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THE TORMENTED TRIANGLE : THE REGIONALISATION OF CONFLICT IN SUDAN, CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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The Tormented Triangle: The Regionalisation of Conflict in Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic

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Introduction

In February 2008, approximately four thousand rebels from eastern Chad travelled a thousand kilometres across the entire country to attack the capital, N’Djamena, with the aim of ousting President Idriss Déby. At first sight this seemed to be a strictly Chadian affair: an attack by a disenfranchised group of men from one of Chad’s marginalised peripheries against their corrupt government. However, a closer look reveals a more complicated regional picture. The weapons and pick-up trucks that the Chadian rebel used in the attack were provided by the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The rebels had prepared their attack in western Darfur and north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR), and many fighters among their ranks were mercenaries from these areas. Déby was nearly ousted, but in the end he managed to repel the rebellion and stay in power. The reason for this is that the leaders of the main groups attacking N’Djamena – the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement and the Rassemblement des forces pour le changement – quarrelled over who would succeed him. Furthermore, as the rebels became bogged down and ran out of ammunition, France, a long-standing ally of Déby, decided to support him and allow weapons provided by Libya to reach the Chadian capital. Also crucial was the military support of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a rebel group from western Sudan, whose leadership hails from the same tribe as Déby – the Zaghawa.

This attack in N’Djamena was a manifestation of a process of armed conflict regionalisation that has connected the crises in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR. Initially in 2005, when violence erupted in Chad and later in CAR, the media, human rights advocates and some analysts described these conflicts as a simple ‘spill-over’ from the war in Darfur, or the ‘Darfurisation’ of the region. In this logic, the causes and symptoms of the Darfur conflict, which many of them had labelled genocide, had merely been transplanted from Darfur into neighbouring cross-border areas. This narrative favoured the Chadian and CAR governments of Idriss Déby and François Bozizé as well as their supporter and former colonial power France, as it diverted attention from their own shortcomings and responsibilities. The ‘Darfurisation’ thesis has since been deconstructed and discredited as a number of recent studies have elucidated the intrinsic roots of the conflicts in Chad and CAR (ICG 2006, 2007b; Marchal 2007; Tubiana 2008a; Berg 2008).

1 The authors wish to thank Blaise Burnier, Julian Thomas Hottinger, Didier Péclard, Matthias Siegfried, Judith Vorrath and Laurie Nathan for their invaluable feedback, as well as CSS staff for the stimulating discussions, in particular Myriam Dunn, Simon Mason and Victor Mauer for their most helpful suggestions. Any omissions or mistakes are the sole responsibility of the authors.
It is now understood that armed conflict in north-central Africa (Chad, Sudan and CAR) has a regional dimension. However, this paper goes further and agrees with Marchal (2006b) that the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR have become so interwoven that they form one ‘system of conflict’ rather than three distinct conflicts. The discourse on regional conflict systems gained momentum in the post-Cold War era as scholars started to analyse conflicts through a regional prism that takes into account the considerable speed with which security threats can travel across space (Lake and Morgan 1997; Buzan and Wallensteen 2003). Such dynamics have been referred to as ‘regional conflict formations’, where conflicts become interconnected and bound by their geographic proximity, making them more complex (Rubin et al. 2001). Similarly, Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998: 623) defined such systems as ‘regional conflict complexes’, which involve ‘situations where neighbouring countries experience internal or interstate conflicts, and with significant links between the conflicts’. In north-central Africa, this process of regionalisation of armed conflict is facilitated by specific structural conditions (state deficiency, uncontrollable hinterlands, regional instability, and trans-border trade, migration and identities) that have come to the fore since the escalation of the Darfur conflict in 2003. In the following discussion we will thus refer to the ‘Tormented Triangle’ as a label for the regionalised armed conflicts in this region. The aim of this paper is to make sense of regionalised conflict in north-central Africa, in particular the structural factors that have caused it and the dynamics sustaining it.

![Diagram of regional conflict system](image)

**Figure 1:** A regional conflict system takes shape as a result of the interplay between structural factors and conflict dynamics, activated by catalysing events

In order to analyse the Tormented Triangle we employ a generic analytical framework that differentiates between conflict dynamics (actions and events) and the more profound calculations of the conflict parties, based on material incentives, normative frameworks and other structural preconditions (see Figure 1). There are two caveats that have to be mentioned with regard to the analytical framework we use. First, while we are concerned with the emergence of regionalised conflict as a result of structural conditions (black arrow), there is also the reverse effect of regionalised wars shaping the structural conditions (grey arrow). Second, this graph in no way implies determinism in the relationship between structure, dynamics and outcome. The structure may be characterised in terms of specific incentives, geographic pre-conditions or a specific political environment (Herbst 2000; Hentz 2007). At the level of manifest conflict behaviour, scholars have pointed at different characteristics of contemporary warfare, such as different strategies and actors involved in conflicts, as well as their various inter-linkages across state boundaries (Kaldor 2001; Hentz 2007; Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Guided by this analytical framework, the paper begins with a descriptive account of how the Tormented Triangle took shape through a series of key events that led to the regionalisation of
conflict in north-central Africa. The following section delves deeper by highlighting the different structural elements pertaining to why the Tormented Triangle emerged. Our analysis is embedded in a larger body of theoretical and empirical research on regional conflict formations. Contemporary armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere frequently have regional manifestations, and there has been substantial research, for example with regard to the Mano River States (Marchal 2002, Richards 1996, Adebajo 2002), the Great Lakes (Rubin et al. 2001, Prunier 2009) and the Horn of Africa (Lunn 2008). In addition, there have been some attempts to conceptualise the emergence of regional conflict formations (or regional complexes) in general, and in the third section we explore these, as well as question whether such concepts are helpful for the understanding of the Tormented Triangle. We conclude by outlining a number of policy implications for conflict management and resolution in the context of regionalised conflicts in north-central Africa.

Dynamics of regionalised conflict: How the Tormented Triangle took shape

When examining the triangle of intersecting national boundaries in north-central Africa, it is helpful to visualise a braid. Chad, CAR and Sudan each represent a ‘thread’ that is defined not only by its borders, but more so by multiple ethnic groups, languages, traditions and beliefs. Such elements are further woven into a vast and diverse topography that ranges from dense forest and savannah in the south to long stretches of arid deserts in the north. An examination of a map of this region (see Figure 2) reveals deceptively clear state boundaries that are challenged by the reality of porous borders, which allow goods and people to travel between states, contributing to the patchwork nature of this region. Such fluidity has much significance as problems and events often reverberate across state boundaries.

![Figure 2: The tri-border region of eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur](source: Center for Security Studies, ETH, Zurich)

Taking such descriptive characteristics into account, this section will discuss key historical events that led to the escalation and interweaving of conflicts in north-central Africa (primarily eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur in western Sudan), beginning with events from decolonisation to the Darfur conflict (1960-2003), and then proceeding to examine the current regionalisation of armed conflict (2003-2008). Through this discussion we aim to illustrate the region’s complexity, which is articulated in the fluidity of alliances,
regional influences and rapid changes in power. We utilise a loose chronological approach to describe how the Tormented Triangle took shape via notable domestic conflicts, actors and strategies that were used within these three countries.

1960-2003

Chadian independence meets conflict and regional influence

Chad and the CAR fell under French colonial rule within the federation of Afrique équatoriale française. Shortly after independence, both countries quickly fell into internal power. In 1966, civil war erupted in the Muslim north of Chad in response to interethnic tensions driven by the poor management and autocratic rule of Chad’s first president, François Tombalbaye, a member of the southern Sara ethnic group. This conflict represented one of the first signs of regional factors playing a role in Chadian politics, as the principal insurgent group from the north, known as FROLINAT (Front de libération nationale du Tchad) was founded in Nyala, Sudan (Prunier 2007: 43). Tombalbaye held power until 1975 when he was killed during a coup led by General Felix Malloum, another southerner. In 1976, a split occurred within FROLINAT leading Hissène Habré to leave the group and found his pro-western Forces armées du nord (FAN). At the same time, Goukouni Oueddei emerged as the leader of FROLINAT and eventually became president of Chad in 1979 with Libyan support. He remained in power until 1982 when FAN, who had retreated to Darfur and eastern Chad, took over N’Djamena and their leader Habré declared himself president (Azevedo 1998).

In the late 1970s, the situation in Chad had become increasingly turbulent and represented an early form of the Tormented Triangle as external powers sought to control the country and counter each other’s influence. Libya stepped up its involvement due to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s aspirations to extend his influence into Central Africa. The Libyan military, aided by Oueddei’s rebel forces, occupied parts of northern Chad, and they used Darfur to launch invasions in the east (Burr and Collins 1999). Habré, on the other hand, controlled southern Chad including N’Djamena. He remained in power until 1982 when FAN, who had retreated to Darfur and eastern Chad, took over N’Djamena and their leader Habré declared himself president (Azevedo 1998).

In 1990, Habré was removed from power as General Idriss Déby assumed leadership during a military coup that was, once again, aided by Libya. Darfur was used as a staging ground where cross-border attacks occurred between Déby’s Libyan-supported forces and Habré’s army (Prunier 2007: 69ff.). President Déby, a member of a clan within the Zagawa tribe, stacked the armed forces with members from the Zagawa, with these continuing to dominate the military through the 1996 and 2001 elections, both of which Déby won (Marchal 2006a). He failed to reform Chad’s political structure and at the same time maintained a favourable relationship with Sudan and France (ICG 2006: 2f.). Despite Chad’s violent post-colonial history, the 1990s brought some level of stability. Subsequently, however, internal dissent rose, culminating in 2005 when key members of the ruling elite joined the rebellion – barely two years after oil production commenced in the south.

A similar tale in the Central African Republic

While Chad experienced massive turmoil, CAR endured its own post-independence challenges and external influences. Following independence, CAR endured multiple coups until 1965, when former colonial soldier Jean-Bédel Bokassa overthrew President David
Dacko. Bokassa initially enjoyed support from France but the increasing brutality of his regime led France to abandon him. Bokassa sought Libyan backing, but in 1979 he was forcibly removed by the French military. Dacko was restored to power until the state military, led by General André Kolingba, took over power in 1981 (Foka 2009). Kolingba, a member of the Yakoma tribe that inhabits parts of southern CAR, ruled as a corrupt military dictator and catered mainly to the Yakoma-populated southern belt of CAR while enjoying French support (Berg, 2008; ICG 2007b). The ethnic favouritism resulted in internal dissent amongst the non-Yakoma groups and an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1983. According to Berg (2008: 20), Kolingba’s rule brought in a period ‘establishing for the first time ethnic identity as the crucial factor in the political culture of the Central African Republic’.

In the early 1990s external pressure to democratise led to CAR’s first elections in 1993 in which Kolingba lost to Ange-Félix Patassé – a politician who came from both the Gbaya and Kare tribes, yet grew up in Paoua in the north, which is home to the Kaba tribe. Rather than addressing economic and political problems, Patassé launched a broad effort to weaken the Yakoma-dominated military and stacked the French-backed Presidential Guard with members from the Kaba thus perpetuating the political exploitation of ethnicity (Ngoupandé 1997). These divisions fuelled violence in 1996 when the military launched three mutinies. As a result, the African peacekeeping force known as Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui was created to monitor and quell hostilities. This development provided France with an exit strategy out of CAR’s deteriorating political and social situation. Deprived of French patronage, Patassé – similar to Bokassa – lobbied for Libyan support. Thus the Gaddafi-created Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) got involved and provided a peacekeeping force for Patassé and his presidential guard. Additional backing came from the Congolese rebel group Mouvement pour la libération du Congo led by Jean-Pierre Bemba (ICG 2007b:14ff.). Similar to Chad, the webbed tale unfolded in CAR as those in control of power in the centre appealed to foreign sponsors and utilised regional and colonial alliances to prop up their weak regimes.

**Sudan’s constant storm**

Meanwhile Sudan, which gained independence from the UK in 1956, was in the midst of a civil war that lasted from 1955, when army units in the south mutinied and formed the Anya-Nya movement, until 1972, when peace was achieved through the Addis Ababa Agreement. Divisions between the dominant Arab and Muslim population in the north and a non-Arab, mostly Christian and animist population in the south kept the country fundamentally divided. The seeds for these divisions were sown by the British policy of governing the north and south under separate administrations and transferring power to northern elites at the time of independence (Johnson 2006). In the absence of major conflict from 1972 to 1983, oil development and exploration commenced. However, the discovery of oil added another conflict dimension to a country that continues to be torn over the distribution of political power and economic resources from the centre to the periphery. Civil war erupted in 1983 and triggered a series of events that would lead to the involvement of regional actors.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a southern rebel group, was formed in the early 1980s in reaction to President Gaafar Nimeiry’s attempts to introduce Muslim political governance, which included imposing *sharia* law and dissolving the southern Sudanese government (Johnson 2006). Nimeiry ruled until 1985, when a coup forced him out of power and through elections brought Sadiq al-Mahdi into power. In 1989, al-Mahdi was overthrown in a coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF), which installed Omar al-Bashir as president.
With the north receiving external support from its Muslim neighbours, such as Libya, the SPLA was aided in particular by Mengitsu’s Ethiopia and by Museveni’s Uganda (De Waal 2007a, 2007b).

Regional alliances as well as cross-border movement of armed groups were a key factor during the second Sudanese civil war from 1983 to 2005. Northern CAR, for example, was used by both parties, with the SPLA using it as a safe haven while the Sudanese government staged attacks against the SPLA in western Bahr el-Ghazal from there (Africa Confidential, April 2002). The civil war lasted until 2005 when the SPLA and Khartoum concluded thirty months of negotiations and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement granted southern Sudan autonomy, a referendum on self-determination in 2011 and an equal distribution of oil revenues from the south. However, the CPA was overshadowed by the conflict in Darfur, which began before the North-South negotiations concluded, as well as by the less-publicised conflict in eastern Sudan, tentatively terminated through the Eastern Peace Agreement of 2006.

2003-2008

Traded Alliances: the story of Sudan and Chad’s deteriorating relations

As shown above, north-central Africa’s post-colonial history has been marked by conflicts that have frequently included the involvement of external actors. Since 2003, cross-border entanglement in this region has been reinforced by escalating conflicts. This is particularly true for the conflict in Darfur, which began to gain media attention in 2003 (De Waal 2004). This led to cross-border alliances coming to the fore while creating massive refugee flows that have added immense pressure to already fragile societies struggling with their own domestic challenges. Initially, the conflict involved the Janjaweed Arab militia supported by the Sudanese military and the central government, versus the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/A) and JEM rebel groups. However, as fighting progressed, fluid loyalties and infighting surfaced within the rebel movements, causing divisions between JEM and SLM/A, as well as other rebel groups in this region (Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Furthermore, as the Darfur conflict escalated, Chad’s domestic situation erupted in political turmoil that set off a series of events leading to shifting alliances between the Chadian and Sudanese governments (Tubiana 2008a).

Refugee flows from Sudan into neighbouring Chad and CAR were a factor in the process of regionalisation in addition to shifting tribal and state alliances within the competing groups. The Zaghawa ethnic group dominates JEM. Chadian President Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, initially maintained his alliance with Khartoum, as demonstrated by his attempts to arrest Khalil Ibrahim, the head of JEM, and send Chadian troops to support Sudan, and his role in brokering the 2004 ceasefire agreement between Khartoum and the Darfur rebel groups (Behrends 2007; Berg 2008). However, Khartoum expected Déby to

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2 It bears noting that Sudan and Uganda were involved in a proxy war where Kampala supported the SPLA and Khartoum backed the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. In 1999, Museveni and al-Bashir signed the Nairobi Agreement, which began to repair the damaged relations between the neighbouring countries.

3 For example, in 2005 during the peace negotiations in Abuja, the SLM/A split into two groups, one headed by Minni Arkoy Minawi, a Zaghawa, the other one led by Abdel Wahid el-Nur, a Fur.

4 A ceasefire was established in N’Djamena in 2004. Déby was later removed from the mediation process at the request of JEM and SLM/A, which distrusted Déby as he had been a long-time supporter of the Sudanese government. The African Union subsequently took over mediating duties and transferred the negotiations to Abuja, Nigeria. The negotiations were concluded in May 2006 when the SLM/A Minawi faction and the
apply more pressure on the Zaghawa Darfur rebels, while Déby, who was losing popularity, increasingly needed the domestic support of the Zaghawa elite to keep his government together. By 2005, Déby had caved into political pressure and dissolved the alliance with al-Bashir, opting to support the Darfur rebels (Berg 2008; Tubiana 2008a). At this critical juncture, fluid alliances shifted and gave birth to a deepening regionalised conflict.

What caused Déby to suddenly shift from his support of Sudan to backing the Zaghawa rebels in Darfur? An examination of this heated period reveals that the Déby regime was weakened due to political malfeasance and to the eroding support of the Zaghawa elites. Déby, whose term was to end in 2006, modified the constitution and removed the two-term limit through a largely unpopular 2005 referendum, which caused broad dissatisfaction and inspired a desertion from the government of many Zaghawa military members. At the same time, the beginning of oil production in southern Chad increased possibilities for spoliation within the state apparatus, which increased competition among the ruling Zaghawa elites (Marchal 2006a: 475).

Due to Déby’s traded alliances, Khartoum stepped up its support for Chadian rebel groups that sought to topple Déby’s regime. A prime example of this shift is found in the January 2006 attack on the Chadian border town of Adré that was carried out by the Darfur-based Front uni pour le changement (FUC), a Chadian rebel group supported by Sudan. This attack led Déby to openly condemn Sudan’s support of this group and such cross-border violence (Small Arms Survey 2007). As Behrends (2007: 124) aptly notes:

‘The government of Sudan has demonstrated an unmasked interest in helping to overthrow Déby by enlisting the help of Chadian Zaghawa opposed to their president, and by doing so, also weaken the Darfur rebels. On the other side of the border Déby explicitly supported rebels against Sudan.’

The situation further escalated in April 2006 when the Mahamat Nour’s FUC used the safety provided within Darfur, arms supplied by Khartoum and the route provided through northeastern CAR to attack N’Djamena, in an attempt to overthrow Déby (Berg 2008: 30f; Tubiana 2008a: 20f). Following this attack, a peace deal between Sudan and Chad was briefly achieved in 2006 through the Tripoli Agreement, but fighting soon resumed and intensified in 2007. A similar Khartoum-supported attack on the Chadian capital took place in February 2008 and nearly succeeded in toppling Déby (Tubiana 2008a).

A deepening braid with Central African Republic

While Sudan and Chad each had intensifying conflicts that became increasingly interconnected, CAR also became a player in this regional conflict system as its northern region offered largely ungoverned territory for transit and refuge (ICG 2007b; Tubiana 2008a: 20f). While much of CAR conflict remains internal, Déby’s influence on CAR central government as well as Chadian and Sudanese rebels’ use of the north-eastern region as a maelstrom of political and criminal activity has generated a regional dynamic.

In 2001, François Bozizé was accused of involvement in a coup attempt against Patassé and sought refuge in Chad, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Déby as well as backing from France, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon (Berg 2008). With assistance from Déby, Sudanese government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, although the agreement was never implemented (Nathan 2006; Lanz 2008b).
Bozizé amassed a group of fighters that consisted of impoverished young men and ex-combatants from Chad and CAR (Debos 2008). Bozizé returned to CAR from Chad for another coup attempt, which met with success in March 2003, ousting Patassé (Berg 2008). The subsequent period is significant as it highlights the web of alliances that characterise the Tormented Triangle.

In 2004, former supporters of Bozizé, many of whom were Chadian and upset by broken promises of compensation for their efforts in assisting the coup, began to attack government targets (Debos 2008). In response, Déby sought to act as a mediator and to counsel the Chadian rebels. These efforts met with some success, but many remained frustrated and eager to take up arms. According to Debos, some of the Chadian disaffected rebels ‘drifted to the northwest of the country (CAR), where they continued to harass and loot the local population’ (Debos 2008: 230). Others, however, returned to Chad to join local rebel movements. Eventually, many of these disaffected individuals joined the rebellion in north-eastern CAR launched after the 2005 elections by the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) – which serves as an umbrella organisation for other armed groups (ICG 2007b). Interestingly, in an indication of how volatile alliances can be, the UFDR attracted former enemies who joined forces in order to oust Bozizé, whom they accused of neglecting the Vakaga Region in terms of development and political representation (Spittaels et al. 2009).

Not only are Chadians involved with local rebel groups and criminal gangs throughout northern CAR, but on the governmental side the inner circle of Bozizé’s personal security, in particular the presidential guard, consists of Chadian soldiers, although many of them left after the February 2008 attack on N’Djamena. In addition, Chadian troops have been involved in key peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad and the more recently created regional peacekeeping mission Force multinationale en Centrafrique. Human Rights Watch (2007b) further noted that:

‘Chadian anti-Déby rebel groups have based themselves in CAR and Chadian army troops have carried out independent raids against CAR rebel groups on CAR territory, and have also engaged in abusive looting raids inside CAR, some involving the rape of civilians.’

Furthermore, CAR President Bozizé accused Khartoum of supporting armed groups in the north-eastern region of his country, although Sudan has denied such claims (Small Arms Survey 2007). Khartoum’s interest in supporting the northern CAR rebel movements is due to the desire of Sudan to use the rebellion to blackmail Bozizé and persuade him to limit Chadian influence in CAR, thus depriving Sudan’s enemy Déby of an ally in the region (Prunier 2007). Thus Khartoum’s role in CAR, while limited, includes the provision of military training to armed groups in CAR, in particular the UFDR (ICG 2007b).

In summary, the conflict dynamics within this tormented triangle reveal a web of state and non-state actors that strategically utilise regional alliances and fluid borders to obtain or maintain power. As we have highlighted, each state has a history of domestic cleavages that have led to conflict. These local conflicts create regional turbulence, with conflict in Sudan influencing turmoil in neighbouring Chad and CAR and vice versa. This conflict system has

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5 However, according to Human Rights Watch, incursions of Chadian troops are more frequent in the CAR’s north-western Ouham and Ouham-Pendé province than in the north-eastern Vakaga province, and are thus more relevant in the context of the north-western rebellion of the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (see also Spittaels et al. 2009).
become tightly woven to reveal a braided tormented triangle where key events, such as the conflict in Darfur, present a trigger to conflict regionalisation.

**Structural background of regionalised conflict: why the Tormented Triangle took shape**

The previous section described a series of events and actors that constitute the dynamics of the regional conflict system in north-central Africa. These events were fostered by a particular structural environment. This section sheds light on a range of interlinked structural conditions that have given rise to the regionalisation of the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad, and to a lesser extent in north-eastern CAR. In other words, it attempts to explain why the Tormented Triangle took shape.

**Statehood and clientelism**

Both CAR and Chad qualify as so-called ‘weak’ or even ‘failed’ states in the sense that their governments are unable to deliver ‘political goods’ to the entire population. These goods include, most importantly, security, but also benefits such as a functioning legal system, health care, education and critical infrastructure (Rotberg 2004). The current regime in Chad is headed by the quintessential example of a president who takes power in a coup and then:

‘concentrates government power in his own hands and members of his own ethnic group, while paying no heed whatsoever to notions like separation of power’.

(Berg 2008: 12)

Since his usurpation of power in 1990, Idriss Déby has built an elaborate system of patronage, where governmental positions are systematically given to members of his clan as well as to co-opted former enemies for their personal enrichment. This practice has allowed Déby to rule since 1990, but has completely eroded institutions and made Chad one of the most corrupt countries in the world (ICG 2008). It has also fostered ‘armed factionalism’ as political power can only be obtained through the force of arms (Marchal 2006a).

The situation in CAR is even worse. As noted in the previous section, President Bozizé came to power in 2003 thanks to Chadian mercenaries, and his rule today hardly extends beyond the capital Bangui, a situation that has led the International Crisis Group to call CAR a ‘phantom state’ (2007b). Bozizé is the latest ruler in:

‘a series of cleptocratic regimes [that] have availed themselves of the resources of the country to enrich themselves while embroiling peacefully coexisting ethnic groups in competition with one another’. (Berg 2008: 18)

Similar to Déby, Bozizé maintains power by appealing to foreign sponsors, especially France, Libya and Chad, and by monopolising power in the hands of family members and members of his ethnic group, the Gbaya. (Berg 2008: 22). Sudan is different from Chad and CAR insofar as the central government is more capable and relatively effective in the area around Khartoum. However, political power and resources remain concentrated in the hands of an elite from the Nile Valley around Khartoum, and consequently peripheral areas such as Darfur have been systematically marginalised (Johnson 2006). Despite the hyper-dominance of the central government, the Sudanese state is characterised by persistent instability, with different elite factions constantly vying for power. In this ‘turbulent state’ the use of military power to manage peripheries remains the default option, to the detriment of building a more consolidated and inclusive system of governance (De Waal 2007b).
What Sudan, Chad and CAR have in common is the inability of ruling elites in the capital to project the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in their hinterlands. As a result, those holding power in the centre are constantly threatened by rebellions that may materialise in peripheral areas. To counter this threat, the ruling elites are compelled to enter clientelistic relationships with insurgent groups, secret services and governments of the region – a key factor for conflict regionalisation (De Waal 2007a: 1). Such relationships entail arming and mobilising rebel groups across the border and unleashing them against the insurgents and the civilian population that apparently supports them. It also includes appealing to regional powers, such as Libya, in order to secure their patronage, for example by allowing them to use peripheries as strategic rear bases.

**Hinterlands in post-colonial states**

It is common knowledge that the borders of many African states were drawn arbitrarily by the colonial powers, dividing areas that had strong historic links and bringing them under the rule of separate, distant capitals. Thus, in many large post-colonial states in Africa, the hinterlands are historically, economically, politically and culturally dissociated from their capitals and oriented towards neighbouring areas across the border. Eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur provide telling examples in this respect. For example, eastern Chad is almost a thousand kilometres from N’Djamena and during the rainy season overland travel is difficult. Eastern Chad is the site of the historic Wadai Sultanate, which was an independent political entity for centuries (Behrends 2007). Likewise Darfur was independent until 1916, when the British incorporated the Darfur Sultanate into Sudan. Furthermore, Darfur is several hundred kilometres from Khartoum and geographically distinct from the Nile Valley and Northern Sudan (Prunier 2007: 1-4). CAR presents the most extreme example of a hinterland: the district of Vakaga in the northeast is almost a thousand kilometres from Bangui, and during half of the year it is completely inaccessible overland. Furthermore, people in the northeast do not speak Sanjo, CAR’s national language, and most of them are Muslims. In terms of culture, politics and trade, north-eastern CAR is oriented towards Abéché in eastern Chad and Nyala in South Darfur as opposed to Bangui or any other part of CAR (ICG 2007b: 25).

Isolated hinterlands coupled with state weakness have fostered the regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa insofar as they offer strategic rear bases for rebels from neighbouring countries. For example, in 1990 Déby invaded Chad from Darfur and overthrew the Habré regime; more recently, Chadian rebels used north-eastern CAR before launching their attacks on N’Djamena in April 2006 and February 2008; and the Darfur rebels have operated extensively in eastern Chad. Furthermore, the power vacuum in their peripheries requires the ruling elites of Sudan, Chad and CAR to build clientelistic networks on one or the other side of the border in order to gain a military advantage and to tap into the lucrative trans-border trade. This has involved arms deliveries to transnational tribal groups, which contribute to escalating and regionalising armed conflict.

**Historic pattern of regionalised conflict and integration**

The border region between Sudan and Chad historically constituted an intermediate zone with the Sultanate of Wadai on one side and the Sultanate of Darfur on the other. According to Behrends (2007: 101), the two sultanates were ‘similar in strength and size and, for the most of the 17th and 18th century, they fought each other over allegiance, land, slaves or control of trade routes.’ The frontier region – where armed conflict is taking place today – represented an area for strategic competition between the two regional powers. The people living between
Wadai and Darfur were forcibly integrated into one or the other sultanate. Local chiefdoms learned to instrumentalise big-power rivalry, and when one of the regional powers weakened, they would shift their allegiance (Behrends 2007: 102). As a result, the frontier region between Chad and Sudan was characterised historically by a pattern of regionalised conflict, integration and shifting allegiances. When Wadai and Darfur were colonised by the French and the British respectively, the border became more of a dividing line than an intermediate zone (Behrends 2007: 106). People and goods nonetheless continued to cross the border freely and local affiliations rooted in tribal origin, language and religion dominated their identities. When Sudan and Chad gained independence in 1956 and 1960 respectively, the former intermediate zone was separated by a clear dividing line, and Darfur and eastern Chad became peripheral areas, whose inhabitants were systematically neglected by their capitals and used to fight proxy wars, most violently in the 1980s and again since 2003.

The status of the border area between Sudan and Chad as a historic intermediate zone represents a structural aspect of the process of regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa. The people in the region share a common story of being squeezed between two regional powers that posed a constant existential threat to them. Hence, they have learned to fight in self-defence – a tradition that continued to be fostered in the context of post-independence turmoil in Sudan and Chad. They are also susceptible to opportunistic alliances with bigger powers on both sides of the border in order to gain an advantage locally, for example in land struggles.

Trans-border ethnic communities

The regionalisation of conflict in north-central Africa has also been fostered by the presence of ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas whose loyalties primarily lie with their kin, rather than with the central elites. There are various such groups in north-central Africa, but the role of the Zaghawa, also called the Beri, is particularly significant. The Zaghawa have traditionally lived in eastern Chad and northern Darfur, although they have spread all over the region in the past few decades. As Tubiana writes (2008a: 22), for the Zaghawa, like other nomadic Arab tribes of the region, ‘the border has never existed: a person can be born in one of these countries and live in the other, and feel that they belong equally to both.’ The Zaghawa consist of three sub-clans – the Kobe, the Wogi and the Bideyat – and they are highly differentiated socially and politically, which has led to many internal rivalries (Tubiana 2008b). The Zaghawa have traditionally been important stakeholders in the region, given their position in the cross-border trade between Chad and Sudan. Their role has been enhanced since Idriss Déby, a Bideyat Zaghawa, took power in Chad in 1990. As a result, many Zaghawa have been placed in influential positions in the Chadian government, security apparatus and economy. The access to power and resources of Zaghawa in Chad has fostered an increasing awareness among the Zaghawa in Darfur of their disenfranchisement within the Sudanese state. It is thus not surprising that Zaghawa leaders have played a key role in the Darfur rebellion that broke out in 2003 (Marchal 2006a: 470f.). As mentioned above, pressure from members of the ruling Zaghawa elite in N’Djamena led Déby to support the Darfur rebellion.

Ethnic solidarity across borders is not automatic. However, the fact that the ruling elite in N’Djamena consisted of a group whose kin in neighbouring Sudan were being persecuted made it difficult for the Chadian government to remain uninvolved – especially given that Déby is highly dependent on the support of a narrow Zaghawa elite. This constellation inevitably drew the Chadian government into the war in Darfur and led to the break-up of the
alliance between Déby and al-Bashir, which was crucial for the relative stability of the region in the 1990s. As a result, a violent proxy war between Sudan and Chad ensued, the repercussions of which gravely affected the region. Trans-border ethnic communities such as the Zaghawa have added to armed conflict in the region through cross-border trade of weapons and other military material (Tubiana 2008a: 36ff.).

Cross-border migration and trade

As described above, the area between Sudan, Chad and CAR did not historically function as a border, and even when the line of demarcation appeared on the map, people and goods still travelled more or less freely across it. Indeed, there are longstanding migration and trans-border trade between eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur, which continue even today and have contributed to spreading armed conflict in the region. After the French imposed colonial rule in 1909 and dismantled the Wadai Sultanate, many people from the area east of Wadai migrated further east into British-ruled territory in Darfur (Behrends 2007). The migration of Chadians into Darfur continued during the colonial phase as well as after independence. Migration accelerated in the 1980s when eastern Chad was afflicted by severe droughts and civil war. The Chadian migrants, many of them from Arab tribes, aggravated the competition for land in Darfur caused by ecological deterioration, population growth and mismanagement of resources. These local conflicts were militarised as Darfur became the stage of a proxy war between Libya and the West over the control of Chad (Prunier 2007). Chadian migration also played a role in the most recent conflict in Darfur, and in its spread to eastern Chad. Disenfranchised young men from Arab tribes in Chad were recruited into the ranks of the notorious Janjaweed, and not surprisingly, similar Arab militia groups eventually formed in eastern Chad, apparently comprising men with a very similar background (ICG 2008b).

Cross-border trade has been important in the region, which is logical given that eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur have been oriented more towards each other than towards their respective capitals. Indeed, there has been little restriction of cross-border movement of goods, as governments in the region lack the capacity to control their borders. This has facilitated the regionalisation of conflict insofar as it has allowed trade of military material across the border. It has also fostered the proliferation of small arms and the emergence of a pool of combatants with fluid loyalties, as described below. CAR is a case in point. The country has a 1,200-kilometre frontier with Sudan, but the government only maintains two border posts (ICG 2007b). Consequently, as Tubiana writes (2008a: 20f.), north-eastern CAR ‘acts as an area of transit and trade for nomadic peoples [...] and rebel groups from all neighbouring countries.’ The border between Darfur and eastern Chad is similarly porous. Thus, the Darfur rebels are procuring most of their weaponry from eastern Chad (Tanner et al. 2007).

Combatants with ‘fluid loyalties’

Since the commencement of the Darfur conflict in 2003, a large number of armed groups have emerged in north-central Africa (Prunier 2008). Some of these groups have a political agenda, but many seem to be motivated primarily by economic opportunities. Debos’ research (2008) differentiates this argument and shows that there is a pool of armed men, whose livelihood and social identity depend on their status as combatants. Returning to their home communities is difficult for these men, as they are often stigmatised as a result of the violence that they have perpetrated. Many of these fighters have, at some point, been integrated into
regular security forces, only to return to being insurgents when that option became more lucrative or when their leader was ejected from the government. In other words, these combatants have ‘fluid loyalties’, which means that they can be mobilised for any project: they will defend the government or fight insurgencies, be it in their own country or in foreign states.

The presence of a pool of combatants with fluid loyalties has been an important factor explaining the regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa. These combatants have made it easy and cheap to instigate rebellions or to fight counter-insurgencies in neighbouring countries. If governments had to send their armies to invade other countries, they would be much less capable of destabilising their neighbours militarily, and less interested in doing so. However, the presence of combatants that are cheap and easy to mobilise makes the option of proxy warfare attractive. Thus, President Bozizé took power in CAR thanks to such actors, and they subsequently instigated the rebellion in north-eastern CAR. Many of these combatants are fighting as part of Khartoum-sponsored rebel groups in eastern Chad; the Janjaweed and the Darfur rebels may also have recruited from them.

Conceptualising Regional Conflict Systems

Our analytical framework distinguishes between structural conditions and catalysing events that set in motion conflict dynamics, leading to the formation of a regional system of conflicts. The previous two sections revealed how and why this system developed in north-central Africa. Our aim here is to place this case within the regional conflict literature by examining how some scholars have understood the emergence of regional conflict formations. A relevant question in this context is whether, as Hentz (2007) suggests, regionalised conflicts constitute a new type of war that is distinct from existing categories such as inter-state wars, civil wars or ‘new wars’. To answer this question, a comprehensive comparative analysis beyond the scope of this paper is needed. However, it is possible to identify the specific characteristics of regional conflicts, and for this purpose we use a set of criteria that scholars of conflict theory have put forward to identify different types of wars: the actors involved in conflict; the strategies they use; the aims they pursue; and the territory and space where armed conflict takes place (Thompson 1973; van Creveld 1991; Lake and Morgan 1997; Goodhand and Humle 1999: 16f.).

Actors

Since World War II interstate wars have by far been outnumbered by civil wars, which are by definition struggles between armed groups within a country and their government. Regionalised conflicts feature a broader variety of actors that may or may not include the government. Non-state actors are particularly important in regionalised conflicts, in particular those linked to cross-border populations. Therefore it is indispensable to take into account linkages between communities across state boundaries. As Buzan (2003: 248) puts it: ‘Regional security in Africa is […] substantially defined by the sub-state level’ and ‘non-state actors are as big a part’ of the spreading of conflicts as states. Thus, cross-border amities and enmities between sub-state and state actors have played a major role in regional conflict systems. In an earlier study, Thompson (1973) identified a set of conditions for regional subsystems, noting the prominent role that multiple actors (two or more) play within a regional system where geographic proximity and intense interdependence are significant factors. As described in this case study, the clientelistic relationship between three key
governments and multiple transnational armed actors was an important driving factor for the regionalisation of the conflict in north-central Africa, creating a web of shifting alliances that has led to perpetual regional instability.

**Territory and space**

Hentz (2007) has coined the term ‘wars across states’ in order to capture the regional logic of many wars in Africa. Such wars are distinct in that they are not confined to the territory of a state, but take place in the border regions of several states. Indeed, the strict territoriality of states gravitating around their capitals is a European concept. As Herbst (2000: 40ff.) notes, before colonisation hardly any part of Africa had developed a coherent nation-state. Many African states today continue to have fluid territoriality with peripheries constantly advancing and retracting (Geiger 2008). It is these hinterlands that provide the space for regionalised conflicts. Thus, in the context of the Tormented Triangle, armed conflict takes place in peripheral areas that have neither been included in, nor directly controlled by, the respective governments of Sudan, Chad and CAR. These areas have remained oriented towards commercial and religious centres in the region outside or inside the country, rather than their state capitals (Bierschenk and Sardan 1997). In order to assert control, governments have relied on clientelistic relationships with local armed groups. Hence it is not surprising that the regionalisation of armed conflicts in north-central Africa was driven by these cross-border populations and the armed groups in the region.

**Strategies**

In terms of the strategies of conflict actors, the conflict in north-central Africa seems similar to what Kaldor (1999: 97f.) has labelled ‘new wars’, which borrow ‘from both revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency’. On the one hand, conflict parties are unable to permanently control territory, and therefore resort to a variety of tactics to secure the population’s support (Weinstein 2007). On the other hand, actors have used counter-insurgency tactics, aimed at destroying the civilian support base of the enemy and making civilians the main target of military operations (Goodhand and Humle 1999: 14). Regionalised wars are therefore characterised by excessive brutality and massive displacement, as violence is perpetuated directly against civilians. This is the case in Darfur, where over one third of the population has been uprooted since 2003.

**Aims and incentives**

The aim of wars is a disputed subject in contemporary civil war literature, the main bone of contention being whether or not wars are ‘political’ and what such political warfare would imply (Hentz 2007: 20ff.; Kaldor 1999: 69-89; Goodhand and Humle 1999: 16). In this context, a range of scholars have moved away from trying to find ‘aims’ or associated ‘causes’ of war. Instead, they have looked at the likelihood of the outbreak of war as well as incentives for actors to fight wars, with a particular focus on economic factors (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The relative importance of economic incentives versus political motives remains disputed (Nathan 2005; Marchal and Messiant 2002), but it is clear that economic factors play a role both in the emergence and in the regionalisation of conflicts. As the analysis revealed, cross-border trade networks were important in the Tormented Triangle, for example by linking communities in peripheral areas and making
weaponry available to armed groups. However, unlike other regional conflicts, lootable resources only play a marginal role in north-central Africa.

Conclusion and policy implications

Our analysis reveals that while the original causes of armed conflict in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR are largely separate, they have merged into a regional system of conflict that transcends state boundaries. The emergence of this conflict system was facilitated by a series of interlinked structural conditions. These conditions include fragmented states, power vacuums in hinterlands, the presence of trans-border ethnic groups, a caste of young armed men in search of the next war as well as perpetual regional instability. The process of conflict regionalisation in north-central Africa is historically rooted. However, the current system of regional conflict was catalysed by the escalation of violence in Darfur in 2003, and subsequently took shape as a result of events such as the inflow of refugees from Darfur into eastern Chad, the increasing trans-border activities of armed groups and the collapse of the Chad-Sudan alliance that had previously stabilised the region. The diagnosis of the crises in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR as one system of interlocked conflicts results in a series of policy implications. Most fundamentally, we argue that in the context of north-central Africa, the state-based approach that dominates the analysis of, and response to, armed conflict must be replaced with a regional lens.

This approach is relevant insofar as the worldwide attention generated by the Darfur conflict has resulted in a multitude of interventions to ‘manage’ armed conflict in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR. The region is host to the world’s largest humanitarian operation with hundreds of relief agencies and thousands of humanitarian workers delivering aid to those affected by armed violence, in particular displaced people. There have also been different initiatives to make peace through mediation and negotiations between rebel groups and their respective governments The African Union (AU) mediated between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government in Abuja, Nigeria from 2004 to 2006; along with the UN, the AU continues to organise peace negotiations with the aim of ending the Darfur conflict. At the same time, Libya has tried to broker deals between various Chadian rebel groups and President Déby, while CAR is preparing for an ‘inclusive political dialogue’ (Sguaitamatti 2008). None of these processes has borne fruit and some have arguably made matters worse by contributing to the fragmentation of the rebel groups (Lanz 2008b). North-central Africa is also host to different peacekeeping missions, most notably the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which at full deployment is supposed to comprise more than 25,000 personnel, and the European Union Force (EUFOR) that brought 3,500 well-equipped European soldiers to Chad and CAR (Seibert 2007). Both missions have robust mandates that allow for the proactive use of force to protect civilians, but neither has made a significant difference in the region so far.

The primary challenge in terms of conflict management is to recognise that north-central Africa constitutes a complex interconnected conflict system and consequently there is a need to devise, as Rubin (2001:7) argued in the context of regional conflict in the Great Lakes, ‘sets of policies that address multiple arenas and sources of conflict within a given region in an integrated way’. An important reason for the ineffectiveness of the current policies, as mentioned above, is that the regional dimension of the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR has not been sufficiently addressed and thus a series of recommendations for conflict managers derive from this deficiency. Thus it is important for humanitarian actors to recognise that the distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons is largely
artificial in the context of regionalised conflicts transcending state boundaries. Displaced people within their countries or across the border are similarly vulnerable and they should therefore be awarded the same level of protection and assistance.

International mediators are essential to address the historic marginalisation of hinterlands by brokering agreements between rebel groups and the government that determines the sharing of power and wealth between the centre and the peripheries. The AU is currently doing this in Darfur and similar processes could be useful in Chad and CAR as well, although these processes should go beyond merely dividing state power and resources among the strongest armed groups. While this classic approach to peacemaking is relevant, it is not sufficient. Parallel processes that engage the leadership of tribes in the region, not just one country, are crucial, as are negotiations between governments of the region, in particular between Chad and Sudan. Regional organisations are probably the most suitable mediators given the legitimacy they confer on a process and the broad support they can mobilise. However, the relevant sub-regional organisations either do not include all three states (i.e. the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States) or they are discredited as tools of Libya’s dominance in the region (i.e. CEN-SAD). The AU is therefore the most obvious mediator, although the failure of the Abuja negotiations has negatively affected its image. To enhance the legitimacy of mediation processes in the region, the leverage of supporting structures, such as ‘groups of friends’, is key, even as the negotiations continue to take place under auspices of the AU and the UN.

In terms of peacekeeping, the required response to regionalised conflicts is a mission that spans across different countries. This is partly the case of EUFOR, which operates in Chad and CAR. However, the main axis of the Tormented Triangle is between Darfur and eastern Chad and at present the cooperation between EUFOR and UNAMID is limited. It is imperative that the two missions improve their communication and collaboration. If not, security provided in one area makes another area across the border relatively less secure, which risks undoing the humanitarian gains of peacekeeping altogether.

The logic of conflict ‘management’ is short to medium-term. It is important to complement these efforts with a long-term conflict ‘resolution’ approach that aims to tackle the structural causes that led to the formation of the Tormented Triangle. Three initiatives appear to be particularly important in this context. First, a sustained effort should be made by international actors to improve governance in CAR, Chad and Sudan. Conflicts are less likely to erupt if a broad range of political parties, ethnic groups and regions are included in government. Inclusivity will also enhance the government’s legitimacy and improve its capacities to govern. At the same time, it is important to go beyond the central government and appreciate the governance capacities of other actors. In this context, efforts to strengthen local governance structures in areas affected by conflict will be particularly useful in terms of preventing armed violence in the future. International actors have significant leverage in CAR and Chad and to a lesser extent in Sudan. If they devise the right incentive packages it would be possible to improve governance in the long run.

Second, conflict resolution in north-central Africa requires comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes in order to neutralise transnational groups of combatants with fluid loyalties. Contrary to such programmes in the past, the emphasis must be on their sustainability. This means that they must address the social stigmatisation of combatants as well as their livelihood needs so that their reintegration into civilian life lasts longer than the beginning of the next war. Third, it is essential to build the capacity of tribal
groups to resolve conflicts over land. Indeed, fertile land is scarce in the semi-arid climate of north-central Africa and competition over land has been an important source of conflict in the region. Inclusive processes are required to address the land needs of nomads as well as sedentary farmers and to activate traditional mechanisms for land sharing.

The challenge of pacifying the Tormented Triangle is considerable and will continue to occupy the international community in the future. The first step, however, is to get the diagnosis right by recognising that a process of regionalisation has taken place and transformed armed conflict in such a way that conventional instruments of conflict management and resolution are no longer effective. A new regional approach is needed.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of the Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td><em>Forces armées du nord</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FROLINAT</td>
<td><em>Front de libération nationale du Tchad</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FUC</td>
<td><em>Front uni pour le changement</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFDR</td>
<td><em>Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement</em></td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>UN-AU Mission in Darfur</td>
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