1.- What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2005? What are the key issues for your country in 2005 (especially with regard to the negative referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands; after the recent EU enlargement and on behalf of the perspective of the upcoming accession round(s))? 

The Spanish foreign policy has experienced complex and profound changes in recent years. The Socialist Government with José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero at the helm (elected in March 2004) began to redirect Spanish foreign policy in new directions (the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, the restoration of good relations with Morocco, Venezuela or Cuba and a shift away from Atlanticism to Europeanism). The foreign policy principles of this Government are: the return to the ‘heart of Europe’ (a closer relationship with France and Germany) and insistence on effective multilateralism, defence of democracy, human rights and respect for International Law. The current Government considers that Spain’s national interests will be better defended if the EU consolidates its role as a global actor, contributes to international peace and security, and guarantees the prevalence of an effective multilateralism in the international scene.

Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that there are also elements of continuity between the current and the previous Governments in that the Socialist party has not altered longstanding Spanish foreign policy regional priorities: the Mediterranean region and Latin America. Furthermore, the fight against terrorism and the importance of the relationship with the US came to be included in the Spanish foreign policy agenda due to the international events after 9/11 and the crisis in Iraq.

As far as the Mediterranean region is concerned, the Spanish government wants to boost EU-Mediterranean relations within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Spain, together with the British Presidency, is organizing an extraordinary Euro-Mediterranean Conference, so-called “Barcelona + 10”, as a way to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and give a much-needed renewed impetus to these relations. The conference will be held in Barcelona, in November 2005. From a Spanish vantage point, it is important that new EU initiatives, (the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East), do not distract the attention of its EU partners away from the Barcelona Process. There is a widespread fear in Spanish foreign policy circles that the Barcelona Process will disappear or be absorbed by the ENP, particularly among those that were involved in the launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995. This is the case of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who when speaking before the Spanish Parliament asserted that Spain wants to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process in a moment where two coincident policies have been put over the table (the mentioned ENP and the Strategic Partnership for the Middle East and the Mediterranean). Madrid’s eagerness to preserve the Barcelona label is most likely stemming from a will to preserve what some perceive as one of the main Spanish contributions to the European Foreign Policy in the past decade. For Spain, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has meant an instrument to enhance Spain’s influence over its non-EU neighbours and as a mean to force

1 Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.  
both Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean EU member states to get involved in the management of Mediterranean challenges.

- **Latin America** has always been a national priority for Spain due to the cultural affinity (language, common history) and the economic relationship (Spain is one of the largest European investors in Latin America). However, in spite of Spain’s efforts to promote the region and its inherent potential, Latin America has had relatively little appeal for Spain’s European partners and, consequently, CFSP activity towards the region has been particularly limited. With the 2004 change-over in the Spanish government, relations with Latin America have been seen in a new light. Two examples of Spain’s interest in enhancing the EU’s position in Latin America are, on the one hand, the multilateral relations between the EU and Latin America and, on the other, the bilateral relations between the EU and Cuba. As far as multilateral relations are concerned, Spain has already begun preparing with particular care the Fourth **UE-LAC** Summit, to be held in Vienna in 2006, given that Madrid would like to boost the EU and its member states’ interest for the region. The general EU disinterest displayed in connection with the Third EU-LAC Summit (Guadalajara –Mexico- May 2004) was motive for particular concern in Spain.

In terms of **EU-Cuba relations**, the post-2004 change in Spain’s stance on the Castro regime has been an important factor contributing to a recent modification of the EU’s position. In fact, Spain has over time had a considerable influence on the EU policy towards Cuba, which is well illustrated by the shift in the Union’s position as the Spanish Government has changed hands. The Conservative Government (People’s Party 1996-2004), under José María Aznar, reversed the Spanish-Cuban constructive dialogue Felipe González Socialist Government (1982-1996) had developed and replaced it with a harder opposition to the Castro Regime, a policy which was again altered as the Zapatero Government came into power. Recently, the Socialist government has re-established formal contacts with Cuba and is working towards the launch of a renewed EU-Cuba political dialogue, as well as seeking the elimination of all EU-imposed diplomatic sanctions against the Castro regime. As a consequence, at the GAERC of January 2005, EU foreign ministers agreed to temporarily restore normal diplomatic relations with Cuba although maintaining a constant monitoring of Cuba’s progress towards pluralist democracy and respect for human rights. However, as Ángel Bermúdez, from the Observatory of European Foreign Policy asserts, the EU is decidedly suffering a loss of influence over the evolution of events in Cuba and perhaps this could be remedied in part if the presence of the EU on the island is strengthened.4

- Concerning the **fight against terrorism**, Spain hosted a global Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in March 2005, coinciding thus with the first anniversary of Madrid terrorist attacks. The central idea of the conference was that ‘a democratic government is the only legitimate –and still the only effective– way of fighting terrorism’.5 The Summit brought together global leaders and other

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3 Latin America and the Caribbean.
5 The Club of Madrid, an independent, non-partisan organisation dedicated to strengthening democracy around the world by drawing on the unique experience and resources of almost fifty former heads of state and government of democratic nations, was the responsible of organizing this Conference. The purpose of the Summit was to commemorate the victims of terrorism across the world and provide a global forum to debate fresh ideas and alternative visions on how to fight terrorism within a democratic framework. Its web page is: [http://www.clubmadrid.org](http://www.clubmadrid.org)
exceptional individuals, whose experience and expertise turned vision into reality. It was attended by heads of state and government, key policy-makers, leading scholars, heads of international and non-governmental organisations, business and religious leaders, as well as outstanding intellectuals, artists and journalists.

Zapatero has also made a contribution to the international debate on terrorism through his proposal of creating an ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ (idea first launched during the inaugural UN General Assembly session in September 2004) in co-sponsorship with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The initiative met a favourable reception at the United Nations and it is foreseen that the organization will help put the proposal into practice, as the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated in July 2005 through the creation of a high-level group of eminent persons. Several governments, such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom, and organizations, such as for example the Arab League, have expressed interest in joining this UN initiative.6

- The relationship with the United States is another priority of the Spanish foreign policy, although it is an issue on which the two main political parties have very divergent views on. The Socialist Spanish Government has in the past eighteen months sought to regain the trust which was lost after the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and build a better relationship with the US. Efforts, however, have centred on dialoguing through the framework of the EU and not so much directly with Washington. For the moment, it has not been possible to celebrate a bilateral meeting between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and George W. Bush, although the Spanish government has tried to improve the bilateral relationship between the two countries in the aftermath of Bush’s re-election. Perhaps symptomatic of the distance Spanish-American relations are going through currently is the cold shoulder the Spanish Prime Minister received when he called Bush to congratulate him on winning a second mandate. The courtesy phone call was never returned. The current troublesome Spanish-American relations stand thus in sharp contrast with the close personal rapport the previous Spanish premier, José María Aznar, enjoyed with the US President.

Finally, the crisis that the EU is going through as a consequence of the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty has not altered main Spanish foreign policy priorities. Spain’s support for, on the one hand the enhancement of EU’s international role and, on the other hand, the Spanish favourable take on the future accession of Croatia and Turkey remains unaltered. In terms of other hot issues on CFSP agenda, the Spanish Prime Minister has supported the EU moves to lift the arms embargo on China in a recent trip in that country (July 2005).

2.- Does your country adopt a more pessimistic or optimistic stance regarding the ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty? How might the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands influence the ratification debate in your country and also have an impact on the outcome of the referendum?

- Spain became the first country to approve the European Constitution by referendum on 20 February 2005. In fact, the governmental motto for the campaign was “The first with Europe”. The voter turnout must, however, be considered as low, in that only 42.3% of eligible voters cast their ballot, making the

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referendum the least attended of all of the country’s elections since the restoration of democracy in 1977. The result of the referendum was, nevertheless, going to be overwhelmingly in favour of the Constitution, with 76.73% in favour, 17.24% against and 6% blank votes.

- The main political parties in Spain, the centre-right Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español supported the ‘Yes’ vote, meanwhile the third main party, the more leftist Izquierda Unida and some regional parties, above all in Catalonia and the Basque Country, campaigned for the ‘No’ vote.

- As far as the debate on the European Constitution in Spain, José I. Torreblanca, senior analyst of one of Spain’s most prestigious think tanks, Real Instituto Elcano, has asserted that the lack of internal debate among the main parties “does not say much for democratic quality inside Spanish political parties and indicates that part of the alleged consensus in regard to Europe was, or is, fictitious”, unlike France or other countries. At a public level, the debate during the referendum was more focused on Europe, rather than on the European Constitution per se. The lack of in-depth and rigorous public debate in Spain thus stands in sharp contrast to the referendum campaigns in France or in the Netherlands. The fact that in Spain only an approximately four million texts of the Constitution were distributed in an electorate which counts 35.4 million voters surely did not assist the process of fomenting a wider debate. Torreblanca therefore believes that “the campaign contributed to making the idea of Europe even more banal”.

- Once the results of the favourable referendum in Spain were in, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero would return the gist of Jacques Chirac (and Gerhard Schröder) during the Spanish campaign and promote the ‘Yes’ vote in a personal appearance in France, where he made a speech in a special session of the French National Assembly in Paris, and afterwards he took part of a meeting supporting Chirac in the referendum campaign. The main Spanish opposition party (PP) would afterwards seize on the French rejection to severely criticise Zapatero for ‘backing the losing team’. Zapatero’s European strategy had been the reestablishment of privileged relations with France and Germany, as these two countries represented the core elements of the Socialists’ more pro-European and less Atlanticist foreign policy. However, in the view of the raising star of Tony Blair and the fading protagonism of Chirac-Schröder this strategy seems to have backfired.

- Given the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, Zapatero has maintained that the ratification process should not be abandoned or considered dead until all member states had had their say. However, the Spanish Government has also pragmatically supported the idea of opening a period of reflection in order to analyse the reasons of the ‘No’ votes and to find out the better way to solve the situation. From the political opposition, however, Mariano Rajoy (PP’s current leader) has expressed his strong opinions against proposals advocating a partial approval of the European Constitution, as it has been argued from many corners of Europe. Rajoy and his party opposes, in particular the suggestions to the effect of only adopting the first part of the Constitution (containing the reference to the Council vote weighting of each member states), which, compared to the Treaty of Nice, clearly disfavours Spain.

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Thus, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was never an item for debate during the Constitutional campaign in Spain.

3.- National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2005

a) The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP (e.g. taking into account current developments like the current ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty);

- Spain’s National Defence Directive, presented on 30 December 2004, states that “Spain will promote and support an authentic European Security and Defence Policy, will back initiatives designed to achieve a common defence, and will contribute to providing the European Union with the civil and military capabilities required for active and independent intervention to prevent and resolve conflicts and to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.  
- The current Spanish Government has maintained the line of its predecessors in defending the development of a European Security and Defence Policy compatible with NATO. Spain works in the direction of avoiding overlapping of structures, means and military capacities between EU and NATO, and hence, deploying available budget resources in the most optimal way.
- At the time of writing, no Spanish public or parliamentary debate, as regards to the future of CFSP/ESDP if the Constitutional Treaty does not come into force, has yet taken place. Nor have the Government or any of the opposition parties made their position on this issue public yet. However, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is nowadays working on these issues and is foreseeing what it would happen with CFSP/ESDP future if the Constitutional Treaty does not come into force.

b) The role of the EU in crisis management e.g. in Congo, Georgia, Darfur;

- The Socialist Government, like its Conservative predecessor, is in favour of the development of a real European defence policy. What is more, Spain wants to be in the forefront of this European effort. According to Spain, the Union should provide itself with a wide range of crisis-management instruments, either civil or military, in close cooperation with the UN, and in such a way that it is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance. The current Spanish Government highlights the success of the EU Military and Civilian Operations on crisis management and it stresses the important Spanish contribution to them.
- José Bono, the Defence Minister, has said that Spain is willing to contribute to the pacification of the Sudanese region of Darfur. It will provide two CASA 212 transport aircraft and military advisors. Moreover, the Spanish Government supports the EU adopted measures both at political and humanitarian level for the same region.
- Spain took part in the EU military mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis). Today, around 500 Spanish soldiers are taking part in the recently-launched EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea). As far as EU civil missions are concerned, Spain is also involved in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 20 national experts and in the one in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) with 8 national experts.

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Spain also sent a battalion to Afghanistan for two months in autumn 2004 during and after the presidential elections there. Moreover, in June 2005 the Spanish Parliament voted to support (with the exception of Izquierda Unida) the decision to send a battalion (500 soldiers) to the region of Herat, in order to reinforce the local security in view of the upcoming elections to be held in September.

However, one has to observe that the debate on these issues in the Spanish Parliament is very poor, perhaps as a consequence of the fact that the regions to which the missions have so far been targeted are not a priority for Spain.

c) The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP;

The EU’s Eastern enlargement has further reinforced the perception that it is increasingly harder to promote Mediterranean and Latin American issues within the EU. Particularly, there is the perception that Latin America is now a remote concern for the EU, in contrast with some years ago. Hence, Spain is concerned about the increasing marginalisation of Spanish foreign policy priorities on the EU agenda. The importance attributed by EU institutions to the Ukraine crisis is perhaps a sign of the times that new priorities, influenced by the new eastern members, are on the rise in the European Foreign Policy.

However, it must be noted that the greatest impact of the Eastern enlargement for Spain has to do with the distribution of cohesion and structural funds. The negotiations on the EU Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 are followed in Spain with certain pessimism. In this sense, 73% Spaniards believe that ‘Spain will end up being harmed by the negotiations for the distribution of EU funds in the coming years’, compared with only 19% who think the country will benefit from them. But almost all Spaniards (85%) also agree that their country ‘must show solidarity with the new European member countries that need EU funds’.10

d) The view of the European Security Strategy (ESS) as an instrument for enhancing coherence in the EU’s security policy; how does your country view the ESS and which issues are of particular importance?

Both the former Conservative and the present Socialist Governments have positioned themselves favourably on the European Security Strategy. The National Defence Directive, made public on December 30, 2004, gives a positive reading of the fact that the ESS is based on a multilateral system of concerted action and initiatives within security and defence organisations, with the possibility of carrying out early and rapid interventions and, if necessary, powerful ones.

The Socialist Government is gradually introducing the key concepts and principles of the ESS into Spanish foreign policy. Since Javier Solana, former socialist Foreign Minister, is the driving force behind the ESS, it is easy to see how the key issues of current Spanish foreign policy and the strategic objectives of the ESS converge. Moreover, the process is reinforced by the appointment of Alberto Navarro, former Head of the High Representative’s Cabinet, as Spain’s Secretary of State for the European Union.

e) European Neighbourhood Policy and its implications

Spain supports the European Neighbourhood Policy as a means to have an instrument to foment security, stability, development and co-operation with the neighbours states, both the new ones (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, South Caucasus) and the old ones (in the Mediterranean). However, Spain will only support this policy if it is capable to provide concrete benefit (or at least not to harm) the Mediterranean partners, in particular the Maghreb countries.

Some aspects of the ENP can be positive for these Western Mediterranean countries. For instance, the strong bilateralism of this policy may benefit some countries which are more open to reforms and which are better prepared to tackle the procedures of the new financial instruments that will be created. In that sense, Morocco seemingly has the potential to be one of the new policy’s major beneficiaries. Nonetheless, Spain is aware of that this policy has been designed especially for the “new neighbours” rather than the old ones and this is why a cautious attitude can be observed among Spanish officials and political elite.

In summary, Spain supports the ENP all the meanwhile it remains somewhat reserved awaiting the policy’s further development and, particularly, the final decision on the allocations of funds to the Southern Mediterranean Partners. In any case, Spain will firmly oppose to any idea of dilution of the multilateral dimension of the Barcelona Process as a consequence of the ENP.

f) The creation of Battlegroups and their role for ESDP.

- In the Declaration on European Military Capabilities (endorsed on 22 November 2004), Spain committed itself to further improve military capabilities. It also offered contributions to two (or potentially three) EU Battlegroups as part of Rapid Response elements.
- First, Spain offered to contribute to an EU Battlegroup, which will be fully developed in the first semester of 2008 and based on Spanish national troops.
- The second Battlegroup will be based on the already existing Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, to which Portugal and Greece will contribute further capabilities. It will be available during the first semester of 2006.
- Potentially, Spain will contribute in a Battlegroup based on French, German, Belgian and Luxembourgian troops.
- Finally, Spain supports all EU actions to enhance its capacities to react rapidly before crisis situations.

4.- The Constitutional Treaty and its future – National perceptions concerning a ‘plan B’?

**Official positions on the Constitutional Treaty provisions on CFSP / ESDP and external relations? Constitutional Treaty or some version of ‘Nice Treaty Plus’?**

Describe (briefly) the position of your country on the following key issues and the possibility of their realisation without a Constitutional Treaty as a ‘plan B’, ‘C’ or ‘D’:

- Spain has not already presented any official position with regards to the future of the Constitutional Treaty provisions on CFSP/ESDP and external relations after the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. However, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is nowadays working on this possibility.
- However, the Real Instituto Elcano (March 2005) was in favour of implementing some of the initiatives concerning CFSP/ESDP included in the Constitutional Treaty even before its entry into force.11

a) External Representation: What is the final position of your country on the European foreign minister and the President of the European Council? Will / should there be a post resembling that of the Foreign Minister based on the Nice Treaty (something like an enhanced High Representative)? How could this be realised?

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11 Powell, Charles; Torreblanca, José Ignacio y Sorroza, Alicia (2005), *Construir Europa desde España: Los nuevos desafíos de la política europea*, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos.


- As far as the European Foreign Minister is concerned, Spain supported Javier Solana, a member of the Spanish Socialist Party, as a candidate for this post and pressed to put through this appointment as soon as possible.

- The Spanish government consistently supported the creation of the new figure of President of the European Council ever since the introduction of the French and British proposal to this extent in the European Convention.

b) Basic structures of the European External Action Service have already been developed. Now that the Constitutional Treaty might not enter into force, is your government in favour of developing such a body in order to support the High Representative?

- The EU External Action Service was seen by the Spanish government as a very useful element to support the new figure of the European Foreign Minister.

- For the moment, however, the Spanish Government has not positioned itself in favour or against the creation of a body like the EEAS to support the High Representative.

c) Decision-making: Does your country opt for an extension of qualified majority voting in the field of CFSP? Will the Nice provisions be sufficient for an efficient CFSP/ESDP decision-making within the enlarged EU?

- Spain favoured the extension of qualified majority voting as a general rule in the field of CFSP, with the exceptions of defence questions and in situations where a member state claims that a vital national interest is at stake.

- Spanish Government recognises that the Treaty of Nice is not sufficient for the EU to have a significant role in the international politics. However, the Spanish Government has to date not been forthcoming on how to supplement the Nice provisions in view of creating an efficient CFSP/ESDP decision-making.

d) Crisis management: What is the official position on expanding the Petersberg tasks and making reference to tasks that involve military resources? Which regions does your country consider as particularly promising for EU crisis management?

- The Spanish government supported giving a broader definition to the Petersberg Tasks to include other objectives that imply the use of military means, i.e. conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization operations, military advice, disarmament operations and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism.

- Spain has not pronounced itself about where the EU should launch military or civilian operations. However, according to Spanish traditional regional priorities, we can predict that Spain would have an active role in boosting the presence of the EU in the Mediterranean or Latin America if a crisis would affect those regions.

e) Defence: What is your country’s position towards the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS? Was your government in favour of creating a full-fledged operational EU headquarters?

- Spain is in favour of the establishment of a civilian-military cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). It considers that EUMS is an important project for the progress of ESDP. Spain (the previous Conservative Government) rejected the European defence proposal made by France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium, which wanted to place the EU military operations headquarters in Tervuren. Spain finally joined the defence proposal agreed to by France, Britain and Germany in the autumn of 2003, consisting of the establishment of an EU planning capability, but with close links to NATO.

- Concerning the European Defence Agency, the Spanish Government believes that it is a fundamental step for the development of the ESDP. Besides, the
already mentioned Real Instituto Elcano has forwarded the opinion that the EDA is essential for the consolidation of ESDP.

f) Is your country in favour of realising provisions such as the permanent structured cooperation even without the Constitutional Treaty? What measures would be preferred?

- Spain supports the use of permanent structured cooperation between member states who are able and willing to fulfil higher criteria on military capabilities, in particular qualitatively, with the purpose of undertaking more demanding military operations. The Spanish Government has consistently been very interested in taking part in any structured cooperation and it has committed itself to increase its military capabilities.
- However, the possibility of progressing in this kind of provisions without the Constitutional framework is difficult to envisage.

g) Would your country support the creation of core groups inside or outside the EU in CFSP/ESDP if the Constitutional Treaty finally failed?

- The Real Instituto Elcano recommended, in a report presented in March 2005, that Spain should be present in any core group or initiative which would strengthen CFSP/ESDP. This recommendation would be an interesting option for Spain if the Constitutional Treaty finally fails.12
- Spanish Government has not pronounced itself on this possibility. However, Spain has traditionally been in favour of core groups, provided that it can take part of the initiative.

5.- Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

- Centro de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación Internacional (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org)
- Instituto Complutense de Relaciones Internacionales (http://www.ucm.es/info/icei): Rafael Calduch.
- Unidad de Investigación sobre Seguridad y Cooperación Internacional (UNISCI) (http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/nplantilla.htm): Antonio Marquina.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Granada): Diego J. Liñán Nogueras.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Salamanca): Luis Norberto González
- Instituto de Estudios Europeanos (Universidad San Pablo-CEU)

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12 Powell, Charles; Torreblanca, José Ignacio y Sorroza, Alicia (2005), Construir Europa desde España: Los nuevos desafíos de la política europea”, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos.