## Contents

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................... 3  
Introduction to the Conflict Research Programme.......................................................................................... 3  
The Horn of Africa........................................................................................................................................... 3  
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 4  
Political Markets in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea....................................................................................... 5  
Moral Populism in the Horn of Africa.................................................................................................................. 7  
Transnational Drivers of Armed Conflict............................................................................................................. 10  
Economics and Natural Resources....................................................................................................................... 13  
Peace and Security Architecture......................................................................................................................... 15  
Emergent Dynamics.......................................................................................................................................... 18  
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 20

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Executive Summary

Introduction to the Conflict Research Programme

The overall goal of the Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is to provide an evidence-based strategic re-orientation of international engagement in places apparently afflicted by the world’s most intractable violent conflicts. Its premise is that in these places, the ability of public authorities to provide even the most basic level of governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real politics’ of gaining, managing and holding power, which we argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach helps explain the frustrations of state-building and institutionally-focused engagement; it can also inform the design of improved interventions, which reduce the risk and impact of conflict and violence in developing countries, alleviating poverty and insecurity. A key objective of our research, and a key contribution to the ‘Better Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies better targeted, more nuanced and rooted in a clear understanding of the social condition that undergirds persistent contemporary conflict.

The locations for research are Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Our central hypothesis is that governance in these difficult places is dominated by the logic of a political marketplace. These political markets are turbulent, violent and integrated into regional and global networks of power and money. We also hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in identity politics, persecuting ideologies and violent extremism) is a counterpart to the marketisation of politics, and the two flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, conflict and trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools can neither capture the everyday realities of politics and governance in these difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics of contested power relations. External interventions risk being enmeshed in logics of power and may end up inadvertently supporting violence and authoritarianism. At the same time, in all war-torn spaces, there are relatively peaceful zones: what we term ‘pockets of civickness’. These might be territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local authorities) social (civil society groups helping the vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external (interventions that regulate flows of political finance).

The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally relevant research that can enable real-time analysis of the dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civickness’ and public authority, enabling better interventions to manage and resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, and create conditions for more accountable and transparent governance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute to a better understanding of what works in addressing violent conflict across our research sites. We will develop comparative understanding of how different interventions affect violent conflict and the risk of renewed violent conflict, across our research sites. We will also examine the contextual factors that affect the effectiveness of these interventions. Intervention areas selected for comparative research: Security interventions; civil society and community mediation interventions; resource interventions; and interventions designed to strengthen authority and legitimacy, including at the sub-national level. We envisage emerging findings from our political economy analysis of conflict drivers to shape our comparative analysis of specific interventions.

Our research methods include (a) comparative political ethnography (b) refined datasets (c) models of violence and political business (d) socio-political mapping of the structural drivers of conflict and the groups involved in political mobilisation and coercion and (e) action research exploring agents of change. We have a unique and robust infrastructure of local researchers and civil society networks across all our sites that will facilitate both fieldwork research and remote research. The CRP team is already closely engaged with key political processes – and regional actors - in the countries concerned, designed to promote peace, humanitarian action, human rights and democracy. This engagement is a key part of our method and will ensure that evidence-based research is effectively communicated to institutions engaged in trying to reduce the risk and impact of violent conflict in our research sites. Our emphasis is upon a mix of research methods and mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. In line with this flexible approach, we will hold an annual in-country workshop with each DFID country office, and key stakeholders, to work through the implications of our research for them in a practical, flexible and responsive way. This will be supplemented by regular written and face-to-face/virtual communication with country staff.

The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is home to 220 million people. It is one of the most conflict prone areas of the world, rendered particularly vulnerable because of its strategically critical geographical location, which makes its
politics particularly strongly influenced by events in the Middle East. Recurrent wars have left its people impoverished and often hungry, and its natural environment in a precarious condition. The HoA is host to more than 40 percent of the world’s United Nations peacekeepers; more than 50 percent of the African Union mission in Somalia is included. The Red Sea region is emerging as a particularly significant flashpoint for regional political rivalry and armed conflict.

The Red Sea region straddles Africa and the Middle East. It is strategically important for international security, especially maritime trade. Partly because the region is divided between two continents, it is neglected by international policymakers including in HMG. However, Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran) and Egypt are all actively engaged in politics and security in the Red Sea, notably in Yemen but also with respect to Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.

This synthesis paper analyses a set of issues in the HoA and Red Sea region using the framework of the political marketplace and moral populism. One striking element of the literature search is the scarcity of scholarly work on the HoA as a region (as opposed to individual countries), and the near-total absence of work on the Red Sea. A second is that the politics of the HoA/Red Sea region have been dominated by a succession of geo-strategic and regional power struggles, of which the current one is between Ethiopia and its vision of a regional security order, pursued by a mix of military power and state-led economic development, and a coalition of Arab countries which see the area as part of their security perimeter, and which pursue their goals primarily through political financing strategies.

The paper provides a brief history of political markets and moral populism in the region, outlining how it is paradigmatic for the emergence of the political marketplace form of governance, and how varieties of identity politics have emerged and transformed in response to this—including ethnic mobilisation, rival Islamisms, and the ‘sleeper issue’ of nationalism. It covers the high prevalence of inter-state rivalry and armed conflict (direct and by proxy), boundary disputes, and the regional organisations, especially the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that are engaged in the region’s peace and security challenges.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea constitute one of the most strategically important, complex, volatile and yet under-studied regions of the world. Indeed there is no shared working definition of the ‘Horn of Africa’ while the Red Sea is conspicuous by its absence as an integrated unit of security and political analysis. Recent developments have meant that the states of the Arabian Gulf are also active players in this region.

The Conflict Research Programme identified regional dynamics as one of its core areas of interest from the outset. This includes two sets of regional dynamics: the Horn of Africa/Red Sea (the focus of this paper) and the Gulf/Syria/Iraq. The two regional agendas also overlap and the research processes and findings will speak to one another. For the Gulf countries, the Horn of Africa is a second-tier security and political concern.

Scarcity of Scholarly Work on the Region

The Horn of Africa presents huge challenges to scholars and policymakers. The region is part of sub-Saharan Africa yet profoundly influenced by the Arab world; it is a region of unparalleled diversity with very few experts familiar with more than one country; it is an area that had a uniquely complex colonial experience with a variety of African, Arab and European forms of imperial domination; it is unique in Africa in that pre-colonial political traditions have identifiable continuities in contemporary statecraft and governance. Almost all the scholarship and policy analysis is concerned with individual countries, and more occasionally a single cross-cutting issue such as food security. There is remarkably little in the way of regional political analyses of the HoA. Recent exceptions are Reid (2011), Bereketeab (2013), Mengisteab (2014), de Waal (2015) and Clapham (2017). Each of these combines national level analysis with attention to regional institutions (usually bemoaning their weaknesses), inter-state rivalries, and border disputes. Some older volumes are noteworthy, such as Doornbos et al. (1992), Tvedt (1993), Woodward and Forsyth (1994) and Gurdon (1994), all of which were written in the immediate aftermath of the momentous changes of 1991—described by Clapham (2017) as the region’s ‘year zero’. Peter Woodward has also written consistently from an international relations perspective (Woodward 2002, 2006; also see Woodward 2013a as an update on his 2002 book). There is also a small but significant set of scholarly works that focus on ethnicity and nationalism (Lewis 1983; Salih and Markakis 1999), and a number of collections of ethnographic essays that span different countries of the region, highlighting common themes (e.g. Markakis and Fukui 1994, Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). Additionally, there is a growing set of detailed local studies generated within the region, including by IGAD and its units such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) and its
Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution Strategy (Wulf and Debiel 2009; IGAD 2013; Woodward 2013b), alongside more general policy-focused publications by regional think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the journal *Discourse*.

Analysis of the Red Sea trans-region is scarce to non-existent. The Red Sea is seen as a fundamental socio-cultural gulf dividing Africa from south-west Asia; similarly it divides the domains of scholarly and policy expertise. Ali Mazrui (1986) provocatively asks, if the North African countries are seen as part of the continent, why not the Arabian Peninsula too? Having identified the historical ties that bind the two shores, he writes, ‘The most pernicious sea in Africa’s history may well be the Red Sea. This thin line of water has been deemed to be more relevant for defining where Africa ends than all the evidence of geology, geography, history and culture.’ (p. 29)

Few scholars have studied the politics of the Red Sea, with Aliboni (1985) standing out as a significant if dated account, and Ehteshami and Murphy (2013) as a more recent, but still incomplete volume. A Google scholar search yields the following totals for publications with any combination of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ in the title, along with three locations: Red Sea, Persian/Arabian Gulf, and the South China Sea.

- Red Sea: 37
- Persian/Arabian Gulf: 530
- South China Sea: 43,455

The recent report on peace missions to the African Union identified the ‘shared spaces’ between Africa and its neighbouring regions, including the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden, as a policy priority (WPF 2016). The potential value of academic analysis of the Red Sea is amply demonstrated by the enduring relevance of the conclusions of one of the few books that do exist, namely Roberto Aliboni’s *The Red Sea Region: Local actors and the superpowers* (1985). Aliboni identifies three main trends in the politics of the region. He writes, ‘Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s regional policies aimed at enhancing internal and external security have proven destabilising and in a way even adventurous.’ (p. 116) Examples he provides, from the 1970s, are its fostering divisions in Yemen, its role in promoting Somali irredentism as a way of reducing Soviet influence, and its routine disregard for the norms of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in supporting separatist movements in the Horn. Aliboni’s second trend is the Arab countries’ piecemeal financial support for anti-Communist groups and for poorer governments ready to make friendly tactical moves, which end up stoking local conflicts as a result. He sees Saudi Arabia and Libya as guilty of this in different ways (p. 117). Third, Aliboni identifies the dominant factor in the politics of the Red Sea as relations among Arab states, especially the ‘central axis’ of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with those countries’ relations with the Horn derived from their primary axis of rivalry in the Levant and Peninsular. Each of these trends resonates with the post-Cold War era, in which the region’s most powerful countries—still Egypt and Saudi Arabia—are responding to the rivalrous realpolitik and the threat of violent *jihadism*.

Aliboni concludes his short book by drawing out the implications for western countries.

In this uneasy regional context the western countries are practically absent. ... While Western absence appears remarkable, in view of the crucial importance the Red Sea region is supposed to have in the wider frame of the area South-east of NATO, this absence can hardly be explained today and could hardly be excused tomorrow.... On the other hand, a direct Western presence in the region may be neither necessary nor politically wise. The West has powerful and prestigious allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in the Red Sea. If these allies were to discard the destabilising policies they have carried out in the past and promote instead policies of co-operation both on the inter-Arab and Afro-Arab levels, the Western countries’ preoccupations with the area will lessen remarkably. In the end this would be the most correct path to the stabilisation and security of the region, and in this sense the most important conclusion of this book may be that it is up to the regional countries to manage stability around the basin by promoting co-operation among all the regional actors (pp. 118-9).

Aliboni’s book is now more than three decades old, and limited by its preoccupation with the interests of the most powerful states, to the neglect of the African countries at the southern end of the Sea. It also has little analysis of the Israeli interest and role. Nonetheless it is a model for the kind of analysis that is strikingly needed today.

**Political Markets in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea**

The HoA is a paradigmatic instance of the development of the political marketplace in the contemporary era (de Waal 2015). Incorporating Yemen and the countries of the Arabian Gulf into an integrated regional analysis further illuminates the political economy of conflict in the HoA, and also widens and deepens the political marketplace framework.
In the early part of the colonial era, both shores of the Red Sea were part of the Ottoman Empire. The patterns of imperial rule, on the ‘hub and spokes’ model, provide an adaptable template for neopatrimonial rule (Barkey 2008). The Abyssinian Empire was similarly a pre-modern multi-ethnic land empire, which had many of the same features of patrimonial governance (Donham and James 1986). The Egyptian empire on the Nile was another variant, notable for its use of mercenaries on its slaving frontiers, its racism and its development of militarised tribalism as a mechanism of peripheral governance (Trout-Powell 2003). The region was transformed by the opening of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent imperial rivalry for control of the Nile headwaters and the Bab al Mandab. Few of the territories were occupied by colonial powers with anything other than the intent of protecting sea lanes and excluding rivals. In the late colonial era, the richest territories in the Red Sea region were Egypt and Eritrea, both of which appeared set on building modern states, albeit in rather different ways.

The HoA/Red Sea was a theatre of Cold War confrontation in the 1960s (with the Yemen civil war, which for a moment appeared to threaten an Arab nationalist revolution in Saudi Arabia) (Wenner 1993) and the 1970s (with the spectacular switch of alliances in the Horn, prompting Zbigniew Brezinski’s famous phrase that détente ‘lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden) (Woodroffe 2013). The cost of defeating Communism was that nationalism—the one ideology with a proven record of underpinning statebuilding—was also in retreat, replaced by a mercantile form of politics that was fertile ground for developing the political marketplace.

In the 1970s, the oil boom transformed the countries of the Arabian/Persian Gulf, and in doing so also radically altered their relations with their African near-neighbours and Yemen. Today, the economic disparities in the Red Sea region are striking. The GDP per capita of the IGAD region is $1,000; in the GCC region it is $26,000. The three countries at the northern end of the sea (Egypt, Israel and Jordan) have a combined GDP of $658 billion; the four countries at the southern end (Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen) have a combined GDP of just $42 bn. Egypt’s GDP at $331 bn is larger than the combined GDP of the eight IGAD countries at $255 bn. Saudi Arabia’s GDP is $646 bn; the combined GDP of the other GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) is $750 bn.

This astonishing economic transformation began in the 1970s with the oil boom, at the same moment that the Horn was plunged into war and revolution. The explosion of employment opportunities in the Gulf, alongside economic and political crisis in the HoA, led to an exodus of skilled and semi-skilled labour, notably including a huge proportion of the Sudanese professional class and very large numbers of Somalis. Urban Sudan and Somalia rapidly became remittance-based economies (Brown 1992; Jamal 1988). In the 1980s, the wages earned by Sudanese and Somali workers in the Gulf countries represented as much as 40 percent of their countries’ gross national income, and were the major source of investment, especially in real estate and small businesses. The Gulf economies not only overshadowed the Sudanese and Somali ones, but in a sense also enveloped them. Trading companies, set up in the Gulf states during the 1970s oil boom, owned and managed by Somalis and Sudanese, later emerged as major players in those countries’ domestic economies. Most Sudanese Islamic banks began in this manner, as well as the major Somali companies Dahabshiil and Indhadeero.

Arab-African economic relations were also influenced by the wave of lending, commercial and concessionary, provided by Arab banks after the oil boom. This direct bank lending was not, overwhelmingly, driven by a strategic developmental vision, but instead by case-by-case commercial considerations.

Large scale employment by north-east Africans in the Gulf has had far-reaching social, cultural and political implications also. The social and religious mores of the conservative, often puritanical, forms of Salafi Islam common in the Gulf spread to the HoA (and indeed elsewhere). Gulf-based charities funded schools and mosques, driving a historic shift from Sufism to Wahhabism in public religious life. The visible effects of this include changes in dress, especially for women, and behaviour codes in public. Although the Saudi government has often been held responsible for the spread of Wahhabism, it appears that it was only during the 1970s that it was actively promoting Islamism in the Horn, as part of the Saudi anti-Communist strategy of that time, and the principal beneficiaries of this policy were the Sudanese Muslim Brothers. Subsequently, the Saudi rulers have dealt with heads of state, while permitting private individuals, charities and foundations, to pursue their own separate agendas, which often include supporting Salafi schools and mosques. Qatar has followed a distinct policy, more consistently supporting the Muslim Brothers, and the Emirates have had a secular foreign policy.

The economic dominance of the Gulf had political impacts, often driven directly in finance. In Sudan, Islamic banking was permitted from 1977 onwards, directly causing the growth of the Muslim Brothers as the best-funded and best-organised political force. The growth of political Islam
in Sudan was only briefly a goal of the Gulf countries, but it provided a strategic opportunity that Sudanese Islamists were able to seize.

In Somalia, the principal financial mechanism for remittances was a hawala system run by the Somalis themselves. Islamic banks and foundations were unable to penetrate the country during the Siyad Barre era—despite his opening to funds and security support from the Arab world, Siyad remained resolutely secular to the end. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a pervasive Islamisation of public and commercial life in Somalia. Political finance has been associated with the money transfer and telecoms sector, which is both wealthy and has huge political clout (Collins 2009; Phillips 2013). In the last decade Gulf states re-emerged as direct providers of political money, particularly in the context of federal politics in Mogadishu, but during 2016-17 also in Hargeisa.

The political and economic crises in the Horn of Africa and Yemen in the late 1970s and the protracted civil wars of the 1980s brought each of the Horn of Africa countries to the point of collapse. Somalia did indeed collapse, and Sudan and Ethiopia narrowly escaped. As the Horn of Africa rebounded economically, it did along a strikingly trajectory model to that which had gone before. Sudan rebuilt its political economy and governance system as a political marketplace, and to the extent that Somalia became functional, it was on the same model. Ethiopia and Eritrea attempted more conventional models of developmental statebuilding. In Eritrea this collapsed following the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, to be replaced by a tightly-managed dictatorship. The one country in the region that has, thus far successfully, pursued developmental state path is Ethiopia, but this has also been accompanied by growing corruption and ethnic politics, which threaten both the political stability and the developmental trajectory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government. That experiment is now in peril: the choice facing Ethiopia is between an institutionalised form of developmental governance, and a political marketplace.

The political economies of Sudan and Somalia developed as subordinate players in an economic arena dominated the Gulf states and their rulers. The characteristic politics of the Gulf states is lineage patrimonialism, both at home and abroad: family and money are what count above all else. The foreign policies of the Gulf states, when dealing with Africa, have been built around personal ties of loyalty. Gulf leaders deal with sovereign rulers (in exceptional cases, subnational leaders who have acquired some international legitimacy), whom they provide with political budgets in return for acknowledging the primacy of their patrons and following instructions accordingly. This is a hierarchical system based on a sovereign order. It is separate from private and charitable financing, which follow similar patterns but with different goals. The Gulf rulers therefore enter the Horn of Africa political marketplace as political financiers and patrons, sustaining and indeed intensifying the monetised patronage relationships that already exist.

Therefore, even while the Gulf countries appeared to be scaling back their political engagement in the Horn of Africa in the 1990s and 2000s, the conditions were being established for far-greater political penetration later on. This recent wave of Gulf engagement with the Horn of Africa has been driven by a host of political and security factors (Obaid 2014), has been facilitated by the economic vulnerability of the Horn of Africa, and has been operationalised through political funding—direct loyalty payments to political actors. Saudi and Emirati political cooperation policies can determine financial flows to Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia (de Waal 2015). While political relationships between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa are somewhat volatile, economic relationships have proved much more stable (Shinn 2017).

Yemen’s history vis-à-vis the Gulf countries is much more intimate and complex (Gause 1990; Healy and Hill 2010), but has the same fundamental components of a complex, violent national political marketplace, with Saudi Arabia playing an important and delicate role as political financier (Philips 2011, 2016). Since the 2011 uprising in Yemen, the country has slid from optimism about transformation to a democratic system, to economic and political crisis, civil war, and a stalemated internationalised civil war with a major humanitarian crisis (Al-Dawsari 2012; Hamidadin 2015; Hill et al 2013). The country’s financial meltdown lay at the heart of its political crisis, causing the crash of a monetised political market (Salisbury 2014). Yemen today represents an advanced case of a turbulent, unmanageable, regionalised political marketplace, intermixed with moral populist sectarian politics (Salisbury 2015).

**Moral Populism in the Horn of Africa**

There are few parts of the world with greater diversity than the Horn of Africa. The peoples of the Horn of Africa have some of the world’s oldest and most complex civilisations: Sudan has more and older pyramids than Egypt; Ethiopia has ancient Semitic languages and Hebraic faiths, and some of the longest-established Christian communities in the world; the Prophet Mohammed sent his companions to seek asylum on the southern shores of the Red Sea (which they received), and the city of Harar is one of Islam’s holiest sites. Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda all have
great diversity within their borders. The region today is evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, with significant numbers of ‘noble spiritual believers’ (to use the apt terminology of the 1973 Sudanese constitution, more accurate and respectful than the commonly-used and misleading term ‘animists’), notably in South Sudan and south-west Ethiopia. Ethiopia possesses several indigenous scripts, and there is more linguistic diversity within the Nuba Mountains of Sudan than in the entire African continent south of the Equator. While the Somali people, spread over four or five countries in the HoA (and now with a global diaspora) possess a common language and culture, there are also significant diverse minorities in Somalia, especially in the riverian areas of the south of the country. And the Rift Valley is of course the site of the oldest identified human ancestors on the planet.

Most of the peoples of the HoA have multiple identities: they have allegiance to nations, to ‘nationalities’ (the Marxist language of historically-constituted identity remains current in Ethiopia, which has a constitution, adopted in 1995, which awards its constituent nationalities the right of self-determination), to ethnicities, to faiths, to livelihoods and to communities. These identities are multiple not only in that people can call on different identity markers depending on context, but also in that individuals and communities are flexible and creative in the ways in which they self-identify. Political projects that try to enforce unitary ethnic or religious identities on people, do violence to the subtle and flexible nature of allegiances. However, the same richness of identities in the HoA means that there are many different entry points for moral populist mobilisation.

Ethnic Politics

The main historic model of peripheral governance by the empires based on the Nile and in the Ethiopian highlands, and their colonial era variants, was one of indirect rule or administrative tribalism. Local chiefs were appointed or promoted, and their authority regulated and reinforced. Under British colonialism, tribal chiefs became local despots, combining executive and judicial power limited only by what their colonial masters could tolerate (Mamdani 1996). Insofar as chiefs were also able to interpret custom to their advantage, and thereby dictate the content of ‘customary laws’, they were also legislators (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). And insofar as they were agents of pacification, policing and counter-insurgency, they were also military agents. By these mechanisms, ethnic identities were created and solidified during the era of imperial consolidation. But it would be an error to see identity politics solely as manipulation by the powerful: local people were also able to utilise identity labels in order to constrain the power and legitimacy of their chiefs, compelling them to serve as brokers between local communities and the state (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Leonardi 2015). Identity politics also provides for a measure of accountability of leaders. A leader cannot invoke identity politics, whether ethnicity or religion, without making an implicit covenant with the more authentic custodians of those identities, such as chiefs, priests and prophets. Those custodians can, invoking values and followers, then call politicians to account.

This social and historical landscape provides fertile ground for ethnic politics, as does the physical landscape (Reid 2011). Kinship relations provide the basis for security and trust in times of insecurity, and for political-military mobilisation—and a measure of accountability. The multiple purposes served by ethnic identification in times of insecurity, means that armed conflicts typically become shaped by ethnic politics.

Nationalism: A sleeper issue?

The language of nationalism and self-determination was prominent in the HoA in the period of decolonisation up until the 1980s, and it has been one of the most conspicuous features of political discourse in the region (Bereketeab 2015) which has had more secessionist movements than the rest of the continent put together (Englebert 2009). However, nationalism meant very different things in different countries (Lewis 1983). In Somalia, nationalism consisted not only in decolonisation but the (re)unification of the five Somali territories of (Italian) Somalia, (British) Somaliland, (French) Djibouti, the Kenyan north-eastern district, and the Ethiopian Ogaden. Somali nationalism appealed to the concept of a primordial Somali ethnic identity, glossing over the differences among Somalis, especially in the south of the country (Healy 1983). In Eritrea, nationalism consisted of an attempt to forge a common identity among the diverse groups that coexisted within the territory carved out by Italian colonists, in opposition to Ethiopia (Abay 1998; Gebre-Medhin 1989; Mesfin 2017). As a country that had not been colonised, Ethiopian nationalism did not possess the element of decolonisation, but rather took two conflicting forms: the pan-Ethiopian nationalism of (re)establishing a historic empire based in the northern highlands, and the subaltern nationalism of suppressed groups (primarily Oromo and Tigray) claiming the right of self-determination against a feudal land empire (Hassen 1990; Holcombe and Ibssa 1990; Donham and James 1986; Chanie 1999). Tigrayan and (especially) Amhara politcised identities have emerged from interaction with the state, armed movements and most recently state politics of identity (Abbay 1998; Adhana 1999; Teká 1999).
In Sudan and South Sudan, nationalism and self-determination have been indeterminate and shape-shifters, as the very idea of a ‘Sudanese’ identity migrated historically from a centre of gravity among detrivalised southerners and Nuba, to a political, cultural and economic elite historically associated with the middle Nile Valley and Egypt. In a country in which colonisation took on different shades (c.f. Trout-Powell 2003), so too decolonisation has been a complex and shaded affair.

In the last twenty years, nationalism has not been a preferred frame of analysis for politics in the region, despite the fact that two new countries (Eritrea and South Sudan) have been recognised on the basis of their respective claims to national self-determination. Rather, analysis has shifted to sub-national identity units. Notably, the differences within the Somali population and in particular the discrimination against minorities in the south of the country, have become the topic of much attention. Somalia’s African neighbours have not wanted to recognise or foster a pan-Somali nationalism that caused them so much trouble in the past. However, the question of Somali national identity has not disappeared: what it means to be a Somali remains a very salient question, and Somali politicians increasingly refer to a common national identity. Eritrean nationalism became closely associated with the political dominance of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and its leader Isaias Afeworki. But the recent performance of the Afeworki government has not led Eritreans to abandon their nationalist sentiment and the Eritrean state still maintains a tight control over the key instruments of control, leading some to speculate that forms of modernist nation-building are still in prospect (Hepner and O’Kane 2009; Woldemikael 2009). In Ethiopia, the 1995 formula of a ‘nation of nations’ has become unmoored from its original Leninist theorisation and instead been supplanted by an everyday ethnic primordialism in national politics, which the ruling party struggles to manage. Leading members of the EPRDF do not even appear to be familiar with the theoretical underpinnings of their country’s distinctive form of federalism, assuming that the label ‘ethnic federalism’—originally dismissed by the EPRDF as an insulting simplification—is indeed correct. Given the remarkable resilience of the nation-state as the popularly-accepted framework of political life, we can expect to see new forms of nationalism resurgent in each of these countries.

Rival Islamisms

Different visions for social and political Islam have long co-existed within the HoA, at times in a state of mutual tolerance, at other times in conflict (de Waal 2004). This is particularly salient within Sudan, which provides an important case study for the political management of Islamism.

Historically, Sudanese Islam has been dominated by Sufi orders, and by a Mahdist tradition, particularly strong in the western provinces. The major Sufi sects in the country have followed different political strategies: the Khatmiyya sect aligning itself with a politically and commercially powerful class; the Tijaniyya politically quietistic; and the Mahdists (Ansar) seeking to build a revolutionary millennial state. Although not a sect in the traditional sense, the colonial and post-colonial neo-Mahdists have functioned as one, with the descendants of the Mahdi also serving as leaders of the Umma Party. Numerous other variants of Sufiism, some with political profile, have also existed, ranging from the followers of Ali Betay in eastern Sudan, who established conservative, self-sufficient communities, to the Republican Brothers of Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, who developed a unique hybrid of traditionalism and pluralism.

The colonial state in Sudan was never fully secularised, as the British made strategic alliances with Sufi leaders, and two of the three largest political parties at the time of independence were associated with the Khatmiyya and Mahdists respectively (the third was the Communists). This meant that when the Muslim Brothers established a Sudanese branch, they found that they could not follow the strategy that had been so successful in Egypt, of being the sole claimants to the mantle of Islam. The Muslim Brothers had to compete with other Islamisms. They did so by adopting a modernist, democratic and pluralist approach (El-Affendi 1991). Under the charismatic, intellectual and mercurial leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, the Sudanese Muslim Brothers were endlessly creative, flexible and opportunistic—and often divided.

The Sudanese Muslim Brothers were divided on key questions, and ultimately split along three axes. One was whether or not to adopt an exclusively democratic strategy or whether they should make alliances with the military. A second controversy was whether Islamism is necessarily aligned with Arabism, or whether there can be an African Islamism. A third question was whether or not Islamists can function within a secular or a multi-religious state, or must insist on an Islamic state. After 1989, in power courtesy of Islamist military officers, Sudanese Muslim Brothers were exceptional in their efforts to embrace the widest range of political Islamisms, including Iran. The Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC), set up in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf War as a challenge to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), embraced many who were shunned by the conservative guardians of
the OIC. The PAIC welcomed not only Shia organisations but Al-Qaeda, which was initially more a social support organisation for veterans of the Afghan campaign of the 1980s, than a terrorist organisation per se. Perhaps because of the vibrancy of its Islamist intellectual climate, Sudan has proved inhospitable grounds for Salafism. In Ethiopia and Somalia, however, Wahhabis have made enormous headway against Sufism, assisted by the formidable financial and cultural resources available in the Gulf countries. This is seen in the transformation of dress codes for Muslim women, and in the near-complete takeover of mosques and Islamic schools by Wahhabis. Somalia has become deeply islamised in the last 25 years: all aspiring Somali politicians must be publicly devout. Al-Shabaab as the most militant manifestation of this: it is a deviant manifestation of Islamism but nonetheless draws its legitimacy from the thorough-going Islamisation of public life.

Eritrea is an interesting counter-example, where state hostility towards any form of politicised religion has kept fundamentalism at bay, while Pres. Afeworki has continued to deal politically with Arab states including Saudi Arabia and Qatar (although relations with the latter are under strain).

In the last decade, differences among Islamists in the Greater Middle East have become a significant driver of Islamist politics in the HoA. There have been two components to this. One is the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Because there are no significant Shia communities in the HoA, there have been no outbreaks of armed conflict directly attributable to this rivalry, unlike Yemen, where the Saudis felt obliged to intervene militarily in opposition to the Houthi insurgency. However, the Saudis have used their considerable financial and political muscle to compel Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia to close down Iranian diplomatic and cultural missions, and to minimise political, commercial and military links to Iran. The second element is the competition between Turkey and Qatar (on the one hand), which support the Muslim Brothers, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (on the other), which are resolutely opposed to them. This competition is most notable in Somalia, where these two blocs vie for influence, using political funding as their main tool. Somaliland, which earlier this year agreed a combination of about $750m in deals with the UAE for Berbera port and related infrastructure, and a military base, has severed ties with Qatar, while the government in Mogadishu has resisted taking sides.

**Transnational Drivers of Armed Conflict**

Over recent decades, it has been impossible to ignore the transnational drivers of armed conflicts in the HoA/Red Sea area.

The HoA has a long catalogue of inter-state boundary disputes, active and latent, and other international conflicts, including countries sponsoring proxies against one another, fighting bilateral disputes in the territory of a third country (e.g. the Ethiopian attacks on Eritrean military advisors in Somalia in 2006), and non-state groups that range over different territories (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has been active in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which has been active in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Libya and South Sudan, involving itself in internal conflicts in Chad and CAR at minimum). Most of these inter-state military actions remained un-documented and/or do not appear in the standard databases of conflicts, and so escape conventional political analysis.

There is very little scholarship on transnational violent and coercive politics in Africa, so that rigorous attempts to explain the prevalence of these conflicts are scarce (exceptions include McGinnis 1999, Cliffe 2004, de Waal 2004, Reid 2009, and Bereketeab 2013). It is plausible to hypothesise that boundary disputes and proxy wars (supporting insurgents in neighbouring countries) are symptoms of inter-state rivalries for position in a power hierarchy. However, each transnational armed conflict has its own complex history, and it is equally possible that the high prevalence of these conflicts derives from the accumulation of unresolved disputes.

A list of cross-border violent incidents involving governments of the countries of the Horn between 1960 and 2015 runs to a minimum of 92 cases (Twagiramungu 2017). The exercise of cataloguing and analysing these conflicts will be continued and deepened as part of the CRP research. The following are the major recent and current cases of boundary disputes:

- Ethiopia-Eritrea: the most hotly disputed and politically salient unresolved inter-state war, with the Ethiopian refusal to accept the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission over the town of Badme, whose occupation in 1998 was the casus belli, standing in the way of a permanent settlement of the boundary;
- Eritrea-Djibouti: a boundary dispute that has led to war, mediated by Qatar until the latter’s withdrawal in
2017 after Djibouti and Eritrea downgraded relations with Doha markedly under Saudi pressure;
- Sudan-South Sudan: multiple disputes, including recurrent armed conflict over Abyei, disputes over five other disputed areas, and several areas claimed by South Sudan including Heglig, which led to war in 2012;
- Ethiopia-Somalia: although the Ethiopian boundary with Somaliland was settled with the British during the post-war period, Ethiopia and independent Somalia fought two wars over the boundary with former Italian Somalia, which remains unsettled; Somali ambivalence about Ethiopian influence in Somalia is linked to the border issue, and the Ethiopia-Somalia Faultline has been the major axis of insecurity in the region since the 1960s.
- South Sudan-Kenya: a long-standing border dispute over the Illemi Triangle, not currently active;
- South Sudan-Uganda: South Sudan has made claims along the border, which have led to local conflicts;
- Sudan-Egypt: a long-running dispute over the Halaib Triangle, which has intermittently led to armed clashes; this dispute has the celebrated anomaly of the 'unclaimed' territory of Bir Tawil;
- Somalia-Somaliland: the Somaliland Republic claims that its boundaries are those of the former colonial territory, while the Somali region of Puntland claims the areas inhabited by Daarood clans.
- Somalia-Kenya: emergent dispute over the maritime boundary;
- Eritrea-Yemen: dispute over the Hanish Islands led to war in 1995, and although the issue has in principle been settled by the International Court of Justice, it may yet recur.

The AU, using the AU Border Programme, is seeking systematically to delineate and demarcate borders and to minimise the potential for inter-state conflict. One of the more successful examples of this is the process of finalising the status of the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary, a long and contentious border which is characterised by many places in which the nationals of one country reside in the territory of the other. The maritime boundary between Sudan and Saudi Arabia is also held up as a model for the mutually consensual management of shared seabed resources.

The implication of the ubiquity of inter-state conflicts and contests, and the involvement of neighbouring states in each and every internal conflict, means that any peace negotiations to resolve an internal conflict requires (at minimum) a pre-negotiation among the regional powers and stakeholders to resolve, or accommodate, their political differences.

**Regional Power Rivalries**

Reflecting the scarcity of primary scholarship on inter-state conflict in Africa, there are no comparative or theoretical studies of the underlying causes of such conflicts. The transnational violent and coercive politics dataset, developed by the World Peace Foundation, can be analysed in order to examine patterns and test hypotheses.

One plausible hypothesis is that conflicts reflect competition for ranking in regional power hierarchies. This would argue that inter-state conflicts occur when one or both governments seek to settle an unclear power hierarchy in their favour. Thus, Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1977 would be seen as the seizure of a strategic opportunity when Ethiopia was seen to be weak. The Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998 would be seen as a dispute over which state was to play the dominant role vis-à-vis the other and in the wider region. The Sudan-Chad war of 2006-09 would be interpreted as the military renegotiation of the relationship between those two countries, as Chad rose from the status of client state to one of co-equal. The South Sudan-Sudan war of 2012 would be interpreted primarily as a South Sudanese attempt to exert political primacy over Khartoum. (Other examples of proxy conflicts, for example in South Sudan and Somalia, could also be included.)

A second hypothesis would be that inter-state and transnational conflict arises from internal causes, with conflicts spilling over boundaries. The region’s borders cut through territories traditionally occupied by identity groups (e.g. the Somalis, divided into five; the Beja divided between Eritrea and eastern Sudan; the Nuer divided between Gambella state in Ethiopia and adjoining areas of South Sudan, etc.) Conflicts involving these identity groups will tend to have political repercussions on the other side of the border, including refugee flows, and rebels at minimum seeking safe refuge in the neighbouring country and at most seeking state sponsorship of their cause.

A third explanation would be that external factors (e.g. the Cold War, the war on terror, or the Saudi-Iran conflict) serve to exacerbate conflicts within the Horn, with national governments becoming proxies for global or extra-regional powers, or using the latters’ support to make political and military claims.

A final hypothesis is that the long and complex history of unresolved conflicts, many of which involve disputed...
borders, means that conflicts commonly have a transnational element.

Each of these hypotheses could be investigated using a mixture of case studies and quantitative analysis using the TVCPA dataset. It may be that some transnational drivers are more important in some cases, and less so in others. Thus, to give an arbitrary example, shared ethnicity may be a more important factor in conflict spillover between South Sudan and DRC, while sponsorship of proxies in order to establish a regional power hierarchy may be more important for Gulf countries’ involvement in Somalia. The relative significance of these causes has important repercussions for international policy and practice.

Extra-Regional Drivers of Conflict

The Horn is influenced by armed conflicts outside its region, notably in Yemen, Libya, DRC, and CAR, and also intense political competition, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and recently among the GCC countries. These are significant in several ways. First, they have spill-over effects such as refugees. Second, IGAD member states are actively involved in some of them (e.g. Sudan and Eritrea are members of the Saudi-Egypt-UAE coalition in Yemen; Uganda has been engaged in DRC; Sudan and South Sudan have forces directly or indirectly involved in CAR). Third, the military, political and financial investment made by extra-regional parties, can change political dynamics in the HoA. For example, the resources provided by some GCC countries to Eritrea, has worried Ethiopia, and the funds provided by Arab countries to Somali politicians ahead of that country’s recent elections, has been cause for concern by the African countries that are seeking to influence a political settlement in Somalia.

The HoA remains a focus for American, European and Asian strategic interest. In 2003, the U.S. established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, as the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), the U.S. military’s only permanent presence on the African continent. It was initially under CENTCOM and was transferred to AFRICOM in 2008. From Djibouti, the U.S. flies aircraft and drones on missions in Yemen and Somalia. The U.S. has six other drone bases in the Horn (Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya) and has had troops stationed in Uganda in support of Ugandan efforts against the Lord’s Resistance Army (this mission is due to close in September 2017). France also maintains a Foreign Legion base in Djibouti. The European Union is engaged in naval patrols off the Somali coast and related anti-piracy activities. China has recently signed a lease on a base in Djibouti, to serve as a logistical base for maritime and military operations. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also announced a base in Djibouti, while the UAE has existing bases in Eritrea and Somalia, and recently agreed a new base in Berbera. Turkey is also to open a base in Mogadishu.

Historically, international actors have been a cause for instability in the region, notably in the 1970s when superpower rivalry exacerbated the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, and when there was an initiative to make the Red Sea an ‘Arab lake’. A stable peace and security order may be more difficult when external actors are assertively pursuing their interests. As described by Nawaf Obaid (2014), in what is an unofficial document but nonetheless comes closest to an articulation of a Saudi defence doctrine, the withdrawal of the U.S. security umbrella from the greater Middle East necessitates a new Saudi assertiveness, including the establishment of a Red Sea fleet and a wider security perimeter that involves both shores of the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the UAE has also become much more assertive about its wider strategic interests, notably including the security of the Indian Ocean and a commitment to Saudi leadership of the peninsular (Hokayem and Roberts 2016, Taddele 2017).

Maritime Security

The HoA is adjacent to some of the world’s most important sea lanes, notably the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, through which most of Europe’s maritime trade with Asia must pass. The Suez Canal was closed twice in modern history: briefly in 1956 and for a longer period after the 1967 war. The closure had a profound impact on world trade, with a major increase in shipping costs from the Middle East, Asia and East Africa to Europe (Feyrer 2009; The Gamming 2014). The increase in trade costs affected Ethiopia particularly severely and was one reason for an economic downturn that contributed to unrest and the 1974 revolution.

For this reason there is considerable international attention to maritime security. This has included multinational naval task forces to combat Indian Ocean piracy. There is an additional risk of maritime terrorism, from groups that have access to the coastline in Yemen or Somalia. Ship owners fear that armed conflicts on either shore of the Red Sea could lead to a belligerent party threatening vessels with artillery fire or mines, in order to extract concessions from governments or companies. Such fears contribute to the militarisation of the Red Sea with major trading countries seeking to establish naval bases in the area to protect their interests.

The Red Sea is particularly important for Egypt, which is heavily reliant on revenues from ships passing through the
Suez Canal, has invested heavily in the expansion of the Canal to take larger ships, and which has historically regarded the security of the shipping lanes as its own exclusive responsibility. This is a particularly striking example of a general feature of Red Sea politics, which is that all players have a shared interest in maritime security, but the mechanisms for coordination and implementation are lacking.

**Economics and Natural Resources**

**Transboundary Natural Resources**

The River Nile has historically been a source of both conflict and cooperation among the riparian states (Schulz 2007). Recent tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile Waters, consequent on the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), have revived concerns over the regional politics of the Nile Valley (Kameri-Mbote 2007). The World Bank’s Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been remarkably successful in generating consensus among the relevant ministries of riparian states on how best to manage this shared resource (Salman 2010), even though Egypt has kept its distance from the major NBI commitments. In March 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a declaration of principles over the waters of the eastern Nile Basin. However, Egyptian-Ethiopian disputes over the Nile waters have not been concluded.

These tensions and contestations need to be analysed, not just as inter-state water diplomacy, but also as exercises in governance and power within countries. Control over water is not merely an issue of national interest, but of the political and economic interest of certain groups in society and in government. In Egypt and Sudan, there are well-established ‘hydrocracies’—citadels of technical expertise exercising great power over the policy-making process (Molle et al. 2009; Mirumachi 2015). In the Sudanese case, the Gezira irrigated scheme has been at the centre of statebuilding for a century (Barnett and Abdelkarim 1991), though in the 2000-14 period this hydrocracy was circumvented by a politically-well connected Dams Unit that pursued both a more ideologically Islamist agenda (Verhoeven 2015) and also played an important role in recycling funds for political purposes. Ethiopia has no established hydrocracy, but is fast establishing one as a component of its developmental strategy.

The negotiations over shared water resources, and especially the river Nile, can be seen in three ways. The first is as an arena of inter-state bargaining in order to achieve a regional public good (i.e. the best common management of a shared resource) with positive externalities (positive sum economic outcomes and the development of trust and cooperation among states). This is the dominant international approach (Salman 2010).

The second is as a contest between different visions of what the public good should consist in: a technocratic maximisation of water control, or a broader ecosystem-wide management of a fragile and changing system (Lankford 2015; Mirumachi 2015).

Thirdly, the Nile waters negotiations can also be seen as an arena for political bargaining in which technical water concerns are intermixed with, or subordinated to, other political concerns such as national security, populist mobilisation, or political financing. Thus Egypt’s hydropolitics is intermixed with national security calculations, and occasionally takes a populist turn, for example in the last days of the Mohammed Morsi government, when the beleaguered regime sought to mobilise nationalist sentiment on the Nile waters issue. Sudan’s readiness to take the side of Ethiopia rather than Egypt in the dispute is linked to the fact that the principal beneficiary of expanded irrigation from the GERD will be Sudan, and the Sudanese government had already sold the land leases for much-needed cash, and could therefore not afford to abandon its support for the dam.

**Ethiopia’s ‘Economy First’ National Security Strategy**

The countries of the region have radically different resource endowments, in terms of agriculture, water, minerals, and potential for power. This creates potential for complementarities of economic strategy along with likely strains if a policy of market integration were to be pursued (Healy 2011). The regional political economy of the HoA therefore needs to be analysed in a manner distinct from (e.g.) the East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States. The HoA is also distinctive in that Ethiopia—the country at its geographic centre, and potentially its hegemon—has embarked upon an extremely ambitious state-led development strategy, which is closely integrated into its national security strategy.

Ethiopia’s 2002 ‘Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy’ (FDRE 2002) identified poverty reduction as the centre of its national security strategy. This has been described as an ‘economy first’ security strategy and also an ‘inside-out’ strategy, insofar as it builds upon an analysis of internal weaknesses before moving to external policies. Ethiopia’s policy of accelerated economic growth and achieving a ‘democratic
developmental state’ is premised on the view that the country’s weakness is rooted in its poverty.

The Ethiopian strategy is state-led and infrastructural, rather than market-led. The objective is to establish shared infrastructure with its neighbours, notably transport and power grids, with the economic objective of better utilising the comparative advantages of neighbours in certain sectors, given their contrasting resource endowments, and the political objective of establishing common interests based on these shared infrastructural investments. The strategy does not involve dismantling barriers to trade or permitting the free movement of people, as the disparities in economic development would, it is feared, disadvantage the less developed countries, notably Ethiopia itself. Kenya and Sudan have embraced this initiative, opening power interconnectors, and in Kenya’s case, an additional programme of roadbuilding to better connect Ethiopia to Kenyan ports. (A special status agreement signed in 2013 between Kenya and Ethiopia has yet to be ratified in Nairobi.)

Accelerated growth also brings significant tensions, notably over land (with conflicts arising from large-scale land acquisition in all countries) and water (see above). The Ethiopian government has recently recognised the need to revise and update its foreign policy strategy (Gebreluel 2017).

The Political Economy of Ports

Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked country, and is dependent for access to the sea on ports in the territories of countries that have historically been antipathetic to it. (It also has one of Africa’s largest shipping lines, a legacy of earlier days when it did have seaports.) Central to Ethiopia’s economic-security strategy is diversifying its access to the sea, through infrastructural investment and building diverse alliances.

This has far-reaching implications for peace and security in the HoA region, which can best be analysed by understanding the position of Djibouti, and the potential tensions that may arise through the expansion of Dubai Ports World (DPW) to have a controlling stake in a number of the ports in the Horn, in Djibouti and Somalia.

The Government of Djibouti secures its main revenues from commercial and strategic-security rents: from port fees and from leasing its territory for military bases. It is leveraging its geo-strategic location and its reputation for stability to attract the investment of global powers and corporations (Styan 2013). It has French, U.S. and Chinese military bases on its territory (soon to be joined by Saudi Arabia). The recent opening of a Chinese naval base, the first overseas Chinese base, illustrates the importance of the Red Sea maritime route to China. The Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA), under the Presidency, has partnerships with international corporations, including the Dubai-based DPW to develop the new Doraleh multipurpose port. The state of Djibouti is thus run in large part as a commercial enterprise, translating part of its revenue streams into providing employment and services for its small population. The political and commercial interests of the external providers of rent ensure that the country is sufficiently well-managed to provide those public goods. As such, Djibouti is an exemplar of a mutually-beneficial public-private partnership, providing both political goods to its citizens and developmental outcomes.

The expansion of DPW to have a controlling stake in several of the key ports for Ethiopia’s access to the sea—most recently Berbera in Somaliland—has been cause for concern in Addis Ababa. While the UAE is seen not primarily as a commercial actor that is sympathetic to secularism (Taddele 2017), it is also emerging as a political and security actor (Roberts 2016). Ever suspicious of Egypt, Ethiopia’s approach to the UAE expansion into the Horn will depend on its perception of UAE-Egyptian alignments. For example, Ethiopia reportedly dropped objections to the recent agreement for an Emirati base at Berbera when language restricting its use to Emirati soldiers was included in the deal.

Climate Change

The HoA is vulnerable to environmental crisis, exacerbated by climate change. The HoA has an unusually complex ecological-climatic system, so that the impacts of global warming are particularly difficult to predict. It is likely that the northern and western parts of the region will become drier and the southern and eastern parts will become wetter, and the climatic variability will increase. This will cause stress to food production systems. Climate change may yet emerge as the greatest threat to human security in the region (Admassu et al. 2014). Ethiopia has pioneered the global South’s strategies for approaching responses to climate change (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011; Kaur 2013). There is a pressing need for the region to develop a coordinated response to the threats posed by climate change, especially one that engages the people of the region in the discussion.
Peace and Security Architecture

The complexity of the HoA is manifest in the number of distinct but interacting levels of political conflict: local, national, regional and extra-regional.

Contested Multilateralism and the Lack of a Security Community

One of the striking features of the HoA/Red Sea region is the lack of a consensual security community. Thus, it not only means that the mechanisms for resolving conflicts within the region are weak (notably IGAD, see Woodward (2013b)), but there is an enduring threat to national and regional ownership of the region’s agenda. Powers outside the region (e.g. the PS at the UN Security Council or the GCC) can take political decisions with major repercussions for the Red Sea including the HoA, without the interests of the region in mind. There is a pressing need for a wider multilateralism (a collective security mechanism involving not just the states of the region but those in adjoining regions) and a deeper multilateralism (involving security, economic, governance and democracy agendas).

Emperor Haile Selassie was one of the most eloquent and prescient exponents of collective security and international law, famously in his 1936 speech at the League of Nations, and later for his pivotal role in enabling the formation of a single African inter-state entity, the Organisation of African Unity (no mean feat at the height of the Cold War in 1963). Ethiopia is a historic multilateralist, seeking to embed its foreign policies with multilateral institutions, and serving as host to the AU. Sudan was, with Ethiopia, a founder member of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. But by the same token, multilateralism and multilateral institutions are treated with skepticism by others in the Horn. Eritrea was denied its right of self-determination by the UN and OAU; the territorial principle of uti possedites adopted by newly-independent African states in 1964, to respect inherited colonial boundaries, was vigorously disputed by Somalia (leading to two inter-state wars); and southern Sudanese felt they were defrauded of their right of self-determination by their northern brethren through the stratagems used to achieve national independence for Sudan in 1956 (rather than unity with Egypt).

Today, the UN, AU and IGAD are seen by many Eritreans and Somalis as vehicles for power interests. Nonetheless, the inter-connected nature of the conflicts and governance problems in the HoA, and the involvement of the region in both the crises and the solutions to them, determines the need for an overall integrated and holistic regional framework.

In 1996, the Heads of State and Government of the HoA re-founded IGAD, broadening its mandate to include peace and security. This led to several studies, by, amongst others Leeds University and KPMG, and the establishment of a Peace and Security Division and a Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Despite the sharp differences between IGAD member states—notably Ethiopia and Eritrea—certain steps were taken. One was to set up a mechanism for conflict early warning and response (CEWARN), focusing on the less politically contentious issue of cross-border pastoralist populations. Another was to set in motion consultation towards a comprehensive peace and security plan. In turn this led to the Khartoum Conference to launch the IGAD Strategy on Peace and Security Discourse (IGAD 2007).

The IGAD strategy is remarkable for its inclusiveness. It requires IGAD member states to define their national security goals and strategies and submit them to public review. It requires that the IGAD civil society forum and inter-parliamentary union be involved in developing the details. The strategy document specifies:

New mechanisms to promote discussion and consensus-building at all levels within the IGAD region should also be developed.

- Discussion among IGAD Member States and other stakeholders to identify and agree upon core values for national security promotion;
- Bringing the peace and security agenda to the CSO forum, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and national parliaments;
- Promotion and facilitation of national peace and security promotion strategies and monitoring their development;
- Identification of additional or remedial mechanisms to assist those nations that are facing difficulties in developing, implementing or monitoring a security promotion strategy;
- Enabling the free movement of people throughout the region and developing norms for common citizenship;
- Encouragement of citizens’ exchanges on issues of regional integration, conflict resolution and reconciliation, and the development of a culture of peace; and
- Establishment of fora whereby the IGAD security promotion strategy can establish a dialogue with neighbouring or overlapping regions (east and central
Africa, Sahara and Sahel, Arab League, etc. (IGAD 2007, p. 12)

More than a decade on, these recommendations remain as salient as ever. Moreover, they are not an anomaly: these links between inclusive processes, economic development, the governance of diversity and peace and security have been articulated by the AU. Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(c) specifies ‘participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.’ The issues of peace and security in the HoA are appropriate to be on the agenda of the Pan African Parliament and the African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council (AU ECOSOCC). The need for the inclusion of a broader array of stakeholders, including academic institutions and civil society organisations, is also specified in the AU’s Livingstone formula (African Union 2008) and the Tripoli Declaration (African Union 2009).

But it is equally striking that neither the IGAD Secretariat nor its member states have taken even the first steps towards implementing the commitments. On the contrary, even the most basic elements of a workable peace and security mechanism for the HoA have seen regression rather than progress. Because Eritrea is suspended from IGAD, the organisation does not hold regular summits, but instead has extra-ordinary summits at which the heads of state and government meet to decide on pressing issues (most often South Sudan). The IGAD Secretariat does not function as a support to either the summits or to the peace and security commitments that the organisation has taken on, such as the South Sudan peace process. The chair of IGAD has been held by Ethiopia for nine years without rotation.

IGAD is severely constrained in its ability to play the uncontested roles of custodian of norms, forum for conflict management, and arbiter of disputes. The 2013 review of the EU-Horn strategic partnership observed, there is a: ‘lack of a regional security system able to make states feel secure with each other.’ (European Union 2013, p. 20)

The African Union has stepped in to fill some of the gaps left by IGAD. The AU has taken on the role of mandating and coordinating the peace support operation in Somalia, which was initially envisaged as an IGAD operation. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan took on the role of facilitating the implementation of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the negotiations over the independence of South Sudan, a task that would logically have fallen to IGAD as the custodian of the CPA. However, the AUHIP’s role also led to jealousies among leading IGAD figures who saw themselves as being displaced, and who consequently rushed to take the lead in seeking to mediate in South Sudan in late 2013.

Neither IGAD nor the AU has been able to manage the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, nor indeed other conflicts involving Eritrea such as its border dispute with Djibouti, where Qatar stepped in as mediator. Ethiopia has used IGAD, the AU and the UN as mechanisms for excluding Eritrea from having a voice in peace and security discussions. The AU is, in principle, the custodian of the 2000 Algiers Agreement that ended the Ethio-Eritrean war, but has not been prepared to criticise Ethiopia’s failure to implement its commitments to the ruling by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Neither IGAD nor the AU has had a relevant role in engaging with the repercussions of the Yemen war in the HoA. The requirement of a functional peace and security mechanism for the HoA has never been greater, nor more lacking.

The HoA/Red Sea region demands not only a multilateral approach, but also an approach of multiple and overlapping multilateralisms. There are numerous overlapping multilateral organisations engaged in the Red Sea region: African, Arab, trans-regional, some political, some developmental, and some both:

- African Union
- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
- East African Community (EAC)
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
- Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
- InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
- League of Arab States (LAS)
- Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
- Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

The need for a Red Sea forum or conference has long been recognised. The foreword to Roberto Aliboni’s book was written by Egypt’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Boutros Boutros Ghali: ‘It is my earnest hope that one day soon a conference of all the littoral States of the Red Sea will be convened, giving new impetus to co-operation and solidarity among these states’ (Boutros-Ghali 1985, p. xi). He continued, ‘Solidarity is the only valid means available for transforming the Red Sea into a zone of peace, co-operation and friendship, a factor of peaceful co-existence among the peoples of the area rather than a zone of instability, tension and confrontation.’
Peace Missions

There is a growing literature on peace operations, especially in Africa (HIPPO 2015; WPF 2016). More than one third of the world’s peacekeepers are deployed in the Horn of Africa, in five missions. The Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) currently has 22,000 uniformed personnel. The UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has 17,000 but is drawing down. The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) consists of an Ethiopian brigade with a strength of 4,000. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is 12,500. The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) is a coordination mechanism for the armed forces of the countries involved (CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda) which has a target strength of 5,000.

The EU is by far the largest contributor to the African Peace Facility (and thus the major donor to AMISOM), and EU member states fund a substantial proportion of UN peacekeeping missions in the region through their assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. Until 2015, the EU was providing 90 percent of funds for AMISOM, a quotient that it has now cut to 80 percent. The fact that the AU and the troop contributing countries have struggled to increase their proportion from 10 to 20 percent, indicates the challenges that will face the AU if they are to implement the proposal to fund 25 percent of African peace operations’ costs, on which basis the UN Security Council will authorise the remaining 75 percent to be covered by UN Member States assessed contributions.

Overall, international support to UN and AU peace operations is a major international investment in the peace and security of the region. Yet there is insufficient appreciation of how peace operations are deeply entangled in the politics of the region. Discussions on peace operations tend to be dominated by technical and operational considerations with the politics being downgraded, a tendency that recent reports such as the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) have sought to reverse.

In earlier decades, armed conflicts were protracted and complex, with many proxies involved, and peace negotiations were scarce. The first Sudanese civil war was fought for ten years before the first (internal, Sudanese) peace initiative was floated, and sixteen years before the first international peace process began (in late 1971). There were no significant peace talks in the Ethiopian civil wars that followed the 1974 revolution until 1989. In both these cases, neighbouring countries and other powers were actively engaged in supporting either the government or the rebels. Today, almost every civil war has an ongoing peace process. In the case of the South Sudanese armed conflict, it began within a week of the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013. Such expedited engagement is, prima facie, welcome and to be supported. However, it also comes with complications.

In the peace processes in (for example) Darfur, South Sudan, and Somalia, many of the same actors that would have been engaged in military support to one side or another in earlier years, are now involved in either the peace negotiations, peace support operations, or both (WPF 2016). It is reasonable to assume that these neighbouring states continue to have much the same interests as before, and therefore that the peace negotiations and peace operations are conducted with an eye to achieving the same objectives (de Waal 2017; Berhe and de Waal 2017), and that the security arrangements in peace agreements and peace operations reflect these interests. One of the research challenges for the CRP is to ascertain the extent to which peace missions do indeed have a normative conceptualisation of peacemaking, and the extent to which they are cross-border projections of political and military power. This is most evidently the case for AMISOM in Somalia (Wondmagegnehu and Kebede 2017). It raises important questions regarding the doctrine of AU-led peace enforcement operations (Fitz-Gerald 2017).

The peace missions in the HoA have diverse mandates. AMISOM and the RCI-LRA are mandated by the AU PSC, with AMISOM’s mandate endorsed by the UNSC (resolution 1772 of 2007) and the RCI-LRA supported by a UNSC presidential statement (14 November 2011). Neither of these two missions is a peacekeeping mission: they are combat or counter-insurgency missions. Neither has a mandate that involves the protection of civilians (PoC) although their military objectives—defeating Al-Shabaab and extending the authority of the Somali government, and eliminating the LRA—may be said to entail an outcome that protects civilians. Each of the different troop contributing countries to AMISOM follows its own operational procedures, resulting in diverse outcomes in terms of respect for human rights and protection of civilians. Operation Linda Nchi, conducted by the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) in Somalia in 2011, is pursued in support of various different political and security objectives (Anderson and McKnight 2014) and has been accused of violations of international humanitarian law (including attacks on civilian targets), and complicity with Al-Shabaab in smuggling activities (Journalists for Justice 2015). The KDF denies the allegations and argues that it must of necessity deal with the Somali commercial sector, observing that the alternative would be to drive businessmen into dealing exclusively with the insurgents.
The UN missions in the HoA (UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS) all have PoC mandates. In the case of UNAMID, PoC was the primary political rationale for the deployment of the mission in the first place, driven by international outrage over the mass atrocities in Darfur. With Sudanese governmental consent at best grudging, and UNAMID’s operational strategy focused on physical presence rather than problem-solving, the mission has not succeeded. The experience of UNAMID has been one of the examples that has informed the recommendation by the HIPPO to shift from a ‘military first’ to a ‘politics first’ approach (HIPPO 2015). The conflict in South Sudan led to a rapid revision of UNMISS’s mandate to focus on PoC, including the unprecedented situation of about 200,000 civilians seeking sanctuary in the UN’s own military bases. As the AU develops its own approach to PoC, it is under pressure to adopt a doctrine that replicates that of the UN, but it is also argued that the AU should not attempt to be a ‘second best’ UN but should rather play to its own strengths, which lie more in the political than the operational (Conley 2017).

Peace missions in their diverse forms will undoubtedly be a long-term element in the political and security landscape of the HoA for the foreseeable future. They need to be envisaged, not as time-limited and task-specific missions, but rather as ‘missions without end’ that function within the region’s turbulent political marketplace (de Waal 2009).

**Emergent Dynamics**

**The War in Yemen**

The war in Yemen is both consequence and cause of the dynamics described. The war arose from the irresolvable internal tensions within a national political system run as a political marketplace, in which the ruler ran out of the wherewithal to regulate the political arena, and from Yemen’s position in the region and geo-strategically.

The war in Yemen must be understood in the context of the country’s historic relations with Saudi Arabia. The boundary between the countries is arbitrary; the two share a long political and cultural history; many of the most powerful families in Saudi Arabia have Yemeni origins; and Yemeni political developments can have far-reaching ramifications for Saudi Arabia. In the 1960s, the Saudis feared that Yemen would be the route to a secular Arab nationalist takeover of the Kingdom. Since the rise of Al-Qaeda in the 1990s this fear has been resurgent in different political colours. Saudi policy towards Yemen has been a mix of judicious distance, tactical monetary patronage and intermittent strong-arm measures (such as the fierce support for the Royalists in the 1960s civil war, the 1990 expulsion of Yemeni migrant workers, and the current intervention). On their side, Yemen’s rulers have sought to diversify external sources of support, in order to lessen dependence on Saudi Arabia.

In 2014, the Saudis decided to intervene for a mixture of domestic and regional power motives, and the UAE came in to support the Saudis, subsequently taking on a leading role in some operations. The war in Yemen demands a political solution, but the Saudi-Emirati coalition seems determined to press its military options to the limit before they would be prepared to consider political alternatives. The war appears to be in a protracted stalemate, and even a purported military victory by the coalition would not resolve the underlying political problems.

The outbreak of the Yemeni war has been the single most important factor that has generated renewed strategic interest in the Red Sea: this accompanied Saudi plans for a Red Sea fleet, and most recently Egyptian-Saudi pressure which led to Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan all cutting ties with Iran. Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have contributed troops to the Saudi coalition, while Eritrea has allowed its territory—especially the port and airbase at Assab—to be used for air strikes into Yemen.

**The GCC Dispute**

The 2017 dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on one hand, and Qatar, on the other, was a remarkable escalation of long-standing differences among the GCC member states, rooted both in their particular histories and rivalries, and also in the contrasting approaches that they have taken to the questions of political Islam and relations with Iran. Of concern here is how this dispute has played out in the HoA. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the loyalty of the states that they see as their clients, is a matter of paramount importance. They demanded that the AU and its member states, notably in the HoA, take their side in the dispute, and came down hard on those that refused to do so—notably Somalia. The fact that Qatar did not quickly back down in the face of Saudi-Emirati demands, and instead took a defiant stand with the support of Turkey and Iran (and some within the U.S. government), means that the dispute is unlikely to be resolved quickly, and the stakes may increase.

Under any scenario other than a rapid resolution of the Gulf dispute, the countries of the HoA would find themselves in an uncomfortable position, in which they would be vulnerable to punitive action by one side or the other, most likely pressure from the Saudi-Emirati coalition. This could
create instability in Somalia as those seen to have taken a pro-Qatari or pro-Turkish stand, or remained independent, could find their lines of political finance cut while those of their rivals are more generously funded. It could create a reality or a sense of isolation in Ethiopia, as Addis Ababa sees an Egyptian-linked effort to surround the country and cut it off from access to the sea.

Other Issues

The HoA/Red Sea region is prone to surprises. This is inherent in the nature of a complex system in which events at one level can cause repercussions at other levels. None of the countries can be considered stable. Eritrea will undoubtedly face a transition at some point, most likely a traumatic one. This needs to be a priority for research, especially as the international re-engagement with Eritrea, with the UN, EU and Arab countries all intensifying their contacts, allows for a greater flow of information and more opportunities for strategic analysis and planning, than have existed in the recent past. Ethiopia is in serious danger of losing its hegemonic status in the HoA, and other leaders in the region sense this and are ready to act accordingly. The prospects of instability within Ethiopia also cannot be ruled out. Sudan has managed to maintain a core of continuity over many years, managing its instability in a manner that does not have broader regional repercussions, but this also could change.
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