

FORNET

www.fornet.info



A network of research and teaching
on European Foreign Policy
(funded by the European Commission)

CFSP Forum

Volume 3, Issue 2

March 2005

Note from the Editor

Spyros Economides, London School of Economics,
Guest Editor

The theme of this issue is the EU's evolving relationship with Southeastern Europe and with the Western Balkans in particular. The contributors, practitioners and academics alike, assess both broad strategies and particular instruments with which the EU tackles a region which offered CFSP its first challenge and which arguably still remains its major foreign policy test. Conditionality, prospective enlargement, regional co-operation and military engagement are all simultaneously at play in the EU's policy towards Southeastern Europe and the question still remains whether there is a coherent, overarching vision to this policy.

Contents

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| EU Foreign Policy in the Balkans | 1 |
| SEE Progress to Accession | 3 |
| Accession Conditionality after 2004 | 7 |
| Regional Cooperation in SEE | 10 |
| The EU Military Operation in Bosnia | 12 |
| Call for Papers | 15 |

EU Foreign Policy in the Balkans: A Credibility Test

Alexandros Yannis, Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs –Western Balkans, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, Belgium*

CFSP was to a certain extent born in the Balkans. This was probably due more to necessity than to choice. History and geography compelled the EU, during its first days of building a common foreign policy in the early 1990's, to plunge headlong into the management of crisis in the Balkans.

Today, while the Balkans are calmer, world priorities are shifting, and the EU's foreign policy ambitions and interests are global, geography and geopolitics continue to impose the Balkans as a top priority for the EU. The objective now is to set the Balkans on an irreversible course towards self-sustaining stability. This is far from done and it remains a tough challenge.

For the EU, stabilising the Balkans is as much about finishing business in the region as it is about building the EU's credibility as a global actor in foreign affairs. The Balkans are in Europe and at the borders of the EU, and therefore the stability and development of the region are of as much interest to the EU as they are to the peoples of the region. Balkan problems, if not checked and resolved, can easily spill over into the EU. In this context, trafficking of peoples and drugs, and other forms of organised crime immediately come to mind.

However, the importance of the Balkans is also critical to the very credibility of EU foreign

policy. The High Representative Javier Solana has encapsulated this challenge by stating that, 'we cannot fail in the Balkans'. The EU's credibility as a global actor in foreign affairs inevitably requires successful management of the Balkans for the simple reason that the EU cannot nurture the pretensions of a global actor and a role in 'far away places', if it cannot stabilise its own immediate neighbourhood.

The Balkans without doubt were a largely European responsibility from the very beginning of the crisis in the region, when Jacques Poos, then Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, speaking as the President of the EU Foreign Minister's Council prematurely declared that 'the hour of Europe has come'. However, divisions, frustration and paralysis dominated the initial European response to the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the accompanying inter-ethnic violence and Balkan wars of the 1990s; the days when, in the words of David Owen, EU mediator in former-Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995, 'the member states of the European Union and their Foreign Ministers did accept responsibility...but they never exercised power'.

The EU has not only fully accepted its responsibility in the Balkans, but it is now providing leadership and direction in the region. EU diplomacy, military and police operations, financial and technical assistance and, above all, the vision of eventual membership to the EU are today the driving forces of stabilisation in the region.

The period 1999-2000 can be considered the turning point. First, the EU started fostering a more coherent policy and vision vis-à-vis the region. This was due to gradual recognition within the EU of the member states' shared strategic interest in the stabilisation of the Balkans. The problems in the Balkans were soon elevated to European ones, and there was increasing agreement that any viable solution would have to be a European solution.

The perspective of EU membership was first promised in June 1999 in the founding document of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, in itself a major departure point towards a more coherent approach in the region. In the Presidency Conclusions of the Feira European Council a year later, the promise of eventual EU membership provided additional impetus. The Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 reconfirmed the EU perspective of the Balkans and extended to the region pre-accession instruments employed in the enlargement process of Central

and Eastern Europe. Today, the Stabilisation and Association process (Sap), which prepares the countries in the region for their eventual EU membership, has become the EU strategic framework that aims to consolidate stability and secure the future of the region within the EU.

A second, and dramatic, change in the context of the Balkans was the victory of democratic forces in Serbia in October 2000 and the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. This enabled a more proactive EU policy towards the region as the countries in the Balkans, one by one, were all now able to provide constructive and forward looking leadership as interlocutors with the EU. Integration with the EU emerged as a shared objective in the region and willingness to cooperate with the EU became a critical factor in relations with the EU.

Finally, over the last four to five years the EU has started developing the capacity to manage international problems – beginning to put its capabilities on a par with its ambitions. The establishment in 1999 of the position of the High Representative for the CFSP considerably strengthened the EU's ability to become a key player in the Balkans. Prominent examples were the High Representative's leading role in managing the crisis in FYROM in 2001 and in mediating the constitutional dispute between Serbia and Montenegro in 2002.

The development of capacities to launch civilian, police and military operations further enhanced the credibility of the EU as a leading actor in the region. EU Special Representatives were appointed in FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a EU Special Representative promoting regional cooperation was appointed to lead the Stability Pact. In 2003, a police mission was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina and soon after a military mission in FYROM, which was then followed-up by a EU police mission. More recently in December 2004, the EU launched a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to replace SFOR.

In this spectacularly transformed landscape in the Balkans where the EU has assumed a leading role, and amid shifting global priorities and challenges, let us imagine for a moment that things again go wrong and that the region slides back into crisis and violence. The EU is likely to be singled out for blame. Enormous political and human resources, as well as financial investment, will be virtually wiped out. The EU would once again have to expend its energy on painstaking political, diplomatic and other crisis management efforts to redress the situation. But what would be particularly disastrous for the EU would be the

blow to its credibility as a global actor in foreign affairs: its credibility in the eyes of its partners and the world at large would be seriously tarnished; its ability to provide leadership in its neighbourhood, let alone in 'far away places', would be put into question. The Balkans relapsing into crisis would even challenge the essence of one of the greatest historical achievements of the EU: peace through integration and conflict prevention through enlargement; arguably, the biggest current foreign policy assets of the EU, at least on the European continent. This becomes particularly relevant when considering that progress in the Balkans is not yet irreversible. The problems are known and there are still several hard challenges.

Kosovo, probably the most prominent pending issue, is still in search of a viable political settlement that will enable it to focus on the key challenges of reforms, institution building and economic development to ensure that it does not become a black hole or a failed state inside Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has some distance to cover before the state and its peoples will be glued definitively together in such a way as to be able to invest all their resources and energy to accelerate reforms with the objective of membership of the EU. Stability in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as in FYROM and Albania are not totally irreversible either. Croatia appears to have made the quantum leap forward but

whether it will be the rule or the exception in the region will be decided in the next few critical months and years.

The EU has contributed to formidable progress in the Balkans and now provides both leadership and direction, with the vision of membership remaining the guiding star in the still perilous times ahead. Today the Balkans have a great potential to shed for ever its legacy of war-prone, divided societies, and to consolidate stability, accelerate reforms, deepen democratisation and speed their way towards the gates of the EU. So the achievements are clear, the problems are known, and the ambitions, the policies and the instruments are there. What is needed today is to maintain adequate EU political and diplomatic focus on the region; keep the membership perspective credible and attractive, particularly in light of the fact that the process promises to be long, and match responsibility with leadership in settling the remaining outstanding issues in the region. Amid shifting global priorities and pressing global challenges, the temptation to consider the job already done in the Balkans is strong. The risk is that things can again unravel; and the point is that for the EU foreign policy in the Balkans there is much more than the Balkans at stake.◊

** The views expressed here are personal.*

SEE Progress towards EU Accession

Vladimir Gligorov, Senior Researcher, Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Austria

At the Thessaloniki summit of the European Union (EU) with the countries from the Western Balkans (WB) in late June 2003, it was declared that the integration of the EU would not be complete without the accession of Southeast Europe (SEE). This region in the EU jargon consists of seven countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro, and the territory of Kosovo, which is under international protection. The Thessaloniki declaration can be taken as a commitment by the EU to work together with the countries in this region on their accession to the EU.

The countries of the Western Balkans (a subset of

five countries, i.e., SEE minus Bulgaria and Romania), participate in the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP). In April 2004 a new European Partnership (EP) instrument was created for them to institutionalise this commitment. The EP sets out short- and medium-term measures that partner countries should fulfil to advance in their integration with the EU. The end state of the whole process, as stated in the EPs, is full membership in the EU.¹ Indeed, the EPs incorporate elements of the pre-accession process though with weaker commitment, less financial support and with the overall responsibility still located with the commissioner for external affairs of the EU.

The SEE countries are at very different stages in the process of EU integration. In this regatta there are:

- the candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania;
- the new candidate country Croatia;
- an applicant country with a Stabilization

and Association Agreement (SAA): Macedonia;

- a country negotiating its SAA: Albania;
- a country to start negotiations for an SAA after fulfilling certain criteria: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- a country that is not yet ready to start negotiating an SAA agreement: Serbia and Montenegro; and
- a territory that is under a tracking mechanism within the Stabilization and Association process (SAP): Kosovo.

Candidate countries

In the conclusion statement of the Irish presidency in mid-June last year, the European Council reconfirmed that Bulgaria and Romania are an integral part of the ongoing round of enlargement, which saw ten new member states join the Union on 1 May 2004, and which will conclude in 2007. According to the decisions approved in Brussels, the treaty may be signed in mid-2005. It looks increasingly likely that these two countries will join the EU on January 1, 2007.

In June 2004 the EU Summit gave a go-ahead to negotiations with Croatia. In December, it was decided that the negotiations would start on 17 March 2005 if Croatia were judged to be cooperating fully with the ICTY (International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia). Increasingly, the condition has come to mean the surrender to the ICTY of General Ante Gotovina by the Croat government. The recent assessment of this issue by the European Union is that the start of the negotiations will be postponed until this condition has been met.

The *avis* for Croatia is very positive. It says that Croatia is a functioning market economy and that it should be able to withstand competitive pressures in the medium term. It also judges Croatia to be a functioning democracy that respects human rights. The detailed assessments cite quite a number of problems, which will obviously be the subject of the negotiations, but no major obstacles are envisaged. Probably the key area of concern is the efficiency of public governance and problems with the rule of law.

The negotiations, when they start, should go rather smoothly. Though it is difficult to say how long they will last, the Croats at least expect them to be quite short. It is hardly possible that they will be so fast that Croatia could join the EU in 2007, but by that time the dates for the end of the negotiations and for accession could indeed be set. The setting of these dates could coincide with

the actual accession of Bulgaria and Romania, assuming everything goes as planned in the case of the latter two countries.

Looking at the three candidate countries' prospects together, the most likely scenario seems to be that Bulgaria and Romania will join the EU in 2007 while Croatia will have a fixed date of accession determined at that time.

Accession to the monetary union is a different matter. Bulgaria has a currency board and intends to adopt the euro by 2009 without changing the exchange rate regime or the current parity with the euro. Similarly, Croatia intends to adopt the euro as soon as possible, at the latest two years after accession to the EU. Romania, on the other hand, will in all probability need more time to join the monetary union.

Other SAP countries

The remaining countries in SEE are much further away from accession to the EU. Macedonia submitted its application for membership in the spring of 2004. It will most probably get the *avis* in the second half of 2005. It is hard to predict now what the *avis* will say. However, given that Macedonia has a SAA agreement with the EU and that it has been offered an EP, it is hard to imagine that the *avis* will be negative. It may set out the conditions for the acceptance of Macedonia's candidacy, but in the end the status will have to be granted and the negotiations will have to start. It is, however, not sensible to speculate on the speed of the whole process of accession. In the meantime, Macedonia has to implement the SAA and the EP. The assessment of the implementation progress will have a significant influence on the content of the *avis*.

Albania is negotiating its SAA and the progress is slow. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to fulfil 16 systemic conditions to start negotiating its SAA. Once the process starts, however, it can be expected to be speeded up because the institutional capacity of this country can be upgraded rather quickly once the major constitutional and other legislative issues are solved.

Serbia and Montenegro are a different matter altogether as is of course Kosovo. The EU supported the creation of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro with the aim to foster their reintegration as a precondition for their integration with the EU. That attempt failed. The state union all but withered away. Therefore, in mid-2004, the EU decided to rely on a two-track approach to

Serbia and Montenegro. In effect, it will negotiate separately with the two states, but they will eventually sign the same Stabilization and Association Agreement. The process should start some time this year, if a positive assessment is produced by the European Commission by the end of March or the beginning of April of 2005. The main condition is the cooperation with the ICTY. Indeed, even after the whole process starts, this continuous fulfilment of this condition will determine the speed and the depth of the EU integration of Serbia and Montenegro.

To complicate matters, Montenegro plans to hold a referendum on its independence. The referendum is currently planned for February 2006. Its outcome should not create additional problems when it comes to the negotiations with the EU, but may bring about political changes in Montenegro as well as in Serbia. Those may delay the process of EU integration, but may also speed it up depending on the political outcome.

When it comes to Kosovo, the prior issue is the so-called final status of this province that is currently under international protection. The EU has a SAP tracking mechanism for Kosovo, but obviously cannot get into any kind of contractual relations with a non-sovereign political entity. This year, 2005, a more intensive diplomatic effort will have to be made to start the search for the appropriate solution for Kosovo's sovereignty. After that, the already existing intensive involvement of the EU could be redefined to be part of the SAP and eventually lead to a SAA.

Possible timing of accessions

The above description of the process of Southeast European enlargement of the EU does not take into account directly the extensive involvement of the EU in this region in the areas of security, building of institutions, economic and financial assistance and in the political developments that includes direct involvement in public governance and in state building in the case of the two protectorates or quasi-protectorates of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, growing economic integration with the EU has to be taken into account. The development and growth of the region depends very much on trade with and investments from the EU. Also, intra-regional liberalisation and normalisation is premised on the process of EU integration. Finally, the process of the Southeast European EU enlargement can hardly stop before all the countries and territories are included. Once Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia accede to the EU, the remaining region can hardly

be left out. That becomes even more obvious if the negotiations with Turkey start later this year. Thus, the question of when and how rather than of whether is the only realistic one. Table 1 (below) contains a forecast for the accession to the EU and for the adoption of the euro.

The reasoning behind table 1 is as follows. It is assumed that the EU will play by the book. Barring unexpected developments, Bulgaria and Romania should join as planned in 2007. Croatia could be close to the end of its negotiations with the EU and could accede either in 2009 or 2010 at the latest. Macedonia could start to negotiate in 2006 or at the beginning of 2007 and be ready to join early in the next decade, at the latest in 2013. All the other SAP countries should have their SAAs signed by 2007 and could negotiate their accession at some point after 2013. It does not seem too optimistic to argue that all of the SEE will join the EU by 2015.

Thus, the year 2007 seems crucial: two countries should accede, one should get its date of accession, one should have already started negotiations, and all the others should be armed with their SAAs and should start preparing for negotiations in the near future.

The adoption of the euro depends on the expectations of the particular countries. In the case of Montenegro and Kosovo, it is likely that they will not be introducing their own currencies before joining the EU. In the case of Bulgaria and Croatia, early adoption would be consistent with the expectations built into their monetary and overall economic policies. Similarly, Macedonia and the other post-Yugoslavia states will be expecting to adopt the euro as soon as possible, which is two years after joining the EU, if the system of euro adoption is not changed. The same goes for Albania too. It is only Romania that is expected to make longer use of the ERM II mechanism.

Conclusion

SEE, and especially the Western Balkans, has a lot of unsolved problems. A forward induction from those problems makes for a very pessimistic assessment of the prospects for the EU Southeast European enlargement. A different conclusion is reached by inducing backwardly. If it is assumed that the EU cannot stop its Southeast European enlargement and that it will need to know the timetable by the beginning of 2007, then it seems safe to say that the whole process will come to an end by 2015. All the outstanding problems, some

of them quite daunting ones, will have to be solved by then. Outside of the process of EU integration they may be even be unsolvable. Thus, this is a major test for the ability of the EU to project stability and development through integration.◊

¹ More detailed discussion is in V. Gligorov, 'European Partnership with the Balkans', *The Vienna Institute Monthly Report*, No. 4, April 2004, pp. 8-14.

Table 1

| | SEE EU accession forecast | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|------------|-------------|
| | SAA¹⁾ | Negotiations | EU | euro |
| Bulgaria | 1995 (EEA) | 1999 | 2007 | 2009 |
| Romania | 1995 (EEA) | 1999 | 2007 | 2012 |
| Croatia | 2005 | 2005 | 2009 | 2011 |
| Macedonia | 2004 | 2006-2007 | 2012-2013 | 2015 |
| Albania | 2007 | 2009 | by 2015 | by 2017 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2007 | 2009 | by 2015 | by 2017 |
| Serbia | 2007 | 2009 | by 2015 | by 2017 |
| Montenegro | 2007 | 2009 | by 2015 | since 2002 |
| Kosovo | 2007 | 2009 ²⁾ | after 2015 | since 2002 |

Notes: 1) In some cases SAA can be expected to be ratified and in others only signed by the date in the table. Kosovo will in all probability have something that resembles an SAA. - 2) Kosovo's negotiations may be somewhat non-standard.

Accession Conditionality after 2004: A Case of Moving Goalposts?

David Phinnemore, Jean Monnet Chair and Senior Lecturer in European Integration, School of Politics and International Studies, Queen's University Belfast, UK

Central to the EU's enlargement process is conditionality, the requirement that would-be members meet a range of conditions before they can be admitted. This was made clear in 1993 when the Copenhagen criteria were formally adopted and has been restated on numerous occasions since. This is not only with regard to eastern enlargement for which the Copenhagen criteria were originally written, but also EU enlargement to include countries of Southeastern Europe.

The Copenhagen criteria are now more than ten years old and since they were announced not only has the EU undergone a first eastern enlargement, but it has also assumed more commitments with regard to non-member states and has evolved into a significantly more integrated entity. This is reflected in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – the Constitutional Treaty – that was signed in October 2004. The process of enlarging, coupled with increasing demands for membership, has obviously provided opportunities for the EU's member states and its institutions to reflect on the appropriateness of the conditions that it requires would-be members to meet before they can be admitted. As for its new commitments, notably with regard to the Western Balkans, these have been accompanied by additional criteria that the affected states must meet prior to entry. And the Constitutional Treaty will lead to various revisions to the fundamentals of the EU that have a direct bearing on what is expected of states wishing to join.

All this suggests changes to the conditionality criteria that current and future candidate and applicant states are having or will have to meet before the EU will admit them as members. Whether, therefore, the threshold for EU membership will be significantly raised remains to be seen. After all, it is not conditionality alone that determines whether the EU allows candidates to join, other political factors are also important. And the EU has repeatedly insisted on its commitment to further enlargement whether

it be to include Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the countries of the Western Balkans, or Turkey. Further confirmation of the commitment can be expected as accession negotiations with Croatia, Turkey and others are opened.

Yet what conditions will these states have to meet? At a minimum, states seeking membership will have to clear the same hurdles as the candidates that joined on 1 May 2004. They will have to prove that they meet the Copenhagen criteria: 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union'. This has been made clear most recently in the Commission's *avis* on Croatia's application for membership.¹ And, in the case of Turkey, the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 confirmed that accession would be 'on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States'.²

Yet, as Croatia's case reveals, additional criteria for membership do exist, and these have been known since the country's Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU was signed in 2001. This states that accession to the EU is dependent on the implementation of the provisions of the SAA.³ This was confirmed in 2004 by the Commission in its Strategy Paper on the future of enlargement.⁴ Its *avis* also made it clear that accession would proceed on the basis of 'the conditions set for the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP), notably the conditions defined by the Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997' which are regarded as a 'fundamental element'.⁵ The European Council, in deciding to open negotiations, made a similar observation. Hence, at least three further conditions must be met: the return of refugees, co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the pursuit of regional co-operation.⁶

Moreover, as the European Council noted in June 2004, the framework for negotiations with Croatia and others would take 'full account of the experience of the fifth enlargement process'.⁷ This provided an opportunity to revise the basis on which the EU admits member states. It was taken up and when the Commission published its Strategy Paper on the future of enlargement in October 2004, its

language suggested that the EU would be implementing the criteria in stricter sense than previously. It warned not only that Croatia would have to fulfil the various obligations already noted, but also that progress in accession negotiations will be 'fully dependent on the sustainability of political reforms and Croatia's fulfilment of [these] obligations'.⁸ It also warned that negotiations could be suspended were there to be 'a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded', and that this would only require a qualified majority within the Council.⁹

What was also significant in the strategy paper was the tightening of the requirements regarding the adoption of the *acquis*. This has always been a key element of the accession process and provides the focus for accession negotiations. Yet as Bulgarian and Romanian negotiators have been heard to complain, candidate countries now seeking membership of the EU are required to do more than those that joined in 2004. Not only is adoption of the *acquis* required, but also its correct transposition and implementation. And more intense monitoring has been introduced with the EU retaining the option to delay accession beyond 2007 albeit only for one year. Furthermore, a prerequisite not only for entry to the EU but also for progress with negotiations is now 'effective and efficient application' of the *acquis*.¹⁰ To this end, new 'benchmarks' on legislative alignment and a 'satisfactory track record in implementation' are being proposed.

Similar statements were included in the Commission's assessment of Turkey's progress towards accession. Here though, there was further evidence of the greater demands being made, at least with regard to progress in accession negotiations. The Commission has proposed that Turkey's existing legal obligations regarding the *acquis* – arising out of the 1995 customs union agreement, for example – must be fulfilled before the negotiations are opened on the relevant chapter(s).¹¹ Moreover, the text places much greater emphasis on the need for the EU to ensure that it is in a position to admit Turkey. No mention is made, however, of an implicit condition for Turkish accession: resolution of the Cyprus issue. Some see this as '*sine qua non* for Turkey's membership'.¹² And, the European Council has implied as much noting that 'a settlement of the Cyprus problem ... would greatly facilitate Turkey's membership aspirations'.¹³ It can be anticipated that both Greece and Cyprus will be requiring

settlement before Turkey is admitted to the EU.

This final point underlines the fact that each member state has a veto over the accession of a state to the EU. In fact they possess a double veto in that an accession treaty requires domestic ratification in all of the member states. This has rarely proved problematic, but in the case of Turkey it may prove decisive. Three member states – Austria, France and the Netherlands – have already indicated that they may put EU enlargement to include Turkey to a popular vote. The prospect of popular endorsement appears remote, at least according to opinion polls. The obstacles that Turkey must overcome in order to join the EU appear to be much higher than those faced by those that have already been admitted.

This need not have been so. The European Convention and the 2003-2004 intergovernmental conference could have revised the mechanism by which states accede to the EU. They did not. In fact, and assuming the Constitutional Treaty comes into force, they appear to have made accession to the EU more difficult. This has been done not least by retaining the existing requirement for unanimity among, and domestic ratification by, the existing member states. No attempt was made to move to a qualified majority, such as the two-thirds majority required for the admission of new member states to the UN.

More significantly, the range of principles that would-be member states have to respect before they can join has been increased. Article I-58 requires that acceding states respect the values set out in Article I-2. Currently, acceding states must respect 'the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law' laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. Under the Constitutional Treaty, the 'principles' have become 'values' and 'human dignity, ... equality ... and the rights of persons belonging to minorities' have been added to the list. The last of these confirms what is already expected in the Copenhagen criteria, but the other two are new. Moreover, the list of values is followed by a statement that they 'are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination'. Implicit is that these too have to be present in acceding states.

Later on in the Constitutional Treaty, Article III-292(1) lists the principles that have inspired (and

presumably continue to inspire) enlargement. These include those that appear in Article I-2 albeit with reference now to 'the universality and indivisibility' of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and no explicit reference to either 'liberty' or 'the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. Added to the list is the 'principle' of 'solidarity' and 'respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law'. These are arguably implicit in what is already expected of states joining the EU. The point, however, is that they are now more explicit and hence more detailed attention may be given to them. On this, two further developments should be noted. First, it is no longer sufficient for an applicant state simply to 'respect' the EU's values. It must, in line with Article I-1, also be 'committed to promoting them' with the EU. Second, the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Constitutional Treaty means that the EU has a more detailed 'measuring stick' for the accession criteria.¹⁴ As a consequence, assessments of eligibility for membership could become tougher.

To summarise, as the EU learns from and moves beyond its first phase of eastern enlargement, and has to contemplate the admission of even more applicants, the requirements of membership appear to be shifting. More is expected of all would-be members before they join and additional, albeit context- and regionally-specific, criteria have to be met. Added to this, the Constitutional Treaty has not made it any easier for states to join the EU. Whether and how this will alter the speed and dynamics of the EU's further enlargement remains to be seen.◊

¹ European Commission, *Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union*, COM (2004) 257 final, Brussels, 20 April 2004, p. 5.

² *Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002: Presidency Conclusions*, revised version, Council of the European Union Document 15917/02, Brussels, 29 January 2003, point 18.

³ See Phinnemore, D. 'Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8 (1), 2003, 77-103 at 99; Pippan, C. 'The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU's Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9 (2) 2004, 219-245 at 238.

⁴ European Commission, *Strategy paper on progress in the enlargement process*, COM(2004) 657 final, Brussels, 6 October 2004, point 3.2

⁵ European Commission, *Opinion on Croatia's Application*, *op cit*, p. points B.1 and A.a. respectively

⁶ *ibid*, pp. 27-37 (points 1.2.3 and 1.3). See also *Brussels European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004: Presidency Conclusions*, Council of the European Union Document 10679/04, Brussels, 18 June 2004, point 33.

⁷ *Brussels European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004, op cit*, point 32.

⁸ European Commission, *Strategy paper, op cit*. point 3.2

⁹ *ibid*.

¹⁰ *ibid*.

¹¹ European Council, *Recommendation on Turkey's Progress towards accession*, COM(2004) 656 final, Brussels, 6 October 2004, points 5 and 7(6).

¹² Suvarierol, S. 'The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union', in Çarkoğlu, A. and Rubin, B. (eds) *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 55-78 at p. 55.

¹³ *Brussels European Council, 12 and 13 December 2003: Presidency Conclusions*, revised version, Council of the European Union Document 5381/04, Brussels, 5 February 2004, point 39.

¹⁴ European Policy Centre, *The Draft Constitutional Treaty – An Assessment* (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2003), p. 32.

EU Policy of Regional Cooperation in South East Europe: The Creation of a Virtual Reality

Othon Anastasakis, Director, South East European Studies, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, UK

Building trust and cooperation in Southeast Europe is a complicated and challenging endeavour considering the historical legacies of fragmentation, antagonisms, and the recent wars in former Yugoslavia. Yet, the region is composed of states which are bound by a common geography, a common history, a similar political culture, same developmental trends, shared concerns, and similar international aspirations. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has made cooperation even more necessary for the survival of all the newly formed state entities. It is hard to imagine small countries like FYR Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, or aspiring states like Montenegro or Kosovo, surviving politically and economically without establishing close forms of cooperation with their neighbours in the region. In addition, there is significant pressure on the region to cooperate from the EU in the form of regional initiatives, cross-border projects and financial support.

The EU has imposed regional cooperation as a *sine qua non* for further EU engagement with the Western Balkan countries. Following the adoption of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP), regional cooperation became the condition, the means and the aim of the EU integration process, closely tied with the goal of EU membership. The EU rightly points out the need for reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, before the Western Balkan countries become members of the European Union. The EU is also right when it advocates that many issues and problems in Southeast Europe – economic, political or security – are regional and cannot be resolved on a national basis or using bilateral instruments alone. In its strategic planning, the EU is identifying particular areas of regional concern which include regional trade, co-operation in justice and home affairs, infrastructure, transport, energy or environment. As a complement to the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) bilateral financial framework, the Commission has also adopted a CARDS regional scheme covering those parts of the programme which

are not country specific. During the period 2002-2004 the Commission approved a budget of €197 million, 10% of the available CARDS funding, directed towards integrated border management, institutional capacity building, democratic stabilisation and regional infrastructure (CARDS Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, European Commission, October 2001). In December 2004, the EU renewed its commitment by approving a multi-annual indicative programme of €85 million for 2005-06 (CARDS Regional Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2005-2006, European Commission, December 2004); its priority areas include institution building and support of public administration, police and judicial cooperation against organized crime and corruption, cross border cooperation in economic and civil society matters and private sector development and infrastructure.

Since the introduction of the SAP, there have been some regional interaction and a positive dynamic towards cooperation in South East Europe. In trade, a number of bilateral free trade agreements have been signed among the countries (including Bulgaria and Romania) with the help of the Stability Pact. Trade liberalisation and the prospect of free trade area is pivotal and is expected to bring the countries closer to EU trade norms and standards, facilitate trade among the countries in the region and attract direct foreign investment. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), have also provided for cooperation in labour and capital mobility, reciprocal rights of business establishment, and the liberalisation of the supply of services. Political cooperation among states has intensified in the areas of refugee returns, border crossings, visa regimes and organised crime. Political elites in Yugoslavia's successor states are getting closer to each other, exchanging visits and apologies for the evils of the past; the President of Serbia and Montenegro apologised for crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia and Serbia are pursuing a policy of rapprochement and have recently signed agreements on minority rights. EU conditionality and pressure have been in most instances quite effective in forcing the different parties to cooperate. Cooperation with ICTY and refugee returns have been two visible examples of effective external pressure and guidance. Progress has also been visible in infrastructure, in regional transport and the environment. The EU has been relatively successful in promoting cooperation in energy by launching a regional electricity market initiative and in December 2004, the 25 EU member states and the countries of Southeast Europe, agreed on the basic principles to formally establish an Energy Community between them. The Energy Community is expected to create a

single regulatory space for energy in the European peninsula and help to address energy poverty issues with the aim of providing affordable power supply to the citizens. In addition, there has been a proliferation of Euroregions - associations of neighbouring municipalities - focusing on various projects of common interest (Kumanovo-Presevo-Gnjilane, Nis-Sofia-Skopje, the Eastern Adriatic, the Prespa Lake). Regional initiatives outside the EU have also been complementary and helpful in other areas of regional cooperation, and the example of the US-led Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) stands out as a successful experience of cross-country exchange of information on terrorist activities and organised crime. The regional picture is therefore far better than what it was five years ago and many regional actors are seeking ways to interact and cooperate.

Having said that, regional cooperation in Southeast Europe is at an infant stage, especially compared with the level of integration and cooperation achieved by the other EU member states. Regional cooperation is an ongoing process which does not start with the SAp and does not finish with EU membership. It is a gradual process which engages multiple actors in an ever-increasing number of activities. But there are limits to how far regional cooperation in Southeast Europe can go and in any case it is not sensible to create unrealistic expectations from the current process of regional cooperation; a number of political and economic impediments and the legacy of the recent hostilities and ethnic distrust, still weigh heavily on the region. The lack of political will is naturally the prime obstacle to regional cooperation and local actors are still not convinced that the benefits of regional cooperation overtake the benefits of non-cooperating. The stunning example of the inability of Serbia and Montenegro to harmonise their economic systems and work in consensus for the purposes of the SAp stands out as a very representative case of non-cooperation within the same country. A similar practice is evident in the relationship between the Federation and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For other governments in the region, European integration and membership in international organisations such as NATO are far more significant than regional or cross-border cooperation; at times even regional cooperation is perceived as competitive or an impediment to the goal of European integration. All Southeast European countries want to become members of the EU in order to escape their regional misery. A further impediment to the development of

regional cooperation is that the economic structures of the countries in the region are quite similar and competitive to each other, leaving limited room for intra-regional trade opportunities. In many ways, the countries in the region are competitors rather than complementary economic partners. Despite the existence of a network of bilateral free trade agreements, the volume of trade between the countries is still limited and all of the countries are directed towards the EU rather than their regional partners. In addition most of the countries complain that regional movement and communication from country to country and from capital to capital is still constrained by visa restrictions or other obstacles in the regional infrastructure.

Regional cooperation in Southeast Europe is deemed necessary by all the external actors involved but for many it is still wishful thinking or at best a virtual reality of initiatives and agreements, promises and ambitious statements with limited substance or actual interaction. In many ways the Stability Pact symbolises all those limits to regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. People are highly sceptical of a plan which was initially designed on very ambitious grounds but whose current visibility and impact is minimal. Although the Stability Pact has been involved successfully in trade agreements or some infrastructure projects such as the Danube bridge of Novi Sad, its role as a co-ordinator of reform and reconstruction is inadequate. A further example of virtual regional cooperation is the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECF), the only local initiative from within the region but which remains a regional forum of ambitious declarations and limited substance.

Regional cooperation in Southeast Europe has been mostly an externally driven process. Most of the ideas, the initiatives, the projects are externally designed, and introduced by foreigners to the local populations. Since the Dayton peace accords, the international community has put forward a number of regional initiatives to bring the countries closer together and to get the local actors to cooperate. The role of the EU is pivotal in setting the standards and rules of cooperation; it is the living example of how functional cooperation can lead to further integration, peace and prosperity. But when dealing with regional cooperation in Southeast Europe, the EU is faced with a number of dilemmas and sober realities which limit its ability to generate an effective regional cooperation discourse. Its most significant dilemma is how to combine the aim of regional cooperation in an area of such

increasing diversity, which is obvious in the economic development, state-building or stages of integration with the EU. It is also apparent in the way external actors divide the region between the most problematic western vs the better 'rated' eastern Balkans. Some countries are members of NATO, some are not. Some countries are emancipated nation-states, others are incomplete states, and others are mere protectorates. This makes it difficult for the EU to keep up with a common regional framework for its SAP and to define the nature of regional cooperation and its added value among unequal partners. In the Western Balkans, the EU has to deal with a declining international engagement and a decreasing interest of major donors. This new reality is the outcome of a certain Balkan fatigue emanating from the experience of big spending on crisis management and post-war reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. It is also the outcome of the diversion of international attention elsewhere and the international priority of democracy building in the Middle East. The lack of a proper and safe regional environment permeated by limited rule of law, informality and economic unpredictability gives a further blow to foreign direct investment. Those problems are reflected in the current role of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, in theory the main regional instrument which identifies regional needs and projects and has to fundraise for them. Today it seems like one more regional initiative which struggles to survive alongside the other numerous Balkan regional initiatives. That leaves the EU as the main player in the region with an obligation to come up with a convincing strategy, to retain its financial commitment and more concretely to address adequately the needs of regional cooperation in its 2007-2013 financial perspectives.

In sum, regional cooperation in Southeast Europe has to be understood in a realistic, post-war and highly vulnerable environment which for the time sets restrictions and generates limited opportunities. What the EU can do best is create an environment, a virtual reality, conducive to regional cooperation and focus on the bilateral goal of membership. The European Union or any other external actors cannot force local actors to cooperate if the latter are not ready to engage in such a process. Local partners have to feel confident and safe before they cooperate with their neighbours; and their confidence can only increase through closer association with the EU. ♦

The EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Marie-Janine Calic, University of Munich, Germany

From the early 1990s onwards, the EU has assumed ever-greater responsibility in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Southeast Europe. At the same time, the EU's engagement in the Balkans has had a catalytic effect on the formation of its common foreign and security policy. In the Balkans the EU has, for the first time, engaged in conducting its own security operations. In January 2003, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched, followed by Operation Concordia in Macedonia in April 2003 – the first ever EU military mission. The launch of ALTHEA, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, marks the beginning of a new phase in the development of the Union's crisis response capability, aiming at an integrated civil-military, peacebuilding approach in support of the long-term perspective of EU integration. But are the strategies and instruments used appropriate to accomplish the ambitious goal? What are the challenges ahead?

ALTHEA's mandate

The EUFOR-ALTHEA operation was launched on 2 December 2004 as a Chapter VII mission under the UN Charter. UN Security Council Resolution 1575, of 22 November 2004, authorised the EU Member States to create EUFOR as a legal successor to SFOR.¹ In June 2004, NATO decided to conclude its SFOR operation, following which the Council adopted its Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²

ALTHEA's mandate builds on Annex 1A and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accord and consequently pursues the following objectives:

- to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in the Dayton/Paris Agreement;
- to create a stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic BiH, co-operating peacefully with its neighbours;

Indirectly, ALTHEA should also pursue the objective of furthering the EU approximation with the goal of signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the Union.

In order to fulfill these tasks it was decided to deploy a robust force of some 7,000 troops - the same force levels as NATO-led SFOR. In

addition to the EU Member States, third countries would be invited to participate in this operation.

Operation ALTHEA is being carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities on the basis agreed with NATO ('Berlin Plus'). It is supported by Over the Horizon Forces (OTHF). Therefore, ALTHEA will depend not only on leadership and support by Member States - but also on the logistic and military support by NATO.

There is no end-date for the EU force, but the Council of the EU will review the EU Force's mandate by the end of 2005, in light of security and political developments. Common costs amount to € 71.7 million.³

Regional challenges

In Bosnia, the EU intends to demonstrate and further develop its capability as a serious international security actor, but it faces a challenging task. Although the country is in better shape than it has been for a decade, peace is not yet self-sustaining. NATO has declared Bosnia a success story mainly because its priorities have shifted elsewhere and not because of real improvements in the security situation on the ground. Some genuine military tasks, such as the separation of armed forces and the exchange of territories between the two entities, have been carried out. However, other key tasks are still on the agenda. For instance, the arrest of indicted war criminals, military reform and downsizing, as well as fighting the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), are all still hot issues.

In the latter case, significant quantities of light and heavy weapons remain dispersed at storage sites throughout Bosnia - by the end of 2004, there were at least 53 storage locations in the Republika Srpska and 23 in the Federation. Although there is no imminent danger of war, there is a serious risk of theft and smuggling activities. According to the International Crisis Group, there are approximately 1,500 known pieces of heavy artillery, 20,000 pieces of man-portable artillery tubes (mortars) and 300,000 light weapons that remain uncontrolled.⁴

In addition there are some key regional security threats that have yet to disappear from the agenda. Challenges to regional security have generally diminished but some upcoming developments, such as Kosovo's final status talks that are due to start in mid-2005, and the possible dissolution of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, pose threats in that they may set a dangerous precedent for the fragile post-Dayton Bosnian state.

EUFOR, therefore, needs to consider dangerous contingencies. Despite the uncertainty surrounding Kosovo's status and the future of Serbia and Montenegro, and the impact this may have on regional security, member states are already discussing intensively how to end the EU's executive role in peace implementation in the near future. However, under a more probable scenario this mission would not end for many years to come.

The European Perspective

Bosnia and Herzegovina represents 'a key challenge' for the EU, as pointed out in the European Security Strategy Document for that country adopted on 17/18 June 2004. Officials claim that the deployment of EUFOR would mark the transition 'from the era of Dayton to the era of Brussels', and that ALTHEA would become part of a more coherent, integrated European approach towards the region.⁵ But does the operation add in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programs and its ongoing police and monitoring missions?

The June 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration confirmed that the future of all Western Balkan countries is within the EU. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina has fulfilled the obligations of the 'road map', and the Commission has launched a feasibility study that should lead to the opening of negotiations on a SAA. On 14 June 2004, the Council adopted the European Partnership, which defines concrete short and medium term priorities for reform.

Experts have, for a long time, called for greater coherence in peacebuilding activities, in particular by applying an integrated civil-military approach and unified leadership role. With the deployment of ALTHEA, the EU is now in a much better position to coordinate major activities, in particular between the police forces, the military and various reconstruction programs. Generally, by creating a secure environment, ALTHEA potentially complements the peacebuilding mission by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown, who is also at the same time the EU Special Representative's (EUSR). Officials believe this would also help Bosnia and Herzegovina make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP). In that sense, EUFOR's exit strategy might indeed be identical with Bosnia's entry strategy into the Union.

However, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has a long way to go before it can realistically hope to become a candidate of the Union. Sarajevo has taken important first steps towards the European

integration goals set out by Brussels. However, the record on implementation of legislation lags behind expectations. There is lack of coordination and incompatibility across different state levels, public spending is high, and much more needs to be done to improve the administration. Most importantly, the general problem of a dysfunctional state has not been resolved. 'There is little proof that BiH has used the Road Map and "EU requirements" to dynamise reform', an evaluation report by the European Commission concludes.⁶

While there are new opportunities to improve coherence between the different pillars of the peace operation, new confusion may arise within the EU system. There is now a greater need to coordinate activities of European institutions at different levels: First, in Brussels a clear division of roles between the Council, the High Representative, the PSC and the Military Committee is needed. Second, when it comes to civil reconstruction tasks, the Council and the European Commission need to ensure that the instruments used complement each other. Third, there is the danger of confusion of roles between the operational HQ at SHAPE and the EU Command Element in Sarajevo. Last but not least, the variety of security actors on the ground requires close coordination, in particular as far as the EUSR, EU Monitoring Mission, EU Police Mission and the Delegation are concerned. In summary, it remains to be seen whether and how actors and instruments will interplay in practice.

Transatlantic Division of Labour

Critics of a greater EU military involvement in the region have claimed that the Union would not be recognized as a serious actor on the ground and that, therefore, its capabilities as a security provider would be limited. However, it needs to be stressed, that over the last five years, the image and credibility of the EU has considerably improved all over the region. Today, the Union appears to be a unique actor, because it provides both a political perspective and substantial financial support. Further, other donors such as the US are either disengaging from the region or substantially reducing their assistance. Against this background, Brussels is being viewed as the most important partner to SEE countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷

An open question remains with regard to the division of labour with international partners, since neither NATO nor the US has decided to leave peacekeeping exclusively to the Europeans. Instead, difficult negotiations were necessary before consensus over the division of roles within

Bosnia was established. Under the Joint Action, EUFOR was finally granted 'full authority', exercised through its force commander in order to fulfill the tasks specified in the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement; moreover the Union decided that the Force Commander shall report to EU bodies only.

Besides the EU presence, NATO established a small headquarters of 200 personnel in Sarajevo, led by a US General. Its responsibilities comprise providing advice on defence reform with a view to enhancing PfP-capabilities, to provide assistance in counter-terrorism, as well as in the detention of persons indicted for war crimes. Also, the US will keep some military presence on the ground (at Tuzla airbase). It remains to be seen whether the relationship on the ground with EUFOR will develop into a truly complementary one.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that the EU, through its military engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken important steps towards the implementation of the 1999 Helsinki agenda and the development of its crisis management capabilities. ALTHEA can be regarded as a serious test case for the Union's capabilities to manage violent conflict and engage in post-conflict rehabilitation. However, by using the Balkans as a test ground for new CFSP and ESDP tools, Brussels has created a dynamic that drags the Union ever deeper into the various political and security related activities of conflict mediation, peacekeeping and long-term stabilisation, thereby dangerously widening the capabilities-expectations gap. Claims are already being made that the Union should take over the peacekeeping force in Kosovo next - a much more dangerous endeavour than that in Bosnia. Institutional overstretch would not only create new instability in the Balkans, but also seriously undermine the credibility of the Union as a foreign political actor, both in the region and internationally. ♦

¹ <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/619/22/PDF/N0461922.pdf?OpenElement>

² http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_252/l_25220040728en00100014.pdf.

³ <http://www.euforbih.org/sheets/fs050103a.htm>

⁴ International Crisis Group; EUFOR-IA: changing Bosnia's security arrangements; Sarajevo 2004.

⁵ European Security Strategy - Bosnia and Herzegovina / Comprehensive Policy . Adopted by the European Council, 17/18 June 2004. <http://www.eusrbih.org/policy-docs/?cid=1,1,1>

⁶ BiH, SAP Report 2003, p. 21.

⁷ See, for instance, the Evaluation of the Assistance to Balkan Countries under CARDS Regulation 2666/2000, Synthesis Report, Bd. I, June 2004
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/program/cardsrep.htm>>.

CALL FOR PAPERS
LSE/KCL European Foreign Policy Conference

The Ethical Dimension of European Foreign Policy
London School of Economics, July 1st-2nd, 2005

The International Relations Department of the London School of Economics (LSE), the War Studies Department of King's College London (KCL), and FORNET invite post-graduate research students with research interests in European foreign policy to submit abstracts (max. 300 words) outlining the main points of their proposed papers **by Friday, April 22nd** along with a copy of your CV. Any topic related to European foreign policy qualifies for submission. We are particularly interested in submissions pertaining to this year's theme, "The Ethical Dimension of European Foreign Policy".

If selected for the conference, presenters will be asked to submit a paper of between 3,000 and 5,000 words by Friday, June 17th for inclusion at the conference. Selected paper-givers will be expected to deliver a 10-minute presentation at the conference. In addition, selected papers may be published on-line on the LSE International Relations Department, King's College War Studies Department and FORNET websites.

Conference Information

Following the success of last year's inaugural conference at the LSE which featured talks by Prof. Christopher Hill (Cambridge), Lord Hannay of Chiswick (former UK ambassador to the UN and EU), and Robert Culshaw (Director of Americas and Overseas Territories, FCO) and was attended by over 110 participants from all over Europe and abroad, the LSE and King's College are proud to host this second annual research student conference.

This year's keynote address will be given by the Honourable Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group. Gareth Evans was also a member of the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whose report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" was published in December 2004.

Conference proceedings will take part throughout the day at the LSE on Friday, July 1st and in the morning of Saturday, July 2nd. In addition, a wine reception is planned for Friday evening. All research students and other interested parties are invited to attend. Conference registration costs £10 and includes all conference fees, coffee and light snacks.

For further information including registration procedures please see the conference website <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EFPC/>. Registration for conference participation will begin on May 1st, 2005. Please direct any inquiries to efpc@lse.ac.uk.

Please submit your materials to:
European Foreign Policy Conference
London School of Economics
Dept of International Relations
c/o Michael Aktipis
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
E-mail: efpc@lse.ac.uk

The Constitutional Treaty: Anatomy, Analysis and Assessment

Graduate Workshop on the Constitutionalisation Process of the European Union and its outcomes

7-8 July 2005 - Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris

Academic Convenors:

Renaud Dehousse - Jean Monnet Chair and Director,
Centre d'Études Européennes de Sciences Po Paris
Wolfgang Wessels - Jean Monnet Chair of Political Science,
University of Cologne

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris and IGC Net, an EU-wide research project on European integration processes and the EU constitution, organize a graduate workshop on "The Constitutional Treaty: Anatomy, Analysis and Assessment".

The aim of this workshop is to gather advanced PhD students working on European studies and international relations to discuss their working methods, field research and the first results of their research with well-known academics and experts. The seminar will be held in English.

Dead-lines

All abstracts (max. 500 words) should be sent no later than 28 March 2005 to Nadia Klein (nadia.klein@uni-koeln.de) and Francesco Marchi (francesco.marchi@sciences-po.org). The authors of the selected papers will be informed by 18 April 2005 at the latest. All accepted papers should be sent no later than 20 June 2005. They will be published on the IGC Net website.

Abstracts

The abstract should state the title and subject of your paper and describe your main research question. It should also indicate briefly the state of the art of your research area and contain information about the structure of your paper.

The academic convenors look forward to receive proposals from doctoral students on the following themes:

- The Institutional and Legal Reforms by the Constitutional Treaty
- Definition and Objectives of the Union (CT, Part I, Title I)
- Fundamental rights and Citizenship of the Union (CT, Part I, Title II)
- The system of competences (CT, Part I, Title III and V)
- Institutional reforms and the EU polity (CT, Part I, Title IV)
- The institutional architecture of CFSP/ESDP (CT, Part III, Title V, Chapter II)
- General and final provisions (CT, Part IV)

Forms and Processes of Constitutionalisation within the EU

- The Convention: method, working and output
- Intergovernmental conferences and treaty reforms
- The ratification process of the European Constitution
- Integration theories and forms of EU constitutionalisation
- Negotiation processes
- Deliberation