CFSP WATCH 2003

NATIONAL REPORT IRELAND

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1. Basic Views of CFSP/ESDP in your country.

- In general, the CFSP and ESDP have been viewed through the prism of 'neutrality' as understood and practised in Ireland.
- As a consequence, the Irish public debate on CFSP tends to take place within a somewhat defensive context, focusing – in most political quarters – upon the protection of Irish neutrality against the inroads of CFSP and ESDP, and with specific concerns about 'mutual defence', military spending and arms control, the relationship with NATO, 'enhanced co-operation', the impact of CFSP on Ireland and associated erosion of 'sovereignty'/independence.
- The debate is further complicated by the domestically contested notion of 'neutrality', its historical practice, its disputed contemporary relevance in a globalised world, its current implications for Irish foreign, security and defence policy, its conflation with Irish independence and its use as a synonym for an ethical/pacific approach to international relations.
- In consequence, European defence has been a difficult subject for consecutive Irish governments. A central political concern has been to downplay the issue lest it foment popular suspicion that Irish neutrality was in any way threatened. It is not at all clear if stronger political leadership would effect any change in this attitude.
- This sensitivity is seen in Ireland as contrasting somewhat with the public debates in other member states and even in other 'non-aligned' member states. At both elite and public levels, security and defence debates in Ireland are seen as being 'different' to those in other countries.
- A recent survey conducted for the Irish Times found that a majority (58 percent) believes that Ireland should consider joining a EU common defence provided that the state can decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to join any particular military action. A further 10 percent support unconditional membership of such a common defence, while 31 percent opposed membership of any military alliance. Opposition to a EU common defence is highest among women and the 18-24 age cohort. ¹
- That opposition may be said to focus upon (a) armaments/sale of arms causes conflicts (b) involvement in EU defence = dependence on nuclear weapons (France and UK) (c) the alleged "resource wars" statement attributed to Delors and (d) the "do you want your grandchildren to die for NATO?" argument.

However, several qualifications may be made.

¹ The Irish Times, May 17 2003
Ireland is not so unique

- Firstly, Ireland is not as unique or anomalous as is sometimes assumed – either within or outside Ireland.
- In essence, Irish ‘military neutrality’ approximates to the current policy of non-alignment of Austria, Finland and Sweden.
- In terms of public debate, Ireland has much in common with Sweden, given the similar sensitivities about identity and the historical development of their neutrality policies, which are both somewhat identity-driven.
- In policy terms, Ireland perhaps shares even more with Finland, especially given that Irish policy-makers view Finland as an excellent example of what is sometimes described as an ‘active’ neutral i.e. Finland is not isolationist but an engaged non-aligned actor and has no explicit self-interest in the arms industry.
- All EU non-aligned actors are seen by Irish elites as operating with a broad understanding of security and of their status as small states. Such an understanding implies a multilateral response to security threats, with CFSP and ESDP posited in that context.
- Movement towards hard security in CFSP and ESDP provoke considerable domestic political controversy.

Europeanisation

- Secondly, it is important to note that there has been a shift in Irish foreign, security and defence policy that accords somewhat to the concept of ‘Europeanisation’.
- Particularly since the early 1990s, there has been a greater willingness on the part of Irish policy-makers to frame Irish foreign, security and defence policy within a broader European context.
- Numerous academic and public policy seminars have been organised on the topic of Ireland’s role within the CFSP/ESDP that have generated substantial elite-level debate.
- However, there is a continued inability to communicate this deeper engagement with CFSP/ESDP to a broader mass of Irish citizens.
- The Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat government has continued – as have all past Governments – to reassure the electorate that nothing fundamentally has changed in Irish security and defence policy and that Ireland maintains its traditional policy of ‘military neutrality’. Strikingly, no political party – until quite recently – has formally called for any fundamental reappraisal of that policy.  

Impact of Referendums on Irish CFSP/ESDP Policy

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Third, Ireland is, however, unique in having to conduct national referenda to ratify each phase of EU treaty change (Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty and Nice Treaty) and will do so again to ratify any constitutional treaty arising from the Convention on the Future of Europe and the 2004 IGC.

This requirement arises from a 1986 court case taken initially to challenge the Government’s right to ratify EC treaty change via parliamentary vote. The Supreme Court explicitly cited provisions establishing EPC as imposing new restrictions on the conduct of foreign policy that were not necessitated by membership and which therefore required popular assent.

At each of the foregoing referendums the ‘neutrality’ issue has been a major point of debate and controversy – with opponents of change insisting that proposed developments threatened or undermined neutrality and treaty proponents insisting, primarily, that the proposed changes would have little or no impact on the ‘traditional’ policy of ‘military neutrality.

Traditionally, governments relied upon the "safeguard clause" written in to successive Treaties since Maastricht at Ireland's request (Article 17 of TEU - "The policy of the Union ...shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States....")

In response to the initial rejection of the Nice Treaty in autumn 2001, the Government sought and won a Declaration from the Seville Summit that confirmed that Ireland's policy of military neutrality was in full conformity with the Treaties, including the Treaty of Nice, and that there was and is no obligation arising from the Treaties which would oblige Ireland to depart from that policy.

In addition, the Government published its own National Declaration reaffirming Ireland's continued attachment to its traditional policy of military neutrality and confirming, in line with that policy, that (i) Ireland is not party to any mutual defence commitment; (ii) that Ireland is not party to any plans to develop a European army; and (iii) that Ireland will take a sovereign decision, on a case by case basis, on whether the Defence Forces should participate in humanitarian or crisis management tasks undertaken by the EU, based on the triple lock of UN authorisation, Government decision and approval by Dáil Éireann (parliament).

Finally, alongside ratification of the Nice Treaty, the constitution was simultaneously amended to provide that:

"The State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 1.2 of the Treaty referred to in subsection 7° of this section where that common defence would include the State."

Thus, the Constitution now prohibits Ireland from joining a common defence. This is de facto, a guarantee that any future change on this matter will require a referendum. EU referendum opponents have criticised this provision on the grounds that the amendment would not prevent Ireland from joining NATO!

http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/information/display.asp?ID=980
http://www.mcconnells.ie/nicetreaty/declarations.html
Differing Perceptions

- Fourth, there is a distinction to be made between the perception of the CFSP/ESDP held by academics, policy-makers and practitioners on the one-hand and certain sections of civil society, the media and the general public on the other-hand.
- A communications problem seems to have emerged in relation to developments in CFSP/ESDP i.e. experts are well informed on policy development but in the absence of a sustained and substantial political debate, the general public is simply left behind.
- Consecutive referendum debates then become periods of ‘crisis learning’ – with CFSP/ESDP experts and the socio-political elites pitched directly against dedicated political activists in the battle for public hearts and minds.
- In general terms, the public begins from a position of scepticism towards developments in CFSP/ESDP because they view it through the prism of neutrality, whereas the policy-makers are more supportive of CFSP/ESDP developments because they tend to view ‘neutrality’ more pragmatically, and sometimes even instrumentally.
- Even when ‘defended’ by political elites, CFSP/ESDP is most often presented as a necessary ‘cost’ of EU membership which impinges only marginally if at all upon the practice and substance of Irish foreign, security and defence policy.
- Policy makers have only recently begun to make a strong explicit case for an effective and coherent EU foreign, security and defence policy.

Potential for Debate

- Fifth, there is significant potential for serious debate on the CFSP in Ireland.
- During the Balkans crises, September 11th and the most recent Iraqi crisis; calls for ‘more Europe’ were heard regularly in the Irish discourse, reflecting similar demands in some other EU States.
- The EU’s definition of security, the need for increased coherence in EU foreign policy, EU-US relations, the tempering of globalisation, the logic of integration have all been discussed with increased frequency in Ireland since the mid-late 1990s.
- Irish neutrality should not be confused with any aspiration to isolationism. There is considerable concern on all sides of the debate for Ireland to maximise its influence so as to ensure that Irish values make an international impact. This widely shared aspiration for an ethical base (‘enlightened self-interest’) to Irish foreign policy is sometimes overlooked.
- There is increased potential for, and desire on the part of Irish policy-makers to influence the development of the CFSP/ESDP more pro-actively than was previously the case.
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• However, the weak communication of CFSP/ESDP developments prior to referenda leaves policy-makers vulnerable to groups fundamentally opposed to the direction of EU Treaty change and/or Irish membership of the Union who employ ‘pro-neutrality’ arguments against EU referendums.
• It is also true to say that many such opponents assert that there exists an inverse relationship between a commitment to UN peacekeeping and a contribution to EU security and defence policy.

What are the priorities for your government in CFSP?

• The key, inter-related priorities of the Irish government are a holistic and broad-based security focus for CFSP. If there is to be hard defence then Ireland would want to be able to opt-out or not to opt in as the case may be. But Ireland would prefer that an opt-in or opt-out model should not emerge because then it would probably have to remain outside and its general policy is to keep to an absolute minimum the number of areas of EU activity in which Ireland does not participate.
• To ensure that in terms of institutional development and decision making, CFSP remains rooted in a consensus of national foreign policies. According to the Irish Government’s alternate representative in the Convention, Mr. Bobby McDonagh—quoted by the UK’s representative, Mr. Peter Hain “CFSP will only be strong if it draws on the experience and assets of the Member States (and) communitisation simply will not work.”
• Over the course of the 1990s successive Irish governments have repeatedly emphasised that ESDP must be seen as being embedded within CFSP rather than as a separate or stand alone policy area. They have therefore repeatedly pressed for equal attention and resources to be devoted to the civilian and military dimensions of EU foreign policy.
• Another focus of attention has been development co-operation, which is also deemed by the government to be part of Ireland’s conflict prevention approach to international peace and security.
• During the Convention debate, Irish government amendments reflected this twin desire for retention of the EU’s holistic approach to security.
• For instance, the Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche, proposed an amendment to the ‘solidarity clause’ that sought to reflect a broad definition of security as understood from an Irish perspective.
• Granted, the emphasis in the amendment on re-active measures may be interpreted as evidence of Ireland’s restrictive interpretation of security to the exclusion of defence. However, the amendment should also be seen within the context of Ireland’s emphasis throughout the Convention on combating the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and social exclusion, as a means of enhancing European security.
• The Irish Government is particularly concerned with multilateralism and respect for the UN system as the linchpin of international security.

5 http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1480.pdf
• The legitimacy of CFSP/ESDP operations is determined by this commitment to the authority of the UN. This gives rise – at official level – to the institution of the ‘triple lock’, which precludes Irish participation in peacekeeping or peacemaking operations without formal authorisation of the United Nations. This is a legislative requirement arising under the Defence Acts.
• Policy-makers are keen to increase Ireland’s influence over European developments so that the EU, in turn, can become a more effective international actor to the benefit of a common (especially Irish) interest.

**What are the key issues for your country?**

• The challenges associated with globalisation: terrorism, failed States and rogue States many of which are popularly seen as being rooted in more fundamental failures of politics and socio-economic development.
• These challenges are understood to arise from a complex and explosive mix of issues.
• Considerable public attention has been given to the Middle East conflict, the unequal distribution of wealth and the threats posed by inter-ethnic conflicts.
• This has translated into an increased appreciation at elite level of the need for more effective European co-operation but only when mandated and/or legitimated through the United Nations.
• This focus on the UN also lends potency to those that create a zero-sum equation between the development of an EU capacity for military security and the UN’s capabilities in this area. When the EU is then subsequently conflated with NATO (through CJTFs joint planning etc) it gives rise to posters seen during the Nice Treaty referendum declaring “Hello NATO, Goodbye UN”.
• There is a strong popular consensus about Ireland’s role in the world i.e. Ireland is willing and equipped to make a contribution to international peace and security – and in particular through conflict resolution (peacekeeping) and development co-operation.
• A particularly strong theme running through this consensus is a concern with issues of international development, poverty and injustice. This translates into direct concern with regions such as Africa and East Timor and the strength of development NGO’s, returned aid workers and missionaries and small activist groups – many of whom are critical of the Union’s trade, commercial and development policies.
• There is considerable popular attachment to a concept of sovereignty that is regularly conflated with independence and Irish identity
• Hence, there is also a tension between the self-evident logic of integration and the continued emotional relevance of sovereignty.
• There is comparatively little popular Irish resonance for the argument that a stronger Union is necessary to temper US hegemony. Where the United States is seen positively, it is as a crucial partner, linked by strong social, cultural, economic and demographic bonds. EU ‘competition’ with such a partner is not then highly valued. Where the US is seen negatively it is as a hegemon in a dangerous world of power politics. In this case, the Union’s marshalling of its
own ‘power’ capacity simply places it alongside the United States as yet another dangerous and/or threatening power.

2. National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues

The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP

- Taking elite and popular attitudes together, the overall perception of the CFSP/ESDP is probably best seen as ambivalent.
- The pervasive orthodox view at elite-level would support the creation and development of the Petersberg Tasks of crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping so long as all are rooted in an intergovernmental decision making framework.
- These are tasks in which Ireland is deemed (by both elites and general public opinion) to excel and there is then a genuine desire ‘to contribute’ that expertise at European level – subject to the auspices of the UN.
- During crises, such as the Balkans in the early 1990s, there were confused calls both for ‘more Europe’ and for ‘less Europe’. ‘More Europe’ in the sense of demands for Europe to speak and to act more effectively as a single unit and ‘less Europe’ in the sense that some saw the impact of European great power politics as exacerbating or even provoking such conflicts.
- At first sight, September 11th constituted something of an exception. Apart from shared values and kinship with the United States, it seems the logic of European integration was rendered more apparent and there was therefore significant consensus on the need for more cooperation. Certainly, there was significant agreement among policy-makers on this count.
- For Ireland, a supplementary lesson was learned from this vulnerability and paradox i.e. that hard defence does not necessarily afford States or citizens their desired security. The causes of conflict, terrorism, failed States etc. require redress and this, in turn, demands a long-term, multi-faceted, multilateral, law-based response (sometimes to the neglect of hard defence).
- Ireland is far more sensitive to any perceived shifts in the CFSP/ESDP or ‘militarisation’ of the EU than almost any other member state.
- During the Iraq crisis, the prevailing question was ‘where is Europe?’ which proved to be a short-hand for what is the purpose of the CFSP/ESDP?
- Two conflicting answers were advanced in the public debate. On the one-hand, those who tend to be pro-integration cited divisions amongst EU Member States as evidence of the need to make the Union speak with one voice and act effectively. On the other hand, those who tend to be pro-neutrality (not all of whom would be opposed to further European integration) cited the Iraq crisis as evidence of the impossibility of a common foreign policy and the danger of involvement in great power politics.
- Consequently, this recent crisis has produced mixed perceptions of the CFSP/ESDP; those who think more can and should be done and those who think the exact opposite.
The volatility of public opinion should be noted here. Opinion polls prior to the Allied coalition invasion of Iraq showed 68 percent opposition to any support of the Allied war effort through its use of Shannon airport as a refuelling stop. After the invasion, 51 percent supported the government’s decision to facilitate the United States even in the absence of a second UN resolution.

One of the points noted in a recent House of Lords Report on CFSP corresponds with experience in Ireland, namely the lack of awareness generated in the media about the positive aspects of the CFSP/ESDP. In particular, the civilian dimension of the CFSP/ESDP tends to be ignored.

Public debate takes place in a relative vacuum of knowledge of the merits or otherwise of certain courses of European action since media attention is drawn first to larger state responses (Britain, France Germany etc) and then to national positions.

Of course, policy-makers and interested academics are engaged with these issues and consider the myriad of issues raised by previous CFSP/ESDP experiences.

The position of your country towards NATO

- In two words, ‘unique’ and ‘emotive’.
- Ireland is not a member of NATO for reasons originally defined in terms of values such as independence and anti-partitionism, and for reasons of anti-British sentiment. While the saliency of such attitudes has diminished over time they have been joined in recent years by values rooted in pacifism, anti-imperialism, anti-militarism and opposition to the international trade in armaments.
- Ireland, however, is a member of the Partnership for Peace programme since 1999 and through this institution maintains low profile contacts with the Supreme Allied Command in Brussels. In contrast to all other EU member States – and even Switzerland, the decision to join the Partnership was, and remains significantly controversial.
- That controversy is grounded in the fact that, having promised in its opposition election manifesto to decide the matter through a referendum, the Fianna Fail-led government (in coalition with the Progressive Democrats) decided that the State should join the PfP by decision of Government alone following a parliamentary debate, arguing that while in opposition Fianna Fail believed that a referendum was necessary, once in government – and based on legal advice from the Attorney General – such a referendum was not in fact legally required.
- As a result of this, any political assurance to guarantee a referendum in the event of major proposals for a common European defence were significantly devalued in the first Nice Treaty referendum campaign – and resulted in the constitutional changes outlined above.
- PfP membership has not translated into a more positive impression of NATO on the part of the general public since no public presentation of Ireland’s participation is ever made. Participation remains low key, low profile and almost wholly unreported.
- The nuclear capacity of some of NATO member states, the foreign policy history of some of those key states and the alleged role of NATO and its member states in
extending a ‘militarised’ approach to security are all cited by opponents of Irish participation in European security structures. In turn, CFSP/ESDP are presented by many of the same activists as being fundamentally compromised by EU links with NATO (CJTFs information sharing, joint planning etc). CFSP/ESDP is then subsequently denounced as making Ireland part of NATO’s superstructure in Europe.

The role of the EU in crisis management

- In general, there is a sense that the EU has learned some painful lessons of the Balkans in the early 1990s and is somehow making up for lost ground
- Irish media attention to the EU’s current role in the Balkans is minimal and this can mean that constructive evaluations of the CFSP/ESDP are conducted by policy-makers and academics beyond the attention of the public.
- This is particularly true of the Middle East where the media is inclined to highlight efforts on the Middle East peace process as having originated with the US. The critical focus then becomes US-Israeli relations.
- The public seems to be less aware than academics and policy-makers are of the paradox that the EU is poor at managing crises immediately but good at long-term crisis management.
- As a result of EU referendum debates, the neutrality debate and the importance of the UN in Irish foreign and security policy, the legitimacy of CFSP/ESDP actions – in the popular mind – rests not upon the democratic values and interest of the Union per se but upon mandates provided by the United Nations. EU security/military action undertaken without UN authorisation is seen largely as being about the self-interest of larger member states and lacking in accountability and legitimacy.

The perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP

- In Ireland, there has been a tendency to focus more on the impacts of enlargement on the economic governance of the Union and on Ireland’s role therein and benefits there from.
- However, there is undoubtedly an appreciation of the diversity and scale problems associated with enlargement.
- This was reinforced in the public mind during the Iraq crisis when Rumsfeld drew attention to the split between old and new Europe.
- Used to seeing the small candidate states as natural allies on a host of issues, it became apparent for the first time that in military matters there was a significant difference between Ireland and these States and that difference revolved around the contrasting relationship of these States and Ireland with NATO.
3. European Convention: Reform of EU External Relations, CFSP/ESDP

External Representation: What is the position of your country on the appointment of a European foreign minister and a President of the European Council? Is your country in favour of double-hatting?

- Initially, Ireland was opposed to the creation of a full-time European Council President and favoured the retention of a rotating Presidency.
- Two principle reasons influenced this decision. The fact that the case was not made sufficiently to justify change, as far as the Irish government was concerned and the criteria employed by Ireland that emphasised equality and institutional balance.
- Ireland also saw positive benefits in the concept of rotation (socializing all Member States into the system, raising public awareness of the Union in Member States etc.). The creation of a President of the European Council was seen as creating a new institution to which powers would accrue and which would diminish the role of the President of the Commission.
- Ireland was instrumental in building support for retention of the ‘principles and premises’ that had informed the Union to date. A so-called ‘Friends of the Community Method’ (FoCM) group emerged consisting of 16 small States of which Ireland was a key participant.
- During the latter stages of the Convention, the Irish Government signalled its intention to support the European Council President proposal so long as it was effectively a Chairman role and not a Presidential one. Respect for the institutional balance was a key ingredient for Irish support and Convention concessions on the status and size of the Commission helped to secure Ireland’s final acceptance at the Convention of the European Council President idea.
- Irish practitioners expressed initial doubts and reservations on the proposal for double-hatting of an individual responsible for both CFSP and EU External Relations. These practical doubts were then outweighed by the swell of support from other member states and the absence of any countervailing point of principle. The doubts, however, remain and now centre upon procedural issues.
- The Irish government opposes, for example, the prospect of the EU Foreign Minister chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. It is seen to be unwise to allow the initiator of policy to also chair the Council. There are also issues of accountability involved.

Decision-making

- Ireland has ‘red-lined’ the extension of QMV to sensitive areas such as CFSP, taxation and aspects of JHA.
- The position on ‘structured co-operation’ and ‘closer co-operation’ is very conservative.
Crisis Management

- There is general elite support for the extension of the Petersberg Tasks.
- Translating this support into practical measures, such as increased defence spending or more targeted spending, is a different matter.
- Apart from a down-turn in the Irish economy, there is significant sensitivity to increases in military spending especially as these would inevitably be presented as being at the cost of other sensitive policy areas (health, education, etc).
- The focus on an ‘Armaments’ agency will be presented politically by some as further evidence of the ‘militarization’ of Europe.
- The Irish Defence Forces have factored ESDP’s development into their military doctrine and practice and spending requests.

Defence

- The proposal most strongly endorsed by the Irish Government and Convention delegates is the extension of the Petersberg Tasks.
- The least favourable are the clauses on flexibility: ‘structured co-operation’ and ‘closer co-operation’. In a recent debate at the National Forum on Europe these were highlighted as areas that would be the subject of substantial change at the IGC. 6
- As regards ‘structured cooperation’, this is linked with the fear that some member States would exploit the legitimacy afforded them by the name of the Union to execute tasks that Ireland might consider to be either unwise or even illegitimate but which Ireland would be unwilling or even unable to veto outright.
- ‘Closer cooperation’ raises the sensitive political spectre of an Article V-type mutual security guarantee for the European Union and the definitive end of Irish military neutrality. Such an eventuality would have to be proposed and contested through a likely bitter referendum campaign. The main opposition party, Fine Gael, has proposed a somewhat alternative ‘solution’ in which an Article V-like provision might be a subset of a declared ‘common defence’ but be created as an associated opt-in protocol. This would allow states such as Ireland to be members of a ‘common defence’ without subscribing to an automatic mutual security guarantee. 7

4. Mapping of activities in CFSP-related Research

Academic Institutions

The academic discipline of International Relations is very underdeveloped in Ireland. There is no Department, no professorial chair and no national centre for the study of international relations in the state. The field is essentially subdivided between those of

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6 Speech delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen, to the National Forum on Europe, Dublin Castle 3 July 2003
7 http://www.finegael.ie/beyondneutrality/index.shtml
political science and modern history with little or no focus on the European Union as a discrete international actor.

The field of European foreign, security and defence studies rests therefore upon fragile academic grounds in Ireland and is most often to be found represented in undergraduate or postgraduate programmes whose focus is that of European Studies. In undergraduate programmes, this is true for University College Cork, University of Dublin (Trinity College) and the University of Limerick. At postgraduate level, this is the case at the Centre for European Studies at the University of Limerick and University College Dublin’s Dublin European Institute (host to the FORNET programme). The Royal Irish Academy’s National Committee for the Study of International Affairs has also devoted its attention, from time to time, to aspects of EU foreign, security and defence policy

Think-tanks

The Institute for European Affairs Dublin is the main think-tank in Ireland on European affairs with access to key policy-makers and experts who analyse the issues, options and implications of European developments for Ireland. The IEA hosts an elite-level study group dedicated to CFSP/ESDP issues, convenes seminars and hosts guest speakers on this issue, addresses associated foreign policy issues with other dedicated study groups (eg Balkans, relations with Russia, EU-US relations etc), publishes analytical texts on CFSP/ESDP and Irish involvement therein as well as the regular distribution of newsletter on CFSP/ESDP developments to key policy making constituencies.

The European Movement acts as an advocacy coalition for Irish membership of the European Union and plays a role during referenda campaigns providing information on Irish EU membership – including the implications of CFSP/ESDP

Useful sources

Primary Sources:

Government Publications:

Parliamentary Debates and Reports:
Dail Debates
Seanad Debates
Joint Oirechtaas Committee on European Affairs Reports

Newspapers & Journals:
An Phoblacht (http://www.irlnet.com/aprn/archieve/2002/)
Irish Times (www.ireland.com)
Irish Independent (www.unison.ie)
Sunday Independent
Sunday Business Post
The Examiner

National Forum on Europe:
www.forumoneurope.ie

Relevant Current Affairs Television & Radio Programmes:
‘Prime Time’ (Thursday nights, 10pm Radio Telefís Éireann, R.T.E.1)
‘Questions and Answers’ (Monday nights, 9.40pm R.T.E.1)
‘The Week in Politics’ (Sunday nights, R.T.E. 1)
‘More to Do’ (Tuesday nights, 11.25pm R.T.E.1)
‘The Sunday Show’ (Sundays at 12pm, Radio 1)
‘Five-Seven Live’ (Weekdays, 5pm, Radio 1)
‘Morning Ireland’ (Weekdays, 7am-9am, Radio 1)
http://www.rte.ie/news/
‘Saturday View’ (Saturdays, 12:00 noon, Radio 1)
‘Tonight with Vincent Brown’ (Weeknights, 10:00 pm, Radio 1)

Websites: (all websites were visited between June and August 2002)
Irish Political Parties
Fianna Fail http://www.fiannaFail.ie, also www.fiannaFail.ie/ffineurope.php4?id=430
Fine Gael (1999; relaunched 2003) Beyond Neutrality: Ireland’s Role in European
Fine Gael http://www.finegael.ie/main.htm
Labour Party http://www.labour.ie/policy
Sinn Fein http://www.sinnfein.ie/
Green Party http://www.imsgrp.com/greenparty/neutral.htm
Socialist Workers’ Party http://www.dojo.ie/socialist/home.html

NGOs & Think Tanks:
Afri (http://www.afri.buz.org/). (Action from Ireland NGO)
Peace and Neutrality Alliance
The European Movement
The Institute of European Affairs, (www.iea.ie)
The National Platform (http://www.nationalplatform.org/)

Government/Oireachtas (Parliament)/State Department sites:
Defence Forces (http://www.military.ie)
Garda Síochána (http://www.garda.ie)
Department of Foreign Affairs http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh
Department of Defence (http://www.gov.ie/defence)
Department of Justice (http://www.justice.ie/)
Secondary Sources (Irish related):


Goldmann, K. & Gilland, K. (2001) Nationality versus Europeanisation: the national view of the nation in four EU countries (Stockholm University)


Keatinge, P. (1973) *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy* (Institute of Public Administration)


McDonagh, B (1998) *Original Sin in a Brave New World*, Institute of European Affairs: Dublin


