Note from the Editor
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At the FORNET plenary held in Brussels in April 2005, Ben Tonra (University College Dublin, and a FORNET member) organised a ‘new scholars’ roundtable’. PhD students from all over Europe submitted applications to give short presentations on ‘theoretical perspectives on the CFSP’. Only a few applications could be accepted, however, so competition was quite fierce. Six proposals were selected, out of a very strong field. In a fascinating and lively session at the plenary, the new scholars gave short presentations on new, innovative and/or adapted theoretical approaches to the study of EU foreign policy. This issue of CFSP Forum contains short articles by those scholars based on their presentations.

Europeanisation: Framework or Fashion?
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Europeanisation is currently a fashionable term, and sloppy use easily obscures its substantive meaning. Is Europeanisation an ephemeral fashion that will soon lose its attraction, or a framework of genuine significance? To move ‘from fashion to framework’, this article first defines the concept of Europeanisation, second discusses its applicability in the realm of foreign and security policy, third considers its mechanisms and conditions, and finally reflects upon its added value as framework.

Defining Europeanisation

Europeanisation is conceptualised here as an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels, capturing the growing ‘interwovenness’ of both. It is composed of three complementary dimensions:

- ‘uploading’: the projection of national preferences to the EU level within the emergence of new structures of government at this level;
- ‘downloading’: the reception of EU-generated incentives and their integration into the national level;
- ‘crossloading’: the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing’ things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene; thus change is not only ‘due’ to but
By bridging national and European levels in an ongoing mutually-constitutive process of change, Europeanisation attempts to capture the dialectical relationship between the actors and the system, between nation-states and the EU, and thus between attempts at collective action and the persistence of national foreign and security policies. The theoretical embedding of Europeanisation into the wider approaches of new institutionalism or social constructivism supports this idea.

**Applying Europeanisation to foreign and security policy**

Applying this definition to foreign and security policy raises several methodological quandaries, caused both by the difficulties inherent in delimiting Europeanisation and by the unique characteristics of foreign and security policy at national and European levels. The challenge is to apply a definition of Europeanisation, initially formulated for policy areas in the supranational (first) pillar, to a policy area in the intergovernmental (second) pillar, which is also considered to lie at the heart of national sovereignty. The quandaries are:

(1) Defining Europeanisation as a matter of ‘reciprocity between moving features’ is of little help methodologically as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variable. Considering Europeanisation as a process suggests that it generates a result – a Europeanised entity. But it is difficult to define these ‘results’: the EU-generated input - viewed as modifying the national level - is also seen as being conceived at that same national level. Europeanisation will thus be both process and constantly changing result at European and national levels.

Analytically one should, however, distinguish between a process and its results. To avoid the danger of a theoretical discussion ‘running away with itself’, this article advocates a parsimonious approach, defining as the main idea of Europeanisation domestic change generated by an EU impact. By conceptualising the two main dimensions of Europeanisation as a ‘defining’ property (‘downloading’ – domestic change caused by an EU impact) and an ‘accompanying’ property (‘uploading’ – projecting ideas from the national to the EU level and emergence of new European structures), one can separate Europeanisation from other related concepts, thus safeguarding its internal coherence and reaching the rigidity of an analytical framework. The following sections concentrate on this defining property: domestic change generated by an EU impact. The third complementary dimension, cross loading, can be investigated in parallel.

(2) The EU input, supposed to generate change at the domestic level, is difficult to detect in the foreign and security policy arena. Not yet communitarised, CFSP follows an intergovernmental decision-making process: there is no supranational entity above the national governments to decide what CFSP should be. Cooperation as an incentive for domestic change exists, but compared with the level of institutionalised integration evident in the first pillar, it is weaker, less clearly defined and more difficult to detect.

(3) Given that Europeanisation is conceptualised as domestic change, the question arises how to define ‘change’, how to measure it, and how to differentiate between changes of or within the ‘core’ of institutions or policies. Besides being empirically observable, changes have to be defined as affecting the ‘core’ of a policy area and not just its ‘periphery’.

(4) Finally, it is difficult to establish the ‘missing link’ between the expected modifications at the national level and the supposed EU incentives. There is a risk of overestimating Europeanisation as an all-explaining factor, neglecting other endogenous or exogenous influences. National foreign and security policies are indeed subject to numerous intertwined and competing incentives, stemming from both the domestic and the international spheres, acting concurrently with Europeanisation. The methodological challenge is thus to define and isolate the ‘EU effect’. At the domestic level, modifications may well occur because of national reform projects (such as reforms of the armed forces), political changes (such as government changes), influence of pressure groups (such as the defence industry) or political events (such as the Balkan wars, 9/11). In fact, it is not always clear whether Europeanisation has ‘overtaken domestic processes or just added to them’. In terms of the international sphere, modifications can also be caused by the effects of globalisation, global politics (such as the end of the Cold War), other international institutions (particularly NATO), and of course the EU as a whole with its different forums of cooperation. In fact, Europeanisation of foreign and security policy will be caused not only by cooperation within the CFSP, but also within different European frameworks. This reveals a diffuse picture of Europeanisation in the area of
foreign and security policy with a European impact difficult to define and to follow, and its consequences (domestic change) difficult to assess. Hence the question arises: how to cope with these methodological challenges?

One possibility is to pay particular attention to the modes of transfer and developments over time. With regard to the modes of transfer, defining the origin of incentives for change is crucial, as they might not always come directly (or at all) from the EU level. In terms of time, working back along the temporal chain can help to establish a causal relationship. However, if process-tracing might indeed help to discern causal explanations, it cannot assess ‘whether the EU was a factor of crucial importance’. That is why a combination of different methods seems appropriate.

Another instrument is the comparison of modifications observed in different countries (rather than single case studies), and over time (as opposed to a snapshot). Contrasting results from different countries over time will not only highlight modifications but will also help to assess whether they can be causally linked to the EU, attempting thus to ‘isolate’ an EU impact. Furthermore, they permit a better judgment of the magnitude and level of change, and provide evidence of the (changing) roles and competences of nation states in foreign and security policy.

Some scholars discuss the use of counterfactual reasoning to establish the causal importance of the EU. This would mean mentally constructing the situation in which the EU factor would be absent, that is, how national foreign and security policies would have developed without the EU/CFSP. Although there are criteria (such as logical, historical and theoretical consistency) supporting plausible counterfactual scenarios, the criticisms of this approach remain salient. It appears to be an ‘interesting, though ultimately inconclusive, thought experiment’, difficult to defend methodologically.

Consequently, a Europeanisation study always needs to take into account the internal and international situation: reasons for policy, polity or politics changes at the national level will always be a mix of endogenous and exogenous factors that can be competing or mutually reinforcing. Although acknowledging that in the end Europeanisation will be only one factor amongst others, it remains to be shown whether it can be reduced to an intervening variable. These methodological challenges also impact upon the mechanisms of change through which Europeanisation operates in the foreign and security policy arena.

How does Europeanisation work?

If domestic modifications occur, their extent and their inherent mechanisms will depend not only upon the European input, but also upon the particular conditions of the national level on which they act. Historically-embedded factors such as country-specific macro-institutional patterns, state traditions, legal patterns or market and civil service traditions condition a country’s reaction to a European impact. Patterns of persistence or adaptation are bound by these national opportunity structures that condition the particular translation of EU input into the unique national settings.

The mechanisms of change are characterised by the lack of supranational power evident in the second pillar. Rather than operating through an imposed vertical change within the parameters of binding EU law as in the first pillar, Europeanisation in foreign and security policy operates through a voluntary horizontal process of change. It appears as a learning process about good policy practice for elites for which the EU sets the scene, offering a ‘forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer’. This highlights the strong voluntary dimension of domestic change in second pillar areas, leaving more room for manoeuvre to national governments to orientate the changes. It also emphasises the salient role of the actors who, socialised at the European level, provide the linkage between national and European levels and intervene as transmission belts for change. Their role even gains in importance given the weak level of institutionalised co-operation. The concept of ‘cross loading’, describing modifications coming from other countries, policy areas or institutions beyond CFSP also incorporates these ideas, with the EU being the frame for change rather than its origin.

Conclusions

Despite the methodological challenges, Europeanisation offers a useful analytical framework for assessing the transformation of the nation-state on account of European cooperation, in that it captures not only domestic change, but puts this change in a dynamic perspective with the EU level. It thus contributes considerably to the understanding of ‘the changing nature of governance and the state by endogenising international governance in the
models of domestic politics and policy’.14

Through EPC and CFSP, foreign and security policy – traditionally at the very heart of national sovereignty – has become a part of the EU integration process. Although organised ‘only’ in intergovernmental terms and regularly criticised as being weak and even ‘uncommon’,15 cooperation in this area is expected, together with the general co-operation within the EU, to have affected the national foreign and security policy. It is to capture this interaction of EU and national levels, to assess the transformation of the nation-state on account of this growing interwovenness of national and European spheres, and to reveal the underlying mechanisms of change that Europeanisation is useful. It offers indeed a ‘healthy corrective of overemphasis on interstate bargaining’ and opens the door to new, nuanced theoretical insights.16

However, Europeanisation is only one part of a bigger picture of the changing nation-state and cannot serve as an all-encompassing idea.17 Future empirical studies will not only further sharpen the nature of this process and its results but also assess whether Europeanisation of foreign and security policy entails rather an enabling or a constraining dimension. In fact, the growing interwovenness of national and European levels does not automatically equate either to a loss of sovereignty or to fewer opportunities or capacities for action. Whether and to what extent foreign and security policy has been Europeanised or whether it is still a ‘domaine réservé’, these two ideas seem finally to be rather complementary than exclusive. Through offering, at the European level, an opportunity to maintain influence on the international scene and to benefit from collective European power, CFSP/EU seems to help European states to cope with different national challenges. The seemingly ‘sovereignty-hurting’ participation in the EU/CFSP, might, in the end, offer a possibility to ‘rescue’ the nation state (to use Alan Milward’s term) from its decaying capacity of international action. Consequently, beyond assessing the state of Europeanisation, there is an urgent need to interpret its consequences.18

1 I would like to thank the University Association for Contemporary European Studies and the European Commission for the kind support of this project with an UACES 2005 scholarship.


4 This is suggested by Dyson and Goetz, ‘Living with Europe’, pp. 15, 20.

5 Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem’, p. 9.

7 Jeffrey J. Andersen, ‘Europeanisation in Context: Concept and Theory’, in Dyson and Goetz, eds, Germany, Europe, p. 50.


17 Ibid.


19 Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem’.


22 Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem’, p. 15.


25 Recent research shows that Europeanisation even seems possible without direct or even intergovernmental cooperation. Bastien Irondelle illustrates that despite the absence of EU policies, cognitive and normative policy frames of French military policy have been increasingly redefined along European lines. Irondelle, ‘Europeanisation without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-96’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003.
Preference Formation in the Absence of Structural Mechanisms: The Case of European Security Policy

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Since Eastern enlargement has been successfully accomplished, an increasing number of authors and commentators have argued that foreign and security policy will most likely replace economic and regulatory policies as meaningful guiding principles of European integration in the near future. Hence the question arises of how useful existing research programmes are in explaining the institutionalisation of European security policy. If we understand a government’s policy-making as a process of constrained decisions by a purposive actor, we can explain this by combining subjective preferences with external constraints and opportunities. However, the various approaches in International Relations and European Studies are characterised by severe weaknesses exactly with regard to this interrelationship. Consequently, this short paper focuses on explaining preferences in security issues and demonstrates that most research programmes rely on a single structural mechanism for their explanation: anarchical self-help, the market, or socialisation. Although these are relevant factors, they are sometimes insufficient and more often too indeterminate for a comprehensive explanation.

A simple counterfactual thought experiment might illustrate the relevance of the problem of preference formation. Many scholars have emphasised the ‘sea change’ in the institutionalisation of European defence policy after St Malo. After all, this represented a dramatic change in British preferences in this issue-area. Nobody would argue that the actual development of the last seven years would have happened without this change. At first glance, a change in the self-help system, a change in market conditions, or a suddenly socialised Britain does not provide a very plausible explanation for this critical juncture. This illustrates the importance of developing systematic analytical tools able to explain preferences in European security policy: we need to know who wants what, when and for which reasons.

This paper first reviews the state of the art regarding the explanation of preferences in security issues. The second step roughly outlines an issue-specific framework that consists of three explanatory factors: functional; institutional; power.

International Relations and preference formation in security issues

The state of the art in IR theory concerning the explanation of preference formation is, above all, characterised by a reliance on structural mechanisms, namely ‘power’, ‘plenty’ or ‘interactions’. Accordingly, subjective state preferences are inferred from objective conditions. Put critically, ‘theories of interest formation that assume one fundamental motivation in all states across all issue areas prompted by a systemic selection mechanism are parsimonious, but wrong.’

Firstly, neorealists can be criticised on both counts. They either postulate that anarchy (or, the corollary of ‘self-help’) indirectly forces states to seek capabilities in order not to ‘fall by the wayside’, or claim that European states desire to enmesh Germany in an international security institution to prevent future security competition among European powers and, accordingly, pursue an ‘institutionalizing strategy’. Nevertheless, preferences in security issues must always be derived from prisoner’s dilemma situations. A state aims to secure its position based on both external constraints and opportunities of relative power – that is a single mechanism in a hierarchy of issue-areas.

While neorealists draw on an analogy of anarchy and the market, both liberal intergovernmentalists and neo-institutionalists confine themselves to the economists’ market. They draw heavily on (structural) economic theories of preference formation, and, accordingly explain them with domestic interest representations. Again, there is a structural precondition on the demand side: increased costly interdependence in security issues resulting in negative or positive externalities, eased by enhanced cooperation (for example by reducing transaction costs). In other words, there is a need to adapt through policy coordination. Basically, the progressive analytical shift was to allow for variation in distinct issue-areas. Consequently, the ‘national interest’ is not simply out there but is shaped by processes of
domestic preference representation. However, Moravcsik’s argument is eventually based on a single market mechanism, which eliminates ‘false preferences’ in the economic domain: if an interest group representing firms of a specific sector ignores the market conditions of the world economy, the firms are, in the long term, endangered by insolvency. This means that liberals take into account the distinctiveness (and lack of a hierarchy) of issue-areas but still rely on a single mechanism, namely the market.

Finally, constructivist or reflexive approaches oppose a pure instrumentalist perspective and can be differentiated from the rest of the literature in that they generally question the linear impact of objective structures on subjective preferences. The environmental structure is not solely seen as posing constraints or opportunities for states, but following Giddens’ structuration theory, constructivist emphasises the degree to which social environments and actors penetrate one another. Top-down approaches mainly focus on intersubjectively shared role conceptions and cultures, which are reproduced or changed by the states’ interactions. These cultures either affect the preference formation of states directly, or have constitutive effects on the states’ (role) identities and, then, on their preferences. In contrast, the much more common empirical research from the bottom-up perspective focuses either on strategic or organisational cultures. These constitute the cultural-institutional context, creating norms and thereby influencing the states’ preferences in security matters. Thus, constructivist approaches emphasise ‘deeper effects’ of structural conditions not only on state preferences but also on identities. Based on the idea that identities and the resulting interests are learnt in interactions by responding to how an actor is treated by others, it is, again, one major mechanism that does the explanatory work, namely socialisation. By this, either a distinct culture of international politics (such as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian) or a culture of a distinct organisation is shaped, which influences the preference formation of a state in a given situation – either top-down or bottom-up.

In sum, each of the proposed mechanisms sheds light on important aspects but is simultaneously characterised by a high degree of indeterminacy. These theories do not provide the analytical toolkit to achieve a sufficiently high degree of differentiation between objective conditions and subjective preferences. Even more important, however, this kind of differentiated perspective is exactly what is required for an empirical analysis of the highly complex institutional forms within the EU. These explanations of preferences usually rely on so-called structural mechanisms, namely anarchy, market and socialisation. While neorealist explanations are primarily characterised by indeterminacy and partly contradicting expectations (‘balancing’ vs. ‘institutionalising’), liberal intergovernmentalists can only save their basic arguments by ad hoc assumptions, such as emphasising the role of ideas and political leaders in security issues. This seems to be an indicator that the originally formulated scope of the approach has been too broad. The major problem of rational-functionalist approaches is that they entirely neglect both unintended consequences of institution-building and more general effects of the existing institutions on states’ preferences. Finally, by introducing constitutive effects, the socialisation mechanism has delivered interesting insights into the problematics, but has not developed specified conditions under which we could expect a certain outcome. Due to its emphasis on ontological aspects, it suffers the inherent problem of empirical applicability: we do not receive reliable information about who wants what, when and for which reasons. Therefore, a theoretically informed issue-specific framework is outlined below, which should facilitate the empirical and comparative analysis of what EU member states really want with regard to the institutionalisation of their security policies at the European level.

An issue-specific analytical framework

The problem with security issues is that they are neither characterised by a consensual goal- and means-orientation nor by easily resolvable cause-effect relationships, which makes the development of hypotheses about the member states’ preferences even more difficult. Hence the proposed explanation of state preferences does not refer to one particular school of thought, although self-interest, functional demands, legitimacy and power all contribute explanatory ‘building blocks’.

The security environment

Although an insufficient condition in itself, it seems reasonable to start with the assumption that member states perceive a certain demand for institution-building in security matters. This is mainly rooted in the conviction that either they are unable to provide security unilaterally or doing so is relatively costly. This explanatory factor – reflecting functionalist thought – will be conceptualised along two dimensions, which
imply distinct causal mechanisms affecting the preferences on substantive scope and institutional form.

Firstly, the questions arise of both who generates those threats and risks and who is affected by them, namely societal or state actors. While we can speak of an ‘international’ security problem when state-induced threats are increasingly dealt with in the EU, we use the term ‘transnational’ security problems when society-induced threats and risks are the focus of the decision-makers. The consequence is mainly that international security problems rather follow the logic of defence and particularly deterrence, while transnational ones rather function according to the logic of compellence or coercion.12

The second critical distinction refers to different types of ‘problematic social situations’. In particular, the distinction between collaboration (the way security problems are usually conceptualised) and coordination problems with distributional consequences, which is the most frequent situation during the process of European integration, contributes to the overall explanation. While the first distinction facilitates the explanation of preferences for substantive security issues, the last one is fruitful for the analysis of preferences for a respective institutional form.

**The ‘feedback effect’**

The second explanatory factor broadly refers to arguments generally labelled as ‘historical-institutionalist’, which are mainly reflected in the literature on ‘Europeanisation’.13 The idea is that the integration process itself has an impact not only on the states’ positions and the bargaining process, but also on states’ preference formation. The conceptual link between the integration process and a state’s preference formation is provided by the ‘domestic salience’ of European norms.14 This means that the integration process might have an impact on how (il)legitimate the member states perceive European involvement in security issues. The respective strength of norms’ salience determines, then, their impact on the member state’s preferences for further (non-)institutionalisation. In general, we can distinguish between two distinct mechanisms of how the institutional paths have an impact on the states’ preferences. While some responsibilities were practically ‘layered on’ existing institutional arrangements (e.g. ESDP on CFSP), others entered the EU’s institutional context rather by ‘functional conversion’ (for example, conflict prevention and development), which resulted partly in new roles for existing institutions (such as the Commission).15

**The role of the US and NATO**

This factor could be labelled as the ‘power component’ of the issue-specific framework. The idea behind this is that political decisions regarding European security policy are not independently made but often take the American position into account. However, the US’s position is ambivalent, which, again, points to the indeterminacy of pure realist expectations on the subject. On the one hand, the US is very much interested in more equal burden-sharing. On the other hand, it does not want the Europeans to become too autonomous in global security politics – particularly not in exchange for a loss of NATO’s responsibilities.16 When we cannot adequately determine the US’s position on the institutionalisation process by pure theoretical means, we have no other option than to examine it empirically on a case-by-case basis to find regularities.

In general, we can distinguish between the general relationship of a member state towards the US and the questions of how far the US opposed specific steps of the EU towards institutionalisation, or supported them, or was not interested in them. Due to the fact that the US has many means of influence at its disposal, we expect that American opposition to an issue-specific increase in institutionalisation will have a constraining impact on the member states’ preferences because the costs of enhanced institutionalisation would rise. However, the scope of US influence also depends on the respective traditional bilateral relationships. It can be expected that the better the traditional relations, the higher the possible influence.

**Conclusion**

The objective of this exclusively theoretical paper was to point to some inherent difficulties of the ‘holy trinity’ of IR approaches in explaining preference formation in security issues. This becomes particularly salient when we have to deal with the highly complex institutional forms in the European context. The reliance on broad structural mechanisms offers an insufficiently differentiated perspective. Therefore, a rather issue-specific framework was proposed that focuses: firstly, on changes in the security environment; secondly, on the impact of the integration process as such; and, finally, on the role of the US and NATO.
Obviously, this short paper could only offer a broad conceptual outline; whether it can really improve the analytical toolbox of other IR approaches will be eventually decided on the empirical ‘battlefield’, that is by the empirical results it is able to offer in future research.\footnote{1}


9 However, they have been confronted with serious operationalisation problems. Hence in empirical research scholars, such as Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, prefer to apply measurable ‘proxy’ concepts, such as ‘institutional structures’ instead of the actual constructivist variable of ‘institutional cultures’. In general, the ‘real’ constructivist hypotheses are largely unsuitable for ‘broad’ and ‘formalized’ research designs. They would necessitate in-depth qualitative research. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Explaining Governance Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy’, International Organization, vol. 58, no. 1, 2004, pp. 155-156.


11 ‘[A]ny theory of states’ preferences can only consist of conditional hypotheses dependent upon the issue area as well as upon knowledge, values, and domestic interests. Such hypotheses would refer to empirically-based statements about the orientation of certain classes of states in certain situations. Since states are corporate actors with multiple purposes and a comparatively low degree of institutionally specified goals (as opposed, for example, to an interest group representing farmers), very few of these hypotheses would be of general validity and most of them would be time- and space-specific in their applicability.’ Zürn, ‘Assessing State Preferences’, p. 299.

12 Zangl and Zürn conclude that state-induced threats and risks have been widely reduced in the OECD world and respectively in the EU, whereas societal (non-state) threats and risks are increasingly challenging nation-states’ ability to successfully fulfil their security functions. Hence we can expect that the EU member states will prefer to build institutions in particular with regard to society-induced issues. Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn, ‘The Effects of Denationalization on Security in the OECD World’, Global Society, vol. 13, no. 2, 1999, pp. 139-162.

13 The principal reason for introducing this explanatory factor is mainly rooted in the problem of causal direction, which will be extremely relevant to control, but cannot be resolved by the first and third factor alone (Pierson, Politics in Time, p. 153). A further reason is that, while the issue-specific framework’s first and third explanatory factors refer to the logic of consequentialism, this second factor rather argues within the logic of appropriateness. By this, potential explanatory factors are not excluded per definitionem.


The Institutionalisation Process of CFSP: An Historical Institutionalist Approach

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The three I’s: interests, institutions and identities

Analyses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have often led to divergent conclusions according to which factor was privileged by the theoretical framework behind the analyses. Three substantive causal factors – interests, institutions and identities, the so-called three I's – constituted the core of different theoretical approaches to European integration; yet, usually, one of these factors was privileged over the rest (not to say that it was the only one taken into account), neglecting the utility of incorporating other factors into the final explanation.1

Drawing on the existing rationalist/constructivist debate, this article explores the insufficiencies that mainstream approaches have shown in the study of CFSP. Realist and other material rationalist approaches to the analysis of CFSP have failed to provide a persuasive account of certain dynamics behind the CFSP’s development, overlooking the influence of institutional and identity factors. For its part, sociological approaches have underestimated the role of agency in the formulation of CFSP. As it is argued here, one should not neglect the importance that member states have in CFSP development. National interests are still crucial elements, but they have to be conceived as something that will vary in the process of interaction at the CFSP level. Besides, other factors should be incorporated into the analysis to get a broader picture of the process: exploring the impact that institutional developments have had on member states’ preferences and identities seems indispensable.

Even though intergovernmentalism appears as a more parsimonious theory explaining cooperative dynamics among member states in the earlier stages of European Political Cooperation (EPC), it does not seem appropriate to explain fully later developments of CFSP. This is primarily due to its conceptualisation of the three I’s. Preferences and identities are taken as exogenously given; each bargaining instance treated as a separated deal; and institutions are seen as epiphenomenal. Intergovernmentalism simplifies the explanation and eliminates high levels of variance.2 However, all these aspects can be and need to be problematised for a better explanation of CFSP.

An approach drawing on historical institutionalist assumptions (see below) could offer a better understanding of how ‘institutions matter’, affecting policies, interests and identities over time. From this point of view, interests are conceived not as fixed, but as evolving during actors’ interactions, and informed both by material and ideational factors. In the same vein, identities are based on common norms and values, the result of a process of social construction. Most significantly, this perspective allows for a broad conception of ‘institutions’, including bureaucratic organisations, practices and norms.3 In sum, one can only make sense of CFSP processes analysing the complex relationships between the three I’s.

‘Moving logics’: a developmental model for CFSP

In spite of the obvious divergences between rationalist and constructivist approaches, scholars have attempted to ‘bridge the gap’, incorporating in their own analyses elements from both approaches. Therefore, many voices have argued for a dialogue, to ‘seize the middle ground’, between these two approaches.4 In the same vein, this section argues that both rationalism and constructivism offer useful insights for analysing the institutionalisation of the CFSP. According to March and Olsen, the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness are not mutually exclusive, but they can be conciliated. One model for the conciliation of these two approaches is what they describe as a developmental relation between the two logics (progression from one logic to the other).5

That is the model privileged here to study the development of CFSP. In this way, the process of CFSP institutionalisation can be better described following a developmental model from a logic of consequentiality to a logic of appropriateness. Thus, even if EPC departed from an intergovernmental, informal, decentralised process and very much controlled by the member states, repeated interactions...
and contacts, the sharing of information and the development of some bureaucratic bodies to coordinate the activities would have promoted higher levels of cooperation, beyond the initial willingness of the member states. Institutions would also facilitate a process of socialisation and the emergence of a we-feeling among CFSP policy-makers.

This developmental model is based on some specific assumptions about rationality. Actors are conceived as being rational within a specific social and normative framework whose robustness has varied over time, leading towards more rule-based action. This analysis takes as a starting point the rational actor: even in highly institutionalised frameworks, rationality plays a crucial role in determining actors’ behaviour. The concept of rationality used here is that of bounded rationality, which acknowledges the limited cognitive capacity of individuals. Thus, policy-makers do not dispose of all the necessary information to make the right choice; moreover, their preferences may be not ordered or too complex.

In this context of incomplete information, the institutional framework can provide some clues and patterns to decipher the environment and others’ behaviours; in sum, to reduce uncertainty. Actors do not act in a social or ideational vacuum. They are reflexive and take into account the social and normative context in which they find themselves when acting strategically. This theoretical framework situates rationality within an institutional context.

As argued here, the institutionalisation process of CFSP or, in other words, the development of CFSP institutions (bureaucratic organisations, practices and norms) might have promoted the socialisation of foreign policy-makers within the CFSP framework; and therefore, facilitated a certain convergence of interests and identities in the long term. Different authors studying CFSP have argued that as a consequence of repeated contacts and communicative exchange among foreign policy-makers at the CFSP level, a process of socialisation has taken place. The result of these communicative practices has been the development of intersubjective structures of meaning that facilitate mutual understanding and trust, a community feeling, and in the long term, changes in identities. To be sure, nowadays, CFSP actors have not yet fully internalised the norms of the community they belong to; however the social environment and the collective identity have significant effects on their behaviour, what allows for the deployment of strategies of rhetorical action and social influence. All these processes have been completely overlooked in rationalist analyses.

This conception of the relationship between the social environment and individuals’ behaviour, the inclusion of social and ideational factors in the definition of preferences, as well as the possibility of changing interests and identities, do not exactly correspond with material rationalist accounts of CFSP. But, actors cannot be considered to be rule-followers, since strategic action is at work, internalisation of CFSP/ESDP norms and rules is still very weak, and many inconsistencies between norms and actors’ behaviours can be documented in CFSP records. Nevertheless, and according to this developmental model, one could expect that as a consequence of increasing CFSP institutionalisation and socialisation of actors in the values of the community, a move from a logic of consequentiality to a logic closer to appropriateness may occur in coming years. In any case, at the present time, the CFSP regime cannot be conceived as following the later logic, but lies in between these two logics, in the middle of a continuum between consequentiality and appropriateness.

**Applying an historical institutionalist approach to CFSP**

A historical institutionalist approach can offer the methodological tools to analyse the developmental model exposed before, examining in-depth the CFSP institutionalisation process. An institutionalist approach seems very relevant in the case of the EU (also for the second pillar), given the density of the institutional arrangements at this level, higher than in any other area of international relations. At the same time, this approach does not neglect the importance of other factors (interests and identities) and then it can be useful to clarify the interplay among them.

The historical variant of the new institutionalism can be conceived here as a way to bridge the two logics of action (appropriateness and consequentiality). The advantage or disadvantage of historical institutionalism is that it does not have its own ontology, but it can adopt either a rationalist or a sociological ontology. For Hall and Taylor, historical institutionalists ‘tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms’, and, for this reason, it ‘stands in an especially pivotal position’, embracing explanatory elements of
both a calculus and a cultural approach.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, it can be used as a perspective to explore ways of bridging both logics of action, trying to conciliate them into a specific research design. The resulting model would be one adopting neither calculus nor cultural approach, but a model of strategic action within an institutional context.

A historical institutionalist approach allows for the analysis of the effect of institutions (bureaucratic organisation, practices and norms) over time, ‘in particular the way in which a given set of institutions, once established, can influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors who established them’.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, it captures the impact of long-term CFSP developments, as well as processes of path dependency and lock-ins.\textsuperscript{13} We can only understand the current institutional setting by understanding and analysing its historical development. Rationalist analyses that take political interactions as a ‘one shot-interaction’ miss this point, as well as the fact that historical developments can trap actors in concrete dynamics.

From an historical institutionalist perspective, institutions are seen more as constraining than enabling actors, emphasising the enduring effects of past policy choices. Consequently, the difficult thing is how to explain change.\textsuperscript{14} Historical analyses have usually referred to critical junctures to explain institutional change, i.e. ‘moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a “branching point” from which historical development moves onto a new path’.\textsuperscript{15} Of course, the problem again is how to explain what generates these critical junctures or environmental change, and most importantly, how to predict change and not just to explain it after it already occurred.

But although its notion of path dependency could lead to a reductionist notion of agency (past actions determine the range of possibilities for future action), that is not usually the case. Historical institutionalism does not neglect the possibility of strategic action affecting the institutional setting, and in this way, it can allow for a dialectical agency-structure model.\textsuperscript{16} This model entails the possibility of creative agency; that is, actors are capable of strategic learning from past experiences and new available information to adapt and respond to structural properties.\textsuperscript{17}

To date, historical institutionalism has been mostly inductive and produced few hypotheses about under which conditions institutions become locked-in or produce path-dependent processes, constraining actors’ strategies. To remedy this, fresh empirical research, drawing on process-tracing and comparative analyses is needed. But the methodological challenge goes beyond that. For historical institutionalism, institutions influence choice and behaviour (constraining the range of possible actions), but can also be shaped by agency in a mutually constitutive process. Therefore, the problem is how to ‘break the cycle’ to determine and test causality.\textsuperscript{18} A possible solution might be to apply a methodological strategy consisting in an ‘analytical bracketing’ which ‘entails the continuous reversal of the causal order among agents and structures in empirical analysis’.\textsuperscript{19}

**Concluding remarks**

Even if research based on this approach may seem less parsimonious than that based on a rationalist one, it is an attempt to design a theoretical framework that provides a comprehensive explanation of the development of CFSP, with the institutionalisation process the main explanatory variable. A diachronic perspective highlights the importance of institutional and normative factors which prevent member states from having total control over the CFSP’s development. National interests are affected by processes of path dependency, reducing the range of possibilities for legitimate action available to member states. At the same time, the institutionalisation process, facilitating socialisation among policy-makers, might have led to the development of an EU’s common identity in its external dimension.

The approach presented here allows the identification of those situations in which the dense institutional context at the CFSP level may have not only shaped the process of goal selection and actors’ strategies, but also led to a reconstitution of actors’ behaviours and interests in terms of European norms rather than national ones. However, there are still some gaps regarding when, how and why this process takes place, and the same goes for processes of path dependency and learning. Therefore, the primary aim of empirical research should be to gather evidence in order to clarify under which conditions these phenomena occur.

1. This is true for both rationalist and sociological approaches.
3. Obviously, the first question regards the definition of institutions, i.e. what should we include within this category.
without risking ‘conceptual stretching’. From the perspective adopted here, institutions include bureaucratic organisations, practices and norms. Bureaucratic organisations refer to the ‘old’ meaning of the term institutions (formal structures and procedures); practices refer to informal procedural rules within a specific regime (how interactions among actors take place); and, finally, by norms it is meant formal and informal substantive rules (what values and goals should be promoted in actors’ decisions).


6 M.E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy.


10 To be sure, institutionalism is not a ‘grand theory’, but a middle-range theory, concerned with the specific effects of institutions in a particular polity, but not suitable to explain the general direction of the European integration project. S. Bulmer, ‘New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market’, Journal of European Public Policy, no. 5, 1998, p. 382.


14 Peters, Institutional Theory, p. 68.


17 According to Hay and Wincott, historical institutionalism can and must be developed into a theory ‘capable of linking the subject in a creative relationship with an institutional environment […]’ Within this perspective change is seen to reside in the relationship between actors and the context in which they find themselves, between institutional “architects”, institutionalized subjects, and institutional environments’. C. Hay and D. Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency
Theorising the Effects of the CFSP on National Foreign Policy and the Concept of Europeanisation

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The limits of traditional approaches

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has usually been conceptualised from an intergovernmentalist perspective and it is often assumed that a common European foreign policy is constrained by the foreign policies and interests of the EU member states, while the CFSP itself is not considered to have far-reaching effects on these national foreign policies. Such views seem to be confirmed regarding issues on which the member states do not speak with one unified European voice, such as the Iraq crisis. However, there is also considerable evidence which leads to the presumption that this traditional approach alone no longer suffices. It has been suggested that some kind of communitarisation has taken place as far as ‘day-to-day business’ is concerned,¹ and that the CFSP has ‘transformatory’ effects on the national foreign policies of the EU member states.²

While intergovernmentalism can explain the origins of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the forerunner of the CFSP, it has difficulty explaining the further development of EPC and then the CFSP as well as its impact on the national foreign policies of the EU member states. So what is needed is an approach which enables us to understand the relationship between the CFSP and national foreign policies, and which offers an analytical perspective that facilitates the exploration of the linkages between these different levels of analysis.³

The utility and applicability of the concept of Europeanisation

In this context Europeanisation has become a fashionable concept in recent years. In general, there has been an increasing interest in investigating how the growing communitarisation and coordination of policies within the EU may (re-)influence the member states, their policies, polities and politics.

In order to explore the circumstances under which such Europeanisation may take place, in many studies it is assumed that there is a certain ‘goodness of fit’ between the EU level and the member state level.⁴ This ‘goodness of fit’ describes the compatibility between the two levels and manifests itself in a ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’. If there is a ‘misfit’ it is further expected that there will be adaptational pressures for the national level.

This ‘goodness of fit’ framework corresponds to a view of Europeanisation that focuses on the adaptation of member states’ policies in response to EU pressure and in compliance with EU requirements. In the area of foreign policy, such vertical adaptation may occur in the context of the accession of new member states to the EU, for example. Each new member state entering the EU has to take over the ‘acquis politique’ of the CFSP and – if there is a misfit – adjust its foreign policy to it.

However, it also has to be taken into account that the member states themselves may take part in shaping the European policies they are affected by afterwards; the member states may also make proactive attempts at exporting national policies to the level of the EU (this is usually referred to as ‘up-loading’, whereas the reception of European policies by the national level is called ‘down-loading’).⁵

Moreover, the mode of policy-making within the CFSP is still fundamentally different from most policy fields that have been at the centre of attention of Europeanisation studies so far. In foreign policy there usually exists no ‘clear, vertical chain-of-command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member states’.⁶ Thus, it seems that the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation of Europeanisation is not as suitable for the field of foreign policy as for other policy fields in which national decision-making competences have been transferred to the European level to a relatively large extent.

 Instances of Europeanisation of national foreign policy may come about through other mechanisms or dynamics, which are not as obvious as the vertical ‘down-loading’ of EU policy templates by the member states. Recent research results suggest that Europeanisation may also take place on a more horizontal basis and in a less linear and automatic fashion.⁷ Given the specific nature of the CFSP, it seems plausible to pay more attention to the interactions and exchanges between the member states within the framework of the CFSP and (possible) resulting adaptations towards each other as well as to collective learning and
socialisation processes.

Two logics of Europeanisation of national foreign policy

Another important issue – which, up to now, has often been neglected in the research on Europeanisation – concerns the question of how these (possible) adaptations can be explained. So far the concept of Europeanisation has generally rather been used for describing processes of interaction than as an explanatory concept. 8

In this respect, it seems useful to draw upon the rational choice and sociological variants of the new institutionalism. These basically reflect the divide between rationalism and social constructivism in International Relations theory and they are particularly based on different logics of action regarding how states determine and pursue their national interests. 9 Thus, in principle, both the vertical and the horizontal kind of Europeanisation can be viewed from two different perspectives, which also entail different expectations about the effects of Europeanisation.

From a rationalist perspective, CFSP outcomes will only be accepted if they fit exogenously given national preferences. If there is an adaptation at all this is expected to be only strategic adaptation, i.e. there may possibly be changes of the strategies and the behaviour of the actors, while their preferences are regarded as stable. Such strategic action is usually associated with rational calculations as well as with trade-offs or side payments and a bargaining style of decision-making. However, it has been noted that in the CFSP context such mechanisms of tactical manoeuvring among the member states can hardly be observed. 10

In contrast, a social constructivist approach would assume that the CFSP can also have more far-reaching effects on the preferences of the actors. In particular, the CFSP can be viewed as providing a cognitive and normative policy ‘frame’ as well as an opportunity for the socialisation of policy-makers. 11 It is assumed that such policy frames do not so much prescribe concrete requirements with which EU member states must comply, but can rather trigger more profound collective learning processes. 12 Furthermore, emphasis is also often put on the horizontal exchange of ideas and principles between the governments and foreign policy elites of the member states. It is essential that in this case the actors do not merely adjust their strategies to achieve their given preferences but that these preferences themselves may be changed, thus leading to a ‘deeper’ adaptation of national foreign policies.

There is considerable evidence in the literature that EPC and then the CFSP have facilitated elite socialisation among the participants. 13 It has further been shown that the policy-makers in the EPC/CFSP network in some regards have gradually begun to pursue shared sets of norms, ideas and policy understandings and to engage rather cooperatively in problem-solving than bargain on behalf of their governments. 14 On the whole, it seems that these changes of the national foreign policies of the EU member states may not necessarily come about in response to pressure, as the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation suggests, but that instances of Europeanisation may also occur without major adaptational pressure. It has further been criticised that the ‘goodness of fit’ framework is ‘somewhat excessively structural’ 15 and mechanistic and that it tends to neglect the discretion and role of the individual policy-makers. The behaviour of these actors is not merely determined by external constraints and their individual motivations and preferences must not be underestimated. 16

Conclusions

In conclusion, it is a great advantage of the concept of Europeanisation that it facilitates an exploration of the relationship between the CFSP and national foreign policies and thus of the specific circumstances of the foreign policies of the EU member states. In contrast to an intergovernmentalist perspective, which would assume that the national foreign policies of the member states constrain the CFSP while they are not affected by it themselves, the Europeanisation perspective takes into account that these national foreign policies may be influenced by the CFSP, although this may not necessarily come about by means of adaptational pressures from the EU level to the national level, but in a more indirect manner, particularly through exchanges between the member states and through socialisation and learning processes.

However, in order for the Europeanisation approach to deliver what it promises and to be more than a merely descriptive device, it seems useful to draw upon different variants of the so-called new institutionalism and to use the concept of Europeanisation within both a rationalist and a social constructivist approach.
to theory. It is particularly important that depending on the basic underlying logic, in principle there can be two effects of Europeanisation of national foreign policy: on the one hand strategic adaptation, which (possibly) leads to changes of the strategies of the actors while their preferences remain stable, and on the other hand more complex learning, which may also have more far-reaching effects and cause changes of the preferences of the actors.

It is assumed that these two basic approaches are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary and that ultimately, it is an empirical question which variant seems more useful for explaining specific situations and aspects of the (possible) Europeanisation of national foreign policies. Thus, the question of how the different kinds and mechanisms of Europeanisation of national foreign policy relate to each other seems to offer an interesting and challenging field for further research.


7 Bulmer and Radaelli, ‘The Europeanisation’.

8 White, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’, p. 21.


European Foreign Policy: Providing a ‘Structural’ Alternative in a Unipolar World?

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The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union’s ancestor, was, under the cover of an industry revival programme, a foreign policy and security project from the start: preventing war between France and Germany was the overriding objective. Although the European Community contented itself with this peaceful objective and its ‘civil power’ role for several decades, the European Commission slowly developed an external relations system. From the late 1950s, an expanding network of European Commission delegations carried out mainly development and information functions in the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP).\(^1\) Development and foreign policy have therefore been closely intertwined in the European external relations agenda, while Africa, kept on the agenda by the determination of the Commission and a few member states, has often been the favourite field for new initiatives.

Now a security and defence policy dimension is being added to this development and foreign policy cluster: it is striking to note that the European member states have been able to agree on conflict prevention and resolution programmes – through the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping, crisis management), and very often, again, with Africa in mind.\(^2\) Africa has therefore often enjoyed first-hand experience in the slow definition of the EU’s external identity and the EU’s current actions in Africa might tell us much about this identity and what it might become.

Finding a theoretical framework that enables us to analyse the EU-Africa relationship, however, is often a difficult task: International Relations theory has long considered Africa to be an irrelevant periphery, while current works tend to insist on the gap that lies between the post-Westphalian EU and the pre-Westphalian African states.\(^3\) Keukeleire’s theory of a European ‘structural’ foreign policy however provides an interesting analytical framework that helps grasp European foreign policy, particularly in non-Western regions. He argues that European foreign policy aims at ‘the transferral of various ideological and governing principles that characterize the political, social, economic and inter-state system of the EU such as democracy and good government, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, regional political and economic cooperation and integration or free market principles, and so on’.\(^4\) One of the main strengths of this definition is that it takes both the normative and the institutional aspects of European foreign policy into account.

A ‘structural’ European foreign policy?

The term ‘structural’ was used by the European Commission itself in its first communication on African conflicts in 1996: ‘structural stability’ was described as a ‘state of affairs which includes both sustained economic development and democracy, respect for human rights, and sound political and social structures’.\(^5\) Therefore Keukeleire, in describing European foreign policy, uses a word first meant to describe the aim of this policy. The European structural foreign policy, based on the EU’s own experience, pursues structural changes in the internal situation of the countries and in inter-state relations. Implicit in this definition is the link drawn by the EU between its own experience as a regional organisation that achieved peace and the idea that Europe has a special role to play in the world, based on the values defined by the European Commission in 1996.\(^6\) There is a strong normative aspect in this foreign policy objective: the EU considers its own experience to be a model that should be followed and promotes a normative - even transformative - agenda in other parts of the world where it enjoys a strong influence as one of the primary providers of development aid.

European foreign policy is a young teenager, born with the end of the Cold War, when it became clear that Europe would need to provide increasingly for its own security as the US was disengaging from the continent. Like most teenagers, European foreign policy is therefore often described as hesitant and hampered by its growing body: many authors have deplored the obvious lack of communication between European institutions and a lack of cooperation between member states who cling to their sovereign rights.\(^7\) Keukeleire, however, provides an explanation for this lack of coordination: in the elaboration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the inter-relational goals may at times be more important than the policy goals.\(^8\) Whereas in the eyes of an external
observer the EU may have failed as a diplomatic actor in a particular matter, for its member states the EU may have performed, for example, because an individual member state could be persuaded not to act on its own. Europe’s structural foreign policy is as much an external as an internal project on which member states are asked to find a – sometimes disappointingly limited – consensus. It is also an institutional project: the broadness of the European structural policy necessitates close coordination between institutions that were previously clearly separated. In the case of the EU’s relations with Africa in particular, the development agreements concluded between the EU and the ACP and humanitarian aid fall under the first pillar, while the CFSP falls under the second pillar.

**An ideological content? The production of ‘European values’**

While political analysts increasingly insist on the EU’s normative power, some European politicians call for the definition of common European values on the international scene and see the increasingly unilateral American foreign policy as an opportunity for Europe to unify. The EU, according to these Europhiles, has successfully met a huge security and economic challenge since its foundation in 1957: it has slowly extended democratic peace and economic development to and beyond its eastern and southern borders. This success, based on political dialogue and soft power instruments, could be emulated by other regional organisations.

This call for a European set of values that could be exported also underlines the interdependence of political structure and will now that a foreign policy structure has been established, citizens and states attach a normative framework to it and agree on further institutional steps forward. The EU would obviously like to promote this virtuous circle in other regions of the world. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 with the ACP states, should lead to Regional Partnership Agreements between the EU and ACP regional organisations. Simultaneously, the EU and its member states strongly encourage the development of African intervention capabilities and mediations: the EU’s African Peace Facility is designed to support African Union peacekeeping and peace support efforts, while three training centres were created in West Africa for a standby force. This support is meant to compensate for the lack of African military capabilities as much as for European states’ unwillingness to intervene militarily in what are often considered intractable African conflicts. The EU is therefore developing what could be called ‘multilateral subsidiarity’: when African regional organisations cannot intervene or when rapid intervention or financial support is needed, the EU will be ready to lend its support.

The agreements signed with the ACP states also illustrate the progressive elaboration of a European normative structure. At the end of the 1980s, considering the poor results of the EC’s development agenda in the ACP countries, the EC’s hardliners – the British and the Dutch - insisted that the EC-ACP Lomé Convention be implemented in close coordination with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, unprecedented elements of political conditionality – a democratic environment, respect for human rights – were added to the convention. The Cotonou Agreement (articles 8-13), signed in 2000, furthers this ‘normalisation’ process by subjecting the EU-ACP trade arrangements to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and democracy and good governance conditionality - all elements cited by Keukeleire in his definition of a structural foreign policy.

**The European ‘structure’: specific or universal?**

Considered in this light, the EU’s relationship with Africa seems to lose some originality: the EU in fact follows the international trend towards a broader and normative and moral type of intervention. Moreover, the EU’s determination to strengthen its place on the international scene may be achieved by less generous means than is usually admitted. R. Gibb depicts the EU as a tough liberal actor most of all concerned with promoting its own interests. WTO rules and the promotion of regionalisation are used to legitimise the enhanced access EU exporters will be given to ACP markets, while observers note that Africa has little to gain from a regionalism based on the wholesale liberalisation of internal trade.

The concept of structural foreign policy helps to underline this lack of consistency between the EU’s stated objectives and the reality of its relations with Africa. Keukeleire underlines that the comprehensiveness of the structural programme advocated by the EU should be applied on both sides of the EU-Africa relationship:

Structural changes on the EU’s agricultural and external trade policies combined with the active support for...
more fundamental reforms within the WTO, IMF, World Bank and G7/G8 framework, would lead to much more profound changes for other countries and regions in the world than most of the structural conflict prevention measures in the EU’s agreements and cooperation programmes ...

The kind of interrelatedness between economic and security matters that the EU underlines in its relations with many African states should logically be implemented on the EU side as well. As things are, the liberal reforms and regional integration programmes promoted by the EU may well trigger more tensions than economic growth, while purely diplomatic measures that would significantly address the political dynamics of an emerging conflict should not be neglected.

The originality of the EU ‘structural’ foreign policy is therefore questionable. Moreover, there is a paradox in the EU wanting to offer an alternative to the US unilateral and military strategy, while it desperately tries to impose its own model in other regions of the world. Nicolaïdis and Howse underline that the EU is above all a ‘laboratory’ where options for interstate cooperation are generated; its main strength is in its political creativity. The current insistence on European values – on an ‘Eutopia’ – may however threaten this creativity and standardise the EU’s relations with other regions more than is officially claimed.

Conclusion: understanding the contradictions

Keukeleire’s theoretical model casts an interesting light on the EU’s current foreign policy trends and rightly underlines the importance of a European ‘structural’ policy at the European domestic levels as well as in the intra and extra-European relations. By underlining the normative – and, possibly, transformative – features of European foreign policy, it also helps in grasping the contradictions and inconsistencies that still characterise the EU’s foreign policy agenda. But the danger here is to think that because the EU is promoting a ‘structural’ foreign policy, the latter will automatically be original and represent an alternative to other actors’ foreign policies. During the last decade, the EU has tended to adapt its agenda to international fashions in spite of the innovative potential that could be drawn from each member state’s experience and capacities.

The strongest point in Keukeleire’s concept of ‘structural’ foreign policy may therefore be its capacity to underline that the European foreign policy is far from being a uniquely external project and is at least as much about European internal integration: the EU is an ever-evolving project and its foreign policy is therefore very much about developing its institutions, getting the support of member states and citizens and promoting its own interests. As much as it wants to appear ‘soft’, alternative and multilateral, the EU is above all a political entity, with its own form of foreign policy, therefore of power.

2 The decision to create a European rapid-reaction force of up to 60,000 personnel – divided into battle groups - for the purposes of humanitarian tasks and crisis management, was clearly taken with Africa in mind (D. Gow, ‘EU peace forces ready in new year’, The Guardian, 22 November 2004). The very first military intervention led under the EU’s leadership, the Artemis Operation, unsurprisingly took place in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.
8 Keukeleire, ‘The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor’.
9 The pillar structure would disappear with the adoption of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, a step often called for by the NGOs that lobby the EU on conflict resolution (such as Saferworld and International Alert).
12 The African Union (former Organisation of the African Unity) in particular draws both its name and some of its institutions from the European model.
Securitisation Processes in the Formulation of European Foreign and Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Why an EU foreign and security policy in sub-Saharan Africa? A theoretical puzzle

EU foreign and security policy in Africa has recently undergone sweeping changes, most notably with the launch of its first autonomous military operation ever, the use of development aid to fund military deployments and its first steps into foreign military cooperation and security sector reform. Originally coined the ‘Battle Groups for Africa’, the latest and up to now most successful development in ESDP has moreover been explicitly vindicated on the necessity to be able to intervene in African conflicts.

The explanation of such groundbreaking changes raises profound theoretical challenges. The large scale and innovative involvement of the EU in Africa can indeed hardly be accounted for within a realist or a liberal approach based on European interests:

- The ACP-EC relationship has gradually lost its prominence since the end of the Cold War. New development aid priorities have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe while global and bilateral liberalisation agreements have further eroded the asymmetric trade preferences that the ACP once benefited from. Africa today represents neither a major economic interest nor a pressing security concern for the EU.
- Some of its member states of course entertain a specific relationship with Africa, but their interests in the region are either colliding or said to be waning. Some defence and foreign ministries are furthermore opposed to any Europeanisation of their African policies. The former colonial powers in Europe can therefore hardly be said to constitute a consistent and powerful lobby group.
- Interventions in Africa might prove more dangerous than rewarding in terms of

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16 The future intervention in Darfur confirms this strategy: the EU, with NATO, will provide logistical assistance to the African Union.
19 K. Meagher notes that, despite neo-liberal arguments that Africans have nothing to trade with each other, persuasive cases for trade-based integration have been made in West and Southern Africa (K. Meagher, ‘Throwing Out the Baby to Keep the Bathwater: Informal Cross-Border Trade and Regional Integration in West Africa’, in Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa: A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 11, Uppsala, 2001, pp. 27-39). M. Boas also notes that ‘it is in Africa’s second economy that we find endless imagination, innovation and entrepreneurship’ (M. Boas, Regions and Regionalisation: A Heretic’s View, in Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa, p. 35).
national or European interests. A commitment to contribute to the stabilisation of the region exposes the EU to both a risk of failure and a danger of overstretch in a war-ridden continent. French involvement in Africa might even raise suspicions and deter other member states from agreeing to involve the EU as such.

Stability in sub-Saharan Africa therefore represents neither a priority nor a least common denominator among EU member states. Logics of consequence would seemingly have kept the Europeans out of Africa instead of getting them increasingly involved.

The invention of necessity: the social construction of European security issues

The mere confrontation of pre-defined ‘national interests’ cannot therefore account for EU security involvement in Africa. Exploring logics of appropriateness would imply a reference to socialisation processes between representatives of the member states at the European level. We would argue that these processes are largely based on the use of particular discourses, and that they need to be both substantiated theoretically and assessed empirically.

Structural discourse analyses usually keep a focus on the systems of signification shaping the policy options available to foreign policy decision-makers at both national and to a lesser extent European levels. They propose interesting insights in the linguistic structures enabling and constraining the formulation of foreign policy which arguably no study in the beliefs or cognitive dispositions of the actors could bring with comparable accuracy and reliability. In our case however they can only acknowledge a discursive change from a ‘civilian power’ to a ‘full instrumental power’ discourse but give little clue as to how, why and when such a change has come about.

The emphasis of speech act approaches on agents and change might help overcome this crucial shortcoming. While it has been extensively applied to security studies, little has been done yet to introduce it in the field of foreign policy. The securitisation approach seems however to provide a fruitful tool to analyse the social construction of a particular European security issue, that of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. The social interplay between EU member states and institutions can indeed be studied through the role and impact of their respective discourses.

This approach claims that the scope and content of security threats cannot be analysed objectively but that they depend on the successful utterance of a particular discursive mechanism. It does therefore not entail that actors do not have interests or that there is no reality ‘out there’. A political actor addresses an audience about a lethal threat to a referent object (most often the survival of the state or the nation), and claims that ordinary rules need to be breached to grant it exceptional powers to prevent the threat and restore security. Such a securitising move is successful if the audience is convinced of the existence of the threat and comes to view such exceptional measures as necessary if only on a temporary basis. Securitisation fails when the speaker does not manage to get the support of the audience, when ‘necessity’ does not occur.

Normative references to both humanitarian imperatives and security interests have largely been used to legitimise and foster the reinforcement of European foreign and security capacities throughout the 1990s. Securitisation discourses have been used to claim that regional conflicts had proliferated in Africa in the post-Cold War era, and that they represented a new threat the EU had to deal with. In other words, these discourses have ‘brought about a change in the world by representing it as having been changed’.

Whose security? Securitisation processes in the formulation of EU foreign and security policy

These African conflicts have moreover been constructed discursively as two different forms of threats. On the one hand regional instability in Africa has been depicted as a threat in relation to immigration, terrorism, arms and drug smuggling. Analysing these securitising moves might therefore open promising insights into how and why African stability has been designed as a stake of importance for European security and put up on the European agenda in a manner that crosses over all three pillars of EU policies. On the other hand African regional instability has been characterised as a necessity per se, in order to prevent further massacres and civil wars, thereby helping to legitimise the creation of new instruments (ESDP) and the transformation of older EU policies such as development cooperation. The referent object in this case is not European; it is the sheer survival of African civilians that is at stake.
The main difference between these two securitisation processes is that in the latter case the audience and the referent object do not refer to the same group of people. In the case of what we would term ‘humanitarian securitisation’, a speaker addresses an audience to convince them that the survival of another group (African civilians) is at stake and that they should allow him/her to breach the normal rules and take exceptional measures to stop the massacre.

While Africa has only rarely been described as a threat for the EU, securitisation processes still have been at work which can account for the scale and innovations of the EU involvement in African conflicts. These discourses have helped break new grounds in the development of EU foreign and security policy, by overriding existing rules and establishing new ones in reference to a humanitarian imperative.

The most obvious example is the traditional allocation of development aid exclusively to development activities. The EU has begun to fund African military deployments in Burundi and Ivory Coast in 2002 and 2003 on the basis that ‘security is a prerequisite for development’, a discourse now enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement. Such a discourse has allowed not only for an exception to be made, but for a revolution to take place in the practice of EU development cooperation. This sweeping change has later been institutionalised in an EU-ACP agreement on a 250M€ Peace Facility for Africa already used in Darfur and Chad and probably soon in Somalia and Congo DRC.

**Operationalising speech act analysis**

Even though its scope and ambition are much narrower than those of ‘securitisation’, the concept of ‘humanitarian securitisation’ therefore provides an interesting tool to analyse the first developments of ESDP and the incremental use of development cooperation for security-related activities. Several major changes in EU foreign policy in the 1990s could arguably be accounted for as the product of a specific humanitarian discourse legitimising the breaking of many implicit rules which were limiting the EU involvement in African security.

Many occurrences of such speech acts can be identified in the most recent developments in the field of European defence where their analysis sheds a new light on the so-called ‘militarisation’ of the European Union. The understanding that NATO held a right of first refusal was for instance breached with the launch of Operation Artemis in 2003. Even though autonomous operations had been formally envisaged since the Saint Malo agreement, it was arguably only a formal concession made by Atlanticist member states as a remote perspective on which NATO would hold a pre-emptive right. Operation Artemis also extended the regional scope of potential EU military operations far beyond the Balkans despite previously shared understanding (in a ‘food for thought’ paper) and strong initial opposition from some member states. The necessity of a clear legal basis for EU activities was almost silently breached to allow the Council headquarters the first steps of the EU in the field of military cooperation (planning support for the AU deployment in Darfur) and security sector reform (Operation EUSEC in Congo DRC).

Humanitarian speech acts underlining the necessity to be able to intervene in crisis situations can also help understand more formal changes the stakes of the Finno-Swedish proposal to integrate the first concrete defence component in the Treaty. The humanitarian orientation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ (although not exclusively related to Africa) arguably played a major role in the demise of the civilian nature of EU integration with the Amsterdam treaty.

Such speech acts are at work at both the national and the European levels. A renewed focus on them could in this respect help us study European foreign policy as ‘the sum of what the EU and its member states do in foreign policy’. The Conservative argument that ESDP amounted to a loss of sovereignty (and the creation of a ‘European army’) was overridden by the UK Labour government when it proposed the concept of battle groups originally called ‘battle groups for Africa’. The African destination of the EU battle groups was repeated by Tony Blair in a domestic media campaign on Africa in November 2004. Lastly attention could be paid to the post-9/11 references to terrorism and immigration from Africa which have recently emerged in European discourses and to their potential impact on European foreign policies.

**Outstanding theoretical issues**

For all its success the concept of securitisation has rarely been applied to a delimited case study. We have so far only tried to show how useful the concept of ‘humanitarian securitisation’ could be, but it remains to be seen how usable it is. A representative set of EU and national foreign policy statements on crisis management in Africa should be analysed to identify and define in each case the actors who
have supported and ‘uttered’ these changes, those who have tried to oppose them with competing speech acts, their referent object and audience, the European identity that these discourses are constructing and promoting (a ‘European responsibility’ in Africa) and the external and institutional ‘conditions of satisfaction’ of these securitisating moves (evolution of the international context, particular crises, internal developments). How can one account for instance for the French failure to convince the EU to take part in Operation Turquoise in 1994\(^7\) and for its success with Operation Artemis in 2003?\(^8\)

It also remains unclear whether securitisation speech acts function as perlocutionary or illocutionary acts.\(^6\) As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde put it: ‘Since securitisation can never be only imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case’.\(^9\) The reference to Austin, who concentrated on illocutionary acts, would therefore be partly misleading as securitisation speech acts would function as performatives before they manage to establish the social reality of a threat and become illocutionary. Other speech act theorists\(^10\) could therefore more fruitfully be referred to whose debates have to some extent been mirrored in the field of security studies.\(^11\)

The speech act approach needs to be tested against competing hypotheses and approaches. It might even be conceived as complementary to other approaches like structural discourse analyses,\(^12\) FPA approaches,\(^13\) social institutionalism\(^14\) or classical realism. Their theoretical compatibility would however need to be thoroughly assessed, particularly in relation to the structure-agent debate. Complementarity indeed does not necessarily entail consistency. The implementation and impact of the EU foreign policy could be partly analysed in terms of speech acts, as has been convincingly tried recently with its conflict prevention and crisis management policies.\(^15\)

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3. This is all the more surprising as some researchers have prominently invested both fields. Waever however points to future promising applications of speech act theory to foreign policy in one of his latest writings, ‘Discursive Approaches’, in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds, *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 212.
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