Table of Contents

Introduction 2

Political Economy of State Collapse and Crisis 5

Development as State Making 10

Cities and Fragile States 17

Regional and Global Axes of Conflict 23

References 26
Introduction

During Phase 1 of the Crisis States Programme our research focused on the ability of public authorities at local, national and international levels to manage conflict. We believe it has been strategically important for understanding and acting upon the governance dilemmas facing the developing world and particularly its poorest communities, countries and regions. Hallmarks of the Centre’s analytical approach have been: to see states on a continuum rather than in dichotomous and rigid typologies; to focus on ways communities manage conflict rather than assume it can be avoided (thus we have rejected the language of ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post-conflict’); to link local, national, regional and global levels of analysis; and finally to privilege an historical perspective within our interdisciplinary institutional approach. We plan to build upon these strengths in our Phase 2.

Phase 1 allowed us to develop a set of concepts, categories and hypotheses about ‘crisis states’, which will now be explored in rigorous comparative analysis in Phase 2. Our research in Phase 2 takes a harder look at actual processes of collapse into war and intense episodes of violence, or prolonged episodes of violence and war where the state has remained intact, as well as differential experiences in securing peace and pursuing reconstruction. In Phase 2, we will be able to offer explanations about processes of collapse, war and of reconstruction.

Central research questions

The over-arching questions that we aim to address during Phase 2 research are:

A) Why and how, under the conditions of late development, are some fragile states able to respond effectively to contestation while others collapse and/or experience large-scale violence?

B) What are the factors that contribute to and impede state reconstruction in post-war periods?

What do we expect to learn?

We will examine the historical political economy processes through which violent and non-violent challenges to state authority generate legitimacy crises, and why such crises result in state collapse in some contexts and not others. We aim to understand, in Gramscian terms, what allows the state to reproduce the conditions for its own existence and when and why it cannot. We will also explore why political violence in some contexts contributes to the construction of more developmental and welfare-minded states, and it does not do so in others. We intend to uncover the broad patterns of the political economy of conflict in order to discover the conditions under which state reconstruction is likely to endure.

In Phase 1 we identified crucial governance dilemmas for developing states. In Phase 2 we will build on this knowledge to identify the mechanisms and dynamics behind war and breakdown, state resilience, and the combination of both. We will strive to understand the co-evolution of world order and state building in the developing world: the set of opportunities and constraints that order establishes, and the assets, responses, and processes within the state at the national and city levels.

We believe our research in Phase 2 will also allow us to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in fragile states and countries where states have collapsed, as well as those undergoing reconstruction, how patterns of intervention have differed and which approaches have contributed to securing peace and the conditions for development and which have not. The international community has become deeply involved in designing interventions in these situations, but the
interventions are often based on a poor understanding of history and usually evaluated in technical terms on very short time horizons. Soon after new governments came to power in Uganda and Rwanda, for instance, attention to securing immediate development objectives eclipsed the longer-term impact of the conflicts on the possibilities for reconstruction.

Our focus on local, national and global dimensions in Phase 1 proved useful. We want to extend this approach to considering, from a comparative perspective, additional levels of analysis that we identified as important. These include regional dynamics, which are critical in explaining the dilemmas of conflict and reconstruction. Moreover, beyond our focus on local and micro-level dynamics we recognise the importance of meso-level political processes and institutions, particularly at the metropolitan or city level. For Phase 2 we are proposing to address this as follows.

There will be a much more focused research agenda, based on more systematic comparative analysis. The Centre’s work will be divided around three major interrelated components that will allow us to maintain our work at local, national and global levels, while extending our successful regional level work and scaling-up the local level focus:

1) Development as State-Making: Collapse, War and Reconstruction
2) Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction
3) Regional and Global Axes of Conflict

Although we are adopting states as our principal focus of investigation, we recognise that they do not exist in isolation but are embedded within wider contexts and overlay complex meso-level processes and microcosms. Focusing on the relationship between cities and states will allow us to examine how cities can help build nation-states as well as undermine them, while the exploration of regional and global axes of conflict will permit us to understand the kinds of macro-level processes that can fundamentally affect states and cities and their capacity to act effectively and in concert. Our research will shift more towards Sub-Saharan Africa while maintaining a comparative perspective in work on Latin America and Asia, especially for understanding differential outcomes in managing conflict and reducing instability, stagnation and poverty.
Crisis, Fragile and Failed States
Definitions used by the CSRC

**Fragile State**: A “fragile state” is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems. (It is a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts). In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis: in economic terms, this could be institutions (importantly, property rights) that reinforce stagnation or low growth rates, or embody extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, in access to the means to make a living); in social terms institutions may embody extreme inequality or lack of access altogether to health or education; in political terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly fragmented security organisations. Drawing on insights related to “institutional multiplicity” – ubiquitous in our research so far: In fragile states, statutory institutional arrangements are vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional systems be they derived from traditional authorities, devised by communities under conditions of stress that see little of the state (in terms of security, development or welfare), or be they derived from warlords, or other non-state power brokers. The opposite of a “fragile state” is a “stable state” – one where dominant or statutory institutional arrangements appear able to withstand internal and external shocks and contestation remains within the boundaries of reigning institutional arrangements.

**Crisis State**: A crisis state is a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks. (There is a danger of state collapse). This is not an absolute condition, but a condition at a given point of time, so a state can reach a “crisis condition” and recover from it, or can remain in crisis over relatively long periods of time, or a crisis state can unravel and collapse. Such a process could lead, as we have always argued, to the formation of new states, to war and chaos, or to the consolidation of the ancien régime. Specific “crises” within the subsystems of the state can also exist - an economic crisis, a public health crisis like HIV/AIDS, a public order crisis, a constitutional crisis, for instance - with each on its own not amounting to a generalised condition of a crisis state although a subsystem crisis can be sufficiently severe and/or protracted that it gives rise to the generalised condition of a crisis state. The opposite of a crisis state is a “resilient state”, where institutions are generally able to cope with conflict, to manage sub-state crises, to respond to contestation, wherever the state sits between fragility and stability.

**Failed State** – We define a “failed state” as a condition of “state collapse” – e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence. This term is used in very contradictory ways in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a “poorly performing” state as “failed” – a tendency we reject). The opposite of a “failed state” is an “enduring state” and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organisations, might continue to exist.

*Crisis States Workshop – London, March 2006*
Political Economy of State Collapse and Crisis

As in Phase 1, the starting point of our analysis is that processes of institutional formation and change in late developers are inherently conflictual. The main problematic is to understand why and how some states manage conflict in non-violent and legitimate ways while other states face military challenges to their rule. In order to do this, we adopt an historical political economy approach that essentially entails the examination of how economic and political decisions and processes interact. More specifically, political economy explores the production and distribution of power and wealth and how and why processes of political and economic contestation either support or undermine the formation and change of property rights and institutions underlying (primitive) accumulation process. There are several lenses in which we develop our analysis of the political economy of conflict in late developers:

1. ‘Institutional multiplicity’

In Phase 1 of our research we developed a concept of institutional multiplicity, where individuals and organisations appear to operate often simultaneously in multiple institutional systems, governed by very different sets of incentives. Institutional multiplicity is a situation in which different sets of rules of the game, often contradictory, coexist in the same territory, putting citizens and economic agents in complex, often unsolvable, situations, but at the same time offering them the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another. Often the interventions of the international community simply add a new layer of rules, without overriding others. In such situations, the conventional political economy of state modernisation – which suggests that if the state establishes an appropriate set of incentives and sends the correct signals political and economic agents follow suit – is clearly insufficient.

In terms of analysing the state, institutional arrangements encompass both formal and informal rules governing the behaviour of those who occupy positions within the state as well as those non-state actors that are co-opted/contracted by the state or rivals to the state in fulfilling the functions ascribed to the state. Constitutions and law are formal institutions affecting all subsystems of the state and each subsystem has specific institutional arrangements important to our analytical framework: security (mix of public and private provision, codes of ethics governing armed forces and police, security doctrine, etcetera); administrative (procedures for appointments/promotions, mix of public-private provision, centralised-decentralised authority, regulations governing taxation and powers granted); legal (pattern of judicial appointments, hierarchical structures of decision making, the mix of ‘traditional’ and modern liberal judicial authority, etcetera); political (division of executive, legislative and judicial authority, method of attaining office, the regulation of organisations that can contest for political office, etcetera); economic (mix of liberalised and regulated markets, incentives for employment, savings, investment and trade, and mechanisms for capital accumulation). Non-state actors are always affected by the formal and informal institutional arrangements governing the behaviour of state actors, but may have evolved alternative formal and informal institutional arrangements distinct from the state. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have their own constitutional/legal arrangements in the territories they dominate; and urban gangs have their codes of ethics and justice, as do the regional power brokers of the DRC.

2. ‘State capacity and capability’

In analysing the performance of the subsystems of the state and among non-state rivals, we will in every case be looking at the evolution of capacity – the abilities and skills of personnel and organisational culture, including the ability to manage conflict and to win popular support and
extend territorial presence. While we separate these subsystems for analytical purposes, we will attempt to form a judgement about their interaction to arrive at an assessment of state capacity and effectiveness at any given point in time. The capabilities of non-state rivals are important as well, including their ability to win popular support and to extend their presence territorially. In terms of capabilities, there are important agency factors that always need to be taken into account, including the quality of leadership and the development strategies adopted. While capacity is influenced by path-dependent factors, the developmental states of Northeast Asia and followers in Southeast Asia provide ample evidence that capacity is also created through political decision and action. At a methodological level, we want to develop better qualitative and quantitative means of assessing state capacity and its strengths, weaknesses and deficits.

3. ‘Influencing’ or rent-seeking

It is useful to consider that in post-war and poor economies there are multiple mechanisms that link state and society. In adapting Weber’s ideas on economic sociology, there are several competing mechanisms through which influencing, or rent-seeking, activities occur. The first are legal and institutional influencing activities, which are the dominant form of rent-seeking in advanced economies and the least developed form in poor economies. Business chambers and labour unions represent a small part of the population and political parties are often factionalised and unstable the less developed the economy is. In contrast, lobby groups, political parties, labour unions and legal campaign contributions to parties on the part of business groups are well-established forms of institutionalised rent-seeking or influencing in richer countries. The second mechanism of influencing comprises informal patron-client networks, which are a central feature of many poor economies. Such clientelism is a substitute for the welfare state, which is often inadequate in meeting welfare demands of large parts of the population. Third, and closely related to the second, are illegal forms of rent-seeking or corruption. In the absence of viable institutionalised mechanisms to influence the state, corruption (and clientelism) become important substitute forms of influencing in less developed economies. When one or more of the above three mechanisms fail to provide influencing opportunities to political actors, political violence represents a fourth path to influence, capture or usurp the state altogether.

It is possible to consider these four influencing mechanisms as functional substitutes that operate to a greater extent under different stages of development and under different political settlements. An important component of the research agenda is to consider the relationships between alternate forms of influencing and state capture and the mechanisms through which declines in the first three forms of influencing contribute to the rise of political violence. In turn, we need to explain why political violence generates state collapse in some contexts and not others.

4. Coalitional analysis

The emergence of political violence is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for state collapse. This is because there may exist a significantly powerful coalition of supporters who benefit from the formal and informal mechanisms of influencing the state. In order to explain why political violence escalates into state collapse, we will employ coalitional analysis, according attention to the

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1 It is thus important to understand that internal political stability in poor late developers is not maintained primarily through fiscal policy, but through the largely off-budget and selective accommodation of factions and coalitions organised along patron-client lines. The common features of this type of politics have been collectively described as patrimonialism, clientelism, and patron-client politics, and factional politics. The common features include the personalisation of politics by faction leaders and the organisation of politics as a competition between factions. See Khan (2005).

shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements that govern the exercise of different forms of authority within society. We are concerned with the ways in which shifting coalitions of power contribute to state collapse; are forged in order to prevent state collapse; and emerge as a result of state collapse and war.

Coalitional analysis will enable us to overcome the limitations of purely structural and actor-based explanations of breakdown and collapse. Structural arguments examine the conditions most conducive to state collapse, but do not explain how and why a particular country’s state breaks down. Agency-based arguments emphasise the role a leader’s policies play in contributing to state-building or collapse but do not explain why such policies endure.

By linking questions of why state collapse occurs and why it persists, the research promotes an integrative approach. We assume neither that historical institutions dictate future political outcomes nor that political actors determine outcomes on the basis of will alone. We will assess the historically constituted conditions that lead to state collapse and reconstruction. It takes structures seriously since the organisations of state, society and economy institutionalise a given distribution of power. These institutions provide the conditions within which and against which actors manoeuvre. They are also likely to provide the conditions that predispose actors to favour one outcome over another. But individuals are the ones who take action. Politics is about defining legitimate grounds for rule and about redefining what is possible.

Political coalitions, Yashar suggests, serve as an analytic lens to assess the ways in which structures condition political options and the future to which actors aspire. Coalitions are defined as alliances among social actors and groups. They provide the organisational framework for delineating who sides with whom, against whom, and over what. Coalitions bring together groups or institutions with heterogeneous goals that are willing to sacrifice for some intermediate, collective goals. Coalitions are the nexus at which structure and agency meet and modify individuals’ options and capacities to affect change. The research will analyse which conditions generate coalitions that give rise to political violence and state collapse, and which conditions generate coalitions that give rise to political violence but avoid state collapse. Moreover, coalitional analysis will inform the reasons that reconstruction policies were not just initiated, but endured in some cases.

Another important reason to incorporate coalitional analysis is that the state itself is an agent of coalitions. As opposed to the technical views that see the state as simply a set of institutions with functional attributes, the state is a social relation. Regardless of regime type, state leaders require social support and thus the state and the institutional rules it creates and sanctions are the by-products of prior bargaining solutions, or settlements among relevant political forces. It is thus necessary to identify the nature of coalitions and factions underlying the state in order to understand the historically situated rationality of state policies, and in particular, the reasons why a certain distribution of assets and patronage is reproduced.

Finally, coalition analysis allows us to look at the role of international actors in terms of their linkages with local actors and the relation between internal processes within crisis states and the external environment. Coalitional analysis opens up the possibility of breaking down the internal and external dichotomies through which so much of the literature looks at post-war reconstruction processes and instead examine coalitions that cross internal/external boundaries.

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5. Divisibility and Boundary Activation

The nature of political coalitions underlying state support (and in particular, the extent to which these coalitions survive through activating and maintaining boundaries) determines the extent to which political, economic and social conflicts are more indivisible. The creation and activation of boundaries contribute to the escalation of political conflict and violence.\(^4\)

An important component of identifying the nature of coalitions is to examine the extent to which they merge heterogeneous groups with conflicts of interest (and therefore more amenable to peaceful bargains), as opposed to a political structure where collective actors are more narrowly focused and therefore potentially less tolerant of policies that disadvantage them. Politics based on ethnicity, region, or religion are likely to pertain more to the latter category.

Narrow identity-based conflict tends to all-or-nothing struggles for indivisible stakes (control of the state, and state patronage, land and other valuable resources and the rights associated with them). **Divisibility** refers to the extent to which the conflict over a right is a question of ‘more or less’ (such as in the capital-labour struggle) as opposed to ‘all-or nothing’. When political coalitions are organised around regional, ethnic or other identity aspects, the distribution of assets and resources tends to be more indivisible. As Hirschman and Wood argue, the greater the indivisibility of asset distribution and state patronage, the more intense conflicts over rights associated with these income flows will likely become. In turn, the greater the intensity of conflict, the more likely such conflicts will be resolved through violent as opposed to non-violent means.\(^5\)

Moreover, as Wood argues, the extent to which conflicts involve divisible benefits, and the contending parties are economically interdependent (as with labour-capital struggles), the more likely a range of mutually acceptable arrangements may be possible.\(^6\) In such cases where the principal antagonists are economically interdependent (such as South Africa and El Salvador), the cessation of violence and other forms of hostile relations (labour strikes, capital flight) promises substantial potential benefits to both parties sufficient to create a structural basis for compromise that is self-reinforcing. It is more probable that peace will endure if there is a material interest on both sides of a conflict to negotiate. For instance, in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis, the adoption of successful measures to fight the epidemic can provide benefits in terms of a public good in the interest of all groups. In the case of indivisible stakes, compromise is more difficult because neither party believes the returns will be adequate unless it can control all of the stakes.

There are two important implications of the above discussion for examining post-war reconstruction. First, the political economy of conflict is central to understanding the prospects for peace-building. In particular, an examination of the economic structure underlying conflict is crucial to understanding the extent to which there are interdependencies among the antagonists. Secondly, in situations where conflicts are based more on indivisible stakes, it may be necessary to inject significant resources across contending groups to maintain political legitimacy and stability. Insufficient donor injections of resources may amount to battling a large fire with a few hoses.


\(^6\) Wood (2000).
Development as State Making: Collapse, War & Reconstruction

The first component of the research involves a systematic comparative study of processes of state collapse, war and reconstruction. From an historical perspective, much of the developing world today is characterised by states in the process of formation. The focus of this study will be on the organisations and institutions that make up fragile states and the proposition that the quality of political action and organisation at the level of the state determines the trajectory of collapse, the avoidance of collapse and processes of reconstruction. We aim to study eight cases in great depth supplemented by a comparative set comprising six additional secondary cases.

Our research questions will be:

- What has been the pattern of state collapse in the countries we are studying and can we, in hindsight, identify the main symptoms indicating that a collapse was on the horizon?
- Why have some fragile states that have experienced prolonged warfare managed to survive while others have not?
- How and why, when non-state actors emerge to challenge the state in certain domains, has this lead to war while in others it has not? What has been the role of non-state actors, including civil society organisations that intervene to facilitate negotiations between the state and warring groups (civil liberty organisations, human rights and humanitarian INGOs and citizen groups) as well as international actors, in the avoidance of war?
- What processes of reform and state organisation (in relation to non-state or societal actors) have been most successful in periods of reconstruction in terms of achieving security, growth and development, and welfare? Are there trade-offs we can identify in terms of achieving these objectives?
- How do developing states respond to and interact with global markets?
- What has been the role of interventions from the international community in processes of decline into war and state collapse, as well as processes of reconstruction, how have they differed one from the other, and which interventions have contributed positively to security, growth and welfare?

Six of our eight core case studies have experienced important episodes of violence and war and we will include three types of experiences: (1) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed, but where there is at least a decade of reconstruction experience; (2) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed and the future is uncertain; (3) countries where states have avoided collapse despite significant armed challenges to their authority. Two of our core cases form a fourth category of states that will serve as a “control”: (4) countries which have avoided significant episodes of violent conflict and war where states have remained intact, despite poor performance in relation to growth, welfare and the standards of ‘good governance’ promoted by the international agencies.

Our wider set of countries also fall within these four categories.

During Phase 1, we began to elaborate this framework in the context of our work on state building in Afghanistan. During the final year of Phase 1, we piloted this work in a small comparative study of African cases of states that experienced collapse and those that have avoided it.
Our conception of the state and fragile states

Our research is concerned with “fragile states” (see box on p.3), or those states in the developing world that are particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts and significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of their sub-systems. We are concerned with the conditions under which a fragile state becomes what we call a “crisis state” – a state under acute stress where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks, opening up a danger of state collapse. By studying how particular instances of crisis, like a fiscal collapse, an explosion of violence, or the HIV/AIDS epidemic, challenge reigning institutions and how they are acted upon, we can learn more about the dynamics of state fragility. We will study such periods of crisis in a systematic and comparative manner at national, city and regional levels and assess the part played in outcomes by state and non-state actors and organisations and the institutional frameworks in which they can be found. We plan to build on this conception of the state to continue to explore why some fragile states succumb to crises and enter a spiral of violence, collapse and war while others do not.

Our general framework lies at the intersection between a Weberian understanding of the state and the political economy of state building, as developed by Gramsci, Tilly, Tarrow, Olson, and others. We will look at the state through the prism of its functions encompassing a set of five ‘sub-systems’, the quality of which has a major impact on the key outcomes that will concern us: security, growth and welfare. These five ‘sub-systems’ are the: security system, administrative system, legal system, political system and economic management system. We understand the organisations and institutions that compose the state as emerging from society (as the result of conflict and reflecting a particular balance of power) to provide the organisational and institutional framework for economic and social reproduction and development, including the provision or non-provision of public goods and, importantly, social goods (effective redistribution, respect of democracy and human rights, and the institutionalisation of recognition of ethnic minorities) all of which contribute to achieving security and welfare. Importantly, the evolution of these processes are influenced by international institutions and organisations in an indeterminate direction.

This approach has three important implications for the way we will study the problems of state collapse, state survival and state reconstruction and that will define the framework of our case studies:

- We must study the economic foundations in which particular states operate and their historical evolution;
- We must study both the quality and nature of state organisations and institutions and their relation to alternative sources of power in society;
- We will evaluate performance of the state in terms of outcomes in ensuring security, growth and welfare, and will assess the impact (if any) of international institutions and organisations on securing these outcomes.

The framework of economic analysis

We will base our analysis of the evolution of particular states on an understanding of the economic parameters in which they operate. We will employ a simple model of the economy, taking into account the evolution of formal and informal sectors of production and exchange, and domestic and international markets, placing some importance on patterns of inequality (related especially to region, religion, ethnicity and language).

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7 In this we follow Frances Stewart, et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume 1: The economic and social consequences of conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, but with a view to looking at patterns of inequality in access to political power as well, a central element lacking in their earlier analyses.
Economic activity (production, employment, exchange) takes place across ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies. By the ‘formal economy’, we mean economic activities that have a legal status and are subject to regulation, surveillance and measurement, by local and national political authorities. The ‘informal economy’ encompasses a huge amount of activity in developing countries, from subsistence-oriented activities, to economic activities lodged within households, to larger scale activities with no legal status, including both large and small scale criminal activities – largely beyond the reach of regulation, surveillance and measurement. Phase 1 of our research demonstrated significant evidence of the expansion of the informal economy, not only in poor but in middle income countries (a movement from quadrants A and C in Table 1 towards B), with transformative impacts on the possibilities of political organisation and serious implications in relation to a public authority’s ability to tax or regulate economic activity.

**Table 1: Simple Model of the Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal Economy</th>
<th>Informal Economy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Markets</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Markets</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We would suggest that fragile states are characterised by considerable proportions of economic activities located in quadrants B and D of Table 1. Quadrant D represents an area likely to be almost entirely composed of criminal activities. We propose to analyse the historical evolution of the economies in our case study countries according to this template and to develop our political and institutional analyses of the processes of collapse, war and reconstruction (and resistance to these processes) with this simple model in mind. We believe both domestic and international interventions in recovering from war and state collapse need to be assessed in terms of their impact on these structural characteristics of the economy.

**The framework for analysing particular states**

We will examine the performance of states (that is of the five subsystems that make up the state) by analysing: (a) the character of the institutions reigning; (b) the capabilities of individuals and organisations in each; (c) the countervailing non-state institutions and organisations that vie for control with, or effectively carry out these functions in the absence of, the state; and (d) the international actors (multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, international crime syndicates, Christian Churches and Muslim schools) who arrive with alternative institutional arrangements (for example, international laws and conventions, norms of business behaviour, or associational behaviour) and profoundly affect the functions of subsystems of the state.

What is perhaps different about this vantage point on evaluating the state is the examination of the exercise of state functions as a contested terrain between public authorities and various non-state actors, influenced by international actors. In some cases the state contracts out, or co-opts in non-

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8 There may be purposeful neglect of the informal sector by state actors, particularly if the same patron-client networks operate within and outside the state (P. Chabal & J-P Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

9 It is notoriously difficult to study the informal economy at a macro-level. We can capture trends in the informal economy at the macro-level by studying changes in the formal economy in relation to investments, business activities and employment, imputing consequences for informal economic activity and supplementing this with the study of particular activities in the informal economy (through sectoral analysis).
state actors to perform these functions, but in others non-state actors emerge to fill the gaps left by absent state authority, or, importantly, to challenge the state (Table 2).

The security system provides for protection of the territory/society from external threats, protection from violence and threats from within the society, enforcement of laws and judicial and administrative decisions. As such it involves both military and police organisations at national, regional and local levels, intelligence agencies and presidential guards or other special forces. Institutions – both laws and norms – and capabilities determine principles of civilian authority or the lack of it, compliance with human rights standards, standards of discipline, etcetera. A variety of non-state actors often possess coercive power – from private security firms, to local and regional organisations and their leaders (for instance, warlords or tribal authorities), crime syndicates and their bosses, gangs and vigilantes, and dissident political organisations and their guerrilla armies.

We will be interested in explaining the conditions under which state organisations co-opt or contract these non-state actors under their authority and where such actors emerge as rivals and challengers to the state. On the other hand, civil liberty, women, or citizen organisations that aim at expanding the notion of security dot the landscape of beleaguered states. We will analyse the conditions under which these can expand the welfarist or social security agenda of the state to enhance personal security.

Table 2: Analysing the State (national, regional and local)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State subsystem</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
<th>International Actors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Capabilities and Performance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security (Institutional arrangements)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Private security firms</td>
<td>Neighbouring states and their security forces;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Community defence groups</td>
<td>Armed non-state organisations in neighbouring countries;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence agencies</td>
<td>Warlords</td>
<td>Distant states and their security forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Presidential guards and other special forces</td>
<td>‘Traditional’ authorities</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crime syndicates</td>
<td>Regional organisations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gangs/vigilantes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political orgs and their armies</td>
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<td>Civil liberty, women and citizens groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative (Institutional arrangements)</td>
<td>Finance esp. revenue</td>
<td>Private firms</td>
<td>IMF</td>
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<td>Social services (health, education)</td>
<td>Local potentates</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Public works (transport, utilities)</td>
<td>Gangsters or warlords</td>
<td>UN Agencies</td>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>Religious/traditional organisations</td>
<td>Bilateral donors</td>
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<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Community organisations and NGOs</td>
<td>Reg’l Development Banks</td>
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<td>Private and community media orgs</td>
<td>Intern’l NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal/Justice (Institutional arrangements)</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>‘Traditional’/religious authorities</td>
<td>Intern’l Religious organisations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>Local warlords</td>
<td>Intern’l Firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court officials (prosecutors, lawyers)</td>
<td>Wealthy families and businesses</td>
<td>Foreign Occupation administrations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justices of peace, ombudsmen</td>
<td>Political organisations</td>
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</table>
The *administrative system* importantly provides for the collection of revenue, the delivery of services related to public goods (such as health, education, transport or water), information circulation and regulation, and management of international relations. It involves bureaucratic organisations at national, regional and local levels and both formal laws and informal norms determine their behaviour (links to private interests, traditional authorities, and so on). A variety of non-state actors (private firms, local potentates, gangsters or warlords, religious organisations, community organisations, NGOs, media organisations) may be contracted to perform these functions, may traditionally perform them, may simply fill the gaps where no state organisations exist, or may emerge to challenge the state in fulfilling these functions. The *legal system* provides dispute resolution mechanisms, codifies property rights and regulations governing all sorts of social, economic and political activities. It involves both state and non-state actors, including courts, judges, prosecutors and lawyers and their respective organisations at all levels. Here there is often a huge gap between what is formally organised at the level of the state and everyday practices of dispute resolution and definitions of control over property by all sorts of non-state actors, including traditional authorities, local warlords, local wealthy families and businesses, political organisations with territorial control exercised through alternative institutional arrangements, as well as vigilante groups and informal justice systems.

The *political system* provides the institutional framework governing access to public authority, determining who holds positions of power within the state at national, regional and local levels. The rules (constitutions, legal regulations about elections or appointments to positions of authority within the state) often diverge considerably from the norms that actually reign in this domain. While organisations like political parties, or political movements, may formally be recognised as vehicles for participation, in reality patronage networks, tribal authorities, religious authorities, media organisations, and local and regional power brokers may either effectively control state organisations or appropriate their functions at local, regional and national levels. The organisations that operate on this political terrain play a major role in defining what constitutes legitimate behaviour within, and by, the state. Indeed a major function of political organisation is engaging a battle over establishing the grounds of legitimacy, whether in constitutional/legal, religious,
traditional or ethnic or other terms. Our study of state breakdown also must include the study of regime breakdown, to which it is sometimes tied.

Finally the economic management system of the state provides the institutional framework governing macro-economic management, setting incentives for employment, savings, investment and trade, and, especially in situations of late development, the institutional and organisational arrangements to ensure capital formation and investment. In many of the countries we are studying the reach of this system is limited and huge proportions of economic activity fall outside the formal purview of the state and are governed by non-state actors through informal rules and informal enforcement mechanisms. Our study will attempt to assess the reach of formal economic management system over time, trends that expand and contract its reach and the relationship of this to processes of state collapse and reconstruction.

Assessing Outcomes: security, growth and welfare

Economic Growth and Development: When assessing outcomes of state performance we distinguish between economic growth and economic development. The former can occur if there is a natural resource boom. The latter refers to the former plus qualitative changes in production structure and in productivity levels. Thus, we include diversification of production and exports, savings and investment rates to measure development.

In assessing Welfare, we will consider health and education indicators, investments in health and education and, also, the extent to which this spending is pro-poor. Important, in terms of many of the countries we are studying, will be progress made in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis.

We will assess Security, both in terms of national security and ‘personal security’. National security is improved as a greater percentage of the territory is controlled by the state. In ‘small-n’ studies we can examine how this dimension of security changes over time. Of course, positive outcomes in achieving national security do not always lead to improvements in personal security. In many Latin American countries, urban crime is very high despite there not being an issue of national security (Colombia is an exception). Thus both these dimensions of security must be assessed.

Choosing our ‘universe’ of cases

We have decided to undertake largely qualitative comparative analysis of a small number (‘small-n’) of countries that have experienced war as our intention is to investigate, understand and explain processes and patterns of state collapse and reconstruction. As Ragin argues, small-n is not a ‘second best’ solution when statistics are unavailable, but rather the first option when the focus of interest is processes and patterns rather than variables. Our interest in historically based analysis, where we can evaluate the interaction of economic conditions and the functioning of states along the five parameters explained above, makes this the decidedly preferred approach. We are building this research on a rich tradition of scholarship.

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12 Examples of comparative studies that inspire us are: Moore’s book on the paths of capitalist development that lead or not to democracy; Scokpol’s work on revolutions; O’Donnell, Przeworski, Linz’s and others programme on democratic transitions; Linz’s study of democratic breakdown; Rokkan’s and Duverger’s work on political parties; and Hirschman’s reflection on development.
In choosing our universe of cases, we have decided to focus on a central set of eight countries (Table 3), six of which have experienced important episodes of violence and war, and we will include three types of experiences: (1) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed, but where there is at least a decade of reconstruction experience (Uganda/Rwanda); (2) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed and the future is uncertain (Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo); (3) countries where states have avoided collapse despite significant armed challenges to state authority (Colombia and Mozambique). Two of our core cases form a fourth category as a ‘control group’: (4) countries which have avoided significant episodes of violent conflict and war where states have remained intact, despite poor performance in relation to growth, welfare and the standards of ‘good governance’ promoted by the international agencies.

**Table 3: Eight Core Case Studies - Countries that experienced war**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years</td>
<td>Uganda, Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, collapse and future is uncertain</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant armed challenges to state authority but state did not collapse</td>
<td>Colombia, Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries that have experienced neither war nor collapse (despite the odds)</td>
<td>Tanzania, Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each case we want to examine the economic condition of countries before war broke out and the evolution of their state organisations (along the parameters outlined above) and the relation between the two in leading to the outbreak of war. We want to understand what led to the collapse of the state in four cases and not in the other two. We will examine the processes of state reconstruction in the first two cases and processes of state maintenance and reform during war in the last two cases. It is our intention to discuss and apply the analytical insights concerning reconstruction in Uganda and Rwanda to the policy discussion and debates about reaching peace and launching reconstruction in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We will place considerable importance on evaluating how international interventions in our case study countries in relation to the five domains of state organisation (security, administrative/fiscal, legal, political, economic) have fared over time – what has worked and what has not (see also the ‘regional and global axes of conflict’ component, below).

Our wider set of countries are chosen with the same four experiential categories in mind. Having this wider set of comparators will allow us to continue to examine processes of state collapse, its avoidance and reconstruction along a continuum, which proved so fruitful in Phase 1 of our work. These seven countries are also chosen with a view to allowing us to extend comparative analysis of the whole set, or paired comparisons within the set, or geographical subsets. The wider set allows us to place our concern with processes of state collapse and reconstruction in a wider comparative framework, setting Sub-Saharan African countries in comparison with countries in Asia and Latin America (the importance of which was demonstrated during our Phase 1 work).

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13 Methodologically, we can more easily examine the role of international factors by looking at a geographical subset defined as a region that interacts with global forces.
Table 4: Secondary Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years</td>
<td>Lebanon, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, collapse and future is uncertain</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant armed challenges to state authority but state did not collapse</td>
<td>Philippines, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries that have experienced neither war nor collapse (despite the odds)</td>
<td>Pakistan, Ecuador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction

The second component of the programme involves a study of the relationship between cities and states, while also locating cities within regional and global contexts. This component of the research is concerned with the contribution of cities:

- To state resilience where the collapse of fragile states has been avoided
- As viable entities in unravelling states and unstable regions
- In conflict, war and reconstruction.

The research also considers the impact of urban violence and conflict on cities themselves and the implications of this for state fragility and regional stability. Hence this element of the research is specifically focused on the urban dynamics (social, political, economic) that contribute to state making and/or collapse over time, explored through an historical investigation of urban dynamics and the extent to which they can be explained by:

- Demographic and spatial issues
- The nature of the built environment
- The level of integration of the urban economy into state/regional/international markets
- Collective action and coalitions of interest acting in and on the city.

Systematic and comparative studies at the city level will be placed in historical context in order to establish the relationships between cities and states over time, recognising that there are often disjunctures and few simple linear connections in the relationship between cities and state building. Additionally, attention will be paid to the socio-spatial (re-)ordering of urban areas and the human experience over time of living in:

- Cities in fragile and collapsed states
- Cities in unstable regions
- Violent cities.

**Why we Need to Study Cities and State Fragility**

There is a close relationship between cities and state making, with national state building and urban autonomy in Europe having been shown to be in dynamic tension historically (Tilly, 1989). We seek to demonstrate how cities in developing countries, as social, economic, political and spatial entities, promote or prevent state unravelling. In part this relates to cities as jurisdictional entities and intergovernmental relations between municipal, metropolitan and other tiers of governance. Beyond this, however, it is concerned with cities as spatial entities, as planned and unplanned built environments and public and private spaces. The way we conceptualise cities spatially and dynamically is as follows:

- Demographically: Growing and densely populated spaces
- Economically: Sites of production, exchange and innovation
- Politically: Locations of contestation, cooperation and coordination
- Socially: Arenas of social reproduction, inclusion and exclusion.
Through these sites and processes cities can be constitutive spaces for state formation and understanding the conditions under which this is likely to occur or be undermined is central to our project.

Second, cities have always had a place in war, as locations of refuge and protection or of siege and attack. Moreover, in recent years the vulnerability of cities as objects of war and targets of terrorist attack has become abundantly clear, such that the centrality of cities in contemporary warfare is now indisputable. While this has been widely investigated in the context of industrialised countries few systematic or comparative studies have been undertaken in respect to the large urban centres of the developing world. This is despite the fact that the majority of wars are now fought in impoverished countries with often devastating and transformative impacts on urban spaces and urban governance. Thus under conditions of war it becomes particularly important to understand the role of cities.

A focus on cities and conflict does not serve to neglect rural areas. On the contrary, rural and urban processes across regions and within national polities are inextricably connected. However, we argue that while in the twentieth century armed conflicts in developing countries were heavily fought in the rural areas of the developing world – hence for example Eric Wolf’s (1973) *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* - now it is the cities of such countries that have become sites of what have been called ‘urban wars of the twenty-first century’ (Beall, 2006). Just as Wolf’s ‘peasant wars’ were connected into urban dynamics, so ‘urban wars’ are not divorced from dynamics in the hinterlands of cities. Nevertheless, a focus on cities is necessary precisely in order to show how urban centres absorb much of the impact and fallout from contemporary conflict and war, both directly and indirectly and how this has consequences for development as state making. In this context we will explore how changing trends in warfare are transforming the role of cities in processes of state collapse and reconstruction. Important premises here are that violent conflict can limit the reach and legitimacy of national states and that when state collapse is imminent, or where reconstruction is underway, city level actors take centre stage in strategies to foment peace and stimulate economic recovery.

Third, it is possible to regard cities as microcosms of broader conflicts or simply as terrains upon which competing national or regional interests and coalitions of power and influence vie for resources and wage their wars. However, we are also concerned to demonstrate that cities are important in their own right, as economic social and political spaces and as places where institutions emerge and are honed in particular ways, where property rights are contested, identities are formed and notions of citizenship develop. Over the past two decades, many cities around the world have become characterised by rising forms of violence, insecurity, and illegality. We propose that these characteristics constitute the essence of state fragility. As sites of high crime and insecurity, cities themselves today have become new theatres of war, which are rapidly becoming associated with or indeed paradigmatic of a broader form of ‘twenty-first century urban warfare’. It is in urban spaces that terror is increasingly conducted, where new forms of violence are emerging along a hazy boundary between criminal and political violence and where residents withdraw into fortified or delimited spaces with significant consequences for inclusivity at the city level and state making more broadly. As such, the element of the research that focuses on cities in and of themselves, links to our broader focus on development as state making and related state subsystems.

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14 Hills (2004) does look at war in developing country cities, but almost entirely from the perspective of military doctrine, while Graham’s (2003) collection looks at cities and terrorism but without a specific developmental focus and without a consideration of the relationship between cities and state-making.
Framework for Analysis, Hypotheses and Research Questions

We propose that under conditions of equilibrium states can most effectively perform their social reproduction and development functions in the context of cities. Conversely, under conditions of disequilibrium cities take over many of these functions, sometimes independently from the state. Building on the discussion of the ‘Political Economy of State Collapse and Crisis’ above, this element of the research will look at institutional multiplicity at the urban level, local and metropolitan state capacity and capability, coalitions acting in and on the city, as well as conflicts that are divisible and indivisible and their relationship to socio-spatial issues in cities.

Part A: Cities and State Making

The first component of the cities research will explore the historical role that cities have played in state making, crisis, and collapse. Previous studies have demonstrated that urbanisation is robustly correlated with economic growth on the one hand, and that excessive primacy\(^\text{16}\) is negatively correlated with economic growth and political stability on the other.\(^\text{17}\) However, the direction of causality in both cases remains unclear. Going beyond traditional explanations of economic geographers, who emphasize the economic benefits of agglomeration and the political costs of centralized rent-seeking, we will explore the historical and spatial evolution of institutions and citizenship in cities and city-systems.\(^\text{18}\)

Our analysis will revolve around the concepts of institutional multiplicity, state capacity, contestation and the divisibility of assets outlined above. In particular, we seek to explore the origins and consequences of institutional marginalisation/inclusivity in the urban context, which is often characterised by institutional multiplicity, and how this relates to overall state capacity. Debates between urban regime theorists and their critics offer a complementary and parallel analytical terrain to coalition analysis,\(^\text{19}\) which will provide a cornerstone in our analysis of political contestation in the urban environment. And finally, we will explore how the divisibility of assets such as urban land, property rights and urban identities contributes to contestation, the nature of the institutional environment and the constitution of urban and national citizenship.

Through the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods, we will establish a framework for understanding how cities affect the development of institutions conducive to state development, and how institutions affect the social, economic and political landscape of the urban environment. Conclusions will be drawn as to whether or not cities are an appropriate theatre for the commencement of national reconstruction strategies, and whether or not the characteristics of urban spaces provide clues as to the potential for future outbreaks of violence at the state and regional levels. Policy makers will find our analysis of the institutional dynamics of cities and states particularly relevant when devising policies aimed at minimising the risk of future state breakdown and mitigating the social and economic impact of past and present incidents of state collapse.

Hypothesis One

The correlation between particular patterns of urbanisation with political stability and economic growth may be explained by the historical evolution of institutions and citizenship in the urban environment.

\(^\text{15}\) The division of research questions across the following three categories is a heuristic devise to aid analysis. It is recognised that some issues, areas of focus and case studies, designated in one category, can equally inform analysis in another.

\(^\text{16}\) ‘Excessive primacy’ refers to the dominance of the political, economic and demographic landscape by a single city.


\(^\text{18}\) City-system refers to the spatial distribution of populations, as well as economic and political activity across cities within a state.

\(^\text{19}\) Reference to urban regime theory will also enhance the overall comparative approach given its extensive use in cross-national research (Mickey Lauria (ed.), Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory, Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy, Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, 1997).
Hypothesis Two
Changing trends in warfare are rendering cities central to processes of conflict management, reconstruction and state making/collapse.

Research Questions
- Can the relationship between urban development and state making be explained by city specific institutions (both formal and informal)?
- How do struggles over divisible and indivisible assets (e.g. property rights and identity) manifest themselves in and beyond cities and how do they differ from struggles in rural areas?
- To what degree does the inclusivity or exclusivity of the urban institutional environment affect political and economic outcomes at the city and state level?
- Under what conditions does urban belonging and identity foster or undermine the cultivation of state citizenship over time?

Part B: ‘City-States’ and Regional Cities
The second theme of the cities component will explore the role that ‘city-states’ and regional cities play in state making, collapse and reconstruction. In many countries in the South capital cities have become isolated centres of political and economic activity, essentially functioning as self-contained political and economic units divorced from their hinterlands.

At the same time, regional cities that do not serve as centres of national political activity thrive on formal and informal transnational regional economies, operating largely outside the regulatory purview of the state.

Why and how, in the context of domestic and regional instability, do these cities not only survive, but actually grow? What is it about urban life that allows people to survive, cope and even prosper despite state fragility and state collapse? And how have advances in communication, transportation and information technologies facilitated urban autonomy?

Here we will examine the institutional dynamics of cities embedded in fragile states and conflict-ridden regions, and the regional and international forces that have, and continue, to shape the urban environment. For example, drawing on some of the key themes of the Regional and Global Axes of Conflict component of the agenda, we will assess the impacts of trade liberalisation and structural adjustment policies on the rise of city-states and regional cities, and the impact of regional military interventions on the political, economic, social and spatial ordering of urban centres.

Coalitional analysis will provide an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between urban regimes and state governance in the context of these autonomous cities. At a more fundamental level, we will investigate how urban life and the spatial ordering of cities can promote a sense of urban citizenship and belonging (or marginalisation), and the ways this can either challenge or be constitutive of a shared national identity.

A critical question to be addressed in this component is the extent to which city-states and regional cities work for or against the consolidation of state legitimacy and authority. In other words, how does the persistent autonomy of city-states and regional cities relate to domestic and regional

City-states are capital cities that are essentially divorced from their hinterlands, but that are linked into regional and international political and economic networks. Examples include Kinshasa, Luanda and Kabul.

Regional cities are non-capital cities (i.e. not political centres) that are linked into regional economic networks that transcend national political boundaries. Examples include Pemba (Mozambique), Goma (DR Congo), and Jalalabad (Afghanistan).
instability and violence, state making and state collapse, and the spatial ordering of the built environment? Does urban autonomy perpetuate or even exacerbate conflict and violence in rural areas? And how do cities remain ‘above the fray’ in war-torn regions?

We will answer these questions using a comparative case-study approach, paying particular attention to the historical relationships between cities, states and regional/global processes. Our conclusions will help inform policy makers concerned with regional conflict management, domestic and regional economic development, urban-national governance issues and the possibilities and potential pitfalls of decentralisation as a conflict management and national development strategy.

Hypothesis One
Cities with robust institutions (formal and informal) persist and even grow and prosper in fragile states and unstable regions.

Hypothesis Two
Regional instability reinforces the autonomy of ‘city states’ strengthens linkages into regional and international markets at the expense of national economic and political stability.

Research Questions
- How does urban life allow people to survive, cope and sometimes prosper in ‘city-states’ and regional cities despite unstable regions and/or fragile states?
- How does the persistent autonomy of ‘city-states’ and regional cities relate to:
  - Instability and violence in the surrounding region
  - Urban spatial ordering
  - State building/collapse in their respective countries?

Part C: Urban Violence and Crisis Cities
Focusing specifically on urban centres, this element of the research on cities asks why under conditions of stress and contestation some cities become violent and dysfunctional while others do not? The analysis is concerned with institutional multiplicity and how robust and inclusive are urban institutions and their confluence. Further, it seeks to understand how they interact with the built environment and socio-spatial dynamics. Viewed over time cities are literally concrete manifestations of ideas on how society was, is and should be (Beall, 1997). Thus as spatial and physical entities, cities tell us a lot about issues of inclusivity and divisibility, as well as state capacity and collective action on the part of citizens. For example, numerous studies have noted the widespread changing patterns of urban spatial organisation as a result of rising forms of violence, insecurity, and illegality (cf. Beall, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 1990 & 1998; Low, 2001; Rodgers, 2004). Just as warfare often leads to the erosion of the social and infrastructural fabric of cities, in the face of endemic violence and high levels of crime, urban dwellers – rich and poor alike – often create defensible spaces such as gated communities, engage in practices that advance the privatisation of security, and foster new forms of socio-spatial governance based on territorial segregation and exclusion. In a variety of ways, such practices lead to new conceptions of what constitutes a city, eroding notions of citizenship, transforming cities from open spaces of free circulation to more fractured and fragmented archipelago-like localities, thereby fundamentally changing the character of urban social life and constraining local government and service delivery. These processes can also have significant ramifications for the nature of urban governance and political life, as can indeed the fact that cities are more generally frequently critical sites of protest and unrest, which can also act as catalysts for social and political change.
At the same time, processes of urban change give rise to new opportunities and alternative forms of socio-economic organisation. Class formation and the development of elites is a critical element of urbanisation and economic growth at the city and national levels. Formal and informal economic activities serve to reinforce and reconfigure these processes, which will be explored in relation to social, economic, political and spatial dynamics. In particular and in relation to coalition analysis, the social and institutional relationships framing the interaction between elite and non-elite urban dwellers will be explored and the extent to which this informs the emergence of crisis cities will be assessed. With reference to issues of divisible and indivisible assets, we will consider especially the significance of land, labour, infrastructure and services.

One of our objectives in this component is to determine whether or not cities are appropriate spaces for concentrating resources as a vehicle for taming urban violence or in the reconstruction phase after war or conflict. It is anticipated that our findings will illuminate what planners and policy makers should do to maximise returns on their interventions in relation to post-war urban area. This will include issues of social and economic policy, infrastructure and finance and the rural-urban dimensions of the state subsystems that form part of our overall analysis. These issues will be considered in relation to the insights obtained from studies of violent cities.

**Hypothesis One**
Rising forms of urban violence (crime, gang warfare, terrorism), insecurity and illegality undermine urban institutions and their ability to contribute to state making and development.

**Hypothesis Two**
The coping mechanisms and responses of people in crisis cities leads to increasing contestations between coalitions built on formal and informal institutions leading in some cases to pernicious urban violence.

**Research Questions**
- Why under conditions of stress and contestation do some cities unravel or collapse even to the point of violent conflict and others not?
- How do people in contested cities prosper and survive or not?
- How do conditions of stress and people’s responses lead to reconstruction or perpetuate violence?
- What is the impact and potential of urban renewal as a reconstruction strategy?

**Our choice of city case studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities and State-Making</th>
<th>City Regions and the State</th>
<th>Urban Violence and the State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>Ahmmedabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>Kabual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>Pemba</td>
<td>Managua</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bogota</td>
<td>Goma</td>
<td>Medellin</td>
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<td>Lusaka</td>
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</table>
Regional and Global Axes of Conflict

The third component of our research will look at regional and global axes of conflict that affect processes of state collapse and reconstruction in nation states and cities alike. This research will build on insights generated from the global level work undertaken during Phase 1, but will be more tightly integrated with our comparative studies of fragile states, war, state collapse and reconstruction at the country and city levels. The questions to be addressed here will also be addressed by teams involved in the country and city studies. In Phase 1, attention to work at the global level allowed us to be responsive to major changes in the international situation and to shape and guide our research agenda accordingly. This component of Phase 2 will allow us to continue to develop the Crisis States Research Centre’s work in this way.

We are planning to undertake work around three central issues at the regional and global levels: (a) The impact of economic reforms prescribed by international agencies on processes of state collapse and reconstruction; (b) The regional dimensions of war and peace; and (c) The impact of the international security architecture on processes of collapse and reconstruction. While all three of these issue areas will be studied within our comparative country and city cases, understanding trends and their policy implications also requires separate attention and investigation at regional and global levels of inquiry.

Economic reforms and their impact on state collapse and reconstruction

In Phase 1 we began an examination of the political impact of economic liberalisation policies involving state downsizing, privatisation and trade liberalisation in the countries we were studying. Our work in the Andean region, in South Africa and Sierra Leone and in Uganda and Zimbabwe pointed to the significant and widely varying impact of these policies on processes of state collapse, on possibilities for peace and reconstruction and on the parameters of political organising in a wide range of countries.

In Phase 2 we will examine the sequencing of reforms in relation to moments of extreme stress and state collapse in the countries we are studying to identify whether, for instance, structural adjustment reforms played any role in the unravelling of states in Africa, or had little or no impact on these processes. In addition to sequencing, other important factors include the pace and magnitude of the reforms, and the extent to which they were accepted by local actors. We will be concerned with specific issues like the prescriptions for state spending, particularly on defence, to evaluate whether they are consistent with prescriptions particularly related to post-war conditions like those around disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR). We will also consider the privatisation of social and welfare functions of the state, and the resultant impact on education, health and other sectors in response to particular crises like the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We will ask whether liberal trade policy has positively, negatively or neutrally affected the consolidation of revenue raising functions under conditions of state reconstruction.

These issues are often debated in a dogmatic and absolutist fashion by the proponents and the opponents of economic liberalisation. The former claim that liberalisation is an unqualified good and the latter insist that it is an unqualified bad. On the basis of our research in Phase 1, we believe that the actual results have been mixed and that the impact of liberalisation, whether positive or negative for different countries and for different groups within a country, depends on a range of variables. In Phase 2 we will explore these observations more systematically, with the view to discerning patterns and trends. We have a normative bias in favour of social justice and pro-poor policies, but our approach will be analytically open-minded and objective.
Regional Dimensions of War and Peace

We will be concerned here with three key issues: the ways in which warfare and processes of collapse take on regional dynamics – the so-called ‘contagion effect’ of domestic conflict; conversely, the ways in which war termination in one country can spur peace processes in neighbouring countries; and the role and efficacy of regional organisations as multilateral security and conflict resolution forums.

There is widespread evidence that processes of war and state collapse in the developing world transcend the boundaries of cities and nation-states; this is a consequence of weak states, porous borders, and war alliances forged among state and non-state actors at the regional level. For example, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of war in northern Uganda without looking at violent conflict in southern Sudan. Understanding the dynamics of warfare and the possibilities for peace and reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo requires an inquiry into the role played by Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, among others. These regional dimensions of conflict appear to be very difficult for international actors and ‘donor’ agencies to address and therefore in country programmes and interventions they are often ignored or marginalized. We would propose that a good understanding of the regional dimensions of conflict is crucial both to peace making endeavours and to designing policy in countries emerging out of war.

A key analytical concept in this regard is that of a ‘regional security complex’, a term coined by Barry Buzan and defined as:

a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.20

A second key concept is that of ‘regionalism’, a process whereby state and non-state actors link their activities in formal and informal ways at the regional level because of geographical proximity and expected gains.21 For all but the most powerful states and their targets, the regional level is more important than the global level in terms of conflict and security.

When regional issues are addressed by donors it is often through a blanket and uncritical endorsement of regional associations like the African Union or South African Development Community (SADC). There is also an inappropriate tendency among major donors to advocate the adoption of European models of political and economic integration in the very different circumstances of regions in the South.22 More recently, international agencies have been supporting the establishment of security regimes at the regional level. However, initial research in Phase 1 of our programme has already made a strong argument suggesting that regional security associations built by members with vastly differing political and security norms are unlikely to be effective. Our findings also indicate that the strength or weakness of member states, and their views on surrendering a measure of sovereignty to the regional organisation, are important variables in determining the viability of the organisation.

The critical question from a comparative perspective is why some regional organisations are substantially more effective than others in terms of conflict prevention and resolution We want to build on this work in Phase 2 and assess the impact of regional efforts to promote national and regional security. Our primary cases will be the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organisation of American States. Secondary cases will include the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Gulf Co-operation Council, the European Union and the African Union. We will examine the historical origins of these organisations; the economic and administrative capacity of member states; the political orientation of these states and the extent to which they have common values; the role of regional hegemons and external powers; and the nature and prevalence of conflict in the region.

**International security architecture and processes of collapse, war and reconstruction**

In the country and city studies we will place particular emphasis on the role of foreign actors in processes of state collapse, war and reconstruction and we will draw together the insights to inform a global view. Additional work on this theme will be undertaken in the following four areas:

- A major Large-N study on the long-term impact of military interventions will be undertaken. It will examine the extent to which military interventions have succeeded in their stated objectives, particularly those related to securing peace, over a period from the end of World War II to the present. The study will distinguish between the interventions of different types of actor (e.g. major powers; regional powers; international organisations; etc).

- A comparative study of the role of international actors in peace building and reconstruction, drawing on the country case studies with particular attention to how different international actors have played different roles. A key political and development question is the extent to which the international actors imposed their models on local actors and, conversely, the extent to which there was local ownership of reconstruction programmes.

- An analysis of changes in security co-operation between major powers and fragile states. During the Cold War this co-operation was based on partisan ideology, power politics and strategic balancing. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, there was a shift towards security co-operation, under the rubric of “security sector reform” (SSR), which sought to promote democratic norms, respect for human rights and the security of citizens. We want to study whether the security co-operation taking place currently as part of the ‘war on terror’ is reverting back to the Cold War orientation and undermining SSR.

- The processes of “peace making” and “mediation” are central to possibilities for state reconstruction in the wake of war. Our work in this area will focus on the questions “Which strategies have been most successful in bringing opposing parties to the peace table and securing negotiated settlements?”; “Which strategies have heightened the level of tension and conflict?”; and “When is a conflict ripe for resolution?”. In addressing these questions we will consider the military and political balance of power; the role of neighbouring states, regional organisations and major powers; the application of ‘sticks and carrots’; and objective and subjective determinations of a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’.
References


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### Selection of Working Papers from Series 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP14</td>
<td>David Keen</td>
<td>‘Since I am a Dog, Beware my Fangs: Beyond a ‘rational violence’ framework in the Sierra Leonean war’</td>
<td>August 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP16</td>
<td>Suzette Heald</td>
<td>‘Domesticating Leviathan: Sungusungu groups in Tanzania’</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP17</td>
<td>Hugh Roberts</td>
<td>‘Moral Economy or Moral Polity? The political anthropology of Algerian riots’</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP21</td>
<td>Victoria Brittain</td>
<td>‘Women in War and Crisis Zones: One key to Africa’s wars of under-development’</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP24</td>
<td>Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín</td>
<td>‘Hyper-fragmentation and Traditional Politics in Colombia: Discussing Alternative Explanations’</td>
<td>March 2003, revised September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP27</td>
<td>Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín</td>
<td>‘Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience’</td>
<td>April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP29</td>
<td>Jean-Paul Faguet</td>
<td>‘Decentralisation and local government in Bolivia’</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP31</td>
<td>Robert Hunter Wade</td>
<td>‘What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The World Trade Organisation and the shrinking of ‘development space’</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP34</td>
<td>Hugh Roberts</td>
<td>‘North African Islamism in the Blinding Light of 9-11’</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP35</td>
<td>Dennis Rodgers</td>
<td>‘Dying For It: Gangs, Violence and Social Change in Urban Nicaragua’</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP37</td>
<td>David Keen</td>
<td>‘Demobilising Guatemala’</td>
<td>November 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP40</td>
<td>Ann C. Mason</td>
<td>‘Constructing Authority Alternatives in Colombia: Globalisation and the Transformation of Governance’</td>
<td>February 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP46</td>
<td>Jonathan DiJohn</td>
<td>‘The Political Economy of Economic Liberalisation in Venezuela’</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP48</td>
<td>Jo Beall, Sibongiseni Mkhiize &amp; Shahid Vawda</td>
<td>‘Traditional Authority, Institutional Multiplicity and Political Transition in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP52</td>
<td>Manorama Sharma</td>
<td>‘Critically Assessing Traditions: The Case of Meghalaya’</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP54</td>
<td>Jo Beall</td>
<td>‘Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa’</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP55</td>
<td>Laurie Nathan</td>
<td>‘Security Communities and the Problem of Domestic Instability’</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP59</td>
<td>Jo Beall</td>
<td>‘Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South Africa’</td>
<td>January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP60</td>
<td>Manoj Srivastava</td>
<td>‘Crafting Democracy and Good Governance in Local Arenas: Theory, Dilemmas and their Resolution through the Experiments in Madhya Pradesh, India?’</td>
<td>April 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP62</td>
<td>Jean-Paul Faguet</td>
<td>‘The Effects of Decentralisation on Public Investment: Evidence and Four Lessons from Bolivia and Colombia’</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP67</td>
<td>Antonio Giustozzi</td>
<td>‘The Ethnicisation of an Afghan faction: Junbesh-i-milli from its origins to the presidential elections (2004)’</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP68</td>
<td>Andrew Fischer</td>
<td>‘Close Encounters of the Inner Asian Kind: Tibetan-Muslim co-existence and conflict in Tibet past and present’,</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP73</td>
<td>Giovanni Carbone</td>
<td>‘Populism Visits Africa: the case of Yoweri Museveni and no-party democracy in Uganda’</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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