The Securitisation of Development Projects: The Indian State’s Response to the Maoist Insurgency

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Abstract

Over the last two decades, the Indian state machinery has used a conventional counterinsurgency approach in response to the left-wing extremist (LWE) Maoist insurgency in central and eastern India, to varying degrees of success. Simultaneously, the state has adopted the strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’, in order to draw civilian support away from the Maoists towards bolstering state legitimacy in regions that have historically lacked governance structures or state- guaranteed services provision. This study aims at exploring the means through which the Indian state has instrumentalised developmental programmes and schemes to address the security threat posed by the Maoists, thus contributing to the securitisation of development discourse and to the security-development nexus. This is presented through two main narratives adopted by the Indian state - Holistic counterinsurgency as a legitimate policy response and State building through service provision.
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List of Acronyms:

COIN- Counterinsurgency
CPI (Maoist)- Communist Party of India, Maoist
FCAS- Fragile and Conflict-affected States
LWE- Left-Wing Extremism
MHA- Ministry of Home Affairs
MNREGA- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NITI Aayog- National Institution for Transforming India
PIB- Press Information Bureau, Government of India
PMRDF- Prime Minister Rural Development Fellowship
ST- Scheduled Tribes
TADA- Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act
UAPA- Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
WHAM- Winning Hearts and Minds
1. **Introduction:**

Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) periodically reappears in the Indian political discourse every few years, especially post-2005, when the newly formed Communist Party of India (Maoist), began its renewed attack on state machinery in the central and eastern states of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha. These particular states rank relatively lower than the rest of the country on several human development indices; in addition, the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are inhabited by the country’s highest Scheduled Tribe (ST) populations, who have been historically marginalised by the Indian state and lacking in socio-political capital (Guha, 2007). The Maoists have therefore been successful in garnering local support from Adivasi (indigenous tribes) communities, for whom they have established parallel systems of governance and service provision. The Indian state formulated several policy responses to address this threat to their sovereignty, ranging from an aggressive counterinsurgency strategy, to an evolved ‘multi-pronged’ approach that acknowledges the developmental woes in the regions where the Maoists have gained dominance.

The Indian state has engaged in the deployment of high levels of security forces in LWE-affected districts to address the internal security threat posed by the Maoists. The ‘Indian state’, is an umbrella term that refers to the different state machinery, such as the paramilitary forces, police personnel and various ministries of governance at both the central and state levels. The heightened security measures are justified as necessary to pursue developmental programmes in the present and future. For the purpose of this study, I will be primarily focusing on the securitisation of official development policy in the state of Chhattisgarh, by drawing on data from policy that has been implemented by the central government in surrounding LWE affected states. Although Chhattisgarh ranks higher than other states on development indicators, the state has witnessed some of the highest number of civilian casualties and incidents of violence between the Maoists and different security personnel, therefore being termed as the ‘worst Maoist-affected state in the country’ (SATP, 2016).

The function of state policy extends beyond the mere implementation of schemes and developmental programmes - policy is inherently political and serves the purpose of furthering state ideology by presenting action on a social issue in a technical and professional manner. By combining policies to address two conventionally distinctive subjects of state interest - development and security, the Indian state has framed the Maoist insurgency as a security threat that can be resolved by simultaneously addressing the lack of governance and provision of basic services in LWE-affected districts. While this is framed in highly positive language that projects development-related policies as a manifestation of the state fulfilling its social contract, I will challenge the depoliticised nature of these policies by demonstrating how they contribute towards state-building through counterinsurgency operations against the Maoist insurgency.
I aim to explore the ways in which the discursive formations as manifested through various policies have contributed to the legitimization of brutal counterinsurgency measures that have devastated Adivasi communities and culture, as well as the extent to which these developmental measures have been successful. Furthermore, the discourse analysis will examine the extent to which the security-development nexus has been instrumentalised to prioritise the state’s security interests over addressing the socio-politico-economic roots of unrest in LWE-affected states where the Maoists have gained popularity. On this basis, I aim to examine the answer to the following research question- *How has the Indian state securitised development projects in the course of its counterinsurgency operations against the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh?* I wish to demonstrate my findings through two main narratives utilised by the Indian state, namely- ‘Holistic counterinsurgency as a legitimate policy response’ and ‘State-building through service provision.’

The study shall be outlined into the following sections- Section 2 will provide a brief contextual background into the political origins of the Maoist insurgency and how the state’s response has evolved, as represented through the changing discursive narratives manifested in its official policy responses. Section 3 provides a literature review of the different relevant theories related to the securitisation of development and state-building as a legitimised form of counterinsurgency. Section 4 will delve into the methodological strategies and theoretical basis of critical discourse analysis. In Section 5, the narratives will demonstrate the discursive findings of the analysis undertaken. Section 6 concludes by summarising the findings of the discourse analysis and draws attention to how the research question has been addressed.

### 2. Background Context:

The post-Independence Indian state has largely followed a development paradigm that prioritises infrastructural development as an indicator of growth and prosperity, be it in the form of dams, bridges, coal mines or transport networks. The first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru infamously once stated that rural, marginalised populations should tolerate the exploitation of their livelihoods and resources for the ‘greater common good’ of the Indian state as an entity that is striving to develop and achieve global status (Roy, 2001).

However, this development trajectory produced larger inequalities and exploitation of the lowest strata of Indian society - the landless lower caste rural Indians and the Adivasis, one of the oldest populations in the Indian state (Shah, 2018). The Indian state failed to adequately guarantee their social, political and economic rights, which produced a violent, guerrilla rebellion in 1967 that became known as the Naxalite movement (named after the village with the first documented insurgency - Naxalbari, West Bengal). This peasant rebellion, heavily influenced by General Mao’s ideological tenets of a protracted revolutionary war, was quickly squashed by an aggressive response from the Indian government (Routray, 2013). The movement gained resurgence in the neighbouring states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand at the turn of the 21st century, where it was rechristened as
the Maoist movement (Shah, 2018). The Maoists have since then, engaged in a protracted guerrilla war against the state security forces and at a symbolic level, against the neoliberal agenda adopted by the central Indian government since it undertook market liberalisation in 1991 (Ahlawat, 2018).

The Maoist struggle has evolved into an extreme left-wing movement that seeks justice against the Indian state’s brutal discrimination and historical neglect of Adivasi community living in remote regions of the country (Chatur & Jagannath, 2012). They have established a parallel state and alternative development structures in many of the rural districts that they control, primarily in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, which comprise of significant tribal populations residing in highly underdeveloped districts (NIC, 2014).

Increased violence by the Maoist armed forces against various state apparatus such as local police forces, civil servants as well as politicians, occurred simultaneously as the state governments encouraged private business conglomerates to establish infrastructure projects in the mineral and resource-rich Dandakaranya forest regions of central India (Sundar, 2016). These attacks gained significant negative media coverage within a narrative that solely focused on the atrocities committed by the Maoists against the local state machinery, without addressing the root causes- systemic disregard for socio-economic development in these remote areas that formed the ideological basis for Maoist-inflicted violence (Sundar, 2012). This aided the formation of a discourse that legitimised treating the Maoist movement as a ‘law and order’ issue that required a fitting counterinsurgency (COIN) response from the state (Raja, 2005).

The state response was best captured by the then Prime Minister Singh’s repeated statements that framed Maoism and LWE as the ‘biggest internal security threat facing India in the 21st century (The Hindu, 2010). The central government encouraged the formation of various civilian-based COIN militias such as the Salwa Judum (‘Purification Hunt’), who have been accused of large-scale human rights abuses against civilians suspected of being Maoist sympathisers, especially within their ‘model village’ camps (Sundar, 2016). Within the official COIN response, the Indian state has deployed various Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), the most dominant one being the Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) who also set up camps for the purpose of surveillance on Maoist-controlled villages (Chatur & Jagannath, 2012). However, these operations have remained unsuccessful in eliminating the Maoist movement (Routray, 2013) as well as subsequently reduced state legitimacy and efficient service delivery of essential public services such as schools, health centres and roads for the Adivasi populations (Dasgupta, Gawande & Kapur, 2017). As a result, the Indian government has resorted to employing several different schemes and plans to be enforced by security forces under the ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ (WHAM) approach, in order to simultaneously address the lack of development and also reduce local support for the Maoists (Sundar, 2012).
3. Literature Review:

3.1. Securitisation Theory:

Ongoing academic research in the field of securitisation theory has focused extensively on the role of foreign interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), as a response to the counter-terrorism political discourse in the post-9/11, War on Terror era (Duffield, 2001). Securitisation theory, as conceptualised by the Copenhagen School (1998), asserts that political elites selectively exaggerate the threat of a ‘security object’ in order to legitimise the use of exceptional force to neutralise said threat. The framing of securitisation theory by the scholars from the Copenhagen School comprises of three pivotal dimensions - a successful speech act, the establishment of an existential threat and the legitimate use of violence to address this threat (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). I will be using this conceptualisation of securitisation discourse as the main theoretical framework for policy analysis and the critical exploration of narratives construction.

The means through which the ‘securitising actor’ constructs such a threat as dominant to national and human security, is through a successful ‘speech act’ with the support of the mainstream media, which convinces civilians that the state requires to undertake an extraordinary response in order to eliminate the constructed threat (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). Speech acts such as the famous Bush administration statements legitimising the invasion of Iraq post-9/11, serve as useful examples of the political will to identify, as well as define a common enemy against whom the nation will accept state brutality (Howell & Lind, 2009). The Indian state makes use of repeated press releases and highly selective terminology in order to securitise the threat posed by the Maoist insurgency, which shall be further explored in the analysis section.

Although securitisation theory is critiqued for its Eurocentrism and vaguely broad domain (Stritzel, 2007), it can be applied to the Indian state’s response to the Maoist movement. Since the mid-2000s, several governments at the central and state levels have used successful speech acts to securitise the Maoist threat of a protracted war to establish a more benevolent state, as a legitimate cause for an aggressive, kinetic counterinsurgency (Ahlawat, 2018). It is an ‘inter-subjective threat’ (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) because other threats to human security, such as poverty, illiteracy and right-wing terrorism that are far more predominant in the country, are not prioritised with as much vigour by the state (Duffield, 2001). This lies in contrast to views asserting the linkages between human security and securitisation of development, which shall be further explored in the next section.
3.2. Underdevelopment as a Security Threat:

“I argue that we will not enjoy development without security, or security without development.”

The above quote encapsulates the institutionalised perception of the various threats that underdevelopment poses to both nation states and the global economy, further reinforcing the one-dimensional securitisation of development. Within this framework, securitisation occurs through the instrumentalisation of development discourse pertaining to foreign aid, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction of FCAS in order to achieve security goals. The reinforced notion that security cannot flourish without development and vice-versa, is challenged by several authors who argue that despite official claims representing a symbiotic nexus, states tend to prioritise addressing security threats in identified cases of underdevelopment. For instance, Fisher and Anderson refer to the trend of Western donor states concentrating aid in the military and security sectors in regions of conflict within Africa, thus operating within the securitisation discourse that legitimises violent policies by authoritarian regimes curbing dissent (2015). Biswas (2014) asserts that the Indian state’s coercive counterinsurgency policies are not as ‘multi-pronged’ as its dominant COIN response is publicly stated to be (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2019). Despite several governments officially recognising the socio-economic causes for the appeal of the Maoist rebels amongst impoverished Adivasi communities, policy implementation remains geared towards reestablishment of security and state presence in LWE affected states rather than delivering on development-related goals (Biswas, 2014).

The evolution of the security-development nexus involved a circular reinforcement between development and security agendas of nation-states, where underdevelopment in the Global South came to be viewed as a security threat and a potential source of conflict (Duffield, 2001). The manifestations of the development-security nexus, which the Indian state has readily adopted into its COIN response, is identified most visibly (Howell and Lind, 2009) at the end of the Cold War when the ‘new wars’ saw the deployment of UN Peacekeeping troops in post-conflict reconstruction of communities in Kosovo and Rwanda. This ‘radicalisation of development’ discourse (Duffield, 2001), implies that conventional developmental goals such as poverty, food insecurity and climate change, are not resolved for their intrinsic value (Sen, 1999), but because they instrumentally solve potential sources of violent conflict. The expansion of the domain of development was instrumental to the securitisation discourse, where the emergence of ‘human security’ contributed to the institutionalisation of the security-development nexus even further. By framing conventional developmental issues such as poverty and livelihood insecurity as important security targets, states were now responsible for ensuring the long-term security of civilians from potential sources of violence, through addressing their immediate developmental needs (Saferworld, 2011).
Howell and Lind discuss how the War on Terror functioned as a political regime that intensified the interdependence between political and security actors (2009). The securitisation of development enabled the absorption of political and national interests into the framing and implementation of development projects, with the vested motives of re-establishing state legitimacy and power hierarchies (Howell & Lind, 2009). In LWE affected districts, where the Maoists have established parallel systems of administration and governance, the various levels of central and state government strive to reestablish political power through the instrumentalisation of development works to address the security threat of these alternative institutions available to civilians. Development hence becomes a tool of addressing the threat of insurgency rather than the threats of poverty and underdevelopment (Kamra, 2019).

This is a representation of the dominant worldview that underdevelopment needs to be addressed through the application of heightened security measures, since there exists a constant tension between development and conflict (Howell & Lind, 2009). The securitisation of development therefore becomes a means of addressing this binary and has been adopted by various political systems to resolve conflict caused due to underdevelopment, rather than addressing the root causes of conflict itself. In sharp contrast to the liberal view on war that is based on the idea of conflict impeding development, Cramer provocatively argues that development is inherently conflictual and dependent on war (2006). Similarly, Bhattacharjee draws on Zizke’s commentary on violence to illustrate how the Indian state machinery’s response to the Maoist insurgency emphasises the insurgents’ use of violence as a disruption to the normal functioning of a stable governance structure, whereas Zizek asserts that this is more representative of the violence inherent in the governance institutions itself (2017).

3.3. Dependency Theory:

Dependency theory is well-situated in the security-development nexus and is a challenge to the normative perspective that problematizes the lack of development as a security threat, especially concerning the manner in which underdevelopment of the periphery is a direct result and function development at the centre (Wallerstein, 1974). This phenomenon is best manifested in the new forms of state humanitarianism and liberal peace orders adopted by states trying to address terrorism or counterinsurgency through market mechanisms. The ‘strategic complexes’ presented by Duffield, comprise of complex alliances between the state, security forces, private business and civil society (2001). These networks further increase dependency between the core and periphery, as the state outsources its development responsibilities to private business stakeholders who have invested in infrastructure or extractive industry projects in conflict-zones, paramilitary forces as well as to religious fundamentalist groups who aim at proselytising their mainstream cultural identities on indigenous communities through the establishment of boarding schools and hospitals catering to Adivasi communities in LWE affected districts (Woodman & Kroemer, 2018).
The heightened and asymmetrical interdependence (Castells, 1996) between the Global North and South under globalised, capitalist world systems is reflected in India in the post-liberalisation era, where the core (the central government located in New Delhi, as well as the Chhattisgarh state government located in the state’s capital city of Raipur) consolidates its capacities by building ties with the periphery while excluding its populations from the benefits of this process (Duffield, 2001). A clear example of this is the increased exploitation of the forest and mineral resources in Central India has led to further marginalisation of Adivasis, exacerbating their grievances and therefore increasing the motivations of the Maoists to wage war against the state.

3.4. State-building through counterinsurgency:

I will be utilising Stewart and Brown’s categorisation of the dimensions in state building and state failure in order to identify literature on how states instrumentalise the securitisation discourse to deliver on the developmental needs of their citizens (2009). These include authority failure, where the state is unable to protect civilians from different forms of violence, including structural violence (Uvin, 1999); service failure, where the state is unable to ensure adequate service provision to its populations, and legitimacy failure, where the state lacks the required support and consent from civilians due to which it resorts to non-democratic means to reassert its legitimacy (Stewart & Brown, 2009). These dimensions are highly interdependent, as will be illustrated below. Service provision failures are improved upon by the Indian state in order to regain territorial control over LWE affected districts, through the construction of physical infrastructure such as highways (Sundar, 2016), which subsequently contributes to attempts by the state to regain authority and legitimacy from the Maoist structures of governance.

The ‘expanded state’ functions in a manner beyond the conventional scope of COIN, engaging its security forces in developmental work that are atypical of traditional operations carried out by armed forces (Kamra, 2019). A popular and repeated pathway has been the WHAM approach, which has been utilised since the Vietnam War (Gordon, 2018; Sundar, 2016). WHAM is a tool of counterinsurgency that utilises security forces in the implementation of development projects and service delivery, working under the assumption that this will reduce local support for the insurgents (Mantas, 2013). Schafer however, critiqued this assumption, arguing that a more comprehensive approach is required to address lack of development; furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect fragile states to engage in efficient service delivery and administration, as well as counterinsurgency simultaneously (1989). The WHAM approach is also a convenient tool of both reinforcing state legitimacy through service provision (Mcloughlin, 2015), as well as through the Weberian concept of reasserting state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, especially when governance structures lack sufficient consent to being ruled by the civilians under their administration (Di John & Putzel, 2012).
These hypotheses, however, have been critiqued by scholars exploring the linkages between service provision and violence in conflict zones. The expectation that service delivery can improve state legitimacy and contribute to state building, has been strongly challenged by Mcloughlin, who argues that such propositions frequently fail to take into consideration the shifting expectations of citizens, therefore problematising the simplified notion that social contracts are reinforced through the mere provision of basic services (2015). Similar research conducted specifically into the impact of anti-poverty programmes such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme Act (NREGA), reveals that there is no assured reduction in violence levels in LWE affected districts after such interventions are carried out because of the lack of existing state capacity that is required to ensure successful implementation (Dasgupta et al, 2017).

Counterinsurgency serves as a convenient tool of population-control that extends beyond the stated aims of regaining territory. By promoting a form of ‘liberal peace’, the state simultaneously reestablishes its governance structures and also attempts to regain ideological support from civilian populations (Gordon, 2018). ‘Development as COIN’ also enables a re-negotiation of state-civilian relations amongst populations that are often caught in the crossfire between state security forces and insurgent groups (Kamra, 2019). In the process, the social contract is reformulated to address the political imperatives of the state in curbing an insurgency as well as increasing state legitimacy through development projects (Corebridge & Harris, 2000). Biswas further questions whether the introduction of development schemes and projects in LWE affected districts is pursued with the purpose of pacifying anti-state sentiments rather than the stated aims of rebuilding state legitimacy and accountability (2014). This is a significant reminder that the state is not only engaged in a COIN operation for material gains but also to win an ideological war to reassert its reputation of toughness, rather than to address the root causes of the insurgency (Biswas, 2014).

The development discourse adopted by the Indian state, is strongly reminiscent of Ferguson’s portrayal of the apolitical state, which merely serves as a bureaucratic tool engaged in policy implementation, without addressing the root causes or the drivers of conflict (1990). As a consequence, the solutions proposed tend to be highly technical, and do not address the political nature of the problems that need to be resolved. The critique on the cognitive failures of development interventions is further expanded upon by literature on the hidden functions of their unintended consequences. Autesserre warns about the dangers of relying on simplistic narratives to explain conflicts with complex causes, which subsequently produce highly reductionist and depoliticised solutions that are implemented due to their administrative convenience (2012). However, these policy decisions are deeply harmful, leading to the erasure of indigenous knowledge and value-systems, since they are top-down, professionalised and independent of local inputs (Uvin, 1999).

For instance, the Indian state has increasingly collaborated with ‘Quasi-state actors’ who have become the representation of state-directed development (Sharma, 2006) and symbolise the ‘benevolent state’, therefore
contributing to the process of increasing official state legitimacy while simultaneously serving its security goals (Kamra, 2019). They contribute to the construction of public infrastructure, such as government administrative buildings, schools and national highways, that are physical symbols of state authority which subsequently become easy targets of Maoist attacks (Biswas, 2014). Fisher and Anderson, on the other hand, adopt a far more critical approach to how securitisation of development is instrumentalised to gain state legitimacy through ‘illiberal state-building’, when different nation-states utilise the securitisation discourse in order to legitimise state-sanctioned violence against civilians (2015). The state utilises the greed-motivated discourse (Collier, 2000) to discredit any grievances on the basis of which insurgents take up arms against the state and gain local civilian support (Varynen, Nafziger & Stewart, 2000). By propagating the ‘resource curse’ narrative of violence (Autesserre, 2012), the state can easily justify the implementation of highly technical policies that fail to address the historical marginalisation, land conflict and social discrimination of Adivasi communities. This further justifies the dependence on local militia groups and the paramilitary forces in order to re-establish its presence in LWE affected districts. This was manifested through the tacit state support for the Salwa Judum - the infamous militia group accused of large-scale human rights abuses - a clear indication of the Indian government’s prioritization of security over development (Sundar, 2016).

Any effective COIN requires the expansion of the category of an enemy against whom the state can gain popular support when its legitimacy is being challenged. Arendt’s seminal conceptualisation of ‘Action as Propaganda’ (1968) argues that political elites frame an enemy in a manner that legitimises an aggressive and indiscriminate attack on them, therefore serving the function of propaganda while simultaneously attempting to eliminate their threat. Similar to the Nazi state’s creation of specific laws that criminalised Jews on arbitrary basis (Arendt, 1968), the Indian state has also used politically convenient laws such as the ‘Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act’ (TADA) or the ‘Unlawful Activities Prevention Act’ (UAPA), in order to cement their propaganda as factual evidence of criminality (Arendt, 1968). This facilitates the ease with which different state governments can arrest activists and lawyers who aim to highlight rights violations perpetrated by the state against Adivasis accused of being Maoist sympathisers (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

4. **Methodology:**

4.1. **Critical Discourse Analysis:**

I will be utilising critical discourse analysis as a methodological tool in order to explore how the Indian state, through its various branches, has securitised the development discourse in order to combat the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh. The variety in sources of data that will be highlighted below, comprise of their own
ideological foundations and emphasis the dialectical relationship between discourse formation and social practice (Fairclough, 1993). Discourse analysis is useful to also highlight the contrasting ideological underpinnings and its functions in the construction of discourse around an ‘object’ (Foucault, 1969).

Discourses not only represent social realities, rather, they are instrumental in constructing and constituting them (Fairclough, 2001). They act as the means through which power relations are manifested but also perpetuate them, therefore influencing the ways in which we perceive reality (Fairclough, 2001). According to Fairclough, discourses are three-dimensional, consisting of a discursive event, discursive texts that reproduce that event through various linguistic tools (speeches, publications, reports, statements) and lastly, social practices that encompass the process through which the texts and events interact in daily life (Fairclough, 1993).

‘Critical’ implies a process of deconstructing the continuities and changes in a discourse in order to explore the hidden connections and functions of that discourse, which requires a primary method of critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis will require an interrogation of the ‘pragmatic presuppositions’ that will contribute towards making ‘pragmatic inferences’ of the context in which texts and speeches were produced, which facilitate the reproduction of the socio-political orders that the analyst wishes to investigate. In this case, the role of context can be understood as exploring the social positioning of between the ‘addresser’ and ‘addressee’ of the texts, who contribute to the discourse formation (Hymes, 1964).

4.2. Analytical Strategies:

In order to analyse the processes involved in discourse formation, it is necessary to review the linkages between the forms of rationality or what Foucault termed as ‘regimes of truth’ and the systems and practices through which they are legitimised (1981). These ‘regimes of truth’ are reinforced and naturalised through speech acts (Dunn & Neumann, 2016), which enable certain statements and claims to appear factually accurate, largely due to the power relations that are embodied within them (Foucault, 1972). Speech acts are an important method of furthering a discourse and feature dominantly in the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation of securitisation theory. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde explain the importance of recognising the role of discourse in studying securitisation by stating, “the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations” (1998). The speech act is integral to the securitisation discourse because it allows the audience (subjects) to accept the security threat (object) as legitimate and also justifies the state’s use of ‘extraordinary measures’ to address the threat (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998).

Narratives form a significant methodological tool through which discourses are framed, purposed and perpetuated. They are also useful to demonstrate how discourse formations determine policy solutions, especially with respect to how the development discourse has been instrumentalised through a few key narratives
that justify its securitisation as a legitimate policy response. Narratives serve certain functions, despite their failures - they influence how action is oriented towards the social and material world that we perceive, they offer simplistic explanations of highly complex problems and subsequently they enable the implementation of technical, apolitical, unilinear solutions (Autesserre, 2012). Furthermore, the application of certain frames in order to construct problems in an easily identifiable manner, is relevant to the propagation of discourses through narratives; frames determine which problems deserve attention and action, therefore contributing to the naturalisation of certain practices that are developed as legitimate responses to those problems over time (Autesserre, 2012). I will be making use of narrative framework in order to identify how specific narratives have been framed within the securitisation of development discourse that has been adopted by the Indian state. These include two dominant and complimentary narratives - Holistic counterinsurgency as a legitimate policy response and State building through service provision.

I will scrutinise the relationship between policy and language and the manner in which this reproduces power relations of the social world which legitimise the policies implemented (Foucault, 1981). As a result, the dominant discourses become the frame through which certain policies becomes optional or normalised. Based on the language used to frame the narrative, a development intervention is presented with minimal room for manoeuvre, thus presenting a scenario where that policy is perceived as ‘inevitable’ despite its repeated failures (Schaffer, 1984). Schaffer asserts that the presentation of policy as ‘common sense’ is dangerous, since it creates a demarcation between policy and practice, which eventually permits for the assigning of blame on the implementation phase rather than the conceptualisation of the policy itself (1984). I will attempt to challenge the naturalised presentation of policies by revealing the discourses implicit in their formulation and implementation.

4.3. Evidence:

Data collection will be based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative secondary sources. No primary data collection shall be undertaken due to the risk associated with the process. The main sources of evidence has been grey literature such as government reports on Maoist-inflicted violence since 2005, new strategies of official COIN that is periodically upgraded, as well as official state reports on data pertaining to service delivery of schools, health care centres, road construction and tribal community development. These include annual reports on internal security published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India, press publications by Members of Parliament regarding specific government schemes in LWE affected districts. Reports compiled by security experts familiar with the Indian state’s COIN history, will be referred to as a mediating source between government data and academic research-based data. These are predominantly sourced from reports published by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).
Economic and political economy-based primary academic studies are a source of data that measure concepts such as the impact of service delivery through COIN on state legitimacy and pacifying violent conflicts. Secondary academic studies explore the discursive formations of theoretical concepts such as the securitisation of development within official state policy and practice. These studies, most of which have a basis in securitisation theory, have primarily been based on conflicts with Western superpowers; however, similarities can be drawn from these cases and applied to the Indian context.

I will refer to ethnographies conducted amongst the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), the main cadres of the Maoist movement behind the attacks on the state machinery in Chhattisgarh, as well as ethnographic reports on the lived realities of the rural areas within which the movement’s base is situated. Media coverage on the state’s response to Maoist violence and official government efforts at provision of services and infrastructure will be selected to reference how mainstream media influences civilian support for the state.

5. Discourse Analysis:

By referring to two narratives, I will demonstrate how the Indian state has securitised its development discourse in order to address the Maoist insurgency and also analyse the extent to which development interventions are used as a dominant COIN strategy.

5.1. Holistic Counterinsurgency as legitimate policy response:

The state of Chhattisgarh was newly formed in 2000 in order to foster fast track development for the historically marginalised STs, who form a large proportion of the state’s population. However, the state still has one of the highest poverty rates and one of the slowest poverty reduction rates, especially with respect to improving social inclusion through human development indicators such as health, literacy levels and mortality rates in India as of 2012 (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, LWE affected districts such as Dantewada that have witnessed some of the most violent encounters between the Maoists, civilians and security forces, have the lowest literacy rates in the state - a mere 41% as compared to the state average of 71% (Sundar, 2016). While there is insufficient research to establish a correlation between poor performance on development indicators and the Maoist insurgency (Eynde et al, 2015), different wings of the Indian government have strongly engaged in this idea to facilitate policy formulation based on promoting development as a form of counterinsurgency (Kamra, 2019). In 2018, Prime Minister Modi reinforced this notion at the inauguration of a steel plant in Chhattisgarh, where he said,
“I believe violence and conspiracy like this has only one answer - development. The trust that will arise from the development will be able to get rid of violence.” (NDTV, 2018).

This serves as a strong representation of state ideology functioning under the ‘underdevelopment as a security threat’ doctrine.

The most visible securitisation of development discourse is through the gradual naturalisation of a ‘holistic’ COIN strategy as a legitimate policy response to address the security threat posed by Maoist insurgents, as well as to address Chhattisgarh’s poor performance on different development indicators. The narrative of a ‘holistic’ ‘multi-pronged approach’ (MHA, 2007) towards addressing LWE in the interior regions of India, aims to forge the state’s goals of reestablishing its sovereignty as well as fulfilling its obligations as the official provider of welfare services for its citizens. Interestingly, this terminology entered official state parlance as early as in 2006, merely a year after the CPI (Maoist) was formed and began its violent attacks against state machinery. The most striking state response that reflects the blatant prioritisation of reestablishing security despite claims that the state was working towards addressing socio-economic causes of violence, was the creation of the civilian vigilante group Salwa Judum in 2006. Although the Indian government declared it to be a ‘voluntary and peaceful initiative’ that was an expression of local resistance against the Maoist cadres in Adivasi-dominated villages (MHA, 2007), the overt support provided by the paramilitary forces towards the mass atrocities such as looting, arson and rape that was committed by the Salwa Judum, as well as its leadership stemming from well-established political parties (Sundar, 2016), points towards a very traditional counterinsurgency strategy that relies on vigilantism to counter grassroots support for insurgent groups (Guha, 1983).

Thus, while there is an ostensible preference towards policy language that equally engages with security and development goals, the state’s focus on reasserting its superior security status is manifest through measures such as fostering vigilante groups on the ground to carry out its counterinsurgency operations. A Naxal-Management Division (later renamed as the ‘Left Wing Extremism Division’) was formed to ‘effectively tackle the naxalite menace from both security and development angles’ (MHA, 2007) and to facilitate ‘security, development, ensuring the rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception management’ (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019). Despite this seemingly integrated approach however, different government reports and press briefings reveal that official state policy has always oscillated from ‘development with security, to no development without security, to no development, only security’ (Sundar, 2016).

For example, following the highest number of civilian casualties in a decade between 2016-17, the government of Chhattisgarh supported the formation of a ‘Bastariya Battalion’ under the CRPF forces stationed in the state, to ‘facilitate the employment and recruitment of tribal youth from the Maoist-hit Bastar Division’ (SATP, 2017). As a result, the state government found a novel means of continuing to outsource its counterinsurgency
operations to tribal populations who have been victims of state-sponsored violence in the past, under the garb of providing stable employment opportunities for them. This is reminiscent of the tacit support provided by the state to the Salwa Judum in its recruitment of underage Special Police Officers (SPOs), despite such practices being declared as ‘unconstitutional’ by the Supreme Court of India in 2011; subsequently the state government renamed these forces as the ‘District Reserve Guard’ thus enabling to fulfill their original functions (Sundar, 2016). In addition, the MHA encouraged an increased 40% recruitment from tribal populations into the CRPFs, in order to ‘wean away potential youth from the path of militancy or Left-Wing Extremism’ (MHA, 2011), an implication of the state’s intent to address high rates of unemployment by increasing civilian involvement in its counterinsurgency operations.

The Indian state has utilised the existence of the security-development nexus, in order to legitimise the securitisation of development discourse; it can now therefore continue fulfilling its social contract with citizens while also pursuing an aggressive COIN in order to eradicate the ‘naxalite menace’. The use of such dehumanising metaphors to allude to a rebel movement that has gained varying levels of support from the Adivasi villages, is also reflective of the primary aim of the state to assert control over its internal security before paying attention to its developmental flaws that the Maoists claim to address (Sundar, 2006). In addition, the regular use of such metaphors contribute towards framing the security responses adopted by the security forces as fitting of the ‘extraordinary measures’ required to address the security threat (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998), despite the well-documented human rights abuses that these forces engage with to achieve their targets (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The MHA further delegitimises the grassroots popularity of the CPI (Maoist), by referring to their strategy in the following way.

“Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the under-privileged and remote segments of the population (2006).”

The use of phrases such as ‘take advantage’ and ‘perceived injustice’ deny the ease with which the Maoists recruit youth from Adivasi communities who are dissatisfied with the dismal state record in those regions; furthermore, it infantalises the political autonomy of these communities. However, most significantly, such a framing permits the state to attribute underdevelopment in LWE affected districts to the presence of Maoists and reinforces the belief that developmental failures create an environment that fosters conflict (Saferworld, 2011). One also needs to question what type of ‘security’ becomes relevant to the state in an insurgency. Different levels of governance collaborate to reinstate political security that is based on territorial and population control, rather than on forms of human security, which further represents how the state instrumentalises developmental failures as a legitimate ground for counterinsurgency (Sundar, 2012). For instance, in every MHA Annual
Report, the review on the internal security threat posed by the Maoists is concluded with the following statement,

“However, it is clear that the Maoists do not want root causes like underdevelopment addressed in a meaningful manner since they resort to targeting school buildings, roads, railways, bridges... in a major way. They wish to keep the population in their areas of influence marginalized to perpetuate their outdated ideology.” - (MHA, 2012, 2015, 2017).

Subsequently, this prioritises the strengthening of security measures in order to pursue development, a reflection of the instrumentalisation of development programmes to address security threats. It also enables the central government to produce policy that reflects its ‘holistic’ counterinsurgency strategy, while only implementing security-related policy. The governance ‘vacuum’ provides a reason to deliver on basic services such as education and healthcare, however these serve the hidden function of providing a cover to strengthen security-related capacities of LWE affected states. The manner in which the central government approaches ‘capacity-building’ of LWE affected states, captures the dominant method used to securitise development discourse since it is primarily concerned with aiding states to strengthen their security apparatus. This is produced through financial aid to different states through various schemes such as the Security-Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE) and Special Central Assistance Scheme (SCA) which fall under the ‘Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme, and the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) that funds the fortification of police stations in LWE-affected states (MHA, 2015).

The most significant of these, the SRE scheme, ensures recurring reimbursement to states for any operational and training-related expenditures for the maintenance of security forces, for compensation towards civilians or security personnel killed in LWE related violence, as well as any expenses incurred by ‘village defence committees’ that engage in ‘community policing’ (MHA, 2011). The MHA provides far more detailed explanations on the funding of security-related schemes in all its Annual Reports and on its official website than that dedicated towards detailing the development-related schemes, thus establishing the limited ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Schaffer, 1984) that compels the state to first address security-strengthening (Sundar, 2016). The MHA justifies this prioritisation, by relying on constitutional provisions that demarcate ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ as purely under the jurisdiction of state governments, thus enabling the central government to gradually reduce its percentage of funding from a full 100% to 75% to state governments for these schemes (MHA, 2015).

The SCA scheme is another case where the state frames issues of development in a securitised lens that legitimises the utilisation of development-related funds for fulfilling security goals. Implemented in 35 of the worst LWE affected districts in the country, the scheme aims to ‘fill the critical gaps in public infrastructure and services in these districts’, with funding of Rs. 30 billion dedicated towards the same objective (PIB, 2017). This begs the question of why an ostensibly development-related scheme receives such substantial funding under the
Modernisation of Police Forces umbrella scheme, which is designed to primarily strengthen security response against encounters with Maoists at the ground level. In addition, it reveals which aspects of a failing public infrastructure the Indian state considers significantly ‘critical’ enough to receive funding under its official counterinsurgency response. The holistic response is once again geared to respond to the security threat posed by the Maoist insurgency towards state legitimacy rather than addressing the lack of administrative and governance infrastructure in LWE affected districts.

A prominent representation of the hidden functions served by the holistic counterinsurgency narrative can be captured by the large disparities in the funding available to states under different security and development-related schemes, while official policy still continues to project an image of the ‘multi-pronged’ approach. In comparison to the Rs. 180 billion spent on the SRE scheme, funding for the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) has been fully stopped under the claim that respective LWE affected states now have ‘sufficient flexibility to conceive and implement schemes/programmes suited to their local needs and aspirations, including requirements to bridge the developmental deficit gaps in backward regions within the States’ (PIB. 2016). Once again, the central government has successfully evaded blame for the failures of a seemingly holistic counterinsurgency, by instead focusing on different ways through which respective states can grow more self-sufficient at countering the Maoist threat to state legitimacy.

Another important dimension that needs examination is the framing of how successful counterinsurgency strategies are measured. Improvements in the implementation of state policy are predominantly measured only in terms of the success of security-strengthening exercises, such as the number of police stations fortified against Maoist attacks and the increased percentage of Maoist fatalities in comparison to security force casualties due to increased funding to security personnel on the ground (SATP, 2013). The language in the following quotes, signifies how development schemes receive secondary importance in the state’s overall approach towards measuring the success of its response to the ‘LWE scenario’:

“Over the last four years, there has been a substantial improvement in the LWE scenario. Incidents of violence have seen a 20% decline with a 34% reduction in related deaths in 2017 as compared to 2013. The geographical spread of LWE violence also shrunk from 76 districts in 2013 to just 58 districts in 2017... ” (PIB, 2018).

“The improvement in LWE scenario can be attributed to greater presence and increased capacity of the Security Forces across the LWE affected States, better operational strategy and regular monitoring of development schemes in affected areas.” (MHA, 2018).
On the other hand, the glorification of counterinsurgency policy fails to take into consideration the reduced number of civilian deaths of those caught in the crossfire or the improvement of other development indicators as a product of a holistic counterinsurgency policy. Significantly, marginal increases in the number Maoist fatalities in comparison to security force fatalities cannot be taken at face value as a representation of improved security levels or subsequent improvements in development indicators in LWE-affected districts (SATP, 2013). This can be attributed to the high incidence of fake encounters where paramilitary forces have been accused of murdering civilians in order to reach targeted kill numbers, a phenomenon that became dominant under the infamous ‘Operation Green Hunt’ and the police-led ambush of Tadmetla village in Chhattisgarh in 2011 (The Wire, 2018).

Lastly, the state legitimises the security-development nexus by reinforcing the benefits of securitisation on delivering developmental outcomes, such as improving the availability of employment opportunities, as is demonstrated below. However, there are thinly veiled undertones that imply the cultural hegemony of ‘mainstream’ Indian culture, thus equating the discourse on development with enforced social inclusion.

“The developmental outreach by the Government of India has resulted in an increasingly large number of LWE cadres shunning the path of violence and return to the mainstream.” (MHA, 2018).

By bringing tribal youth into the mainstream, the different state machinery is fostering a development ideal that promotes livelihoods security with re-establishing state legitimacy and lowering political support for the Maoist insurgency. This strategy therefore instrumentalises the existing security-development nexus, in order to fulfill state obligations towards civilian populations inhabiting conflict zones. In addition, the wide-held belief that unemployment presents a security threat is co-opted by the state which is the securitising actor, armed with the capacity to frame the Maoist insurgency as the more urgent security threat to be addressed.

5.2. State-building through service provision:

The Maoist insurgency has been addressed primarily as an issue of ‘internal security’ that legitimised the state’s excessive use of paramilitary and police forces (Kamra, 2019). However, as the rise of extrajudicial killings and large-scale human rights violations of civilian populations by security forces gained public attention (Human Rights Watch, 2009), this produced a response that aimed to manage the public image of the Indian government as a ‘benevolent state’ that was committed to resolving the socio-economic causes of the Maoist insurgency, which was a deeply developmental issue (Kamra, 2019). Despite a counterinsurgency strategy on the ground that was highly aggressive and based on ‘sanitising’ LWE-affected states of Maoist cadres (SATP, 2014), Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that,
“Dealing with left-wing extremism requires a nuanced strategy, a holistic approach. It cannot be treated simply as a law and order problem.” (BBC, 2009).

Similar sentiments were echoed by the newly appointed Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Bhupesh Baghel in 2018, when he commented on the inability of the state government to have successfully addressed the demands of the Maoists in the past, which would have enabled reductions in fatalities and violence. He said,

“We need a political, economic and social approach... the policy of bullet-for-bullet has failed miserably and it's time to give a new thought to the issue.” (SATP, 2019).

However, he further elaborates,

“...there is no question of withdrawing security forces (from Naxal-affected areas). Whatever system is going on, will be continued till further strategy is devised.” (SATP, 2019).

As a result, the central and Chhattisgarh governments have adopted a middle ground as official state response that involves the utilisation of paramilitary forces in the implementation of developmental schemes and programmes. This is based on the implicit assumption that addressing the absence of governance and lack of basic service provision, will contribute to increasing civilian support and improve state legitimacy in LWE-affected districts (Eynde et al, 2015). These are perceived to be integral to the framing of underdevelopment as a security threat that enables the persistence of the Maoist insurgency despite conventional counterinsurgency operations for over a decade. Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that the Maoists have established a parallel state and attempted to improve livelihoods security over unadministered regions of the country (usually deeply isolated, forested terrains), that have been historically at the receiving end of political marginalisation (Guha, 2007).

However, the general trend is that the central government does not acknowledge this political history while formulating development-related schemes and policies for LWE affected states. The emergence of the Maoist insurgency has further complicated state response to an already democratically marginalised region; Maoists are violently opposed to the ideals of a parliamentary democracy and prevent the smooth running of general and state elections in certain villages they control in districts such as Dantewada and Sukhma (Shantha, 2018). Therefore, the discursive frames underpinning policy-formulation, are centred around the belief that improving the implementation of development schemes related to literacy, transportation, employment and health indicators, will help the state garner legitimacy and authority in the eyes of its civilian population. While this is a positive development, it is necessary to challenge the unintended consequences and hidden intentions of these attempts to delegitimise the Maoist insurgency or the popular dissatisfactions that the Maoists claim to represent.
Amongst the various development-related schemes designed by the state to be implemented in LWE affected states such as Chhattisgarh, I will be focusing on the Integrated Action Plan (IAP), different literacy schemes centred around establishing boarding school education systems for children in Maoist-controlled territories and the controversial Civic Action Programme (CAP), which also includes an active Media plan aimed at disseminating state propaganda against Maoist ideology. Most importantly, by highlighting certain key statements made by different state institutions pertaining to these schemes, the tacit intentions of the Indian state to quell the insurgency rather than its declared aims of addressing lack of overall development, shall be emphasised. The state attempts to reassert its legitimacy through the implementation of development schemes, by framing the narrative of the lack of socio-economic development as more urgent over the lack of democratic representation (Eynde et al, 2015). In addition, the technical and depoliticised language that is used to describe these schemes, clearly represents the prioritisation of re-establishing state legitimacy through service provision, rather than addressing the political roots of the insurgency (Ferguson, 1990).

The IAP is a prime example of state policy that is regularly modified and rebranded in order to hide the failures of implementation. The original programme, when implemented in 2010, was intended to serve 60 districts in LWE affected states (10 of which were in Chhattisgarh), however, under its rebranded form as the Additional Central Assistance scheme (ACA), it was later expanded to 88 districts as the Maoist cadres increased the frequency and geographical spread of their activities against the Indian state (PIB, 2015). The programme was designed to provide public infrastructure and services such as primary schools, village roads and primary health centres. The most dominant feature of the scheme was that it provided respective states with ‘sufficient flexibility’ to spend the fixed funding amount on any schemes ‘based on the needs of the district’ (PIB, 2010). Despite the seemingly apolitical light in which this programme was formulated, it served the important political function of helping the state to win over local support in Maoist-controlled districts. The flexibility enabled local state representatives, such as police personnel and district magistrates to possess increased control over funding for select development schemes, thus also contributing to the devolution of power at local governance levels (Eynde et al, 2015).

This is well captured in the erstwhile Home Minister P. Chidambaram’s statements on the proposed benefits of the programme as, “bridging the development deficit and trust deficit in LWE affected areas” (Balchand, 2011). Central to this strategy is the WHAM approach, which is manifested through the implementation of the different schemes included in the IAP. The paramilitary forces are involved in the construction of national highways and roads under the Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojna scheme (PMGSY), as well as in the construction of ‘Pota-cabin’ boarding schools and Ashram schools (run by charitable organisations backed by the Hindu nationalist organisation- Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) for tribal children under education-related schemes such as the Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA) (Khurana & Kunhi Kannan, 2014). However, despite the multi-dimensional approach adopted by the state in the design and implementation of this programme, the relative autonomy it
provided to LWE affected district-level administrations in the hopes of state-building, proved to be unsuccessful. This is largely due to the failure of the central government to account for the dominance of the Maoist cadres who controlled the decision-making regarding the selection of government-recommended development schemes in deeply isolated villages and districts in Chhattisgarh, such as Dantewada, Sukhma, Bastar and Narayanpur (Sundar, 2016). Furthermore, funding from the central government to LWE affected states implementing the ACA was stopped in 2015, with the MHA citing the desire to increase individual state autonomy in responding to specific developmental needs as the dominant reason (2016). Hence, the state successfully evaded responsibility for the failure of the IAP by either continuing its policies under new nomenclature or by devolving power without accounting for the lack of local governance structures at the lowest levels of state administration in LWE districts.

Incidentally, by attempting to address several developmental woes under one programme, the Chhattisgarhi government subsequently diverted nearly 40% of funds towards the improvement of road connectivity in comparison to building educational or health-related infrastructure (Gill et al, 2015). Such motivation is excellently captured in the following comment made by the Special DGP Awasthi, with respect to the involvement of paramilitary forces in the construction of roads and highways connecting LWE affected districts under schemes such as the PMGSY and Road Requirement Plans (I &II).

"Our security forces are slowly penetrating into the core areas of the Naxals and establishing camps, in order to reduce the distance travelled by our men..."

The stated purpose of improving transportation connectivity and administrative control by employing paramilitary forces to ensure the safety of highway construction, can also be challenged on the grounds of whether it benefits tribal populations who have historically rejected notions of development that increase their interactions with the non-indigenous world (Shanta, 2018). Most importantly, Sundar’s ethnographic accounts question the relevance of improving road connectivity in bringing about economic development as it is legitimised by the Indian state, if it is not accompanied by proportionate improvements in healthcare and other service provisions across LWE affected districts (2016).

The central government has been simultaneously engaged in the funding and implementation of additional educational schemes under the SSA and Right to Education Act (RTE), apart from the funds dedicated towards improving literacy rates under the IAP. This neatly falls under the narrative of service provision contributing towards state-building because the stated intent of providing education in regions with disproportionately high illiteracy rates amongst ST populations, significantly differs from the hidden functions such policy serves regarding its ability to improve state legitimacy and state-civilian relations. The central government has provided 100% funding to LWE affected states to engage CRPF forces in the construction of Pota-cabins, Ashram schools.
and hostels for children belonging to tribal communities at far distances away from their homes in conflict zones, thus effectively cutting ties with their socio-cultural roots (Abrol, 2018) in order to facilitate their easy entry into ‘mainstream’ Indian society (NITI Aayog, 2015). This produces two complementary and reinforcing results- it not only helps improve paramilitary-civilian relations through the WHAM strategy, but also effectively breeds ignorance about a very active political movement as well as an entire lifestyle that future generations cannot relate to. Furthermore, it forms an important aspect of the overall strategy used by the state to downplay the highly politicised issue of erasure of indigenous culture (Woodman & Kroemer, 2018), in favour of presenting a logical, technical solution that would lower illiteracy and poverty rates amongst the communities that are embroiled in counterinsurgency operations against the Maoist insurgency.

Lastly, the central government has devised a strong propaganda machine in order to increase public support for the securitisation of development schemes as a legitimate method of state-building in areas under Maoist control. The Civic Action Programme (CAP) was implemented in 2011 and funded LWE affected states to employ CRPF battalions “to build bridges between the local population and security forces” (MHA, 2011). These involve the construction of schools, provision of medical assistance through health camps and most controversially, through the ‘Screening of films related to India's freedom movement; great leaders of India; culture of different regions of India; history of India; secularism; social evils-dowry, child marriage etc’. The imposition of mainstream Indian Hindu cultural norms onto Adivasi communities that generally do not engage in the social evils of dowry or child marriage, is a reflection of the hidden functions of state-building which intend to transform and destroy the socio-cultural roots of support for the Maoist insurgency (Sundar, 2016). Under its Media plan, the central government engages with local media platforms in LWE affected districts in Chhattisgarh, in order to broadcast the development schemes of the central government on the state-owned All India Radio and considers the media to be a ‘potent instrument in creating awareness among the target population about the socio-economic developmental schemes of the Government’ as well as to ‘highlight the how LWE violence is preventing implementation of the schemes, policies and initiatives of the Government’ (MHA, 2015). Similarly, the MHA exhorts civil society and the Indian mainstream media sources across the country ‘to build pressure on the Maoists to eschew violence, join the mainstream...’ (2012). This serves the vital function of demonising any dissenters against the securitisation of development discourse (civil rights and human rights activists, Adivasi community leaders) as Maoist sympathisers, thus legitimising extraordinary measures such as arresting them under the UAPA law (EPW, 2018).

Therefore, the Indian state maintains its control over the discursive framing of its response to the Maoist insurgency as legitimate, despite its inability to successfully address past failures over more than 20 years of counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, it has prevented any challenges to these narratives carrying forward the securitisation of development discourse from gaining public support through the ‘strategic complexes’ it has established with institutions within the private sector and media.
6. Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Indian state’s official policies in responding to the Maoist insurgency have been centred around the securitisation of development discourse in order to rebuild its legitimacy and authority in LWE affected districts in Chhattisgarh. The instrumentalisation of the security-development nexus to further its counterinsurgency operations reveals the hidden functions of the official multi-pronged approach adopted by different state apparatus. The securitisation of development projects is undertaken through the operationalisation of the WHAM approach, by which the delivery of basic services under the supervision of paramilitary forces or the disastrous combing operations that involve the large-scale human rights violations of civilians suspected of being Maoist sympathisers, is legitimised as the extraordinary measures necessary to usher in development and improve state-civilian relations.

The two key narratives analyse the official state responses that instrumentalise the security-development nexus in order to improve performances on development indicators, not for their intrinsic purpose of improving the living standards and democratic rights of Adivasi communities, but for increasing state control amongst populations that have historically mistrusted state machinery. The ‘Holistic counterinsurgency as legitimate policy response’ examined how ostensibly holistic counterinsurgency policies formulated by the central government prioritised capacity building of states through the improvement of security apparatus over the provision of public infrastructure. Likewise, the ‘State-building through service provision’ narrative demonstrates the way the language framing schemes significantly hides the hidden political functions served by depoliticised development policies.

This study aimed to explore the manner in which a well-popularised nexus that usually functions between donor states in the Global North and recipient states in the Global South is demonstrated by the Indian state towards threats to its system of parliamentary democracy. Further research needs to be conducted into the variation of responses amongst Adivasi communities towards an insurgency that claims to address its developmental woes. Lastly, an acknowledgement by the Indian state of the nuanced political views held by ST populations under Maoist control, would enable it in addressing the threat of underdevelopment as a priority over its current strategy of eradicating the ‘naxalite menace’.
7. References:


