Discussion Paper 16

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE TO PROMOTE AFRICAN STABILITY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PROSPERITY

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April 2009

Crisis States Discussion Papers
ISSN 1742-6634 (print)
ISSN 1742-6626 (online)

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Crisis States Discussion Paper

Building an Effective African Standby Force to Promote African Stability, Conflict Resolution and Prosperity

Jeffery E. Marshall1

‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.’

Chinese Proverb

The African continent is perhaps the last significant developmental challenge in the world. Jeffery Sachs (2005) states that Africa was left behind in the last wave of development and the prospects of a new developmental wave are uncertain. While there are still pockets of concern in Asia, the last developmental wave greatly benefited Asia and not Africa. Accordingly, Sachs thinks the developed world must act decisively to assist Africa. The problem is even more significant now that the developed world is concerned about recessions and financial collapse in key sectors. While there is still an enormous gap between the developed world and most of Africa, the financial crisis will almost certainly have an impact on aid to Africa, and as a result Africa will need to work all the harder at solving its own problems.

African leadership will need to make some difficult choices. With limited resources, where should they invest to further development? Should they invest in developmental efforts, economic programmes, debt payments or security? In many ways, security is at the base of a hierarchy of needs. Without this solid base, Africa will continue to languish with sluggish development. While security is not a sufficient condition for development, it is a necessary condition and this condition is not present, or not sufficiently present, in many areas of the African continent. As a result, putting money into developmental efforts in unstable areas will be problematic and significantly more costly.

Just as the global financial crisis may have significant impacts on economic and developmental assistance, it may likewise have a major impact on peacekeeping forces from the developed world. For example, the European Union (EU) is currently debating whether to send additional troops to DRC. The decision makers appear to lean towards not sending troops. Yet the situation is critical:

‘Oxfam says the EU foreign ministers meeting in the French city of Marseille should agree to provide troops as support for the UN’s peacekeeping force in the eastern DRC. The agency says this will help aid agencies to deliver assistance in the area. The group says the EU is well placed to rapidly provide the additional

1 Brigadier General Jeffery Marshall is currently the Director of Mobilization and Reserve Affairs at the US European Command, where he was previously the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans and Assessments and the Assistant Foreign Policy Advisor. He was the US Ground Force Commander in Bosnia during SFOR X and led the multinational team in Afghanistan that designed the Afghan National Army and built its initial organisation, training programmes, recruiting policies, sustainment programmes and bases.
troops that the people of the DRC desperately need.’ (SABC News, November 3, 2008)

In addition, the European forces are already heavily committed to supporting other operations, such as in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Given budgetary pressures on the military and an already strained force structure, the EU may have difficulty in sending forces for peacekeeping in Africa.

Likewise, the UN may become increasingly short of resources to support African peacekeeping operations. Overall, the UN peacekeeping budget has risen 50 percent since 2005, with much of this growth resulting from operations in Africa. Currently, the UN has seven such operations involving approximately 45,000 troops, plus police and other personnel, at a cost of US$4.3 billion a year (see Annex A). The operation in the DRC is the largest the UN runs and it looks likely that it needs to grow even larger to be effective.

As a result, over the next several years Africa may need to conduct more of its own peacekeeping operations. These operations are vital to Africa for two reasons. First, without peace, there will be no prosperity. Second, given the economic situation, the developed world will be far less inclined to invest in unstable situations. Africa must provide the security to induce foreign aid and investment. The African Union (AU) clearly understands this situation. In May 2003, AU defence chiefs agreed on a framework for an African Standby Force (ASF), designed to put a multinational standby brigade in each of the regional economic communities (RECs, see Figure 1) (AU 2005). The goal is to have deployable brigades in each of the African regions available for peacekeeping and other contingency operations.

The ASF promises a capability to provide peace and stability to the African continent. However, it has been unable to live up to its promises primarily because it is handicapped by

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**Figure 1: African Regional Economic Communities**

The ASF promises a capability to provide peace and stability to the African continent. However, it has been unable to live up to its promises primarily because it is handicapped by
inadequate command, control and support systems. Without these capabilities the ASF cannot deploy and conduct prolonged peace operations. Currently, virtually all of the training and development for the ASF is devoted to training infantry battalions. In order to allow the ASF to achieve its full potential and capabilities, the AU and the international community need to develop effective command, control and support systems for the ASF as well as the support structure to sustain ASF capabilities. At the stand-up ceremony for US African Command (USAFRICOM) in October 2008, Brigadier General Jean De Martha Jaotody, Head of the AU’s Operations and Peace Support Unit, articulated the need to establish these systems to make the ASF more effective. This discussion paper assesses the weaknesses of the ASF’s capabilities, and offers some recommendations as to how the ASF may be strengthened.

**African Standby Force**

The nations of Africa formed the AU from the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity by the Constitutive Act in 2000 and officially launched it at the Durban Summit in 2002. It consists of all the nations in Africa except Morocco. Their goal was to provide a more cohesive organisation to improve African unity, promote peace, human rights and good governance and promote development (AU 2000). While this is a noble vision, the AU has very few sovereign powers to achieve it. It has a pan-African Parliament and operates largely through the AU Commission (AUC) and eight RECs. While the AU declares African unity, it still remains largely a coalition of the willing with limited ability to drive solutions throughout the continent. The ASF, requiring cooperation from both the AUC and the RECs, could be an important step toward achieving this vision if it is successful.

The RECs pre-date the AU and are an integral part of the African Economic Community. They are critical centres of cooperation and discussion. While they do not have sovereign powers, they are more homogenous than Africa as a whole. Thus, the countries in a REC tend to have more common interests than countries further apart. The REC leadership (the heads of state and government in the countries that comprise the REC) determines the employment of the ASF brigade within the region, assuming the brigade is ready for deployment. It also discusses deploying forces of individual nations within the region. However, since the REC is not sovereign, it can neither prevent nor compel individual national action. The 2008 debates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) over deployments to DRC are an example. SADC elected not to send troops, but one of its members, Angola, did. Likewise, SADC debates over Zimbabwe show the dynamics of REC decision making and the ability of one country in a REC to forestall collective action. Militarily, the REC leadership can prevent use of the ASF brigade but can neither compel the use of individual national military forces, even if they are part of the brigade, nor prevent individual national deployments.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) provides the policy oversight for peace and security operations in Africa. It coordinates overall policy development, the roadmap for the ASF and the Continental Early Warning System. The AUC (2002) gives it the key purpose of being ‘a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’. The same document indicates the structures for the PSC to accomplish this purpose, stating that it ‘shall be supported by the

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2 The author was present at the USAFRICOM Standup Ceremony at Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
3 Morocco is not a member primarily because of the dispute over Western Sahara.
Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund’. The PSC’s objectives, which should guide the strategy and employment of the ASF, are to:

- Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
- Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the PSC shall have the responsibility to undertake peace making and peace building functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
- Promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
- Co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
- Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
- Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

The AUC’s Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) is the primary action arm of the Council. It plans and coordinates peace operations in Africa. In order to create the ASF, the AU developed a roadmap in March 2005, which envisions developing the ASF in two phases (AU 2005):

- **Phase One** (up to 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective would be to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions (see Table 1), while RECs/regions would complement the AU by establishing regional standby forces up to a brigade size to achieve up to Scenario 4;
- **Phase Two** (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged that, by the year 2010, the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs/regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4, involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces.
### Table 1. ASF Design Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days from an AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force in 14 days.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the time the AU drafted the framework, the UN had conducted seven peacekeeping operations in Africa, with at least one more in Sudan on the table. The AU wanted to take over the entire operation in the Sudan. However, they soon realised that they did not have the operational reach to deploy and sustain the peacekeeping operation with only African forces. The mission in Darfur is now a hybrid UN-AU mission. Likewise, the AU has had trouble maintaining African forces in Somalia. To date, the ASF has achieved Scenario 4 only as part of a broader UN-peacekeeping operation. Arguably, therefore, the AU still has not completed the Phase I goal. The PSC is operational, but given the inability to complete the formation of the Regional brigades to date, Phase I is still ongoing. Nevertheless, AU participation in several UN operations is encouraging.

The ASF is designed to have five brigades, one in each region (North, West, Central, East and South), coordinated by the PSC/PSD. The brigade structure is shown in Figure 2. It has a headquarters unit, four infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance element, an aviation element, a communications element, a military police element, a forward logistics element (or forward support battalion), a medical element, military observers and a civil support element.

This structure provides virtually all of the capabilities a brigade will need in a peace operation. It has enough combat power for both force protection and to conduct operations. It provides a reconnaissance element to gather information. The helicopter element can both augment the reconnaissance element and provide transportation and logistics support, depending upon the helicopter type(s). Military police provide the capability to manage detention facilities or to patrol supply routes. The signals element should be able to provide basic support to the brigade headquarters. The military observers group provides the capability to monitor ceasefires and other agreements. The engineer element, depending upon its structure, provides the capability for brigade support and humanitarian assistance. Depending upon the construct of the civilian support group, it may provide excellent liaison with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private voluntary organisations (PVOs) and
international governmental organisations (IGOs), as well as some degree of civic action capability.

There are, however, a few caveats:

- Virtually anywhere the brigade operates will be an austere environment, with little or no viable infrastructure and food supply. Therefore, the brigade will need to be self-supporting. The small logistics battalion may be stretched quite hard to meet the demands of an austere environment.

- The brigade has a large number of vehicles and four helicopters. These will put a significant strain on the brigade’s maintenance capabilities. The problem will be compounded if the equipment is not standardised. Multiple vehicle types will require a significantly larger stock of spare parts and trained mechanics.

- The engineer element is undefined in the structure. Engineers can run the gamut from light sappers to heavy construction units. Sappers provide limited construction capability, but are highly deployable and useful in combat operations for some mobility and counter mobility tasks. Heavy construction engineers have a far higher transportation requirement, but provide excellent capabilities to support a brigade in an austere environment and for humanitarian support.

- Depending on the environment, the military police capability may be far too small. Military police may be required for headquarters security, detainee-camp security, displaced persons security, route security and law enforcement. Recent peace operations have shown the need for all of these functions. The small military police element can accomplish only one of these tasks well.

- The communications element may be stretched very hard depending upon the size of the brigade’s area of operations and the type of equipment and systems

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Figure 2. ASF Brigade Structure
See Annex B for explanation of military symbols
in use. If the communications equipment and systems are not standardised, the element may have a very difficult time maintaining communications.

- While the brigade may have adequate command and control capabilities for tactical operations, it is clearly not robust enough for operational command requirements. The AU will require the ability to not only provide tactical command in a crisis, but also manage the overall crisis response that includes far more than military tactical command. Under the present construct there is the AU PSD and the ASF brigades. There is no operational level of command.

- There is no explicit civil affairs capability. While this could reside in the Civil Support Group (CSG), such a capability is invaluable in peace operations to help manage displaced persons and refugees and provide military liaisons to NGOs and PVOs.

- There is no explicit public affairs department. If this is not in the CSG it is a critical weakness. Public affairs is important in virtually any operation, especially peace operations when the command needs to ensure that it is getting key messages out to the populace, the belligerent parties and NGOs, PVOs and IGOs.

- Legal and contracting functions may be in the CSG. If not, they need to be included.

- Special operations forces are an excellent force multiplier and training force that can be used for many different tasks if properly trained. They may also be extremely useful for extreme operations that involve extracting critical personnel in emergencies.

Some of these capabilities, such as special operations forces, civil affairs and military police, may be difficult to properly train and maintain. The AU may want to consider creating a centralised operations support group that contains some of these capabilities. These issues will be discussed further below.

**Developing an Effective ASF**

The AU has conducted three peace operations to date in Africa, with varying degrees of success (see Annex C), and the African infantry battalions have performed well in these. Their performance validates African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and other training programmes, with ACOTA-trained battalions having been deployed in several peace operations. The problems African forces have experienced lie primarily in command, control and logistics. Command and control issues range from tactical communications to arranging operational command lines in multi-national efforts. Logistics issues range from deploying forces across a huge continent to sustaining operations and supporting humanitarian relief. Many of the problems the AU has in command and control are not that different from the problems experienced by the EU and NATO. All three organisations operate on a national consensus basis and cannot compel an individual member state to provide forces. Consensus must be forged before an operation is approved and once approved, the consensus then drives objectives. All three organisations then need to solicit forces from troop-contributing countries. Once a force is deployed, national caveats from these countries can significantly constrain an operational commander’s flexibility and ability
to plan and conduct operations. However, in spite of these challenges, all three organisations have successfully deployed forces in contingency operations.

The US and the EU both provide significant assistance to the AU to help build its peace operations capability and capacity. While efforts like the Africa Clearing House help to synchronise efforts, there are still problems with coordination and overlapping programmes. If the US and the EU want to help the AU more effectively, these efforts need to be better synchronised and they need to look beyond the easy target of training infantry battalions.

The current ASF structure envisions a decentralised brigade structure based in the RECs with an executive structure in the AU. Given the current state of ASF development and the scarcity of some resources, the AU may want to reconsider certain aspects of the structure. While the decentralised brigade structure makes sense from a regional perspective, the simultaneous development of critical capabilities may prove difficult. In addition, the RECs have differing capacities to develop the brigade structures envisioned in the ASF. The AU needs to develop an effective military structure that provides centralised planning and support and decentralised execution. At present, the AU does not have adequate capabilities at either the centralised AU level or down at the RECs.

Rather than delegate virtually all operational structures to the RECs the AU may want to consider centralising some of the critical, hard to train and sustain capabilities and improve the central PSD capability to plan and control operations. With this approach, the RECs can focus on training effective infantry battalions and the immediate command, control and logistics capabilities required by the battalions during operations.

While African forces have been involved in some combat during peace operations, the majority of these incidents were self-defence. If the AU participates in Scenario 6 events (see Table 2), there is a strong likelihood that AU forces will engage in active combat. The crisis in Zimbabwe is a potential example. The prime minister of Kenya proposed a non-permissive operation in Zimbabwe in the face of a cholera epidemic and Mugabe’s criminal government (Chicago Tribune, November 18, 2008).4 Such an operation will almost certainly involve combat operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Advice</td>
<td>• Permissive</td>
<td>• Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited or no local logistical support</td>
<td>• Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All internal tasks</td>
<td>• All internal tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Observer (UN)</td>
<td>• Permissive</td>
<td>• Peace monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited or no local logistical support</td>
<td>• Truce/treaty monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civilians/potential refugees</td>
<td>• All internal tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NGO/PVO/IGO liaison</td>
<td>• NGO/PVO/IGO liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Observer (AU)</td>
<td>• Permissive</td>
<td>• Peace monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited or no local logistical support</td>
<td>• Truce/treaty monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civilians/potential refugees</td>
<td>• Potential NGO/PVO/IGO liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All internal tasks</td>
<td>• All internal tasks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Permissive operations imply the cooperation or at least the non-opposition of all parties in the situation. Non-permissive operations mean that at least one party will oppose the intervention, potentially with military force.
| 4 AU peace building | • Permissive  
• Limited or no local logistical support  
• Civilians/potential refugees | • Peace monitoring  
• Potential peace enforcement  
• Potential disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration  
• Treaty/truce monitoring  
• Movement control  
• Potential humanitarian assistance support  
• Potential NGO/PVO/IGO liaison  
• Potential security-sector reform and law enforcement/training  
• Potential non-combatant evacuation operations  
• Potential extremis force  
• All internal tasks |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5 AU Peacekeeping   | • Permissive  
• Limited or no local logistical support  
• Civilians/potential refugees | • Peace monitoring  
• Peace enforcement  
• Potential disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration  
• Potential humanitarian assistance support  
• Treaty/truce monitoring  
• Movement control  
• Potential sanctions enforcement  
• Potential security-sector reform and law enforcement/training  
• NGO/PVO/IGO liaison  
• Potential non-combatant evacuation operations  
• All internal tasks |
| 6 AU Intervention   | • Non-permissive  
• Humanitarian assistance requirements  
• Civilians/refugees  
• Limited infrastructure/support  
• Crisis response | • Peace making  
• Potential regime change  
• Humanitarian assistance support  
• Movement control  
• Potential disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration  
• NGO/PVO/IGO liaison  
• All internal tasks  
• Security-sector reform and law enforcement/training  
• Potential non-combatant evacuation operations  
• Potential extremis force |

We can use the matrix above (Table 2) to develop a list of the capabilities the ASF requires to support likely operations. The matrix below (Table 3) lists the tasks and determines whether there are shortfalls in the ASF structure. As the AU looks at the capability requirements, it
needs to determine what it needs to develop itself and what it can potentially draw upon from the UN, other organisations such as the EU and donor nations.

**Table 3. Task/Capability Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Capability in ASF Structure?</th>
<th>Additional Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace making</td>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace monitoring</td>
<td>Infantry battalions/military observer group (MOG)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truce/treaty enforcement/monitoring</td>
<td>MOG/Infantry battalions</td>
<td>May require technical augmentation depending on requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration</td>
<td>MOG/CSG?</td>
<td>Will require significant augmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee and/or denial of movement</td>
<td>MOG/Infantry battalions</td>
<td>May require augmentation depending on scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of sanctions</td>
<td>MOG</td>
<td>May require technical augmentation depending on requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible separation of belligerents</td>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian support</td>
<td>Limited to non-existent</td>
<td>Requires a far more robust civil affairs and logistics capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Requires a far more robust civil affairs and logistics capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence management</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Will require technical support depending on the scope of the requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison with NGO/PVO/IGO</td>
<td>CSG?</td>
<td>Potentially very limited capability. May require civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustain the force</td>
<td>Support battalion and medical company - limited</td>
<td>Current structure of the brigade’s support battalion may not provide sufficient capability to sustain the full brigade in an extended peace operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide operational command and control</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There is no operational headquarters structure in the ASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide tactical command and control</td>
<td>Brigade HQ and signal company</td>
<td>Can provide support for internal brigade operations, but most likely cannot provide support for an AU mission headquarters and support to other organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather information/intelligence</td>
<td>Recon troops</td>
<td>Limited or no sensor capabilities. Limited analytical capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the force</td>
<td>Limited capabilities in infantry battalions and medical company</td>
<td>Limited. Can provide counter terrorist force protection, but limited to no force protection for disease and other protection issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pent</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-sector reform</td>
<td>Limited to none</td>
<td>ASF Infantry may be helpful, however, security-sector reform requires an extensive systemic effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement/training</td>
<td>None – military police capability will be completely used for internal requirements</td>
<td>Needs augmentation depending on requirements. Training will require a training organisation and parallel structure to the military force within the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremis force</td>
<td>No explicit capability</td>
<td>May require highly trained units to extract high value personnel/personnel with designated security status from dangerous situations or to extract units that are in danger of being overwhelmed. This could run the gamut from a special operations forces capability to an armour capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
<td>No explicit capability</td>
<td>Will require combat forces and mobility forces, as well as civil affairs. Capability requirements will depend on whether the situation in permissive or non-permissive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To accomplish any task beyond Scenario 2, the AU may consider developing a Central Operations Support Group (COSG) that could support all operations as shown in Figure 3. Such an organisation will provide many of the capabilities identified as shortfalls in Table 3. This is a very robust structure that will take some time to develop. It will also require a great deal of thought on stationing, solicitations from troop-contributing countries and operations-deployment doctrine. It will also require a significant amount of training to become effective. These challenges will necessitate a great deal of cooperation both within the AU and with donor nations. The investment, however, will be worth it to provide an effective ASF that can deploy, conduct operations and sustain itself with less support from the UN and other organisations.

Complementary to this effort, the AU may want to consider streamlining the brigade structures to make them more deployable and sustainable. An example structure is shown in Figure 4. This structure removes the engineer and aviation elements that may be difficult to train and sustain at a regional level. It focuses the support elements solely on supporting the brigade forces and does not anticipate using internal brigade support elements for observer, humanitarian assistance and civil affairs support. These functions will be performed by units from the COSG.
In order to mitigate the challenges, the COSG should be developed in a phased manner over several years. Phase I, depicted in Figure 5, provides key capabilities that can be used to support a single contingency operation and to train AU peace-operations forces. Subsequent phases could expand this capability to the full COSG that can support multiple contingency operations as well as large scale operations that require more than a brigade-sized element. An example could include a failed state and operations in Scenarios 5 and 6.

As the AU looks to improve its capabilities and capacity to undertake Scenarios 4 to 6, it will need to improve its command and control and logistics capabilities. It will also need to
develop an internal training organisation that will ensure common doctrine, standards, tactics, techniques and procedures across the ASF, as well as continue to train AU forces.

Command and control is critical to any operation, but perhaps even more so in a peace operation given the complexities of the requirements. It is even more complex in the multinational operations that are typical in African peace operations. The very nature of the ASF requires virtually every operation to be multinational. This means that the ASF will need to establish common doctrine, systems, tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the ASF. Without these commonalities, ASF units will not collaborate properly and the chance for fratricide and other problems rises significantly.

There are two key problems arise in multinational operations. First, each country brings its own national caveats to the operation. The caveats limit what the forces can and cannot do. For example, one nation in an operation may not be able to conduct combat operations, while another can. The commander must understand the caveats and organise the forces appropriately. As he looks at the tasks that he must accomplish in the operation, he must select the appropriate forces depending on caveats and must balance operational impacts. As he makes critical decisions, he may need to have the national support elements for each country yet new missions. This could slow decision-making and response times. The more the national support elements can establish upfront, the greater the flexibility the force commander will have. When the AU constitutes a force, it should clearly define missions, ensure the nations that provide forces understand the requirements and attempt to minimise the caveats and work out as many details before the force is committed. This could well mean that the PSD staffing needs to be increased to improve its planning and coordination capabilities. For example, during the planning for AMISOM the UN needed to provide additional planning capabilities for the PSD to develop the concept of operations (Derblim et al. 2008: 37).

Second, each nation has its own command and control systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. This will severely impact on operational control and flexibility if the forces cannot operate together. The problem may be even more severe if forces come from multiple REC nations. The more the AU can standardise systems and processes, the greater flexibility it will have in creating quick response forces. Potentially, the AU can draw some lessons from NATO’s interoperability programmes as well as the EU’s Eurocorps. The more the ASF exercise together, the more interoperable they will become. Exercises such as African
Endeavor and the Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities (RECAMP) exercises are critical. The PSD should incorporate lessons learned from these exercises into a common ASF interoperability programme and doctrine. They should also ensure that all training programmes reflect this doctrine. Chapters X and XII of the Roadmap address the need for these requirements. The PSD must be given the capability and the authority to ensure they are met.

The Roadmap specifies a fifteen-person planning element (PLANELM) at each REC to support the brigades. This structure is shown in Figure 6. With eight staff sections and a chief of staff, this structure does not provide a great deal of capacity to meet the interoperability and planning requirements. The AU may want to consider expanding this capability to ensure that each REC has the capacity to plan and coordinate training and to ensure compliance with interoperability requirements.

The proposed brigade headquarters may not be sufficient for the requirements of complex peace operations. While the brigade headquarters should be able to provide tactical control over brigade operations, it almost certainly will not be able to provide overall operational control except for small-scale operations. Operational command and control during a contingency operation is extremely complex. It requires the ability to integrate civil-military operations, interface with senior level officials from the UN and NGOs, PVOs and IGOs. It also requires the ability to set conditions that allow for the tactical command and control to function properly. These include developing the logistical infrastructure support, coordinating air support, developing the communications infrastructure support and ensuring the flow of supplies and personnel. It also entails a significant strategic communications capability, which is not present in the brigade structure, to manage public affairs and ensure consistency of the messages. Public affairs cannot be neglected in a crisis.

Neither the PSD nor the brigades have these capabilities. The PLANELM has some of these capabilities, but is too small for an operational headquarters. At best, it can provide the kernel

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5 African Endeavor is a US sponsored command and control exercise that brings together nations from throughout Africa and selected European partners to exercise command control and communications interoperability.
for one. Therefore, under the current construct an operational headquarters must be constituted on the fly. This situation complicates the stand-up of a crisis-response team, complicates decision making and brings together an ad hoc team that may never have trained or worked together.

The AU should develop a deployable headquarters that can function as the core of a mission. The Eurocorps provides a robust structure for both EU and NATO operations. It includes a command and staff as well as a support brigade, and has successfully conducted operations as part of Stabilisation Force in Bosnia, Kosovo Force in Kosovo and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. With a trained and deployable headquarters, the AU could quickly create a mission structure for contingency operations and ensure an adequate operational command capability. The headquarters in the proposed COSG could form the basis for this headquarters, but it should be fully engaged in ensuring the ASF is properly trained and supported. A separate operational headquarters similar to Eurocorps would provide a better structure.

Interoperable command and control systems are vital to the success of any multinational operation. These systems need to provide commanders with situational awareness, decision-support tools and the ability to rapidly communicate decisions and orders. All nations in the task force need to use the same systems, databases and communications protocols. These need to be regularly practised during exercises such as African Endeavor. Given the huge distances in Africa, an effective command and control system will require satellite communications, wide area networks, as well as local area networks. ASF forces will need to rapidly establish these systems in austere environments and provide communications and command and control throughout the area of operations. In addition, they may need to provide integration and potential support for NGOs, IGOs and PVOs that are supporting humanitarian efforts. Thus, they will need both closed, secure communications networks as well as well-policed open and integrated networks.

*Logistics* are the heart of any peace operation, especially in Africa. The tyranny of distance and the austere environment in which most peace operations occur require a well-developed, deployable logistics capability and concept of support. The ASF must be able to deploy to the area of operations, and then support itself in an austere environment. Currently, the AU is dependent upon donor nations such as the US to provide airlift support for the ASF. While this has worked to date, the AU cannot always guarantee this lift will be available. Lift is a high use asset with considerable demands placed upon it. When a crisis breaks, the US and other nations may not have the spare capacity to provide timely lift.

There are three solutions beyond donor lift support. First, the AU may use existing lift assets from countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Some of these countries provided lift support in past operations. Unfortunately, these aircraft are often poorly maintained and there may be pilot shortages. In many cases, African nations obtained aircraft without developing the required support systems to train pilots and maintain the aircraft. The clear need for US and other support seems to indicate that these assets are not sufficient. Second, the AU may investigate contract airlift. Private sector contractors have been used effectively in a variety of operations (for example NATO’s Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, SALIS). However, contract airlift presents two problems: it is expensive, and almost certainly the AU will require donors to pay; and simply relying upon contract airlift will not help to build ASF capability and capacity. Third, the AU could start building its own airlift capability. This option could build upon the existing national capabilities noted above.
The NATO Strategic Airlift Capacity (NSAC) programme could provide an example of how the AU can pool resources to develop an ASF airlift capability. NSAC is a multinational air wing in which participating countries support the effort and essentially have a timeshare of the aircraft. The heavy air wing component provides command and control, airlift squadron and maintenance capabilities. While NSAC is a C-17 aircraft programme, the AU may consider an initial C-130 programme that could later include C-17s as it gains experience. A combination of a programme like SALIS/NSAC, contractors and NATO support could provide an effective way to develop an ASF airlift capability.

Sustainment is as much a mindset as it is an actual capability. Without a culture of sustainment, the ASF simply will not be able to sustain capabilities that it develops or support operations in austere environments. The recommended COSG provides the structure to support operations and provide systemic sustainment. However, simply creating the organisation is not enough. The ASF must also create a sustainment culture. This may be the single biggest obstacle the AU will face. The sustainment organisation will require an ability to deploy sustainment packages\(^6\) to peace operations. As the AU considers how to build and deploy these packages it must determine how the COSG should be organised and where it should be located.

Broadly speaking the COSG can be organised functionally or operationally. In the functional structure (Figure 3), functions are grouped together to provide effective functional leadership and training. This makes it far easier to train units and to sustain them. However, during deployment, the AU will need to tailor sustainment packages from this structure and create a deployable task organisation. Alternatively, the COSG can be organised around pre-built Area Support Groups (ASG). A potential ASG structure is shown in Figure 7. The ASG model has the advantage of creating deployable structures and continually training as a sustainment team. However, it may not be able to provide proper training for the functions or to sustain them.

Location likewise presents two choices. If the COSG is centralised, its command and control and training will be far more effective. However, the central location could be distant from potential operational areas, making it difficult to deploy sustainment packages. Dispersing the COSG via ASGs, potentially co-located with ASF brigades, could reduce deployment problems, but would significantly increase command and control and training problems.

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\(^6\) A sustainment package is a tailored group of units, supplies and services organised to meet specific functional requirements.
Training and an effective training system provide the capability to build and sustain the capabilities and capacity the AU will need for an effective ASF. As discussed above, Africa already has several training institutions and partner training programmes. These programmes and institutions need to be linked together into an integrated training system that allows the ASF to develop and propagate a cohesive doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and processes. The proposed COSG has a training headquarters built into it to help develop the training-management system. This headquarters should be the focal point for all doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and processes. It should develop standards and certify that all training centres and facilities meet them. It should also work with partners to ensure that all peace-operations capacity-building programmes develop the required capacity and assist in sustaining it through an effective training and exercise programme. Eventually, the training headquarters in the COSG may be moved into a separate function and report directly to the PSD. If the AU adopts an ASG organisation structure for the COSG, then the training organisation should include a robust training capability for the functional units.

Capacity building must be the AU’s number one priority. None of the ASF brigades is on track to meet the targets laid out in the Roadmap. While most RECs are able to field the core infantry battalions, they are having difficulties with the other units. In addition, as experience in several AU peace operations has demonstrated, the AU needs to build far more robust command and control and sustainment capabilities if it wants to establish an effective ASF. First, the AU must determine what the ASF needs – what kinds of capabilities does it require? Second, the AU must determine which RECs and/or countries have the resources and support structure required to build and sustain the capability. Third, the AU must then decide who has the will to do it – not just to build the capacity, but to actually deploy it in support of AU operations. Table 4 summarises the capabilities that are required if the AU is to develop an effective ASF that can conduct peace operations throughout Africa.

As the AU looks to determine where to build capacity, it must ensure that it selects RECs and countries that can actually build and sustain this capacity. Building a unit may be easy. Donor nations may provide equipment and training. Sustaining what is built is a far more complex task. The AU will need to ensure that it can maintain the equipment, recruit and train new soldiers and pay for the unit on an ongoing basis. In some cases, no single AU country may be able to build and sustain critical capabilities. Therefore, the AU may need to
consider creating units that are formed from multiple countries and are centrally located for these capabilities. The Eurocorps French-German brigade could provide an example of how to build and sustain multinational units. SALIS and NSAC also provide models the AU may be able to modify to meet its needs.

The AU must ensure that any country that it selects to build capacity also has the will to deploy the capacity to support peace operations. Building capacity in countries that will not support continent-wide peace operations will only waste precious resources. Some countries, such as Ghana and Rwanda, have clearly demonstrated the will to deploy forces in peace operations. Other countries have shown far less desire to deploy forces.

Table 4 Capacity Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat operations</td>
<td>ASF Brigades</td>
<td>ACOTA trained with experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy forces</td>
<td>COSG</td>
<td>Currently, limited to no capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace support</td>
<td>ASF Brigades</td>
<td>May require augmentation depending on scope. Consider expanded MOG in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COSG with technical capabilities for disarmament, demobilisation and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reintegration, and treaty/sanction enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational command</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Consider a smaller scale of a Eurocorps-like organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian support</td>
<td>COSG</td>
<td>Currently, limited to no capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response/consequence management</td>
<td>COSG</td>
<td>Currently, limited to no capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-sector reform</td>
<td>COSG/PSD</td>
<td>Currently, limited to no capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement/training</td>
<td>External to ASF</td>
<td>Currently, limited to no capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Reaction force/extremis force/ non-</td>
<td>COSG</td>
<td>Special operations forces, but may need to consider a central armour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combatant evacuation operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and doctrine</td>
<td>COSG</td>
<td>This is a capability to create and sustain capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the AU needs to consider the geopolitical aspects of where it will build capacity. Given the lack of airlift, the AU will need to ensure not only that the capacity it creates meets the three tests above, but also that it can actually be deployed in peace operations. Capacity where it cannot be used is simply not effective. In addition, the AU needs to consider the inter-country dynamics and potential rivalries for capacity manifestation. Finally, the AU needs to consider whether building capacity in a nation could, in the future, be used by that country in hostile actions against other AU countries. Rwanda could be an example. There is evidence that members of the Rwandan army are taking part in the hostile actions of the DRC rebel forces (World News, December 12, 2008). If former members of the Rwandan Army are involved, there is a potential that ACOTA-trained troops are participating in and perpetuating the conflict. Rwanda denies the allegations.
The bulk of the conflicts on the continent are in central Africa in a belt running from Guinea through Eritrea, and this is likely to continue. The major outlier is Zimbabwe, which could turn hot at almost any time. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is clearly positioned proximate to this belt and has the most experience with peace operations. In addition, the countries in ECOWAS have some of the most developed training capabilities in Africa. Within ECOWAS, Ghana perhaps combines the necessary elements of stability, infrastructure and will to employ forces for peace operations. Nigeria also has both the infrastructure and the will to deploy forces; however, its stability could be lower than that of Ghana. The AU may want to consider developing the core of a COSG in Ghana and surrounding countries.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The AU has the desire to establish the capability to conduct African peace operations to promote stability and set the conditions for prosperity in Africa. The ASF roadmap discusses virtually all of the capabilities required to do this. However, the roadmap invests most of the responsibility and capabilities with the RECs and the standby brigades in the RECs. While the brigade structure will be effective once it is brought online, it simply will not be able to provide the capabilities required for Scenarios 4 and higher. The AU needs to consider ways to develop the additional capabilities required for these scenarios, which are the key to promoting stability and prosperity in Africa.

With the current global economic conditions, donor resources could become increasingly scarce. The AU, other organisations and donor nations need to develop effective and synchronised programmes to help the AU develop the capabilities envisioned in the roadmap.

Strengthen the AU PSD

The PSD requires additional capacity to properly plan peace operations and ensure that the ASF maintains consistent standards, doctrine and capabilities. The PSD needs to be able to plan ASF development, coordinate the decision making for crisis response and ensure that the ASF implements a consistent, comprehensive doctrine. In addition, the PSD should have the capability and capacity to certify countries so as to ensure they meet AU standards and are not employing AU trained forces in non-AU sanctioned operations. If countries violate AU policies, the PSD should recommend the PSC sanction these countries and suspend them from AU training and funding until the situation is resolved. The UN, EU and NATO should consider assigning planning, training and logistics officers to the PSD in order to assist them in these efforts. This programme should last at least two years and then the UN should maintain a robust liaison office within the PSD to help coordinate further training initiatives and coordinate with the ACH and other assistance efforts.

Synchronise assistance

The Africa Clearing House (ACH) should be strengthened and made a permanent organisation co-located in the AU headquarters to coordinate international support to the AU and ASF. Training programmes should be co-ordinated to ensure they teach an AU sanctioned doctrine and eliminate duplication of efforts where appropriate. The EU and NATO should provide full-time personnel to advise and assist the PSD and the ACH in prioritising and developing training and assistance requirements. With potential funding constraints it is even more important to synchronise efforts and target critical capabilities. The low hanging fruit of infantry battalions has been harvested. Synchronised and well
planned assistance is now required to develop the next level of capability. The EU and potentially NATO are in an excellent position to help synchronise many of these efforts since the largest donors are US and European. The Chinese, however, cannot be left out. The ACH will need to effectively engage and synchronise Chinese assistance. As the AU and ACH coordinate support efforts, they must continually ensure that the ASF develops not only the capability, but also the capacity to sustain the capability. Programmes must be life-cycle programmes rather than simply fielding programmes. They must include provision for continuous training and maintenance.

Build in sustainment to existing training programmes

ACOTA and other training and capacity-building programmes must be modified to train logistics forces. The units in the COSG will need training to ensure they can properly support the entire task force in an austere environment. This will run the range from combat logistics support through setting up and running field hospitals and field sanitation to contracting support and operational logistics planning. PSD and operational headquarters planners need to be included in this training. Training programmes will need to develop not only units, but help to develop a culture of sustainment. The AU cannot afford to have C-130 aircraft grounded because of lack of parts and trained pilots or patrol boats sitting in dry dock waiting for repair. Advantage should be taken of the US Global Peace Operations Initiative for funding. As noted above, this funding includes a plan for sustainment funding. The EU could also provide funding and trainers for logistics training. This should be part of the training network discussed below.

Develop a coordinated, certified training network

The various peace-operations training facilities in Africa should be linked into an AU-certified training and education system. They should teach a common doctrine and processes to ensure that all ASF units are completely interoperable, regardless of their home region. The PSD and COSG should certify the training centres to ensure they are teaching approved doctrine. If centres are not certified, the international community should redirect funding until they are certified. The recommended COSG includes a training headquarters. Over time, the AU may need to move this capability out of the COSG and report directly to the PSD so as to provide the PSD the capabilities it needs. The AU may want to move the training headquarters out of the COSG structure immediately and have it report directly to the PSD. As part of this programme, an operational and tactical doctrine for the ASF should be developed that will be used by all units in the ASF. This doctrine needs to incorporate all facets of the ASF from administration through logistics to combat operations. Consistency will allow the ASF greater interoperability and improve crisis response. The COSG should conduct both training and assessment visits to ASF units to ensure they understand the doctrine and are implementing it within their training and operations. The COSG should also coordinate all training assistance via ACOTA and other training programmes to ensure they teach the approved ASF doctrine.

COSG

A Central Operations Support Group (COSG) should be established to rapidly develop core command and control and sustainment functions. Consideration should be given to locating this in ECOWAS to take advantage of its operational experience, stability and proximity to many of the current peace operations in Africa. Development of the COSG should occur in phases while retaining central AU control. The priority is to develop the core capabilities required for current operations. While airlift will be difficult to develop and to sustain, it is a
critical requirement for any peace operation in Africa. The AU and donor nations should consider a programme like SALIS for targeted airlift capability.

**Develop a deployable operational headquarters**

A deployable operational headquarters needs to be developed to facilitate overall command and control in a crisis. This headquarters must be capable of integrating into an overall AU or UN command structure. It should resemble Eurocorps while being smaller and capable of integrating the existing PLANELM structure into the target REC if required. The AU and EU should cooperate on a phased development of this capability and the AU operational headquarters should provide an observer/liaison to Eurocorps to better understand its organisation and function.

**Streamline the ASF brigade structure**

The ASF brigades should be restructured to focus primarily on their tactical tasks. This will improve the brigade’s ability to both deploy and to sustain capabilities – for example by removing the aviation and engineer elements and placing them in the COSG. These functions are expensive and hard to train, maintain and sustain. Centralisation will reduce expense and provide improved training oversight and potentially deployability. Consideration should also be given to moving the Military Observer Group (MOG) to the COSG. The personnel in the MOG require training in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, observer force, and treaty compliance. This is a complex training requirement the RECs may not be able to maintain. A centralised MOG in the COSG will ensure that trained personnel can readily deploy to meet the tight timelines anticipated in Scenarios 1-3. Priority should be given to training and assistance based upon the RECs cooperation with overall ASF doctrine and policies as well as its progress on the roadmap.
### Annex A. UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MINURCAT</strong></td>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia</td>
<td>271 total uniformed personnel, including 45 military observers and 226 police officers, supported by 272 international civilian personnel, 139 local civilian staff and 70 United Nations Volunteers</td>
<td>US$0.3b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNAMID</strong></td>
<td>Darfur (Sudan)</td>
<td>Military: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, Yemen and Zambia</td>
<td>Strength as of 30 September 2008 10,461 total uniformed personnel, including 8,287 troops, 135 military observers, 2,039 police officers, supported by 633 international civilian personnel, 1,389 local civilian staff and 222 United Nations Volunteers</td>
<td>US$1.6b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MONUC</strong></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia</td>
<td>Current strength (30 September 2008) 18,434 total uniformed personnel, including 16,667 troops, 702 military observers, 1,065 police; 937 international civilian personnel, 2,168 local civilian staff and 552 United Nations Volunteers</td>
<td>US$1.2b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIL</strong></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Military: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Croatia, Czech Republic,</td>
<td>Strength as of 30 September 2008 12,708 total</td>
<td>US$0.6b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>Military: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Togo, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Strength as of 30 September 2008 225 total uniformed personnel, including 20 troops, 6 police officers, 199 military observers; supported by 103 international civilian personnel, 148 local civilian staff and 19 United Nations Volunteers</td>
<td>US$0.05b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>Military: Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay and Zambia</td>
<td>Current strength (31 May 2008) 328 total uniformed personnel, including 240 troops and 81 military observers as well as 151 international civilian personnel, 194 local civilian staff and 61 United Nations Volunteers</td>
<td>US$0.1b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Military: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, China, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,</td>
<td>Strength as of 30 September 2008 9,153 total uniformed personnel, including</td>
<td>US$0.5b.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe

7,827 troops, 190 military observers; 1,136 police; supported by 403 international civilian personnel, 627 local staff and 275 United Nations Volunteers

| TOTALS          | Military: 44,756 | US$4.3B |
Annex B. Military Symbols

Infantry

Engineer

Wheeled Reconnaissance

Light Utility Aviation

Signal

Military Police

Forward Support Battalion

Medical

Support

General Aviation

SOF

Special Operations Forces

CA

Civil Affairs

ASG

Area Support Group

I Company

II Battalion

X Brigade/Group

XX Division
Annex C. AU Peace Operations

The AU formed missions to meet three significant crises since 2004: Burundi, Sudan and Somalia. The UN took over two of the missions and is now contemplating taking over that in Somalia. In addition to these three, Chad and DRC are critical active UN peace operations that employ African as well as other forces, and the UN continues to be involved in several other operations in Africa that are, hopefully, more stable situations (see Annex A). The AU missions in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) provide representative examples to analyse peace operations in Africa and the AU capabilities to meet them. AMIB started before the AU drew up the roadmap for the ASF and perhaps provided some of the background that drove it. AMIS and AMISOM are post-roadmap operations.

AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

The first real test of the AU’s resolve and ability to conduct peace operations was in Burundi. South Africa had originally stepped into the crisis in Burundi. The AU subsequently collected additional troop contributing countries to put together a peacekeeping force for Burundi.

Mission statement (Boshoff and Francis 2003: 41)

The AMIB is to deploy within 60 days of the provision of a mandate to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, in order to further consolidate the peace process in Burundi.

Mandate tasks (Boshoff and Francis: 41-42)

- Act as liaison between the parties;
- Monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;
- Facilitate the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and the technical committees responsible for the establishment of a new National Defence Force and Police Force;
- Facilitate safe passage for the parties (during planned movement to the designed assembly areas);
- Secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
- Facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes;
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- Co-ordinate mission activities with the United Nations’ presence in Burundi;
- Provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders.

AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

Darfur has significant humanitarian support requirements, a tangled political situation with multiple rebel groups fighting the government of Sudan and a challenging logistics requirement given its location. AMIS has been deployed for a period of one-year renewable if need be, to perform the following mandate (AU AMIS website):
• To monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and all such agreements in the future;
• To assist in the process of confidence building;
• To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to their homes, in order to increase the level of compliance of all parties with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.

In all sectors under its jurisdiction, AMIS performs for the benefit of the local populations the following tasks by the deployment of military observers, protection forces as well as civilian and military police from all over Africa:
• Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs;
• Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all parties;
• Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population;
• Monitor and verify efforts of the Government of the Sudan (GoS) to disarm government-controlled militias;
• Investigate and report about allegations of violations of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement;
• Protect civilians that it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS.
• Protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat, and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities;
• Provide a visible military presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.

**AMIS Mandate under the Darfur Peace Agreement**

• Monitor and verify activities of all parties and the security situation in and around areas where a secure environment has been established;
• Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs within the area of responsibility of existing IDP camps, through the NGOs and GoS, in coordination with AMIS CIVPOL;
• Monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities by all parties;
• Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population;
• Monitor and verify attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias;
• Investigate and report all allegations of violations of the ceasefire agreement;
• Protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations;
• Protect observer patrols on vehicle and helicopter-borne deployment as required;
• Be prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within means and capabilities in accordance with the rules of engagement;
• Be prepared to protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and immediate vicinity, within capabilities and in accordance with AMIS rules of engagement;
• Provide visible military presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outpost in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population;
• Provide road security patrols along major lines of communication;
• Carry out preventive deployments as necessary to reduce the incidence of inter-party and inter-tribal attacks.

AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The situation in Somalia combines a humanitarian crisis from severe drought conditions, a failed state and fighting between armed groups. In addition, the rise of piracy off the Somali coast further complicates the situation.

Mission (AU AMISON website)

AMISOM mandated to conduct PSO in Somalia for a limited period of 6 months to stabilise the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the UN.

Tasks

• Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
• Provide protection to the transitional federal institutions and key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions;
• Assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan;
• Provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts;
• Monitor the security situation in areas of operation;
• Facilitate humanitarian operations, including repatriation of refugees and IDPs;
• Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self defence.
Abbreviations

ACOTA  African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
AMIB  AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS  AU Mission in Sudan
AMISOM  AU Mission in Somalia
ASF  African Standby Force
AU  African Union
AUC  African Union Commission
COSG  Central Operations Support Group
CSG  Civil Support Group
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
IGO  International Governmental Organisation
MOG  Military Observer Group
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NSAC  Nato Strategic Airlift Capacity
PSC  AU Peace and Security Council
PSD  AU Peace and Security Directorate
PVO  Private Voluntary Organisation
REC  Regional Economic Community
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SALIS  Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (NATO)
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The Crisis States Research Centre aims to examine and provide an understanding of processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states and to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in these processes. Through rigorous comparative analysis of a carefully selected set of states and of cities, and sustained analysis of global and regional axes of conflict, we aim to understand why some fragile states collapse while others do not, and the ways in which war affects future possibilities of state building. The lessons learned from past experiences of state reconstruction will be distilled to inform current policy thinking and planning.

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**Cities and Fragile States**

**Regional and Global Axes of Conflict**

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