Cities, Conflict and State Fragility

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Executive Summary

Cities have long been connected with processes of bureaucratisation and state building, as they have been to conflict and war. In bringing these two associations together Charles Tilly (1992) provided a useful analytical linchpin by famously highlighting the interaction between cities and war making as a critical factor in state making. He showed how in early modern Europe urban merchants struck bargains with medieval power brokers when agreeing to help fund wars aimed at extending or consolidating sovereignty. The intersection of cities, states and violent conflict remains significant today, although it manifests in different and more complex ways, particularly under conditions of state fragility.

Cities have changed, states have changed and armed conflict itself has changed. Many cities in contemporary fragile states emerged as sites of colonial extraction. Urban elites today do not possess the same autonomy from states that provided the European urban merchant classes the bargaining power they were able to exercise historically. Further, in many developing countries state power holders tend to access capital from abroad rather than domestically, or fund their activities in ways that do not depend on taxation from cities. As taxation is generically a key component of state building, and as an urban tax base is generally considered critical, this uncoupling of taxation and the state-making enterprise constitutes a significant departure from the historical experience of mature economies. Lastly, and most pertinent to our argument is that conflict itself is changing. In this respect cities are increasingly critical locations and therefore crucial sites of political engagement and policy intervention.

To understand these changes, we frame our discussion in relation to three forms of conflict and how they impact upon cities. In brief, **sovereign conflict** refers to situations where international actors are directly and explicitly involved in the war in question. **Civil conflict** refers to violent conflict between two or more organised groups one or more of which claims to represent part of the state itself. The struggle is for control of state institutions and/or territory within sovereign boundaries (though there may be outside intervention). **Civic conflict** refers to a broad array of conflict that tends to take place in cities. Our concern is not with constructive contestation but rather with destructive and violent manifestations of civic conflict including, for example, gang warfare, violent crime, terrorist acts, religious and sectarian riots, spontaneous rebellions and violent protests in response to perceived state failures. Civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries but is associated with the distinctly urban quality of proximity to, and the visibility of, government.

In sovereign conflicts cities – and capital cities in particular – are seen as particularly significant territory, so that ‘securing the city’ can become an overriding priority. This can persist during post-war ‘reconstruction’ processes, which often see international actors pour into cities where their involvement in decision making is often at the expense of local needs and actors, with implications for future civic conflict. Historically civil conflict has often
taken root in rural areas, meaning that even though cities are often the ‘prize’ to be won they can remain spaces of relative security during the war. Under these circumstances cities can become relatively autonomous, turning away from what is left of the state and seeking protection instead from other actors, including rebel groups, with important implications for state consolidation. Civic conflict is ultimately a reactive expression of grievance by urban populations vis-à-vis the state or other urban actors. It is important to note that it is not the fact that cities are inherently alienating that leads to civic conflict, but rather how power is structured in urban spaces.

Our research suggests that civic conflict is on the rise, in relative if not absolute terms. This is linked in part to civil wars being in decline and being associated with urbanisation processes that sometimes result in civic conflict. Where civil conflicts spiral into civic ones, they become increasingly urban in character. External intervention in sovereign conflicts can also give rise to new conflicts – particularly in cities – even where the aim is ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction. Civil and sovereign conflicts can erode the state at city level, for example when cities that are struggling to cope with the impact of surrounding conflict become more dependent on financial transfers from the centre or where non-state actors become providers of urban services and compete with state institutions for legitimacy.

Urban politics are critically important to the way social tensions and antagonisms are managed in cities. We identify four ways in which this occurs: i) manipulation of contestation into violent conflict; ii) deferral and/or suppression of contestation; iii) clientelist cooption of the aggrieved; and iv) fostering of generative engagement. Each of these has a distinct impact on state fragility through processes of state erosion, consolidation and transformation. The third and fourth of these approaches offer the best route for avoiding conflict in the medium and long term; but only the last is likely to allow for state transformation and dynamic development.

Civic conflict can be positive and creative, but when violent and destructive it represents a significant contemporary threat to human security, state consolidation and development. Peace settlements and reconstruction processes brokered nationally need to take careful account of their impact on urban populations and the state at city level. ‘Post’-conflict urban stability cannot be taken for granted, especially in the context of state fragility, while reconstruction efforts can actually undermine the potential of cities to accommodate inclusive political coalitions that promote development and state transformation in the city and beyond.
Introduction

Historically cities have been intrinsically linked to processes of state building and bureaucratisation. For example, Charles Tilly (1992) argued with respect to early modern Europe that power holders who fought wars to consolidate territory had to develop relations with urban elites who had the capital to fund such wars. The nature of these relationships and the bargains they entailed were fundamental to processes of state formation in Europe. Indeed, the interaction between wars, cities and states critically shaped European history, resulting in the consolidation of modern bureaucratic nation states over other forms of polity.

However, the relationship between cities, states and war in low and middle income countries in the contemporary world is far more complex. Tilly’s analytical model of state transformation proved too blunt a tool for understanding this relationship today. Nevertheless, his work has been invaluable to ‘think with’ and his project remains an important element of our rubric, precisely because of his focus on the interactions between cities, processes of state building and violent conflict. This engagement provided us with both the questions and insights to interrogate the impact of cities and urban politics on state fragility, resilience and development, and how this is influenced by intersecting axes of violent conflict. Our conclusions are paradoxical: historically urban areas have been seen as the crucible of state making, while contemporary scholarship has focused in large measure on the political and democratic potential of cities (Amin and Thrift 2002; Beall and Fox 2009). Yet across much of the developing world urban centres have also been primary sites of state erosion: a fact that is often obscured by the concentration of both national wealth and state organisation in cities. Understanding this dual character of cities remains essential for understanding present day state making in fragile situations.

We briefly reflect on the way in which cities, states and conflict have changed since the period of European state formation, highlighting the particular characteristics of cities and states in the contemporary developing world and why the interactions between cities, states and conflict have not necessarily produced consolidated bureaucratic national states. We then outline our tripartite typology of contemporary conflicts – distinguishing between sovereign, civil and civic conflict – and drawing on our extensive research, explore the ways in which cities are incorporated into these different forms of conflict either as targets, spaces of relative security, or incubators of further conflict. Lastly we suggest that in relative terms at least, there is a global trend towards the third form: civic conflict. Fundamentally urban in character this form of conflict, when allowed to become violent and destructive, arguably represents an enormous contemporary threat to human security worldwide.

In contrast to Eric Wolf’s (1969) landmark analysis of ‘peasant wars of the twentieth century’, Jo Beall (2006; 2007) has argued that violent conflict has become increasingly urban. As a result of a diversity of processes including the tendency for invading powers to zone in on capital cities, mounting violence on the part of state authorities against their own urban populations, as well as the destructiveness of increased terrorist attacks throughout cities across the world, she argued that we need to think instead of ‘urban wars of the twenty-first century’. In conversation with this paper, Dennis Rodgers (2007; 2009) wrote about ‘slum wars of the twenty-first century’, emphasising that violent conflict such as gang warfare and urban crime, although usually considered forms of ‘social violence’, can actually be seen as deeply political in nature. They also represent the continuation of ‘peasant wars’ by other means and in a new spatial setting. Beall (2009) subsequently grappled with the paradox of urban conflict, whereby cities are both sites and sources of creative political contestation as well as destructive and violent outcomes. In his study of Kampala, Tom Goodfellow (2010)
advanced our thinking in his explanation of why, in a city blessed by the relative absence of violent conflict, there was institutional gridlock and apparent lack of interest in the city and its institutions, at the expense of effective urban politics and planning. This overview paper is the result of our joint reflection on these paradoxes and provides a framework for analysing the rich body of research undertaken under the rubric of the Cities and Fragile States Programme (CAFS) of the Crisis States Research Centre.

Analysis of the CAFS research confirms that civil and even sovereign conflicts are giving way to civic conflicts across a wide range of fragile contexts. Drawing extensively on this broad corpus of work, we discuss the ways in which the three heuristic forms of conflict we identify in our framework can and do transition, and how the rise of civic conflict appears to reflect a global trend. Under such circumstances we reflect on the circumstances under which urban political processes can channel conflict into non-violent forms of generative civic engagement and those under which conflict in cities is effectively deferred or suppressed. In linking these processes to the question of state fragility, we examine how they intersect with processes of state erosion, state consolidation and state transformation. The latter two are respectively linked to the distinction deployed by the Crisis States Research Centre between state resilience and dynamic development (Putzel 2008).

Cities, states and conflict: Varying forms, evolving dynamics

At their most basic, cities are critical loci of capital accumulation (Tilly 1989). As argued by Lewis Mumford (cited in Tilly 1992: 13):

‘two great forces drive the growth of cities: the concentration of political power, and the expansion of productive means. Below a threshold combining minimum levels of power and production, only villages and bands exist.’

However, in more recent times and under different historical conditions, power located in cities derives from a wider range of sources.

Many developing countries experienced some form of colonisation, mostly by Europe. Pre-colonial cities in these territories were by and large quite small and such capital accumulation functions they had were transformed if not destroyed by the colonial encounter. Under colonialism cities took on new functions, mostly related to facilitating the extraction of resources and the export of primary products, as well as military protection of colonial regimes (Beall and Fox 2009). The effect was the disproportionate growth of colonial capitals and ports, giving rise to primate cities without the expansion of productive means that had spurred urban growth in Europe (Herbst 2000). Critically, urban elites that were central to colonial state-building activities lacked the autonomy that their European counterparts had historically exercised. In other words, the subordination of (wealthy) cities to (coercive) states that took place over a long period of dynamic interaction in Europe was in place from the near outset of the colonial encounter.

The urbanisation that accompanied early post-colonial experiments with import-substitution industrialisation was not accompanied by the anticipated expansion of productive capacities and urban employment, which was stunted further by the subsequent shift to primary commodity exportation – a trend reinforced by increasing international pressure for open economies. Urban populations continued to grow apace with the result that today ‘many low and middle-income countries are suffering the pangs of the urban transition without the potential benefits of extensive industrialisation’ (Beall and Fox 2009: 58). The consequence is
that in many fragile regions and especially in large parts of Africa, rapid urbanisation has proceeded with neither an autonomous urban capitalist class nor an industrial working class that could engage the state.

States in such contexts are also very different. International borders are largely ‘fixed’ and the principle of national sovereignty has been established. National borders are protected internationally so that states no longer not have to consolidate their internal territorial power and legitimacy (Herbst 1996). However, the international economy has become increasingly integrated so that where state consolidation has not yet taken place, global pressures and incentives mean that both economic management and political accountability can become ‘externalised’ (Clapham 1996). Indeed, there is an extensive literature on the intersection of cities and city regions as global economic hubs that operate often independently of states (Friedmann 1986; Friedmann and Wolf 1982; Robinson 2002, 2006; Sassen 1991, 2006; Scott 2001; Taylor 2004).

Consequently different conditions structure the behaviour of power holders and brokers in cities and states in different times and contexts. What remains constant is that political elites seek beneficial arrangements with those controlling access to resources and capital. The issue is how closely associated the latter are to cities. There is an enduring reliance on accessing international capital among former colonies and alliance partners from the Cold War era. More recently this has been reinforced through the mechanisms of international aid and open international capital flows (Moore 2001). For their part, external actors provide capital in the interests of accessing and stimulating emerging markets and countering existing or perceived global security threats. Given this context the Tillyan state-making dynamic between domestic coercion and domestic capital is broken.

Lastly and most critically in recent decades, conflict has changed. The wars that fostered European state making were fought between medieval sovereigns and, once state systems began crystallising, between the governments of consolidated states. Yet we know that inter-state warfare has been in decline for some decades now (Kaldor 2006; Newman 2009). Many commentators saw this decline as being accompanied by a rise in the number of civil wars, with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001: 4) declaring: ‘the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of armed conflicts within states.’ The violence of the first half of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and many other places seemed to validate this claim.

Nevertheless, claims of a radical increase in the incidence of civil war in the late twentieth century are incorrect (Newman 2009). An extended debate about how to define civil war and on qualitative changes in the nature of warfare itself (Keen 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000; Kaldor 2006) overshadowed empirical evidence suggesting that both inter and intra-state war are in decline, lessening by nearly half in the decade immediately following the Cold War (Gurr et al. 2000). At the same time, many forms of low-level instability and conflict are on the increase (Fox and Hoelscher 2010; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). These are difficult to categorise but are increasingly important in the context of rapid urbanisation.

In this paper we explore different and changing forms of violent conflict in fragile settings, as they relate to cities. We adopt an analytical framework of conflict that goes beyond a categorisation based on an internal-external distinction or one between political and other (social and economic) forms of conflict. The parameters we identify provide an analytical
vehicle for exploring the ways in which cities and urban governance are implicated in violent conflict and its mitigation.

**Sovereign conflict** refers to situations where international actors are directly and explicitly involved in warfare. Whether through international territorial disputes or their overt intervention in civil wars, sovereignty is challenged in juridical or political terms. Cities are affected by sovereign conflicts insofar as they invariably involve attempts to capture and control capital cities, which along with primate cities are important containers of sovereignty. Control of capital cities can obviate the need to seize the whole territory because they are generally seats of executive authority, sites of economic wealth and centres of political power. As such they constitute what Putzel (2010) identifies as ‘significant territory’, by virtue of their symbolic and leverage value.

**Civil conflict** or war refers to violent conflict between two or more relatively organised groups within sovereign boundaries. One or more of these groups represents (or claims to represent) part of the state or is fighting for control of all or part of it. In civil conflicts parties to the conflict are politically and militarily organised within sovereign boundaries (though there is often external support) and have publicly stated political objectives (as well as often unstated economic objectives) (Cramer 2002; Keen 1998). The government or the group representing the state is invariably a principal combatant and one or more of the groups involved must be seeking to take control of part of the state, supplant or restrict core functions of the state in a given geographic area. A party in revolt must exercise some de facto authority over a part of the national territory and its population. In other words, in civil war the monopoly of violence formerly held by the state is already partially taken over by rebels, local warlords, organised criminal groups or private militias. Lastly, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance to the stronger party over a sustained period (Sambanis 2004).

Contemporary civil conflicts have been fought without respect to conventional rules of engagement. On the contrary, often they have been intent on generating fear among non-combatants, destabilising social and economic structures and sometimes targeting particular groups as in ‘ethnic cleansing’. Classically, civil conflicts have been closely associated with terrain, such as the proximity of ethnic groups to homeland territories, and the social and military attributes of rural areas where military organisation can more easily take place beyond state reach (Kalyvas 2006). More recently, based on studies of civil conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, research has shown that cities also provide the social infrastructure for sustained armed resistance to state power (Staniland 2010). Our research suggests that the relationship between civil conflict and urban areas is complex. Cities sometimes serve as places of refuge or relative security during conflict, become economic hubs in war economies, or become sites of insurgency and combat, particularly when civil conflict overlaps with civic conflict.

**Civic conflict** we see as the violent expression of grievances (which may be social, political or economic) vis-à-vis the state or other actors. It refers to diverse but recurrent forms of violence between individuals and groups that might include organised violent crime, gang warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest over state failures such as poor or absent service delivery. Civic conflicts can sometimes overlap with civil conflict, insofar as they may involve high levels of organisation, powerful economic interests, or the presence of elements of the state, which can sometimes turn against its own citizens, for example during forced evictions. However, civic conflict differs from
civil conflict in that it is ultimately a reactive process. While civil conflict can be thought of as essentially instrumental, civic conflict can be both expressive or involve attempts to reconfigure power relations, although this may fall short of taking control of formal structures of power.

Civic conflict generally takes place in cities, which provide the physical and social infrastructure for significant mobilisation and insurgency against marginalisation or state neglect. It is closely linked to state failures to cope with the demands and challenges of urbanisation. Although civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries, and there can be commonalities and intersections between civil and civic conflicts, civic conflict is fundamentally urban in nature and is often associated with urban qualities such as density, diversity and compressed inequality (Beall et al. 2010; Rodgers 2010). Although a broad concept that cannot be specified too rigidly, we argue that violent civic conflict: a) is generally linked to state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas; b) consists of violent events that may be isolated or connected by a sustained organised campaign or set of political demands; c) rarely involves an attempt to take permanent control of the state, even in part; and d) is consequently less ‘all or nothing’ or ‘indivisible’ (Hirschmann 1994; Di John 2008; 2010) than sovereign and civil conflict and thus, in theory, more amenable to resolution. It is the link with the state and the association with citizenship (Earle 2010) that leads us to use the term ‘civic conflict’ rather than social, economic or political violence, although what we consider under the rubric of civic conflict has also been described in these terms (Fox and Hoelscher 2010; Moser and McIlwaine 2006).

The tripartite construct of sovereign, civil and civic conflict provides a useful analytical framework – as opposed to a rigid typology or an ‘absolute’ classificatory system – for analysing the ways in which cities and conflict intersect at a time when conflict is changing but where there is little consensus as to the fundamental character of this change. It also accommodates fluidity and porosity between these three heuristic forms of conflict. Our analysis suggests that contestation – understood as an inevitable condition and consequence of development and change – can either be channelled destructively through conflict (understood as violent conflict) or in a more constructive way through generative forms of engagement.

Cities as critical locations in different forms of conflict

In this section we look more closely at the three forms of conflict and their modes of interaction with cities. In sovereign conflicts, capital cities are of unmistakable importance given that in a given state they are the sites where sovereign authority is concentrated. In war, ‘the main criterion international actors look for is control of the capital city – a test that reflects certain facts on the ground but does not require the majority of the state to be under control’ (Landau-Wells 2008). While the ‘city-as-target’ has long been a feature of warfare (see for example Bishop and Clancey 2003), the way in which cities – and especially capital cities – are involved in sovereign conflicts has changed. As resource and population intensive sites, cities have always been targets for attack but they are increasingly sites of resistance as well. For example, in response to the onslaught by US and UK forces on cities such as Basra, Baghdad, Kandahar and Kabul, belligerents in countries under attack have increasingly resorted to forms of ‘asymmetric warfare’ that tend to involve unpredictable acts of terror as opposed to more ‘conventional’ military approaches (Hills 2004).
The urban implications of this are clear. For foreign invaders, ‘taking the capital’ or other major cities has seemed a sure route to a decisive victory, but increasingly populations without equivalence in military technology have taken to urban resistance and unpredictable violent combat. The result is what Arjun Appadurai (1996: 152-3) has called ‘the implosion of global and national politics into the urban world’, ushering in a ‘new phase in the life of cities’, where enmities have been transformed into ‘scenarios of unrelieved urban terror’. This ‘urbanisation of insurgency’ has posed enormous challenges to conventional military practice. Urban insurgents under attack in Iraq and Afghanistan have exploited the physical characteristics of their cities to force US military personnel to come into very close proximity, thereby exposing them to much higher casualty risk (Graham 2007: 8). Western democracies – which incidentally have been the prime wagers of sovereign wars (CSRC 2008) – expect quick decisive victories based on superior technology and are particularly vulnerable to ‘asymmetric’ strategies that are casualty-intensive, unpredictable and protracted (Coker 1992; 2002). In the US and beyond this has resulted in a ‘revolution in military affairs’ and technological innovations so that ‘surgical’ operations can be conducted in cities with the aim of zero casualties on the invading side (Graham 2007: 18; Coker 2002).

Even during lulls in combat or periods of reconstruction, international decision making impacts on cities. Research on Kabul explored the way in which international involvement in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan’s capital city led to the marginalisation of the city’s interests as an urban centre. The city became a symbolic epicentre of state building, an important site of national reconstruction and remains the primary locus of the international presence in the country. Yet ironically the city itself is in dire straits. It has mushroomed in size – in large part as a result of on-going conflict across the country at large – yet international decision makers operate ‘over the heads’ of municipal actors and local interests. This phenomenon Daniel Esser (2009) refers to as the ‘over-determination’ of urban governance, where the axis connecting national and international agencies is the most powerful one, formulating policies and determining institutional structures and relations in the urban realm, at the expense of city level actors and citizens. Indeed, urban planning became an integral part of international engagement in ‘post’-conflict Kabul, placing national and internationally security concerns above the long-term coherence of city planning (Beall and Esser 2005).

The case of Dili in Timor Leste also shows how the presence of large numbers of international actors in a conflict-affected city can exacerbate tensions. Here their presence and activities created the illusion of sustained employment and other opportunities that were in fact fragile and finite. At the same time the urban policies and planning that should have been put in place were neglected (Moxham 2008). These insights necessarily modify perceptions of what appear to be, but in fact are not, urban-biased reconstruction efforts and alert us to the need to pay due attention to structural and socio-economic shifts that can occur in cities as a result of war and over the longer term can lead to yet more conflict in the city itself. We explore this link between sovereign and civic conflict below.

The capture of cities as confirmation of victory is also a goal in many civil conflicts. Contemporary sovereign wars often involve formidable air power that moves directly on cities to ensure a quick and decisive win (Landau-Wells 2008). By contrast, in civil wars the capture of cities tends to be the end point, often after protracted periods of guerrilla warfare or armed combat, often conducted in the countryside. The struggle to capture capital cities can ultimately stand in the way of peace. Our research richly amplifies the difficulties that a single military organisation can face in trying to capture both the cities and countryside,
prolonging civil war as illustrated by our studies of Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009) and Mozambique (Sumich and Honwana 2007). A consequence is that for substantial periods of time capitals and other significant cities can be places of relative calm and security during civil war. A typical example is Kinshasa, which has been a relative island of calm in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country ravaged by conflict (Freund 2009; Kapagama and Waterhouse 2009). This last point has far-reaching implications. First, it generally leads to the influx of rural or displaced populations into cities, leading to massive urban growth, evident for example in Kinshasa but also Luanda during Angola’s protracted civil war (Beall 2007).

For cities to provide a haven in civil conflicts is fairly common. In Kashmir, for example, conflict has been confined largely to the hinterlands, while Srinagar supported a large migrant population that sought security and livelihoods in the city, as well as many ‘floating’ elements of the military and paramilitary forces (Venkatachalam 2007: 23). Smaller, regional urban centres are also affected by civil conflict as illustrated by the case of Gulu in Northern Uganda. Here rural populations were displaced on an enormous scale as a result of the war between the Ugandan state and the Lord’s Resistance Army; and while Gulu remained ‘a haven of relative safety’ throughout the civil war, with the cessation of hostilities it mushroomed in size from a modest provincial town to become Uganda’s second largest city (Branch 2008). In some parts of Colombia too, conflict has seen the relative clearing out of some rural areas as people move into towns, with rural parts of the South Bolivar region losing between 50-70 percent of their population to urban centres (Vargas 2009: 10).

Hence, somewhat counterintuitively, rapid urbanisation and urban stability often go hand in hand when a civil war is raging nearby. During most of the two decades of guerrilla struggle in Nicaragua during the 1960s and 1970s – until the final stages in 1978-1979 – and then again during the ‘Contra’ war that broke out in the 1980s, military action was largely confined to the countryside and the capital city, Managua, remained peaceful even as it grew (Rodgers 2009). Similarly Quetta, situated in a conflict-prone region on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, has grown extremely rapidly and absorbed a potentially explosive combination of rival ethnic and sectarian groups, yet it ‘has historically witnessed relative peace between its major communities’: even when the conflicts in which the region is engulfed have entered the city they have done so only to a limited extent (Gazdar et al. 2010: 6-7). Within Afghanistan throughout the turbulent 1980s, cities had a seeming ‘protective screen’ that insulated them from the violence. Even after this screen was dramatically smashed in the capital city certain major urban centres, such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, managed to stay relatively peaceful under the dominance of significant warlords (Giustozzi 2009: 11).

One reason for this is that elites actively involved in warfare often work hard to keep cities secure, even if they are benefiting from the conflict at large, as is evident in Quetta in Pakistan (Gazdar et al. 2010). Cities play a vital role in war economies and as hubs in associated national and transnational networks, which might be jeopardised by open urban conflict. Moreover, elites themselves are often resident in cities and are averse to exposure to conflict, often wielding consolidated coercive power to prevent conflict impacting too hard on urban centres, as was the case with the warlords dominating Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. Thus in the mid 1990s in the midst of civil war the economies of these cities were actually doing rather well by comparison with the rest of the country, including relative to Kabul and Kandahar where no groupings had managed to consolidate control (Giustozzi 2009: 11-12). In Colombia, the relative security of towns in South Bolivar was similarly found to be linked, in
part at least, to the fact that municipal governments were often co-opted by insurgents, who in one case signalled ‘their intent on replacing the state’ by pledging ‘to protect the town from petty criminals’ (Vargas 2009: 6). It seems, therefore, that there are two principal circumstances under which cities come to be the ‘eye of the storm’ in civil conflict: when insurgent parties have not been able to penetrate the city; or when there are deliberate strategies on the part of warring parties or economic elites with access to the city to prioritise urban security.

Under such circumstances cities can become increasingly autonomous vis-à-vis the central state. A clear example is Goma in Eastern DRC, a town that in the context of the devastating violence and bloodshed of the Congo wars (1996-2003) began in many ways to thrive. With the central state largely incapacitated, the city’s residents benefited directly from being the focal point for cross-border transactions between the densely populated, mineral-rich eastern part of the country and the regional markets of Rwanda and Uganda. Goma was increasingly seen as a place of opportunity with its own distinct ‘transboundary’ identity. At the same time it was the headquarters of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie rebel movement and viewed as a ‘rebel’ city, increasing its sense of autonomy from a state largely based in Kinshasa, almost two-thousand kilometres to the west (Vlassenroot and Buescher 2009: 14). Like Italian city states such as Genoa in early modern Europe, Goma’s autonomy was built primarily on trade and the power of trading elites (Tilly and Blockmans 1994), but the city’s independent stance has also been fuelled by its role in civil conflict and as a regional centre of gravity for international intervention.

The relationship between civic conflict and cities is relatively straightforward because locationally civil conflict generally takes place within cities and it is invariably directly related to the socio-economic and spatial particularities of cities. While civil conflict involves groups seeking to impose their will on populations and territories, civic conflict is more reactive and often reflects the relative powerlessness of some urban populations, vis-à-vis elite groups or state institutions seeking control over them. In these circumstances the state neither fully suppresses nor fully gives people voice, leading to expressions of grievance against the state and dominant groups in various ‘asymmetric’ forms of conflict ranging from crime to mass rioting to terrorism. In short, civic conflict can be thought of as the myriad forms of domestic asymmetric warfare against city-based elites, or sometimes against their clients.

To a degree it is possible to distinguish between civic conflict among different elements of urban society (such as gang warfare, ethnic pogroms, violent crime) and that between state and society (for example violent riots, terrorism, violence towards state personnel and property or state violence towards citizens). However, the distinction is rarely clear-cut and our research demonstrates that civic conflict generally implicates the state, either directly or indirectly. The communal riots that have scarred the history of Ahmedabad in Western India and which erupted with particular force in 2002 represent, on the face of it, conflict between Hindu and Muslim elements in the city. Yet Hindu ethno-religious identity also became associated with an exclusionary state-making project in Gujarat, with the state deploying its power in the service of one religious group over another (Chandhoke 2009: 7). Ultimately the state ‘refrained from either preventing Hindu mobs from implementing their macabre designs, or from protecting Muslim citizens’ (Chandhoke 2009: 4).

Systemic discrimination and neglect embodied in state institutions at the city and supra-urban levels are central to almost all civic conflicts. Rodgers (2009: 960) argues for the specificity
of the urban realm, as a locus of political power and population concentration and as such it is
the ‘disjuncture between the two that generally leads to the emergence of urban violence …
not the fact that cities are putatively inherently alienating spaces’ (see also Rodgers 2010).
Our research suggests that civic conflicts appear to be an increasing feature of the urban
experience, certainly as they are associated with transitions from civil and sovereign conflicts
or their aftermath. In the following section we trace the dynamics by which conflict
transforms itself or can be transformed by external interventions, helping make sense of the
seeming paradox that cities can be islands of stability and security in the midst of conflict, are
not inherently alienating or antagonistic places, and yet are associated with some of the
bloodiest violence of recent times.

**Civic conflict and conflict transitions**

Conflicts are not static and can reshape themselves in response to new threats, shifting
objectives, fresh actors and changing economic circumstances. Sovereign, civil and civic
conflicts become layered upon or replace one another. In Iraq, for example, sovereign conflict
has been focused on cities, which has triggered spiralling civil and civic conflict, leading to a
disastrous combination and reinforcement of all three in the on-going hostilities in this
country. This section examines the dynamics of such transitions and explores their causes and
consequences. We begin with a brief examination of some of the interactive effects between
sovereign, civil and civic conflicts and then explore how the cessation of civil war can
actually generate civic conflict, with important implications for peace and reconstruction
policy interventions.

The case studies most clearly illustrating how the involvement of external sovereign powers
can jeopardise the stability and security provided by cities in civil conflicts are those from
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Karachi, for example, sovereign conflict over the border in
Afghanistan and increasing international involvement in the city itself, fuelled by concerns
over the ‘Jihadi threat’, exacerbated civil fragmentation and civic conflict, rendering the city
itself a growing locus of state fragility in Pakistan (Budhani et al. 2010). Karachi’s reputation
as a site for the operation of criminal and terrorist organisations has become self-fulfilling in a
context where working through subterranean social networks predisposed to violence has
virtually become an ‘acceptable’ way of doing things. The operations connected with the ‘war
on terror’ have only served to exacerbate this tendency, with the effect that the city has
become more, rather than less, violent.

The ‘over-determination’ of cities in the process of reconstruction after civil conflict is
explored by Esser (2009) with respect to Kabul. Such over-determination can also lay
foundations for a new sovereign conflict, as illustrated by the case of Lebanon. Hoeckel
(2007) argues that the concentration of post-conflict reconstruction in the central business
district of Beirut during the 1990s dramatically failed to integrate both the city’s periphery
and its rural hinterlands, with the effect that they became highly vulnerable to extremist
takeover in the form of Hezbollah, leading ultimately to the Israeli invasion of 2006. Similar
dynamics were identified in Nicaragua where the economic over-determination of the capital
city of Managua during recent decades gave rise to increased conflict between different
factions of the urban elite that spilled over into widespread civic violence in the city at times,
especially following the re-election in 2006 of the Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega (Rodgers
2008). The policy lesson here is that the tendency in ‘post’-conflict contexts to exploit the
capacity of cities to act as sites of symbolic reconstruction projects should be resisted or
treated with caution, especially if this is at the expense of addressing the needs of wider local
populations within integrated metropolitan initiatives.
With the cessation of civil conflict in Dili, the focus on reconstructing the capital city followed patterns similar to those observed in Kabul and Beirut. A strongly neoliberal approach to reconstruction, rooted in the capital city, fell prey to two fatal oversights: one was the neglect of poverty alleviation and agricultural production in the countryside and the other, a neglect of poverty alleviation and job creation in the city itself. The focus on supposed ‘national’ development priorities in Timor Leste emanating from the city but without specific attention to either rural or urban development needs proved disastrous. The result was the influx of villagers to the city due to perceptions that development and opportunity lay there. Yet the drastic absence of urban infrastructure, services and jobs lead to the explosion of civic conflict in Dili on a huge scale in 2006, just a few years after the civil war leading to Timor Leste’s independence had officially ended (Moxham 2008). The failure in the transition out of civil conflict to plan for the specific spatial dimensions of development and reconstruction across rural and urban areas had the consequence of civil conflict simply reappearing in urban settings in the form of civic conflict. Rivalries between ‘Easterners’ and ‘Westerners’, which in fact were historically very weak and vague, were given added salience in the urban setting: ‘It took Dili, housing the failures of national-level disintegration and heightened insecurity, for these regional identities to emerge in opposition to each other’ (Moxham 2008: 14).

If civil conflicts drive urbanisation – and we have observed that this tends to be the case – then civic conflict is a common, one might even say normal, response to that rapid urbanisation. For example, in Northern Uganda during the civil war the regional town of Gulu was a haven of relative stability but it has been suggested that ‘if Gulu town is to become destabilised internally or if its population is to become a destabilising influence in the region, this would only occur, perhaps counter-intuitively, after the war ends’ (Branch 2008: 2, emphasis in original). Conditions that emerged in the town during the decades in which it was the eye in the storm of the Ugandan northern civil war included the dramatic rise in the authority of women and youth relative to male elders. The surrounding war has resulted in a transformation of the lives of women that is ‘nothing short of historic’ (Branch 2008: 11), as they adopted new political, social and economic roles, higher levels of education and sustained engagement with the NGO community and the government. In addition, many young ex-Lord’s Resistance Army combatants sought refuge and anonymity in the town, which in general had been ‘at the cutting edge of the changes introduced into Acholi society as a result of war and displacement, and as such has served as a haven for many of those for whom those changes are beneficial’ (Branch 2008: 14-15). However, these changes also had a fundamentally traumatic impact on Acholi society, and the end of the civil war saw the standing of some (primarily older men) decline as a result of the urbanisation brought about by the war, with the possibility that they may attempt to reconstitute their authority. In other words, the occurrence of civic conflict – which Branch identifies as a distinct future possibility – will only happen once the civil conflict is over. Strange though this seems, it is in fact an increasingly common pattern.

Another way in which the management of the transition out of civil conflict can foster civic conflict is when sanctions are used by the international community to bring civil war to an end. Keen (2009) notes the danger that sanctions can worsen matters by leading to feelings of victimisation and increased hardship and this can ultimately lead to civic conflict whether the civil war has ended or not. Sanctions hit cities particularly hard – Keen cites the effects of sanctions on the industrial centre of Yangon, Myanmar – and can create a general environment of neglect, decay and criminalisation in cities that provides fertile ground for the asymmetric expression of grievances to emerge. Even the lifting of sanctions as conflict
comes to an end can sow the seeds of further urban conflict. In Iraq this process ‘created economic hardship in towns associated with sanctions busting, including Fallujah, and this fed into the subsequent insurgency’ (Keen 2009: 17). There are also many non-economic routes to civic conflict in the ‘post-conflict’ transitional period. Where peace processes are not sufficiently inclusive, ‘underlying causes of violence are likely to remain unaddressed; excluding large sections of civil society [which] will tend to prolong, or even exaggerate, their grievances’ (Keen 2009: 25). In addition, the question of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration can take a huge toll on cities, which tend to be the spatial location for the ‘reintegration’ of ex-combatants into society. As Utas (2005, cited in Keen 2009: 27) points out in relation to Liberia, ‘[m]arginalisation appears to be the norm for a large proportion of young urbanites. Thus re-marginalisation and not reintegration is the natural outcome awaiting most ex-combatants.’

Matters are often made worse when new arrangements for policing are mismanaged after civil war in the panic to maintain security, resulting in politicised and fragmented urban police forces. With regard to contemporary Iraq it has been noted that under such circumstances the police have the confidence of neither the military nor the civil society they are empowered to protect, resulting in the involvement of citizen militias that further destabilise the security situation (Davis 2007: 8). Few conquering forces in recent civil wars can have had less understanding of city life than the Taliban, who were both ideologically hostile to urban life and had little or no exposure to it at either the level of leadership or rank and file (Herold 2004; Giustozzi 2009). Interestingly, under their rule in the late 1990s civic conflict broke out in the form of urban revolts in Mazar-i Sharif and Herat – the same two cities that had remained largely insulated from conflict during earlier periods of the civil war. Rather than the urban population as a whole rising up against the Taliban these revolts were sectarian in character; but it is significant that it was these particular cities, which had managed to remain stable during the civil war due to their containment from events in rural areas, that erupted ‘when faced with the domination of hostile groups coming in from the villages’ (Giustozzi 2009: 14-15). What these examples suggest is that when sovereign or civil war formally comes to an end, some of the very factors linked to the relative stability of cities during the war can themselves become sources of new civic conflicts.

Our emphasis on civic conflict serves to draw attention to the fact that interrelated social, economic and political changes have resulted in an urbanisation of conflict. The changes in post Cold War warfare have been conceptualised by Kaldor (2006) and extensively debated (for an overview see Di John 2008; 2010); the impact of contemporary international conflicts on cities has been highlighted (Bishop and Clancey 2003; Graham 2004; 2007; 2010); and the increased relevance of more prosaic forms of urban violence has been convincingly argued (Caldeira, 1996; Moser and McIwaine 2006; Rodgers 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). Notwithstanding their insights, these debates have largely come into being in isolation of one another and have neglected the links between conflict, social and economic dynamics and political change. In the following section we turn to the question of urban political institutions, leading us back to the issue of state fragility itself.

**Urban politics: Violent civic conflict and generative engagement**

A key condition affecting the likelihood of progress towards peace in divided cities – along with control of land, the distribution of economic benefits and threats to group identity – is the extent to which a wide range of urban dwellers have access to policy making and the political process (Bollens 2007: 11). Notwithstanding high-profile contentious events such as disputed elections, our city studies illustrate that the failure to provide and institutionalise
vehicles for non-violent interaction over civic issues – or what we term ‘generative civic engagement’ – often leads to violent civic conflict. Instead social tensions and antagonisms are manipulated or, where the state has the authority and coercive capacity, are suppressed or deferred in the interests of elites.

This is not inevitable. Political processes and coalitions can be developmental, with greater inclusiveness reducing civic conflict, as illustrated by the case Bogotá and Medellin. Colombia has been ravaged by civil conflict for decades, with government and paramilitary forces fighting across different parts of the country for over four decades. Homicide rates in the three major cities, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali, were among the worst in the world for much of the 1980s and 1990s, with the violence in these cities being related in part to the wider civil conflict, with paramilitaries and other political actors implicated in urban criminal networks, especially in Medellín. As such, Colombia’s major cities were never really the ‘eye of the storm’ in the country’s civil conflict, although the smaller towns of South Bolivar may have played this role (see Vargas 2009). In the late 1980s intellectuals asserted that ‘more than the violence in the mountains what is killing us is the violence in the cities’ (Sanchez 1987, cited in Gutierrez et al. 2008).

The Colombian state, in contrast to many states suffering prolonged insurgency, had delivered impressive economic growth and showed surprising effectiveness in some of its capacities (Gutierrez et al. 2008; Ramos 2010). Since the 1990s, Bogotá and Medellin have also seen an extraordinary reduction in civic conflict, described by Gutierrez et al. (2009) as a ‘metropolitan miracle’. Against a backdrop of soaring levels of urban violence, a fresh style of politics accompanied the new 1991 constitution. This allowed for wider political participation and debate, which in turn saw coalitions of essentially middle class and elite interests emerge. They were politically heterogeneous but homogeneous in their collective commitment to the provision of public goods targeted at wider urban society but ultimately for their own benefit as well. Simply put, ‘the bourgeoisie discovered that its own interests sat well with the urban modernisation programmes’ proposed by the capital city’s mayor. Consequently a relatively diverse combination of urban interest groups, who traditionally had pitted their interests against one another and continued to do so in other cities such as Cali, came together in the realisation that ‘the factionalism of traditional politics made collective action difficult and the costs paid in terms of the need of provision of private security were too high’ (Gutierrez et al. 2009: 14).

The ‘miracle’ was achieved by the particular configuration of the political coalitions forged in the two cities at critical junctures alongside the creation of institutions and processes for generative engagement. The subsequent drop in homicide rates was not achieved in the third city, Cali, where a developmental coalition did not emerge and where violent civic conflict persists. In Bogotá and Medellin it was the presence of a substantial and differentiated vocal urban middle class that made the critical difference. Had only a narrow coalition of dominant elites been involved in decision making, the costs of providing private security for themselves would not be prohibitive and thus the motivation for broader urban public good provision would not have been present. Indeed, this is what has arguably occurred in contemporary Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua (Rodgers 2008).

The formation of developmental urban coalitions in Bogotá and Medellin is one of the most compelling examples we have of institutionalised mechanisms for generative civic engagement in a persistently fragile state. However, it is important not to overplay the inclusionary nature of class coalitions in these cities as elsewhere. The majority of poor urban
residents in Bogotá and Medellín were not welcomed into public debate and attention needs to be paid to the ‘illusion of the bourgeoisie that the defence of its interests equals the defence of society as a whole’ (Gutierrez et al. 2009: 15). While there has been a reduction in violent crime and homicides, the institutionalisation of mechanisms to allow for the articulation and negotiation of conflicts between the lower and higher rungs of urban society needs further attention.

The case of Ahmedabad illustrates what can happen when a broader Colombia-style coalition with shared interests in the promotion of generative civic engagement is absent. Here communal differences between Hindus and Muslims were manipulated and heightened (Chandhoke 2010). Antagonisms are long-standing, dating back to the fact that Muslims did not generally participate in the anti-colonial struggle and have been persistently reproduced in the city, exacerbated since 1995 when the Bharatiya Janata Party took power, further politicising Hindu identity and binding it closely to the state (Chandoke 2009). Historical failures on the part of civil society organisations throughout much of the twentieth century also contributed to the failure of channels for generative civic engagement to emerge. For example, trade unions in the city failed to develop a working class culture and identity and neighbourhood politics also failed to transcend caste and religious barriers (Chandhoke 2009: 22-3). It then only takes a certain historical contingency – which in Ahmedabad came in the form of the rise to power of the religious right – to provide ‘the trigger for the translation from non-associationalism to violence’ (Chandhoke 2009: 29).

However, for every Bogotá there is a Bangkok. Here a coalition between the urban middle classes and the monarchist elite led to the Thai military coup in 2006, which was followed by a narrowing of political space (Glassman 2010) and consequent turmoil as the rural and urban poor alike took to the city streets in the name of a greater say in the affairs of the state. The Thai case is also a reminder that urban middle classes can often be conservative, seeking to obstruct changes promoted by political forces that seek greater public spending in the interests of the poor. The elite-middle class coalition in Thailand in many ways caused an explosion of new civic conflict in the context of the narrowing of space for generative civic engagement, resulting in what Glassman (2010: 1318) terms a period of ‘post-democracy’, which can precipitate violence. In Colombia it was sky-high levels of urban violence that provided the stimulus for a developmental elite-middle class coalition to emerge.

The same can be said of the city of Durban and the KwaZulu-Natal region during the transition from apartheid. Alongside other factors, a weariness of violent civic conflict propelled disparate elite and middle class groupings into the inclusive developmental coalition that ultimately secured peace and political stability for the city and province (Beall and Ngonyama 2009). Forging channels for creative political encounter between different social classes in cities is integral to forging generative engagement. Violent civic conflict can precipitate the necessary institutional change, as in the Colombian and South African cases, or it can be the result of a failure to do so, as illustrated by the cities of Ahmedabad and Bangkok. The lack of channels for civic engagement can result in the manipulation of social tensions into extremely violent conflict outcomes.

No coalitions, no matter how inclusive or developmental are set in stone. They are challenged by those who are excluded from them or by those whose influence changes as a result of them. In Maputo, Mozambique, for example, the stability of the FRELIMO regime has in large part depended on its coalition with the urban middle classes. This is increasingly being called into question as that middle class comes to see itself as excluded (Sumich 2007). While
they continue to support FRELIMO in electoral terms, there has been a hollowing out of the regime’s support base and its supremacy seems to stem more from a lack of credible alternatives than anything else. In part because of the urban base of the regime, the ruling elite has sought to increase its influence by extending the state’s reach into the countryside, and consequently has paid little attention to rising poverty, inequality and crime in urban areas. Feelings of disenfranchisement in urban areas are now common to the urban middle classes and low income residents alike, resulting in the 2008 riots: ‘the most dramatic indication that the social contract between rulers and ruled is being broken’ (Sumich 2010: 5).

FRELIMO’s experience in Maputo illustrates how a loss of faith in the state after a period of raised expectations can drive civic conflict. In fragile states emerging from prolonged civil conflicts, military organisations that eventually win victory sometimes transform themselves into political organisations and usher in extended periods of peace and stability. They can benefit from a considerable ‘peace dividend’ whereby they enjoy the support of a majority of the population fatigued from conflict. Promising national renewal, democracy, growth and improvements in the quality of life for all, for a certain period of time they can enjoy high levels of good will among a population grateful for their achievement of ending the war and ushering in a legitimate state. In such situations persistent social tensions and antagonism are ‘deferred’, with people prioritising peace and security over asserting demands against the state or other social groups. However, there is a limit to how long these ‘latent’ conflicts can be deferred if new ruling elites fail to deliver on all their promises, as recent events in Maputo illustrate.

The ‘deferral’ of social conflict can take the form of active suppression. This was the case in post-genocide Rwanda where the state is relatively strong, centralised and has significant reach. The horrific events of 1994 and the civil war leading up to it and certain aspects of Rwanda’s long history as a relatively autonomous kingdom contributed to a generalised submission to state power, enabling a regime with an ambitious agenda for state consolidation and economic growth to restrict political debate that might hinder rapid progress (Goodfellow and Smith 2009; Beswick 2010). Moreover, in nations torn apart by war ordinary citizens can be suspicious of organised politics of any kind. Hence the cessation of violent civil and civic conflict may not accompanied by the opening up of channels for non-violent and generative civic engagement. Despite the Rwandan government’s admirable ambitions, the possibility that civic conflict is effectively being deferred, with potentially dangerous implications for the future cannot be discounted (Goodfellow and Smith: forthcoming).

Under such circumstances the risk is that unexpressed and pent-up grievances could result in further and potentially much more destructive civil conflict. Indeed, what the police termed ‘isolated’ grenade attacks in Kigali in December 2008, January 2009, February 2010, March 2010 and May 2010 looked increasingly less isolated in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election and more like asymmetric civic conflict. Kigali, the capital and only large city in the country, offers the best opportunity for an ethnically inclusive and interlinked civil society, an autonomous private sector facilitating middle class growth, and institutions for political conflict to develop (Goodfellow and Smith: forthcoming). It is in cities that there is the concentration of diverse actors and the proximity of state institutions that can potentially allow for violent civic conflict to be channelled into institutionalised forms of political debate, participation and interaction. When this does not occur, the likelihood of violent expressions of urban conflict emerging is not only high but can spread from the city scale to that of the national state.
Impact of urban conflict on state fragility: Erosion, consolidation and transformation

Thus far we have explored and illustrated how cities are implicated in the three forms of conflict discussed, paying particular attention to civic conflict given its increased prevalence and importance for human security. In this section we consider the implications of the city-conflict nexus for state fragility based on the different ways in which potential civic conflict in cities can be managed. As noted, our research shows that unlike in Tilly’s historical analysis, contemporary cities and states rarely become more integrated as a result of violent conflict. At best, state making is assisted by a weariness and fear of further violence; but while violent conflict is not usually constitutive of state formation today, cities can be and are places where the underlying dynamics of civic conflict translate into processes that are constitutive of state building. This section analyses the ways in which the interaction between conflict and cities can impact on state fragility, for better and for worse.

State fragility can be impacted by three key processes: state erosion, consolidation and transformation. The relationship between state erosion and consolidation is fairly straightforward: they are essentially opposite processes, referring to the extent to which a state’s monopoly of violence and its administrative capacity are undermined or strengthened. Conflict tends towards state erosion, but by exploring the urban scale we can understand how this takes place locally, with important policy implications. Civil and sovereign conflicts tend to erode states at the local level in ways that are often overlooked. For example, we have noted how cities are often the ‘eye of the storm’ in civil wars, but at the same time especially strong demands are made of municipal or metropolitan tiers of government in terms of service delivery with local states being unable to cope with the rapid influx of people. This is often accompanied by increased dependence on financial transfers from the centre at the expense of developing their own taxation mechanisms. This has been evident in Srinagar, Kashmir (Venkatachalam 2007) and is exacerbated in contexts where international actors intervene and ‘over-determine’ urban decision making ‘above the heads’ of local state institutions. As a result they become marginalised with long-term implications for local state capacity (Esser 2009). This can be particularly damaging in the case of metropolitan tiers of government that have potentially important taxation functions and have especially strong demands made of them in terms of service delivery.

Civic conflicts, for their part, impact on state erosion primarily at the local level: our case studies of Ahmedabad (Chandhoke 2009) and Karachi (Budhani et al. 2010) demonstrate how non-state violence can be seen as increasingly legitimate, ultimately undermining local state authority and consolidation. Yet their impacts do not remain solely local. As the case of Pakistan clearly illustrates, the erosion of the state in a city the scale of Karachi can ultimately contribute to national state fragility. Goma’s history illustrates how in cases of civil conflict, quite aside from the impacts of the conflict itself on state fragility, the fact that cities caught in the crossfire are able to cultivate a degree of autonomy and ‘city state’ status that in turn can pose further obstacles to the state’s territorial reach and may adversely affect state consolidation even after civil conflict has ended (Vlassenroot and Buescher 2009).

The third process, state transformation, is somewhat more complex in nature, as is its relationship to the urban realm. State consolidation and transformation can be linked respectively to the notions of state resilience and development (Di John and Putzel 2009). State transformation or a developmental state is one that delivers growth and welfare alongside security, whereas a state delivering security alone is resilient and perhaps consolidated, but not developmental.
Tilly noted how in Europe rulers bargained ‘with capitalists and other classes’ in ways that ‘created numerous new claims on the state: pensions, payments to the poor, public education, city planning, and much more’. This caused states to transform: in the process of bargaining, ‘states changed from magnified war machines into multipurpose organisations’ (Tilly 1994: 9). Many of the states we have studied lack the institutionalised processes to allow for bargaining to take place that includes the urban middle classes and low income groups. This can drive conflict, especially of the civic kind. The failure of institutions that foster or allow for inter-group bargaining or generative civic engagement has the effect of both increasing the probability of conflict and decreasing the probability of the state becoming a developmental ‘multi-purpose organisation’. The dependence by states on the wealth of cities – not always the case in fragile states – should enable those who inhabit cities and drive their economies to make particularly emphatic claims on the state. However, this is often not the case because the ability to make such claims is obstructed or weakly institutionalised so that development suffers independently of the effects of conflict itself on development.

The processes that avert violent conflict and those that usher in state transformation and development can (and ideally should) be one and the same. Examples of conflict being averted through institutionalised mechanisms for civic engagement and elite bargaining that brings into play powerful social actors other than the state include our studies of Bogotá and Medellín and to an extent Durban, where developmental coalitions emerged. More often than not, however, our research shows that conflict aversion and development do not go together. As we have seen, conflict can be deferred or suppressed and this does not necessarily mean inclusive development will follow.

Conflict can be averted by resilient and largely peaceful yet stagnant states, such as Tanzania and Zambia. Here the conflicts characteristic of socio-economic change essentially have been ‘co-opted’ through clientelistic relationships that stem from a particular type of ‘elite bargain’ at the centre. When the ‘elite bargain’ is broadly inclusive in that rents are shared among a wide range of groups, this can prevent the emergence of violent conflict. However as Lindemann (2010: 26) argues with respect to Zambia, this kind of inclusiveness and the ‘corresponding peace and stability do not necessarily lead to higher state effectiveness and developmental outcomes’. This situation has been termed ‘resilient stagnation’ by Putzel (2010). With our emphasis on process and change we argue that these states have consolidated but have not transformed.

At the urban scale as well, social tensions and violent civic conflict, often heightened by urbanisation itself, may be contained (resilient stagnation) rather than being channelled into transformative engagement. The creolisation and Swahili culture that accompanied urbanisation in Tanzania helped Dar es Salaam remain unusually peaceful by African city standards. This was not only because Swahili creolism blunted ethnic differences and was a source of nation building, but because at the level of the local state the Swahili tended to avoid involvement in politics, which ‘precluded them from being perceived as threatening’ by other groups (Bryceson 2008: 20). In a sense, some of the factors that have kept Dar es Salaam peaceful are the same as those that have prevented widespread demands being made on the local state in ways that might stimulate dynamic urban development. Urban social forces in Dar es Salaam were in a sense eclipsed and co-opted by a centralised, Swahili-based nation-building project that succeeded in averting conflict, while at the same time deflecting some of the contested bargaining processes at the local and metropolitan scale that can help foster state transformation.
In other cases, we see cities remaining in a state of ‘resilient stagnation’ only to see this breakdown due to dynamics that ultimately lie beyond the city. For example, between the end of Uganda’s countrywide civil war in 1986 and the outbreak of riots in late 2009, similar processes of clientelistic co-optation of antagonistic urban conflict were characteristic of politics in Kampala. Despite a much higher level of ethnic tension than in Dar es Salaam, for decades this did not manifest in violence, not because social tensions were channelled into effective institutionalised bargaining but because informal systems of rent sharing and elite collusion kept the lid on tensions in the city. This has been at the expense of development and state transformation at the metropolitan level (Goodfellow 2010). Largely due to increasing national level tensions that extend beyond the city, elites in Kampala have begun aggressively to manipulate violent civic conflict, which became a significant feature of capital city life in 2009.

Kinshasa is also a place in which conflict was avoided throughout much of the Mobutu period after 1965, and stability prevailed even after spiralling decay set in from the mid-1970s and up until the violent uprisings of the early 1990s. The rise of a unique ‘Kinois’ sensibility and identity probably played some part in this stability, but it is more likely associated with the location of the national state elite in the city and the various clientelistic networks it espoused, so that there has been little by way of an autonomous bourgeoisie to exert independent power against the state (Freund 2009). To an extent, therefore, we can think of Kinshasa as a place where for a lengthy period the same forces that kept conflict at bay also kept state transformation at bay, despite an initial phase of state consolidation (Hesselbein 2007).

A framework for analysing conflict and state fragility in cities

We have highlighted four different ways in which social tensions and antagonisms are managed in cities: i) manipulation into conflict; ii) deferral or suppression; iii) clientelistic co-optation; and iv) channelling violent civic conflict into generative engagement. Both clientelist cooption and generative engagement offer the best route for avoiding conflict in the medium and long term; but only generative engagement is likely to combine conflict avoidance with dynamic development and state transformation. We do not want to overplay the difference between these four approaches. For example, in some cases the line between ‘clientelistic co-optation’ of conflict and ‘deferral’ of conflict may be very thin, not to mention the fact that as several of our cases illustrate, the management of violent civic conflict in a given city may change over time, either gradually or suddenly, and can be highly contingent on national circumstances and international interventions. Nevertheless, they provide a useful analytical framework for thinking about city-level outcomes in relation to the erosion, consolidation or transformation of the state at the city level.

In summary, our research suggests that manipulation of social tensions and antagonisms leads to violent outcomes and civic conflict, as well as state erosion. The consensual deferral of conflict or its active suppression occurs when the fatigue associated with protracted hostilities during a previous civil war allows governments more leeway than usual. States can take advantage of this peace dividend and undergo some transformation but not adequately consolidate. In other words, as the state takes on new developmental projects and roles it creates fresh antagonisms or exacerbates existing ones. The deferral of conflict does not necessarily consolidate the state because mechanisms for dealing with on-going and new social tensions are not put in place, eventually resulting in civic conflict that the state cannot contain. Clientelist cooption may allow the local state to consolidate by including a wide range of elites in rent-sharing networks that stave off conflict; but the very establishment of
this equilibrium may prevent the state from effectively transforming because inclusive development will rarely be a priority.

In order to minimise violent civic conflict in both the long and short term while also allowing states to both consolidate and transform, the fourth approach is necessary: the establishment of institutionalised forms of political organisation and interaction through which the interests of diverse socio-economic groups vis-à-vis the state can be channelled, allowing political solutions to emerge from political contestation and institutionalised bargaining. The cases of Bogotá, Medellín (Gutierrez et al. 2009) and Durban (Beall and Ngonyama 2009), despite their limitations, illustrate the possibility that cities and metropolitan government offer for developmental coalitions to form out of intensive political engagement. These cases also support the need for policies that go beyond promoting ‘good governance’ and that seek and facilitate ‘good politics’ (White 1995).

The relationships between the management of social tensions and urban civic conflict on the one hand, and on the other processes of state erosion, consolidation and transformation, is presented in schematic form in Table 1. This is suggestive and not exhaustive of all cities in fragile states. It is simply presented to stimulate thinking about the differential effects that violent civic conflict can have on fragile states depending on how it is managed. As such it should dispel any crude notion that cities per se are spaces where state building necessarily happens, or where violent conflict is an inevitable outcome.

Creating channels for generative civic engagement is not simply about multiparty elections, which in some fragile situations can serve to precipitate conflict if advanced too soon. Rather it is to recognise the importance of city politics and the urban public sphere for the negotiation and consolidation of interest groups, from elite coalitions to trades unions, cooperatives and civil society more broadly, so that counter-powers to the state elite become institutionalised. This is critical in fragile states where, as we have seen, national political elites are inveigled with national and international interests and are not informed by the challenge of bargains struck with urban economic elites. Following the idea that the democratic state is ‘a bargaining equilibrium or relation amongst relevant political forces’ (Di John and Putzel 2009), nurturing democratic channels of engagement is a means of strengthening the ways in which forces in society can make themselves relevant and can stake their place in that bargaining outcome. Cities provide concentrated opportunities for diverse people to come together across multiple factional, religious and ethnic divides and to coalesce around interests with unifying and constructive potential, often the pursuit of public goods that are in the arenas of local and metropolitan government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to managing urban civic conflict</th>
<th>Potential effect on state fragility</th>
<th>City examples</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Manipulation into conflict               | Erosion                            | Ahmedabad  
Karachi                         |
| Deferral/suppression                     | Transformation without consolidation| Kigali  
Maputo                            |
| Clientelistic co-optation                | Consolidation without transformation| Dar Es Salaam  
Kampala 1986-2009  
Kinshasa 1965-1991               |
| Generative engagement                    | Consolidation with transformation   | Bogota  
Medellin  
Durban                            |

Civic engagement and political mobilisation are not important simply for their own sake: they are steps towards developmental state building and transformation. When the field of institutionalised bargaining is opened up, this creates a need for strong and active states that can respond to new demands, driving them towards new roles as ‘multi-purpose’ organisations. To achieve this in fragile states the challenge is to change the logic of politics from one which is either about violent conflict or its suppression to one involving a reinvigoration of creative political contestation, and this is where cities and metropolitan government become important. One side of the fragile state coin is the incapacity of states to respond to demands, but the other is that populations do not demand enough of the state, largely because the mechanisms are not in place for them to do so. Stunted civil societies have focused on individual patrons rather than generating a culture of rights, and ultimately states can only achieve developmental transformation if their citizens are given and claim the institutional space to engage the state itself. History and our own research suggests that it is those most proximal to the state – urban dwellers – who both need to make this happen and have the greatest prospects of forming the necessary coalitions to allow it to happen.

**Conclusion and policy implications**

The Cities and Fragile States research programme of the Crisis States Research Centre was a ‘blue skies’ endeavour that set out to explore the relationship between cities, conflict and state fragility. As a broad and exploratory endeavour it did not seek to yield firm conclusions so much as to set in motion a research agenda and offer a framework for analysis. The purpose of this paper has been to draw together some of the themes from a body of research on cities and conflict in fragile states that comprises 32 working papers across 15 case study cities. The types of conflict considered – here categorised as three overarching forms of sovereign, civil and civic – are in reality quite diverse, as are the contextual variations between the city studies, and so we have not tried to address hypotheses, or answer a single question: to do so would be not to exploit the richness of the research output and the potential implications for policy that emerge.

Nevertheless, the identification of conflict transitions across a large number of the city studies is significant, as is the deeper understanding of the dynamics of civic conflict that we offer.
We show not only the adverse impacts of conflict but also how social tensions and urban political processes can in certain circumstances reduce violent conflict when channelled through institutions that allow for generative outcomes. Our research has shown that this is both possible and increasingly necessary given the rise of civic conflict, particularly in the wake of sovereign and civil conflicts.

In policy terms the research suggests that national-level peace settlements and reconstruction efforts need to take careful account of their likely impacts on cities and urban populations. This is so that they do not exacerbate the likelihood of violent civic conflict, which in fragile conditions is already high and can easily spill over from the city to regions and countries as a whole. However, by the same token, city-level political processes allow social groups to bargain, debate and form broad coalitions of interest that if supported can promote developmental activities in the city and ultimately state transformation beyond.

Drawing on this general message, further policy implications flowing from the analysis in this paper are summarised as follows. Sovereign and civil wars are declining, but civic conflicts – encompassing various forms of violence in cities – are on the rise. These different forms of conflict require very different kinds of policy interventions both nationally and internationally. Above all is a need to acknowledge the importance of urbanisation as a factor in civic conflicts and the particular governance needs of cities and challenges associated with urban politics. The heterogeneity, density and compressed inequality that characterise cities, along with the frequency and intensity of interactions between populations and the state in urban settings, require more attention to politics and policymaking processes than in rural areas.

Due attention needs to be paid to the often-overlooked effects of sovereign and civil conflict – and post-conflict reconstruction – on the local, as well as national, state; often the erosion of municipal state capacities has long-term implications for development. However, it is important to emphasise that a focus on the metropolitan scale or even the local state is not the same as suggesting that decentralisation is the answer. Our research shows that violent conflict of all kinds is likely to rupture inter-governmental interaction and communication so that local government in cities becomes increasingly divorced from central government. In other words, regardless of the depth of devolution of state powers, attention needs to be paid to the interaction between tiers of government – how it is preserved, fostered and reconfigured in both conflict and post-conflict situations.

In many cases of civil war, the inability for armed groups to take control of both cities and countryside actually prolongs the civil war. Under these circumstances cities may remain relatively stable, but this does not mean that urban power brokers do not need to be taken into account in efforts to end the conflict. On the contrary, it implies that peace building involves clear efforts to bridge the rural-urban divide and to bring together stakeholders from both urban and rural areas. While cities are often havens of relative security in civil war, it would be a mistake to take urban security for granted when hostilities have ended. Major population movements and socio-economic ruptures often lead to widespread conflict in cities after civil war, and yet while contemporary military experts are acutely aware of this there has been a notable lack of attention to urban centres by development specialists concerned with humanitarianism and post-war reconstruction and development.

Virtually all of our research indicates that in the wake of sovereign and civil conflict, fragile states continue to rapidly urbanise. Unless issues such as urban employment, housing and
basic services are addressed, civic conflict is likely. To simply treat the city as a central node for the rebuilding of national infrastructure, such as roads and telecommunications, is to overlook some of the profound socio-economic changes that conflict is likely to have caused among rapidly growing – and often increasingly poor – urban populations, all of which need attention in their own right.

Social relations in cities are always contested, but the question is how to translate this into generative civic engagement rather than violent civic conflict. Simply suppressing conflict can be counterproductive in the medium and long term. Moreover, cities are ideal arenas in which to push the boundaries of democratic politics and institutionalised bargaining, insofar as antagonistic bargaining is often required for the emergence of consolidated interest groups that can act as counter-powers to the state. The urban middle classes are critical to such processes, but it is also important to find meaningful ways of extend political processes and developmental outcomes so they are more inclusive of low income groups. Elite bargains can be inclusive in that they often include people from all ethnic/racial/religious groups and as such foster state resilience at the urban level, but not necessarily development and state transformation. Our research suggests that when bargaining processes extend beyond elites new demands are made on the state, even if such demands are made through or in alliance with elites. This ensures state transformation and development without actively stoking violent conflict. The process is neither easy nor automatic as development inevitably creates antagonisms and new or different exclusions.
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