

## CFSP WATCH 2003

### NATIONAL REPORT GERMANY

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#### 1. Basic views of CFSP/ESDP

##### *Government*

In Germany EU membership is traditionally perceived as a key issue and an element of continuity in the foreign policy of the **government regardless of its political “colour”** and so is participation in CFSP/ESDP.

Each government and particularly the *Auswärtiges Amt* has attached great importance to belonging to the network of foreign policy cooperation for various reasons:

- CFSP/ESDP offers better opportunities to react to international challenges and to shape the international environment than “going it alone” or with varying ad hoc coalitions;
- European integration would be incomplete without CFSP/ESDP and progress in these highly sensitive fields strengthens the overall integration process;
- In the early nineties, i.e. after German unification, CFSP served as a means to demonstrate the country’s firm belonging to the west.

Not surprisingly Germany attaches great importance to a well functioning CFSP/ESDP system and has actively contributed to the efficiency of its institutions and procedures. Given Germany’s integrationist approach governments have favoured close ties between CFSP and EC organs and an early integration of WEU into the EU framework.

Though primarily designed as a “civilian power”, situations may occur where the EU and its member states will have to take recourse to the use of force. This is why Germany supports an extension of the EU instruments in the area of civil and – as a last resort – military crisis management. Since not all EU member states might be able and willing to act jointly in this field all the time Germany is in favour of models of flexibility/enhanced cooperation.

In contrast to others Germany has always favoured close relations between the EU/CFSP and the United States and was among the first to suggest a transatlantic political dialogue.

Germany has always been among those who support an early familiarisation of the candidate countries with the CFSP. The government has not taken an official stance in the debate about the “old” and “new” Europe but stresses the dimension of a “joint” European future. Though the government fears that CFSP may become more difficult in a group of 25 this aspect may not prolong the accession process. The government has also undertaken national initiatives to prepare the future CFSP staffs in the candidate countries with the requirements for CFSP. Though not officially confirmed those experiences may have contributed towards the German initiative to replace the rotating presidency by the figure of an EU foreign minister.

## Sources:

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/>: among other things: ESDP: A key project for European unification, last updated in March 2003.

Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag vom 3.4.2003 zur internationalen Lage und zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Brüssel (<http://www.bundestkanzler.de/>).

Uwe Schmalz: Die europäisierte Macht – Deutschland in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, in: Heinrich Schneider/Mathias Jopp/Uwe Schmalz (eds.): Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik? Bonn 2001, pp. 515ff.

### *Public opinion*

The pro-CFSP attitude of the political elite is widely shared by **public opinion** in Germany. Questioned about the value of CFSP in general 80% answered in an affirmative way in June 2003. To decide about defence issues in the EU framework receives lesser support (56%). With regard to specific CFSP items the following results occurred:

- 57% in favour of an EU rapid reaction force
- 84,5% in favour of crisis management instruments
- 63% in favour of an EU Foreign Minister
- 67,5% in favour of an EU seat at the UN Security Council
- 84% in favour of a CFSP acting independently from the US
- 75,5% in favour of a CFSP human rights policy

However only 31% of those interviewed support the idea to involve the future member states in CFSP already now.

## Source:

Europäische Kommission (ed.): Eurobarometer 59, June 2003, pp. 20ff.

## 2. German perceptions with regard to CFSP/ESDP issues

Compared to the early nineties and the obvious failure of CFSP conflict management in the Western Balkans the performance of the CFSP/ESDP since the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty is perceived as considerable progress (Parliamentary opposition seems to be somewhat less optimistic here.) September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 and the European disaster during the Iraq war are said to work towards an accelerated reform process and a strengthening of the CFSP.

Among the **successes** over the recent past the following issues occur:

- The EU plays the leading role in solving the political crisis in Macedonia, in restructuring Kosovo and supporting the stabilisation of Bosnia and former Yugoslavia with particular emphasis on the work of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Special Envoys;
- The EU has gained in profile in mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the High Representative in a key function and based on close cooperation with the US;
- The reconstruction of Afghanistan and the role of the EU Special Envoy there;

- The Fifteen are an “important political factor” in the UN framework despite some still existing frictions among the Fifteen and the special status of France and the UK in the UN Security Council;
- The EU has achieved a high degree of common positions and actions in the field of human rights;
- Germany attaches great importance to a CFSP policy in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control, also as part of the EU’s initiatives in conflict prevention and combating terrorism;
- EU-NATO cooperation has successfully been intensified in international crisis management particularly with regard to the Balkans and terrorism. Progress in ESDP is seen as a necessary tool to improve and complete the EU’s capabilities thus working in favour of a stronger European role in NATO. However, any sort of costly duplication has to be avoided.

### Sources:

62. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die Europäische Union (Berichtszeitraum 1. Januar - 31. Dezember 2001), Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/8565 vom 13.3.2002.

Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, Berlin, 26.6.2003, Plenarprotokoll 15/53, pp. 4312.

Rede des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber „Eckpunkte des europäischen Reformprozesses“ vom 8.11.2001.

### 3. European Convention: Reform of EU external relations, CFSP/ESDP

The federal government has taken various initiatives to influence the debate both in the working group VII on CFSP and in the plenary. The presence of Foreign Minister Fischer as the German government representative in the Convention has to be understood also as a proof of the great importance Berlin wished to attach to the reform process. Germany would have favoured a more integrationist approach with regard to CFSP institutions and procedures but submitted less demanding proposals in order to achieve also the assent of the intergovernmentalist voices among the Fifteen. With regard to the specific items mentioned in the questionnaire the German positions (also shared by the political opposition) were as follows:

- Full support for a **double-hatted European External Representative/Foreign Minister** who would offer one single “face” towards the outside for an extended period and suggest greater consistency between CFSP and EC instruments and resources.

According to the German proposal the Foreign Minister of the EU

- Should be nominated unanimously by the European Council and have the assent of the President of the European Commission and be confirmed by the European Parliament,
- Should chair the Council on external relations,
- Should have a right of initiative (together with the member states),

- Should take over all Presidency functions also towards the outside (with the support of the Commission delegations abroad, the Commission staff of DG I and some sort of a European foreign office),
- Should also dispose of two deputies one being in charge for Commission affairs the other to chair the Political and Security Committee and possibly also to replace him in the Council.

With respect to French interests in particular, the German position (and that of the Chancellor obviously more than that of the Foreign Minister) was in favour of a President of the European Council whose functions in the area of external representation should, however, be limited to his level.

- full support for the idea to introduce **majority voting as the general rule for CFSP**, however, not for military issues.
- Germany suggested, together with France, an **extension of the Petersberg tasks** to include all possible risks and in particular those of international terrorism (“solidarity clause”).
- Germany insisted on the possibility to move towards a common defence and to develop ESDP into a **European Security and Defence Union**; the new treaty should offer those EU members who wish to do so to transfer their mutual defence obligations from WEU into the EU.
- For long (i.e. already at the intergovernmental conferences of Amsterdam and Nice) Germany has been in favour of models of **enhanced cooperation** to be understood not as a “closed shop” but as a means of a European “*avant-garde*”/ coalition of the willing to go ahead in matters of security and defence in the EU framework. The government suggests different decision-making procedures for enhanced cooperation: the introduction and implementation of military operations would require unanimity and the possibility of constructive abstention while in other fields like arms procurement, joint armed forces, human resources the presently existing provisions (arts. 27a-e TEU) with some adaptations could be used.

These ideas are also part of the initiative of the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to which Chancellor Schröder actively contributed.

### Sources:

Beitrag von Herrn Dominique de Villepin und von Herrn Joschka Fischer, Mitglieder des Konvents: „Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Vorschläge für den Europäischen Konvent zum Bereich Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, 22.11.2002, CONV 422/02 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/>).

Gunter Pleuger, alternate member of the Convention: “Double Hat”, CONV WD 017, 6.11.2002 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/>).

Hans Martin Bury, alternate member of the Convention: “Some Questions and Answers regarding the “Double Hat” of High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations”, CONV 053, 25.11.2002 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/>).

Proposed amendments to the text of the articles of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part III (sections on CFSP and ESDP) with particular reference to the suggestions tabled by Joschka Fischer, Member of the Convention.

Beitrag des Präsidenten der Französischen Republik, Herrn Jacques Chirac, und des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Herrn Gerhard Schröder: “Deutsch-französischer Beitrag für den Europäischen Konvent zum institutionellen Aufbau der Union“, 16.1.2003, CONV 489/03 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/>).

Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, Berlin, 26.6.2003, Plenarprotokoll 15/53, pp. 4312.

Gemeinsame Erklärung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Brüssel, 29.4.2003.

#### **4. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research**

For long the following researchers/institutes deal with CFSP/ESDP issues:

- IEP (= Institut für Europäische Politik), Berlin (Dr. Mathias Jopp, Dr. Elfriede Regelsberger)
- SWP (= Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Berlin (Dr. Reinhardt Rummel, Dr. Peter Schmidt)
- CAP (= Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung), Munich (Franco Algieri, Jannis Emmanouilidis)
- HSFK (= Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung), Frankfurt a.M. (Dr. Peter Schlotter, Dr. Matthias Dembinski)
- Prof. Dr. Reimund Seidelmann (University of Gießen)
- Dr. Ingo Peters (Free University Berlin)
- Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Dr. Udo Diedrichs (University of Cologne)
- Prof. Dr. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (University of Würzburg)