

CFSP Forum

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Note from the Editor

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A year ago this month, ten states acceded to the European Union. This issue of *CFSP Forum* is devoted to analysing the impact of enlargement on the CFSP from the perspective of the new member states. What impact have the new member states had on CFSP and EU foreign relations in general? What effect in turn has accession to the EU and therefore the CFSP had on their foreign policies?

The issue begins with an overview written by a member of the current Enlargement Commissioner's cabinet. Several articles by FORNET members then consider the dual processes of adjustment (by the EU and by the new member states) in some of the new member states. A final article considers the impact of CFSP on a candidate country, Bulgaria, due to enter the EU in 2007.

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The Impact of the EU's Biggest Enlargement So Far

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Like many historical events, the enlargement of the European Union on May 1st last year now seems like it was always inevitable. EU politicians have often presented it as the outcome of grand, strategic design by wise leaders. But it really resulted from incremental steps and a series of rhetorical commitments that gradually locked an often reluctant Union into expanding because they could find no other way of satisfying the demands of the would-be members. The same pattern could well be repeated with other countries.

Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the new democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe tried to join every international club. Across the region, people wanted to 'return to Europe'. For most, membership of the EU and NATO was the fastest route back into the European political mainstream. They hoped that acceptance by these organisations would re-affirm their Europeaness, and put the dark days of communism and exclusion from the West behind them forever. Their motivations for joining were more based on identity and escaping the Soviet sphere of influence than on hopes of financial transfers.

But the EU did not meet these aspirations with an immediate and generous welcome to the family. Many politicians argued that the Central and East Europeans should be integrated into

some sort of European confederation, not allowed into the EU itself. But Central European politicians kept banging at the door, and then-Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel eloquently made the case for entry on historical and moral grounds. Within four years, even the most reluctant West Europeans had run out of excuses for keeping the other half of Europe outside.

In 1993, the Union specified three conditions for wannabe joiners to meet: they had to be democracies, market economies that could compete in the single market, and able to take on all the obligations of membership. Initially these looked like obvious, 'motherhood and apple pie' conditions that the applicants could quickly fulfil. But once the Commission began to specify what they really meant, the criteria quickly expanded into thousands of pages of legislation for the candidates to implement, and very detailed institutional changes. 'We asked for an affirmation of our European identity and got a check-list of technocratic requirements in return', says Bulgarian political scientist Boyko Todorov. This check-list took the EU's influence much deeper into domestic policies and institutions than it has ever achieved in Western Europe, because the Commission was able to demand that the candidates change areas that were not officially part of Community competence in the existing Union, such as macroeconomic policies, treatment of minorities and reform of the judiciary.

The long road from 1989 to 2004

The 15-year slog to the 2004 enlargement was tough for the would-be members, and it took much longer than people in the region expected. Reformist ministers would have found it much harder to make such expensive changes to national policies if everybody had realised how much effort and how many years would be involved. But enlargement always seemed only five years away, just over the horizon of the next election, which helped to sustain flagging reform efforts.

This decade and a half passed much more quickly on the EU side. Many politicians expressed surprise and even disapproval when the Commission announced that ten countries were ready to join in its progress report at the end of 2001. Hubert Védrine, France's then foreign minister, publicly questioned the Commission's methodology for assessing the candidates' readiness. But the member states had largely delegated the whole process to the European Commission to manage after they set

the membership conditions, so it was too late to ask this question.

The heads of state and government took the key decisions at critical moments - such as starting negotiations with just six countries in 1998, and setting the final date for 2004 - but all these steps were carefully prepared by Commission staff. The Commission was the unsung hero of the enlargement project, because it kept the show on the road even when the member states were distracted by other projects like the euro. Although the Commission was often a tough and unyielding negotiator for the candidate countries to deal with, achieving enlargement became a *raison d'être* for important parts of the institution, which ensured progress even when there was little political impetus from EU governments.

The 'big bang' strategy to ten new members emerged logically from the progress of the candidates. In 1998, when the accession negotiations began, there were wide gaps between the candidates, making a phased series of accessions look quite likely. But when the first six countries began negotiations, it galvanised the laggards. Latvia and Lithuania worked hard to catch up with Estonia, and Slovak voters threw out their authoritarian prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, when it became clear they could not join the EU while he was in power. By 2001, only Bulgaria and Romania were far behind the other candidates.

It became difficult to make a convincing case for a small enlargement of less than ten new members, because the gaps between the candidates had narrowed so much. Poland presented the only real dilemma. Its accession preparations moved in fits and starts, sometimes in step with the other candidates but often falling behind. Some Commission officials were tempted to threaten Poland with entry after the smaller, better-prepared applicants, to force it to get its act together - but the country never dropped far enough behind the other candidates to make such a threat credible. And Poland's size and tragic history, especially in the 20th century, made the country's accession a priority for Germany. 'Enlargement without Poland is not really enlargement', as many German politicians said.

The impact of enlargement on the Union

The new members have started to change Europe's political complexion much more than most diplomats and politicians in the old 15 countries expected. The addition of another two-thirds as many members has put further strain on EU institutions and policies that were already creaking

at 15. But the last year has shown that more important than the expansion of numbers are the views and priorities that the new members have brought in. They have joined one or other coalition of member states on each issue under discussion, changing the political dynamics in areas like tax competition (the new members want more of it), defence (Central and East Europeans are firmly Atlanticist), and Russia (where the new members will want a tougher policy than France, Germany and Italy currently prefer). Although most of the new members are small countries – only Poland has a population of over ten million – they tip the balance of views in the Council on many issues.

Although the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004 will make for a turbulent period of politics over the next few years, Europe will emerge stronger in the longer term. The EU is very bad at strategic planning to prepare itself for foreseeable challenges, but it is quite good at muddling through once a crisis arrives. And the new members will be keen for the EU to function better, so they will work hard to take European integration forward. As a Slovak politician put it, 'We didn't work this hard to join a club that doesn't help us solve our problems.' Even if they are not committed federalists of the old school, the new members are ambitious pragmatists. If they can use their own experience of 15 years of transforming their economies and societies to galvanise the more sclerotic parts of the EU, the new members will soon become the brightest stars on the EU's flag.◇

**This article expresses my personal views, not those of the European Commission.*

Changes in Slovenian Foreign Policy following Accession to the European Union

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With accession to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) the primary goals of Slovenian foreign policy have been accomplished. Membership in the EU, however, has placed the setting of new goals into a new perspective. The void in foreign policy goals, strategies and conduct was to be filled within the framework of the EU's foreign policy, that is, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and external relations. This article points out various aspects of the Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy, understood as the incorporation of institutional, conceptual and behavioural patterns developed within the EU's foreign policy into the construction, organisation and conduct of Slovenian foreign policy.¹ It focuses on the first two of these aspects in order to show the significant influence of EU foreign policy on Slovenian foreign policy and, by pointing out one case in EU foreign policy in which Slovenian foreign policy had a genuine interest, it assesses whether the Europeanisation of Slovenian foreign policy is moving beyond the organisational and declaratory aspects to reveal significant Europeanisation in foreign policy attitudes and conduct.

Changes in Slovenian foreign policy following entry to the EU are most apparent at the organisational level. The Slovenian foreign ministry has undergone a major reorganisation in the last year, which may be directly attributed to membership in the EU and the need to function within the CFSP framework. The second, conceptual change in Slovenian foreign policy can also be observed in the new organisation of the Ministry's work, but even more so in official documents and speeches, particularly those of Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. Whereas the organisational change was triggered by the adaptation of work related to the EU's external relations and the CFSP framework, the roots of the conceptual change are in fact only partly related to the CFSP. At least two other causes can be identified. One is the change in foreign policy priorities following accession to both the EU and NATO. This change relates to the new relations with the EU

but is not directly related to the nature of the EU's foreign policy as such. The second trigger is the challenge posed by the presidency of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which Slovenia holds in 2005.

Before the recent reorganisation, work at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was organised in so-called sectors, which were divided geographically. There were sectors covering neighbouring countries and South-east Europe; Africa, Asia and Latin America and Pacific; North America, Western, Northern and Central Europe; and Eastern Europe. There was also a division of sectors according to issue-areas: questions of international law; multilateral politics; cultural international relations; European integration and economic relations; and NATO. The geographically defined sectors thus did not match any arrangement of relations within the CFSP. Neighbouring countries included member states of the EU, candidate states and Croatia and South-east Europe while the sector covering all of Europe except for Eastern Europe included member states and candidate states. This pattern was logical from the point of view of Slovenian foreign policy.

The issue-area-related sectors indicated two characteristics of Slovenia's foreign policy. First, a somewhat narrow understanding of what the issue-areas of foreign policy as such were. The internal organisation covered only the issues of international law, cultural relations and multilateral politics. Second, an interesting conception of the organisational approach to security can be observed. Though evidently covered in the scope of relations towards neighbouring countries and especially towards South-east Europe, as an issue-area it can only be attributed to the sector for relations with NATO.²

The Ministry's new organisational mode indicates a straightforward adaptation of its work within the frameworks of the EU's external relations and the CFSP. In the geographically-related divisions we can observe the logical change following EU membership. In the conception part, the direct effect of the CFSP is evident. The Ministry is today organised in three big Directorates covering European issues and bilateral relations; policy planning and multilateral politics; and international law and interest protection (including sectors covering international legal matters and diplomatic and consular affairs). The European and bilateral directorate is divided into sectors for the EU; relations with the EU and European Economic

Area member states; relations with the states of the Western Balkans and the EU candidate states, including the Stability Pact for South-east Europe and regional co-operation; Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Americas and the Caribbean; Asia, Africa, Australia and Oceania; and the sector for cultural international relations. The new geographical divisions within the Ministry after the reorganisation show significant alterations due to EU membership. While the previously organisationally-dispersed relations with the countries of Europe are now ordered according to the EU's logic, the rest of the world is also more differentiated; i.e. Slovenia had no interest or need to cover relations with certain parts of the world specifically, like the Caribbean, or to differentiate central Asia from the rest of Asia. The new pattern clearly follows the EU's external relations and the new scope of Slovenian foreign policy, conceived as part of the CFSP. The Directorate for policy planning and multilateral politics is subdivided into sectors covering international relations and human security, security politics, the OSCE, international development co-operation and humanitarian aid, economic diplomacy and policy planning and a research sector. Compared to the Ministry's previous organisation it is easy to note the new level of attention paid to security and human security issues as well as humanitarian aid which may be attributed to the EU's identity in world affairs (in the case of humanitarian aid) and general security-related issues in the world after 9/11 broadly and more narrowly to the European Security Strategy.³

Conceptually, Slovenian foreign policy priorities in the 1990s and up to the first half of 2004 can be conceived in concentric circles. Such a conception was outlined in the Slovenian parliament's 'Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia' in 1999⁴ and reaffirmed in the Government's document 'Appropriate foreign policy' in 2002,⁵ the two steering documents of Slovenian foreign policy up until accession to the EU and NATO. The utmost priorities of Slovenian foreign policy, as proclaimed in the 'Declaration' were accession to the EU and NATO and the settlement of relations with neighbouring countries. These two goals do not appear in a hierarchical relationship. They are then followed by the strategy on relations with European countries and the United States of America; South-east Europe; and the rest of the world. A mention of 'global politics' and regional politics concludes the 'Declaration'. In the Government's document the framework for Slovenian foreign policy is conceived in so-called 'horizons' or 'circles'. It differentiates between

the horizons of the EU; NATO; South-east Europe; Arab states and Israel; and eventually the horizon including Asian, African and Latin American states. Both documents thus organise the foreign policy in concentric circles, understood in geographical terms. Not only does the scope of Slovenian foreign policy show some limitations but the interest is also shaped by an awareness of the limits of reach in geographical terms.

A number of new documents, including the foreign policy chapter in the 'Strategy of the Development of Slovenia (a draft for public debate)',⁶ the 'Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2004' and the 'Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2005'⁷ and the Foreign Minister's speeches as well as official presentations in the Slovenian parliament,⁸ however, reveal a significant switch in relation to the 'concentric circles' conception. The new conception can be seen as 'axis and wheel', whereby the issue-area conception of priorities represents the (broad) axis and the geographical concept is contained in the wheel part. The 'Strategy of the Development of Slovenia (a draft for public debate)' outlines a broad axis with an overarching understanding and strategy of Slovenian foreign policy based on changes and challenges in the international community that are linked to processes of globalisation, interdependence, heterogeneity and the new modes of governance (including regionalisation), as well as to the cohesiveness and consistency of foreign policy. Only then it points out activities within the framework of international institutions, including acceptance of responsibility for maintaining the stability of the international community and support for humanitarian activities and two geographical areas that deserve special attention: the South-east Balkans and the Mediterranean basin. Such a framework is more open and flexible but most significantly it gives priority to the issue-areas of international politics, again recognisably close to the EU's values and goals, and it develops strategies vis-à-vis two geographical regions of direct importance to Slovenia.

The Council's decision on (not) opening up EU accession negotiations with Croatia was the first test of the 'Europeanness' of Slovenian foreign policy. It is an example of the actual conduct of foreign policy in a case where Slovenia's priorities seemed to be at stake. The above-mentioned document on Slovenia's priority tasks for work in the Council stresses support for

Croatian accession to the EU on the basis of respect of the principles applied in previous enlargements, fulfilment of the accession criteria and the conditions set by the European Council at its meeting on 16/17 December 2004.⁹ The European Council reaffirmed its earlier conclusion, urging Croatia to take the necessary steps to ensure full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and clearly stated that the Council's decision to open up accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005 would be subject to the country's full co-operation with the ICTY. Three months later when Carla del Ponte expressed her dissatisfaction with Croatia's co-operation with the ICTY and when the Council was deciding whether to open the negotiations or not, Slovenia (together with Austria, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Ireland and the Slovak Republic) supported the start of accession negotiations.¹⁰

The Slovenian attitude was in line with its priorities for work in the Council, namely support for Croatia's road to the EU and it was understood (justified) as being compatible with the principle of candidate states fulfilling the criteria whereby support was sought through the argument that the criteria calling for 'full co-operation' with the ICTY were not well defined.¹¹ Although it was known beforehand that most likely the Council would not support the opening up of accession negotiations, Slovenia was not alone in its support to commence the negotiations but found itself in the company, among others, of other EU member states geographically close to Croatia (Austria, Hungary, the Slovak Republic) indicating the importance of Croatia's membership in the Union for the region. However, looking more broadly, support for Croatia to start EU accession negotiations despite its less than optimal co-operation with the ICTY points to incomprehension of the importance of the ICTY and international criminal tribunals for the EU. Support for the International Criminal Court is one of the landmarks of European foreign policy attitudes. It significantly shapes the EU's identity and values in world politics.¹²

Whereas the organisational and conceptual ('declaratory') aspects of Slovenian foreign policy reveal the significant impacts of EU membership and the EU's foreign policy and hence the Europeanisation of the organisation and setting of priorities and strategies in foreign policy, the analysis of the first test of Slovenian

foreign policy after accession leads us to the conclusion that the national interest prevailed over 'European' values. In other aspects of Slovenian foreign policy, namely in the bigger geographical scope and broader issue-conception, Slovenia's attitudes have yet to be seen. However, since there are relatively few issues and far-away regions and countries whose problems, relations and other issues directly concern Slovenians, it is hard to predict that the Slovenian attitude will differ in any way from the mainstream ('European') one.◊

¹ The definition of Europeanisation is derived (simplified) from Radaelli's, as a concept which 'consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.' See Claudio M Radaelli, 'Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?', *European Integration Online Papers*, 8 (2004), p. 16, available at: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm>.

² This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the 'Declaration on Slovenian foreign policy' adopted by the Slovenian parliament on 17 December 1999 (available at http://www.gov.si/mzz/zunanja_poli/deklaracij_o_zuna_poli_repu_slov.html), 'NATO and security' appear under the same heading, whereas there is no separate title for 'Security'.

³ The Slovenian government's support for the European Security Strategy supports the argument expressed here. It is seen in various documents, including a publication of the Government Service for European Affairs prepared by its Department for Co-operation: '*Prednostne naloge Republike Slovenije za delo v Svetu Evropske unije v letu 2004*' ['Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2004'], May 2004, Ljubljana, p. 59, available at: [http://www2.gov.si/svez/svez-web.NSF/0/68B2F1366F3825CFC1256E93003084A6/\\$file/Prednostne+naloge.pdf](http://www2.gov.si/svez/svez-web.NSF/0/68B2F1366F3825CFC1256E93003084A6/$file/Prednostne+naloge.pdf) and in the document adopted by the Slovenian parliament: '*Deklaracija o stališčih za začetek delovanja RS v institucijah EU v letu 2004*' ['Declaration on positions on the beginning of work of the Republic of Slovenia in the institutions of the European Union in 2004'], adopted on 12 May 2004, published in the '*Uradni list*' ['Official Journal'] of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 35/02.

⁴ '*Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije*' ['Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia'] adopted by the Slovenian parliament on 17 December 1999 (http://www.gov.si/mzz/zunanja_poli/deklaracij_o_zuna_poli_repu_slov.html)

⁵ '*Primerna zunanja politika*' ['Appropriate foreign policy'], adopted by the government on 10 October 2002, mimeo.

⁶ '*Strategija razvoja Slovenije – osnutek za javno razpravo*' ['Strategy of the Development of Slovenia – a draft for public debate'], June 2004, available at: <http://www.sigov.si/zmar/projekti/srs/srs-osnutek.pdf>.

⁷ '*Prednostne naloge Republike Slovenije za delo v Svetu Evropske unije v letu 2004*' ['Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2004'], May 2004, Ljubljana ([http://www2.gov.si/svez/svez-web.NSF/0/68B2F1366F3825CFC1256E93003084A6/\\$file/Prednostne+naloge.pdf](http://www2.gov.si/svez/svez-web.NSF/0/68B2F1366F3825CFC1256E93003084A6/$file/Prednostne+naloge.pdf)) and '*Prednostne naloge Republike Slovenije za delo v Svetu Evropske unije v letu 2005*'

['Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2005'], May 2005, Ljubljana (http://www.gov.si/svez/menu_top_slo.php).

⁸ The speeches and interviews of Dr Rupel are assembled on the home page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.gov.si/mzz/govori/default.html> and <http://www.gov.si/mzz/minister/mnenja.html>.

⁹ '*Prednostne naloge Republike Slovenije za delo v Svetu Evropske unije v letu 2005*' ['Priority tasks of Slovenia in the Council of the European Union in 2005'], p. 72.

¹⁰ STA ['Slovenian Press Agency']: *EU odložila pristopna pogajanja s Hrvaško* [EU postpones accession negotiations with Croatia], 16 March 2005.

¹¹ The argument can be traced in interviews with Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel and a member of parliament, Jožef Jerovšek, the Chairman of the parliamentary committee for foreign policy. In STA ['Slovenian Press Agency']: *EU odložila pristopna pogajanja s Hrvaško* [EU postpones accession negotiations with Croatia], 16 March 2005.

¹² See Martijn L. P. Groenleer and Louise G. Van Schaik, 'The EU as an international actor: the case of the International Criminal Court', *CFSP Forum*, 2 (6), November 2004.

The Czech Republic and CFSP: One Year after Enlargement

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Choosing a profile

As the Czech Republic joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, it had to prepare for a fundamental change in the overall external framework of its foreign policy that added the EU level to it. It can be seen both as a factor partially limiting its freedom of action, and at the same time an opportunity to multiply its own power by pushing its own foreign policy priorities onto the CFSP agenda and thus gaining the support of the entire EU. An easy option available to Czech diplomacy was to follow the CFSP mainstream in a mostly passive manner. In practice this would be just another phase of the harmonization experience from the period of the accession talks with the EU. Instead, the Czech Republic opted for a more demanding role and an active approach based on setting up several key priority areas to pursue within CFSP and where it can find support among other EU members. This more challenging option also entails the Czech Republic being ready to spend the necessary resources (political, human and financial) to gain long-term support. This article first considers the effect of accession on the Czech diplomatic service, and then considers Czech aims and activities in CFSP in the last year.

Transformation of Czech diplomatic service – effect of Europeanisation

A major transformation gradually taking place over the past year has been the structural change of Czech foreign policy - especially the way it is formulated, implemented and supported throughout Czech society. This change was far more radical than in the case of Czech entry into NATO, especially given the significantly broader scope of CFSP. It brought not only a broadening of horizons of Czech activities, but it also directly affected the Czech foreign service and its functioning. In headquarters there was a new rhythm of regular work established, following the pattern of CFSP activities and preparing Czech position on all issues of CFSP agenda, some of

which were before 2004 only of marginal concern to Czech foreign policy. Higher knowledge of CFSP, including existing *acquis* in their area, is now expected in territorial and multilateral departments and practically every diplomat had to get used to receiving loads of documents from EU bodies, working groups and delegations via the COREU network. This period of adjustment was somewhat facilitated through the observer status that the Czech Republic gained upon signing of EU accession protocols on 16 April 2003, allowing it to have representation (without voting rights) on almost all EU working bodies. Among other things Czech diplomacy relies on existing CFSP databases and specialised intensive training, although major impact stems also from 'hands-on experience' through full participation of its experts in CFSP working groups. Discernible change affected also Czech diplomats in third countries, where Czech embassies now take part in regular consultations in EU-25 format and the drafting of EU reports. The significant increase of coordination meetings in EU-25 format is particularly felt in Czech permanent missions to the UN in New York, Geneva and Vienna.

The Czech Republic already in advance focused on how to translate its foreign policy priorities (see below) into the CFSP context, especially through the policy tools of forming and joining variable coalitions with other EU member states, combined with more permanent groups inside the enlarged EU-25. There are several promising formats in this regard – starting with Visegrad cooperation,¹ potentially combined with Benelux or the Nordic countries. Czech policy also increasingly draws on European interests and general aims that act as an important reference point for its own initiatives. The first year of full experience with the CFSP mechanism also pointed to the importance of internal rules and procedures. Czech diplomacy had to learn carefully how to build coalitions for its sensitive proposals or when to influence EU common positions like for example in the change of policy towards Cuba (see below). Concrete guidance for future Czech policy should be provided in a document on 'Czech accents in CFSP', adopted by the government in March 2005.

CFSP Activities

The government's initial profile in the development, formulation and implementation

of CFSP stresses the following priorities:

- development of the Wider Europe concept and European Neighbourhood Policy , with special emphasis on Eastern and South-eastern Europe and the Middle East;
- support for democracy and human rights;
- measures against WMD proliferation and legislative acts for implementing CFSP *acquis* (EU sanctions).²

The Czech Republic first of all strongly supported the European Neighbourhood Policy and perceives it as both vital for stabilising the region and ensuring its prosperity and social cohesion, which is interlinked with security and prosperity of the EU itself.³ This EU policy is seen as an opportunity for utilising Czech local knowledge and expertise from its transition period. It presented its own assessment on Ukraine and Moldova in 2002 and 2003 and supported the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) into the scope of the Wider Europe initiative. Czech diplomacy could accept an informal deal where the Visegrad format would be used for Eastern Neighbourhood (Eastern Europe – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and Regional Partnership for Southern Neighbourhood (Balkans).⁴

The Czech Republic's new geopolitical situation will be determined by need for a long-term stabilisation of the EU's new external border as affected by necessary slowdown of further enlargement of the EU. A number of crucial states will remain outside of the EU as its direct neighbours (Ukraine, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, etc). The Czech Republic therefore welcomed the new instrument of the EU in this area – European Neighbourhood Policy - although it perceives a number of improvements to it. It would prefer much more detailed Action Plans, offering differentiated treatment based on the conditionality principle, and an active approach with activities targeted on specific groups like university students, local opinion-makers, etc. Two areas are of particular concern to Czech foreign policy: Eastern Europe and Western Balkans.

As for the *Balkans*, Czech activity within the CFSP context included calls for intensive discussions on a future status of Kosovo during the Dutch presidency, which built on a previous strategy paper on Kosovo presented as a joint initiative of the Regional Partnership (the Visegrad countries, Austria, Slovenia) in summer 2004. Serbia and

Montenegro became one of the top priority countries for Czech policy within CFSP, where it therefore pressed for the intensification of EU relations with this country and hoped the process could be accelerated upon publishing the Feasibility Study in April 2005. Yet the Czech position is still strict with conditionality of the cooperation with ICTY, which applies both to Serbia and Croatia (transfer of General Gotovina to the Hague is seen as absolutely vital for further accession talks, but the preference is for an EU common position to be achieved). Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as Serbia and Montenegro are also major recipients of Czech bilateral development aid, and the target of cooperation projects, where EU involvement is welcomed. Czech soldiers contribute to the stability of this region through deployments in KFOR and EUFOR as do Czech policemen, humanitarian workers and civilian administration experts.⁵ Participation in EU operation Althea in Bosnia was nevertheless the source of a domestic row between the government and the right-wing opposition party ODS. Only in mid-December 2004, after heated debate (over the risks of multiple Czech military deployments in four different regions and connected overextension, transfer of operation from NATO under EU command, viability of ESDP, etc.) and protracted delay, did the Czech Parliament authorise the deployment of up to 90 men to EUFOR (including the vertical lift capability of an Mi-17 helicopter unit, which should be a significant contribution of a specialized asset).

Eastern Europe is seen as an even more diversified region, starting with Belarus facing problems of authoritarian regime (thus not meeting basic principles of conditionality, yet also requiring special assistance programmes for the democratic opposition and strengthening civil society) and Moldova facing an internally divided country with a frozen conflict in Transdnestria. Czech diplomacy was particularly active in forming the EU policy here, stressing problems of human and arms trafficking, and of the need to appoint an EU Special Representative (the Czech candidate eventually lost to a Dutch candidate). Even more important was of course Ukraine and its Orange Revolution, where the Czech Republic supported the democratic opposition, called firmly for rejecting the results of the rigged elections, but was rather less visible than either Poland or Lithuania. In addition to bilateral activities it nevertheless supported an active role of the EU, especially of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana. A country that stands out of ENP, and as a special case is

perceived also by Czech policy, is Russia. The Czech republic is not absolutely happy with the bilateral deals and concessions offered regularly by the large EU countries (especially Germany, Italy and France) and stresses the need for an impartial assessment of the state of democracy and market economy in Russia. It is also interested in inducing Russia to become a cooperative partner in several frozen conflicts on its borders, especially in the Caucasus.

Support for democracy and human rights represents an issue area that made the Czech policy within CFSP publicly visible over the first 12 months of its EU membership. The question at stake concerned the change in EU policy towards *Cuba*, where a majority of the EU-25 agreed on the limited impact of sanctions imposed on Cuba in June 2003 after massive imprisonment of Cuban dissidents. Spain was leading a group of EU countries that favoured a complete withdrawal of sanctions and making some welcoming steps towards Fidel Castro upon freeing few dissidents. Czech Republic was, on the other hand, pushing for only conditional removal of sanctions combined with further dialogue with democratic opposition in Cuba. Careful negotiations of an EU declaration that lasted for several weeks culminated in a compromise that satisfied Czech concerns, but was later damaged by public comments by the Czech foreign minister. Media attention was thus focused on the symbolic issue of whether Cuban dissidents would be invited to official state holiday parties organized in Havana by individual EU embassies (as the Czech Republic preferred to keep this option open to decision by embassies) or not (as Spain upon pressure from Cuban authorities insisted on). The main point of support for human rights in Cuba was thus almost lost. Czech official diplomacy was effectively assisted in its effort to explain its position by an article written by Czech ex-president Vaclav Havel and published in *Le Figaro* shortly before the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on 31 January 2005. Czech diplomacy learned how to draw support from some big and smaller EU states (Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Denmark), but also found that other states it counted upon (United Kingdom and Netherlands) were hesitant to burn their fingers.⁶

In the last priority issue of the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation, Czech policy focused on adding the Hamas movement to the EU list of terrorist organizations, on balancing EU policy towards Israel and Palestine (calling for the fight against terrorism, including reform of

Palestinian security structures, to be put as an important issue on the agenda of EU-Palestinian Authority talks), on supporting direct EU engagement in Iraq and on preferring a cautious approach towards Iran regarding its nuclear programme.

Except for the interesting case of the clash over Cuba, media attention correctly focused also on a personal success of the Czech candidate, Karel Kovanda (the former Czech ambassador to NATO), who was chosen as Deputy Director General at DG RELEX, with his portfolio covering CFSP/ESDP issues, relations with international organisations (UN, OSCE, etc) and other highly developed countries.

The Czech experience with CFSP one year after it joined the EU is a mixed one. It managed the institutional challenges of foreign policy adaptation, but only gradually prepared a list of priorities to pursue within the CFSP context. It managed to get some of them translated into EU action, but so far without a major public success comparable to Polish policy towards Ukraine. Only the ensuing months and years will truly show whether the Czech Republic can be more active, innovative and successful in this area.◇

¹ See the commitment to continue with Visegrad cooperation format within the EU-25 in *Visegrad Declaration 2004*, 12 May 2004 Kromeriz, available at: <http://www.visegradgroup.org/declaration/Visegraddeclaration2004.pdf>.

² See the regular report presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament, *Priorities of Czech Foreign Policy for Year 2004*.

³ See *Draft Basis of the Czech Republic's Direction in the EU framework until 2013*, Government discussion paper, February 2004.

⁴ See CTK (Czech Press Agency), 12 April 2004 *CR chce mít i ve společné bezpečnostní politice EU své priority (The Czech Republic wants to have in the EU CFSP its own priorities too)*.

⁵ 400 Czech troops together with 100 Slovak troops serve as Czech-Slovak Battalion in KFOR and they should be further reinforced from late summer 2005 by up to 200 troops, taking over command of one of the KFOR Task Force (until now under Finnish command). In 2005, up to 90 troops will be deployed in Bosnia as part of EUFOR.

⁶ For a full account of this interesting case see Katerina Safarikova, 'Evropský poker o kubanský doutník' (European poker over Cuban cigar), *Lidové noviny*, 30 April 2005.

Cyprus and CFSP: One Year after Accession

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This essay addresses three key issues: Cyprus' foreign policy alignment with the Union's CFSP and its particular interest in enhancing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; its participation in the development and implementation of the ESDP; and the EU's expected contribution to the normalisation of the Republic's relations with Turkey as a means to settling the former's political problem.

CFSP and Cyprus

While a candidate country, Cyprus began adapting its foreign policy to the Union's own. Participating regularly in EU political dialogue, Cyprus had frequently aligned its positions to the Union's, whenever it was invited to do so in terms of sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and démarches. Following the December 2002 European Council and, especially, after signing the Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003, Cyprus participated in various meetings, conferences, and workshops concerned with the CFSP in its broader sense. It also enlarged its collaboration with the EU in such international organisations and regimes as the UN, the OSCE, and the WTO. In its (autumn 2003) Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Cyprus' Preparation for Membership, the European Commission found that Cyprus 'is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations in the chapter on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and is expected to be able to participate in the political dialogue and to align with EU statements, sanctions and restrictive measures by accession'. Cyprus' administrative structures required for the implementation of the Union's *acquis* in the CFSP area were found to be 'in place and satisfactory'. Moreover, since 1 May 2004, Cyprus actively participates in the development of the Union's *acquis* related to the CFSP, concerning either legally binding international agreements or political agreements. Without derogation, Cyprus has aligned its foreign policy with the EU's decisions, common positions, strategies and statements, applying sanctions and/or restrictive measures when the Council so decided. In short, Cyprus has assumed a

constructive and energetic role in the Union's CFSP on a day-to-day basis.

Regarding the Barcelona Process, Cyprus is particularly interested in helping to enhance the EU's relations with the Mediterranean neighbours and partners. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has noted that, long enjoying strong commercial, political and cultural bonds with both Europe and the Middle East, 'Cyprus is ideally placed to play the role of a catalyst in order to achieve a greater convergence of policies for the resolution of problems in the Euromed area'. Thus, Cyprus expects that 'the EU will be able to benefit from its close and excellent relations with the countries of the region, in further strengthening and enriching its relations and enhancing cooperation with the Mediterranean partners and in further enhancing the Mediterranean dimension of the European Union's policy priorities'. More specifically, Cyprus supports the creation of 'a regional programme for the coordination of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership States in the fight against organised crime and terrorism and for tackling issues such as immigration, human exchanges and judicial questions'. In addition, it stresses that 'exchanges between Civil Society organisations in the Euromed area could contribute significantly towards achieving all aspirations of the Barcelona Process'. Cyprus also 'supports the establishment of a regional programme for women that will lead to sustainable action in favour of equal opportunities for both genders in the Euro-Med Partnership'. Last but not least, the Republic of Cyprus 'firmly believes in the benefits to be accrued from the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area'.²

ESDP and Cyprus

Cyprus embraces the scope and objectives of the ESDP. It holds that the EU should 'have the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises, by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field'.³ Cyprus has also endorsed the EU's Security Strategy, as adopted by the European Council on December 2003. The Republic recognises the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, and insists that all EU-led operations should be undertaken in line with the UN Charter. Further, Cyprus treasures the enhancement of EU cooperation and collaboration with other regional organisations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, in crisis prevention and crisis management

operations. Accordingly, it has decided to contribute, 'within the ambit of its abilities', to the efforts of the EU at acquiring the capability to undertake the Petersberg tasks. To this end, Cyprus has contributed 30 policemen, of whom 10 can be rapidly deployed, and has declared that 'if needed, Cyprus stands ready to increase its contribution'. In case of an EU military operation in its vicinity, 'Cyprus would be willing to also contribute with facilities on the ground'.⁴ During the various EU Capabilities Commitment Conferences, Nicosia made specific contributions for ESDP military operations in niche capabilities and infrastructure. More recently, during the Brussels Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Cyprus offered a medical unit and made available infrastructure for the EU's battlegroups.⁵

Cyprus has been participating in the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina with six police officers and in the EUPOL Proxima in FYROM with three police officers. During Operation Artemis, the first EU autonomous military-led mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus seconded one senior military officer at the Operational Headquarters in Paris. This was Cyprus' first participation in an EU-UN Peace Operation. To date, Cyprus has not participated either in the EUPOL Kinshasa operation in Congo or in the EUJUST Lex operation in Iraq. However, the Nicosia government 'fully supports ESDP's Petersberg tasks and is looking forward to future participation in the Union's operations'.⁶

Although a member state now, Cyprus (with Malta) is prevented from full ESDP participation. The Copenhagen European Council decided that only those member states that are simultaneously members of either NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP) are eligible for the ESDP operations that use NATO assets.⁷ Hence, Cyprus and Malta, two European states that do not fulfil this criterion, cannot participate in such ESDP missions. Likewise, their representatives cannot participate or vote in EU institutions and bodies - including the Political and Security Committee - regarding decisions on the implementation of such operations, nor are they allowed to receive EU classified information containing or referring to classified NATO information.

One year after the EU's latest enlargement, some problems have surfaced regarding EU-NATO cooperation.⁸ Until last May, EU and NATO diplomats regularly met to discuss security issues under the Berlin Plus agreement. However, Malta and Cyprus cannot participate in these meetings,

given Turkey's objection on the ground that they are not PfP members. Furthermore, Turkey insists that NATO should not transmit classified information to the EU because Cyprus or Malta have not concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO, hence 'they cannot be trusted'. As a result, NATO and the EU cannot share classified information or discuss serious security issues.

While Turkey blocks Cyprus and Malta from participating in the EU-NATO meetings, the two EU member states have not shown interest in acceding to the PfP. Malta joined the PfP in 1995 but left that regime the next year. The Nicosia government has argued that there is neither an immediate political incentive nor the proper political and social consensus to assume accession to the PfP.⁹ However, the Social-democratic Party (EDEK), with two ministers in the Republic's cabinet, as well as the main opposition party (DHSY), are promoting the idea of PfP accession.

In early May 2005, Cyprus rejected Turkey's bid to be associated with the Union's European Defence Agency.¹⁰ A Cypriot representative argued that 'since Turkey blocks Cyprus' participation in the EU-NATO political dialogue, Cyprus couldn't support Turkey's request'. Analysts in Brussels and Nicosia, stressing that Cyprus' full EU accession can no longer be ignored, suggest that the EU and NATO should work out alternative options to facilitate their collaboration.¹¹ The ball, however, is in Ankara's court and major EU and NATO member states know the way to change Turkey's attitude. In April 2005, in a surprise move, Prime Minister Tony Blair asked his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to reconsider his country's policy concerning NATO-EU co-operation and Cyprus' corresponding participation.¹²

Cyprus, Turkey, and EU's potential role for Cyprus

Cyprus seeks to normalise its bilateral relations with Turkey, a candidate state that refuses to recognize the Cypriot government. Last December, Cyprus supported Turkey's accession prospects. Now it requires the latter's change of attitude. Cyprus' support is premised on the condition that Turkey would sign and implement the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, as a first step towards normalising their relations. Hence Cyprus aims at an EU common position that would demand from Ankara the said normalisation and the removal of all restrictions that Turkey imposes on Cyprus. In particular, Nicosia expects the Union to endorse Turkey's

obligation to sign and implement the Protocol expanding the Ankara agreement and to terminate all restrictions it imposes on Cypriot-flagged vessels. In addition, Cyprus demands that Turkey ceases to block its participation in international organisations and regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and OECD. Finally, Nicosia expects the EU's support in committing Turkey to the rational and fair settlement of the Cyprus Problem - that is, within the framework of the UN and in accordance with the principles, values and norms on which the Union is founded.

A common position on Turkey was agreed among the EU-25 and presented at the EU-Turkey Association Council on 26 April 2005. According to Cyprus' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cyprus achieved for the first time the inclusion of a reference calling for the implementation of the Protocol expanding the Ankara Agreement to cover all new EU member-states, as a step towards the normalisation of Turkey's relations with all member states, including the Republic of Cyprus.'¹³ Moreover, the EU-25 common position calls for the normalisation of 'Turkey's bilateral relations with all member-states, including the Republic of Cyprus'. The EU 'looks forward to Turkey's continuous support for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the framework of the United Nations and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded'. Furthermore, the EU points out the need for 'Turkey to implement fully and quickly the European Court of Human Rights decisions and to change its policy of obstructing Cyprus' participation in various international organisations'. It also calls on Turkey to 'terminate its restrictions on vessels under the Cyprus flag or on Cypriot vessels approaching Turkish ports'.

Having already proven good faith, the Nicosia government now aims beyond 'normalisation'. During Turkey's accession negotiations, it intends to raise some crucial political issues: first, the illegal presence of over 35,000 Turkish troops occupying 37% of the Republic's (and therefore EU's) territory; second, the unceasing flow of illegal Turkish settlers, whose number now exceeds 116,000; and third, the legally condemned exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties in the occupied 'North'. Nicosia treats these issues as 'the international aspects of the Cyprus problem', which have forced the European Court of Human Rights to condemn Turkey in such decisions as 'Loizidou vs. Turkey', 'Cyprus vs. Turkey', and 'Aresti-Xenide vs. Turkey'.

Though the Nicosia Government recognises the

UN's role in the efforts to settle Cyprus' political issue, it also seeks the EU's active role to the same end. Nicosia is eager that the Union play a vital role in ascertaining the settlement's compatibility with the *acquis* and the EU's founding principles. The nomination of Mr. Jaako Blomberg, as Commissioner Olli Rehn's special advisor for Cyprus, was warmly welcomed by Nicosia. Let us recall here that, according to Cyprus' Accession Treaty, 'the European Union is ready to accommodate the terms of a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded'. In the event of a settlement, 'the Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the adaptations to the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish Cypriot Community'.¹⁴

Nicosia believes that the EU can play a pivotal role in promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By closely monitoring the ongoing Regulation 866/2004 and by cooperating with the Government of Cyprus, the EU can guarantee that Turkish Cypriots enjoy the benefits of Accession. The Government also supports the allocation of EUR 259 million to the Turkish Cypriots, as long as the Commission monitors its spending, so as to facilitate the island's economic integration and to improve contact between the two communities and the EU itself. Clearly, the Union can ascertain that improving the Turkish Cypriots' socio-economic standards serves the end of Cypriot reunification and not the entrenchment of the illicit status quo.

As regards the issue of 'direct trade between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU', Nicosia has proposed returning Varosha - the closed/ghost section of the city of Famagusta - to its legitimate inhabitants under the control of the Government of Cyprus. The proposal includes opening the town's port under the administration of an independent Greek-Turkish Cypriot non-profit organization, through which Greek and Turkish Cypriots could export their goods to the EU. The Nicosia government also proposes the use of Larnaka port for Turkish Cypriots' export of goods to the EU and the rest of the world. Turkey, however, has rejected to date the double proposal, maintaining that the EU should bypass the authorities of Cyprus and start direct trade with the Turkish Cypriot 'authorities'.◇

¹ The author would like to thank his colleagues at KIMEDE and especially the chairman, Professor Melakopides, for their useful comments.

² Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cyprus and the EU-Mediterranean Partnership' (Information also

available on the web at www.mfa.gov.cy).

³ Interview with an official of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs who asked not to be named.

⁴ Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cyprus and CFSP/ESDP' (Information also available on the web at www.mfa.gov.cy).

⁵ Military Capability Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004.

⁶ See endnote 3.

⁷ European Council of Copenhagen 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions. Annex II.

⁸ Judy Dempsey, 'EU and NATO vie to Set Trans-Atlantic Agenda', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 February 2005; Judy Dempsey, 'For EU and NATO, Snags over Intelligence', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 November 2004.

⁹ *Simerini* (a Cypriot daily newspaper), 1 March 2005.

¹⁰ *Phileleftheros* and *Simerini* (Cypriot daily newspapers), 3 May 2005.

¹¹ See, for example, Hans Binnendijk, 'Talking security', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 April 2005.

¹² *Turkish Daily News*, 'Now There's a Cyprus Crisis in NATO', 23 February 2005.

¹³ Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Common Position on Turkey', 22 April 2005.

¹⁴ Accession Treaty, Protocol 10.

The Impact of CFSP on Bulgaria's Foreign Policy

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The 'European project' has grown so as to have a major impact on nearly all aspects of European politics and a deep influence on the societies of the participating states, even on states outside the union, for instance of the many states applying to become members of the European Union.¹

By June 2004, *all chapters* in the membership negotiations between the EU and Bulgaria had been closed. Chapters 26 and 27 were among those that provoked no problems – both were officially opened for negotiation in May 2000 and closed in November and June of the same year, respectively.² All five of the subsequent European Commission progress reports underlined the compliance of Bulgarian legislation with the CFSP *acquis*, and Brussels has judged that Bulgaria will be able to adopt and implement the entire CFSP *acquis* by the time of accession; so far there has been a general lack of requests for derogation or transitional periods on both sides. Substantial convergence between Bulgaria's foreign policy and the EU's CFSP is evident.

The seemingly easy negotiations were preceded by an uneasy and hard five years for Bulgarian society and the country's foreign policy processes. The most noteworthy problems were:

- Embedding the foreign policy change/reorientation after the transition in mass perceptions and attitudes (including foreign policy values, priorities and orientation towards alliances and engagement);
- Re-constructing and establishing the new institutional and legal network of external relations;
- Attaining a wide and stable national consensus on the scope, dimensions and range of foreign policy priorities, specifically on the need for EU and NATO membership in the first place (and not just for security considerations);
- Grasping the cognitive dynamics of the new experiences as a new actor establishing a new image and status in the relevant international milieu;
- Assessing and re-vitalising foreign policy as

national asset and a means to achieve national goals.

Negotiations related to CFSP were not and are not in the centre of public debate, nor have they raised substantial controversies within elite and public opinion. It is tempting to speculate about the Europeanising of the society and national discourse, but in my opinion this manifestly high degree of consensus is predominantly due *inter alia* also to:

- some lack of knowledge and sufficient information about biases and blunders in the seemingly-smooth mechanics of intergovernmental cooperation in CFSP;
- the tradition among ruling elites to assume that negotiating on CFSP is their business, and to take national consensus for granted;
- the wish to comply with the ultimate end of EU membership;
- a certain underestimation of the CFSP in the public debate and the media as it was not closely related to mass expectations about the benefits of EU membership.

An important dimension of integration for Bulgaria is the output that the EU provides which Bulgaria alone cannot: Europeanisation, welfare and security.³ Similar to any other country, Bulgaria's foreign policy preferences depend on: long-lasting national political and security orientations; security culture (overburdened by historical memory, prejudices and misperceptions on an individual and group level); geopolitical position (clear-cut notions and understanding of unique, favourable changes); interests (quite often an unclear and contestable articulation, save for the consensual perception of European values and Euro-Atlantic priorities).

In Bulgaria, there is a gradual and slow transition from a foreign policy decision-making approach (both in the realist and neo-realist versions) towards a pragmatic, adaptation approach.⁴ Integration and EU activities are predominantly seen as a mix of cooperation between states (within CFSP), the making of common and binding decisions (particularly in the Community realm), and the transnationalisation of society and the economy.⁵

Since 1994, Bulgaria has been invited to join various EU endeavours, common positions and *demarches*. It has done so consistently, including support for negative measures against third countries whatever the cost. Bulgaria established and sustains excellent relations with all of its neighbours, a formidable historical

accomplishment in itself for the Balkans. In its relations with third countries, Bulgaria is keen on its active and promising role in promoting regional cooperation and stabilisation in South-Eastern Europe, where it participates in all subregional and multilateral initiatives and bodies, supporting and joining all important missions and projects. Government officials emphasise the important stabilisation role Sofia has played during the prolonged Balkan crises, which is likely to reinforce the Union's ability to cope with similar crises in the future – beside contributing to overall security.⁶

Bulgaria's main foreign policy accomplishments over the past year include: NATO membership; chairing the UN Security Council; clear and real engagements in international anti-terrorist campaigns (Iraq included); chairing the OSCE; European Parliament assent to Bulgarian accession; and signing the Accession Treaty on 26 April 2005. In compliance with obligations stemming from CFSP participation the following should be specifically stressed:

- Bulgaria accepted and realised in its diplomacy EU world-wide priorities, notably South America (visits by the President, Speaker of the National Assembly and Foreign Minister – all commented on in public discourse), Northern Africa (including a complicated and sensitive humanitarian problem with Libya), the Near East and Transcaucasia, Asia;
- Further concentration on cooperation and participation in EU policies in South-Eastern Europe;
- Sofia joined EU positions in international organisations (UN, WTO, WIPO, WHO, FAO, OSCE, etc);
- Further development of bilateral relations with EU member states;
- Substantial efforts were made to increase the administrative and intellectual capacity to develop and realise foreign and alliance policy as an EU member state (a Diplomatic Institute was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; dialogue with the public and NGOs was institutionalised);
- Optimisation of administrative structures in compliance with member state experience (including the new member states);
- Launching a renovated communication and information strategy;
- Sofia joined ranks with the EU and its member states in specific cases: Georgia, Ukraine.

For the period 2004-05 in regard to CFSP three major events are of importance in shaping Bulgaria's particular positions:

- the constitutional treaty;
- the experience and specific acts and assessments of the new member states;
- the Iraq divide and its implications for the conceptual/doctrinal development of ESDP.

The first raises the question about the role of small countries in the enlarged EU. Although Bulgaria's integration policy still has to be developed, it is reasonable to expect that the country will align with new and old small member states, to maintain and reinforce the Community method so as to sustain an acceptable and more equal role in decision-making, and to defend specific national interests (or national perceptions and interpretations of common interests).⁷

Bulgaria will abstain at least initially from long-term options for coalitions, taking sides, etc – following the experience of the new member states in relation to declared or perceived national interests and their balance with European public goods. In particular it still lacks the experience and complexity of multiple coalition-building in a large Union.⁸ The *directoire* option makes a small and brand new member state understandably uncomfortable.

Bulgaria supported 'double-hatting' – the EU foreign minister – to maximise continuity and improve the efficiency of the Union's representation and role in world matters, including the right to make CFSP initiatives (thus increasing the 'European reflex' in this area).⁹ Support was given to both flexibility and structured cooperation (due to concerns about Bulgaria's limited resources).

For elites and society, an Atlanticist foreign policy is naturally accepted: the USA is the security guarantor and NATO's leader. A unipolar international system, with the pole as a democratic, strong and physically distant country, is considered an acceptable and appropriate structure with fixed rules of the game, providing a sufficient level of security. So Bulgaria signed the 'Letter of the Eight' ('new Europeans'), and sent and supports a battalion of 500 men in Iraq. One should not forget that in 2001-02, Bulgarian society was uncertain about its place in Europe as a wanted and equal partner/ally, and there were and still are some differences in the perceptions about situations and threats far from Brussels but close to Sofia.¹⁰

The government, elite and majority of the public see no conflict or imbalance between the two priorities, European and Atlantic. Rather it is an

explicit, balanced dual asymmetry in excellence: military-security and operation for NATO; economic, welfare, social and the non-military dimensions of security (broadly understood), for the EU. NATO rather than the EU is and will remain the most important security organisation for Bulgaria – the farther to the east and south a country is, the greater its dependence on NATO operational capabilities as a deterrent against security threats. ESDP is seen a complimentary to this.¹¹ Bulgaria welcomed and supports the emerging ESDP as a policy to reinforce the Union's contribution to peace and stability on the continent and elsewhere – in compliance with its strategic goals of EU and NATO membership.

We share the view that being able to deliver an effective security and defence policy is essential for EU credibility – increased crisis-management capabilities under ESDP are a vital element of security policy. With participation in CFSP and ESDP, the importance given to the European Security Strategy will grow.¹²

Strategic culture¹³ in Bulgaria, preoccupied with security and inclusion, is rooted in history and geopolitics – the territories lost in the Balkan and World Wars, all neighbours being one-time war enemies, etc. No wonder there are widespread feelings of insecurity. Hence the need to make a choice of a security guarantor amidst great powers. At the beginning of the 1990s, Bulgaria was again in a state of diplomatic insulation with its international standing questioned (just like after World War II), and the salient issues were territorial defence, credible international guarantees, engagement. There were then two years of public discussion about neutrality as a policy option. But once the choice was made for NATO, a national consensus was reached, and public attention shifted to economic reforms and welfare matters. No wonder there was no public discourse about ESDP.

So what we see is the presence of both *defensive culture* ('avoid wars – wars don't pay'; historical memories and narratives) and *activist culture* (adaptation policy). September 11 marked a turn to an orientation towards soft security policy instruments, the growth of 'We the Europeans' identity and 'Our European values'. My point is that there is growing awareness of the European context. Somewhat clear evidence in this respect is the new National Security Strategy adopted by the government, which reflects the European Security Strategy.¹⁴

Sofia supports the Union's overall approach to both the military and civilian dimensions of

conflict prevention and crisis management and has repeatedly stated its willingness to contribute to future EU military operations and to participate in their definition and development. But Bulgaria is and will be against involving or deploying its forces in neighbouring countries even for peacekeeping missions.

Over the last year Atlanticism has been questioned, due to the developments regarding EU membership, and the developments (or lack of them) in Iraq, including the failure to secure some semi-promised benefits (not least Iraqi debt to Bulgaria) from the loyalty shown to the US.¹⁵

To sum up, Bulgaria in the last several years was slowly but steadily advancing towards a committed European posture in security and defence matters, and proof of this is the development of a 'European reflex' in foreign policy.

The looming coveted membership of the Union to be sure stimulates a more positive and enlightened attitude in particular towards CFSP/ESDP. So Bulgaria's stance is evolving to that of a committed member of EU and NATO. In the CFSP/ESDP field, Bulgaria will be a constructive member of the Union, duly assuming and fulfilling its obligations in terms of crisis management or relevant foreign policy initiatives. It is realistic to expect that stability in South-Eastern Europe and close ties with the US and NATO will be Bulgaria's priorities at the time of accession.

Needless to say, as and when it is an EU member state, Bulgaria will support and vote for further enlargement. The Black Sea region is qualified as sensitive for our foreign policy. As by 2007 the Western Balkans will be encircled by a ring of EU (and NATO) member states, Sofia will actively support and help the countries in question – for the sake of an irreversible transformation of the region into a zone of stability, peace and cooperation. ♦

¹ Morten Kelstrup, *Integration Policy: Between Foreign Policy and Diffusion*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 17/2000, p. 3.

² For an earlier report on the subject, see R. Stefanova, 'Bulgaria', in Antonio Missiroli, ed., *Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP? The View from Central Europe*, European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 24, April 2002, pp. 52-6.

³ Kelstrup, *Integration Policy*, part 5.1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, part 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, part 4.2.

⁶ The author largely relies on private interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 'Euro-Atlantic Integration and International Security' Department, the Ministry of Economy, and the National Security Service, Sofia, January – March 2005.

⁷ See Christian Franck and Dorota Pyszna-Nigge, *New Members*,

IGC and the Constitutional Treaty: Positions of Acceding Countries from Central Europe in the Debate on The EU's Future. Second annual report for the project 'CEEC-DEBATE' (the debate on the *finalité politique* of the EU in the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe), Université Catholique de Louvain, October 2004, p. 10.

⁸ On the complexity of integration policy, see Bjorn Moller, *Privatisation of Conflict, Security and War*, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper no. 2005/2, pp. 4-8.

⁹ See Franck and Pyszna-Nigge, *New Members*, p. 27.

¹⁰ Sofia supports the continued political and military engagement and presence of the US in Europe, especially in South-Eastern Europe. It is noteworthy that the most ardent supporters of NATO and US primacy in military and security matters are the professional military, while professionals from law enforcement are more pro-EU. The wider defence establishment's readiness to participate in or support military interventions elsewhere can be traced to its desire to acquire experience. Politicians are more sensitive to public opinion and criticisms.

¹¹ Article V of the Washington Treaty is still more credible if not more appealing to new members than Article V of the WEU treaty, though the last one will be subject to closer cooperation as foreseen in the constitutional treaty. See Franck and Pyszna-Nigge, *New Members*, p. 8.

¹² On the ESS see Sven Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security', in *Securité and Stratégie*, Royal Defence College Paper no. 82, Brussels, March 2004. On country-specific divergences, see Anna Michalski and Matthias Heise, *European Convention on the Future of Europe: An Analysis of the Official Positions of EU Member States, Future Member States, Applicant and Candidate States*, The Clingendael Institute, Working Paper, April 2003; Olaf Osica, 'A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as Seen from Warsaw's Perspective', *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, vol. 5, no. 14, 14 October 2004.

¹³ We adhere to the notion of strategic culture in Stine Heiselberg, *Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture within the European Security and Defence Policy?* Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper no. 2, April 2003, pp. 3-7.

¹⁴ This document is still a mix of President George Bush's National Security Strategy and the ESS.

¹⁵ See Martin Zaborowski, *From America's Protégé to Constructive European: Polish Security Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 56, December 2004, pp. 5-9.