Labour Migration, Social Movements and Regional Integration

A Comparative Study of the Role of Labour Movements in the Social Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community

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Published: Apr. 2016
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Word Count: 10,072
ABSTRACT

Through a comparative analysis informed by critical IPE, the paper investigates how labour migration has impacted labour movements' agency in the regional communities of West and Southern Africa. It argues that in a time of increased migration and the emergence of regional governance, labour unions must cooperate transnationally to adequately address issues of poverty and social injustice. It finds that labour migration has to a greater extent affected labour movements towards transnational agency in West Africa than in Southern Africa, which consequently reduces the potential for a more socially just and inclusive regionalism in Southern Africa, compared to West Africa.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIPE</td>
<td>Critical International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>Nigeria Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>New Regionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity (Replaced by the African Union since 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTUWA</td>
<td>Organisation of Trade Unions in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATUCC</td>
<td>The Southern Africa Trade Union Co-Ordination Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 2

ACRONYMS 3

1. INTRODUCTION 6

2. BACKGROUND 9

2.1. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION IN SSA 9
2.2. REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 9
2.3. LABOUR MOVEMENTS IN SSA 10
2.4. LINKING LABOUR MOVEMENTS AND MIGRATION IN A TIME OF REGIONALISM 11

3. METHODOLOGY 12

3.1. CASE SELECTION: ECOWAS AND SADC 12
3.2. MIXED METHODS APPROACH 13
3.3. LIMITATIONS 13

4. CONCEPTUALISING LABOUR MIGRATION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION. 14

4.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 14
4.1.1 LABOUR’S AGENCY IN IPE 14
4.1.2 LINKING LABOUR MIGRATION AND LABOUR MOVEMENTS 15
4.1.3 LABOUR MOVEMENTS’ AGENCY IN THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 17
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 18

5. LABOUR MIGRATIONS IMPACT UPON LABOUR MOVEMENTS IN SADC AND ECOWAS 21

5.1 DISPLAYING THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK FOR LABOUR’S AGENCY 21
5.1.1 STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF SADC 21
5.1.2 STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF ECOWAS 21
5.2 MIGRATION PATTERNS IN ECOWAS AND SADC 23
5.2.1 MIGRATION IN SADC 23
5.2.2 MIGRATION IN ECOWAS 25
5.3 SOCIAL FORCES: THE PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN ECOWAS AND SADC 28
5.4 UNDERSTANDING THE STRENGTH OF SOCIAL FORCES: LABOUR MIGRATION’S INFLUENCE ON LABOUR MOVEMENTS’ CONFIGURATION OF POWERS 30
5.4.1 INSTITUTIONS: THE IMPACT OF LABOUR MIGRATION ON INSTITUTIONS IN SADC AND ECOWAS 31
5.4.2 IDEAS: XENOPHOBIA AS AN OBSTACLE TO TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS IN SADC AND ECOWAS 32
5.4.3 MATERIAL CAPABILITIES: UNDERSTANDING UNIONS’ CAPACITY AND INFLUENCE IN SADC AND ECOWAS 33
5.5 DISCUSSION 36

6. CONCLUSION 39

BIBLIOGRAPHY 41

APPENDIX 49
TABLES
TABLE 1 CROSS-NATIONAL INDICATORS FOR ECOWAS AND SADC ................................................................. 12
TABLE 2 MIGRATION PATTERNS IN SADC 2013 ............................................................................................ 24
TABLE 3 MIGRATION PATTERNS IN ECOWAS 2013 ....................................................................................... 26
APPENDIX, TABLE 4 DEGREE OF UNIONISATION AND UNION’S SOCIETAL STRENGTH SADC .................. 49
APPENDIX, TABLE 5 UNIONISATION DEGREE AND UNION’S SOCIETAL STRENGTH ECOWAS ..................... 49
APPENDIX, TABLE 6 SELECTED VARIABLES ON SADC MEMBER STATES .......................................................... 50
APPENDIX, TABLE 7 SELECTED VARIABLES ON ECOWAS MEMBER STATES .................................................. 55

FIGURES
FIGURE 1 LABOUR’S FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ................................................................................................. 15
FIGURE 2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE, MESO-LEVEL AND AGENCY ............................................... 18
FIGURE 3 THEORETICAL TOOL FOR ANALYSING LABOUR’S AGENCY AND STRUCTURE .................................... 19
FIGURE 4 TOTAL INTERNATIONAL AND INTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION IN SADC 1990-2013 ......................... 25
FIGURE 5 TOTAL INTERNATIONAL AND INTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION IN SADC 1990-2013 ......................... 27
FIGURE 6 POPULAR PROTESTS IN SADC AND ECOWAS 1999-2014 .............................................................. 28
FIGURE 7 POPULAR PROTESTS IN SADC AND ECOWAS WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA 1996-2014 ........... 29
FIGURE 8 UNIONISATION DEGREE AND UNION’S SOCIETAL STRENGTH SADC ............................................. 34
FIGURE 9 UNIONISATION DEGREE AND UNION’S SOCIETAL STRENGTH ECOWAS ........................................... 34
1. Introduction
The recent celebration of ‘Africa Rising’, the idea that Africa finally is catching up economically with the rest of the world with fast growth over the past ten years, (Economist, 2013; Time, 2012) has misguidedlly shunned the harsh reality in which the majority of Africans live. The fact is that this celebrated growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has not led to increased prosperity for the 99%. Instead it has been non-inclusive growth, continuing the trend of de-industrialisation and increasing informality, inequality, and poverty (Mbeki, 2009). In response to this trajectory, a wave of African social movements has arisen, presenting a new potential for social transformation for the world’s least developed region. Crystallised as a quest for social justice, citizen rights, decent employment and welfare, this wave represents a bottom-up resistance to the negative consequences of globalisation within the African continent, and as such holds the potential to give the notion of ‘Africa rising’ more credence (Thomson and Tapscott, 2010; Branch and Mampilly, 2015; African Economic Outlook, 2015).

The unequal growth has hampered socioeconomic progress for large populations of SSA. Combined with intensified globalisation1, one result of this significant rise in inequality is increased international migration (Milanovic, 2011; Black et al., 2006). SSA has previously been a main emigration region to the rest of the world, but increases in intra-regional migration have resulted in about 50% of all migrants from SSA migrating to other countries in SSA2 (UN DESA, 2013). With refugees comprising about 6%, the vast majority of migrants are workers and their families (UN Desa, 2013).

Labour migration and social movements are linked in various ways. They are firstly both responses to rising inequality and non-inclusive growth. Secondly, in the context of increasing regionalisation, labour activity plays a role in binding regions together, primarily through migration and subsequently through the potential of the transnational political mobilisation of labour movements. This mobilisation actively uses regional economic communities (RECs) as arenas for social transformation,

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1 Using Mittelman’s definition, globalisation is “a syndrome of processes and activities, […] which has been normalised as a dominant set of ideas and policy framework” (Mittelman, 2000: 4)
2 With an increase of almost 20% since 2000, SSA had more than 17.2 million immigrants in 2013
acknowledging that the national arena has become too small to address the consequences of globalisation (Gant and Söderbaum, 2003; O’Brien, 2008). Despite this, migration and social movements have been paid scant attention within international political economy (IPE) discourse, despite clear linkages with contemporary topics such as regionalisation and globalisation (Castles, 2007; O’Brien, 2000). Labour has been seen either as passive beneficiaries of hegemons (neoliberalism, neorealism) or passive victims of the capitalist world economy (classical structuralism, Marxism), and is considered most often from a Eurocentric perspective (Seabrooke, 2006; O’Brien, 2008).

At a time when it is more salient to ask ‘how to achieve change’ instead of ‘how to keep order’ (Seabrooke, 2006: 14), looking at labour’s agency enables us to reveal new sites of dynamism wherein the sources to shape, constitute and socially transform regional and global contexts lie. This agency becomes a catalyst for change that, from the bottom-up, can push for politics that empower the poor and institutions working on behalf of the marginalised segments of society. In a globalised and globalising world, no country large or small can advance these agendas without considering its neighbours and the need for regional integration. To understand labour agency, we need to contextualise it with both labour migration and regionalisation. The aim is thus to answer the following research question:

*How does labour migration affect labour movements in Sub-Saharan Africa and what implications does this hold for the process of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa?*

Emerging from critical IPE, the theoretical framework needed to explore this question will combine the theory of social forces and agency (Cox, 1981; O’Brien, 2000; Seabrooke, 2006), transformative regionalism (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003) and the social transformationalistic approach (Castles 2014, Munck and Hyland, 2013). This framework will be used to look at how labour migration has affected labour movements in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The paper argues that labour migration can be an opening for labour movements to challenge existing regional integration projects and conversely push for a more socially just regionalisation project. From this foundation at
least three findings emerge from this study. The first is that labour migration not only affects labour movements, but in fact migration exerts agency independently on regional integration projects. The second finding is that labour migration has more progressively impacted institutions and ideas in ECOWAS, which in turn has altered labour and migrant workers’ rights. The final finding is that despite the rise in social movements evident in both SADC and ECOWAS, social movements in SADC are impeded by xenophobia, and regional asymmetries which comparatively weaken social forces for transformative regionalism in SADC, suggesting greater potential in ECOWAS.

The paper is structured around six chapters. The next will present regionalism, labour movements and labour migration in Africa. Then follows an explanation of the methodology and a presentation of the theoretical framework. Informed by this framework, a comparative analysis on labour movements and migration in SADC and ECOWAS will be presented. The final chapter will present conclusions drawn from the findings.
2. Background

2.1. International labour migration in SSA
Recent estimates suggest there were 232 million international migrants worldwide, in 2013, an increase of 33% since 2000 and an astounding 3.2% of the world’s population. The large majority of the world’s migrants are migrant workers and their families (UN Desa, 2013)\(^3\).

While SSA previously has been a main emigration region to the rest of the world, the increase in intra-regional migration has resulted in about 50% of all migrants from SSA migrating to other countries in SSA. This has lead to an increase in the total migrant population of almost 20% since 2000, mounting to around 17.2 million migrants in SSA in 2013 (UN Desa, 2013). Despite uncertainties in migratory reporting and the opaqueness this creates for policy-makers, the increase in migration cannot be reversed nor is it a problem to be ‘fixed’ (Castles, 2007). Persistent global inequality will continue to lead people to search for prosperous opportunities away from home (Milanovic, 2011). Moreover, increased economic development in areas of the Global South will not likely diminish migration either. Instead, it might cause even more migration, as more people are given the necessary resources to migrate. Thus migration must be perceived as a persistent part of social transformation in SSA.

2.2. Regionalism in Africa
Africa has experienced two waves of regionalisation\(^4\). The first one was associated with decolonization and pan-Africanism, where states attempted regional cooperation immediately after the decolonisation process. The second and most current wave started in the late 1980s and early 1990s, instigated primarily by globalisation. This wave is based upon the ideas that regionalism can act as a potential counterforce to economic globalisation and thereby integrate the world’s least developed regions into the global economy (Bøås, 2001). This is a consequence of the fact that the nation state has become internationalised (Cox, 1981) and thus does not longer serve as a proper

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\(^3\) Data on migration is subject to uncertainty. Alone among UNDP, UN Desa and World Bank large differences exist in the presentation of numbers (IOM, 2013). The influential number of undocumented migration causes further uncertainty.

\(^4\) Regionalization refers to formal interaction between states. Visions, values and concrete objective that supervise regionalization processes are referred to as regionalism (Bøås, 2001). This paper will use both interchangeably.
shield against the global economy (Mittelman, 1994). Additionally, increased regionalisation in the rest of the world has questioned the privileges and safeguards given to African states in preferential agreements like the Lomé agreement⁵.

Despite the dominant position of Eurocentric literature, alternative theories have followed based on a broader examination of regionalism in the world. These include autocentric regionalism, development integration, degenerate regionalism and neoliberal regionalism (Mittelman, 2014). The regionalism witnessed in SSA, including that which is spurred by SADC and ECOWAS, is generally explained as neoliberal regionalism. This broadly entails demanding that states should be limited to enabling the free market and that the regional economies turn towards the global markets for investments and resources (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003).

2.3. Labour movements in SSA
Contrary to labour movements in the West, labour movements in Africa preceded industrialisation. They gained relevance because of their involvement in political struggles, mainly the struggle for independence. They are therefore by origin more politically oriented movements - not by constituency (as large groups of workers are within the informal economy) but by choice (Dibben, 2004)⁶.

Labour movements in SSA have until recently followed the global decline of labour movements since the 1970s (Oyelere, 2014). After their important role in the independence struggle, they have diminished significantly due to the vast increase in the informal sector, de-industrialisation and disadvantaging labour laws, as a consequence of neoliberal polices (Kochan, 2005). Despite this trend, labour movements remain the strongest organised civil society actor in most African countries (Schillinger, 2005; O’Brien, 2008). In the face of globalisation, a revitalisation of African unions and their future success now largely depends upon capturing the negative consequences of globalisation and contesting the neoliberal hegemony nationally, regionally and globally (Dibben, 2004; O’Brien, 2008).

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⁵ Preferential trade and aid agreement between the EU and seventy-one African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

⁶ The paper uses the term labour movement to broadly define both official union activity and more loose organised labour agency and networks. The analysis will further include social movements more broadly as an indication of social forces generally in society.
2.4. Linking labour movements and migration in a time of regionalism

Migration, social movements and regionalism have as individual social sciences been studied at great length. Combinations between two of them have occurred, with important scholarly work on migration and regionalism (Adepoju, 2001; 2006; 2005), or migration and social transformation (de Haas, 2010; Castles, 2007), along with important contributions on the recent significance of social movements in the global south (Branch and Mampilly, 2015) and social movements and regionalism (Strange, 2002). While separate studies reveal important insights for understanding the social transformations of societies and its consequences for ordinary people, we must integrate these studies into one single, salient theoretical framework. This will contribute to an understanding of reciprocity between the three variables and how these aggregated relations affect the agency of labour in changing its surroundings. This will be informed by important questions on how labour movements are heard through transnational collective action; to what extent they have created an identity that goes beyond their particular interests; and finally, whether they are capable of putting forward an alternative to the dominant models of regional integration (Botto, 2014).

The linkage between labour movements and labour migrants is based on the understanding that extending employment and citizen rights to migrants not only benefits them but also supports the general quest for enforcing human rights for migrants and nationals alike (Campbell, 2011).

Few studies have embarked upon evolving this more holistic framework of analysing labour movements, migration and regionalism (O’Brien, 2008; McGovern, 2012; Munck and Hyland, 2013). Inspired by these, the purpose here is to continue to develop such an approach, based upon the analytical tools provided by critical political economy. To the author’s knowledge, this will be the first study analysing this within an SSA context, bringing much needed attention to the fast-moving developments there.
3. Methodology

3.1. Case selection: ECOWAS and SADC
This paper analyses to what extent labour movements have been affected by labour migration and the various implications that has had in the context of the two RECs, ECOWAS and SADC in SSA. This selection is based on the ‘most similar case study’ approach (Saunders et al., 2009). Despite notable differences, which will be considered more fully in the analysis, the two RECs are, in the SSA context, quite similar, making for an interesting comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>SADC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member states</td>
<td>15⁷</td>
<td>15⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (USD PPP)</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>4,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth 2003-2013</td>
<td>7.5 %</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP share of Africa’s total economy</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional giant</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giant’s share of GDP</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, ReSAKSS

As Table 1 summarises, the two RECs are fairly similar in economic and demographic terms. Secondly, they are both the more vibrant sub-regional organisations in SSA and, despite differences in the degree of integration, they are together described as “the two regions [which] have all chances at becoming the most important RECs in sub-Saharan Africa” (Fall et al., 2013: 2). Thirdly, they are most similar in term of refugee population, which allows for a meaningful focus on labour migration (UNHCR, 2014). Finally, they share comparable characteristics in terms of the importance of their respective economic leaders (Nigeria and South Africa).

⁷ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
⁸ Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
3.2. **Mixed methods approach**
In accordance with the theoretical framework, the analysis will investigate the transformative agency of labour movements and how it is affected by labour migration. This in itself requires not only an interdisciplinary theoretical approach, but moreover a comingling of research methods. This entails a mix of processed secondary data (from the World Bank, UN Desa and African Economic Outlook), literature and content review, allowing for both establishing patterns and drawing broader relations between migration, labour movements and regionalism (Saunders et.al, 2009). For the literature and content analysis, academic papers and expert reports are used along with regional treaties and organisational papers from labour unions. This results in a more holistic and contextual understanding of the phenomena both individually and how they affect each other. This mix of methods is furthermore necessary due to a significant absence of information on SSA in general and on contemporary labour movements nationally and regionally in particular. Aggregating national trends will be done cautiously and with great respect for the national differences and the validity of these aggregations.

3.3. **Limitations**
Analysing contemporary social transformation is by definition an on-going process, and assessing the potential for change is consequently based upon a configuration of current forces rather than a prediction of future outcomes. The aim here is to see how these forces have been influenced and how they have evolved over time up until the present, thus providing indications of how these will proceed in social transformation in SSA.
Secondly, individual countries in the two regions analysed have a rich history of both migration and labour movements’ political influence, most prominently perhaps in South Africa. The purpose of this study is not a particular assessment of all thirty individual countries in the two regions, but an analysis of regional aggregated trends, patterns and responses. While drawing on key countries in terms of regional mobilisation, potential and influence, the aim is not to accurately analyse the concrete trajectory of individual countries, despite their interesting insights.
4. Conceptualising labour migration, social movements and regional integration.

4.1 Theoretical Foundation

4.1.1 Labour's agency in IPE
Labour's agency has had a limited role in the study of International Political Economy (IPE). Labour has been seen as either passive beneficiaries (by neoliberalism and neorealism), as passive victims of a capitalist economy (historical structuralism) (Seabrooke, 2006) or as an exhausted social force too small a minority today to genuinely have the capacity to shape contemporary IPE (Harrod and O'Brien, 2003). However, critical theorists within IPE have challenged these notions and recast attention towards the inclusion of labour's agency as a social force within the IPE, understood by its capacity to provoke social and political change (Cox, 1996; Herrod and O'Brien, 2002; Gill, 2003).

The role of labour as a social force is given by the dialectic between structure and agency within Critical IPE (CIPE). The political, economic and social hegemony is both the outcome of a historical structure while also the arena for the emergence of alternative possibilities of development. It entails a historical dependency on social, economic and political forces, while allowing the analysis to see change when world orders or forms of state change. It is when these historical structures change that labour as a social force can influence structure by putting “…pressure on social, political and economic structures which lead to change if not transformations in the longer run” (O'Brien, 2013: 8). Structure and agent are thus emergent products of each other. This allows the marginalised to have agency and a transformative capacity, which within the current structure turns out to be potentially far more significant than previously assumed (Seabrooke, 2006).

The internal power of agency – labour as a social force – is given by the configuration of three types of power: ideas, institutions and material capabilities. These three powers also affect world orders and forms of state, but for the purpose of this paper, the focus will be upon their configuration in relation to labour. These can change endogenously or exogenously over time and thus change the agency of labour and hence its impact on the current historical structure (Cox, 1981). Figure 1 presents
this relationship between structure and agency. To the left is depicted the structural framework determining labour’s agency and to the right the configurations of power driving this agency.

4.1.2 Linking labour migration and labour movements
While migration has been studied at length, the focus upon its transformative potential has largely been limited to a focus upon remittances, diaspora bonds and migrants as entrepreneurs (Kwtkar & Ratha, 2010; Leblang 2010; Adida & Girod, 2010; Black & Castaldo, 2009). Furthermore, while there has been a recent and considerable focus upon global and national regulatory policy frameworks for migration and integration, little attention has been given to the regional dimension of labour migration (Munck & Hyland, 2013).

Unlike migration studies, the vast amount of literature on social movements is more concerned with transformative potential. Most of this literature is however written by Western scholars and mainly, though not exclusively\textsuperscript{9}, on the history of movements in the North (Olson, 1965; Touraine, 1985; Tilly, 1975; McAdam et al., 1996; Klandermans 1984 and 1997). The study of the rich history of social movements in the South remains limited and the relationship between migration and social movements in the global South even more so. However, in an ever-increasingly globalised world, the

need for studying the linkage between labour migration and social movements concurrently increases. Bauman argued that in a globalised world “mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor” (Bauman, 1998:9). The migratory impacts of globalisation result from transformations in production structures and labour markets and the subsequent rise in social inequalities. Because migration in the majority of cases is a matter of labour, migration and labour movements must be theoretically, and empirically, explored together (McGovern, 2007).

Applying the CIPE approach can serve to bridge this gap between labour migration and social movements. Instead of merely analysing migration from the traditional push- and pull-theories and at the same time rejecting the determinism of neo-classical theory on the one side and historical-structuralism on the other, a more holistic approach can consider a reciprocal relation between labour migration, structure and agency. The theory of socially transformative migration allows for such an approach (Castles, 2014). Acknowledging processes of structural transformation (how processes such as globalisation foster migration), it recognises these social processes as an outcome of reciprocal dynamics between material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Castles, 2014; Westermann, 2013) and that migration can affect them in return. This allows for dynamism between migration processes that change social institutions and affect social forces, which in turn shape world orders and institutions affecting migration. In this way it allows for agency both in terms of migrants’ agency and affected social forces’ (changed) agency derived from the influx of migration. This gives rise to a system in which migration patterns and motivations, along with social movements’ ideas and agency, are viewed as mutually developing and dynamic.10

Finally, labour migration and labour movements are linked through shared interests. Social movements emerge from the desire to change the lives of marginalised people through skirmishing the vulnerabilities stemming from the consequences of neoliberal globalisation (Thomson & Tapscott, 2010). Migrant workers are in particular vulnerable to these consequences, creating shared interests between labour movements and migrants. The extent to which this occurs can be analysed through how labour migration affects the configuration of power of the social forces.

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10 The same holds for other potentially opposing factors than migration.
4.1.3 Labour movements’ agency in the process of regional integration
Despite not being a paper on African regions per se, but on labour movements’ engagement with them, a theoretical approach to regionalism is still indispensable. The approach taken here will be the new regionalism approach (NRA), whose epistemological and ontological foundation emerges from CIPE (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003). It deviates from the traditional theories of integration such as those of functionalism, institutionalism and trade integration, by including power relations, production, structural transformation, discourse and hegemony into the analysis of regionalism. This is done through a multilevel, comparative and historical analysis following the CIPE model from above, consistent with a structural framework in which world order, forms of state and social forces interact and hegemony ascends. This approach thus examines the ‘becoming’ and constant development of regional projects, and not just activities within a pre-given region.

The link between regional integration and social movements is established as NRA identifies and analyses the counter-forces and agents of transformation in the context of regionalisation in globalisation. Moreover, NRA acknowledges the crucial role of civil society actors, not as threats to the state but as valuable partners. Coined ‘transformative regionalism’, this refers to alternative, bottom-up regionalisation, including pro-democracy forces, labour unions and social movements. As précised by Mittelman: “At the end of the day, the possibilities and limitations of transformative regionalism rest on the strength of its links to civil society” (Mittelman, 1996: 48).

Summarised, we see that the interactions among the changes in the global division of labour, new regionalism as a response to globalisation, and resistance politics such as labour movements are all essential outcomes of the process of globalisation (Mittelman, 2000). These interactions hold the key to potential transformation11, but only to the degree that they configure to challenge the existing historical structure and impact it in another direction through a counter-hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) or a resistance movement (Polanyi, 1944). Only when labour migration alters the agenda of labour movements towards cross-border solidarity, and when they in turn actively push this vision in the regional integration project, the outcome can become socially just through

11“Social transformation, implies a fundamental change in the way society is organised, that goes beyond the continual, incremental process of social change that are always at work” (Castles et al., 2014:34).
transformationalist regionalism (Mittelman, 2000). Regionalism can thus only become transformative to the extent it is based upon sustainable growth and democracy, and is driven by strong relations to civil society and enjoying broad public support. While this type of transformative regionalism has not materialised fully anywhere, the aim here is to investigate the efforts and potential of social forces (Mittelman, 2000).

4.2 Theoretical framework
As argued above on migration flows, regional integration and social transformation are increasingly interlinked. The proposed social transformation perspective centres the role of social movements and labour movements in relation to migration in a regional context. To address the question of labour movements’ role in regionalisation, the focus of the theoretical framework is to inform an analysis on the social transformational agency of labour movements and in particular how migration influences this agency. As recognised above, despite structural constraints, labour has agency to act as a social force and potentially influence or change societal structures.

Figure 2 summarises this relationship and proposes the need for a multilevel analysis, consisting of both the global political economy (world orders) in which the regional integration projects (forms of state) are situated and equally an understanding of how regionalism sets the sphere in which labour movements operate. This reveals both a hierarchy between the three levels, but also allows for them to mutually influence each other. Migration in Figure 2 shows how it emerges from the structural level, but penetrates and impacts both regionalism and the agency of labour movements.
To analyse these interactions and outcomes, the model presented in 4.1.1 is expanded in Figure 3 to examine how labour migration affects labour movements in a process of continued regionalism. To summarise, within a concrete historical structure (i.e. a current moment), the structural framework determining labour’s agency as a social force is determined by three spheres of activity: a) the balance of social forces, b) the state form based on historically grounded relations of state and society at large and c) world orders. Labour’s strength as a social force is in turn determined by three types of reciprocal powers: 1) material capabilities, 2) ideas and collective imaginations of social order and 3) institutions (Cox 1983 and 1996).

Figure 3 Theoretical tool for analysing labour’s agency and structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural framework for labour’s agency</th>
<th>Categories of Power defining labour’s agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forms of state:</strong> Regional economic community</td>
<td><strong>Ideas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Orders:</strong> Globalisation</td>
<td><strong>Material Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGENCY:</strong> labour as a social force</td>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration’s influence on the structural framework for labour’s agency</th>
<th>Migration’s potential influence on labour movements’ categories of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional communities and migration states</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideas:</strong> Int. Solidarity, Human Rights, Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global and regional migration and production regimes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Capabilities:</strong> Unionization of migrant workers, popular protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour movements’ agency</strong></td>
<td><strong>Institutions:</strong> REC-union relations, regional labour rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cox 1983 and own elaboration

The analysis will first look upon how migration has affected the structural framework for labour’s agency in SADC and ECOWAS (left hand side of Figure 3), starting with an overview of the world orders and forms of state characterising the two RECs, and secondly, by an investigation of migration patterns in both. A regional
assessment will follow on the vigour of social movements in SADC and ECOWAS respectively. The second part will analyse in turn how migration has affected the three categories of power and how this has affected labour’s agency (right hand side of Figure 3).
5. Labour Migrations Impact upon Labour Movements in SADC and ECOWAS

5.1 Displaying the Structural Framework for Labour’s Agency
The first section of the analysis investigates what world orders have shaped and thus driven the regionalisation process in SADC and ECOWAS respectively and how this has translated into their current form of state, i.e. the organisation of each REC. This comparison of structural framework will determine what space exists for social forces to impact the regionalisation process in each REC.

5.1.1 Structural Framework of SADC
Southern Africa has a historical trajectory of sub-regionalism mainly shaped by South Africa’s need for cheap migrant labour from neighbouring countries (Adepoju, 2001). The predecessor to SADC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was established in 1980 by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. The principal aim was to reduce economic dependence on the apartheid regime in South Africa, not least through an attempt to eliminate the supply of migrant labour to SA used by apartheid in the mines (Adepoju, 2001). When the apartheid regime ended in 1992, the Windhoek Treaty established SADC to replace SADCC. In 1994, SADC abolished visa requirements between member states, except between Zimbabwe and South Africa under the auspice of combating illegal migration.

The attempts in 1995 to revitalize the slowly developing region were aimed at creating a southern African economic community with free trade, free movement of goods and capital and a single currency by 2000. Despite some liberalisation, the main objectives have yet to materialise due to a general tendency of slow ratification in the member states and a reluctant commitment to deep integration (Page, 2001). The slow implementation serves as a cause for concern for the regionalisation project in SADC (AEO, 2015). The regional integration has further been impeded by the asymmetrical relationship between member states, with South Africa as the clear regional hegemon.

5.1.2 Structural Framework of ECOWAS
Like Southern Africa, West Africa has a long tradition of intra-regional interactions and mobility eased by porous borders and cultural ties (Gagnon & Khoudour-Castéras,
These historical linkages were institutionalised with the creation of ECOWAS in May 1975. Based upon the idea that intra-regional integration would be an important step towards full integration into the global economy, ECOWAS’ creation largely followed the neoliberal regionalisation theory similar to SADC (Adepoju, 2001). In May 1979, the protocol of ‘Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment’ was agreed upon with gradual ratification to follow. The second phase of the protocol entered into force in 1986, granting ECOWAS citizens the right to reside within the territory of another member state when seeking and carrying income-earning employment (Gagnon & Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). The following years of economic recession, short-lived oil booms and structural adjustment programs collectively presented a notable obstacle to further implementation. However, in 1992 the revised treaty of ECOWAS affirmed the right of citizens of the community to entry, residence and settlement, and encouraged member states to recognise these rights (Adepoju, 2001). Despite the fact that the treaty on the free movement of persons is yet to be fully implemented by all members, the institutional framework exemplifies a strong commitment hereto. This strong commitment together with the ECOWAS Travel Certificate from 1985, allowing people to travel without visas and the establishment of a regional ECOWAS passport from 2000 makes ECOWAS to an African leader in terms of encouraging and facilitating the free movement of people regionally (Adepoju, 2001; Deacon et al., 2011).

In comparison, the structural implications for social forces are largely the same for ECOWAS and SADC. They are both largely subject to the same ‘world orders’ understood as the global political economy and international hierarchy. Both regions are among the poorest of the world and are entering the global economy from a highly vulnerable and weak position. Both SADC and ECOWAS are thus regional projects based on statist and capitalist social structures inherent in the world order as well as in the specific regional context (Godsälter, 2014). This implies both regions were formed in attempt to integrate into the world economy through liberalising regional trade and securing free movement of goods and capital. These socio-political-economic structures establish a fundamental framework that influences the actions, interests and identities of labour movements at the regional level. The institutionalisation of neoliberalism at the macro-level by the regional governance framework in both SADC and ECOWAS
restrains social forces but equally creates a dynamic which gives them a purpose for rising up (Godsälter, 2014)

In terms of ‘forms of state,’ both RECs are quite similar. Organisation, structure and institutions are almost similar, with institutions like regional development banks, legal tribunals, a parliamentary forum, a council of ministers and various social and economic forums (Afesorgbor and van Bergeijk, 2011). Finally, in comparing economic characteristics, ECOWAS is slightly more homogenous in terms of GDP, Gini coefficient, human development and size and importance of the informal economy than SADC (see Appendix, Table 6 and Appendix, Table 7). GDP per capita in Nigeria – the regional powerhouse – is notably more similar with its regional neighbours than is the case for Botswana, Angola and South Africa, all of whose GDP per capita is up to twenty times higher than their regional neighbours.

5.2 Migration patterns in ECOWAS and SADC

5.2.1 Migration in SADC
As mentioned, labour migration has been a key feature in southern Africa long before the creation of SADC. The establishment of the mining economy in South Africa in the late nineteenth century relied heavily on cheap labour from neighbouring countries (Minter, 2011). The result was that miners from Lesotho, Mozambique and other countries formed up the majority of the workforce until the 1970s and they continued to make up almost 40 % (Minter, 2011).

Main migration trends today in SADC are analysed in Table 2. International migrants make up an average 2.7% of the population in SADC\(^\text{12}\). This number is particularly fuelled by the Seychelles and secondly by Botswana and South Africa. Since migration in Seychelles in absolute numbers is insignificant when compared with regional figures, deducting Seychelles from the calculation reveals that the average share of immigrants of the population is 1.9 %. This makes South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mauritius the countries with greatest percentage of migrants.

\(^\text{12}\) Unweighted between country size
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC destination</th>
<th>Total emigrants to other SADC countries</th>
<th>Stock of immigrants</th>
<th>Immigrants share of population (%)</th>
<th>Main country of origin(a)</th>
<th>Share of total migrants (%)</th>
<th>Second country of origin (a)</th>
<th>Share of total migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>52,715</td>
<td>146,456</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>321,909</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>132,701</td>
<td>51,448</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>89,160</td>
<td>2,399,238</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>250,156</td>
<td>87,436</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>Cape Verde*</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>31,332</td>
<td>312,778</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Burundi*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>167,336</td>
<td>98,907</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>456,881</td>
<td>360,992</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>34,313</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>259,596</td>
<td>206,578</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>11,095</td>
<td>44,997</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>12,079</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>704,591</td>
<td>218,811</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. R. Congo</td>
<td>154,327</td>
<td>446,924</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>Rwanda*</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>93,605</td>
<td>25,524</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Migrants in SADC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,449,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total migrants, SADC to SADC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,729,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Only from SADC except for countries marked*

Source: Based on numbers from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013)
Figure 4 further reveals that the total stock of international migrants in SADC has decreased, and that the share of intraregional migrants has declined since 1990 to 61% of total migration in 2013.

![Figure 4 Total international and intraregional migration in SADC 1990-2013](image)

*Source: Based on numbers from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013)*

5.2.2 Migration in ECOWAS
As in SADC, migration is nothing new in West Africa. However, since the formation of ECOWAS, intraregional migration has increased and today around 3% of the population of West Africa lives outside of its country of birth (Gagnon & Khoudour-Castéras, 2012).

Table 3 shows the main migration patterns in ECOWAS. International migration makes up an average 3.2% of the population in ECOWAS. Contrary to SADC, outliers in ECOWAS are not small island states but main migration destinations. Ivory Coast, Liberia and Burkina Faso are all significant and sizable member states. The stark difference observed in Table 2 between net emigration and net immigration states in SADC is equally less visible in ECOWAS. Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Togo are all simultaneously attracting large shares of immigrants while also contributing many nationals as migrants to other countries in ECOWAS.
Table 3 Migration Patterns in ECOWAS 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOWAS destination</th>
<th>Total emigrants to other ECOWAS countries</th>
<th>Stock of immigrants</th>
<th>Share of population (%)</th>
<th>Main country of origin (b)</th>
<th>Share of total migrants (%)</th>
<th>Second country of origin (b)</th>
<th>Share of total migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>389,379</td>
<td>234,241</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,609,337</td>
<td>696,983</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td>14,874</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>832,378</td>
<td>2,446,171</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>16,034</td>
<td>162,919</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>320,796</td>
<td>358,829</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>307,201</td>
<td>378,464</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>45,038</td>
<td>18,024</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>255,686</td>
<td>225,484</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>676,184</td>
<td>195,553</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>258,010</td>
<td>132,294</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>169,532</td>
<td>1,233,592</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>157,301</td>
<td>209,398</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>259,786</td>
<td>96,388</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>380,968</td>
<td>202,476</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ECOWAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ECOWAS to ECOWAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,682,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Only from ECOWAS

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013)
Figure 5 shows that intraregional migration in ECOWAS has increased in absolute numbers and thus continued to be a high share of total migration, around 86%. It further shows that the stock of international migrants is greater in ECOWAS than in SADC and secondly that intraregional migration is more than 20% higher in ECOWAS than in SADC.

Source: Based on numbers from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013)

Comparing migration patterns between ECOWAS and SADC reveals stark and unambiguous differences. Absolute migration in ECOWAS is first of all greater than in SADC, even correcting for differences in population size between member countries. Secondly, intraregional migration is greater in ECOWAS than in SADC with 86% of all migrants in ECOWAS coming from other countries in ECOWAS. The same was only true for 61% in SADC. Finally, the migration patterns in ECOWAS are far more homogenous than in SADC. In SADC, Botswana and South Africa are the two major destination countries for the rest of the region. Contrarily, migration is more circular in ECOWAS with Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Togo as simultaneously main receiving and emigration countries. This indicates that mobility is both greater in ECOWAS and that the homogeneity of economies in ECOWAS allows for a more circular flow of migrants.
5.3 Social Forces: The Prevalence of Social Movements in ECOWAS and SADC

Turning to social forces in the two RECs, the purpose here is to analyse their strength and potential, using social movements as a proxy. Branch and Mampilly argue that social movements and popular protests are rising in SSA (2015). Looking specifically at aggregated popular protests over the past three decades in ECOWAS and SADC, a drastic increase is revealed, in which protests have almost tripled (Figure 6), confirming Branch and Mamphilly’s statement.

![Figure 6 Popular Protests in SADC and ECOWAS 1996-2014](image)

The top drivers for these protests were salary increase demands (21%), working conditions (17%), quality of public service delivery (11%) and social divides (8%). These show that it is labour movement in particular – organised labour unions and non-organised labour movements – that instigates these protests. Furthermore these drivers somewhat support the assertion that decades of neoliberal policies and consequential rising inequality has fuelled social movements (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, Thomson and Tapscott, 2005)

Figure 6 suggests that in scope and frequency, popular protests and social movements are quite similar between SADC and ECOWAS. This implies that the current strength of social forces – measured by social movements – is largely similar. As
mentioned, both SADC and ECOWAS have two economic and population hegemons, South Africa and Nigeria respectively. To understand the social transformational capacity of social movements in ECOWAS and SADC, it is imperative to understand the strength and frequency of social movements outside the two hegemons. Figure 7 shows an interesting finding in this regard. When subtracting Nigeria and South Africa it becomes clear that on average there are twice as many popular protests in ECOWAS as in SADC.

**Figure 7 Popular Protests in SADC and ECOWAS without South Africa and Nigeria 1996-2014**

![Graph showing popular protests in SADC and ECOWAS without South Africa and Nigeria from 1996 to 2014.](image)

*Source: Based on data from African Economic Outlook, 2015*

This indicates that on a regional level, aggregated social forces are stronger and more present in ECOWAS, and that this capacity is increasingly shared among multiple countries in the region instead of heavily dependent on one primary country as is the case with South Africa in SADC.

Looking at the regional social forces comparatively, important differences emerge. In ECOWAS, regional social forces have taken a contradictory role towards the neoliberal integration project (Iheduru, 2003). Pressures from below have begun to undermine the ideological and practical basis of free market liberalism, thereby questioning the regional architecture upon which ECOWAS was built. This transnational civil society, composed of both commercial and non-profit networks, is thus effectively
contributing to change and redirecting the regional process in ECOWAS (Iheduru, 2003). Since the 1990s, civil society organisations (CSO) have pushed for and gained an important role in ECOWAS. The regional directory shows more than 3,000 organisations (union, employers, non-profits)\(^\text{13}\) working at different levels with region-centric goals. The evidence suggests dense and relatively effective efforts by CSOs to engage and influence processes in ECOWAS (Deacon et al., 2011). While the frequency of popular protests cannot be directly correlated with this sub-regional CSO network pressuring ECOWAS, it indicates a general stronger social force outside the regional hegemon.

Contrary to ECOWAS, the state-centric nature of SADC, along with a deeply entrenched notion of neoliberalism, has resulted in a substantial exclusion of civil society organisations and diminished the possibilities for a bottom-up regionalisation process. Unlike ECOWAS, it is only service-providing organisations that are incorporated into the government structure in SADC with the purpose of filling the gaps caused by a shrinking public sector (Godsäter, 2014). Despite lofty statements about civil engagement, the main integration focus is still market-led integration, provision of a few social services, liberalisation of trade and facilitation of the movement of capital and goods (Godsäter, 2014). In this focus, critical voices against SADC foundations are most often excluded and marginalised (ibid), thereby not just excluding but also discouraging the development of a regional civil society. The evidence from Figure 7 of a general less frequency of popular protests in the member states of SADC contributes to this perception of a comparatively weaker civil society outside the regional hegemon of South Africa.

5.4 Understanding the Strength of Social Forces: Labour migration’s influence on Labour Movements’ configuration of powers

Drawing on the theoretical framework, to understand both the current capacity and strength of social forces the analysis must explore the underlying configuration of powers behind that particular social force. These are made up of institutions, material

\(^{13}\text{In 1994, ECOWAS became the first REC in the world to grant observer status to CSOs in its meetings. It furthermore established the Forum of Associations recognized by ECOWAS to act as liaison between CSOs and ECOWAS.}\)
capabilities and ideas. The analysis will look at how migration has affected these and in turn how this impacts the social force of labour movements.

5.4.1 Institutions: The Impact of Labour Migration on Institutions in SADC and ECOWAS

The institutional framework on migration and labour rights differs substantially between the two RECs. ECOWAS’ treaty of free movement of people has increased the mobility of citizens regionally and enhanced migrants’ rights (Deacon et al., 2011). With regard to migrant workers’ rights, the protocol guarantees equal treatment in areas such as security of employment, participation in social and cultural activities, re-employment in certain cases of job loss, and training. In 1993, the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission of ECOWAS further adopted the General Convention of Social Security to uphold and ensure the equal treatment of migrant workers.

In SADC, the ‘Protocol on the Free Movement of People’ from 1995 is similar to the 1979 ECOWAS protocol, but due to severe objections from both receiving and sending countries the protocol has never been implemented (Deacon et al., 2011). It was later replaced by the vague ‘Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons’. It severely restricts labour migration, as state party citizenship must be granted for regional migrants to establish themselves and obtain citizen rights in another member state. Labour migration thus becomes subject to national legislation undermining the mobility of workers regionally (Deacon et al., 2011). In terms of labour rights, the SADC Charter for Fundamental Social Rights more resembles that of ECOWAS as it requests that member states ‘foster an environment that grants every worker, including migrant workers, adequate social protection and, regardless of status and the type of employment, adequate social security benefits’ (Deacon et al., 2011: 349).

Looking at the institutional configurations in the individual countries of SADC and ECOWAS respectively, there is stronger affirmation towards the protection of migrant labour in ECOWAS. In SADC only five countries – Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles and South Africa – have signed and ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. In ECOWAS thirteen countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia and Mali – have signed and ratified it.
Thus institutionally ECOWAS and SADC share similarities insofar as they both have soft treaty-based commitments and regional consultative bodies in place to monitor labour and migrants’ rights. However, in terms of migrants’ rights, ECOWAS’ institutional framework is far more encompassing as it gives migrants considerably more rights and a substantial freedom of mobility, both regionally and individually among member states (Deacon et al., 2011). A suggested finding is that higher intraregional migration and more equal symmetry between sending and receiving countries, leads to a stronger prospect of institutional frameworks accommodating and supporting labour migration.

5.4.2 Ideas: Xenophobia as an Obstacle to Transnational Solidarity with Migrants in SADC and ECOWAS

Shaping and advocating certain ideas and identities is an inherent part of understanding social forces. A particular obstacle for transnational agency is increasing xenophobia - one of the most disturbing factors for international migrants in SSA (Campbell, 2011). A survey on South African attitudes to the rights of migrants reveals that 44% believe that temporary workers should not be granted right to freedoms of speech and movement (84% for illegal immigrants) and only 30% believe that temporary workers should be given right to police protection and social services (only 9% for illegal immigrants) (Crush, 2001). On the issue of free movement, a survey from 1999 showed that 53% believed South Africa should place strict limits on the numbers of foreigners who came and 25% wanted to prohibit immigrants. In comparison those numbers were 12% and 3% respectively in Lesotho and 48% and 4% in Zimbabwe (Crush, 2001).

ECOWAS has also historically had problems of xenophobia, with government-led xenophobia in both Ghana and Nigeria in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. This has decreased significantly, encouraging an overall more tolerant attitude in ECOWAS towards migration (Campbell, 2011; Gagnon & Khourour-Castéras, 2012). Xenophobia still exist, as witnessed in Ivory Coast where the notion of “Ivoirianess” and nationality instigated the second Ivorian civil war in 2011, caused by xenophobic tensions against Burkinabes (Stearns, 2011; Okonofua, 2014). What differentiates the two RECs is that the notably stronger presence of xenophobia in South Africa fuels existing asymmetries between the states in SADC, impeding both the strength of the South African Labour movement to push transnational agendas domestically and also spurring apprehension among the remaining labour movements in SADC.
5.4.3 Material Capabilities: Understanding Unions’ Capacity and Influence in SADC and ECOWAS

Looking upon the material capabilities of the regional labour movement, one must examine primarily the capacity and influence of labour movements nationally and subsequently at the regional organisational level as well. The assessment of the capacity and strength of the labour movements can be approached though union membership and unions’ societal influence. While aggregating the individual capacity of each national labour movement to arrive at a regional conclusion is subject to several challenges, this can nonetheless give an indication of the capacity of the labour movement on a regional level14.

The assessment of the degree of unionisation and unions’ influence in each member state draws on a broad variety of information, since these variables are rarely reported15. The societal influence of the labour movement nationally is based upon both historic and contemporary assessment, making the categorization highly relative (O’Brien, 2008). This implies that the label ‘strong’ refers to the relative strength of a labour movement in comparison with other countries in the region, thus not applying to labour movements globally.

In order to compare member states, union density and influence is classified numerically. Union density is classified as weak when less than 5% of the labour force are union members, as medium when this is between 5% and 15%, and as strong when more than 15% of the labour force are union members. The measurement of the national labour movements’ societal impact and influence as a civil society actor is reported using a scale from 1 to 516.

Figure 9 and Figure 8 present this classification for the thirty countries in SADC and ECOWAS17. In SADC, the strongest country in terms of unionisation and the Union’s societal strength is undoubtedly South Africa and secondly Swaziland. The degree of unionisation is strong in six out of fifteen countries and medium in one.

---

14 The aggregated finding cannot be translated into a transnational labour movement. It can however identify the potential and general landscape of labour movements’ strength and societal involvement in member states, which gives an indication of the regional landscape.
15 See Appendix, Table 6 and Appendix, Table 7 for the full detailed assessment.
16 Indicators: Weak: 1, Weak/Medium: 2, Medium: 3, Medium/strong: 4, Strong: 5
17 See Appendix, Table 4 and Appendix, Table 5 for country classifications
This strong degree of unionisation has not translated into a strong position in society for unions. In Botswana and Namibia, labour movements have a weak influence despite a high degree of unionisation. The historical reasons for this difference vary across the two countries, but the outcome today is generally that labour movements are apolitical (Botswana) and politically dependent on the ruling party and with weak influence (Namibia). Overall, this gives an indication of quite weak labour movements regionally. This in turn severely impedes transnational organisations, as transnational agency is dependent upon local capacities in each country. If transnational organisations are weak in the majority of countries, transnational agency is likely weak as well. Figure 9 shows some substantial differences in ECOWAS compared to SADC. Firstly, the unionisation degree is lower in more member states than in SADC. Only Benin, Ghana and Sierra Leone are classified strong, and Togo and Nigeria as medium. Secondly, the reverse is true in terms of union’s influence. Despite low unionisation degree, labour movements enjoy a stronger societal influence as seen in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo and Senegal.

Based on the classification of the fifteen member states in each REC, the comparison shows that despite a slightly higher degree of unionisation in SADC, the
societal influence of labour movements is greater in ECOWAS. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive. Firstly it indicates that union membership alone does not determine influence, but that labour movements' historical importance and activity as a social force can somehow be sustained despite declined membership. The second disclosure regards the relative regional strength in ECOWAS compared to SADC. Contemporary writings often correlate trade unionism's strength in SSA with South Africa's COSATU due to its size as the largest trade federation in Africa (Wood et al., 2013). Analysed individually, COSATU is undoubtedly the largest trade union and a key driver in the biggest social transformation in SSA in recent years – the end of the apartheid regime. However, when analysed regionally, more countries in ECOWAS than in SADC have stronger unions and labour movements that have historically played a transformative role in society and to some extent continue to do so (Wood et al., 2013).

While the comparison of material capabilities on member state level shows a slightly greater strength in ECOWAS, the picture is somewhat reversed when looking at established regional labour movements. Between the two formal regional organisations, the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC) for SADC and Organisation of Trade Unions in West Africa (OTUWA) for ECOWAS, the former is more established and materially stronger while the latter has been relatively weak and with small collective regional influence (Robert, 2005; Deacon et al., 2011). SATUCC’s lead has, among other things, translated to the development of a Social Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers in Southern Africa (Deacon et al., 2011). SATUCC further participates in the ILO-established tripartite in SADC, while within ECOWAS a system of tripartite labour policymaking is only now being attended to (Deacon et al., 2011).

What does this contradictory image of material capabilities imply? One explanation is that aggregating the influence and material capabilities of unions on the national level cannot be translated into transnational agency. This would suggest that despite a general weakness in most member states in SADC, SATUCC transnational agency is somewhat independent from this. An alternative explanation is that despite the more established nature of SATUCC, what matters for transnational labour movements is not merely a formalised organisation, but moreover that transnational agency is embedded nationally, and pushed by ideational forces as well.
On the organisational level, SATUCC has attempted to foster a regional worker identity based on common working class experiences of social marginalisation in the region. Despite this, nationalism still seems to be the strongest undercurrent for most members. In a comment to mark the thirtieth anniversary of SADC, Michelle Pressed from the Labour Research Services in Cape Town stated: “among regional civil society structures, the inclination toward nationalism [...] has undermined [...] solidarity” (Pressend, 2010). This is further advanced by the general nationalist tendencies among people in the region and enforced by the deep statist social structures in the countries individually and the region generally, as delineated above. The attempt to build regional coherence and advocacy through SATUCC has been undermined by nationalism and the presence of xenophobia described above. This leaves the regionalisation of civil society in general and the labour movement in particular to be highly heterogeneous in SADC, with little sense of belonging to a regional community among involved members (Godsäter, 2014).

Although transnational agency is less formalised and established in ECOWAS, the material capabilities and ideological environments nationally are more favourable for transnational objectives like migrant workers rights. This finding is exemplified by active advocacy for sub-regional cooperation in influencing and reshaping ECOWAS to further the common cause on migration, and decent work from Ghana (Ghana TUC, 2010) and advocacy by labour unions in Nigeria in pushing policies for the full implementation of ECOWAS treaties on free movement and the protection of migrant workers and the promotion of their social welfare (IOM, 2015). This highlights that union advocacy at the national level on sub-regional issues can promote transnational agency (Robert, 2005).

5.5 Discussion

The structural framework for social forces is largely the same in ECOWAS and SADC. Both RECs are subject to a neoliberal world order in which they attempt to engage despite their asymmetrical position in world economy. They further share a raison d’être grounded in neoliberal regionalism for global integration. Finally, their institutional set-ups represent similar ‘forms of state’, with a slightly more affirmative engagement of regional integration in ECOWAS than in SADC.

Thus what distinguishes both current and potential agency of labour movements with regards to labour migration in SADC and ECOWAS respectively is not their framework
for action but their differences in configurations of powers and the strength of social movements in each region. The analysis shows that social movements, when correcting for the outlining role of the two major economic and political powerhouses South Africa and Nigeria, are almost three times as strong in presence in ECOWAS in SADC, implying a stronger potential for transnational agency.

Looking upon the configuration of powers as they inform the agency of labour movements, it becomes clear that labour migration has impacted the categories of power for social forces in ECOWAS quite more than in SADC. The more homogenous and circular labour migration between countries in ECOWAS has fostered a more positive discourse and attitude towards migrants as evidenced by the opinion on foreigners and introduction of a regional passport. This attitude has been institutionalised by ECOWAS’ commitment to the free movement of persons and a focus on regional labour rights, suggesting that labour migration in itself has the agency to affect and alter regional structures. This influence of labour migration on all three categories of power seemed to be reciprocal. The institutional framework fosters attitudes towards labour migrants as citizens and equals. These attitudes in turn penetrate the labour movements who become involved in organising on migrants’ rights, not least in the informal economy.

In SADC, migration has historically been less circular and moreover directed towards few countries. This asymmetrical relationship between states has impacted the regional institutional framework for migrants, which is less facilitating of labour movements and migration than in ECOWAS. Despite the historical importance of civil society and labour unions in South Africa in particular, labour movements’ role in building a regional social force has been severely limited by inherent nationalism and widespread xenophobia. The creation of SATUCC is an important step for regional agency, but large differences between national unions represents a significant obstacle. The recurring xenophobic attacks on migrants in South Africa, mainly from other SADC countries, further impedes this work.

The analysis thus reveals that labour migration has impacted the categories of power constituting the strength of the labour movement as a social force in ECOWAS far stronger and more progressively than in SADC. From this outset a reciprocal dynamic has continued to strengthen these in ECOWAS, resulting in a stronger labour movement agency able to push for a socially just regionalism. This is not to say that severe
obstacles do not exist in ECOWAS – they most certainly do. The same obstacles exist for labour movements and their agendas of social justice in SADC. The argument here is that the obstacles limiting the building of a shared regional identity and the development of material capabilities to organise migrants and advance their rights are less in ECOWAS than in SADC. This in turn has impacted the institutional framework in which they act, again where ECOWAS has a better institutional framework for facilitating both the inclusion of the labour movements and advocating free movement of people.
6. Conclusion

SSA is in a crucial moment of social transformation. Increased migration and the emergence of REC enhance the need for transnational cooperation among labour unions to adequately address issues of poverty, social injustice, employment and welfare. This paper has argued that labour migration can be an opening for labour movements to challenge existing regional integration projects, but also push for a more socially just regionalisation project. This deficiency of labour agency is derived from the structure of regional integration itself. The new RECs are necessary arenas of political conflict and bargaining for labour rights, but they hold no virtue. Both labour migrants and labour movements, on the other hand, seek to expand and enforce their rights, which drives the prospect of transnational labour agency pushing for a different type of regional project that is less informed by neoliberalism and instead seeks to provide prosperity for the 90%.

In an attempt to reject the conventional reductionism of approaching Africa as a homogenous entity, this paper has argued that in regard to labour movements’ agency, two quite different processes are taking place in ECOWAS and SADC. Labour migration has more positively impacted institutions and ideas in ECOWAS, which in turn has encouraged regional migration, enhanced migrants’ rights and integration. The enhanced integration has expanded the arena for labour’s participation, leading to a stronger critique from civil society and labour movements of regionalisation in ECOWAS, which consequently has given them more influence and bargaining options on the processes in ECOWAS. This suggests that labour migration not only affects labour movements but also influences agency independently, transforming the regional structures. The study has further rejected that the most celebrated role of civil society in South Africa cannot be translated into transnational agency. While the recent rise in social movements is evident in SADC and ECOWAS, xenophobia, nationalism and few strong bastions of influential labour movements have impeded the potential of this rise in SADC. This results in a weaker social force for transformative regionalism in SADC than in ECOWAS.

This paper has conducted a preliminary examination of what space exists for social forces in West and Southern Africa, and how responses to migration have
reconfigured their power institutionally, materially and ideologically. However, this process of social transformation is utterly contemporary and the theoretical linkages drawn between labour migration, labour movements and regionalism in SSA is novel. Thus this paper should be seen as a foundation from which further research and the gathering of empirical knowledge in particular should build upon, to fully and continually explore these reciprocal effects.

While Africa as a whole stands to gain little from regionalism based on wholesale liberalisation, workers and migrants have even less (Meagher, 2001). If Africa is to truly rise through regionalism, a continued focus from scholars and activists alike on how to build united transnational labour movements that can forcefully transform regionalism is necessary for the future of a socially just Africa.
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## Appendix

### Appendix, Table 4 Degree of unionisation and union’s societal strength SADC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degree of unionisation</th>
<th>State-union relations: Unions’ societal strength and influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak/medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium/Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on table 6 in appendix

### Appendix, Table 5 Unionisation degree and union’s societal strength ECOWAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degree of unionisation</th>
<th>State-union relations: Unions’ societal strength and influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak/Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak/medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Medium/Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium/Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on table 7 in appendix
## Appendix, Table 6 Selected variables on SADC member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP) (current int. US$)(^{18})</th>
<th>HDI(^{19}) 2014 X/187</th>
<th>Gini(^{20})</th>
<th>Informal Economy</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Degree of unionisation</th>
<th>State-union relations</th>
<th>State-union relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>17531 (107 of 229 countries)</td>
<td>0.526 149(^{th})</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>It is estimated that up to 70% of jobs in Angola are within the informal economy(^{21})</td>
<td>55% live below 1.25 $US/day</td>
<td>85% of the workforce employed in agriculture. 15% in industry and services sectors &gt;50% unemployed or underemployed</td>
<td>500,000 members of the two main Labour Union umbrella organisations, which accounts for minimum 3.2% of the labour force</td>
<td>Historically trade unions have weak influence upon the state(^{22})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>18,825</td>
<td>0.683 109(^{th})</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16%(^{23})</td>
<td>Unemployment rate of 17.8%, reaching 34% among youth (20-24 years of age)(^{24})</td>
<td>Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (1977) covers 400,000 formally employed workers, equivalent to a minimum unionization of 17%</td>
<td>Rather weak labour movement, mainly &quot;in-house&quot; with limited ability. Narrow CB. Inherent weakness in unions and mainly apolitical. Limited participation with state and employer to few tripartite structures, and with little if any</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{18}\) World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015  
\(^{19}\) ibid  
\(^{20}\) ibid  
\(^{21}\) Trade Unions of the World, 2001  
\(^{22}\) ibid  
\(^{23}\) Botterweck et al., 2013  
\(^{24}\) African Economic Outlook, 2015
Most LU have failed to build political consciousness and solidarity anchored on concrete ideological clarity on how to develop policies that reflect social justice rather than just accumulation of profits (SATUCC, 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (PPP)</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Membership %</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>54.17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10% in the small formal sector (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>46.18</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>LDC with 71% of employed people living &gt;$1.25.</td>
<td>Of the small % of the workforce in the formal sector, 3% are LU members. Less than 1% of workers in informal economy are LU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1997 there were at least 199 trade unions, although these were largely because authorities, politicians, employers and others were behind the creation and registration of in-house unions and other unrepresentative and phantom unions. The role of trade unions has been undermined by the collapse of large parts of the formal sector. CBA scarcely exists.

Trade Union movement is weak and fragile. CBA poorly developed, very limited strikes.

The 1992 constitution and 1995 labour code gives workers the right to form and join unions. However because the formal economy is small, the absence of union is narrow and they have little influence. CBA practiced very little.

The Tripartite Labour Advisory Council has faced problems in convening its meetings regularly while the National Social Dialogue Forum faces sustainability.

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25 Trade Unions of the World, 2001
26 Trade Unions of the World, 2001
27 All information from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014c
81% of the Malawi workforce was in subsistence farming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Employed in Informal or Migrant Work (%)</th>
<th>Employment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Unionisation (%)</th>
<th>Problems beyond current donor support. Few benefits for informal and migrant workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>18585</td>
<td>0.771 (2012) N/A</td>
<td>35.9 N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The trade union movement is developed but fragile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>0.393 (2008) 95%</td>
<td>45.7 N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The capacity of Mozambican unions to confront structural problems is limited, given its history both under Portuguese colonialism and since independence. Unlike the situation in many English-speaking African countries, trade unions did not play a significant role in the struggle for Mozambique’s independence. And for the most part, the trade union movement remains closely linked to the ruling party, with a primary commitment to seeking labour peace rather than assertively defending worker interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>9964</td>
<td>0.624 (2012) 65%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>38.0% (Lives with less than 2 Based on membership of the three largest LU umbrella) Namibia didn’t become independent before 1990. Until</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

28 Botterweck et al., 2013
29 All information from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014d
then it was under South Africa’s trusteeship and thus apartheid rules. The liberation movement was lead by the South West Africa People’s Organisation. They re-established the National Union of Namibian Workers in 1989. The union remained largely dependent on SWAPO and the union continue to have a weak influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP per Capita</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Unionisation</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Living Under $1.25/day</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>26245</td>
<td>0.756 (71)</td>
<td>65.8 (2007)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>Medium bargaining role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13046</td>
<td>0.658 (118)</td>
<td>65.01 (2011)</td>
<td>39.8% proportion of wage and salaried earners and 24.9% proportion of total employment</td>
<td>20% of labour force is unionised. 30% of labour force is covered by CBA</td>
<td>20% living for less than $1.25/day (2001)</td>
<td>Acceded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>6350</td>
<td>0.530 (148)</td>
<td>49.5 (2015)</td>
<td>51% living for less than $1.25/day (2001) Unemployment at 29%.</td>
<td>20% of labour force is unionised. 30% of labour force is covered by CBA</td>
<td>As an absolute monarchy there is little or no scope for democratic participation in governance. Political parties have not been allowed to take part in elections since 1973. The Swazi trade union movement has been and continues to be one of the major components of civil society and of opposition mobilisation for democratic rights (yet it has also been plagued by internal divisions and disorganization)</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2591</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>37.82</td>
<td>33.4% living for 18.7% proportion of wage</td>
<td>The trade union movement were</td>
<td>The trade union movement were</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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30 Botterweck et al., 2013  
31 Trade Unions of the World, 2001  
32 All information from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014g
less than $2/day and salaried earners and 2.2% of proportion of total employment\textsuperscript{34} for a long time under direct political control by the ruling party. This eased up in the 1990s, however the movement has not returned as a strong civil society player\textsuperscript{35}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Unionisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia\textsuperscript{36}</td>
<td>4086 (141)</td>
<td>50.49 (2010)</td>
<td>60%\textsuperscript{37}</td>
<td>Based on the membership of the largest LU umbrella organisations the unionisation is estimated to be minimum 6%\textsuperscript{38}. Zambian trade unions have a long tradition of participation and leadership in the public policy arena, without fully identifying with any political party, however notable disunity among unions exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{39}</td>
<td>1859 (156)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Based on membership of the largest LU umbrella organisation Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) unionisation is estimated to be minimum 4%\textsuperscript{40}. Trade unions in Zimbabwe have faced a highly volatile political situation in which they have played a leading role as part of civil society in campaigning for democratic rights and for the interests of workers. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has maintained independence from opposition parties and continued its role as an independent critic of government policies. It has taken the lead in trying to organize informal workers. Despite its strengths, however, the trade union movement has been significantly weakened in recent years by government pressure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{33} Botterweck et al., 2013
\textsuperscript{34} Botterweck et al., 2013
\textsuperscript{35} Trade Unions of the World, 2001
\textsuperscript{36} Unless other stated all information is from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014i
\textsuperscript{37} Botterweck et al., 2013
\textsuperscript{38} Botterweck et al., 2013
\textsuperscript{39} Unless other stated all information is from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014j
\textsuperscript{40} Botterweck et al., 2013
repression and by internal disunity. The unions nevertheless remain one of the most significant civil actors.41

Appendix, Table 7 Selected variables on ECOWAS member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP Per capita (PPP) (US$)42</th>
<th>HDI43</th>
<th>Gini44</th>
<th>Informal</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Degree of unionisation</th>
<th>State-union relations</th>
<th>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1865 (202 of 229 countries)45</td>
<td>0.476 (165)</td>
<td>43.53 (2011)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Working poor 44% (2003)47</td>
<td>SAPs contracted the formal economy while informal boomed. Weakened LU. The trade union movement is fast expanding in Benin in comparison with many other countries in Africa. Around 14% of the labour force are members of trade unions, including affiliated unions, and 3 out of 4 publicly employed are LU members. CBA: covers 10%</td>
<td>LU perceived as significant and influential (SATUCC, 2013) While the government generally respects the right to form and join independent unions, and workers, including civil servants, exercise the right to strike, the government does not effectively enforce these labour laws, particularly in the informal sector. The trade union movement is in progress in organising informal workers and self-employed. Fragmentation in trade union movement, in two groupings: one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 Kalusopa et al., 2013
42 From World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015 unless other stated
43 ibid
44 ibid
45 Ulandsssekretariatet, 2014a
46 ibid
47 ibid
48 Botterweck et al., 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Unionisation</th>
<th>Right to Strike</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>0.388 (181)</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Although having only few members, the unions were significantly involved in Burkina Faso's turbulent politics throughout the past 40 years, with a rich history of strikes and protests with great consequences such as bringing down the Yameogo regime in 1966 and Lamizana in 1980s. CBA exists in small formal economy. The right to strike is frequently exercised and generally respected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>6648</td>
<td>0.636 (123)</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Based on the membership of the largest trade union, Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Cabo Verde – Central Sindical it is minimum 6% of the total labour force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>0.441 (172)</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30,000 union members in 2001, equivalent to about 4% of the labour force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4143</td>
<td>0.573 (138)</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>The informal economy is the largest employer in Ghana, surveys show that unionisation has declined, even in the formal sector. Approximately 38% of the labour force are strong active civil society players in the Ghanaian society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. Trade Unions of the World, 2001
50. Ibid
51. Ibid
52. Ibid
The informal economy has created an estimated ten times more jobs than the formal economy since the 1980s, and contribute 20% to 40% of GDP, respectively. Ghana has a rather unified trade union movement with a relatively high density at 7.5% of the total labour force. Several unions are working to extend their services to workers in the informal ‘sector’. An estimated 58,000 workers from the informal economy are affiliated members of trade unions in TUC. Waged and salaried workers covered by CBAs: 70%.\textsuperscript{54}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Art.</th>
<th>Formal sector workers are working in unionised enterprises</th>
<th>for the working force, especially falling wages and disappearance of formal jobs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>33.68 (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1429</td>
<td>35 (2002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>3484</td>
<td>41.5 (2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{53} ILO, 2009  
\textsuperscript{54} Ulandssekretariatet, 2014b
travailleurs de Côte d’Ivoire (UGTCI), Federation des syndicats de Côte d’Ivoire (FESACI) and Confederation des syndicats libre de Côte d’Ivoire (DIGNITE) shows a minimum unionisation of 5% of the labour force\textsuperscript{55}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Density (2007)</th>
<th>Unionisation</th>
<th>$/day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>0.412 (175)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>0.407 (176)</td>
<td>80%\textsuperscript{57}</td>
<td>47.4% lives for &gt;$2/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national Liberia Labour Congress is generally weak. Firestone Agricultural Workers’ Union of Liberia (FAWUL) and the United Workers Union of Liberia (UWUL) have been successful in organising at large companies. Unions have lobbied for a new bill on decent work, including an adequate minimum wage, but without success so far. Generally, governmental labour policies are not helpful to unions\textsuperscript{56}.

Unions are well established in the small formal sector and virtually all salaried employees are reported to be unionised. Following the transition to multi-partyism in 1999 and reforms of 1992 freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively were generally respected for several years, however with increasing state harassment and repression of these rights.

\textsuperscript{55} Botterweck et al., 2013
\textsuperscript{56} Africa Trade union report 2013
\textsuperscript{57} Botterweck et al., 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Child poverty</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Underemployment</th>
<th>Working poor</th>
<th>Trade union density</th>
<th>Freedom of association</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>31.16</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>The trade union members’ share of labour force is 2.8%. It is estimated that 50,000 workers are affiliated in trade unions from the informal economy. Approximately 80% of the workforce is employed in the non-unionised subsistence agricultural and small trading sectors. And, it is estimated that 80% of the mining workforce worked in the informal sector.</td>
<td>Acceded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5877</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>42.95</td>
<td>70%, 54.7% living below $2</td>
<td>Estimates from membership of the two largest TU umbrella organisations: Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Trade Union Congress (TUC), National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), National Union of Electricity Employees (NUEE), Petroleum &amp; Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) shows a minimum labour union density of 9% of the labour force.</td>
<td>Acceded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 Unless other stated all information is from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014e  
59 Botterweck et al., 2013  
60 Ibid  
61 Ibid  
62 Oyelere, 2014
Support from the community, especially the larger unorganized informal sector of the economy. The strategy of the NLC is mass mobilization, links with community and civil liberty organizations for collective action (Oyelere, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>% Unemployed</th>
<th>% Living for less than $2/day</th>
<th>CBA Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2312</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>40.31</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2053</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>35.35</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest informal sector is agriculture (70% of the rural population). Second largest informal sector is wholesale, retail, petty trading and artisans activities.

On the other hand, the minimum wage was increased almost three times from 2012 to 2014, reaching US$111 per month.

Unemployment: 3.4%

52% living for less than $1.25/day

It has been estimated that 39% of workers in the formal economy are unionised. Declared trade union members share of labour force is estimated from 9.0% to 25%.

The trade union movement is under a fast expansion. Labour unions’ paid members increased 24% from 2009 to 2014, mainly due to an influx of members from affiliated unions from the informal economy. Members from affiliated unions have demonstrated an extremely high growth of 600% on the same period, reaching 455,000 members.

Workers covered by CBA:

The government generally protect the right to Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) in practice and is widespread in the formal sector. Most enterprises are covered by CBAs on wages and working conditions.

The Joint Negotiation Board agreed a new minimum wage that was compared with other neighboring countries in June 2014. It is a wage increase at 290% since the negotiated minimum wage from 2012.

The wage share of labour is relatively high in Sierra Leone. At 35% it ranks 68 out of 108 countries and 4 out of 17 Sub-Saharan African countries, only.

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63 ibid
64 Botterweck et al., 2013
66 Ulandssekretariatet, 2014f
67 Ulandssekretariatet, 2014f
close to 2% of the labour force (It is not higher since a very large majority of the labour force operate in the informal economy)
Sierra Leone has some of the oldest trade union movement in Africa and the earliest strikes were recorded in 187465.
Lately a massive increase in organising self-employed informal workers have emerged in the last years, though not within the agricultural sector.

| Togo68 | 1454 (217 of 228 countries) | 0.473 (166) | 45.96 (2011) | 90% The 'sector' contributes between 25% to 50% to GDP and accounts for over 70% of non-agricultural employment. 36% of the working population is living for less >$1.25/day | The trade union density is on a rise in absolute terms and has reached 6.4%. It is also noteworthy that members of affiliated trade unions from the informal economy are also expanding significantly. Unionisation rate in EPZ are at 15%. It is noteworthy that the trade union density is 6.4% of the labour force and 58% of the waged workers. There has been an average growth at 20% of membership from CNTT, CSTT, and UNSIT in the period 2009 to 2014. Much of Togo's formal labour market is regulated by a general Interprofessional Collective Bargaining Agreement. The latest entered into force in 2012. It concerns employment relations, working conditions and raised the minimum wages. Although excessive restrictions apply to the freedom of association and the right to strike in Togo, the rights are generally respected, except within the Export Processing Zones (EPZ). |

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65 Ulandssekretariatet, 2014f
68 All information from Ulandssekretariatet, 2014h