CFSP WATCH 2003

NATIONAL REPORT SPAIN

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What are the priorities for the Spanish Government in CFSP?

In general, there has been broad continuity in terms of Spain's approach to the CFSP in the past decade. Being Europeanist in its objectives and intergovernmentalist in its methods, Spain has been an active participant in the definition of the CFSP, especially in early 1990s, although it is gradually adopting a more pragmatic and laissez-faire stance. This means that successive Spanish governments have tended to leave behind the more far-reaching aims related to the model of European construction defended in early 1990s, to focus primarily on improving CFSP policy instruments. By the same token, Spain has joined the process of creating a EU military force, however, without acting as one of the main promoters of the project.

Notwithstanding the lack of Spanish leadership in the CFSP area during the second part of the 1990s, Europe has always been considered the main priority of the Spanish foreign policy, which is evidenced by Spain’s strategy to Europeanise of its national foreign policy agenda, in terms of the Mediterranean region and Latin America.

Spain is considered as a “middle power” in the CFSP framework, but increasingly, Spain is looking to pursue to play a more significant role in the process of European Integration, especially in terms of the participation in the directoire of the big states. Particularly the current People’s Party government under José María Aznar has tried to take the definitive leap to make Spain one of the major European players, as well as to achieve a prominent role of the country on the international scene.

What are the key issues for Spain?

The three traditional priority areas for Spanish foreign policy are Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean. These priorities have constituted the main and consensual axis of the Spanish foreign policy during the consecutive Socialist administrations (1982-1996) as well as in the first term of the People’s Party (1996-2000). However, since the general election in 2000, the conservative government has gradually introduced a new strategy, focusing on anti-terrorist measures and placing high priority on the Atlanticist relation which now ran even above the mentioned traditional interests; a strategy that has been criticised by the main opposition parties.

- The importance of the Mediterranean Region for Spain is due to its geographical location in this region, as well as the perception of it as an area of risk to Spanish domestic security, a feeling of insecurity that has increased with the growth of illegal migratory flows stemming from northern Africa. Spain’s interest in
the Mediterranean region articulates itself through an independent national foreign policy, above all for the Maghreb, using diplomatic instruments such as treaties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation agreements (signed with Morocco, Tunisia and more recently, Algeria) and political dialogue.

The development of a strong bilateral Spanish foreign policy towards some key Mediterranean partners has been complemented by significant Spanish activity at the European level. When it comes to favouring the convergence of the interests of European member states towards the Mediterranean region, the Spanish role has been noteworthy. Indeed, one can speak of leadership exercised (albeit not exclusively) by Spain in terms of EU Mediterranean policies, in particular in relation to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, its institutionalisation and further development (as for the latter see the Spanish proposals during the 2002 Spanish EU-term Presidency for the establishment of a Euromed Development Bank).

Madrid’s initiatives in the Mediterranean area have served to increase Spain’s general profile in the Union and to improve its image among the third Mediterranean countries. Through the European foreign policy, Spain has seen one of its fundamental objectives for the Mediterranean region realized, namely that the EU should assume the responsibility for increasing the resources destined for Mediterranean cooperation (through the MEDA Programme).

- At the end of the 1990s, Latin America has become a vital interest for Spain, even above the Mediterranean. Two factors explain the priority given to Latin America in the Spanish agenda: first, cultural affinity (language, common history); second, the economic factor (Spain was the largest European investor in Latin America in 1998).

However, Spanish interest in this area has obtained little resonance at the European level. CFSP activity towards Latin America has been limited. Therefore, in contrast to the Mediterranean policy, the case of Latin America is a pattern of clear divergence between the Spanish and European agendas. For example, the stronger interests of Spain in relation to this continent explain why Madrid tends to be more indulgent than its European partners when it comes to condemning Latin American governments over determined offences. However, in coming into power in 1996 of the Aznar government this Spanish policy changed slightly. The People’s Party changed the Spanish-Cuban constructive dialogue that the former Socialist administration had developed and replaced it with a harder opposition to the Castro Regime. In this sense, the idea of a CFSP common position on Cuba (agreed in December 1996) was proposed by the Aznar government, which maintained an ‘anti-Castro’ stance during the years 1996-98. Nevertheless, some of Spain’s European partners (for example, Holland in November 1999) have called for a tougher CFSP stance towards the non-democratic Castro regime, although Spain has so far opposed such a move.

In order to compensate for the limited attention that the EU tends to give this region, Spain has created the Ibero-American Community, an institution intended to co-ordinate policies between Spain, Portugal and the countries of the region. Spain has also made the choice to allocate half of the Spanish ODA to Latin America. Notwithstanding these measures demonstrating a clear Spanish preference for the continent, in recent years Spain has been criticised by some Latin American countries for its seemingly too wide and open-ended global policy towards the
region which is lacking a commitment to concrete measures, as well as political dedication and economic resources.

- From the beginning of its current electoral term, the People’s Party has pursued a deepening and diversification of Spanish relations with the United States. This is illustrated by the signing of the Joint Political Declaration in January 2001 and more recently the revision of the Cooperation Treaty on Defence in April 2002. The main reasons for the Spanish newfound Atlanticism are, on the one hand, the coincidence between the Spanish and US political agenda on anti-terrorism, and on the other hand, due to deteriorating relations with some of Spain’s neighbours, i.e., Morocco, which has given rise to the revival of the perception of the “southern threat”, stemming from the Southern Mediterranean.

The Aznar government has insisted on that Spain’s Atlanticism does not substantially modify the priorities of Spanish foreign policy. However, even if Spanish political forces, with the exception of the opposition party, Izquierda Unida, have accepted the gradual modification of Spain’s position over defence matters and relations with the US, the more recent Atlantist focus has been criticised for harming Spanish traditional interests. Concretely, in this sense, it is alleged that the alignment with the Anglo-Saxon bloc constitutes an element of divergence in the formulation of a common European policy. Madrid’s support for the bombings carried out by the US and Great Britain over Iraq in 1998, or for the Bush Administration’s proposal of launching a National Missile Defence System (NMD) are largely at odds with the dominant opinion in the EU.

- Spain, for domestic reasons, has always requested the attention and solidarity of the EU member states in order to ‘Europeanise’ its fight against terrorism. For example, Spain during its EU Presidency (first semester of 2002), pressed for the inclusion of the terrorism into the Second Pillar as an ESDP issue. The ‘new sensibility’ of the EU-15 after the 11th September has transformed this Spanish priority into a top European priority. This context has given the Spanish government clear dividends in the anti-terrorist field both at domestic and international levels, but without putting at risk the European character of its agenda.

2. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues

Perceived success or failure of CFSP/ESDP:

- Iraqi conflict: The Iraq crisis has supposed the end of the consensus between the major Spanish political parties on the priorities of the Spanish foreign policy as well as a break between the government’s action and the public opinion (91% of the Spanish were opposed to the Iraq military intervention). The Spanish government, however, has supported the US vision of the conflict and gave its vote in the UN Security Council (Spain is an elected member of the Security Council for 2003-2004 term).

The lack of consensus in the EU and the failure of the CFSP was not a motive of preoccupation for the Spanish conservative government because it was allied with the US and, among the EU partners, with UK, Italy, Portugal and Denmark. Notwithstanding, opposition parties blamed the People’s Party government for having broken the European consensus in the framework of the CFSP, when Aznar appeared as one of the promoters behind a letter (The Letter of Eight), published in
several European journals on 30 January 2003 and signed by eight European countries supporting the transatlantic link in the US policy towards Iraq.

- **September 11th**: Within the broader framework of EU solidarity with the US after the terrorist attacks, Spain stood out by its rapid and unconditional commitment to send Spanish troops to fight in Afghanistan. However, Spanish troops were not finally requested by the US.

  The emergence of the issue of the fight against terrorism on the international and European agendas is in accordance with the national interests of Spain and it has favoured a greater role for Spain in an international context. Spain took the lead of the European reaction against the terrorist attacks and in a few weeks, was the main initiative taken behind a new European Action Plan against terrorism that included most of the anti-terrorist proposals that Spain had already on its JHA interim agenda (i.e. the European Arrest Warrant and Procedures, also known as the ‘euro-warrant’, or the updating of the list of terrorist organisations with the inclusion of Batasuna).

- **Missions in Bosnia and Macedonia**: Similar to other EU partners, Spain perceived the role of the Union in the Western Balkans conflicts in the early-mid-1990s as frustrating. For this reason Spain, as well as the majority of the EU member states, accepted the leadership of the US in the region. In order to cover these EU deficiencies, Spain has since decidedly backed the efforts to develop the ESDP as well as to increase EU civil and military capacities in crisis management. Thus, the launch of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been considered by the Spanish government as an important step forward to enable the EU to develop with efficacy the Petersberg Tasks. Finally, it is worth mentioning the presence of Spanish troops in these missions.

**Position of Spain towards NATO (in relationship with the ESDP)**

From Spain’s traditional point of view, NATO and ESDP are not only compatible but also they reinforce each other mutually in the pursuit of the security for European citizens. Therefore, Spain has always defended the creation of a European security and defence identity and at the same time has worked to reinforce the Atlantic Alliance since its full incorporation into NATO Atlantic Council in Madrid in July 1997. Spain has thus managed to definitely erase the negative image of being a “reluctant partner” which was attributed to the country during the 1980s, due to its desire to stay at the margins of NATO.

The current Spanish government has put more emphasis on the reinforcement of the transatlantic link. In this sense, Spain proposes to give an impulse to EU’s strategic association with the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of the existing cooperation agreements in the field of crisis management. Spain considers that EU should focus on improving its own capacity for autonomous crisis management action where NATO as such is not involved, as well as its ability to face new security challenges in Europe.

**The role of the EU in crisis management:**

- **Kosovo**: The Aznar administration supported the NATO’s strategy of bombing Serbia, in which Spain participated with six fighter-bombers. Spanish participation
in the Kosovo intervention enjoyed consensus of all the main Spanish political parties, with the exception of Izquierda Unida. Notwithstanding, the public opinion was very critical of the government’s action (53% of the Spaniards were opposed to the bombing, while only 31% were favourable). The Spanish doctrine about such kind of interventions was later adopted in a document called “White Book of Defence” in March 2000, which is the first of its kind in Spain. The White Book endorses the actuation of NATO over Kosovo and proceeds to recognise that actions similar to Kosovo (i.e. military intervention without Security Council resolution) might be legitimate in the future on a case to case basis even without the consensus of the NATO allies.

- Middle East: The Spanish diplomacy has developed an active presence in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Madrid hosted the Peace Conference in 1991 and the EU sent a Spanish diplomat, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, as Special Representative of the EU in the MEPP until 2003. Under the Spanish EU Presidency, Spain coordinated the launch of the Quartet initiative to put the Peace Process back on track. These actions did help to cultivate Spain’s self image as a peace maker, an image which brought the country influence in the Mediterranean region, as well as being popular at home. The Spanish Government do not disguise its interest in being chosen for holding a new peace conference (Madrid II) in the future.

Spain has a great interest in resolving the Middle East conflict because the latter has hindered the Euro-Mediterranean Process, one of the Spanish national priorities. However, the Spanish approach to the MEPP is based on the belief that the US involvement is a pre-condition for an effective solution of the conflict.

The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP (old versus new Europe)

The perception of being a peripheral country in the EU has increased with the Eastern Enlargement. Spain has also expressed its concern that as the centre of gravity is shifting to the east, priority areas for Spanish foreign policy, such as the Mediterranean region, are being marginalised in the CFSP.

In terms of the old versus new Europe or the Atlanticism/Europeanism cleavage, Spain promoted the Letter of Eight on Iraq, signed by the President of the Czech Republic and the Prime Ministers of Poland and Hungary, among the candidates. Spanish government celebrates that most of the future new member states shares the Spanish Atlantist view, and consequently they contribute to counterbalance the traditional leadership role of the Franco-German axis in the European construction.

3. European Convention:

Contributions:

- Contribution by Mrs Ana Palacio and Mr Peter Hain, members of the Convention: “The Union Institutions”, CONV 591/03, CONTRIB 264, 28 February 2003.
- Contribution submitted by Mr Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, member of the Convention, and Ms Ana Palacio and Mr Alejandro Muñoz Alonzo, alternate

External Representation:

• In terms of external representation of the Union, the Spanish Government promoted the creation of a fully-fledged EU foreign minister accountable to the President of the European Council, who would chair the External Action Council and take over the competences of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for the CFSP for representing the EU in the international community. However, Spanish officials were also sceptical as to the viability of such a double-hatted figure, particularly if he was expected to act as vice-president of the Commission and chair the External Action Council simultaneously.
• The European Council would appoint the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union by qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the European Commission.
• The Spanish government supported the new figure of a President of the European Council since the first French and British proposal. This figure, appointed for a period to be significantly longer than six months and respecting the principle of equality amongst Member States, would prepare and preside over European Council meetings; ensure the follow-up of decisions adopted there, and give added profile to the external representation of the EU and inform the European Parliament about the European Council’s work.
• The delegations of the External Service of the Commission should become real delegations of the EU, including the EU Staff and the national external services ones.
• The coordination between the External Service of the Union and the diplomatic services of the Member States should be improved and reinforced.
• Spain supports the initiative that foresees the creation of a Common Diplomatic School.

Decision-making:

• Spain favours the extension of the qualified majority rule in the field of CFSP as a general rule with the exceptions of the defence questions and when a Member State claims that a vital national interest is affected.
• Spain supports the use of the enhanced cooperation or the constructive abstention

Crisis Management:

• Petersberg Tasks: A broader definition of Petersberg Tasks should include other tasks that imply the use of military means, i.e. conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization operations, military advice, disarmament operations and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism.
• The military means in support to Member States could be used against the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Defence:

- Solidarity Clause: Inclusion in the Constitutional Treaty. This should set out the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance between the Member States.
- Flexibility: The establishment of a structured cooperation between Member States which are able and willing to fulfil higher criteria on military capabilities, in particular in quality terms, with a view to undertaking more demanding military operations.
- Armament: The establishment a European Agency for Military Capabilities
- Proposal of four on European Defence policy: The EU institutions must participate in the construction of a real European Security and Defence Policy. Three or four Member States cannot decide on a European Defence Policy. However, if some countries agree on moving forward to a European Defence Policy within the EU, Spain would give its support.
- The establishment of a mutual defence clause in a Protocol annexed to the Constitutional Treaty, to which willing member states can opt in under certain conditions and fully consistent with NATO commitments. A reproduction of the existent commitment between WEU Members in the EU framework.
- The rule of unanimity for decisions regarding ESDP should be preserved.

4. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

Major experts, universities and research institutions working in the CFSP field in Spain

- Real Instituto Elcano (http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/): Rafael R. Bardají; Manuel Coma; Charles Powell.
- Centro de estudios y análisis de seguridad (Universidad de Granada) (http://www.ugr.es/~ceas/): Javier Jordán.
- Centro de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación Internacional (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/)
- Instituto Complutense de Relaciones Internacionales (http://www.ucm.es/info/icei): Rafael Calduch.
- Unidad de Investigación sobre Seguridad y Cooperación Internacional (UNISCI) (http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/nplantilla.htm): Antonio Marquina.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Granada): Diego J. Liñán Nogueras.
- Facultad de Derecho (Universidad de Salamanca): Luis Norberto González
- Instituto de Estudios Europeos (Universidad San Pablo-CEU)
**Basic References:**


Lamo, Emilio “Spain’s Atlantic Vocation” *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano*, 2 June 2003 <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/>


Palacio, Vicente; Rodrigo, Fernando “¿Tiene España una Política Exterior?” *Política Exterior*, nº 93, May/June 2003.