OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES OR NEW WINE IN OLD?
CONCEPTUALISING VIOLENCE AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

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This paper originates in a nagging doubt. For the past eight years, I have been researching non-state manifestations of violence in Nicaragua. Part of the analysis that I have been developing in relation to these associates them to the effective disintegration of the Nicaraguan state. During recent visits to Nicaragua, however, it has become increasingly evident to me that although the Nicaraguan state may have weakened significantly in relation to what it was in the past, and in particular to what it was and was imagined to be in the revolutionary Sandinista era, this does not mean that it is no longer a significant actor within the Nicaraguan social context. Rather, it is increasingly clear to me that the Nicaraguan state has undergone a significant transformation, the nature of which this paper constitutes a first attempt to grasp from an anthropological perspective.

Although the study of order has long been a central topic of interest to the anthropological endeavour, the discipline has traditionally had difficulties clearly conceptualising the institutions of social structuration. This has particularly been the case with regard to the anthropological imagination of the state, perhaps the most critical – certainly the most prominent – of social institutions linked to the constitution and maintenance of order in the modern era.1 On the one hand, as Michael Taussig points out, anthropology is permeated with something of a “peculiar sacred and erotic attraction, even thralldom, combined with disgust” for the state, which he labels a “state fetishism”. 2 On the other hand, there simultaneously exists little in the way of consensus as to what the state actually is, with scholars having treated the phenomenon as “an actual organization”, 3 “an idea as well as a system”, 4 an “ideological object”, 5 a “myth”, 6 or even “a fiction of the philosophers”. 7 Indeed, this

multiplicity of interpretations recently prompted one anthropologist to even go so far as to declare that the idea of the state had suffered “a death by conceptualisation”.  

In many ways, though, the reverse is true, as this diversity of interpretations reveals the state to be a multifaceted phenomenon, with a wide range of effects and consequences. Consequently, in order to comprehend the state, it is perhaps best “to disaggregate [it] into the multitude of discrete operations, procedures, and representations in which it appears in ...everyday life”. Such an enterprise is beyond the scope of this paper, and instead I want to focus my attention on unpacking one specific aspect of the modern state, namely the nature of its ‘governmentality’. The concept of ‘governmentality’ was coined by Michel Foucault, and incorporates both a notion of government and a notion of rationality. In other words, it is a term that refers to the logic of governance, both in terms of its aims and its methods. In this paper, I will limit myself to considering this issue specifically in relation to the constitution and maintenance of a form of social order, and will furthermore concentrate on exploring the potential relationship between this process and the exercise of violence.

The state’s use of violence is one of the most critical issues concerning the analysis of state governmentality. Paraphrasing Candace Vogler and Patchen Markell, violence can in many ways be said to be something of a spectre haunting the notion of the state. From the anonymous Bhagavad Gita to the writings of Max Weber, via those of Plato, St. Augustine, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza, and Karl Marx, among others, the defining image of the state has been one that sees it as a compact between human beings accustomed to the recourse to violence in the process of self-assertion and self-preservation. Individuals surrender their right to fight one another and invest this right to violence in a common sovereign power – the most prominent example being the state – that commands their obedience for the sake of peace, justice, prosperity, and security. This view of state governmentality is widespread, and even to a certain extent rather commonsensical, but it also presents something of a critical paradox. On the one hand, it can be contended that violence constitutes the justification for the state’s existence because of the continuously rumbling threat of violence in a world inhabited by potentially dangerous individuals. On the other hand, however, it can also be maintained that the rationale for the state derives from violence more directly, insofar as the state is conceived as the institutional regulator of society, bringing peace and prosperity to the unruly world of human beings through the exercise of violence.

From this perspective, as Elias, Tilly and Olson put forward in relation to different contexts, the defining quality of the state in effect becomes its use of violence to instrumentally ensure order. This violence is fundamentally different to the individualised violence inherent in

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12 Although states have, of course, varied considerably through history, taking on the multiple guises of divine kingships, plutocracies, liberal democracies, or dictatorships, among others.
what Thomas Hobbes calls the “state of nature”.\textsuperscript{14} It can in many ways be qualified as redemptive violence, a source of salvation in a fallen world, enjoying a special legitimacy that other forms of violence do not. Certainly, as Max Weber famously pointed out, it is the fact that the state has “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” – as opposed to the simple monopoly over violence – that sets it apart from other violent social phenomena.\textsuperscript{15} At the same time, however, Benedict de Spinoza draws attention to the fact that the legitimacy of state violence arises less from its ends and more from the state’s ability to exercise this violence in an effective manner.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, it develops less from the aims of this violence but rather from their actual achievement. This raises a key question that I take as the starting point for my inquiry: what happens when the state lacks the capacity to effectively achieve its ordering endeavour through the exercise of violence?

I begin this paper by considering the premise that patterns of violence have undergone a fundamental shift in contemporary Latin America, from being predominantly state-related forms of political violence to non-state forms of social and economic violence, due to the weakening of states. With reference to the example of Nicaraguan youth gangsterism, I underline the way in which such latter forms of violence can nevertheless constitute modes of social ordering, which suggests that it is important not to underestimate the ontological correspondence between state and non-state forms of violence in Latin America. At the same time, however, this apparent correspondence raises some problematic epistemological issues, which lead me into a discussion of the nature of state governmentality, for which I propose an alternative conception that I then briefly exemplify in the Nicaraguan context. I conclude with some thoughts on how to better understand the state’s continuing role as an actor in the contemporary Latin American panorama of violence.

**Violence, the state, and social sovereignty in contemporary Latin America**

It has become increasingly common to talk about a “crisis of governance” in contemporary Latin America.\textsuperscript{17} This crisis is perceived to involve an institutional erosion of the state due to the twin processes of neo-liberalism – which is leading to an ever-increasing reduction of the resources available to the state as a socio-economic actor – and globalisation – which is seen to have debilitated the state by subordinating its capacity to shape the national arena to supranational institutions and processes.\textsuperscript{18} The resulting ‘weak’ states are in particular seen to be increasingly limited in their ability to control the peoples and territories they are associated with, and over which they have historically established and maintained order.\textsuperscript{19} This is widely seen to have fundamentally changed regional patterns of violence during the course of the past decade and a half. In particular, it is held that there has been a shift in the political economy of violence, with state-related forms of violence having declined markedly, and given way to more diffuse social and economic forms of violence, principally involving non-state actors. As Teresa Caldeira succinctly summarises, “now the most visible forms of


\textsuperscript{17} John Gledhill, ‘Putting the state back in without leaving the dialectics out: Social movements, Elites, and Neoliberalism’, mimeo, 1996.


violence stem not from ideological conflicts over the nature of the political system but from
delinquency and crime”.

At the same time, despite this changed political economy of brutality, incidences of violence in
contemporary Latin America have reached unprecedented levels. Although this trend is
generalised throughout the region, it is perhaps most apparent in contemporary Central
America, where criminal violence is now so prevalent that levels of violence are comparable
to, or even higher than, the decade of war which affected the region during the 1980s. The
consensus is that this predicament is consequent to the generalised lack of order in Latin
America due to the reduction of the capacities of previously ‘strong’ states to maintain order
through violence. As Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings put it, it is thought that there has
occurred a “democratisation” of violence in the region, whereby it has:

ceased to be the resource of only the traditionally powerful or of the
grim uniformed guardians of the nation... [but] increasingly appears as
an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals.

Nicaragua is a paradigmatic case in this regard. The leftist Sandinista revolution of the 1980s
in many ways constituted something of a modernist project, which although never completely
challenging the historically oligarchic configuration of Nicaraguan society, nevertheless
affected it sufficiently to produce what Timothy Mitchell calls a “state effect”, or in other
words a sense of the existence of an autonomous social structure “that somehow stands apart
from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives”. The
state expanded in an unprecedented manner, providing universal services to the population
and establishing itself as the primary vector for the revolutionary project of transforming the
social, economic, and political bases of life in Nicaragua. Partly as a result of civil war, but
arguably even more due to neo-liberal prescriptions to ‘roll back’ the state, high levels of
corruption and political disillusion,

corruption and political disillusion,

20 Teresa Caldeira, ‘Crime and Individual Rights: Reframing the Question of Violence in Latin America’, in
Elisabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (eds), Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in
OPS (Organización Panamericana de la Salud – Pan-American Health Organization), La Violencia en las
22 J. Pearce, ‘From civil war to ‘civil society’: Has the end of the Cold War brought peace to Central America?’,
23 S. Cuadra, ‘Globalization and the capacity of violence to transform social spaces: Some critical points about
Kruijt (eds), Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America, London: Zed
and Society, 43:3 (2001), pp.61-93; Carlos M. Vilas, ‘Family Affairs: Class, Lineage and Politics in
Formation after the Cultural Turn, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, p.89.
27 The corruption of the now-imprisoned former Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Alemán is well established – he
is estimated to have siphoned off upwards of US$100 million during his five years as president (Transparency
Transparency International, 2004, p.13) – but it is important to note that corruption also concerns the Sandinista
Party. The latter’s reputation suffered considerably when it rather blatantly transferred large amounts of state
property to the party leadership ranks after losing the elections in 1990, a process that is referred to in Nicaragua
as “la Piñata” (a piñata is a papier-mâché figure that is filled with sweets and often features at parties, where it
profound economic crisis, the Nicaraguan state has been steadily eroded since the electoral defeat of the Sandinista regime in 1990 and the beginning of the process of so-called ‘normalization’, to the extent that Katherine Isbester talks instead of a process of “state disintegration”.

The most dramatic reflection of this state disintegration is widely considered to lie in the dramatic explosion in criminal violence that has affected the country during the past decade and a half. According to Nicaraguan police statistics, crime levels have increased steadily by an annual average of ten percent since 1990, compared to just two percent during the 1980s. The absolute number of crimes more than tripled between 1990 and 2003, with crimes against persons – including homicides, rapes and assaults – rising by a staggering 460 percent. A 1997 CID-Gallup survey reported that one in six Nicaraguans claimed to have been the victim of a criminal attack at least once in the previous four months, a proportion that rose to one in four in Managua, where 40 percent of all crime occurs. Not surprisingly, perhaps, a 1999 survey conducted by the Nicaraguan NGO Ética y Transparencia found that crime was considered by the general population to be the principal problem affecting Nicaragua by a margin of over 30 percent.

The same survey found that 43 percent of the respondents who admitted to having been victims of crime stated that they had not reported the crime to the police because “it was no use”. The police have only limited patrolling capacities in urban areas, and are completely absent in 21 percent of the country’s 146 municipalities. Regionally, the Nicaraguan police have the lowest number of personnel per capita and per crime, the lowest budget per crime, the lowest budget per police personnel, and the lowest average salaries in Central America. This penury obviously makes the police susceptible to corruption – thereby undermining their mission to establish and maintain order – and also clearly limits their technical and material capabilities. In a media interview in 2001, Commissioner Franco Montealegre admitted that police were often out-gunned by criminals, including in particular the widespread pandillas,
or youth gangs that roam the streets of Nicaraguan cities, robbing, beating, terrorising, and frequently killing.  

The social consequences of the unchecked crime and insecurity in Nicaragua have been terrible, particularly at the local level, where the erosion of the social fabric has reached such dramatic proportions that it is no exaggeration to talk of a veritable social atomisation. “It’s each to his own” was an expression that was constantly repeated by my informants when describing Nicaraguan social life, and indeed, traditional units of social solidarity such as the family, household, or neighbourhood had shattered, while networks of trust and mutual aid had worn away. Certainly, there was little in the way of a local social collectivity, as was graphically described by Don Sergio, one of my informants in the poor Managua barrio (neighbourhood) Luis Fanor Hernández:

Nobody does anything for anybody anymore, nobody cares if their neighbour is robbed, nobody does anything for the common good. There’s a lack of trust, you don’t know whether somebody will return you your favours, or whether he won’t steal your belongings when your back is turned. It’s the law of the jungle here; we’re eating one another, as they say in the Bible…

“We are living in a state of siege”, was how another of my informants called Adilia described the situation, adding that “people are always scared to leave their homes, it’s too dangerous”. Her mother, Doña Yolanda, dramatically echoed this:

There’s so much delinquency, it’s impossible to live… they’ll kill you for a watch… they’ll kill you for a pair of shoes… they’ll kill you for your shirt … they’re everywhere, you’ve got to watch out… they could be your neighbour, even your friend, you can never be sure… you can’t go out any more, you can’t wear rings, bracelets, nice shoes, anything that makes us look a little better than we really are… how can we live? It’s not possible…

There is no doubt that at one level, the situation of crisis, violence, and breakdown characterising contemporary Nicaragua is highly chaotic and disorderly in nature, thus corresponding rather closely to the received wisdom on the socio-political consequences of ‘weakened’ states. But while the Nicaraguan state is certainly a ‘weak’ state when measured against its effective fulfilment of the Weberian index of having a monopoly over legitimate violence, this does not necessarily mean that there is a dearth of order in Nicaragua. As Robert Latham points out, although the condition of sovereignty – which can be defined as a condition whereby a specific institutional arrangement possesses final and absolute political authority within a given community – has traditionally been considered a property of states, it “can be and historically has been understood as an attribute not just of states but of other forms of social organization as well, operating within and across national boundaries”. In particular, Latham contends that it is possible to imagine the existence of non-State “bodies of relations that effectively structure practices and agency in a given area of life” in a manner equivalent to states, which he labels forms of “social sovereignty”.  

39 A pseudonym, as are the names of all the informants mentioned.
Such an analysis is highly appealing in relation to Nicaragua, where the ubiquitous youth gangs that dominate the contemporary Nicaraguan political economy of violence can plausibly be conceptualised as local forms of social structuration. Certainly, during the mid-1990s, they were clearly recognisable, socially-constitutive institutional arrangements that obeyed definite, codified rules and adopted very specific patterns of behaviour. Gangs exercised their constructive function at multiple levels – the individual gang member, the gang group, but also the wider neighbourhood community – using violence as the cement for these manifold processes of social and symbolic structuring. Gang members would engage in violence in prescribed ways, including in particular semi-ritualised forms of gang warfare, which arguably constituted ‘scripted’ social performances that limited the scope of violence through their repetitive and regularised nature, and therefore contributed to circumscribing what Hannah Arendt terms the “all-pervading unpredictability” of violence. Similarly, the existence of a pervasive gang ethos of ‘loving’ and protecting – rather than preying on – their local neighbourhood population meant that gangs were imbued with a vigilante impulse, and effectively provided localised ‘safe havens’ in a wider context of chronic insecurity. Partly as a result, there existed a sense of identification with local gangs within neighbourhoods, making them primary symbolic indexes of community, effectively providing the only anchor point for a sense of local collective imaginary in an otherwise fractured context.

The localised forms of order that Nicaraguan youth gangs constructed within a wider context of violence, insecurity, and social breakdown, characterised by the presence of a ‘weak’ state, was obviously sociologically reduced and exclusive in nature, taking the local neighbourhood as their ontological point of reference for the construction of this social order; rather than a broader territorial form such as the nation, for example, which in the post-Westphalian world is generally considered to be the primary reference point of states. Nevertheless, this question of scale notwithstanding, there is definitely a sense in which gangs and their violent practices can be conceived as institutionally organising local collective life in contemporary Nicaragua and providing local neighbourhood populations with a concrete sense of belonging to a definite – albeit bounded – collective entity in a way that no longer exists at the national level due to the chronic insecurity and declining capacities of the Nicaraguan state.

Seen in this way, it is clearly possible to argue that Nicaraguan youth gangsterism in the mid-1990s was underpinned by an analogous governmentality to the one generally attributed to the state. This is particularly striking in relation to the gangs’ use of violence, which like the state’s exercise of violence is arguably not only teleologically related to the constitution of social order, but moreover seems to follow remarkably similar modes of organisation. Like the Weberian state at the national level, gangs possess a monopoly over the predominant forms of violence at the local neighbourhood level, and these are moreover considered to be legitimate forms of violence, at least in terms of the local manifestation of the gang, because of their simultaneously protective and informative functions. As such, it can be argued that apart from the scale of the process, there is little to distinguish the governmentality of gangs from that of state-based forms of social ordering, and it makes sense to talk about “gang governmentality” on an epistemological par with “state governmentality”. The question that can of course legitimately be asked from this point of view, then, is whether the widely

perceived shift in the political economy of violence in Nicaragua is not simply a case of “old wine in new bottles”, with the social order previously provided by the state now being provided by gangs.

Certainly, this is an analysis that is implicitly supported by Guillermo O’Donnell’s essay ‘On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems’ about both, where he explores the question of the potential cohabitation between state and social forms of sovereignty. Although O’Donnell conceives of the state in a classically Weberian manner, as “a set of social relations that establishes a certain order, and ultimately backs it with a centralized coercive guarantee, over a given territory”, in a quasi-Spinozan fashion he contends that it is not the state per se that underpins the social order, but rather the effectiveness of the law that is lain down by the state. At the same time, however, O’Donnell notes that often “the effectiveness of the law extends very irregularly …across the territory and the functional relations …it supposedly regulates”, and consequently alternative, social forms of social structuration equivalent to the law will inevitably emerge to lay down informal rules by which society can organise collectively. The question this obviously raises is the nature of the relationship that these instances of social sovereignty will have with manifestations of state sovereignty.

O’Donnell explores these issues through the metaphor of a “heat map”, where the degree of state presence is signalled in different colours – with blue signalling a high degree of effective presence, green a partial degree of effective presence, and brown a low level of effective presence – which he then applies to a variety of Latin American countries. Argentina, for example, he contends would be mainly blue – particularly around its urban areas – with some patches of green in the Pampas and Patagonia and a few brown areas in the centre and the Northwest of the country. But while the effectiveness of the law laid down by the Argentinean state is very low in the centre and the Northwest of the country, O’Donnell argues that this does not necessarily translate into these areas being areas of anarchy, as they are dominated by forms of caudillismo, which he maintains are ontologically equivalent to the law in terms of social structuration (although it should be noted that he also argues that this is not the case from a normative point of view). As a result, O’Donnell argues that social order does not have to be “an equal, socially impartial order”, and that a partially effective, territorially-based central state can coexist with more localised, also territorially-based, forms of social structuration.

Although this idea makes a certain amount of intuitive sense, as Abner Cohen has pointed out, neither change nor continuity in a given political form necessarily entails a continuity of its function. The same form can fulfil new functions, and conversely new forms can achieve the same functions as preceding ones. Seen in this way, it will not automatically follow that different forms of social structuration that seem to be fulfilling equivalent functions will share the same governmentality. Indeed, although Nicaraguan gangs can superficially be portrayed as emergent social morphologies that develop to functionally replace the deficient Nicaraguan state as the primary locus of social structuration, the nature of their governmentality is very

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different to that of the state when subjected to close scrutiny. This is particularly the case when the dynamics of Nicaraguan gangsterism are viewed from a longitudinal perspective, which reveals the way in which gang governmentality changed fundamentally between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, to the extent that by 2002 youth gangsterism as a form of social structuration arguably constituted less an example of ‘old wine in new bottles’ than a case of ‘new wine in new bottles’. 47

Putting aside the details of this transformation, it logically follows that the state as a form of social structuration will also not necessarily fulfil the same functions via the same means constantly over time. Such a perspective makes it plausible to imagine that what is generally referred to as a ‘weakening’ of states might not actually constitute anything of the sort but rather corresponds instead to some sort of institutional transformation whereby states have taken on new functions and have new modes and logics of operation. In other words, it is not so much that they have ‘weakened’, but rather that they have ‘mutated’, to the extent that they may well constitute a case of ‘new wine in old bottles’. To explore this issue further, I now turn my attention more specifically to the basis of state governmentality, drawing in particular on the works of Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben in order to extract a possible alternative conception. My intention is not to provide a comprehensive overview of their different analyses but rather to develop a syncretic framework through which to better understand the changed nature of state governmentality in contemporary Latin America.

(Re)conceptualising state governmentality

The classic Weberian conception of the state conceptualises its governmentality as being intimately based on violence, insofar as the monopoly over forms of legitimate violence – to which can be added the extra qualifications of “compulsory jurisdiction” and “continuous operation” – provides the source of the power through which the state can dominate and control the practices and agencies of a given community, both directly and indirectly. 48 To a large extent, this is highly commonsensical; as Hannah Arendt lays out in her seminal *On Violence*, power can definitely very frequently be a function of violence in a number of different ways. 49 As Walter Benjamin points out, however, violence is not a unitary phenomenon. He suggests that there exists a fundamental distinction between what he terms “law-making” violence – violence that establishes the social order – and “law-preserving violence” – violence that maintains order. 50 This perspective implicitly reverses Arendt’s classic formulation of the causal relationship between violence and power, as it can be argued that the ability to determine – rather than simply preserving – the basis of the social order through violence presupposes an initial position of power that is sociologically autonomous of violence, considering that violence constitutes a transgression of already existing social structures. 51 Seen in this way, instead of being a function of violence, it is power that becomes the determinant of its nature, scope, and ultimately logic.

Certainly, this is a view supported by Carl Schmitt, who argued that sovereignty was “not about the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but ...the monopoly to decide”. For him, power derived from the ability to decide upon what he called the “state of exception”, which he conceived as a suspension not just of rules but also the framework in which rules apply.\footnote{Schmitt (1985 [1933]), p.20. Schmitt was writing in the context of 1930s Germany and the rise of Nazism, for which he professed a strong admiration and later actively participated in. His reputation has been rather tainted as a result, and his writings have to a certain extent fallen into disrepute.} According to Schmitt, “every general rule demands a regular, everyday frame of life to which it can be applied and which is submitted to its regulations”. This context of regularity is fundamental to a rule’s validity, and the “state of exception” consequently involves not only an abrogation of rules, but also of their normative context.\footnote{Nietzsche contended that the “doing is everything” (The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956 [1872 & 1887], p.179), and that consequently “willing is creating”, with the “will to action” constituting a “will to power” that fixes “the value of all things ...anew” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, translated and with a new introduction by R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin, 1969 [1883-1885], pp.223, 136 & 139).} It is a form of \textit{tabula rasa} in which “a regular situation must be created” in order for rules to make sense, and therefore constitutes something of a liminal space within which the most basic, raw form of power is enacted. The most fundamental and primordial manifestation of power is the decision of who is a “friend”, and who is an “enemy”, according to Schmitt, who links this core expression of power within the “state of exception” – as well as the ability to precipitate the “state of exception” – to what he calls the “leadership principle”, or \textit{Führung},\footnote{Cited in Alessandro Fontana & Mauro Bertani, ‘Situating the Lectures’, in Michel Foucault, \textit{Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76}, edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana and translated by David Macey, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2003 [1997], p.284.} for reasons that are arguably epistemologically Nietzschean in nature.\footnote{Cf. Michel Foucault, \textit{Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison}, translated by A. Sheridan, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.}

Whether or not one accepts this underlying epistemology, though, the idea that the power to define who and what matters – and who and what do not – clearly constitutes a very concrete basis for social structuration, as Michel Foucault highlights in his classic consideration of sovereignty through the ages. According to Foucault, while “sovereign power” was classically based on the right “to take life or let live”, over the past three hundred years this has been superseded by “the right to make live and to let die”, which is the basis for what he calls “biopower”.\footnote{Michel Foucault, \textit{Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76}, edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana and translated by David Macey, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2003 [1997], p.241.} This shift has occurred partly because the aim of establishing a social order has evolved from being about the extraction of resources from a given population to being about the extraction of labour. Following a first stage whereby “disciplinary” forms of governmentality evolved to order individual bodies in time and space,\footnote{Cf. Michel Foucault, \textit{Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison}, translated by A. Sheridan, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.} these are replaced by a new form of governmentality, which Foucault calls “biopolitics”, that rest upon the management of whole populations rather than individuals through the identification of categories of “valid” and “invalid” persons, with the former being managed and “made to live” in particular ways, while the latter is neglected and “left to die”. Contrarily to Schmitt’s conception, governmentality according to Foucault therefore comes to be about normatively “directing conduct” rather than “confronting adversaries”.\footnote{56 Michel Foucault, \textit{Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76}, edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana and translated by David Macey, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2003 [1997], p.241.}
Explicitly building on both Schmitt and Foucault, Giorgio Agamben proposes a synthetic framework for understanding the basis of power of modern states in terms of the biopolitical categorisation of persons through the endless resort to the “state of exception”. Following a Foucauldian framework, he proposes the existence of a key biopolitical distinction between what he terms “political life” (bios) – that which is considered “valid” life, imbued with sense – and “bare life” (zoe) – that which is “invalid”, nothing more than mere existence. The very act of creating circumstances within which persons can be classified as one or the other is “the originary activity of the sovereign”, according to Agamben, as the possibility of exclusion from “political life” inherently constitutes the progenitorial basis of social structuration. By producing categories of persons that are included in the political community but denied membership of it, these persons are powerfully constituted as groups on whom forms of regulation can be exercised. Drawing on Schmitt, Agamben argues that the governmentality of modern states therefore revolves fundamentally around the “continually operative” precipitation of a “state of exception”, within which the boundaries between these two primordial categories are constantly drawn and redrawn. In other words, the establishment of a “state of exception” constitutes a strategic principle of power that becomes the basis of the governmentality of modern states.

The paradigmatic example of this according to Agamben is the Nazi concentration camp, where Jews were first stripped of their citizenship and then constituted as non-human “others”, but it is possible to imagine a less exceptional – so to speak – enactment of such a form of state governmentality in the shape of a routinised pathologisation of persons that is embedded in everyday practices. Such a framework of state governmentality would arguably provide the basis for explaining how despite the fact that gangs clearly possess significant political authority at the local neighbourhood level in Nicaragua, the state nevertheless continues to exist as a recognisable and influential institution. Contrarily to Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron’s notion that such putatively “weak” states can be qualified as “apparent states”, that is to say states with all the “fixings” of a state – such as a political system, legislature, regulars elections, police, army, and government ministries – but with little power to meet the needs of their population, it can be argued that the Nicaraguan state constitutes at best an “apparent weak state”, or in other words a state that appears to be “weak” when considered from a classic Weberian perspective, but that in fact is imbued with a different kind of governmentality based on the permanent of division of the population into groups of “valid” and “invalid” citizens. This form of governmentality does not necessarily require a constant control or domination over a given population in an Orwellian “Big Brother” fashion, but rather can be enacted through the ability to sporadically precipitate a “state of exception”, in which the state symbolically demonstrates its power through arbitrary control.

60 Agamben (1998), p.83. Agamben contends that politics and the “state of exception” cannot be ontologically segregated, and ultimately the latter is neither liminal nor apolitical, but rather a fundamental space in which wider relations of power and domination are explicitly fought out. The ability to precipitate a “state of exception” therefore constitutes a significant form of power that can actually constitute the basis of a form of state governmentality.
acts of violence that emphasize that it is unaccountable, unpredictable, and therefore creates a sense of terror among those targeted.

In other words, this new form of governmentality does not require that the state be a constant or even a constantly effective presence. This conception of state sovereignty is epistemologically different to O’Donnell, who assumes that the effectiveness of the law or law-equivalent is a function of the constancy of the state or non-state form of social structuration. In terms of the notion of governmentality, this arguably leads to an assumption that social structuration is a singular, universal process, and whether it is state-based or social in nature, that it will always occur unchangingly in the same way, on the same sociological basis, particularly when considered in terms of the exercise of violence. The problem with this is that it promotes a very narrow concept of both state- and socially-based forms of social structuration, normatively investing them with respectively a general and a particularistic focus. However, just as social forms of social structuration such as Nicaraguan gangs in the 1990s can be seen as particularistic in nature but acting in a general way, so the state, which is generally considered to be principally focused on managing a nation’s general good, can also become a focus for very parochial interests. Such a form of governmentality at one level represents something of a “rupture” and threatens to “join order and disorder into indistinction”, but it also allows us to attain a conception of social reality that is consistent with Benjamin’s seminal insight that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”. As Michael Taussig has shown, this description is more in correspondence with the lived experience of life in contemporary Latin America – including, as is collectively suggested by Don Sergio, Adilia, and Doña Yolanda’s above, Nicaragua – which ultimately can be qualified as situations of “ordered disorder”, which are simultaneously “the exception and the rule”.

The governmentality of state violence in contemporary Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan state’s ever-increasing inability to control and dominate the geographical territory it is historically associated with is frequently held up as an example of its consummate ‘weakness’, particularly in relation to its ability to exercise violence and impose order. The high rates of crime and delinquency, combined with the general inefficiency of the policy and a rollback of the modernist gains of the Sandinista revolution, are widely seen to exemplify this reduction in the state’s capacities. A different conception of the evolution of the Nicaraguan state can be suggested, however, whereby the nature of its governmentality has changed such that it no longer seeks to violently control and dominate the whole of its territory according to the classic Weberian model, but rather instrumentally exercises its violence in an inconstant manner that serves only a limited range of specific purposes.

To a certain extent it could be argued that this new form of governmentality is causally linked to the reduction of the Nicaraguan state’s capacities due to neo-liberalism and globalisation,

65 O’Donnell (1999). Indeed, in many ways, O’Donnell’s model of the nature of Latin American societies can be said to essentially see them in terms of national-level equilibriums between state and non-state forms of social structuration.
70 Isbester (1996).
and that it in essence represents a ‘politics of the possible’ insofar as the state lacks the resources to control and dominate territories in the way it used to in the past; and all the more so in a context where a variety of social actors can now effectively manipulate violence. While this may be partially the case, it can also be maintained that the increased violence that has partly resulted from the withdrawal of the state from the public arena has also constituted a context within which new forms of violent action have become possible, including in particular the increasingly accepted exercise of what was previously considered unreasonable violence against specific categories of persons occupying a given territory. Just as Caldeira notes how in urban Brazil, for example, the poor have become stigmatised as inherently dangerous “animals”, therefore undeserving of human rights and against which extreme brutality is acceptable. In Nicaragua, although this has not (yet) reached equivalent levels to Brazil, there has occurred a rise in violent, arbitrary and sporadic ‘raids’ on poor neighbourhoods by the police over the past few years, as well as a tendency towards the criminalisation of certain groups such as youth (especially if they have tattoos or other trappings of gang membership).

In many ways, however, it is at the territorial level that this new form of governmentality is most apparent in contemporary Nicaragua. This is particularly evident in relation to the spatial reorganisation of Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, during the past decade, which has undergone a process whereby a whole layer of the metropolis has been ‘disembedded’ from the general fabric of the city through the constitution of an exclusive ‘fortified network’ for the urban elites, based on the privatisation of security and the construction of high speed roads and roundabouts from which the poor are aggressively excluded. This pattern of urban development rests upon the emergence of a new urban governmentality that explicitly favours the urban elites, both directly and indirectly. In a wider context of a growing transnationalism that sees them looking increasingly towards Miami and other points outside Nicaraguan for the basis of their lives, these have little interest in controlling the whole of a country that is generally poor and offers them little in the way of economic opportunities – and even less the whole of a sprawling city, most of which they never visit. Their interest lies principally in ensuring the security and exclusivity of the limited spaces they occupy, including their homes, offices, shopping malls, clubs, bars, and restaurants.

Beyond the question of governmentality, the constitution of such “power-geometries” raises critical questions about the nature of social relations between different groups within a given territorial space. This breathes new life to the other classic conception of the state, that proposed by Karl Marx, whereby it is conceived as an institution that serves the interests of a dominant class. In many ways this provides a much more concrete (material) basis to the origins of the power that permits the enactment of the alternative framework of state governmentality outlined above than the Nietzschean epistemology that ultimately underpins Agamben’s conception (as well as Schmitt’s and Foucault’s). This allows a line of thought that sees the predicament of contemporary Nicaragua in terms of a historical sequence

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71 Caldeira (1996).
72 This is in many ways paradoxical, because a distinguishing feature of the alternative conception of governmentality outlined above compared to the Weberian conception of state governmentality is that it is not inherently territorial in nature.
whereby following a decade of popular revolutionary rule and the attempted establishment of a modernist state, followed by an anomic and spontaneous “revolt of the masses” in the form of rampant crime and delinquency, the past decade has seen the Nicaraguan urban elites – both traditional and new – conduct their own “revolt of the elites”. In a changed global context where their material basis is no longer national, they are arguably flexing their muscle in order to go their own way, adopting modes of being and promoting a social order that constitutes a rejection of the Sandinista modernist project, and in many ways is a return to past pre-revolutionary forms of inequality, alienation, and injustice that led to the revolution in the first place.

Concluding remarks

I have argued in this paper that the epistemological nature of both order and violence are eminently changeable, and that they are not unitary, singular phenomena. From this perspective, although a case can be made that the state violence upon which order has been based during the past two hundred years has declined in post-Cold War Latin America, and has been replaced by new forms of ‘social sovereignty’ that implicitly constitute ‘old wine in new bottles’ – insofar as they are also concerned with the constitution of the social order – it can also be contended that instead of being residual, the continuing presence of state-based forms of violence in fact constitutes an example of ‘new wine in old bottles’, with the governmentality of states, particularly in relation to their use of violence, having evolved and now being underpinned by a different dynamic to the past. I have proposed an alternative conception of state governmentality that illustrates how this governmentality operates, illustrating it schematically in the Nicaraguan context. This possibility suggests that there is a crucial need to rethink the nature of the state in contemporary Latin America, and that to understand what kind of institution the state is, and how and why it exercises violence, it is critical to think about the nature of the state’s rationale of governance.

In his famed *Political Treatise*, Spinoza proposes that:

> the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent general sufferings, and therefore pursues above everything the very end, after which everyone, strives, but in the natural state strives vainly.\(^{78}\)

As with many of his contemporaries or near-contemporaries, such as Locke, Voltaire, or Rousseau, Spinoza was imbued with a certain faith in the innate rationality of human beings and the states they constructed, arguing that the natural tendency towards an order that constituted “the best of all possible worlds” inevitably led to “civil states”. There is a paradox in this idea, in that at the same time Spinoza also argues that “a state is not bound by law insofar as the state establishes the law”. From this perspective, there is no reason other than faith to expect a state to be “civil”, and the fundamental question to ask is what happens when ‘uncivil states’ emerge.\(^{79}\)

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\(^{78}\) Spinoza (1951 [1883]), p.303.

\(^{79}\) Spinoza (1951 [1883]), p.311.
In many ways, there is a sense in which this question is sidestepped by the dominant discourse on ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states. All too often, behind the label of ‘weak’ states there are what Stephan Feuchtwang has called “spectral states”, which operate under the veil of their supposed ‘weakness’, to the extent that it often constitutes an excuse for any atrocities that they might perpetuate. Indeed, in many ways ‘spectral violence’ is perhaps the most effective form of violence, precisely because it is hidden from view by a conception of social reality that sees it as a consequence of dysfunction. Seen in this way, we come back to our starting point, and the need for a more fine-grained analysis of the state that ‘denaturalises’ it and sees it as the historically contingent and highly variable construction that it is, representing the “sedimentation” of everyday routinised practices of power that need to be understood on their own terms rather than putative normative ones. Only in this way will we truly be able to understand the underlying basis of state governmentality, and get to grips with the task of judging which states are ‘good’, and which ones are ‘bad’.

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81 Feuchtwang (2004).


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- We will examine what kinds of formal and informal institutional arrangements poor communities have constructed to deal with economic survival and local order.