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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

In June, the member states finally agreed a draft constitution, following their failure to do so in December 2003 (see the EU's website on the Future of Europe for details of the agreements: http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm). This issue of *CFSP Forum* contains two articles on the two most important institutional changes for CFSP made in the draft constitution, the EU foreign minister and the external action service.

With this issue, *CFSP Forum* also begins a regular series of analyses of the relationship between 'outsiders' and the CFSP/ESDP. Norway's views of the CFSP are considered here first.

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The Significance of the New European Foreign Minister

Sir Brian Crowe, Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK

- 1) The appointment of, and authority given to, an EU Foreign Minister (EUFM) under the new constitutional treaty is of major importance in the creation of a future effective CFSP, not least following the debacle of the Iraq crisis. But other steps are even more important: the EUFM will play an important part in achieving them.
- 2) High among them is that EU leaders should actually have the necessary political will by putting their money where their mouths are and showing that they really mean it when they say they want Europe to speak and act with one voice. This is a test they have all too often failed, not just on Iraq (which had never even been discussed in the EU before the Iraq crisis and raised a host of very difficult issues simultaneously), but even on issues which should have been easy, like Zimbabwe. The EU has latterly done well in the Balkans, and even in having a coherent policy on the Arab-Israel dispute, and can take some credit for this. But this has not been difficult because there has been no real disagreement. The difficulty comes when the going gets a bit rough, that is, agreeing a common policy when this would require the subordination of a national interest. Yet without this willingness, the CFSP will always be a fair-weather, lowest common denominator policy. A real CFSP

needs to have a foul-weather capability too.

- 3) This needs to go beyond the commitment in the new (as in the old) treaty to consult about, conduct and support a CFSP. Member states need to attach priority to having a common policy, even at the cost of not having everyone's positions reflected in it. This is asking a lot in the absence of a climate of confidence in which member states see their interests as being served by the fact of common policies across the board. In the present state of the CFSP it is perhaps hard to imagine. And yet it has been done, and not just on lowest common denominator or uncontroversial issues. This was the decision of the then Twelve, in December 1991 before the CFSP was even born, to recognise Croatia and therefore effectively all the states emerging from the war-torn old Yugoslavia. It was a decision which tore up existing EC policy (not to recognise any of the Yugoslav states until they had agreed arrangements among themselves) and meant the majority rallying (unhappily) to the minority (actually Germany). Yet a common policy was seen by all as more important than the actual policy itself: admittedly not a particularly happy precedent, since the results were arguably disastrous (the Bosnian civil war), but it shows it can be done.
- 4) The second major need is for the EU to develop effective leadership and decision-making arrangements. In the first half of the 1990s in the major area of European concern, the Balkans, this leadership came from high-profile and energetic special representatives (Lord Carrington, Lord Owen, Carl Bildt), who worked closely with the Presidency of the day and the member states most involved, becoming themselves major formulators and implementers of policies, working within parameters they played a major part in defining in the Council. But as the Americans became more directly involved again in the Balkans, insisting on dealing with the major member states involved and not the Presidency nor other spokesmen for the EU itself, leadership passed from these special representatives acting for the EU to a handful of self-selected major EU member states working closely together with the US and Russia. Common policy formulation took place in various restricted groups, such as the Contact Group or (without the Russians) Quint, but was in any case outside the EU.

The EU and its Council and Political Committee became the forum not where policy was made, but where the EU Contact Group members briefed the rest and secured their endorsement to provide a pretence that these were EU policies. It was no coincidence that this started in 1994, during the first year of the CFSP, under a Greek Presidency which the US was not prepared to deal with seriously.

- 5) The writing was thus on the wall for the Presidency, although it has taken a decade for it to die and be replaced by the EUFM. A major stage along the way was the Kosovo war, which resulted in two crucial decisions by the European Council in Cologne in June 1999: the creation of the ESDP and the appointment of a high-profile statesman, Javier Solana, to the post of High Representative of the CFSP, rather than the kind of senior official who most member states had had in mind when creating the post in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
- 6) After a frustratingly slow start (not least for him) because of the reluctance of Presidencies to give him a serious role, Javier Solana has shown the indispensability of leadership from within the Brussels institutions rather than from rotating national Presidencies. In the *Financial Times* of 13 July 2003, Solana himself gave a wonderful and apt description of his role as he developed it: 'As time goes by I do whatever I want. I know what people think. I pursue my own agenda. I don't have to check everything with everyone. I would rather have forgiveness than permission. If you ask permission, you never do anything.'
- 7) In this he is the successor in spirit and function of David Owen and Carl Bildt in their more limited Balkan roles. By seizing, and finally being endowed by the Council with, the formulation and implementation of policies, within parameters which it lays down but which are also developed by Solana himself, he has created the basis for the new EUFM. Under the new treaty responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the CFSP will pass to him, he will chair the Council and the Presidency (and the troika will, not before time) disappear from foreign policy. With this authority he will be well placed to set about meeting the other conditions described above as necessary for an effective CFSP.

8) The job will be an extremely tough one, demanding a heavy hitter, and hard worker, to make it work. The institutional arrangements will be a considerable complication. He will be responsible not only to the Council which he will chair, but also as the external affairs vice president of the Commission, to the Commission in all areas of Community competence, as well as to the new President of the European Council, who can be expected to want to be active in the foreign affairs field. For the vice president of the Commission to chair the External Affairs Council is, to put it mildly, institutionally incoherent. The creators of this arrangement have passed very lightly over the fact that the Council (and its chairman) and the Commission have inherently different roles in the whole structural concept of the EU. Combining the Council's CFSP and the Commission's external relations portfolios, and their external diplomatic representations, will have advantages in increasing coherence. Most of these advantages could have been achieved by closer cooperation between Council and Commission (such as by having the EUFM as an honorary, non-voting participant rather than full member of the Commission) while still keeping the jobs separate. As it is, everyone will want to make the system work. But there will certainly be internal stresses in the job as it will now be constituted, with considerable management problems in combining the very different ethos which personnel from the Commission, Council and member states' diplomatic services will inevitably bring to the new combined service. This will be a heavy burden on the individual who does it. It is not obvious that Europe has that many experienced heavy hitters available and willing to take it on.

9) In taking the leadership role in CFSP, the EUFM will of course not simply be able to call behind him 'follow me'. It will remain the member states who provide the muscle, the sticks and carrots for the formulation and implementation of common policies. The EUFM cannot succeed unless he has the confidence of the major member states, and he will have to work closely with them. Realising this, the medium-size and smaller member states are suspicious that they will be taken for granted and their interests (or at least views) ignored. The EUFM will have the challenge of seeing that this happens as

little as possible, but the large and medium/smaller member states share this responsibility: if there is to be a significant CFSP, member states will need to recognise that some are actually more equal than others, and greater recognition accorded to the principle that those who contribute most in a policy field need to have greater weight in the decision making. If countries for whom foreign policy until they joined the EU (and EC before that) was little more than relations with their neighbours and speeches at the UN insist on an equal say in the strategic issues of the day, then European foreign policy making will not be common, but will take place outside the EU, as it did in the Contact Group over the Balkans and, more recently, over Iraq (although there were other reasons for that too). It is in response to factors like this that the French, British and Germans have been visibly working more closely together to concert their line before bringing it to their EU partners. The EUFM will need to be part of this process and be trusted by the non-participants to assure their essential interests. How exactly this should be done is as much a matter of feel as institutional arrangement. In line with Solana's quote to the FT above, the EUFM needs to be relied on simply to get on with it.

10) But if the leadership issue, so bound up with the large/small member state issue, is important, as important is the European approach, or rather lack of one, to relations with the US. Like it or not, European foreign policy is in large measure a function of relations with the US. There are areas where the EU/Europeans act more or less on their own, as in Africa, but even that is a function of relations with the US, which chooses not to be involved there. On all major issues, or any issues in which the US is involved, what we Europeans can do depends fundamentally on what the US does, whether we are working with the US as in the Balkans, trying to pressure the US as in the Middle East, or opposing the US as over landmines, climate change or the international criminal court. Essentially Europe needs a broadly common approach to European relations with a US which, as the world's hyperpower, has become more unilateralist and less willing to be constrained by ties with multilateral institutions or countries, even allies. It is unfortunate, and complicates things, that this tendency to unilateralism and the rejection of outside constraints in the US coincides with

an opposite process in Europe, one in which Europeans, less dependent than they used to be on the US for security and more determined to have their voice heard in the world, are insisting on more multilateralism.

11) A more common approach towards the US can only be found by seeking middle ground between the atavistic British and French responses to our transatlantic partner; neither was notably successful in influencing US action over Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the apparent convergence on a more multilateral, that is, UN-based approach in Iraq is a result of a real recognition of the importance of international legitimacy and cooperation, or merely expediency. This is an area in which it is hard to see a significant role for the EUFM, but a Franco-British understanding is an important condition for his success, and for a successful CFSP.

12) In the creation of the post of EUFM the member states have shown willingness to learn from history. In that perspective it and the associated provisions of the new treaty (notably replacement of the Presidency in the function of managing the CFSP) are arguably a development and consolidation of evolving practice rather than a radical new departure. Nonetheless they are an important new departure with promise for providing for more coherent and effective leadership of the EU in the foreign and security policy field, more effective mediation of the tensions between small and large member states and a greater priority for common policies at all. So it is a necessary and important step forward in achieving a real CFSP, even if it is not by itself a sufficient one.◊

The European External Action Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making?

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Buried, almost at the very back of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, is an apparently innocuous declaration. The declaration, on the creation of a European External Action Service, is notable for its brevity (not even one third of a page) as much as for its potential impact upon not only EU external relations, but national diplomacy as well.

The final text, as agreed to by the European Council meeting in Brussels on 17-18 June 2004, now incorporates the declaration into the constitution itself.¹ A look at the new wording is somewhat enlightening but leaves as many questions as answers. The starting point is the ubiquitous EUFM, or EU foreign minister (Union Minister for Foreign Affairs in the text). As his (Javier Solana was appointed as the first EUFM by the Council, meeting at the level of Heads of State or Government, on 29 June) title suggests, one would expect a minister to have a ministry. In spite of opposition to the term minister in some quarters, it appears to have survived the Brussels skirmishes. Thus, the minister will be 'assisted by a European External Action Service' (EEAS).

Next comes the rub – who is to serve in this EEAS and what is it supposed to do? To answer the last part first, we are not really any the wiser following the European Council. Much of this is probably due to the vagaries of the EUFM's post which, again following the European Council, shall 'conduct' CFSP, 'contribute by his or her proposals to the development of that policy' which he or she shall then carry out as mandated by the Council. The same applies for ESDP. The EUFM shall 'preside' over the Foreign Affairs Council, 'ensure the consistency' of the Union's external action, 'be responsible' within the Commission for responsibilities falling to it in external relations and for 'coordinating' other aspects of the Union's external action.

Although the exact mandate of the EEAS has to be worked out, we may already deduce that the EUFM's role vis-à-vis CFSP and ESDP is likely to

be more proactive, policy oriented and, perhaps, more exciting and stimulating. The Commission-related roles appear to be more circumscribed, at least judging by the language used. Notably, the EUFM does not 'conduct' non-CFSP aspects of external relations but has somewhat vague responsibilities and coordinating roles. This raises the question of who ultimately conducts the *communautaire* aspects and what kind of relations the EUFM will establish with the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. The latter in particular will require careful balancing since he (or she) shall 'at his or her level and in that capacity ensure the external representation of the Union' on issues concerning CFSP, 'without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs'.

So, if the EUFM's role is somewhat confusing, we can only assume that that of the EEAS will be similarly opaque, at least until such time as the Council has reached a (European) decision formally establishing the service, at which time the organization and functioning will be specified. To complete this process the Council shall 'act on a proposal from the EUFM, after consulting with the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission'.² In the meantime, we are left to boggle at the potential for serious institutional turf battles as the 'relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from the national diplomatic services of the Member States' begin their collective head scratching and manoeuvring.

We do not know who the 'relevant departments' are yet but, at a minimum, DG-E under Robert Cooper would seem to be an obvious candidate from the Council's side, as would the small but effective Policy Unit. Beyond this it becomes more problematic as we consider the crisis management and conflict prevention aspects of the Secretariat's current set up. What will happen to, for instance, the 140-strong EU Military Staff and any joint 'civ-mil' cell that may be established? What happens to the Sitcen (the Situation Centre)? These are though relatively minor issues compared to those that may beset the Commission.

If the EUFM is to be a kind of père RELEX, we might well ask how extended the RELEX *famille* is? We can assume it would include most if not all of the current RELEX DG and the External Service. But, beyond this, how much of DG

Trade, Enlargement, Development (as well as Europeaid and ECHO) or even the external aspects of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) might legitimately fall under the EUFM's responsibility? Naturally, the scale of the task will also have a bearing on the size of the EAAS – so too will politics. The EEAS could assume either a rather modest form or, along the lines just outlined, it may emerge as a major institutional player.

At the low end of the spectrum the EEAS could comprise a limited number of units from the Council Secretariat, DG RELEX and the current External Service. The possible benefit of a modest EEAS may be primarily internal since the Commission is still adjusting to reforms made since November 2000 and further dramatic upheaval could therefore be counterproductive. Genuine progress has been made in the harmonization of procedures, the deconcentration exercise for the External Service (comprising the 128 delegations) is almost complete and considerable effort has gone into 'mainstreaming' particular issues across a number of policy areas, such as conflict prevention. However, a modest reorganisation, if accompanied by extended demands upon the new service, may lead to concerns that the 'foreign policy' generalists are ill-equipped to address the often technical and detailed aspects of development policy or humanitarian aid which has been the primary focus of Community external relations.³

The higher end of the spectrum is far more ambitious since it would incorporate all of the foreign policy units from the Council Secretariat, all of the External Action DGs from the Community, the Union Delegations as well as Europeaid and ECHO. Again, there are pros and cons to such a scenario. The advantages would lie in the size of the EEAS and the possibility for specialisation within the service, thus obviating fears of marginalisation for one of more aspects of external policy. The possible development of specialist streams as part of the service might also build upon the earlier reforms and provide better career prospects for 'foreign service' professionals. The disadvantages would lie in the considerable institutional upheavals involved and the inevitable turf battles over priorities within external relations. In order to address such potential friction, the EUFM will need to exercise very strong leadership (whilst dodging the inevitable suspicion that he is a Council person in the Commission or vice versa). The emergence of such a service could pose its own formidable coordination problems and it is unclear what the reaction of the Member States (notably the larger ones) to the emergence of such

a service might be.

The background manoeuvring over the EEAS reflects the same tension that relates to the EUFM – where is its real institutional affinity? One proposal forwarded during the Convention by Guiliano Amato, Elmar Brok and Andrew Duff sought to establish the service ‘as an integral part of the Commission administration’ and that the administration shall work ‘as mandated by the Council without prejudice to the competences of the Commission’.⁴ A similar proposal made to the Working Group VII on External Action suggested that the EEAS should be ‘based on DG RELEX, supported by the Council secretariat officials and staff seconded from national diplomatic services’.⁵ Neither proposal was accepted and the EEAS therefore remains in institutional limbo until such time as the High Representative for CFSP, the Commission and the Member States present their preparatory work on the EEAS.⁶

The preparatory work on the EEAS will have to deal not only with the institutional issues but, inevitably, with a number of other important practical considerations that will arise such as budgetary considerations, intelligence support and professional support structures (like training). The process of *toilettage* of the constitution may also throw up other interesting issues such as how the EEAS will relate to the Political and Security Committee, COREPER, Special Representatives or other special functions pertaining to, for example, the fight against terrorism.

All of the above issues carry the risk of potentially serious institutional scuffles. Whilst a certain amount of friction is inevitable, more serious harm might be obviated with some clear initial thinking about the role of the EEAS. Five simple guidelines might be helpful to bear in mind:

- i) The EEAS assists the EUFM whose role, in turn, is to build trust between the Member States, the EU institutions, as well as the outside world. This implies that although the EEAS should be anchored within the existing EU institutions, it must also appeal to a global audience;
- ii) Existing resources should be used wherever possible, which includes harnessing national resources and

expertise more efficiently. This implies that secondment of staff ‘from the national diplomatic services of the Member States’ should perhaps be widened to include those with relevant expertise from trade, development, overseas aid and other ministries (as indeed is the practice in diplomatic services of many Member States);

- iii) The 128 Commission delegations will become Union delegations with the assumption by the Union of legal personality. The delegations are nearing the end of an intensive decentralisation effort which should be built upon, but overloading the delegations with new duties should be avoided. A systematic and expanded approach to training should be adopted, based on earlier proposals from the European Parliament for a European Diplomatic Academy, so that new duties (notably CFSP-related) can be integrated into the delegations;
- iv) All Member States should coordinate and, where a common position has been established, should implement external relations through the EU;
- v) The EEAS should be supported by timely and accurate information on which to base decisions affecting the vital interests of the EU and its Member States.

The Intergovernmental Conference declared that, as soon as the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe is signed, preparatory work on the EEAS should begin.⁷ The Convention was of the view that the necessary arrangements for the establishment of the EEAS should be made within a year from the *entry into force* of the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Either way, it is clear that the process of designing the EEAS holds the potential for serious differences between and even within the institutions but, if these can be overcome, the resulting Service may be a valuable tool in assisting the Foreign Minister to ‘uphold and promote [the Union’s] interests’ in the wider world.⁸ This is a bold ambition indeed and one that will require vision and leadership from all involved and, not the least, from the President of the Commission as well as from the future EUFM himself. Much will rest upon Solana’s considerable charisma and skills, as

well as upon a professional and supportive 'ministry'.¹

¹ See Annex 11 'The Minister for Foreign Affairs', and Annex 12, European External Action Service', *CIG 81/04*, pp. 18-19.

² Ibid. Loc cit.

³ This issue is raised in James Mackie, Heather Baser, Jonas Frederiksen and Oliver Hasse, *Ensuring that Development Cooperation Matters in the New Europe*, ECDPM, October 2003.

⁴ Proposal by Mr Giuliano Amato, Mr Elmar Brok, and Mr Andrew Duff, 'Declaration on the Creation of a European External Action Service', at <http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/873/Art%20III%20225a%20Amato%20EN.pdf>.

⁵ Comments by Mr Elmar Brok and Mr John Cushnahan, members of the Convention, on the preliminary draft final report (WD 021 REV 3) of the Working Group VII on External Action, WGVII-WD70, 12 December 2002, Para. 7.

⁶ Declaration for incorporation in the Final Act re Article III-197, *CIG 81/04*, p. 19.

⁷ Declaration to be incorporated into the Final Act, re Article III-197, *CIG 81/04*.

⁸ *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*, Article 3 (4).

Staying close yet keeping a distance: Norway and the CFSP

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The story of Norway's relations with the European Union is very much that of contrasts and contradictions. Having concluded negotiations for membership twice (in 1972 and 1994), Norwegian governments failed, both times, to gain support for membership from a majority of the Norwegian population. However, although reluctant to tie the final knot, Norway has since the last referendum followed a policy of 'staying close', as close as possible, to the Union. Much of this can be explained by the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement between Norway and the EU, which focuses on the first pillar, and mainly ensures that Norway adopts the same legislation as the EU on single market issues. However, apart from a rather malfunctioning political dialogue, the agreement does not cover foreign policy and certainly not security and defence issues. In spite of this, Norwegian governments, regardless of whether they were composed of parties that were skeptical or positive to the EU, are seeking the same intimacy with the EU on those issues as the intimacy mandated by the EEA agreement.

A key concern for Norwegian policymakers is the risk of Norway's marginalisation as a result of its non-membership in the EU. As an old NATO member, the consequences of suddenly not being a 'member of the club' when security and defence issues are discussed, are strongly felt by Norwegian practitioners. It was to limit the potential consequences of such marginalisation that Norwegian governments towards the end of the 1990s began increasingly to emphasise their willingness and ability to contribute to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). To demonstrate its commitment to the EU's goal of a security and defence policy and its eagerness to be a constructive partner in this endeavour, the Norwegian government confirmed its contribution of 3500 personnel to the headline goal of the ESDP at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. Contributions from non-EU members are not included as part of the headline goal; however they are mentioned in a separate annex. Further, Norwegian authorities made 80 police officers available for the EU's civilian headline

goal. These have participated in the EU's civilian crisis-management operations in Bosnia and Macedonia. Finally, Norway is invited to participate in some of the working groups under the CFSP and can also be invited to align itself with the EU's foreign policy declarations. It does so on the large majority of issues. Official Norwegian policy is thus supportive of the development of an EU security and defence dimension. However, if one takes a closer look, the position is more ambiguous, and reflects the twin concerns of protecting what is perceived as Norway's ability to be a 'player' in European security and maintaining NATO as the core security institution in Europe.

In fact, the sustained and deliberate effort to demonstrate willingness and ability to contribute to the EU's security and defence policy is a relatively recent development in Norwegian policy towards the ESDP/CFSP. Two distinct phases can be distinguished in the 1990s. The first phase, which lasted until the 1998 St. Malo declaration, was characterised by scepticism not only about the desirability of an independent EU security or defence policy, but also about the EU's ability to develop such a policy. Focus was on the many disagreements between EU member states on foreign and security policy issues: the difficulties of developing a common European foreign and security policy were described as so important that it was unrealistic to expect much to happen in this field. However, this did not prevent Norwegian authorities from trying to be present, informally, in the fora in which the Europeans discussed such issues, and from trying to influence developments. Norwegian policy in this phase took two directions: firstly it focused its efforts on marginal security institutions such as the Nordic Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); secondly, it sought to establish close institutional links between Norway, the Western European Union (WEU), which was still at the time considered to be the EU's future 'defence arm', and the CFSP. The Nordic Council and the OSCE were often in this phase described as far more important security institutions in Europe than the EU.¹ Although such claims were clearly made on many occasions simply to avoid the often uncomfortable discussions about Norwegian EU membership, they also reflected a more deeply rooted scepticism about the EU's potential in matters of security and defence. At the same time, however, efforts were made to maintain as close links as possible with the EU and with the WEU, of which Norway was an associate member. Within the WEU, Norway's

representatives argued consistently that the WEU should remain an independent institution rather than being included in, or closely linked to, the EU, and that any intensification of European defence cooperation should take place within the framework of NATO. This not only reflected the interests of Norway as a non-EU member, but also deep-seated beliefs both about what ought to be done in European security after the end of the Cold War, as well as concrete expectations about what would actually happen.

Against this backdrop it is not surprising that the St. Malo declaration came as a great shock to the Norwegian foreign policy establishment. Very few expected further developments in the direction of a common security policy for the EU and even fewer discussions regarding defence. Hardly anyone expected the United Kingdom, which was usually seen as Norway's 'best ally' on these matters within the EU, to take a stance in favour of such developments. After a period of confusion during which Norwegian authorities made rather explicit and clumsy attempts at securing a place for itself inside a future EU security framework, certain redefinitions in policy strategy could be observed. Norwegian governments increasingly started to describe the development of security and defence capabilities for the EU as a positive thing not only for European but also for Norwegian security. The scepticism about the actual potential for further integration and cooperation in security became less pronounced not only in the ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence), but also amongst politicians and more broadly in the security and defence 'establishment'. The EU, traditionally described and understood in Norway as an entity established in order to enhance free trade and economic liberalisation, was changing character in the eyes of the Norwegians.

However, concrete contributions to the EU's security and defence policy are still a different matter from full participation in the institutions in which security and defence issues are discussed on a regular basis. Norway's access to such places remains mostly linked to the particular operations in which it participates, or rather, is invited to participate in. In these cases, one of the sticky issues from the perspective of Norwegian authorities is the stage at which they are included in discussions and planning.

These changes have not, however, gone so far as to provoke a broader Norwegian debate about the particular direction of the ESDP, either in terms of the more recent plans of developing 'battle groups' or in terms of speculation about

trends towards a directoire or deeper integration amongst a core group on security and defence. To the extent that the CFSP/ESDP is discussed, the discussion is kept at a very general level. Norwegian actors, whether in the public debate, in more closed specialist meetings or in parliamentary debates, rarely express a view of the particular direction in which this policy ought to go, or of the advantages or disadvantages of particular institutional solutions. The main issue tends to be what the consequences of a more robust CFSP/ESDP might have for Norwegian security and defence policy.

It is also clear that the core orientation of Norwegian security policy has not changed. Norwegian security policy remains Atlanticist. This is not only a result of the outsider position in the EU but a more fundamental orientation of Norwegian security policy. From the perspective of Norwegian policy-makers NATO remains, and should continue to remain, the core international security institution and it is also considered decisive to Norwegian security. Considerable effort is put into maintaining a good relationship with the United States. This orientation can be traced back not only to the Second World War, but even further: there is a tradition in Norwegian foreign policy of distancing itself from what is seen rather derogatively as the 'great power politics' of the European continent. These policies have in the past often been described in

opposition to the peaceful orientation of 'little Norway'.

Occasionally, however the tensions and contradictions of this Norwegian self-perception as a purely peace-seeking nation, come to the surface. Aligning with 'old Europe' and refusing to support the US and UK in their war in Iraq, the Norwegian government followed the established principles of Norwegian foreign policy, at the cost of breaking with its closest allies. It is not the first time that Norwegian policy falls down on a position closer to the Europeans than the US in situations of transatlantic crisis. These are however painful situations for Norwegian foreign policymakers, as they cut across the strong alliance ties and sense of loyalty to the United States. However, they serve to demonstrate that in its general foreign policy orientation, Norwegian policy does not differ significantly from that of the former European great powers, now member states of the EU. This has not however translated into a weakening of the confidence in the transatlantic option.◊

¹ See for example Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik's lecture, "Regjeringens europapolitikk" (The government's European policy), *ARENA Working Paper 98/6* (www.arena.uio.no).

Recently-published and forthcoming books and articles on European foreign policy

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Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, 'Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces', *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2, Summer 2004.

'The European Security Strategy: Paper Tiger or Catalyst for Joint Action?', Newsletter no. 13 of *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue* (June 2004). Articles by Marco Overhaus, Jan Irlenkauser, Yves Boyer, Christopher Hill, and Esther Brimmer. Available online at:

<http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue13.pdf>.