Note from the Editor
Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

Three key topics regarding EU foreign policy are covered in this issue of CFSP Forum: EU policy towards the Middle East, research on the EU-UN relationship, and the impact of enlargement on the CFSP. Sven Biscop argues that the EU needs to exercise more leadership with respect to the Middle East. Robert Kissack then analyses different ways of researching the EU’s visibility at the United Nations. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet reports on the findings of a major research project on the impact of the 2004 enlargement on European foreign, security and defence policy.

Europe and the Middle East: Time to Resume Leadership – Including Towards the US

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After mediation by Saudi Arabia, Fatah and Hamas reach an agreement to create a government of national unity, which hopefully will end intra-Palestinian strife. A bomb attack in Lebanon demonstrates once again how fragile the situation in the country remains ever since the 2006 war. A leaked memo of Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, explicitly states that sanctions alone will not solve the Iranian issue.

Three recent news items from the Middle East, all of which raise the same question: what is the EU doing about it?

The EU has assumed leadership. The ‘EU3’ (France, Germany and the UK) led negotiations with Iran. In mutual agreement EU member states sent nearly 8000 blue helmets for a reinforced UNIFIL to Lebanon. The EU also achieved some success. For a while Iran did suspend enrichment. But then negotiations broke down and sanctions were adopted. By themselves, the sanctions will not automatically lead to a resolution. And where will the EU be if someone else opts for a military solution? The Lebanese army supported by UNIFIL now guards the border with Israel, rather than the Hezbollah militias. But that does not mean that Lebanon has been stabilized. Where will UNIFIL be if things escalate? These European successes are thus very

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precarious. Without adequate follow-up, failure is almost certain.

The EU seems already to have forgotten its earlier leadership role however. At the December 2006 European Council, the EU returned to the habitual declaration, ‘calling for’, ‘urging’ and ‘inviting’, but without announcing any initiative. Above all, it is up to the EU therefore to resume the initiative.

Evidently, any European initiative would be greatly strengthened if it could be taken jointly with the US. In Washington just as in Brussels the latest signs do not, however, lend themselves to hope. Even before its release in December 2006, the long-awaited Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq was downplayed by the White House as just one report among others. In spite of its calls to engage with Syria and Iran, the main thrust of the ‘new’ strategy for Iraq announced by President Bush in January 2007 was augmenting the number of American forces, while surprisingly threatening language was used vis-à-vis Damascus and Tehran – just the opposite of the recommendations. At the end of February the US did agree to participate in a conference called by the Iraqi government at which Iran and Syria would also be represented. But simultaneously with this potential diplomatic opening rumours about a pending military strike continue to fly in Washington. The US has taken action on Israel-Palestine, but its idea of financing a build-up of President Abbas’ security forces could only fuel the intra-Palestinian violence – and left the field free for Saudi Arabia to take the initiative. Further afield, the US supports the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces in order to restore the Interim Government against the so-called Islamic Courts, deemed to be linked with al-Qaeda.

US persistence in a Manichean worldview leaves little room for the grand bargain with the EU that ideally would be forged. Clearly, the EU objectives to stabilize the Middle East according to its own principles and priorities and to maintain good relations with the US at the same time have for now become irreconcilable. Yet, the EU cannot afford not to act on the Middle East. As a consequence of its engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, the EU has assumed responsibilities, has created expectations and has put its reputation and its troops at risk. Without follow-up, failure is certain. The clichéd image of a powerless EU will once again be confirmed. Without action in support of its own strategy, the EU will suffer by association with the confrontational US strategy.

Since an a priori EU-US grand bargain is not possible, there is but one choice left: the EU must resume the initiative, even if for a while that implies more difficult relations with the US – in that way only are innovative policies possible. If EU initiatives create progress, the US can be brought on board in a later stage – just as happened on Iran in the beginning.

Components of this EU initiative must be:

- Actively facilitating and mediating domestic political dialogue in Lebanon, including with Hezbollah – with its troops on the spot, the EU cannot afford to wait and see.
- Forging a common policy on dialogue with Syria, vital to the stability of Lebanon.
- Resuming dialogue with Iran, starting from earlier ‘carrots’, building on the effect of the sanctions and planning it as a first step towards a broader regional settlement and eventually normalization of Iran’s international position, including its relations with the US – for that appears to be what Tehran is really interested in.
- Resume relations with the Palestinian government and start dialogue with Hamas – the EU must not necessarily recognize political Islam as a partner, but as an indispensable actor.
- Refraining from building up further the EU commitment in Afghanistan without a thorough review of the long-term strategy vis-à-vis the country and without a transatlantic consensus on strategy for the broader region, for Afghanistan cannot be seen in isolation – it is no use pouring troops and money into the country if the region around it descends into turmoil.
- Stepping up consultation with the US keeping it fully informed of EU actions.

Hopefully such an EU initiative will create sufficient initial progress and thus potential for larger success to persuade the US of the need to support it – before the collapse of US policy will force it to change course.

1 This article is based on a full-length book chapter to be published in the 2007 edition of the yearbook of the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN), sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
European Union Member State Coordination in the United Nations System: How to Measure Cohesion

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A little over three years ago in January 2004, CFSP Forum was dedicated to the issue of EU member states in the United Nations. At the time the EU was on the cusp of its enlargement from 15 to 25 members, and the EU was about to shift from being a substantial part of the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG) in the UN to a cross-regional bridge, linking the WEOG, Eastern European and the Asia groups. Today, the EU stands at 27 members and, in terms of the number of votes its members cast in the United Nations, it is nearly twice the size as it was only a few years ago. The question now, as it was then, is how can the EU transform its numerical size into an influential presence in the UN system?

The answer offered in this article accepts the widely held position that the EU needs to act as a cohesive group if it is to maximise its impact on the one hand, and speak with a single voice if it is to be seen as credible on the other hand. This is not a new answer, since it follows the public declaration made by the foreign ministers of the nine member states in December 1973 in the Document on the European Identity, which inter alia called for the member states to adopt ‘common positions wherever possible in international organizations, notably the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.’

The two key variables for analysis identified by Dedring, Laatikainen and Johansson-Nogués were ‘representation’ and ‘voting cohesion’. The former includes common statements made by the Presidency of the EU Council on behalf of the EU, or by European Commission staff. Dedring cited evidence from the 2001 Swedish Presidency of over 90 common statements being issued during the first semester Presidency, while Laatikainen presented data on the number of common statements and documents presented to the General Assembly and the Security Council between 1990 and 2000.

Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués’ article looked at the level of voting cohesion between EU member states in roll-call votes in the UN General Assembly during the 1990s and compared it to the voting patterns of the ten accession states that joined in May 2004. According to game theory modelling, the likelihood of sustaining the level of cohesion achieved in the late 1990s decreases as the size of the EU increases. However, contrary to this hypothesis, patterns of voting data suggest that the eight CEEC states, Cyprus and Malta have been on a converging path for a decade.

Analysing voting records as a measurement of cohesion has been used by other scholars looking at EU member state voting behaviour for a number of years. The approach has a number of strengths but a number of significant weaknesses too, which ultimately render it unsatisfactory for detailed analysis of EU member state behaviour. I will briefly list four strengths and four weaknesses of this approach.

The first strength of studying voting cohesion comes from the voting data itself. The information is reliable and easily available through public records of the proceedings in UN organisations, and is extremely easy to read in its tabulated format. Secondly it is consistent over time and gives the opportunity to compile data over a long period, such as Hurwitz’s survey between 1946 and 1975, or Johansson-Nogués’ survey between 1970 and 2000.

The third strength is that it is well suited to statistical analysis because voting cohesion can be given as a percentage of all votes, and can be viewed over time to identify periods of greater (or lesser) cohesion. Looking at the behaviour of individual EU member states is also possible, identifying which states are most likely to break voting cohesion, during which periods and over which issues. Finally, building on this last point, it is possible to identify the key issues that break EU voting cohesion. The surveys cited in endnote 4 identify inter alia the Arab-Israeli dispute in the 1970s, the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1980s, and nuclear testing in the 1990s.

There are also a number of weaknesses regarding the study of EU member states’ voting cohesion. The first is that privileging voting cohesion as the most important variable being studied means that
there is little or no consideration of what the EU member states are voting on, and what their common position is. More emphasis is placed on speaking as one than on what they say, or where they stand in relation to the rest of the UN. The second weakness is that it ignores the type of vote being cast. Can one attribute equal significance to voting ‘for’ and ‘against’ a motion, as well as abstaining from voting? Abstentions are cast when a government wants to appear impartial or when a diplomat has not received instructions on how to vote. However, abstentions can also be strategic votes to prevent quorums being reached and prevent motions being passed. In the latter case an abstention is a political vote and can be argued to have equal significance to either a vote for or a vote against. Thirdly, no consideration can be made of how difficult it was to reach a common position. Juergen Dedring notes in another paper that it may be more insightful to study when EU member states vote separately than when they vote cohesively because such cases show the limitations of coordination.

The final weakness concerns the reliability of measuring voting cohesion as a proxy of volitional action by the EU member states. Katie Verlin Laatikainen points out in her Forum article that the European Commission claimed EU member states voted cohesively in over 95% of votes, but that this figure included the votes decided by consensus. Laatikainen argues that these votes should be discounted because when so many UN members vote the same way, little or no significance can be attributed to EU membership as a determinant of EU member state behaviour. The same argument can be extended to voting cohesion in general. Without evidence of coordination having taken place prior to the vote, can we be sure that what is being observed is purposeful cohesive action, or simply coincidental patterns of behaviour? Given the similarity among EU member states, the likelihood of them voting in a similar manner is very high.

My proposed solution is to pay more attention to EU representation through common statements, or what I suggest calling ‘declaratory cohesion’. As above, I will briefly set out four strengths of this approach, as well as a couple of weaknesses that illustrate that this is not a panacea for the problem of measuring EU coordination. The first and most important strength is the ‘concrete’ linkage between declaratory cohesion and coordination, since no common statement in the name of the EU is sanctioned without prior agreement by the member states. This means that when we find evidence of declaratory cohesion, we can be sure that it is the product of EU coordination. The second strength is that through reading common statements made in the name of the EU, the researcher is able to gain a better understanding of the ease or difficulty of reaching a common statement. Based on this point, it is possible to identify an acquis politique emerging over time through the incremental development of EU representation, both in its scope and depth. The final strength of looking at declaratory cohesion is that it gives information about which non-EU states align themselves with EU positions. Voting records alone do not provide insight into the wider coordination of ‘like-minded’ states.

Turning to the weaknesses, the first is that uncovering data on EU representation is far more time consuming than looking at voting records, and is yet more time consuming if the researcher attempts to gather qualitative data on the content of common statements. The second weakness of this approach is the possibility of inaccurate reporting by the UN secretariat responsible for minuting discussions. Given that a central tenet of the analytical approach is identifying when an intervention is made in the name of the EU, any failure to attribute the correct authorship to a statement can lead to inaccurate results.

Where does this discussion lead us? The conclusion I want to draw from this is that the real object of study is neither voting cohesion nor declaratory cohesion, but in fact EU member state coordination, which is capable of generating three volitional outputs. The first is to issue a joint statement in the name of the EU, and represents declaratory cohesion. The second is for all EU member states to vote in unison in either a roll-call or consensus vote, and represents voting cohesion. The third is to agree not to act together, and represents non-cohesion. To what extent can we refer to this third scenario as an ‘output’ at all? There are two reasons why the failure to produce an output does not mean we can afford to disregard the process that attempted to bring an output about. The first is that a considerable amount of time may have been spent trying to arrive at either a declaratory or voting cohesive position, and the failure to do so raises the question of what were the opportunity costs of the attempt. The second is that successive failures to reach agreement may not be worthless if they contribute to a gradual reconciliation of divergent positions that
leads to agreement over time. This is consistent with a sociological institutional understanding of EU foreign policy making, in which learning plays an important role in the adoption of European positions.

In an ideal world the researcher would be able to witness EU coordination meetings take place, but alas that is infeasible given the number of EU coordination meetings taking place. Therefore researchers must look for proxy measurements of coordination such as the two discussed here. I argue that declaratory cohesion is the more important of the two proxies, although the third output (non-cohesive position) remains outside our remit of study.

The choice between measuring declaratory and voting cohesion need not be an either/or decision, and by measuring both, a new set of research questions opens up to us. Do EU member states speak and vote cohesively, or do they sometimes do one and not the other? In terms of quantifying change over time, is there a convergence of voting patterns prior to common statements (i.e. does voting cohesion precede declaratory cohesion) or do they occur at the same time? Comparing the two illuminates which EU member states impede common statements and what factors might trigger a change in policy (such as a change in national government). Thus by looking at the two proxies together we are able to look more closely at changes in EU member state behaviour over time and to what extent EU membership alters national interests and policies in the UN system.

1 This paper is based on a working paper of the LSE’s European Foreign Policy Unit (2007/1) European Union member state coordination in the United Nations system: towards a methodology for analysis http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EFPUworkingpaperseries.html


6 This is the case in the ILO where quorum in a record vote is two-thirds of registered voting delegates attending the annual conference. 33.4% of votes cast as abstentions will lead to a vote failing to pass, while 50.1% of votes against the motion would be needed if they were cast as ‘no’.

What Future for the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Enlargement?

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With the 2004 enlargement, new countries with new external priorities and orientations joined the EU. It is therefore most necessary to analyse the impacts of this enlargement – completed by the Romanian and Bulgarian accession to the EU in January 2007 - on the future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). To what extent will the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe support the EU's present efforts to become a strong and partly autonomous international actor? In which ways do they want these policies to develop further?

The strengthening of Europe’s CFSP and ESDP has become one of the most promising integration projects because it not only meets the ambitions of most of the (old) member states, but also responds to Europe’s responsibilities in a world marked by new security threats and by the growing negative consequences of asymmetric power distribution. The EU’s deep commitment to this task was clearly expressed in the European Security Strategy (ESS), endorsed by the European Council in December 2003. This project enjoys large support of citizens from all over the EU.1

In order to evaluate properly the impacts of recent enlargements on the possible future of CFSP and ESDP, much research has to be done because profound and comprehensive knowledge of the new member states’ concerns and expectations in foreign and security policy is an indispensable prerequisite for success. Therefore, the following remarks will try to present some findings on this most important issue. These findings have recently been published in a book entitled The Future of European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Enlargement.2

The new member states’ historical experiences and present concerns have to be taken seriously

In his opening contribution to the book, Gerhard Hafner points to the fact that CFSP and ESDP will become more complicated because the new member states ‘substantially differ in more than one aspect from the other member states’.3 According to his analysis, major differences are to be observed concerning Western values, national sovereignty and relations with third states, mainly Russia. Hafner therefore predicts a ‘possible change in the position of the EU towards Russia’. Other contributions, too, confirm the necessity to take the new member states’ specific situations into account. Thus, László J. Kiss insists strongly on the overwhelming importance the settlement of the minority problems has for Hungarian foreign policy and hence for its commitment to CFSP. Indeed, as Kiss argues, due to numerous Hungarian minorities living in surrounding countries, Hungary’s main interest in CFSP and future enlargements is all focussed on the nearby neighbourhood, advocating an ‘enlargement of enlargement’.4

But the strongest arguments for taking the new member states’ experiences and concerns seriously into account are elaborated by Gediminas Vitkus. He vividly rejects the ‘groundless myths and prejudices’ with which the new member states and specifically Lithuania are usually confronted.5 Having identified three such myths, ‘Russiaphobia, Americomania and Euroindifferentism’, Vitkus argues with regard to the first myth that Lithuania’s real fear of Russia has nothing to do with a phobia, but is – in the light of past and present Russian behaviour and the still missing sincere reconciliation with the Baltic States – the ‘result of a rational and profoundly motivated political choice’.6 Therefore, and this is true for Poland and the Czech Republic, too, the new member states’ commitment to an engagement with CFSP is largely dependent on the Union’s relations with Russia, which all of them want to become more demanding and uncompromising.

The new member states’ ‘Americomania’

It is very well established that diverging attitudes towards CFSP and ESDP stem mainly from each member state’s position concerning the role and indispensability of the United States and of NATO for their security.7 Therefore, it is no surprise to hear that the new member states have cherished – at least in the period prior to their EU accession – a ‘rigid’ understanding of the functions attributed to NATO and the EU. In their view, ‘NATO
performed the task of delivering the all-important hard-security guarantees, whilst the EU was about broader political, social and economic issues.\textsuperscript{8} Seeking first of all reliable protection against all possible attacks on their newly-gained sovereignty – the well-known argumentation goes further – this predilection for the hard-security providers NATO and the US drove the EU right away into the profound rift about Iraq and into the division of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. And this division is the most important reason for all the questioning about the future of CFDP and ESDP after enlargement. Therefore, a closer look at the new member states’ ‘Americomania’ is most interesting.

It seems indeed that these profound European misunderstandings have been provoked by the unfortunate concomitance of two distinct factors: the fear of exclusion (again), and the requirements of NATO accession. All experts from the new member states agree that their countries’ passive, defensive or even hostile attitudes towards the first efforts of the EU to shape ESDP were mainly due to the fear of being excluded again from the main decision-making structures. Poland, for example, hoped that with its NATO accession in March 1999, the country’s ‘exclusion from core decisions concerning European security were finally over. However, just three month later, it appeared that this was to be reversed when, against the backdrop of war in Kosovo, the Cologne European Council articulated plans to create an autonomous European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) as the military arm of the CFSP.\textsuperscript{9} The new member states were simply taken by surprise.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, Poland and others immediately took up the struggle for appropriate and equal involvement of non EU-European NATO member states into ESDP decision making procedures; completely in line with the US, they supported the American ‘3 D’ strategy: no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination. When through the Berlin-Plus agreement of December 2002, the participation of non EU-European NATO member states in ESDP decision making procedures; completely in line with the US, they supported the American ‘3 D’ strategy: no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination. When through the Berlin-Plus agreement of December 2002, the participation of non EU-European NATO member states in ESDP was secured, Poland’s attitude slowly began to change. Therefore, the unfortunate temporal concomitance between the first eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU’s decision to develop ESDP is to a certain amount responsible for the candidate states’ reluctance to support the latter.

A second unfortunate concomitance contributed to the profound division within Europe with regard to Iraq. Whilst Poland, through its unconditional support of the US-led war, hoped to secure its position as America’s preferred protégé and therefore signed the famous ‘letter of the eight’, other Central and East European countries found themselves in a much more uncomfortable position. Lithuania, for example, just like Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania, was not yet definitively admitted to NATO when they had to choose sides in the Iraq issue. Thus, when in February 2003, the president of the US Committee on NATO, a non-profit NGO dedicated to the promotion and expansion of NATO, urged in an e-mail that these states sign the Vilnius group’s letter of support for a US-led war against Iraq, Lithuania complied. ‘The text was non-negotiable: “take it or (do not) leave it”, the e-mail said’. The unanimous vote of the US Senate in favour of the second eastern enlargement of NATO – Vitkus presumes – would probably not have been possible without this proof of unconditional loyalty.\textsuperscript{11} It sounds like an excuse when he adds: ‘In Lithuania as, most probably, in other new member states, support for America has never been perceived as some kind of betrayal of Europe’.\textsuperscript{12}

**What support for CFSP and ESDP after the crisis?**

The findings hitherto reported all suggest that the birth of ESDP and – more precisely – the new member states’ initial reluctance towards ESDP was highly and negatively influenced by these concomitant incidents. It is therefore to be expected that after full NATO and EU accession, things could evolve. And indeed, after having shed the outsider status in ESDP, all of the new member states undertook more or less substantial policy shifts concerning CFSP and ESDP. First it is to be stressed that during the negotiations within the Constitutional Convention, all candidate states concentrated on defending the vote-weighting system of the Nice treaty which – as is generally known – privileges small or medium sized member states. Second, with regard to CFSP and ESDP matters, the candidates states’ positions in the Convention have some important points in common, but diverge significantly in others.

Thus, all of them agreed with the guidelines for the EU’s international role as decided in the ESS. When in May 2004, the General Affairs and External Relations Council endorsed the battle group concept, all new member states decided to contribute. Furthermore, all of them participated in one or more ESDP missions. Their predilection, however, went clearly towards missions following the Berlin-Plus agreement. Thus, Poland for example, voluntarily contributed, though with modest means, to...
Operation Concordia in Macedonia which was hailed as ‘the first and successful test-case of the Berlin-plus agreement’13 – but not to the EU and ESDP. The Czech Republic, too, participated in Concordia as well as to the Althea mission because both ensured ‘very close cooperation with NATO’ for which ‘Czech policy had constantly called for’.14

A further position common to all new member states is their commitment to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2002. Mainly the small or medium sized new member states, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, are heavily concentrating on this approach; these states ‘strongly supported extending the ENP to cover also the Southern Caucasus [...] in order to link those countries to the European political space’.15 It is interesting – and maybe amusing – to note that all three countries expect ENP to not only enhance their security, but also their role in foreign policy. Thus, Hungary is intending to ‘become an important partner for the EU and the United States alike’,16 and Lithuania is even dreaming of the role of a ‘leader of the region’.17 Probably due to the deep polarization that European integration encounters in the Czech Republic, Prague’s expectations seem to be more modest.18

With regard to the overall expectations concerning CFSP and ESDP, Poland clearly presents a special case amongst the new member states. Indeed, with its accession date approaching – thus putting a definitive end to its outsider status – and the negative impacts of the Polish Iraq engagement increasing, Warsaw gradually adopted a more constructive approach towards CFSP and ESDP. At the beginning of the constitutional process, Poland like all other candidate states, opposed strongly the possibilities of flexible integration and enhanced cooperation in CFSP and ESDP. But the country’s attitude began to evolve as soon as it became clear that Poland could actually be one of the ‘ins’ [...] At the same time other member states [...] came to see Warsaw as a natural member of a European avant-garde. Together, these two factors prompted a turn-about in Poland’s attitude towards the idea of Structured Co-Operation, with the expectation being voiced that Poland could be amongst the elite group of member states launching the initiative [Thus] Poland had moved from being a ‘critical observer’ to a ‘prudent participant’ in ESDP, and had begun the make the shift from being ‘America’s protégé’ to resembling something closer to a constructive European.19

In the light of the present Polish government, this assessment might be somewhat over-optimistic. It nevertheless stresses the fact that full EU membership and plain participation in the decision-making procedures definitively spurred the new member states’ commitment to CFSP and ESDP. This might lead to the conclusion that the last enlargement does not represent a major impediment for the further strengthening of Europe’s international role.

Two important restrictions, however, have to be formulated in order to match reality. First, none of the new member states will support any ambitious European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy if it puts at risk the close Atlantic partnership and complementarity between NATO and ESDP. Yet, it still remains an open question what kind of guidelines the ‘balanced Atlanticism’20 so strongly advocated by the new member states could provide for CFSP and ESDP.

Is it still appropriate to perceive the USA and Europe, NATO and ESDP, as ‘two sides of the same coin’?21

Secondly, all the EU newcomers harshly refuse any kind of directory of the ‘Big Three” (Germany, France and the UK), not to speak of the proven Franco-German ‘motor of integration’.22 But whoever is aware of the ‘logic of integration’ dependant to a very large amount on exactly these two factors,23 must admit that the two restrictions possibly might endanger seriously the future of CFSP and ESDP.◊

1 Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union, July 2006; only in the UK, Ireland and Scandinavia does assent fall below 60 percent.
2 Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, ed., The Future of European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Enlargement (Baden-Baden 2006). The book is the result of a conference held in December 2005 at the University of Würzburg and an intense follow-up process. The project was made possible through generous financial support from the European Commission. The following remarks refer only to the contributions regarding the states of the 2004 enlargement. See also Ionel N. Sava, ‘Romania and CFSP/ESDP’ and Carolin Rüger, ‘Bye bye Foreign Minister? – What progress for the CFSP/ESDP with/without the Constitutional Treaty?’ in the volume.
Gediminas Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths about Security and Defence Policy of the EU New Member States: Lithuania’s Case', in The Future of European, p. 111.

Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths', p. 119.

Hafner, 'The CFSP', p. 19 ff, with regard to Austria; Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 'The Big Member States' Influence on the Shaping of Europe's International Role', in The Future of European, with regard to France, Germany and the U.K.


Khol, 'Czech Republic', p. 86.

Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths', p. 123.

Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths', p. 131


Khol, 'Czech Republic', p. 84.

Khol, 'Czech Republic', p. 77.


Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths', p. 125.

Khol, 'Czech Republic', p. 79.


Kiss, 'Hungary', p. 104.

Vitkus, 'Three Western Myths', p. 131.

See Longhurst and Zaborowski, 'The European Union', p. 58; Khol, 'Czech Republic', p. 79.

See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 'The Big Member States', pp.25-53; see also Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 'Franco-German Relations under the Grand Coalition', in Foreign Policy in Dialogue, ed. by Hanns W. Maull (https://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter.php).

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