Patterns and Consequences of Economic Engagement across Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative analysis of Chinese, British and Turkish Policies

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Abstract

This research serves to provide an overview of three different trading nations: the UK (a traditional Africa donor), Turkey (a non-traditional Africa donor) and China (an emerging global power) and their commercial engagement with specific African states including leading oil exporters, such as Angola, those with anti-western orientations such as Zimbabwe, and regional powers such as South Africa. The primary objective is to conceptualise the political impact of growing Chinese trade and investment versus generally declining UK trade and investment, and the significance of new entrants or smaller but growing participants such as Turkey. The rationale of this paper is based on how the transition from dependence on former colonial powers to dependence on alternative state actors will affect domestic governance issues including economic development and human rights. It finds that conceptually, Chinese engagement in Africa and the concept of statehood in Africa are both problematic. It also finds that African economic challenges can be partly addressed through modifications to domestic and foreign state regulations governing engagement of large scale economic actors such as State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and multinational corporations. On the political side, sub-regional organisations such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) are found to be important to state building and state consolidation activities. Their work could be enhanced through traditional and non-traditional state actors cooperating further on issues such as Ebola and achieving all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Introduction

This paper examines how the transition from dependence on former colonial powers to dependence on a broader range of state actors will affect governance issues in Africa including development objectives (defined by areas which will support the eight MDGs1 and recognised international standards of human rights. It generally focuses on the 2000s, when the chorus of development NGOs, celebrities and rock stars demanded debt forgiveness from their western governments (Callaghy, 2001, 126). In the same decade a new generation of African leaders came to power, and the African Union (AU) began promoting "African solutions to African problems" (Mays, 2003).

The cases of the UK (a traditional Africa donor), Turkey (a non-traditional Africa donor) and China (an emerging global power) will be studied. The paper pays special attention to the rapid and exponential increase in its trade with Africa during the 2000s (Arkhangelskaya, 2013).2 In sub-Saharan Africa, a number of states will be included, reflecting diversity in their economic prowess and political orientation. They include: Angola (a leading oil exporter and newest member of OPEC, producing around 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015 (Reuters, 2015), Zimbabwe (with an anti-western foreign policy orientation) and South Africa (with established international ties, emerging political power status and importance as a regional economic hub and African norm entrepreneur). The case of China in presenting African elites with an alternative to the hitherto US and European dominated neo-liberal economic and developmental discourse - also known as the Washington Consensus - is intriguing from both an international relations and developmental perspective. It is also compelling for many African states which seek to replicate China's success and adopt the 'Beijing Consensus' as an alternative political model (no democracy) coupled with a capitalist profit motive. Although not replicating colonial patterns of trade due to the prevalence of market
forces, China is now the dominant player in some African states due to its extra-market decision making, partly based on Africa's abundant natural resources (Eisenman, 2012).

Specifically, the paper aims to contribute to African economic development and human rights disciplines by answering this research question: What are the prospects to enhance economic development and safeguard human rights across African states which have experienced significant shifts in their trading patterns and dependency?

Since most of what is being termed the 'scramble for Africa' (Carmody, 2011) is speculative and has yet to start, there is a limited time window of opportunity in which a national economic interest can be articulated in each case and the potential negative impacts of foreign investments can be limited. There is an implicit reference to dependency theory throughout the paper, a theory which suggests that economic activity in richer countries often leads to economic problems in poorer countries, particularly through coercion under the historic colonial system (Ferraro, 2008, 58-64). However, this paper takes a holistic approach to foreign engagement in Africa within the defined parameters, bringing together some of the diverse works and views from leading scholars in this sub-field of China-Africa relations and African development. They include: Chris Alden, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, and Ian Taylor in publications such as China Returns to Africa, Alex Vines in policy reports such as Angola: Assessing Risks to Stability, and views from various diplomats working in embassies and foreign ministries across Africa and internationally.

China and Africa

Chinese commercial diplomacy focuses on getting things done and is thus considered by African diplomats to be vitally important in addressing the triple challenges of Africa: poverty, inequality and unemployment. For example, in South Africa it is estimated that 4 people are supported by every job in the formal sector (Kaplinsky, 2006, 18). In the 1970s, China had a greater number of aid projects in Africa than the USA (Taylor, 2008, 12) but a lack of economic development in Africa and its marginalisation in world politics led to loss of Chinese interest. There was a brief renaissance in relations sparked by the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 when China was denounced for human rights abuses by the West, but received support from many African states. The 'return' of China to Africa began when China started importing growing amounts of oil from Africa from 1993, particularly from fragile states such as Angola, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Other states, such as Tanzania, Gabon and Cameroon supply China with above ground natural resources such as wood (Kaplinsky, 2006, 14). These states can generally be classified as winners in their trade relations with China, since China represents a large (and generally growing) market for their resources. The losers, on the other hand, are those states such as Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa which need to import oil rather than produce it, which creates an economic burden. These same states also compete with low cost Chinese manufacturing in areas such as textiles, furniture and shoes.

By 2002, China had implemented its 'Go-Out' policy (Reilly and Na, 2007), and by 2003, Chinese engagement in Africa has been conceptualised as part of China's 'peaceful ascendance' (Power and Mohan, 2010). In 2006, the China-Africa summit was the biggest diplomatic event Beijing had ever hosted, in recognition of the large role that China plays on the continent. China became Africa's largest trade partner in 2009 (OECD, 'African Economic Outlook 2011'). Since the late 2000s, African states such as South Africa have
also been "venturing out" and some states such as Zambia have had their economies kick-started by Chinese investment into important but moribund resources such as cooper mines. However, Chinese involvement has never amounted to direct political interference or intervention. To do so would compromise its core foreign policy principles: the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, developed by India and China during the Bandung gathering in 1954-55 (Power and Mohan, 2011). These points include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Columbia University). Furthermore, China must sustain a path of least resistance (i.e. allay the fears of other states through policies such as Peaceful Coexistence) at least as long as it wishes to maintain its rapid economic development unimpeded. The closest China comes to political intervention is through contributing to UN peacekeeping forces. China supplied almost 1900 troops as of December 2012 but is the largest contributor amongst the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (The Economist, 2013), supplying aid, and exceptionally through imposing sanctions.

From 1999, when Chinese trade with Africa amounted to just $2 billion, it has since multiplied to reach $39.7 billion in 2005, $74 billion in 2007, and $198.5 billion in 2012 (Taylor, 2006, 937, Taylor, 2008, 1; Sun, 2014, 7). This massive rise should be contextualised by Chinese trade with the rest of the world. For example, China - US trade was $562 billion in 2013 (Morrison, 2015, 1). Still, it shows China to be a major actor in Africa. In 1989, the EU accounted for 50% of sub-Sahara Africa's trade, but by 2011 it had declined to just 25% (Minto, 2012). These figures clearly show that whilst EU economic influence in Africa has diminished substantially over the last two decades, Chinese economic influence has grown. Other trends include the trade dominance of Nigeria (29%), South Africa (26%) and Angola (16%) which collectively make up 71% of all African exports to the rest of the world, and specific dependencies of some African states on their respective trade partners (such as Cap Verde and Europe, Sudan and China, or Chad and the USA) (Minto, 2012). Seventy percent of Africa's exports to China are in crude oil, and eighty-five percent of new oil reserves found between 2001 and 2004 were found on the west/central coasts of Africa (Ovadia, 2013, 235). This makes states such as Nigeria and Guinea, as growing oil exporters, likely to fall under significant Chinese influence in the near future.

These trends hold out the probability that while China imports a limited number of commodities from Africa, it will export its narrow concept of human rights and some of the same problems that it struggles with internally, such as a lack of workers' rights and environmental safeguards (OECD, 'Africa's Trade Partners', 2011). 'China hawks' are also sceptical about Chinese motivations and impacts, believing Beijing to be a rogue creditor, offering rogue aid due in part to a lack of political conditionality which could contribute to greater debt and problems associated with poor governance, and is generally plundering African natural resources (Power and Mohan, 2010). These points are problematic though. For example, China is paying billions of dollars for access to African natural resources and whilst it is true to say that bilateral trading relationships are often uneven, China is providing substantial and much needed revenues through trade, aid and investments which can be used for developmental purposes. The onus is therefore on the economic, legal and political system functionality in the African state(s) in question. Furthermore, the South African government points to its constitution as being sufficient to protect human rights in South Africa whilst allowing for engagement with China which might have a different perspective on human rights. However, this point may be less convincing in African states without a clear constitution, where there is
limited individual recourse to the legal system or where the legal system is considered to be weak or corrupt. Finally, China is able to counter hawkish views and accusations of not respecting human rights by drawing on the West's negative colonial history in Africa which generally has a positive resonance in Africa, and is also able to leverage its status as a de-facto leader of the developing world.

Negative colonial history lives on in the debate about economic rights versus the universal concept of human rights promoted by the West. For example, Paul Kegame, President of Rwanda, said in 2009 that "Chinese investment in Africa has fuelled the development of the private sector, whereas western countries have mostly exploited African resources" (Taylor, 2011, 96). This comment reflects a broader crisis of confidence in the neo-liberal model, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis. China brings money, manpower and materials, everything it needs to build up the countries in which it operates. But there are three problems: China only operates in certain states where it is conducive to China's own interests, and sometimes engagement is detrimental, especially where the private sector is working against China's political interest in the Forum on China - Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC was established in 2006 and Beijing committed to double aid to Africa up to 2009, which was designed to demonstrate the growing importance of Africa by Chinese decision makers (Taylor, 2011, 18).

China's economic impact in African states such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, has been partly measured through its engagement in the textile industry. In 2000, the US-sponsored African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) came into effect. For the next five years, certain African products were given preferential access to the US market. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing conceived during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also limited cheap Asian textile imports (Tull, 2006, 471). In response, Chinese companies set up shop in Africa as a way to circumvent such restrictions, gain an early advantage on the continent and support Chinese political objectives of restoring its proper place in the world. Chinese companies were quick to take advantage of changes in the global trading system without African companies being able to do the same. Consequently, there was very little African employment in the Chinese companies so there was little benefit to the African economies. However, this could change if the cost of labour significantly increases in China and companies see Africa as a low cost alternative. South Africa is "working hard to improve" the textile industry but further engagement with external partners should be based on local employment and there is pressure to this effect from the trade unions. Enhancing employment is also an issue for other African textile exporters such as Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius and Swaziland (Kaplinsky, 2006, 17).

The rush of Chinese firms operating in Africa lasted until 2005 when the restrictions imposed by AGOA were removed (although due to the flood of products after this period they were temporarily re-imposed) and many Chinese textile companies left. One positive aspect of this change was that many Chinese workers also left, thus reducing some social tensions. This case simply highlights that the Chinese and African states are contenders in the labour intensive textile and clothing industries (Kaplinsky, 2006, 472). However, the reality is different. When Chinese firms withdrew from South Africa, it did not spark a renaissance amongst South African textile companies. It simply encouraged more low cost imports from Bangladesh and Vietnam (Ovadia, 2013, 242). This is probably because the internal markets in Africa are small, there is little competition so
there is no incentive to reform the market for the benefit of local industry. Such reform could be sparked by some African states imposing more protectionist measures, endorsed by major international actors. Industry could also be encouraged by additional measures for preferential market access to large markets such as the USA and EU. The US government has gone same way to address this issue through implementing the African Growth and Opportunity Act in 2000 which gives African-based firms preferential access to American markets (U.S. International Trade Administration, 2000).

Notwithstanding such incidents, African states could use their dependency on the West to reduce social polarisation, economic stagnation and political instability and China would probably still engage them. Alternatively, some states such as Zimbabwe, might continue on a political orientation which increases their isolation from the West and maintains dependency on states such as China. However, this is a false choice. China continues to rely on contacts with the West, such as high technology exports which are still dominated by western companies. Furthermore, China is becoming more western over time, following engagement with the West and adopting international capitalism as its preferred economic model. China’s oil diplomacy works primarily through China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). The Chinese construction industry has a clearer brief: deliver showpiece projects: presidential palaces, airports (China International Fund) and national stadiums (even at a potential loss, given the small margins and possibility for project overruns) to enhance broader Chinese interests and leverage in the personal politics of Africa (Taylor, 2008, 7-12). Chinese companies operate through local representatives in Africa and largely through SOEs, so a range of actors, provincial and local state officials, regional agencies, and/or private business interests, are entrusted with commercial policy implementation. They are generally unaccountable to investors and not deterred by risk. This is an important distinction compared to most other state’s engagement in Africa, which is generally led by a more risk adverse and profit conscious private sector.

Because of Zimbabwe's foreign policy orientation and its attempt to isolate itself from western influence, Chinese influence is disproportionate in the country. Robert Mugabe has travelled to China more than a dozen times since coming to power in 1979, and on many occasions has sought Chinese economic investments for the ailing Zimbabwean economy (Sun, 2014). In 2005, Mugabe received just $6 million for grain imports (Zimbabwe Independent, 29 August 2005). Again, in 2014, Mugabe was hoping for a $10 billion financial bailout, with $4 billion up front, but only managed to secure $2 billion for the future construction of a coal mine, power station and dam. This was not an unconditional investment and in exchange Zimbabwe has had to secure the funds against future mining tax revenues (Hornby and Hawkins, 2014). Other elements of the deal included the offer of a feasibility study for telecoms and infrastructure projects (the loans for which would come from Chinese state owned banks and revenues from Zimbabwean SOEs would also need to secured), $8 million in donated rice and $24 million for schools and clinics (Hornby and Hawkins, 2014).

The result is that large infrastructure projects are likely to be delayed as the terms of the deal(s) are hammered out and only impact positively on the Zimbabwean economy years from now. Furthermore, since high commodity prices cannot be guaranteed (the World Bank states that Sub-Saharan Africa remains vulnerable to a decline in commodity prices (World Bank, 2013)), securitisation appears to be a short term measure and therefore indicative of mal-governance evident in many of Africa's regimes, especially where
previous loans have allegedly gone astray. In terms of economic policy, Zimbabwean borrowing, which is already 80 percent of GDP, could reach 120 percent by 2018 (Hornby and Hawkins, 2014).

In April 2002, the Angolan civil war ended but western states insisted on placing preconditions on Angola before accepting to raise funds for its reconstruction. These preconditions included restarting negotiations with the IMF, holding free and fair elections, using funds from the extractive industries (oil, diamonds and fisheries) for reconstruction and commitments to tackle corruption (Isaac, 2010, 164-165). Although the western governments didn't seem interested in bilaterally supporting Angola in 2004, Angola was nevertheless about to accept an IMF bailout which included provision for strict monitoring of Angola's domestic situation (i.e. corruption). However, the combination of bankruptcy and corruption put enormous pressure on the elite during an election year and meant that unlike most of its citizenry, the Angolan government perceived China's $2 billion of almost unconditional aid in 2005 (except for oil rights, 70 per cent of government contracts having to go to Chinese companies) as a white knight and meant that Angola was able to reject the IMF offer (Taylor, 2008, 20-22).

Bilateral trade has since gone from $1.1 billion in 2002 to $25 billion in 2008 and in 2009 was importing twice the amount of crude from Angola than the USA (Ovadia, 2013, 236). In 2009, there was $166 million of Chinese investment in Angola, putting China only behind Portugal as a foreign investor, and this figure does not include oil related or public investments (Ovadia, 2013, 236). Thus, western engagement regarding Angola has had to adapt to Angola's changing international relations. Due to falling oil prices, Angola was forced to reconnect with the IMF and World Bank in 2009-10. This happened without any Chinese backlash, showing that economic balancing with China even in oil rich African states is not really viable if your revenues can fluctuate significantly and that China is unconcerned about IMF involvement in the economic restructuring of these economies (Verhoven, 2014, 58). However, the costs of taking on Chinese aid, trade and investment may be disguised. For example, although only 2500 Chinese workers were expected to go to Angola in 2005, that number could reach 30,000 and thereby badly compromise Angolan's access in the job market (Tull, 2006, 473).

There are over a million Chinese immigrants across Africa, although all are somehow associated with specific projects or with SMEs (King, 2013, 205). A Turkish government representative in Angola confirmed that social tensions still exist in 2014 due to an increasing number of Chinese workers in Africa and locals who believe local jobs, and job related training, should be given to African nationals first.

Projects financed by Exim Bank in China must use Chinese materials and there is no significant technology transfer (Ovadia, 2013, 244). Still, the high profile image of China investing across different programmes in Angola, including infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and fisheries, should provide a positive impression to most and a much needed boost to the country's development and standard of living (Ovadia, 2013, 241). On the other hand, the Chinese investment can also lead to corruption and/or be wasted through mismanagement, and so the onus is on China and African actors to work with the international community (such as India, Brazil and South Korea which are also actively involved in Africa) to reduce waste in its investments.

This is a challenge as many investments involve opaque ventures between Sonangol, Sinopec, and quasi-private actors such as the '88 Queensway Group'. Some involved in the Queensway Group, such as Sam Pa, are known to have been involved in selling arms
to the Angolan government during the civil war (Burgis et al, 2014). The challenge of governance in Angola, as in other parts of Africa, is also evolving as the oil sector changes strategies from simply skimming off oil revenues, which it is able to do more easily due to the prevalence of confidentiality agreements (Eastwood and McKenzie, 2014), to other forms of corruption as new industries become established. A new $5 billion Sovereign Wealth Fund - the Fundo Soberano de Angola - may go some way to stopping oil related corruption, but as other industries grow a stronger regulatory environment may become more important. The group, through China Sonangol (whose ownership is unknown), also has investments in diamond mining in Zimbabwe and has provided funding and material support to the Zanu-PF and Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organisation (Ovadia, 2013, 245). This shows just how embedded some opaque business interests are in governance issues which dominate China's role in contemporary African affairs. The fact that Exxon Mobil is also heavily invested in oil operations in Angola, also shows that the challenge includes getting all IOCs and related businesses to sign up for a stringent agreement on operations and financing. Sonangol, as a NOC, should have the weight necessary in getting other oil companies to follow its lead. European banks work in a similar way to Chinese and American companies, showing that there may be space for the US and EU to extend their foreign policy frameworks into the financial sector. The EU was able to implement common rules on banking bonuses, so why not extend cooperation into other issues concerning ethics and international capital? (BBC News, 2014).

UK and Africa

UK objectives towards Africa in the 2000s stemmed from the Blair government's interest in debt forgiveness, support for multilateral humanitarian objectives such as the MDGs and occasional military interventions such as Sierra Leone in 2000. But in that time and with a focus on humanitarianism primarily conducted through the Department for International Development (DFID), the UK government has belatedly realised that relations with Africa should follow something similar to China's bilateral and trade-led engagement. London has therefore shifted back to bilateral relations conducted primarily though the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, it is difficult to see how the use of micro posts staffed by a very few diplomats can make a meaningful impact in states where significant (i.e. time consuming) challenges and opportunities lie ahead.7

The rationale for close ties between the UK and South Africa has, throughout the 2000s, taken on a more important political emphasis based on a common language, similar systems of law and finance, interest in the promotion of trade, a rules based international system and in sport (Weimar and Vines, 'UK-South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 2). In addition, a broad range of other issues such as conflict prevention, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, climate change, migration, sustainable and inclusive economies are now under regular review through the UK-South Africa Bilateral Forum (Weimar and Vines, 'UK-South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 2). Established in 1997, it has included top level meetings in Downing Street in 2001 and 2006, it has also tried to address apartheid era grievances, Zimbabwe, and visa issues (Weimar and Vines, 'UK-South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 2). There were also scheduled meetings in 2011 and 2013, although the 2011 trip was cancelled due to UK actions against Libya (Vines, 2013). Close ties are handicapped by a lack of historical links between the current Conservative-Lib Dem coalition in the UK and the ANC. The South African government appears to continue to value historic political ties
despite changes in the South African leadership (Vines, 2013). This may become less of a factor in time as other South African political parties are elected to government and place less emphasis on ideological or anti-apartheid solidarity.

The unilateral announcement by Justine Greening, the UK Development Secretary, that £19 million per year official UK aid to South Africa would be phased out received a negative response from the South African government, describing the move as "tantamount to redefining our relationship" (The Guardian, 2013). Whilst there is a realisation in South Africa that the UK is focused on trade not aid and that the bilateral relationship is supported by the Bilateral Forum and communication twice a month between the foreign ministry desks in London and Pretoria, the visa issue still remains.\(^8\) The economic component also looks rather weak, since the UK has suffered from relative economic decline compared to Germany, China, USA, Saudi Arabia and Japan as South Africa's biggest source of imports (Weimar and Vines, 'UK - South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 3). The UK was the top destination for South African goods but in 2002 was overtaken by Japan, USA and Germany (Weimar and Vines, 'UK - South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 3). This must be quite a concern for London since South Africa is a G20 and BRICS economy and represents a growing economic opportunity for many of its trading partners.

Generally across sub-Saharan Africa, Europe has seen its pre-eminent status in Africa being eroded by China, the USA and India (Minto, 2012). Since South Africa supplies commodities such as platinum to manufacturing industries such as automotives, South Africa remains highly exposed to changes in the global economy. Thus the emphasis is now on developing a value added approach to boost earnings, attract investment into new industries, and industrialise. This reflects the policy of the current South African President, Jacob Zuma, who has focused on attracting investment from the East since 2008, rather than Mbeki, who, between 1999 and 2008 simply called for the 'African renaissance' to be realised.\(^9\) Despite the rather unrealistic objective of doubling bilateral trade by 2015 (Weimar and Vines, 'UK - South Africa Relations and the Bilateral Forum', 2011, 2), the UK at least remains a leading investor in South Africa.

South Africa's social dialogue is currently based on the mining sector, a hugely important area for the economy. It employs 2.9 percent of South Africa's economically active population (more than 500,000 jobs), represents 40 percent of South Africa's exports and constitutes one-third of the market capitalisation of the South African stock exchange (Motlanthe, 2013). After the Marikana mine shootings where the police shot and killed 34 striking miners in 2012 (BBC News, 2013), the South African government is pursuing a more collaborative approach between mining companies, trade unions and mining communities through the Mine Crime Combating Forum as well as ensuring police act in a fair, impartial and objective manner (Motlanthe, 2013). Similar to other African states, a mining code which multinational corporations are expected to sign up to, guarantees social and economic benefits and good governance (Motlanthe, 2013). The UK is already engaged in supporting the South African Development (SADC) Community Infrastructure Report but whether British business will be engaged in the roll out remains to be seen. Baroness Scotland is involved as HMG Trade Envoy for South Africa, so projects have started but there needs to be an "active role" played by UK companies to take political discussions further.\(^{10}\)

On Zimbabwe, the UK faces a multifaceted challenge in its limited dealings with, and even more limited leverage over, the ruling Zanu-PF party. Therefore, in order to engage
on Zimbabwe effectively, the UK has to coordinate with a broad array of interested and possibly more effective stakeholders such as South Africa (which imports 41% of Zimbabwe's goods and services (MIT, 2014), the Commonwealth, the African Union (AU) and its technical body: The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Zimbabwe was the fastest shrinking economy in 2000, leading many of its neighbours (including South Africa) to lose £25 billion in revenue and most international donors to suspend their programmes (Taylor and Williams, 2002, 549). Zimbabwe's arbitrary and chaotic land reform policies go to the heart of African identity and ideology, post-independence governance and economic development priorities. This case also raises the question of whether democracy is a western concept. Democracy has been referred to and adopted by African politicians such as Thabo Mbeki (Mbeki, 2002), Jacob Zuma (The White House, 2013) and the Governance Cluster of the Regional Coordination Mechanism of the UN Agencies and Partner Organisations urging AU member states to ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007 (NEPAD, 2010).

Zimbabwe also highlights the anti-colonial solidarity evident between most African leaders (including South African leaders) and Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe, seeming to pre-emptively thwart any possibility of UK, Commonwealth or NEPAD attempts to isolate the Mugabe regime. South Africa prefers engagement over sanctions and has not sanctioned any state since 1994, nor will it close its border with Zimbabwe. Instead, South Africa worked on quiet diplomacy to help achieve a more inclusive political process with the participation of Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister despite criticism for doing so from the West (NEPAD, 2010). It has also established an international school for diplomats from states such as South Sudan, Somalia and the DRC to learn about Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development and to train them in all aspects of international relations. A similar diplomatic academy was set up by South Africa in Kinshasa to enable diplomats to work more effectively with their international counterparts. State specific challenges, such as Zimbabwe, are thus left to the SADC chairperson to identify and address, possibly through escalating to the AU in extreme cases, rather than pressure being exerted at the bilateral level (NEPAD, 2010). This case shows how difficult it is balance competing demands of maintaining cordial relations with neighbours and addressing specific challenges of mal-governance and economic depression.

Certainly, New Labour's 'third way' in Africa, between socialism and neo-liberalism, has been ineffective, largely because the 1991 Harare Declaration governing how the Commonwealth deals with rule breakers and the Abuja Agreement 1995 governing the implementation of land reform and fair elections in Zimbabwe, have been ignored by Mugabe. The UK has had to balance considerations such as ensuring access for election monitors in Zimbabwe whilst attempting to contribute to better human rights and governance. By 2008, the UK position had hardened and led to imposed 'smart sanctions' on leading members of Zanu-PF party. But by 2013, sanctions had given way to a more conciliatory approach from the West, partly due to the inclusion of opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party leader Morgan Tsvangirai being included as Prime Minister in the cabinet of Robert Mugabe, and partly due to a modified rhetoric emanating out of Harare. The increasing role of China in Zimbabwe, western access to mineral rights and the hope that Jacob Zuma would be able to bridge the colonial legacy gap must not be discounted (Tinhu, 2013).
On Angola, a number of factors appear to have informed UK government opinion that Angola is a state of interest but one where little progress is likely to be made in the short term. First, is the positive change in Angola’s political orientation, from a state which has endured 27 years of civil war to one which is consciously outward looking, attempting to address charges of human rights abuses (ranging from poor political and civil rights to chronic corruption linked to oil deals with major multinational corporations) and seeking to reengage in the international system (Butcher, 2002). Evidence of this can continue to be found in instances where Angola is attempting to be nominated to join various international fora, such as becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2014 (Eisenstein and Smith, 2014). By extension of this change in orientation, there continues to be UK-Angolan discussions about Angola being more supportive of the international human rights agenda (including its voting behaviour in the UN on human rights issues in other countries).

How much pressure the UK was able to put on Angola in the lead up to its re-election to the UN Human Rights Council in 2014 is debatable since Angola was also a member of the organisation at the same time. Nevertheless, there appears to have been some advances made towards the implementation of the 'Voluntary Principles in Angola' which the USA, UK and other stakeholders developed in 2000. 'The objective [of the first roundtable discussion which took place in 2014] was to promote dialogue on security and human rights challenges in the extractive sector, across government, civil society and the extractive industry, foster good governance, prevention of social conflicts in Angola...' (British Embassy Luanda, 2014). It is especially important to make progress before Angola will Chair the Kimberley Process in 2015 which is aimed at stemming the flow of conflict diamonds (British Embassy Luanda, 2014).

Second, there is an emerging defence component to the relationship and the construction of some bilateral defence relations (illustrated by naval relations and the first Defence and Security Trade Mission to Angola (British Embassy Luanda, 2014). Third, is the UK interest in extending economic activities into Angola. However, despite the UK being home to the second largest Angolan Diaspora community in Europe and commercial partnership attempts being sought through Portuguese intermediaries (which were ineffective) there is still a lack of Angolan political interest in the UK as a potential export market (Wildash, 2013). Part of the reason for this appears to be in visa issues hampering bilateral commercial ties (Wildash, 2013).

Whilst the UK appears to have little leverage in Angola, a former Portuguese colony, in Sierra Leone where the British authorities have strong colonial ties, the Blair government was able to send a small number of British troops to intervene in the Sierra Leone civil war in May 2000. Post 2000, mining concessions, with their own private security forces, have been considered as one way in which the UK government might indirectly support the government of Sierra Leone with additional security assets (Reno, 2000, 227). This model could have been applied in other states where the UK and an African government have convergent security interests. However, this clearly does not apply in the case of Angola where China plays the main role in the economy through companies such as China Sonangol and China International Fund and maintains strong links to the Angolan government.

**Turkey and Africa**
Turkey, like China, is dependent on growing engagement with external markets to sustain its economic growth and in order to maintain its current place as the sixteenth largest economy in the world (Invest in Turkey, 2014). Whilst China focuses on aid tied to construction and infrastructure projects in support of its oil policy, the Turkish government is also cognizant that Africa has untapped natural resources of great significance to its own economic development. This started in the 1980s when Turkey first adopted its export orientated foreign trade policy and required clean coal from South Africa, leading to relatively good economic links (Aydin, 2012, 2). However, with no official contact during the apartheid era and following the ANC coming to power under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, priority was given to states which had 'hosted, funded or supported the ANC' which did not include Turkey (Aydin, 2012, 2). Furthermore, with contacts between the PKK and ANC, Turkey implemented a limited arms embargo against South Africa which led Nelson Mandela to decline the Ataturk Peace Prize in 1992 (Aydin, 2012, 3). Greek and Cypriot diasporas in South Africa have also been a complicating factor.

Still, by the 2000s, bilateral trade between Turkey and South Africa stood at around $250 - $300 million (Aydin, 2012, 3). Turkey is South Africa's biggest trade partner in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, whilst South Africa is Turkey's biggest trade partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their respective ties to broader regions should ensure greater cooperation and expansion of trading ties in the years to come. For example, Turkish exporters have developed operations in South Africa to serve the Sub-Saharan African markets. Turkey's customs union with the EU and South Africa's free trade agreement with the EU (signed in 2000) could also hold opportunities for further inter-regional trade expansion. Since commercial contacts are still quite limited, there is potential in under explored areas such as tourism. However, unlike the UK-South Africa relationship and the Sino-Africa relationship, institutionalising the political relationship has been more problematic since the Turkish-South Africa Parliamentary Friendship Group has faced some technical obstacles in the South African parliament (Aydin, 2012, 4).

A Turkish-South Africa Business Council was set up in 1999, showing the predominant economic ties that still exist. Turkey declared 2005 the "Year of Africa", the same year it hosted the first Turkey - Africa Cooperation Summit (Ozkan, 2013, 143). In 2008, the AU declared Turkey a "strategic partner" and has boosted economic and political relations as of 2013 within the pre-existing AU parameters of engagement such as: supporting "African solutions for African problems", participating in peacekeeping operations and when asked, playing a role in the peaceful settlement of disputes (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Not surprisingly, this has led to an Africa - Turkey Summit in 2014 (African Union, 2014). Business associations with close ties to the ruling Justice and Development Party such as the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) have contributed to the growth in Turkey - Africa relations in a similar private-led approach as that championed by the USA and EU.

In aiming to achieve more active participation and a higher status in world (and therefore African) affairs in the 2000s following a foreign policy reorientation under the then foreign minister Davutoglu, Turkey has used foreign aid to Africa as a tool to achieve this end (Ozkan, 2013, 140). Whether the growing economic roles of Turkey and China in Africa represent a challenge to the existing development paradigm remains to be seen, but the realignment of global power to favour emergent blocs such as the BRICS and
MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) in Africa bears serious consideration. This is especially the case since the speed at which Turkey has established itself in Africa after having almost no presence there, beyond basic diplomatic relations just a decade ago, has been remarkable.

Although bilateral trade with Africa has not grown at the same rate as China's, Turkey's trade volume did grow threefold from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $17 billion in 2011 (Ozkan, 2013, 142) and $23.4 billion in 2013 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, even with such rapid engagement at the regional level, including Turkish attendance at dozens of trade and investment fairs in Africa, African relations with Turkey are still not regarded as being vibrant. Spearheading Turkey's effort is the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Ministry of Education, the military and Turkish civil society organisations which have a history of engagement in the Middle East, Central Asia and Balkans. Between 2002 and 2004 TIKA spent $80 million, but between 2006 and 2009 it spent $700 million (Ozkan, 2013, 142). Turkish funding through multilateral aid agencies was only 6% in 2008 and 2009, reflecting its focus on strengthening bilateral ties and its belief in the important role of business, investment and entrepreneurs (Ozkan, 2013, 143-144). Distribution of these funds still favoured established relations, but 24% went to the Middle East and Africa, thereby ranking Turkey number one in aid contributors in 2006 amongst developing nations and number two (after the Republic of Korea) in 2007 and 2008 (Ozkan, 2013, 14, 142). The percentage masks the fact that Turkish aid to Africa increased from $30.9 million to $71 million in just a year between 2009 and 2010 (Ozkan, 2013, 142).

Turkey is a clear example of a state with strategic geopolitical reasons for ramping up aid and quickly diversifying and deepening its ties to Africa in order to become a traditional partner in the western mould. In Zimbabwe, Turkey set up its embassy in Harare in 2011, and Turkey sees great potential in commercial opportunities presented in the textile, clothing, agriculture and construction sectors (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). Unlike Chinese companies operating in these sectors in Africa, this may be better news for African labour. In Angola and Mozambique, Turkey believes that Portugal can play an important role in facilitating trade. Although Turkey might be more optimistic about its chances based on being able to offer Portugal greater access to the Caucasus and Central Asian markets in response, it should still consider the lessons learnt from the UK dependence on Portugal as a trade and investment facilitator. Ankara should also be aware that trade is primarily driven by the private sector, and although some Portuguese companies may be operating in Angola as a function of its colonial legacy, due to market factors or competitive advantage, that is not always the case. Portuguese companies are therefore not a guaranteed element on which commercial policies should be based. Unusually, Turkish - Angolan trade is dependent on 'shuttle trade' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014) and third countries (regional trade hubs) such as the UAE, Lebanon and South Africa. Most Turkish trade and investment in Angola is conducted by Turkish businessmen living in Angola. With a growth in that relationship and within the existing EU framework approach to human rights in Africa, the discussion on Turkish participation in the human rights agenda in Africa may go forward. The EU has played an important role vis-à-vis some Turkish - African relationships. For example, the EU has clearly leveraged Turkish hopes for EU accession and applied pressure on Ankara to cancel a visit by ICC indicted President Bashir of Sudan (BBC News, 2009).
In Somalia, the Turkish president is taking a lead role in reconstruction on the basis of Turkey's interpretation of Islam, leading to some rivalry with Islamic states such as Iran (Harte, 2012/2013). There have been public exchanges (including cultural, religious (imam) and student programmes) and the testing of a new policy of market compassion aimed at enlarging the Turkish footprint in eastern and sub-Saharan Africa (Harte, 2012/2013). However, Somalia and other states in the region will expect Turkey, unlike other donors in the past, to follow through on its aid. Turkey already appears to be aware of this necessity by promoting itself as an Afro-Eurasian state with interests in Africa which are 'not just the reflection of a transient political and economic expectation' (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs). It is most likely to maintain its presence if its primary motivations, in this case religious influence, can be sustained and developed in constructive ways. Turkey represents a good opportunity for some African states to develop close links with in specific industries, whether agriculture, food processing, textiles and clothing, construction materials or durable consumer products. States such as Ethiopia, Tanzania and Senegal already appear to be benefiting from technology knowledge transfer which could facilitate their industrialisation; an area where engagement with China has hitherto been lacking (Kayalar, 2009, 86).

**Conclusion**

A preliminary point should be included here about the potential impacts of China, the UK and Turkey on African development and human rights issues. It depends to a large extent on whether the African state in question can be classified as a state or 'quasi state'. Many states in Africa have recovered from being collapsed states, weak states or failed states, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Rotberg, 2003, 10). However, the reverse is also true, and Zimbabwe is heading towards becoming a failed state. Parts or all a state can fall under the control of warlords or sub-state actors, and this has happened to Somaliland (Rotberg, 2003, 10). Respect for sovereignty therefore means little in a 'quasi state' where the concept of sovereignty has a limited meaning to respecting the personal politics and wealth accumulation of an authoritarian regime. In 'quasi states', including weak states and states experiencing conflict and humanitarian crises, it should be recognised that challenges can often only be addressed by substantial engagement from former colonial patrons who have the pre-existing ties, capabilities and political will to be involved. However, the extent of engagement is problematic.

Firstly, "failed states" might recover so an interventionist doctrine could easily be deemed inappropriate and illegitimate in retrospect. Secondly, in practice, the interventionist doctrine based on either "failed state" or humanitarian discourses have been considered to be illegal or at least legally questionable by many observers. On the major humanitarian issues dealt with by the UN Security Council, China and Russia were against NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (Roberts, 1999, 104) and again in Libya to oust Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 mainly on legal grounds (O'Brien and Sinclair, 2011, 10). So long as China uses the principles of unconditional respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic issues to underpin its commercial engagement in Africa, it will leave many African states, especially major oil exporters, with no incentives to pursue meaningful reform (Tull, 2006, 476). Any change to the Chinese policy would require a fundamental rethink in Beijing about its overall foreign policy orientation. This is unlikely to be facilitated by anything less than a political crisis or a change in leadership. With 114,000 Chinese workers in high risk African states such as Sudan and South Sudan, and others in Ethiopia, Angola and Cameroon, it is possible a major incident could cause a rethink (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).
The very concept of a "failed state" is indistinct and therefore simply labelling a state as failing has serious political and security implications. Furthermore, the late UN official Sergio Vieira de Mello stated that at the core of state failed there was generally "direct armed aggression, covert military intervention, encouragement of proxy warfare, exploitative multinational trade and business practices, or reckless economic destabilization" (de Mello, 2003). Therefore external intervention could simply exacerbate the instability already created by a penetrated state. The converse might also be true. For example, the failure of the UN Security Council to stop genocides in Rwanda lends credence to the idea that intervention is often politically motivated and interests driven. Indeed, balancing national interests with fears about world peace was one of the points raised by Kofi Annan and Gro Harlem Brundtland in a 2015 op-ed (Annan and Brundtland, 2015).

Therefore, operating within the colonial patronage framework or leverage afforded to a non-traditional actor such as China through substantial economic engagement and/or a close political relationship, some states can be effective at lobbying for domestic change. In 'quasi states' where states are less consolidated and personal relationships key, this should be relatively easy, but with an added complication that political rivalry and competition for state power might fundamentally undermine these efforts. It is therefore essential that African governments, donor states and major trading partners agree on the long term roll out of development plans which address the primary needs of the African nation in question.

**Implications for Economic Development and Human Rights**

There are already attempts to improve the quality of natural resource management through voluntary and peer review mechanisms such as the 'Voluntary Principles in Angola', the AU's Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance in July 2002, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Other codes such as the Kimberly Process, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and UN Global Compact tend to be industry specific. These measures are important first steps in regulating extractive industries in specific states thereby benefiting more people in each society. Further measures should include new regulations, mandatory codes and binding commitments from international finance firms on major investments in at risk states. Domestic best practice for vulnerable communities located in extractive regions can be found in Nigeria's Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) which gives 10 percent of oil equity to indigenous groups independent of government intervention (Vines, 2009, 21). There also needs to be broader support from donors for good governance, including assisting states to implement better checks and balances of power. If China pursued a broad spectrum of package deals which it has adopted in the economic realm and applied the same approach to political reform after the economic foundations for economic development had been laid, the results could be staggering. Whilst this remains highly unlikely, the most that can be expected is a middle class social transformative which leads to political pressure for reform. This is actually more preferable as indigenous pursuit for political change cannot be labelled as neo-colonial or interventionist which would comprise its aspirations from the start.

Anti-colonial solidarity is clearly evident between South Africa and Zimbabwe and no economic incentives or sanctions will change Zimbabwe's political orientation without a change of leadership. Donor states should therefore support SADC in its attempts to
develop the sub-regional economy. SADC can bring in contributions from regional states and ministers can meet quickly to decide what to do on crises such as Ebola. There are other regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Arab League which are all represented in the AU so for the broadest approach to human rights and development, this would be the logical institution.

Western states have seen their aid conditionality increasingly compromised by the need to engage states in order to secure their own interests. This included the UK wanting to be able to place election monitors in Zimbabwe and it meant delaying condemnation of human rights in Angola until the UK had been re-elected to the UNHRC. Foreign aid from the West has given way to a greater emphasis on trade, and yet the opportunities of exploiting gateways, whether from the UK into Europe, Turkey into the Middle East and Central Asia, or South Africa into southern Africa, have yet to be realised. Private led growth gives many states less control over economic relations even where the potential is great. However, China and Turkey have been shrewd in their use of aid to support prominent trading relationships but there are also high expectations in the states where they operate that they will follow through on their commitments.

China has no economic incentive for sharing the West's values, quite the opposite. This is one reason why the AU is forced to engage with China through the China-Africa Cooperation Forum where Beijing is able to place limits on African multilateral organisations committed to implementing human rights measures which might affect its own one party rule. China is also clear on issues such as Darfur where its policies are continually shaped by its oil interest in Sudan/South Sudan. The $400,000 support for the AU in its mediation to resolve the Darfur crisis is one example of its very limited commitment to such endeavours (Vines, 2009, 21).

The question is why would China not want to aggressively promote human rights in Africa. The simple rationale is that it would undercut and potentially compromise China's relatively exclusive relationships with major African partners and commercial opportunities therein. The case of Chinese sanctions eventually being imposed on Liberian timber exports during the presidency of Charles Taylor was a rare exception (Tull, 2006, 475). China could perhaps learn from western engagement with crisis ridden states such as DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe in order to avoid further conflict which would be much more damaging to its longer term interests. China could support the twin beacons (and important regional trade partners) of Nigeria and South Africa to help them overcome their own governance issues and establish norms such as transparency across the continent. Rather than become directly involved, as Boone and Doshi note, China is leading by example in its harsh punishments for those found guilty of corruption (Boone and Doshi, 2009, 63). This policy has been carried through from the late 1990s, illustrating that it remains a key point of contention and potential political weakness if people lose confidence in the government (Moses, 2015).

So far, China's public-private approach appears to be supporting what has been termed 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Taylor, 2008, 5). China should consolidate its influence on economic development in Africa through modifying its rules and regulations governing the operations of large economic actors such as SOEs and the '88 Queensway Group'. It might also favour them on occasion over unwieldy private enterprise which could potentially compromise Chinese foreign policy objectives in a largely unregulated African commercial environments until they become properly regulated. Beijing could further centralise and rationalise its chains of command to these strategic SOEs.
China could go further and supplement its participation in FOCAC with better regulation of its own private sector (ensuring smaller companies are subject to stringent licensing procedures for example) and participate in the African Partnership Forum. The OECD already supports (since 2005) MDG monitoring through its headquarters in Paris, and Beijing could examine areas in which the MDG targets are at risk and assist further in implementing the remaining MDG goals before the 2015 deadline (United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2014). For example, support for more hunger and malnutrition initiatives, providing additional measures to help reduce child and maternal mortality, or investing in more HIV anti-viral activities. The concentration of aid and trade in the same place are putting other non-oil producers and landlocked states at a higher risk of not meeting MDG targets. China could therefore redeploy and enhance its aid programme, including training programmes and other resources, in areas where it does not currently have commercial operations. This strategy already appears to be operational in China's response to Ebola in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea where it has spent $200 million so far (Hornby and Donnan, 2014). Whether it will be adopted and enveloped in China's longer term Africa policy remains to be seen.

For a number of reasons then, the prospects for non-traditional actors to have a positive effect on human rights and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa are good. Whilst the prospects of radical change in this area are remote, there are opportunities for continued Chinese socialisation in the international community coupled with African interest in an increasing role in international affairs to forge harmony in the international and sub-regional system. The main issue appears to be the regulation of sub-regional affairs through a mechanism and framework which is effective in addressing a number of challenges and widely recognised as being the most appropriate by all major international actors. It is up to traditional and non-traditional donors as well as African states to be far more assertive in directing private enterprise in ways which will not only guarantee human rights but also build state capacity and societal confidence in joint projects over the long term. This involves a number of aspects including: regulating foreign labour and extractive deals, boosting aid in regions where there is no obvious commercial rationale, building public-private regional development partnerships and giving local communities a greater stake in the national economy through oil equity, diversification and job creation.

It is up to all actors such as China, the USA, EU, IMF, World Bank and non-traditional actors such as Turkey, Brazil, India and South Korea to (continue) to support the roll out of this more equitable arrangement. China and the USA already have a senior-level forum on Africa called the U.S.-China Sub-dialogue on Africa which has been in operation since 2005 (Hanauer and Morris, 2014, 111). Mainly about avoiding duplication in aid and optimising sources of assistance (especially in health, education and agriculture) to obtain their respective objectives, China and the U.S. appear willing to engage on broad topics related to peace, stability and economic development (including good governance, rule of law and access to African markets) (Hanauer and Morris, 2014, 112). Even by 2011, it was unclear how cooperation would proceed in practice given the relatively low priority of specific issues in most single African states (Hanauer and Morris, 2014, 112).

These findings are also important for some Middle Eastern (mainly Gulf) states which currently account for one fifth of investments in sub-Saharan Africa. Land acquisitions in particular appear to be targeting food producing regions in states with the weakest
institutions and governance (Lee et al, 2012, 106). Therefore this change of approach could have a significant impact if adopted by all major trade and investment partners. This would in turn put further pressure on China and African states to adopt what might become emerging global norms on Africa created through greater regionalism and international cooperation.
Eradicate hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and form a global partnership for development.

That is not to say that other the other BRICS and not important. Russia is particularly important to the South African economy for example, because of its civil nuclear energy expertise which could help address electricity shortages in South Africa. There is also potential for Russia to work with many states in the areas of technology and space to enable them to punch above their weight.

Interview with South African government representatives who asked not to be named, 16 December 2014

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5 Email interview with Ian Taylor, University of St. Andrews, 8 October 2014

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