1.- What are the priorities for your government in CFSP in 2004? What are the key issues for your country in 2004 (after EU enlargement, after the Iraq conflict)?

2004 was a year of shifting priorities for Spanish foreign policy, given the outcome of the general elections held on March 14. After eight years of conservative government headed by the Partido Popular (PP) and José María Aznar, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and its leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, won the majority of the popular vote. Even if the external action of the conservative government and that of the newly-elected socialist one may differ in some concrete aspects, we can affirm that, since its accession, Spain has been in favour of enhancing the external action of the European Union. According to the country’s official position, the EU’s goals in this dimension should lie in consolidating its role as a global actor, contributing to international peace and security, and guaranteeing the prevalence of an effective multilateralism in the international scene.

It must be noted that, for the first time, Spain’s foreign policy was an electoral issue—a controversial one—in the campaign leading to the general elections of March 2004. Foreign policy acquired such centrality because of the conservative government’s decision to support U.S. President Bush in Iraq, including the participation of Spanish troops in the conflict. A large portion of Spain’s public opinion clearly and outspokenly opposed this decision. This opposition was evident in the impressive demonstrations of February 15, 2003, when well over two million people flooded the streets of Madrid and Barcelona to protest against the then-potential invasion of Iraq.

In fact, way before the terrorist attacks of March 11, when 191 civilians lost their lives and thousands were injured, the electoral programmes of the two main parties, PP and PSOE, embodied radically different—even opposed—foreign policy projects. It must be recalled that, during the first Aznar government (1996-2000), Spain’s foreign policy priorities focused on a privileged relationship with the United States, distancing itself from the Franco-German axis, and pursuing a more intergovernmental discourse in its dealings with the European Union. This remained so during his second government (2000-2004), perhaps with a stronger emphasis on Spain’s relationship with the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Thus, in 2004, the PP’s electoral programme introduced by Mariano Rajoy, Aznar’s would-be successor after

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he refused to run again, maintained the same priorities and clearly clashed with the socialists’ foreign policy project. The Socialist Party’s campaign for the March 14 elections largely consisted on demanding a comeback to the three ordering, foreign policy principles set up between 1986 and 1996, by Felipe González’s government: domestic consensus on the formulation of European policy, the reestablishment of privileged relations with France and Germany, and a reorientation of Spain’s Transatlantic relations. The presence of Spanish troops in Iraq became a particularly polemical issue due to the socialists’ proposal to withdraw the troops unless the United Nations took political and military control over Iraq before June 30, 2004, and Iraqi institutions were soon restored. Viewing things from exactly the opposite point of view, the PP was studying the possibility of assuming command of Polish troops in the region starting on June 2004.

The victory of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero opened up a whole set of questions about the future of Spain’s position within the EU, and the new priorities of Spanish foreign policy. Once the new socialist government was sworn in, its first decision was ordering the withdrawal of all Spanish troops in Iraq, way before the announced date. According to Zapatero’s statement on the matter, Spanish troops were to progressively abandon the region ahead of time since a UN resolution implying the organisation’s political and military involvement in Iraq was not foreseeable in the near future. All Spanish political parties represented in the Spanish Parliament after the general elections except the PP supported Zapatero’s decision at its first plenary session.

Beyond their differing views on Spain’s participation in Iraq, both the socialist and the conservative governments have based their external actions on the same traditional priorities of Spanish foreign policy. Undoubtedly, these are Europe, the Mediterranean region and Latin America. In this sense, the new Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, started his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 21, 2004, with the statement “We are a European, Mediterranean and Latin American country”. However, the similarities between the PP and the PSOE regarding foreign policy end here. The new socialist government has made a deliberate effort to distinguish its foreign policy from that of its predecessor, particularly with regards to US-Spain relations, which have stopped being a priority at least in the same manner they were for José María Aznar during his last term in office (2000-2004). The most visible example of such repositioning was Spain’s withdrawal of its troops from Iraq.

Beyond Europe, the other two traditional priorities of Spanish foreign policy, the Mediterranean and Latin America, have been given a different impulse by the new socialist government. As far as the Mediterranean region is concerned, the Spanish government wants to boost EU-Mediterranean relations within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Spain, together with the British Presidency, are organizing a new Euro-Mediterranean Conference, so-called “Barcelona + 10”, as a way to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and give a much-needed push to these relations. The conference will be held in Barcelona, in November 2005. For Spain, it is important that the new initiatives of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East do not distract the attention of its EU partners from the Barcelona Process. As for the bilateral sphere, relations with Morocco, and more generally with the Maghreb, have gone back to “normality”. The latest conservative government of José María Aznar had distanced itself more than ever before from Morocco, taking relations between both countries to the point of ‘military conflict’ over the islet of Perejil (also known as Leila). In contrast, Prime Minister Zapatero visited Morocco in his first trip abroad to symbolise the restoration of good relations with Rabat. One concrete example of this new stage in Spanish-Moroccan relations is the agreement to jointly send around 200 troops and police to Haiti, as part of the Brazilian-led UN peacekeeping force (MINUSTAH) in October 2004. Concerning the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Spain has a great interest in resolving the Middle East conflict because it has hindered the Euro-Mediterranean Process. From this perspective, the appointment of former EU Special Representative for the MEPP, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, as Spain’s new Foreign Affairs Minister is significant. Both the EU and Spain recognize that taking the MEPP to a good end is a precondition for building a peaceful and prosperous area in the Mediterranean.

For Spain, Latin America has always been a national priority, deserving the attention of all EU Member States. Despite Spain’s emphasis on the region and its inherent potential, Latin America has had little appeal at the European level and CFSP activity towards the region has been particularly limited. With the recently-elected Spanish government, relations with Latin America have been seen in a new light. The most recent example of the EU’s interest in enhancing its position in Latin America has been the case of Cuba. The change in Spain’s view of the Castro regime has been important to modify the EU’s position. The tough-line
approach against Cuba maintained by José María Aznar's government has been replaced by a softer, more cooperative strategy. In fact, Spain re-established formal contacts with Cuba and is working towards the establishment of a renewed EU-Cuba political dialogue, as well as seeking the elimination of all EU-imposed diplomatic sanctions against the Castro regime. In the GAERC of January 2005, EU foreign ministers agreed to temporarily restore normal diplomatic relations with Cuba.

- As stated before, the ultimate difference between the two main parties' foreign policy strategies was the relation between Spain and the United States. While José María Aznar (PP) had established a special –even personal-- relationship with George W. Bush, the new socialist government differed substantially on what kind of relationship should Spain maintain with the US. The new government seeks a more balanced relation, based on equality, loyalty and mutual respect. And, as the Foreign Minister has stated, a Spanish-American relationship on equal footing will only be possible through a wider framework, that is the European one. After President Bush's re-election, the Spanish government has tried –albeit unsuccessfully-- to improve the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Thus, for now, it has not been possible to hold a bilateral summit between both presidents, despite King Juan Carlos’s visit to President Bush at this ranch in Crawford, Texas, in November 2004.

- The fight against terrorism has been a government priority since the last years of Franco’s dictatorship for domestic reasons. After 9/11, Spain’s priority became a top European priority too, given the salience of terrorism in the international agenda. It must be noted that, as a result of 9/11, the European Union accelerated the approval of measures to protect its territory against international terrorist attacks. In 2002, Spain pressed for the inclusion of terrorism within the Second Pillar as an ESDP issue. The 3/11 terrorist attacks against the commuter railway system in Madrid showed that Europe was not immune to international terrorism. In 2004 Spain’s government worked within and from the EU to foster the UN’s response capacity vis-à-vis international terrorism. In Zapatero’s words, an effective counterterrorism policy must be based on “respect for international law, on respect for legislation, respect for the United Nations and respect for the efforts of the United Nations Security Council”.4 Due to Spain’s notorious role in the fight

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against terrorism, the Spaniard Javier Rupérez chairs the recently revitalized UN Counter Terrorism Committee. Finally, it is worth noting Spain’s interest in helping to bridge the gap between the West and the Arab-Muslim world through what José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero called an ‘alliance of civilisations’ in his speech before the UN General Assembly.

2. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2004

a) Success and failure of CFSP/ESDP (Iraq conflict)

As previously mentioned, the first foreign-policy decision of the new socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was the withdrawal of the 1.300 Spanish troops from Iraq. The Atlanticist policy of the previous centre-right government (PP) was replaced by a more Europeanist foreign policy view and a pull-out from the US-led coalition. Clearly, the decision, and its being the first one of the new government, was more symbolic than actually military relevant. Nonetheless, the socialist government reaffirmed its commitment to the stability, democratization and reconstruction of Iraq. In this sense, Spain committed itself to continue promoting UN and EU actions in the region, to offer a new international cooperation framework to the Iraqi society. Guaranteeing international peace and security, as well as fighting against terrorism not only in Iraq but elsewhere too, will be the main goals of Spain’s actions within the UN and the EU.

b) NATO enlargement (in relationship with ESDP) and its role in Afghanistan and Iraq

First, Spain’s Ministry of Defence has decided to explicitly boost the Common Security and Defence Policy through its pledge to the Headline Goal 2010, its contribution to the development of Battlegroups, and its participation in the European Capability Action Plan and the European Defence Agency. Regarding EU-NATO relations, Spain’s National Defence Directive (2004) states that it is necessary to promote such relations, because balanced, firm and strong Transatlantic ties are a decisive element for international peace and stability. Spain has committed itself to actively take part in NATO initiatives, particularly the Response Force and NATO’s Prague Capability Commitment, in order to contribute to a more efficient conflict prevention policy and, if it is the case, to crises management.
Second, after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, Spain’s government wanted to make its commitment to both NATO and the UN known to the international community. With this in mind, Spain’s armed forces deployed a contingent of about 500 soldiers to Afghanistan, within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Spain enlarged its contingent in Afghanistan from around 140 to 551 soldiers. More recently, the government agreed to move its troops to the more conflictive western part of the country, enabling NATO to play a greater role, and as an attempt to mend some bridges with the United States after their abrupt withdrawal from Iraq.

Regarding NATO contributions to Iraq, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium and Greece refused to go along with the decision made at NATO’s Summit in Istanbul (June 2004) to involve the alliance in the military training activities of the Iraqi forces. However, in the Summit Meeting of February, 22, 2005, Spain agreed to take part in training programmes for judges, police officers, and middle and senior-level personnel, to be held not in Iraq, but in Spanish territory. Furthermore, Spain made a financial contribution of 400,000 euros.

c) The role of the EU in crisis management e.g. in Europe and Africa

The new socialist government, like its predecessor, is in favour of the development of a real European defence policy. Spain wants to be in the forefront of this European effort. According to Spain, the Union should provide itself with a wide range of crisis-management instruments, either civil or military, in close cooperation with the UN, and in such a way that it is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance.

Spain took part in the EU military mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis). Today, around 600 Spanish soldiers are taking part in the recently-launched EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea). As far as EU civil missions are concerned, Spain is also involved in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the one in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima).

As a contribution to ESDP, Spain, along with France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, launched the initiative to establish a European Gendarmerie to bridge the gap between soldiers and policemen in peacekeeping operations. It would be a force intended to guarantee public security and order. Finally, Spain agreed to take part in three of the thirteen EU Battlegroups that will be initially created in 2005 and fully developed by 2007.
d) The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP (old versus new Europe)

Spain’s alliance strategy within the EU has suffered one of the most visible changes since the arrival of the new socialist government. Zapatero’s campaign slogan was “return to Europe”, that is, the rapprochement with France and Germany, the hard core of the European construction, and the distancing from the more Atlanticist partners. If Aznar was one of the leaders, together with Tony Blair, of the ‘new Europe’, Zapatero intended exactly the opposite: to go back to ‘old Europe’. The photograph of Zapatero, Chirac and Schröder at the Moncloa Palace in September 2004 was the counter image of the one taken in the Azores, in March 2003, of George Bush, Tony Blair and José María Aznar.

With regards to other EU members, Spain’s bilateral relations with Poland, initiated by Aznar to have an ally in the issues of cohesion funds and the weight of middle powers—such as Poland and Spain—within the new EU, were cooled off by Zapatero, who postponed a bilateral meeting in December 2004, just one day before it was supposed to take place. It seems that the potential alliance with Poland has been pushed into the background by the much sought-after Paris-Berlin-Madrid axis.

e) The European Security Strategy (ESS)

Both the conservative and the socialist governments in Spain have welcomed the European Security Strategy. The National Defence Directive, made public on December 30, 2004, admits that the ESS is based on actions and initiatives within security and defence organisations in a multilateral system, with the possibility to intervene early, rapidly and, if necessary, in a convincing way.

Spain’s socialist government is gradually introducing the concept and principles of the ESS into its own foreign policy. Since Javier Solana, former socialist Foreign Minister, is the driving force behind the ESS, it is easy to see how the key issues of current Spanish foreign policy and the strategic objectives of the ESS converge. Moreover, the process is reinforced by the appointment of Alberto Navarro, former Head of the High Representative’s Cabinet, as Spain’s Secretary of State for the European Union.
3.- The Results of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on the Constitutional Treaty

Spain did not bring any official contribution or proposal with regards to the Union’s external relations, CFSP or ESDP to the IGC. Spain’s priorities in the negotiations for the constitutional treaty were focused on the country’s weight within the different European institutions (above all, the weighting votes in the Council).

a) External representation

- As far as the European Foreign Minister is concerned, in the European Convention, Spain promoted the creation of a full-fledged EU Foreign Minister, accountable to the President of the European Council, who would chair the External Action Council and take over the competences of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for the CFSP, despite some reserves on the viability of such a double-hatted figure. In the Intergovernmental Conference, Spain did not make any special demand on this question. However, Spain supported Javier Solana, a member of the Spanish Socialist Party, as a candidate for this post (as well as his renewal as the High Representative for CFSP) and pressed to put through this appointment as soon as possible.
- The Spanish government supported the creation of the new figure of President of the European Council since the introduction of the French and British proposal in the European Convention.
- The EU External Action Service was seen by the Spanish government as a useful element to support the new figure of the European Foreign Minister.

b) Decision-making and structured cooperation

- Spain favoured the extension of qualified majority in the field of CFSP as a general rule, with the exceptions of defence questions and when a Member State claims that a vital national interest is affected by the decision.
- Spain supports the use of the so-called structured cooperation between Member States who are able and willing to fulfil higher criteria on military capabilities, in particular qualitatively, with the purpose of undertaking more demanding military operations. The Spanish government was very interested in taking part in any structured cooperation and it committed itself to increase its military capabilities.
c) Crisis management

- Spanish government supported giving a broader definition to **Petersberg Tasks** to include other objectives that imply the use of military means, i.e. conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization operations, military advice, disarmament operations and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism.

d) Defence issues

- Spain is in favour of the establishment of a **civilian-military cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS)**. Spain rejected the European Defence proposal made by France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium, which wanted to place the EU military operations headquarters in Tervuren. Spain finally joined the Defence proposal agreed by France, Britain and Germany in the Autumn of 2003, consisting of the establishment of an EU planning capability, but with close links to NATO.
- Spain favoured the establishment of a **Mutual Defence Clause** fully consistent with NATO commitments, to which willing Member States can opt in under certain conditions.
- In the European Convention as well as in the IGC, Spain fully supported the establishment of a **European Defence Agency**.

4.- Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

- **Real Instituto Elcano** (**http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org**): José Ignacio Torreblanca, Manuel Coma; Charles Powell.
- **Centro de estudios y análisis de seguridad (Universidad de Granada)** (**http://www.ugr.es/~ceas**): Javier Jordán.
- **Centro de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación Internacional (CIDOB)** (**http://www.cidob.org**)
- **Instituto Complutense de Relaciones Internacionales**
(http://www.ucm.es/info/icei): Rafael Calduch.

- Unidad de Investigación sobre Seguridad y Cooperación Internacional (UNISCI) (http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/nplantilla.htm): Antonio Marquina.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Granada): Diego J. Liñán Nogueras.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Salamanca): Luis Norberto González
- Instituto de Estudios Europeos (Universidad San Pablo-CEU)