

CFSP Watch 2005 – Greece – by A.D. Papayannides, Nikos Fragakis and  
Evangelos Vlioras<sup>1</sup>

**1. What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2005? What are the key issues for your country in 2005 (especially with regard to the negative referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands; after the recent EU enlargement and on behalf of the perspective of the upcoming accession round(s))?**

If anything, the moral drawn from the European Union's recent experience suggests that policy issues and institutional questions are intertwined to a degree that prohibits any attempt to approach them as anything else that part and parcel of the existential question of the European Union's place in world affairs.

The European Union, although a product of the post war order of things has exhibited, up to now, an exceptional ability to adsorb and adapt its policies in order to meet new challenges and opportunities, as they appear.

The question that beckons after the recent, deep-seated crisis that accompanied the results of the French and Dutch referenda coupled with the failure of the European Council to find a workable compromise of the financial perspectives of the Union, is whether the enlarged European Union will continue to attach the same meaning to the deepening of integration or pay it simply lip service, whether it will be able to absorb new member states without subverting its institutional balance without causing irreparable damage to the context and the aims of the integration process. At the moment the whole edifice of the Union seems to be oscillating wildly between the views of those prone to rebates and further accessions and the advocates of the deepening of integration.

For Greece the results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands are an expression of the free democratic will of the two peoples and as such are to be fully respected. Greece supports the period of reflection, as well as the continuation of the ratification process and believes that the European citizens' attachment to the construction of Europe is not called into question.

The citizens of core Europe, perceiving a disconcerting reduction in their weight, are concerned with the changing profile of Europe and of where the inner centre of influence currently lies. Reservations with the enlargement leaps seemingly also have to do with Turkey and the inevitable change it will bring to the nature of the EU. It appears that European citizens have not been convinced of these benefits, and that their rejection of Europe's deepening is a delayed reaction to Europe's widening. Furthermore, though mostly pertinent to France, perceptions that a social dimension was lacking and a liberal path was being pre-determined for Europe's economy provided the final blow. Whether these concerns are misplaced, ill defined and even precariously verging on unqualified protectionism is less of an issue right now<sup>2</sup>.

CFSP/ESDP has been one of the aspects of EU life given great specific weight in Greece, both in public debate and within the political process. For several years now, successive Euro barometer findings show constant support for the extension of Foreign Policy, Security and even Defense competencies of the EU. Results of a recent Euro barometer Study indicate that the fact that the

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<sup>1</sup> Α.Δ. Παπαγιάννης; The views expressed in this paper by Mr. Vlioras are his own and don't necessarily represent the views of the Service he's affiliated with.

<sup>2</sup> Ruby Gropas, "Carpe Diem Europe", EU Observer.com 15/6/2005

country is a member of the EU makes the Greek citizens to feel more safe (70%). This percentage is the second highest in EU after Cyprus (78%). Like in the previous surveys of the Euro barometer the majority of the Greek public opinion is in favour of a Common Defence and Security Policy (Greece: 80%, EU: 77%) and also in favour of a EU Common Foreign Policy towards third countries (Greece: 76% - EU: 67%). The 6 out of 10 Greeks express the necessity for a European Constitution (60%), a percentage similar to the one in EU<sup>3</sup>.

With regards to the enlargement of the EU, Greeks remain strong supporters of this process, but only in respect of certain countries (70%). The Greeks (70%) and the majority of the European citizens are not in favour of the possible integration of Turkey (EU: 52%) and Albania (Greece: 58%, EU: 50%). Greeks have dissenting opinions regarding the FYROM (45% is in favour while 47% is against). In EU the 43% is in favour of the future integration of FYROM while the 41% is against. With regards to the Constitutional Treaty, 60% of Greeks are in favor, a percentage in line with the EU average.

The Greek paradigm is typical of a featherweight turned middleweight in an enlarged European Union that has shown from day one, a constant support for the integration process and fervently believing in the EU as a security actor. Greece is one of the most ardent supporters of integration and has shown the level of its commitment by participating in the Euro zone and Schengen.

Having said that CFSP/ESDP issues seldom come to the fore of public attention and when this happens it is more often than not associated with emotionally charged issues such as the perceived inefficiency of CFSP to generate a feasible common position over Iraq and the undercurrent of discontent this has generated. Specific instances of crisis management, such as the DRC or more recently the Darfur Operation are mostly a matter for the relevant desks in the affected ministries and do not figure highly in the public debate. This however is liable to change if the current uncertainty over the end status negotiations in Kosovo flares up.

EU enlargement has opened two dangerous fronts for Greek largely positive perceptions of CFSP/ESDP. First, in the run-up to the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, both EU major countries (especially the UK, chairing the Council), and the US (in an impressive case of Atlantic overreach) pressured Greece and Cyprus into accepting the Turkish de facto veto over Cyprus participation to other international organizations. This matter will rankle politically for years to come, while at the same time it has created a very real problem over the future of EU/NATO institutional coordination.

Second, the start of preliminary EU talks with the FYROM in November 2005 has coincided with a flare-up of the dispute over this country's name with Greece. A proposal by the UN mediator, Matthew Nimitz was deemed "unacceptable" by Greece, which has accepted an earlier proposal of the same source – that had been promptly rejected by Skopje. The issue is complex enough, and it may gain in explosiveness since the EU (and CFSP) is likely to be called upon to face a not so spontaneous combustion of the Kosovo situation.

On the question of further development for the CFSP, Greece would like to see ad hoc arrangements, such as the one by the three EU countries conducting negotiations with Iran, extended to include more EU member-states.

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<sup>3</sup> PC Ioakimidis ed., Newsletter on European Developments: The Greek View, issue 10, 17/9/2005

## **2. Does your country adopt a more pessimistic or optimistic stance regarding the ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty? How might the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands influence the ratification debate in your country and also have an impact on the outcome of the referendum?**

The Greek Parliament ratified the Treaty with an overwhelming majority (268 members of 285 voted in favour and 17 against<sup>4</sup>) in the 300-seat chamber, since parliamentary political parties were in favour – with the exception of the Communists who muster less than 10 seats (with the Euro communists opting for “a different, better Constitution”).

The Government determinedly put aside calls for a referendum to be organized over the Treaty, so as not to risk a negative wave; a parliamentary motion for a post-ratification referendum to be called (this legal device exists under the Greek Constitution) was defeated, but by a 165/125 margin.

The ratification crisis is not considered in Greek public debate as unique or unprecedented, but it certainly is viewed as serious and profound.

One cannot really speak about a real wake-up call, because there is poor interest in the Greek public opinion concerning EU matters and especially institutional evolutions: only when specific events (e.g. Summits, beginning of Turkish accession negotiations) come to the fore, only then does public opinion take notice.

Academics and media analysts dwell on the clash of basic concepts of European integration, notably a victory of the intergovernmental as against the federal model. There is also thought to be diminishing solidarity between member states and an isolation syndrome due to the fear reaction in the face of further enlargement (and possible Turkish accession).

As the impact of the French and Dutch “No” grew on public opinion, a sort of combativeness came to the surface on the part of the supporters of the Constitution from different sides of the political spectrum. This has grown further after the failed June 2005 EU Summit, where the whole budgetary equilibrium of 2007-13 was also put in jeopardy, along with the CAP, which had seemed safe until 2013. The feeling that both agricultural incomes and Structural Funds (Greece hoped for more than 20 billion Euros from 2007 to 2013) are entering in the risk zone was a rude awakening for Greece, where EU financial flows play a central role.

## **3. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2005**

### **A. PERCEIVED SUCCESS/FAILURE OF CFSP/ESDP**

The Iraqi crisis in 2003, that Greece had to deal with as Presidency, has added emphasis and poignancy to the need for a credible CFSP/ESDP. The same crisis has also helped to bring to the surface the underlying truth that despite declarations, presidency conclusions, memoranda, reports and political commitments to the contrary, Europe speaks with a multitude of voices in matters of foreign and security policy.

Greek attitudes towards the CFSP/ESDP edifice reflect the perception that the EU reacts rather than acts and that on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The debacle of CFSP over Iraq and the

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<sup>4</sup> Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in EU -25, online article found in <http://www.cosac.org/en/info/ratification/ratification/>

near failure to produce a common position and address issues of international significance, underlines the fact that old members of the Union as well as the new kids on the block view the CFSP framework as ineffectual and slow and opt for a discussion of major security issues on Euro-Atlantic institutions or on an intergovernmental level, rather than European ones. Case in point the agreement reached between Turkey, the United States and Great Britain on the issue of use of NATO assets in ESDP operations on which no EU institution was consulted<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, the crisis over the Perejil/Leila islet between Spain and Morocco in 2002 highlights the inability of Europeans to act coherently in matters of foreign policy even in the face of threat to the territorial integrity of one of its member-states underlying the fact that since the Imia crisis of 1996 not many things have changed in the field of political expediency<sup>6</sup>. The prevailing view in Greece seems to point towards taking steps to remedy the situation rather than abandoning the CFSP framework altogether.

The new security agenda in the post 9/11 environment<sup>7</sup> demands effectiveness, swiftness and coherence in foreign policy. Europe cannot address these challenges without reconfiguring its foreign policy/security architecture. The missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina/ Operation Althea, FYROM/ Operation Proxima, the Democratic Republic of Congo/ Operation Artemis and the recent Darfur Airlift Operation although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, seem to indicate that the CFSP/ESDP process is going through its childhood illness phase, faced with budgetary and other concerns.

## B. EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT

At the level of crisis management, the main aim of the Greek government is to support a comprehensive approach integrating the capabilities and operational framework in all four areas (police, rule of law, civil protection, public administration). The military and civil aspects of ESDP should be developed on a parallel and equal basis given that they are integrated in a unified action plan. Special emphasis should be given to politico-military coordination, financing participation of third countries and cooperation with international and regional organizations and NGOs<sup>8</sup>.

This comprehensive approach is the fundamental difference between EU and NATO crisis management and sets the basis for the autonomy of these two organizations<sup>9</sup>. Greece contributes to the military leg of ESDP a force of 4700 men, 46 aircraft and 13 warships. Greece participates in the European on-call police force with 180 police officers, 20 of which are assigned to the rapid deployment police force<sup>10</sup>. Greece is also taking part in the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and the UN police mission in Kosovo with 33 police officers in total<sup>11</sup>.

Greece shares the view that the EU has already considerable experience and some successes in the field of conflict prevention. The EU's preventive diplomacy has a great scope for extending its action on the basis of international legitimacy and UN Resolutions. This action would be more effective if the EU coordinates its voice in international organizations further. The EU as the biggest donor of aid can

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<sup>5</sup> Agence Europe, Document on use of NATO capacity under CFDP is "unacceptable", 30/01/2003

<sup>6</sup> Eduard Soler I Lecha, Aznar's Spain and EU foreign Policy: Risky Bet or Adaptation to a Changing Europe, EU Policy Network, online article.

<sup>7</sup> See Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Report to the European Council, Thessaloniki 20/06-2003.

<sup>8</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), The Priorities of the Greek Presidency, online article found in [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/the\\_presidency.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/the_presidency.html)

<sup>9</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Security and Defense Policy, online article found in [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/eu\\_relations/keppa\\_epaa/epaa.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa_epaa/epaa.html)

<sup>10</sup> Ibid

<sup>11</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), Greece's Participation in Peace keeping missions in the Balkans, online article found in [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/europe\\_southeastern/balkans/gr\\_missions.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/gr_missions.html)

further coordinate all its external actions to serve the aims of preserving and extending democratic practices, good governance and respect for Human Rights. Furthermore, the EU's greatest leverage in the field of conflict prevention is that the EU is perceived by its periphery and third countries as an area of security, rule of law, accountable democratic public institutions and protection for minorities<sup>12</sup>. Greece feels that EU conflict prevention efforts must be focused in specific volatile regions such as the Balkans and the Euro-Med area<sup>13</sup>.

Greece's driving force and impetus for promoting EU CCM is in no way different from that of other EU member-states. Greece views its participation in EU civilian crisis management and conflict prevention through the prism of its EU membership and as beneficial to the country's national interests. It is in fact in Greece's direct national interest to do its utmost in order to enhance the security of its periphery.

Greece's approach to crisis management is that of complementarity between the military and civilian track of EU CCM without atrophying one facet in order to divert all resources to the other. The Greek approach to EU crisis management is based on the assumption that in the post Cold War World- laughingly dubbed as new world disorder- crises can no longer be tagged, branded, categorized and easily referenced as either strictly military or civilian in nature, but rather contain elements of both. The crises of our present and tomorrow require a multi-faceted coordinated response with both military and non-military means. The fact of the matter is that these two dimensions are so blurred into each other that drawing a clear distinction is a virtual impossibility<sup>14</sup>.

The successes of the recent mission in the Darfur in conjunction with a similar NATO deployment as well as the mission in the DRC show that the EU has, despite some teething problems, a very active role to play in crisis management once it comes onto its own.

### C. IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON CFSP/ESDP

Greece considers enlargement as a leap towards European integration and under no circumstances should it be allowed to create new dividing lines. The enlargement process can be seen as the most powerful EU External Action Exercise, so far conducted, having a potential to extend the EU's area of peace, security, stability and prosperity to Central and Eastern Europe and quite possibly to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece's aim is that enlargement serves as a point of departure for building stronger relations in the wider European space from Russia to the Mediterranean, based on common values and economic interests. Alongside the arduous process of implementing conformity with the *acquis*, there is a wider political condition relating to respect of democratic values, minority protection and resolution of outstanding border disputes.

It is the prevailing view in Greece that the parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargement, although conducive to increasing stability security and democracy, particularly in southeastern Europe<sup>15</sup>,

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<sup>12</sup> Bruno Coppieters and others, European institutional models as instruments of conflict resolution in the divided states of the Europe an periphery, CEPS working document no.195, July 2003, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Priorities of the Greek Presidency, online article found in [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/the\\_presidency.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/the_presidency.html)

<sup>14</sup> Eleni Demiri and Evangelos Vlioras, The Greek Contribution to CFSP and Civilian Crisis Management, paper presented at the BECSA/FORNET conference on the "Regional Dimensions of the CFSP/ESDP" found in <http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr/upl/Fornetvol8.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Andreas Kintis, CFSP/ESDP: The atrophy of the non-military aspect of crisis management, ELIAMEP Yearbook 2002 (in Greek).

increase difficulties in decision-making and policy coordination. In this light, enlargement was not a matter of choice but one of necessity.

On the other hand, enlargement is heightening tensions in transatlantic relations, since it is becoming apparent that the EU and the United States have divergent world views and do not see eye to eye on issues of international importance such as Iran or the Middle East Peace Process. At the same time, some of the new member-states of the EU have over the past decade formed a close working relationship with the United States, as well as an affinity with American goals and aspirations, which they are unwilling to give up. These countries have (genuine or perceived) security concerns that need to be addressed. Many countries have joined (Finland, Greece) or are joining the EU for security related as well as economic reasons<sup>16</sup>. If the EU does not match the security guarantees provided by NATO and the US for these countries, through a credible CFSP/ESDP, then it will be marginalized resembling a debating society rather than a council of ministers and new member-states will continue discussing important issues outside the EU framework. The EU should provide policy alternatives for new member-states and actually come up with common positions, which the new and aspiring member-states can adopt, before rushing to align with the US.

#### D. EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

More than military capabilities, what Europe lacks today, is a clear security strategy, reflecting a collective approach to the European security interests. To this end, the *Security Strategy of the Union*, presented by High Representative Javier Solana, establishes a base for further consideration by the Member States, in order to reach a final conclusion, on when, where and with what means the EU should intervene in the international field.

The European Union has entered a new stage in the process of strengthening military capabilities for crisis management, launching initiatives such as on the Headline Goal 2010, the EU Battlegroups, the civil-military cell and establishing the European Defence Agency (EDA). These initiatives contribute to the implementation of the European Security Strategy, enabling the European Union to deal better with threats and global challenges and realizing a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy<sup>17</sup>.

Strategic targets should be specified, responding to the new asymmetrical threats, such as the international terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction, which, in many cases, are directly connected with organized crime<sup>18</sup>.

Within the scope of the European Security Strategy it is the position of the Greek Government that it is of the utmost importance for the EU to draw up modalities and procedures for the specificities of applying enhanced cooperation among member states in the Defense field. Greece believes that the eventual creation of a Defense euro zone would not have the effect of undermining transatlantic ties or contravening existing competencies<sup>19</sup>. On the contrary, such a development coupled with the inclusion of a genuine solidarity clause would only strengthen US/ European ties by increasing European burden sharing.

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<sup>16</sup> Stelios Stavridis, "Militarising" the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited, *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXVI no.4, December 2001.

<sup>17</sup> General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions chaired by Dutch Minister of Defence Henk Kamp, Brussels, 22 November 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Spilios Spiliotopoulos, Current Greek and European Defence and Security Topics, online article found in [http://www.dgap.org/bfz/veranstaltung/Rede\\_Spiliotopoulos\\_20031119.pdf](http://www.dgap.org/bfz/veranstaltung/Rede_Spiliotopoulos_20031119.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Government Policy Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy Issues by the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, [http://www.primeminister.gr/gr/lang/en/pdf/platform\\_speech\\_1.pdf](http://www.primeminister.gr/gr/lang/en/pdf/platform_speech_1.pdf)



The Greek Government in the Defence Ministers' council of May 2004 put forward a proposal for the inclusion of Armed Forces in the fight against Terrorism, always under the authority of civilian agencies. Within the ESDP, lies the potential for a wider contribution of ESDP assets and resources in the fight against terrorism<sup>25</sup>.

Based on the Greek Proposal, a common frame of reference was approved during the European Council of December 2004, which among other provisions includes the upgrading of the interoperability of military and civilian agencies, the improvement of intelligence gathering capabilities and military force protection capabilities against terrorist attack.

In order to deal with new challenges on the world stage, the EU needs to equip itself with the proper policy instruments and military capabilities, not merely reaching the revised Headline Goal 2010 commitments but working in tandem with the European Strategic Defense Review. In this respect, the interplay between the European Capabilities Action Plan and the coordination work done by the NATO-EU Capability Group acquire a vital importance and speed up the pace of reform in military affairs, necessary for an autonomous EU operational capability.

Greece favours the greater development of the Battlegroup concept including a necessary synergy and coordination with NATO Response Forces (NRF) in order to avoid unnecessary overlapping and related complications<sup>26</sup>.

#### 4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY AND ITS FUTURE

The Prime minister Mr. Constantine Karamanlis spoke in most enthusiastic terms about the Constitutional Treaty Provisions on CFSP/ESDP in the debate, which preceded the Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the Greek Parliament<sup>27</sup>. This view is shared by the main Opposition party (PASOK) and benefits wide public support. The treaty was ratified by the Greek Parliament, with an overwhelming majority, although there was a feeling in the public opinion, at large, that the circumstances for a referendum on the subject had matured considerably (see above, 1.2.).

The Prime minister, during an official visit to the Czech Republic at the end of August went on record as saying that, with regards to the ratification of the Treaty, Greece feels that the common statement adopted, by the Council, maintains the momentum for the continuation and ultimate fruition of the process. This cooling off period serves as a pause for thought as well as providing ample opportunity for a wider public dialogue on the subject.

Greece remains convinced that the Constitutional Treaty will, when adopted, form a solid institutional basis for an enlarged European Union, serving the interests of all its Member States<sup>28</sup>. Therefore, the Greek Government stands firmly behind the continuation of the ratification process with an extended time frame.

There is considerable unanimity on the establishment of the post of EU foreign minister as well as the concept of double-hatting. The new EU FM will be able also to submit CFSP related proposals to the Council while the Commission forfeits this right.

Arguably, the most debated issue in the Convention was that of efficiency in External Action decision-making in the enlarged European Union. The threat of institutional paralysis due to the veto powers of member states prompted the move for the extension of QMV in CFSP.

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<sup>25</sup> Speech Delivered by the Defence Minister Spilios Spiliotopoulos at the National Defence University entitled The Athens Olympics: The Struggle against international Terrorism: Lessons learned, online article found in <http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/ViewPressObject.asp?HyperLinkID=4&MainLinkID=128&ObjectID=1024>

<sup>26</sup> Spiliotopoulos, ibid

<sup>27</sup> Policy Speech by the Prime Minister Mr. Konstantinos Karamanlis on the occasion of the debate on the Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. Online article found in <http://www.ekem.gr/archives/000070.html>

<sup>28</sup> Prime minister's remarks at the meeting with his Czech counterpart 28 -8-2005



Retention of unanimity as a general rule for decision-making in CFSP means that the stage is set for inertia in the European Union of 25. Preservation of veto powers across the board will increase difficulties in establishing common positions especially in times of crises.

At this time the decision - making of the enlarged EU hangs in the balance, dependent on the willingness of member states to reach agreement.

If anything, developments in 2003 belief have added poignancy and urgency to the need for a credible ESDP, a need that was first diagnosed in the late 1990s with the debacle of the Kosovo war.

Lack of a credible ESDP means that the EU cannot put its money where its mouth is in terms of implementing its External Action.

The construction of a credible ESDP rekindled the debate between Atlanticists, who view NATO as the exclusive provider of common defence and Europeanists, who consider an autonomous European defence option as indispensable to European Integration.

In the field of ESDP, the provisions of the draft treaty are a compromise between the "chocolate producers" in France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and the UK. The novel element of the draft Treaty is the adoption of "structured cooperation" which allows for closer cooperation in matters of ESDP and the application of a clause on closer cooperation in mutual defence.

#### A. EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION

With regards to the institutional arrangements, Greece has declared itself, after considerable soul-searching, in favor of double hating. This is the case for the external representation of the Union, where Greece argued that the posts of the High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged<sup>29</sup>.

Overall, the Greek Government was an advocate for the adoption of the Constitutional Draft Treaty put on the table by the Convention without significant alterations<sup>30</sup>. Greece has been, from day one, a strong proponent of closer integration and would look favorably at a Constitution with greater Political Ambition that would endow the EU with policy instruments essential for bolder steps in the federal direction. However, since discretion is the better part of valor, Greece realizes that in the current political climate in Europe the EU is not ripe for such an undertaking as the prevailing wind blows in the anti federal direction.

The Greek Government has not declared itself, either for or against, the creation of a post resembling that of the EU Foreign Minister based on the Nice provisions, adopting rather a wait and see stance towards recent developments.

The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty where CFSP/ESDP are concerned are a significant step forward in the process to endow the Union with an effective and credible presence on the international stage as well as solidify the interests of those member states who still, at this day and age face credible threats to their national security. In this way the inclusion of some of the provisions of Part A of the Constitutional Treaty to the Nice Treaty might form a realistic, albeit temporary solution to the problem of effective governance and leadership in the new enlarged EU<sup>31</sup>. However, in this considerably less than perfect institutional set up a lot will be riding and depend on the Foreign

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<sup>29</sup> See EU Convention Watch - Greece, Istituto Affari Internazionali/TEPSA. p.2.

<sup>30</sup> EKEM Newsletter on the Future of Europe and the European Union (2003), No. 22, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Stavros Kourtalas & Andreas Hardaloupas, The European Union in search of a stronger role in the International System: The European Foreign Minister and the External Action Service, online article found in <http://www.ekem.gr/archives/000147.html>

Minister's ability to discover convergences of interests among competing member states as well as using to his utmost all his diplomacy skills in order to effectively operate the agencies under his charge on a shoestring budget. Without a clearly defined frame of reference, the tenure of any foreign minister would be an accentuated balancing act between the interests of member states who don't see eye to eye on any number of issues pertaining to external relations.

Greece has been from day one a strong advocate for the creation of an External Action Service to aid and assist the work of the EU Foreign Minister. The creation of the External Action Service goes hand in hand with the creation of the post of EU Foreign minister.

The SME member states such as Greece as well as some of the new member states stand to gain a lot from the creation of a cohesive, all-inclusive external relations service. The creation and institutional bolstering of such a body coupled with a strong foreign minister would have the effect of weakening, over time, tendencies within the Council for informal, directorate style, decisions outside the framework of the Treaties.

In addition, successive Greek Governments have put their weight behind recommendations reinforcing the external action service such as a European Diplomatic Academy and common representation in third countries and international organizations<sup>32</sup>.

## B. DECISION MAKING

Greece is in favor of extending qualified majority voting in all areas, including CFSP with the exception of the military aspects of CFSP/ESDP<sup>33</sup>. Still, this position, which finds constant public support (over 75% in successive Euro barometers), should always be seen in conjunction with an equally steady support for keeping the veto safety valve in place.

Greece put forward the proposal that five years after the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, decisions where the implementation of CFSP is concerned, will be taken by QMV. If, however, a member-state opposes the adoption of a decision by QMV, then the matter will be introduced in the Agenda of the next European Council where Unanimity would apply<sup>34</sup>. Greece gave its support to the Italian Presidency compromise deal proposing that in the field of CFSP, acting on the proposal of the Foreign Minister, decisions could be adopted by QMV<sup>35</sup>.

It goes without saying that a European Union with 25 and from 2008, 27 member states cannot function effectively based on the provisions of the Nice Treaty. The drawbacks of such an eventuality are considerable, irrespective of the member state's size and relative distribution of power. The EU can continue to function with the present institutional set up (weighting of votes, number of commissioners, financial perspectives, representation in international fora) for only so long before the institutional paralysis sets in<sup>36</sup>.

## C. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In the field of crisis management, Greece has supported for many years the updating of Petersberg Tasks to include tasks that require military resources<sup>37</sup>. The existing description of Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty covers a great range of missions, both quality and quantity wise. However the post 9/11

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<sup>32</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Convention and the Future of Europe, online article found in [http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/eu\\_future/convfuture.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_future/convfuture.html)

<sup>33</sup> Ruby Gropas, Greece and the Convention on the Future of Europe, ELIAMEP Opinions, April 2003.

<sup>34</sup> EKEM Newsletter on the Future of Europe and the European Union (2003), No. 24, p. 6.

<sup>35</sup> ELIAMEP, IGC Update, No. 3 p. 4.

<sup>36</sup> Kourtalas & Hardaloupas, as above

<sup>37</sup> Agence Europe, Kostas Simitis calls for Political Union and decentralized federalism and stresses importance of social cohesion, 04/02/2002.

environment has shifted radically European threat perceptions and defense requirements. The Petersberg Tasks description should be amended to include new requirements such as conflict prevention, disarmament, dispatching of military advisors abroad to provide training as well as post-conflict stabilization and assisting government authorities in combating terrorism. In spite of positive position for crisis management, there is an extreme reluctance of public opinion (and of official policy when required to be projected in full public view) to deploy – or to participate in deployment of – theatre forces. Such reluctance is visible from the Balkans to Afghanistan.

On the question of focus, Greece favors a more regional approach for the EU's crisis management focusing on the Union's periphery namely the Balkans, Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean Basin. In 2003, the Greek government organized in the framework of the Greek presidency of the Council, a seminar on EU civilian crisis management and the Mediterranean with very encouraging results.

Greece attributes great strategic interest in Southern Caucasus as the region forms a natural corridor between Europe and Asia and shares in the EU's interest in the region, aiming to secure peace and stability in the region through the resolution of existing conflicts<sup>38</sup>.

#### D. DEFENCE

Greece has for many years advocated the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the treaty as the basic tenet for the whole ESDP framework. Creation of a Europe where citizens enjoy two distinct security standards is a non-starter.

Successive Greek Defense Ministers promoted the institutionalization of Council of Defense Ministers and of joint armaments planning and procurement. The insertion in the Treaties of an automatic solidarity clause in case of aggression, as well as the concept of common borders is a recurring theme of Greek positions in successive IGCs.

Existing solidarity arrangements call for solidarity among member-states on a political level. This should be amended to include solidarity also on a military level along the lines of relevant articles of the NATO or WEU charters. Furthermore, solidarity provisions should cover not only conventional attack on EU territory by a third country, but also new asymmetrical threats that pose a danger for international security such as terrorism, organized crime and even illegal migration. On that score the governing New Democracy party (while in the opposition) was also proposing the inclusion of an article similar to article 10 of the WEU charter, which calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes<sup>39</sup>.

The final wording of the Constitutional Treaty leaves a lot to be desired as it contains certain logical misrepresentations and is coherently challenged on a number of points, the most important of which is the fact that Article 41 calls for automatic solidarity procedures to take effect in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attack, answering to an overt need in the light of the 3/11 bombings, but not conventional attack on EU territory, lagging behind similar NATO arrangements.

The creation of a European Defence Agency is a very significant step for the fruition of ESDP since it is inextricably linked to that of European defense spending. Member-states should be encouraged to harmonize defense requirements in the light of emerging security threats and Petersberg Tasks

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<sup>38</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's General Policy Objectives in South Caucasus.  
[http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/nak/caucasus.html](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/nak/caucasus.html)

<sup>39</sup> Giannis Valinakis, The European Security and Defence Policy (in Greek), 13/3/2003.



very important facet of ESDP, has confirmed its participation in the HELLIOS 2 high definition satellite-imaging program<sup>45</sup>.

Greece has not as of late shown its hand, with reference to what it would do if the whole Constitutional Treaty Ratification process imploded, or whether it would go ahead with initiatives such as the ones already mentioned, even without a Constitutional Treaty. For the moment, the Greek Government is content just playing the field, adopting practical measures that pave the way for a tangible ESDP.

Greece has already declared itself in favor of structured cooperation in ESDP promoting the creation, over time, of a Defense Euro zone, although any such project that would be undertaken outside the purview and jurisdiction of the EU would fall short of Greek Expectations. Any procrastination in the creation of an ESDP true to its name will further endanger the deepening of integration in the EU.

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<sup>45</sup> Speech Delivered by the Defence Minister Spilios Spiliotopoulos at the Conference entitled "European Defence: Importance and Perspectives, 18/ 5/2005, found in [http://www.elesme.gr/elesmegr/periodika/t28/t28\\_13.htm](http://www.elesme.gr/elesmegr/periodika/t28/t28_13.htm)

## 5. ACTIVITIES IN CFSP-RELATED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

### *Greek Centre of European Studies & Research (EKEME)*

6, Kriezotou Street, GR-106 71 Athens

Tel.: + 30 210 362 68 88, + 30 1 360 73 20

Fax: + 30 210 363 16 31

Website: [www.ekeme.gr](http://www.ekeme.gr) , email: [ekeme@info.gr](mailto:ekeme@info.gr)

EKEME, headed by N. Frangakis and Prof. Arg. Fatouros, is the Greek member of TEPSA and as such has participated in the Enlargement-Watch and Convention-Watch. It hosted the TEPSA/EKEME Presidency Seminar on November 2002, which was mainly centered on CSFP/ESDP matters.

### *University of Athens, Institute of European Integration and Policy (IEIP)*

41-44, Aiolou Str, 105 60, Athens, Greece

Tel: +30 210 3689535

Fax: +30 210 3240521

Webmail: <http://pspa.uoa.gr> , email: [eeep@pspa.uoa.gr](mailto:eeep@pspa.uoa.gr)

The Institute of European Integration/IEIP and Policy is headed by Prof. Panos Kazakos and deals with issues of European Integration and Greece's participation in the European project.

### *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy-ELIAMEP*

49, Vasilissis Sofias Ave., 106 76 Athens, Greece

Tel.: +30 210 7257110

Fax: +30 210 7257114

Website: [www.eliamep.gr](http://www.eliamep.gr), email: [eliamep@eliamep.gr](mailto:eliamep@eliamep.gr)

The Hellenic Institute for European and Policy/ELIAMEP, headed by Profs. L. Tsoukalis, Th. Couloumbis and Th. Veremis - an earlier Director General was Y. Valinakis, presently Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs - also deal with CSFP/ESDP matters, publishing a highly regarded Yearbook and occasional papers.

### *Hellenic Center for European Studies-EKEM*

1, G Prassa and Didotou Street, 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 36 36 880

Fax: + 30 210 36 31 133, website: [www.ekem.gr](http://www.ekem.gr)

Associate Prof. K. Ifantis heads the Hellenic Centre for European Studies, which has organized a number of seminars on the Convention and has been publishing monthly Bulletins on this issue converting also CSFP/ESDP.

*Panteion University, Institute of International Relations-IDIS*

3-5 Hill Street, 105 58 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 33 12 325/7

Fax: + 30 210 33 13 575,

Website: [www.idis.gr](http://www.idis.gr), email: [idis@idis.gr](mailto:idis@idis.gr)

President: Prof. D. Konstas

*Defense Analysis Institute*

17, Valtetsiou str., 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: +30 (210) 3632971, +30 (210) 3632902

Fax: +30 210 36 32 634,

Website: [www.iaa.gr](http://www.iaa.gr), email: [institut@otenet.gr](mailto:institut@otenet.gr)

President: Evangelos Tsirkas, Lt. General (ret)

## COUNTRY SPECIFIC REMARKS

The 2004 enlargement is considered generally a positive evolution, but second thoughts have started to come to the surface due (a) to the Turkish accession uncertainties and (b) to the discussions over the negative implications of enlargement in Western Europe.

### *Future enlargement*

There are concerns ever since the failure of the Constitution over the implications on the future enlargement, but this aspect is not considered of major importance as of yet.

For Greece, a higher priority is to be given to the Western Balkans. The overall positive climate towards the accession of Bulgaria and Romania shows some first signs of vacillation, due to the increasing instances of businesses delocalisations in Northern Greece. A further front of uncertainty has been opened, concerning the accession perspectives of the FYROM, due to a flare-up in the dispute concerning this country's name.

The eventual accession of Turkey is receiving a lukewarm "Maybe", but only if fulfils in full European standards in all areas, especially in aspects of the treatment of minorities, religious freedom and the illegal presence of occupation troops on the soil of a EU member state, namely the Republic of Cyprus. The pressures put on Greece (and Cyprus) during the October 3<sup>d</sup>, 2005 inaugural session of EU-Turkey accession negotiations have created negative feelings in public opinion. Notwithstanding the fact that both Government and the Opposition have been supportive of Turkish accession negotiations, mid-October polls show that 50% of respondents are "rather negative" towards Turkish accession, vs. 32% rather positive. Moreover, 58% oppose eventual accession, vs. 29% who favour such an outcome.

Greece has had a brief period of flirtation with closer links to the US, mainly in matters of armaments (opting for the F-16 fighter, possibly for the JSF, as opposed to the Eurofighter) as well in the context of obtaining a regional/subregional role in S.E. Europe/Eastern Mediterranean since Turkey seemed engaged on a path of divergence from the US. Such closer links, reversing a decades-long trend of anti-Americanism in Greek public opinion, came to an abrupt halt when the US were seen "to side with Turkey and to support one-sidedly the FyRoM" in the last months of 2005. Thus, it is back to the EU/back to the fold for the priorities of Greek foreign policy!

This has brought back a tendency of Greek foreign policy-making to try and approach bilateral issues (or impasses) through a European angle: Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, relations with the FyRoM, future Balkan tremors – the list is long...