, what, given the challenging security environment in Afghanistan, the EU and its latest ESDP mission can realistically hope to achieve. The article concludes that increasing EU commitment can be seen as a positive and welcome step for the development of the EU as a global security actor, and of Europe 'showing the flag' in a challenging security environment – but that security conditions on the ground mean that this particular mission will pose a significant challenge to the EU both from the viewpoint of

operational structures and procedures as well as the operation's impact on the ground.

EUPOL Afghanistan: attesting to the EU's growing international role

The European Security Strategy (ESS) lists state failure, terrorism and organised crime among the most serious threats facing Europe today. In light of these stated priorities, Afghanistan is a quintessential case for EU action as it meets all the key requirements for a political response. European countries have also been heavily involved on the ground both in the framework of NATO/ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. Improving the situation in Afghanistan is clearly of vital interest for the EU and its member states. Indeed, since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 the EU has been a key – if not always a visible or coherent – player in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

In considering the evolution of EU and ESDP commitment in Afghanistan – especially given the stated priorities in the ESS – it is worth posing the question of why ESDP was not deployed sooner, why it has come to be considered an appropriate and useful instrument, and what this might indicate that the ESDP is for. Present at the creation of international efforts in Afghanistan (overshadowed, of course, by the US-led war on terror), were substantial tensions among member states over the use of EU security instruments. Diverging views of the EU's role, individual member states' initiatives, and a lack of coordination between EU and NATO have since reinforced this fragmentation. While CFSP did have a place in member states' political considerations in formulating policies towards Afghanistan,² there was no clear conception of the place for ESDP in Afghanistan, and after the rejection of an initial suggestion for a coordinated 'EU-force' in ISAF the topic of ESDP disappeared from the public – at least – agenda. But, this rejection of a role for ESDP also reflected a bigger malaise in attitudes towards ESDP – that of not having clearly defined what ESDP was *for*.³ It was clearly regarded as a natural tool for crisis management in the Western Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa: but beyond these two regions the frequency and location of ESDP operations has smacked of 'ad-hocery', meaning that strategic and ideational divisions over where ESDP is to be deployed have not been resolved. From this perspective EUPOL Afghanistan fulfils a dual function – first, it can be argued that this is a case of Europeanisation in reverse, where pressures

from the alliance for using EU assets lead to member states' consent to an ESDP operation;⁴ and second, that the EU is showing the political flag in Afghanistan.

EUPOL Afghanistan: building on national efforts – and missed opportunities

EUPOL Afghanistan will cover the whole of Afghanistan and will consist of some 160 police, law enforcement and justice experts that are to be deployed at central (Kabul), regional (the 5 regional police commands) and provincial (in provinces, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams) levels. Its aims are to contribute 'to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. More particularly, the mission will monitor, mentor, advise and train at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces'.⁵

The history of international efforts at post-conflict reconstruction, including police reform, coupled with the current political situation in Afghanistan make this a challenging operation. A joint exploratory mission took place from 10 to 21 September 2006 to assess 'the rule of law sector in Afghanistan and to identify priorities for future engagements' and noted that the EU's future engagement should 'provide added-value to the work currently ongoing, and aim to build greater coherence amongst actors rather than increasing the multiplicity of effort'.⁶ 'Coherence' and 'added value', however, are problematic terms – and it is questionable whether either will be achieved – for two reasons.

Just as the 'light footprint' approach that did not succeed at filling the security vacuum after the fall of the Taliban has been termed a 'missed opportunity',⁷ so the neglect of police reform – another missed opportunity – has also been acknowledged on the part of international actors in Afghanistan, including the US.⁸ Police reform efforts have so far been led by Germany and the ESDP operation will build on those efforts and will incorporate the German contingent already present in the country. Germany's reform strategy proceeded by a staged approach, starting in Kabul and then spreading out to the provinces. As of mid-October 2004, 2,624 personnel had been trained at the Kabul Police Academy, including 1,831 non-commissioned officers, of which 55 were female, and 752 border police.⁹ The US also put in place a programme for police reform that focused on training police recruits – indicating two very

different and furthermore not necessarily coordinated approaches: 27,200 police received basic police training through US-supported programmes.¹⁰ The US has also devoted substantial financial commitments to police reform, vastly outspending the EU – indicating once more the imbalance of EU versus US efforts, and the uneven degree of influence associated with this. While EUPOL Afghanistan will be working with a 500-strong US contingent¹¹ it is improbable that this effort would be subsumed, in the name of coherence, under EU coordinating efforts.

Challenges for inter-institutional cooperation

Beyond building on pre-existing different national and institutional efforts, the coordination between different institutional actors on the ground (and in Brussels) – while much needed – will be challenging. Although the co-ordination between Council and Commission appears to be working reasonably well, with an official from the Commission's Conflict Prevention Unit working with the office of the EUSR,¹² reporting has not been shared with NATO: this reinforces the information disconnect between the economic, political and security dimensions so crucial for a working security-development nexus. At present, the EU-NATO relationship on a political level is by far not as cooperative as it could be¹³ – although EU officials note that so far, engagement with NATO has been 'good' with video conferencing taking place during the planning of the mission. ISAF and NATO support will indeed be crucial given the security situation in Afghanistan: however, it remains to be seen how this cooperation will work in practice. As long as relations between the two organisations remain 'frozen' the task of coordination and cooperation will likely be left to personnel on the ground; and although this does not make the task of providing security for EUPOL Afghanistan staff impossible,¹⁴ it is hardly a long-term solution.

Assessing the chance for success: conditions on the ground

Given the challenges for inter-institutional cooperation and a growing profile for EU crisis management that arise out of the security situation in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that it is exactly these testing conditions that set strict parameters of what the EU can hope to accomplish on the ground. There are several key challenges contained in the current mission design: one, co-locating personnel, given the numbers involved but also the environment in

which co-location is to take place, may not be sufficient. Second, it is doubtful what sort of impact the ESDP operation could have on local policing culture. And third, given public perceptions of the Afghan police, which is all too often seen as the problem rather than the solution to improving the rule of law, the ESDP operation faces an up-hill task in fostering effective policing. Challenges thus include establishing working relationships in an environment that is not likely to welcome ESDP as EUPOL Afghanistan is likely to confront vested interests; developing police reform among the Afghan community; and strengthening local ownership.

Challenges to the rule of law – let alone a functioning state – include security, governance, corruption, narcotics and economic development. These are interlinked and overlapping challenges facing the establishment not only of rule of law but also institution building more broadly (which also forms the overall context of this particular mission). And one has to ask what is achievable for ESDP within but also beyond the three-year commitment for the current operation. Analysts note that President Karzai has not succeeded in gaining credibility and legitimacy among the general population and is instead dependent on the international community to enforce his acceptance – which does not significantly extend beyond Kabul. While there has been progress in building formal institutions of government, these institutions are not functioning; and 93% of the budget is financed through external sources, meaning that Afghanistan runs the risk of being permanently dependent on international aid.¹⁵ Linked to the governance and security issues is the drug trade, which has developed into a 'systemic destabilizing factor'¹⁶. Accordingly, when discussing the possibility for Afghanistan's development, an EU official recently noted that currently Afghanistan is 'sub-Saharan Africa plus the Taliban plus drugs' and that, if in ten year's time 'the country is on par with Eastern Turkey in terms of development and Sri Lanka as far as the police/justice sector is concerned, the EU will have been successful'.¹⁷

Conclusions

This article has tried to give an overview of possible motivations behind the launch of this latest ESDP operation and the challenges that EUPOL Afghanistan will face. Among the key challenges are coordination with other international actors; making the EU's efforts visible; and building institutions and improving the rule of law. A conceptual question,

moreover, is the future trajectory of ESDP operations, particularly in civilian crisis management: EUPOL Afghanistan moves ESDP beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the Western Balkans and the declared priority area of sub-Saharan Africa towards a more challenging undertaking with different geopolitical implications. While the operation is too small to constitute a balancing move on the part of Europe in geo-strategic terms, EUPOL Afghanistan poses the question of how successfully this operation will serve to put the EU on the map as a global – rather than just a regional – security provider.◇

¹ K-P. Klaiber, 'The European Union in Afghanistan: Lessons learned', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 7-11.

² On member state foreign policy towards Afghanistan see E. Gross, 'Germany and European Security and Defense Cooperation: the Europeanization of national crisis management policies?', *Security Dialogue*, 2007 forthcoming.

³ On this point see S. Biscop, 'The Ambiguous Ambition: the Development of the EU Security Architecture', paper presented at the colloquium on 'The EC/EU: A World Security Actor?', Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 15 September 2006.

⁴ Although it did not lead to a large enough mission in the eyes of some, including EUSR Francesc Vendrell – indicating another instance of the capability-expectations gap that has plagued EU foreign and security policy since its inception. See 'ESDP Mission: EU Police Mission to Afghanistan Operational by 17 June', *European Report*, 31 May 2007.

⁵ European Union Factsheet. EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). May 2007

⁶ Council of the European Union, 'Report following the Joint EU Assessment Mission on the rule of law in Afghanistan between 10-21 September 2006', doc 13967/06 EXT 1, 15 January 2007.

⁷ Interview with EU official, Brussels, September 2006.

⁸ Interview with policy expert, Brussels June 2007.

⁹ UNAMA website http://www.unama-afg.org/about/_ss/Security_Sector.htm

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 'ESDP Mission: EU Police Mission to Afghanistan Operational by 17 June', *European Report*, 31 May 2007.

¹² International Crisis Group, *Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role*, Asia Report No. 107, 30 November 2005.

¹³ Natalia Touzovskaia, 'EU-NATO Relations: How Close to "Strategic Partnership"?', *European Security*, vol. 15, no. 3, 2006, pp. 235-58.

¹⁴ For instance, intelligence can be exchanged within member states, thereby by-passing the EU-NATO impasse. Interview with member state official, July 2007.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Citha D. Maas, 'Afghanistan: Staatsaufbau ohne Staat', SWP-Studie, February 2007.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ EPC Policy Dialogue 'Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan: challenges for the EU'. Brussels, 5 June 2007

Unnecessary Duplications: The EU-3 and the Future of ESDP¹

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The evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been swift and continuous since the summit in Saint Malo in 1998, but marked with several preconditions from the very beginning. These were partly set outside the European Union, such as the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's 'three Ds'. Others were imposed by the EU and its member states themselves. All texts and settlements in the area of the ESDP have contained restrictions, which can be seen in the very same documents that gave the first impetus to the establishment of the ESDP, including the Saint Malo declaration.

One of these sets out that European capabilities should be enhanced without 'unnecessary duplications, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU'.² The meaning of this term remains open to interpretation, because none of the later ESDP documents elaborates on it. 'To duplicate' means according to the Compact Oxford English Dictionary 'to do something again unnecessarily'.³ The member states are thus required not to set up assets that already are at the disposal of either NATO or the WEU. This seems logical because duplication would drain the already tight European defence budgets.

However, the adjective 'unnecessary' suggests that there are two types of duplications – unnecessary that should be precluded, and necessary that contrary to the definition are not superfluous and could or even should be acquired. Otherwise, the word 'unnecessary' would only duplicate the word 'duplication'. Both types of potential or existing duplications are to be found in the architecture of the ESDP. No one has made the case against the concurrent existence of the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee. Yet the 2003 proposal for an independent EU operational planning and command centre encountered furious opposition and was regarded by many as superfluous.

Although left aside by politicians, the exact definition of what is still necessary and what is not is of a crucial significance. The member states' position on what is necessary to duplicate results from their conception of the *finalité* of the

ESDP and its relationship to NATO, even if this is not formulated directly. Studying their visions may help to identify possible future controversies. Although many actors influence the development of the ESDP, the member states retain a privileged position. In practice, moreover, the big three – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – play a decisive role.⁴ They are seen as representatives of the main views among countries that are members of both NATO and the EU. This article considers the views of the big three, regarding four types of duplication.

There are various NATO roles and assets that the ESDP can duplicate set down by the NATO documents, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance's Strategic Concept or the Prague Capabilities Commitment. They can be grouped under four general headings: mutual defence commitment, transatlantic dialogue, troops and equipment, and planning and command.

Duplication of mutual defence commitments

None of the big three casts doubt on the mutual defence in NATO. The Alliance is seen as the 'guarantor of the collective security of the allies'.⁵ But their views differ on its parallel placement in European treaties. Once opened up for discussion during the Convention on the Future of Europe, it became a highly controversial topic.

The joint German-French contribution to the convention working group on defence proposed enhanced cooperation, which could include a mutual defence commitment. The proposal was denounced by one British representative as 'duplicat[ing] the work of NATO and add[ing] nothing to the real security of European states'. She insisted that defence guarantees should remain with the 'organisation equipped to deliver them with integrated military forces – that is, NATO'.⁶

As a matter of fact, the compromise reached at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2003 went even further than the Franco-German proposal had suggested. It incorporated the mutual defence clause right into the text of the first, constitutional part of the Treaty. According to Article I-41(7), 'if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power'. This turns the European Union into a defence organisation. At the same time,

according to the next paragraph, the commitment should be 'consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation'. Thus, in practice, the constitution takes over the model of the WEU. British politicians regard the compromise as their victory, because the treaty explicitly contains NATO's collective defence role for the first time.⁷

Duplication of the transatlantic dialogue

NATO has evolved into the primary forum for transatlantic security dialogue. The possibility of dropping it for some other form of cooperation would have never been raised, had the then German Chancellor Schröder not suggested that it was 'no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies' and called for a new solution.⁸ However, his own government abandoned the idea very quickly and for the new Chancellor, NATO is 'the centre of security policy dialogue in the Atlantic framework'.⁹

Whereas the British are content with the present form of the transatlantic dialogue and concentrate on practical EU-NATO coordination, France would like to modify the current state of affairs. NATO should provide a forum for 'strategic partnership between Europe and the United States in the framework of the Alliance'.¹⁰ In this form, NATO would turn into a parallel of the EU-US summits that increasingly touch upon security issues, such as the China arms embargo.

Duplication of troops and equipment

Both NATO and the EU have been adapting to the new security threats and challenges over the past few years, which require deployable rapid reaction forces with high-tech equipment and support. Both organisations have created plans for new forces as well as coordinated procurement.

Regarding troops, all three countries participate in the creation of the EU battle groups as well as the NATO Response Force (NRF). For all of them, the soldiers committed originate in a 'single set of forces', thus preventing duplication.¹¹ This is particularly remarkable in the case of France, which has been outside the NATO military structure since 1966, but makes up some 13 per cent of the NRF manpower.¹²

Similarly, the capabilities development processes of both organisations have been coordinated since the very beginning. This has been extremely

important for the British, but reflected by others too. Germany has, for example, chaired the working groups on combat search and rescue as well as strategic airlift under both NATO and ESDP. The European Defence Agency, responsible for enhancing armaments cooperation in the EU and supported by representatives of all three states, has also relied on the work of the EU/NATO Capability Group.¹³

Duplication of planning and command

The ESDP was given two possibilities for planning and commanding operations – under the Berlin Plus framework at NATO's SHAPE, and by national headquarters. In 2003, a third option was created on the EU level as a result of fierce discussions between the UK on one side and Germany and France on the other: the establishment of an EU planning cell within SHAPE and a civil/military planning cell in the EU Military Staff.

The compromise had been preceded by a proposal by Germany and France (among others) for a new EU operation planning centre in Tervuren, Belgium. Although defended by the promoters as a way to approximate national assets, and thus 'limiting national unnecessary duplications',¹⁴ for the opponents it constituted an unnecessary duplication of SHAPE.¹⁵

The proposal for the Tervuren centre would have not provoked such a discussion, had it not been put forward just after the clash over the invasion of Iraq and interpreted as an attack against NATO. The centre had already been proposed by Mr Chirac one year before without any notice¹⁶ and could have been easily refused during the Convention or the subsequent IGC. Moreover, as early as 2000, the UK had assumed that 'in the long run, some less ad hoc collective capability for operational planning and command at the strategic level could have to be developed within the EU' for non-Berlin Plus operations.¹⁷ This is also reflected in the compromise solution. As a matter of fact, the EU planning cell constitutes a duplication of SHAPE, even if smaller than the proposed planning centre. Thus, even the UK accepts the necessity of duplication in planning on the EU level.

The future of the ESDP – disputes ahead?

The EU-3 have a great influence on the shaping of the ESDP. Where they reach a compromise, other member states are likely to accept it

without major changes, as was the case of the dispute over planning in 2003. But where they do not share views, any progress is condemned to be slow or non-existent. The notion of 'unnecessary duplication' is omnipresent in the ESDP debate, even if it lacks clear definition. What the EU-3 jointly regards as necessary duplication will be set up. What one of them considers to be unnecessary duplication will provoke disputes when put on the negotiation table.

In the area of mutual defence, the compromise reached at the IGC in 2003 will be kept in any other future version of the treaty. It strengthens the European commitment as promoted by France and former German government. At the same time, it confirms the priority of the NATO commitment as wanted by the British (and probably would be by the current German government if there was a need for them to express any position). NATO would remain the ultimate defence provider, but the ESDP could evolve in all spheres of military cooperation if the member states so decide.

A parallel dialogue to NATO in the form of EU-US summits has already been present for some time. Yet, NATO is seen as the primary forum for consultations. Disputes may appear if France continues to press for 'the EU's voice to be heard within the Alliance'.¹⁸ However, the French do not want less NATO, just more Europe. This cannot be reached without a prior consensus within the EU which cannot be imposed. A single EU voice is improbable without some form of majority voting in the External Relations Council and this has been plainly rejected so far, not only by the UK but also by many other member states.

The 'single set of forces' should preclude any unnecessary duplications in troops and their equipment. However, what happens if the troops are necessary in both a NATO-led and an EU-led operation? The UK and Germany endorse the priority of a NATO decision.¹⁹ This is not clear from the French discourse. According to Mr Chirac, 'it is the interest of the French and the Europeans to be able to decide on their own destiny and to have the capacity to act jointly without depending necessarily on decisions taken elsewhere'.²⁰ If this means a French aspiration to create an autonomous European capacity without cooperation with NATO, some duplication in troops and equipment would be inevitable. This would become a stumbling block in the development of the ESDP for the UK.

We can expect the issue of operational planning to come to the fore again in the future. The 2003

compromise did not accommodate the main argument of the Tervuren proposal – the need to reduce duplication among the EU member states.

Moreover, SHAPE is a purely military headquarters. But the main added value of the European Union's crisis management is not the fact that it will share the burden with the US, but civil-military coordination. NATO is ill-designed for such coordination at the moment. Even the British see civilian crisis management as 'no small benefit that the EU can bring'.²¹ Mr Struck turned around the traditional view on EU-NATO relations suggesting that 'NATO should be able to access specific means and capabilities of the European Union'.²² This may be another reason why the British actually allowed some, even if restricted, duplication of planning in 2003. Civil-military cooperation will make the European planning capabilities a necessary duplication, if NATO does not adapt and take over the civilian area first. This is, however, part of a wider, transatlantic debate. ♦

¹ This paper is a shorter version of a contribution for the Third EU-CONSENT PhD School, 'The CFSP/ESDP: Effective Multilateralism?', organised in Cambridge, UK in April 2007.

² Joint declaration, British-French summit, Saint Malo, 3-4 December 1998.

³ *Compact Oxford English Dictionary*; available online at www.askoxford.com.

⁴ See, for example, Christopher Hill, 'The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy', *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2006, pp. 1-4; and Bastian Giegerich, 'E3 Leadership in Security and Defence Policy', *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2006, pp. 5-7.

⁵ Jacques Chirac, 'Europe must shoulder its share of the Nato burden', *The Guardian*, 28 November 2006.

⁶ Paper by Ms Gisela Stuart, The European Convention Working Group VIII, Working document 23.

⁷ Speech of Baroness Symons at Rippon Group Meeting, London, 28 October 2004, available at www.fco.gov.uk (accessed 25 March 2007).

⁸ Speech by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the opening of the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 12 February 2005, available at www.bundesregierung.de (accessed 1 April 2007).

⁹ Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Tagung 'Impulse 21 – Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik', Berlin, 10 November 2006, available at www.bundeskanzlerin.de (accessed 17 March 2007).

¹⁰ Conférence de presse conjointe de M. Jacques Chirac Président de la République, de M. Guy Verhofstadt Premier ministre du royaume de Belgique de M. Gerhard Schröder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de M. Jean-Claude Juncker Premier ministre du Grand Duché du Luxembourg à l'issue de la réunion concernant la Défense européenne, Brussels, 29 April 2003, available at www.elysee.fr (accessed 1 April 2007).

¹¹ Eröffnungsrede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck, auf dem 2. Europäischen Verteidigungskongress, Berlin, 9 December 2003, available at www.bmvg.de (accessed 20 March 2007); and

Government press briefing by the Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, November 2002, available at www.pm.gov.uk (accessed 17 March 2007).

¹² French contribution to NATO, homepage of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr (accessed 6 April 2007).

¹³ Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, Art. 5; and 'Defining the EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)', Council document no. 6805/03, 26 February 2003.

¹⁴ Conférence de presse conjointe de M. Jacques Chirac Président de la République, de M. Guy Verhofstadt Premier ministre du royaume de Belgique de M. Gerhard Schröder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de M. Jean-Claude Juncker Premier ministre du Grand Duché du Luxembourg à l'issue de la réunion concernant la Défense européenne, op. cit.

¹⁵ 'Diplomatic warfare breaks out in Nato', *BBC News*, 30 April 2003, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2989023.stm> (accessed 9 May 2006).

¹⁶ Discours de M. Jacques Chirac à Strasbourg (prononcé dans le cadre de la campagne pour l'élection présidentielle), Strasbourg, 6 March 2002, available at www.elysee.fr (accessed 1 April 2004).

¹⁷ 'Military bodies in the European Union and the planning and conduct of EU-led military operations', in Maartje Rutten, ed., *From St-Malo to Nice. European Defence: Core Documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Paris: WEU ISS, 2001, pp. 99-100.

¹⁸ Jacques Chirac, 'Europe must shoulder its share of the Nato burden', op. cit.

¹⁹ Compare then Secretary of State, FCO at the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 November 2002, available at www.parliament.uk (accessed 21 March 2007) and Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Eröffnung des Internationalen Bertelsmann Forums, 22 September 2006, available at www.bundeskanzlerin.de (accessed 17 March 2007).

²⁰ Entretien de M. Jacques Chirac Président de la République, 'Armées aujourd'hui', December 1999/January 2000, available at www.elysee.fr (accessed 1 April 2007).

²¹ Keynote speech by the Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, Royal United Services Institute, London, 28 November 2001, available at www.fco.gov.uk (accessed 25 March 2007).

²² Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck, auf der Konferenz 'NATO 2020: Kommende Bedrohungen und Herausforderungen und die Zukunft der transatlantischen Sicherheitskooperation', Berlin, 11 May 2005, available at www.bmvg.de (accessed 20 March 2007).

With the EU, Without the EU and by Itself: Italy Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall¹

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Looking back at Italy's post-1989 foreign policy and its ties to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a trend towards more self-reliant foreign action seems to emerge. This perception does not contradict the argument advanced in 2001 by Hill and Andreatta that Italy has not taken the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War for rethinking and self-examination.² The process of self-examination has been long and is still underway. The perception also does not oppose the idea that Rome fears exclusion from the core of the European Union (EU) and marginalisation. Fears of being considered a second-rank country have been encouraging a more participative stance from Italy in the international arena.

The relationship between domestic and foreign policies is complex, and the question of what freedom the international order allows a state like Italy to follow its own path is even more problematic. Simplifying the problems, 1989 had many implications for Italy: among them, externally, no longer being on the south flank of NATO, and domestically, being set free from the 'conventio ad excludendum' which prevented the principal party of the left (the Communist party) from participating in governing the country.³

The extent to which Italy was no longer under the protection of the NATO umbrella in a bipolar world imposed on the government the question of how to qualify itself through presence and hard work with regard to the security problem. Membership was no longer enough.⁴ Domestically, consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall were visible in the conduct of the clean hands enquiry, which some recognise as giving life to the Second Republic in 1994. These events occurred in a period characterised by great evolution in the European system, including the development of the CFSP. This article examines Italy's post-Cold War foreign policy within and outside the framework of the Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. It defends the view that a new trend of more self-reliant foreign action by Italy is emerging.

Activism in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall

Despite the failure of the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, Italy in the early 1990s showed a tendency towards a more robust policy. This approach ranged from the participation in the first Iraq war in 1991 to the intervention in Somalia in 1992, in Mozambique the following year and in the patrolling of the Adriatic sea, and the offer of its bases to NATO for air strikes on Bosnia in 1994.

Confident action was noted in the 1994-95 government (Berlusconi) with Antonio Martino as Foreign Minister, and in the 1996-98 government (Prodi). Remarkable was the reaction⁵ of the government when it was humiliated by two apparent setbacks, the exclusions first from the Contact Group over Bosnia (1994) and second from the proposal to reform the United Nations Security Council which contemplated the representation of Germany and Japan and not of Italy. The nervousness about Italian exclusion from an inner group dynamic in EU decision-making caused the Italian call for more European unity and cohesion among member states. The successful leadership operation in Albania⁶ in 1997 was another sign of the new-found self-confidence in dealing with multilateral projects. Joint actions in the Western Balkans region are a typical case study of Europeanisation on national positions.⁷ Italy advanced its national interests in an undisturbed and stable eastern neighbourhood, in controlling transnational criminality and arms trade and clandestine migration through the EU framework.

Italy's position favouring EU enlargement has been noteworthy. The government's attitude to Turkey was characterised by solidarity. During the extraordinary summit in Luxembourg in October 2005, Prime Minister Berlusconi was in phone contact with Austria's Chancellor Schussel, with Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan and with Foreign Minister Fini to defend the cause of Turkey's entry. In the same period during a visit to Rome of Romania's Prime Minister Tariceanu, a warm welcome was offered to that country, together with full support of its accession to the EU. With Russia, the government entertained assiduous relations, the Prime Minister declaring in February 2005 that friendship with Putin was a resourceful factor for the EU and the US, and that it should lead member states to think seriously about accepting Russia within the Union.⁸

With the EU and the Alliance

At Maastricht, in European defence and security policy, Italy supported the integrationist force within the EU and also maintained a pro-Atlantic stance. It strongly defended the idea that the EU should become the protagonist of an autonomous defence capacity within NATO. At the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999, the Italians supported the construction of the EU's defence dimension without prejudicing NATO's central role in the new architecture. In Cologne, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini declared that 'NATO remains the axis of the system of collective defence, whereas the EU needs to organise itself in an autonomous way in relation to the Petersberg tasks'.⁹

Decision-making in the EU in security and defence was a complex aspect of Italy's national foreign policy. Political, military and economic factors, the last linked to the military industry, were intertwining with solutions which needed to be agreed by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries. The government had however started to tackle some of the burdensome questions, and a few changes in attitudes and a budget allocation were agreed. A professional army was set up, and military commitments taken within the multilateral framework as noted above. Italian legislation on the arms trade was brought into line with EU norms,¹⁰ suggesting more determination towards becoming a security producer.

Italy has participated in several military operations, as well as police missions under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), deploying 40,000 military personnel for peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, from the Balkans to Iraq and Sudan. In 2005, Prime Minister Berlusconi affirmed that Italy was among the countries most active in missions authorised by the UN Security Council.¹¹ In 2006 Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini stated that the coexistence of the Italian-led NATO and EU missions in the Balkans was the demonstration of how relations between the EU and the Alliance were increasingly heading towards a rational division of tasks.¹² More recently, in August 2006, Italy contributed 3,000 troops to strengthen the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Foreign Minister D'Alema was considered the driving influence behind making Italy's the largest western input to the force. In March 2007, the Foreign Minister unveiled his interest in utilising EU battle groups as specialised fixed units, employable by the UN, while continuing to favour solid EU-NATO

cooperation.

Italy then made clear that its newly awarded seat (October 2006) as non-permanent member at the UN Security Council was to be used not to feed Italy's temptations of national foreign policy, but to 'maximise the aggregate weight of the EU'.¹³ In May 2007 Prodi urged the EU to play a decisive role in the multilateral task of creating and distributing well-being in the south.¹⁴ A more decisive and consistent policy by EU and NATO forces in difficult regions would possibly follow.

But at times, an assertive national voice from the government was also apparent, as when, in 2002, Prime Minister Berlusconi pulled the country out of the military cargo plane project for the EU's rapid reaction force, the A400M. The declaration in 2002 of Justice Minister Roberto Castelli from the Northern League withholding the approval of the European arrest warrant was indicative of governmental action unknown to integrationist Italy. The imposition of the veto was employed for pursuing policy together with Italian interests. Only in 2005 the government adopted the European law, the last EU state to reconcile national policy with EU directives. The non-adherence to this norm, envisaged after September 2001 to implement EU action against terrorism, was considered by Brussels a serious deficit of integration.¹⁵

With the EU on the Mediterranean (but also without the EU)

Positions on security in the Mediterranean are highlighted by the Italian insistence at the 1992 Lisbon European Council that the Mediterranean be among the areas where CFSP joint actions would be conducted. Later, the government found ways to enhance the economic and security aspects foreseen in the 1995 Barcelona process, when during its 2003 Council Presidency it sponsored a ministerial meeting among the delegates of Mediterranean countries in Naples.¹⁶ A few substantial results were obtained by that policy, such as the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures. Another positive conclusion was the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility and Partnership, and the other achievement was the institution of a new Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly with consultative functions, formed by 240 representatives of 37 Mediterranean countries.¹⁷

The government argued it was trying to encourage EU action through its contacts with the Libyan leader Ghaddafi for the control of illegal migration

from Sudan, Chad and Niger towards the EU (Aeneas).¹⁸ The government's dealings with Libya were also led by the wider task of convincing its leader to join the group of states combating global terrorism, and by the government's aspiration to include Libya in the Barcelona process. In fact, important advances to normalise western relations with Libya were produced by Italy together with the other member states, which induced Ghaddafi to recognise a role in the Lockerbie bombing in 2004. The latter action opened the way to Ghaddafi's visit to Brussels, and to the EU finally lifting economic sanctions.

That the Mediterranean always occupies Italian politicians' minds, also for reasons of energy supply, was again apparent when, in May 2007, the newly elected French President Sarkozy declared his preference for guiding the EU to institutionalise a stronger and more resourceful partnership with regard to the non-EU Mediterranean countries. Sarkozy promptly communicated his plan to Chancellor Angela Merkel to show Germany one of the directions France will lead the European club.¹⁹ On more than one occasion, at that time, Prodi reaffirmed the Italian determination to make clear what the Mediterranean represents for the EU, and to give the Mediterranean a priority among the EU's tasks. It remains to be seen how smoothly and cooperatively they will be able to act together towards new definitions of the partnership.

Continuity and change

Italy's foreign policy cannot be described as disengaged, inattentive, unreactive and uncreative. It has demonstrated confidence in using various frameworks, with the EU and with NATO, with the Union alone, and by itself. The Mediterranean remains a focal point, at least for security purposes including illegal migration, and above all for the closeness of the gas and oil sources. In this area foreign policy gave evidence of some creativity, such as when it sponsored the Forum in Alexandria, the ministerial meeting in Naples, and the initiatives of Dialogue among cultures and investment facilities.

Three main points distinguish some different features of policy. First, being part of Europe continues to stand as a solid political programme, as it was during the terms in office of Berlusconi and Fini, and in particular of Prodi's Europhile team. Berlusconi brought to the fore of Italian politics some modest attempts at affirming national interests at the

EU level, while Prodi preferred to show his European leadership. In Berlin in May 2007, Prime Minister Prodi told the Germans that because of the part Italy played in the past and is continuing to play today, the Italians and the Germans together have the historical and moral duty to take on the responsibility to restart the process of political and institutional integration.²⁰

Second, setting the same value on the European integration project as on the Atlantic Alliance is another strong continuing element of policy, as noted in the weight given to NATO as the spine of collective defence, as well as to the EU to structure itself with more autonomous security operations.

Third, there have been changes in the attitudes towards re-locating Italy at the international level. Policy on commitments abroad in multilateral frameworks including the CFSP and the ESDP is building up a trend in which Italy is taking on more responsibilities. Berlusconi operated to make Italy one of the most active countries in peace-keeping missions, and Prodi's present government mobilised Italian troops to the Middle East. Italy was famously a security consumer but at this moment it is showing to be qualifying itself through presence and hard work. The promptness to intervene in Lebanon has surprised some other member states.²¹ This new dynamism seems to be constructing a more responsive actor.

In conclusion, the end of the bipolar world has created greater room for Italy to be more receptive to changes in approach. However, the relationship between domestic and foreign policies can affect the future trend of external action, and similarly developments in the international order can influence Italy's presence in multilateral initiatives. Whether the country will continue to aim at a more consistent actorness is something to be assessed in the future.◊

¹ This piece has elements in common with a book chapter published in 2006 by Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle, in *Italy and EPC* by the present author.

² Christopher Hill and Filippo Andreatta, 'Struggling to Change: the Italian State and the New Order', in Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds.), *Rethinking European Order. West European Responses, 1989-97*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 263.

³ For a current political view on the *conventio ad excludendum* see Barbara Spinelli, 'La questione comunista', *La Stampa* 14 May 2006.

⁴ Beniamino Andreatta, *Una politica estera per l'Italia*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), p. 349. Andreatta was Italy's Foreign Minister between April 1993 and 1994, during Ciampi's government.

⁵ See the analysis of Dassú and Menotti on the government's reaction. Marta Dassú and Roberto Menotti, 'The Ratification of NATO Enlargement - The Case of Italy', in Simon Serfaty and Stephen Cambone (eds.), *NATO Enlargement. The National Debates over Ratification*. Academic Forum Conferences, 1997. <http://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/dassmeno.htm>

⁶ Italy's guidance of Operation *Alba* in Albania is seen as a

precursor of successive ESDP missions. See Stefano Silvestri, 'The Albanian Test Case', in *The International Spectator*, no. 3, 1997. Quoted in Antonio Missiroli, 'Italy's security and defence policy - between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?' (p.17), paper presented at the Colloquium on *Italy's Approach to International Issues*, Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, 16 March 2007. See also Missiroli's previous work: 'Italy', in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

⁷ Jolyon Howorth, 'National Defence and European Security Integration: An Illusion Inside a Chimera?', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Manon (eds.), *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, (London: Routledge, 1997); Michael Smith, 'Does the Flag Follow Trade? "Politicisation" and Emergence of a European Foreign Policy', in John Peterson and Helene Sjurson (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?* (London: Routledge, 1998); Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Henrik Larsen, *Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU. The Case of Denmark*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005).

⁸ 'Adesione Turchia', 3 October 2005; 'Incontro con Romania', 12 October 2005: <http://www.palazzochigi.it/Presidente/Comunicati/dettaglio> and 'Putin risorsa per EU e US', 22 February 2005: <http://www.palazzochigi.it/Presidente/AttivitaInternazionale/dossier>

⁹ 'Il Ministro degli Esteri Lamberto Dini a Colonia', December 1998: <http://www.governo.it>; Italy was a staunch backer of the Berlin-plus package to provide the EU with access to the Alliance's operational planning and assets.

¹⁰ Paolo Rosa, 'L'europizzazione della politica estera: tra sovranazionalismo e transgovernativismo', in Sergio Fabbrini (ed.), *L'europizzazione dell'Italia*, (Bari: Laterza, 2003). Mathias Jopp, 'The Strategic Implications of European Integration', Adelphi Paper no. 290, 1994, p. 8. Ulrika Morth, 'Competing Frames in the European Commission - the Case of the Defence Industry and Equipment Issue', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 8, 2000, pp. 173-89. Italy's defence budget (which does not include the funding of international peace support operations) has decreased. In the year 2006 it was 0.84 per cent of GDP, the lowest in percentage value of the EU (Missiroli 2007, *op. cit.*, 18).

¹¹ Silvio Berlusconi, 'Intervento all'Assemblea Generale dell'ONU', September 2005:

<http://www.palazzochigi.it/Presidente/AttivitaInternazionale/dossier>. Among the missions authorised by the Security Council there was the post-war phase of Iraqi Freedom in which Italy participated, contributing with 3,500 personnel at the end of 2004. Participation was accepted because it aimed at delivering humanitarian aid and reconstruction of infrastructures, while military support to the Anglo-American military forces was not granted. In 2005 Defence Minister Antonio Martino announced the gradual withdrawal of troops by the end of 2006.

¹² Gianfranco Fini, 'NATO's role in the new Europe', English version, *La Repubblica*, 21 February 2006: <http://www.esteri.it>; Fini's declaration is notable in the light of Bonvicini's comment in 1996 on the extent to which Italy was not convinced about the appropriateness of the share of responsibilities with the USA after having experienced US leadership in operations in Bosnia and Somalia. Gianni Bonvicini, 'Regional reassertion: the dilemmas of Italy', in Christopher Hill, ed., *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 98.

¹³ Massimo D'Alema, 'Europe at 50: lessons and visions for European integration', Oxford University, 8 May 2007: http://www.esteri.it/eng/6_38_90_01.asp

¹⁴ Intervento del Presidente del Consiglio Romano Prodi a Stoccarda, 12 May 2007:

http://www.governo.it/Presidente/Interventi/dettaglio.asp?d=3_1596

¹⁵ Jorg Monar, 'Justice and Home Affairs', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Annual Review, 43 (2005), p. 141. For Berlusconi's behaviour *vis-à-vis* the European project see: Ludovica Marchi, 'Italy's European Vocation Put at Risk?', in Linda Risso and Monica Boria (eds.), *Politics and Culture in Post-War Italy*, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006).

¹⁶ Gianni Bonvicini, 1996, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Francesco Morata, 'La presidenza italiana dell'Unione europea: un semestre anomalo', in Vincent DellaSala and Sergio Fabbrini (eds.), *Politica in Italia. I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), p. 161.

¹⁷ Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU policy in the Mediterranean, 2003:

http://www.esteri.it/eng/4_27_58_52.asp

¹⁸ David Allen and Michael Smith, 'External Policy Developments', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Annual Review, 43 (2005), p. 119.

¹⁹ *Financial Times*, 16 May 2007.

²⁰ 'Intervento di Prodi', 17 May 2007:

<http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/prodi-merkel-eu50.78>
<http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/prodi-merkel-eu50.78/>

²¹ *Financial Times*, 27 September 2006.

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