Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy?
The Economic Factors of Pakistan's Military Coups

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Abstract

Many scholars have debated the causes of the coup d'etat since the mid-twentieth century. A recent branch of theories have linked the risk of military coups d'etat with the state of the economy. This paper applies these economic theories to the case of Pakistan, which has experienced five coups since its independence but has received very little empirical attention. This paper tests four economic variables - GDP, income per capita, defence spending, and export values - against the incidences of coups in Pakistan and finds that low growth rates of these variables are related to the incidence of coup d'etat in Pakistan.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In this era of deliberate and increasing economic and political progress, it is fascinating that the coup d'etat, the scourge of mid- twentieth century development, is still making its presence felt. For decades, scholars have debated the factors which cause a nation's armed forces to overstep their official role as protector of national territorial integrity and seize power. Academics have proposed and tested various theories to answer this question, and have given rise to a substantial body of literature on the causes of the coup d'etat. One school of thought relates the risk and occurrence of coups d'etat to the state of the national economy and the military's stake therein. Based largely on the experiences of African and Latin American countries, such economic theories have seldom been applied to Asian countries, and never to Pakistan. Pakistan makes for a very interesting case study, as there has been no empirical analysis of a coup theory despite its experiencing five coups d'etat, at least three failed coup attempts, and 33 years of direct military rule since independence in 1947. Pakistan's many coups d'etat have often been attributed to political and institutional factors, but the role of the economy and economic factors has to date never been tested on the Pakistani experience.

The exclusion of economic factors as a motivation for Pakistan's military coups implies that academics have either overlooked the role of the economy in the context of Pakistani politics, or that economic factors really do not have any role in motivating Pakistan's coups d'etat and were thus justly excluded. This paper will argue that poor economic conditions are indeed linked with and may have had a motivating role in previous Pakistani coups. To provide the background for this paper, a brief history of Pakistan's coups d'etat will be provided in Section II. This will be followed by a summary of coup theory, which will then be contextualised within existing theories of Pakistan's coups d'etat. These two subsections will lay out the conceptual apparatus of coup theories in both the theoretical literature and the Pakistan literature. A detailed analysis of economic theories of coups d'etat will follow, from which a workable hypothesis will be forged. This hypothesis will provide the basis for variable selection and methodology, which will be further discussed in Section III. Section IV will apply the methodology to

the data, and will include an analysis of the findings. Section V concludes the paper, summarizing the findings and discussing their theoretical and policy implications.

II. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A brief history of Pakistan's coups d'etat is useful and will provide the context for this paper. 1958 was the year of Pakistan's first coup, launched by civilian Iskandar Mirza and Field Marshal Ayub Khan, against the increasingly volatile and unstable political elite led by the Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon. Less than a month later, a second coup resulted in the ousting of Iskandar Mirza by Ayub Khan. For analytical reasons and data limitations,[1] these first two coups will be examined as one coup in Sections III, IV, and V. Pakistan's third coup d'etat was the ousting of Ayub Khan following Pakistan's failure in its 1965 war with India. Lieutenant General and Chief of Army Staff Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan and remained in power until 1971, when the bloody civil war with East Pakistan ended in the formation of Bangladesh. The military government, humiliated and delegitimised as a result of the conflict, handed over power to Zulfiqar Bhutto. Zulfiqar Bhutto, although a civilian politician, established a particularly violent dictatorship around his charismatic personality (Ziring 2004, 163), which led to the further destabilization of an already divided country. The result was that "in the attempt to construct a permanent but personal power base, [Bhutto] had undermined all attempts at nation building, had ruined the economy, and had aggravated sectarian rivalries" (ibid, 160). The political instability of Bhutto's regime, in addition to Bhutto's liberal and irreligious lifestyle, gave General Zia-ul Haq the legitimacy needed to mount a coup d'etat and become Pakistan's third military leader in 1977 (ibid, 168). Zia ul-Haq remained in power until his death in 1987, and democracy was formally reintroduced in 1988. In the following decade, the politicians and party leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each gained power, formed a government, and were dismissed from office twice. Democracy nominally remained until 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup d'etat which overthrew the government of Nawaz Sharif, citing Sharif's corruption and incompetence as justifications for the coup (Aziz 2008, 9).

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[1] Most of the data for the variables investigated in this paper (see Section III) is only available as annual figures.

The official and hypothesized reasons for Pakistan's five coups d'etat (although, as mentioned previously, the two 1958 coups will be examined as one coup) are varied and complex. Before exploring these theories, however, it is necessary to review the more general theories of coups d'etat.

II.1. COUP THEORIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW

There is considerable theoretical and analytical debate regarding coups d'etat in the developing world, and it is therefore useful to define what is meant by the term. For the purposes of this paper, "coup d'etat" refers not to any takeover of the state but to a *successful* and *overt* seizure of power by the *military*.[2] It has been said that any "fool" can attempt a coup at any time (O'Kane 1981, 288), so there must be an analytical distinction for the term to have any usefulness. The distinction between successful and unsuccessful coups must be drawn since it is often difficult to know whether an unsuccessful coup conspiracy ever existed. Because the coup attempt was put down or prevented before it picked up any momentum, a 'conspiracy' may refer to anything from a half - hearted discussion between a few officers to an actual plot. The qualification of the coup being overt is also important as it implies that the coup must be intended, deliberate, and involve a transfer of power.[3] This paper uses the term coup d'etat to refer only to coups launched by the military, which is consistent with much of the literature that is drawn upon in this section and in Section II.2.

As mentioned previously, the body of scholarly work on the coup d'etat is staggering; proportionally, the amount written on why multiple coups occur is considerable. The significant attention bestowed upon this phenomenon is most likely a reflection of the notion that repeated coups d'etat can permanently and negatively impact a nation's prospects for development (see, for example, Collier 2007b, 36). Many scholars have devoted their careers to explaining why some countries are more prone to military coups d'etat than others. There is no shortage of theories, models, hypotheses and analyses,

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[2] This definition of a coup d'etat is consistent with much of the literature on coups d'etat. For a detailed analysis on the defining characteristics of coups in the developing world and what separates coups from other forms of instability (i.e. internal rebellions, civil wars, revolutions) see David 1987, 7 - 13.

[3] Although there is no debate on this matter, there is little agreement in the literature on whether the 1969 replacement of Field Marshal Ayub Khan by General Yahya Khan was in fact a military coup. While some sources speak of Ayub conceding power to Yahya (ex. Noman 1990, 43), if this paper's definition of a coup d'etat is used the events of 1969 *do* constitute a military coup. The takeover by Yahya Khan was a successful, unconstitutional military intervention which resulted in the overt "overthrow" (Wasseem 1994, 222) of Ayub Khan.

all of which are significantly different from, and often contradictory of, one another. Covering the glut of complexities and qualifications in detail is outside the scope of this paper, but a brief summary of this body of literature can be provided by Thompson (1973). Thompson argues that these many approaches to explaining the occurrences of military coups can be placed into four non - mutually exclusive categories: the vulnerability or loss of legitimacy of the civilian regime, the internal dynamics of the military, international trends and demonstration effects, and the "*push - comes - to - shove*" grievances (Thompson 1973, 5). The fourth category is made up of approaches which argue that the surrounding context and the motivations of those mounting the coup are strong or valid enough to risk the consequences of the failed coup (ibid). Most theories of coups d'etat, according to this framework, fit in the last category of "*push- comes- to- shove grievances*," as they tend to focus on the internal context and dynamics of a nation leading up to a coup, and on the motivations and grievances of the military. However, even the most prominent arguments in the field run the gamut from unmet expectations and the lack of military professionalism (Huntington 2006), to the increasing professionalism of the military (Abrahamsson 1971, 154), civil society participation and political culture (Finer 1966), and civilian and military institutional organization and strength (Janowitz 1964).

Unlike the aforementioned scholars, who attempt to explain the causes of coups by examining the socioeconomic and political contexts of a given coup d'etat, Samuel Decalo opposes any attempt to understand military coups through the exploration of socioeconomic environments (Decalo 1990, 4). He proposes that the examination of national political institutions and power struggles as motivating or risk factors are "futile [given] the empirical vacuum on the internal dynamics of little studied African armed forces" (ibid, 11). Decalo represents those in the literature who base their explanations for military coups on the internal politics and dynamics of the military. However, even the military's internal intrigues and interests do not exist in a controlled vacuum. Rather, these are impacted by factors such as national security, institutional interests, and governmental competence, and are moreover inevitably set against an economic context. For this reason, the economic context of military coups must be taken into account.

One assumption of this paper is that military coups occur because of a given context; that is, the military will plan and launch a coup not only because of internal fissures or interests but because of a

wider socioeconomic or political situation in a given country. It is this context that perhaps marks the difference between an attempted and a successful coup. More importantly, it suggests that certain factors, such as a weak economy, may predispose a nation to vulnerability to military coups d'etat.

II.2. THEORIES OF PAKISTAN'S COUPS D'ETAT

This diversity of opinions and variables proposed in broader coup theory is itself reflected in the superfluity of explanations of Pakistan's coups. Attempts to analyse Pakistani coups d'etat have rarely involved the testing of any theory or the investigation of trends, particularly as scholars tend to focus on political events, personalities, and institutional structure and interest. Yet given the five coups and (at least) three coup attempts that Pakistan has experienced since independence, it is an oversight that there has been little empirical investigation of the preconditions or patterns which increase the risk of coups.

The problem with attempting to explain coups or coup preconditions, or any other political phenomenon in the developing world, is that there is often an almost infinite number of causal factors and variables in play. The factors often listed are so diverse, controversial, and wide-ranging in their impact that creating a working theory of coup risk in Pakistan is a difficult exercise. Some explanatory or necessary conditions put forth by authors to explain Pakistan's coups are listed in Table 1, on the following page.

Table 1– Prominent Theories of Pakistani Coups d'Etat[4]

Theory/Explanation	Source
Benevolent modernization	(Huntington 2006, 203)
Civil society penetration	(Hussain 2003a, 28) (Kukreja 2003, 72)
Combat civilian corruption	(Arif 2001, 342) (Ferguson 1987, 44)
Communist ideology	(Zaheer 1998, 29) (Jalal 1990, 119)
Counter - revolution against proletariat	(Ali 2000, 10)
Ethnicity	(Gregory 1981, 65) (Cohen 1986, 316)
External insecurity	(Wilcox 1972, 35)
Foreign policy	(Zaheer 1998, 28)
Ideology	(Cohen 1984, 105) (Burki 1991b, 7)
Institutional interests	(Aziz 2008, 59)
Islamic subculture in military	(Cohen 1986, 319)
Loss of government legitimacy	(Arif 2001, 342) (Kapur 1991, 128)
Military was dishonoured	(Bennet Jones 2002, 34)
Maintenance of power	(Kukreja 2003, 33)
Path dependency	(Aziz 2008, 59)
Personal power	(Kamal 2001, 21)
Politicization of officers	(Hussain 2003b, 18)
Stabilize economic and political chaos	(Wilcox 1963, 210)
Undermined autonomy	(Kukreja 2003, 37)
Underperforming government	(Zaheer 1998, 29)
Unviable political mechanisms	(Kukreja 2003, viii)

These factors and explanations are manifold and may be grouped together into broader categories. To create a general hypothesis of Pakistan's risk of coups, potential variables and influences can be simplified and summarized as a function of the risk of coups[5] in Pakistan, $R_{Coup\ Pakistan}$:

$$R_{Coup\ Pakistan} = f\,(\text{I, X, C, N}),$$

Where: **I** = Institutional Interests

(For example: military spending, autonomy, ideology, professionalism)

X = External Threat

(For example: war, instability, regional insecurity, foreign relations)

C = Civilian Governance

(For example: the legitimacy, incompetence, corruption, ideology, and

policies of the civilian government, as well as interference in military affairs)

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[4] Note that this is not an exhaustive list but a list of the common factors and variables used to specifically explain the occurrence of coups in Pakistan.

[5] The format of this function is based on Collier 2007a, 7. Although this paper does not calculate risk assessments, the term risk is used to demonstrate the idea that these many factors have a positive impact on the incidence of coups d'etat.

N = Internal Threat

(For example: religious, regional, language, class, and ideological tensions, ethnic conflict, state survival, secessionism)[6]

In other words, the risk of the military launching a coup in Pakistan is high if the military perceives a threat to its institutional interests, a threat to the nation's external security or domestic integrity, or perceives the civilian government to be illegitimate, encroaching on military prerogatives, or governing poorly.

These variables, preconditions, and causes have been widely explored, argued, and sometimes debunked[7] by scholars writing on the politics and military of Pakistan. One branch of coup theory that has widely been ignored in Pakistan concerns the economic aspects of instability and coup risk. This is a serious oversight given that an ailing economy is often a main cause or precondition of political instability and loss of political legitimacy, a relationship that will be investigated in Section II.3.

II.3. THE MILITARY, THE ECONOMY, AND COUPS D'ETAT

In recent decades, economic theories of coups have gained some prominence. Although there is much disagreement among scholars on specific points, there has been some consensus that poor economic performance dramatically increases coup risk in a given state. These economic theories, however, have been built almost exclusively around the experience of African and Latin American countries. This academic bias has arisen since those who have built these theories and conducted hypothesis tests are often concerned with a specific region of the developing world. Paul Collier, for example, has built his theory of coup risk and coup traps around the experience of small, Sub - Saharan African countries because of his assumption that Africa has been and is most susceptible to coups d'etat (Collier 2007b, 36).

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[6] Note that there is overlap in factors such as ideology, and that this is not an exhaustive list but rather a grouping of factors and variables commonly used to explain coups in Pakistan.

[7] The one factor which has been almost universally contradicted is ethnicity (see for example, Aziz 2008, 9), a factor that Paul Collier tests and finds to have little impact on the risk of coups d'etat in Africa (Collier 2005, 17).

Rosemary O'Kane argues that the nations most at risk for coups d'etat and coup attempts are those countries that are the most economically undeveloped. These countries are primary producers, dependent on exports of these primary goods, and are therefore most vulnerable to export price fluctuation and revenue instability (O'Kane 1981, 291). Economic instability yields general uncertainty and may cause a government to lose legitimacy, increasing the likelihood of political instability and therefore heightening the risk of coups d'etat.

Paul Collier also finds that the poorest, most underdeveloped states with low incomes are the most susceptible to political instability and coups (Collier 2007b, 36). In his work with Anke Hoeffler, Collier argues that this is because "low income makes it more likely that plots turn into attempts, and that attempts turn into successful coups" (Collier 2007a, 19). More importantly, Collier and Hoeffler argue that a coup *trap* exists for these poor states. According to this argument, low income and poor economic performance increase the risk of coups d'etat, which keep income and growth at low (or negative) rates and therefore increase the chances of future coups d'etat (ibid, 20).

Robert Bates agrees that poor states are the most likely to experience political instability (Bates 2008a, 279). Bates, however, locates the economic roots of political disorder in neither income levels (i.e. GDP) nor in export earnings, but rather in public revenues (ibid). "Poorer *states*," he argues, "are more likely to experience state failure" (ibid, Bates' emphasis). In addition to low state revenues, Bates argues that exogenous shocks are often the triggers of political instability (Bates 2008b, 97). These exogenous shocks can be changes in the regional or world economy, which may also have profound effects upon commodity values and export earnings.

Samuel Huntington also agrees that a weak economy has a major positive impact on the probability of a coup d'etat. He demonstrates that Latin American coups were more prone to occur during years in which the state of the nation's economy worsened, rather than years when the economy prospered and per capita incomes rose (Huntington 2006, 56). This is an argument which has been strengthened by empirical work on early- and mid- twentieth century Latin American coups by Needler (1966, 617) and Fossum (1967, 237). From there, Huntington departs from O'Kane's theory that states with primary economies have a dramatically increased risk of political disorder and instead argues that

the main cause is that a country has a *transitional* economy. Traditional, primary production - based economies are far more stable than national economies which are just beginning to modernize. Modernization and industrialization, he argues, lead to elevated expectations, aspirations which may be far removed from reality (Huntington 2006, 53). When the gap between aspirations and reality is apparent and converted into political grievances, political disorder ensues (ibid, 41). Fukuyama agrees with Huntington and argues that historically, political instability has generally arisen in periods of economic failure or stagnation, particularly if they were preceded by growth, prosperity, and/or stability (Fukuyama 2006, iv).

In general, these authors all concur on one point: a poorly - faring economy is more likely to create political instability and increase coup risk than a prosperous, or at least stable economy. If it is accepted that economic instability can lead to political instability, the question remains *why* military officers would care enough about the economy to overthrow a civilian government. There are several important currents of thought regarding this issue.

One is represented by Huntington who argues that the military officers, by virtue of their education, training, professional socialization, and exposure to new ideas, become more progressive than any other segment of society (Huntington 2006, 201). Frustrated with an inefficient or corrupt ruling elite, the military seeks to modernize the social and economic fabric of the state (ibid, 203). The military is motivated to launch a coup by a desire to fix the ailing economy. Huntington therefore envisions the military more as a benevolent modernizer than as a usurper of power, and views coups as a natural and normal aspect of development (Huntington 1986, 99). He specifically mentions the 1958 coups in Pakistan as a prime example of the modern and reformist officer corps taking power in order to heal a faltering economy (Huntington 2006, 203).

Another vein of thought revolves around institutional or corporate interests. Those advocating such explanations maintain that the military is more likely to stage a coup if there is a real or perceived threat that the defence budget will be reduced by the government. According to Finer, the two main motives for launching a coup are: firstly, defending "corporate status and privileges," and secondly preserving military autonomy (Finer 1962, 47). The former involves preserving the military's power and

prestige in the political and economic system, which becomes more salient during periods of instability, including economic instability. The latter includes autonomy in budgetary decisions, as a strong military may not tolerate a shrinking budget. Decreases in defence spending are often seen as attempts to undermine the power and prestige of the military. Rizvi has argued that this holds true in Pakistan, that defence expenditure is one major interest that the military will work to protect by intervention in politics or otherwise (Rizvi 2000, 13). Collier and Hoeffler have found that "African governments respond to a high level of coup risk by increasing military spending. By contrast, [in] countries with much lower coup risk, the normal government reaction to coup risk is to cut military spending" (Collier 2007b, 20). High defence spending may even further increase the risk of coups d'etat by adversely affecting future economic growth (Cohen 1986, 325).

In addition to official government defence spending, the officer corps often have interests to protect in the national economy. This is true in Pakistan, where the military has been able to use its influence over the state to enlarge its economic power. According to Kukreja, "the military has expanded its role in the economy by active involvement in industry, commerce, and business, developing a stake in government policies and industrial and commercial strategies" (Kukreja 2003, 73). This, combined with the army's own welfare and charity system (Rizvi 2000, 236 - 237) gives the Pakistani army a large stake in the economy, as well as some financial independence from the government, at least with regard to welfare, pensions, and trusts. Siddiqa calls these external sources of military revenue *Milbus*, referring to extra - budgetary "military capital that is used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity" (Siddiqa 2007, 1). This large amount of capital and economic power makes Pakistan's military "one of the dominant economic players in the private and public sectors of the economy" (ibid).

The danger of fixating on the military's economic-self interest as the main cause of coups d'etat is that it may be oversimplified and trivialized into a 'greed versus grievance' debate. The main thrust of the greed debate is presented by Paul Collier, who argues that a major motive for launching a civil war is greed, or protecting and increasing one's economic interest (Collier 2003, 40 – 41), and that risk factors (i.e. income indicators) are the same for both civil wars and coups d'etat (Collier 2007b, 36). The grievance debate argues that violence, civil wars, and coups d'etat are motivated by valid complaints or

injustice. It is overly simplistic to reduce the debate to the notions of greed *or* grievance. One problem lies in the categorizing of variables as being a proxy for either greed or grievance. For example, a fall in national income may represent both a greed motive, as it heralds a decline in the army's income, or a grievance motive, as an economic recession may be caused by poor government policies or a corrupt civilian elite. Arguing that the military only acts to secure its interests serves to "de-legitimise grievances," to disregard very real problems in existing political institutions, structures and procedures (Keen 2002, 1).[8] Ayesha Siddiqa's suggestion that the officer corps' wish to protect its investments is the main reason for military intervention essentially falls on the greed side of the debate, and the introduction of other economic variables into this study may give an impression that a poorly faring economy is the main cause of coups d'etat. This is not the aim of this paper. Rather, the purpose of this paper to *add* economic factors to the general theory of the causes of Pakistani coups. To contextualize it in the debate between greed and grievance, this paper argues that economic interests and instability must be regarded alongside theories of grievance. A more complete general hypothesis of Pakistani coups is therefore:

$$R_{Coup\ Pakistan} = f(E, I, X, C, N)$$

Where: **E** = Economic Instability or Threat

(For example: low or declining GDP growth, declining per capita income, decreasing export prices, threat to the defence budget)

The variable **E** refers to threats to both the national economy as well as to institutional economic interests. This paper aims to examine whether economic instability or threat to the military has had any effect on Pakistan's many coups d'etat.

III. METHODOLOGY

To test the hypothesis that an economy that is failing or declining is a motivating or preconditioning factor for coups d'etat, four economic variables are used. **GDP** data is used to measure the overall growth, decline, or stability of the economy. **Per capita income** (GNP / Capita) is selected to

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[8] Because it is out of the scope of this paper, see Keen (2002, 1 – 2) and Berdal (2005) for a more detailed analysis and critique of the greed versus grievance distinction.

measure the impact of the economy at the individual, income level. The **defence budget** is also tracked in order to show the budgetary importance that each government placed on the military and therefore the stake that the military had in government expenditure.[9] A decrease in these three variables are found by Collier (2007a, 11) to have the greatest correlation with political instability in African states. Collier's hypothesis is used as a starting point for this paper because it is the most recent prominent study of the economic preconditions for military coups. Past studies linking economic performance to increased risks of coups (for example, O'Kane 1981 and Hoadley 1975), however, have found a strong link between **export value** and political instability. In his study of South- East Asia, Hoadley links a drop in total value of exports in a given year with a doubled risk of military coup in the subsequent year (Hoadley 1975, 194) and it is useful to examine whether Pakistan did in fact experience lower export values before each coup. Economic instability is therefore viewed as a function of the four different variables[10]:

$$E = f\left(\downarrow \text{GDP}, \downarrow \text{Per capita income}, \downarrow \text{Defence Budget}, \downarrow \text{Export Value} \right)$$

Because the hypothesis being tested is that relative shocks and declines in the economy increase the risks of coups, data was chosen or calculated to provide the growth rate in GDP, per capita income, value of exports, and the defence budget for each year. GDP growth rate and per capita GNP growth rates were easily found at current market prices. To take into account the contention that public revenues are a more accurate indicator of political instability than income (Bates 2008a, 279), the defence budget was examined as a proportion of total federal revenue expenditure.[11] To make the defence data more relevant for the purposes of this study, the defence expenditure growth rate was calculated for every year so that changes in Federal defence spending would be immediately apparent. A similar method was used

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[9] According to Siddiqa, the political economy of the military's relative power and influence, as manifested in the defence budget, has gained some analytical attention in recent years (Siddiqa 2007, 1). She is careful to mention, however, that "the defence budget is just one part of the political economy" (ibid), and that the *Milbus* needs to be taken into account when discussing the military's interest or stake in the economy. Unfortunately, she admits that this internal economy of the military is "hidden from the public" (ibid) and therefore excluded from any budget or accountability mechanism (ibid, 5) and is therefore illegal. The lack of transparency means that the data and information on *Milbus* and the internal military economy is anecdotal and not statistically useful (ibid, 8). The defence budget becomes the most useful statistical measure available for Pakistan's military interests and is therefore included in this study.

[10] The arrows indicate that economic instability is the function of the *decline* or *stagnation* of these variables.

[11] See Table 6 (in Appendix) for defence expenditure calculations

for the export values. The total value of exports was found for the needed time series, but growth rates of the export values were calculated so that changes over time could be tracked.

The data sources used by previous studies of the economy's impact on coup risk (for example, Collier 2007a and 2007b) were found to be insufficient in terms of time series. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) databases on military expenditure (SIPRI 2008) and World Bank economic indicators (World Bank 2008) are very useful for providing standard, convenient data for a large sample of countries, but lose usefulness for a single country case study. The SIPRI database only covers military expenditure from 1988 to present, and the World Bank indicators only begin from 1960 onwards. This effectively prevents testing for the 1958 coup, and limits testing of the 1969 and 1977 coups. This paper's main sources for the data on per capita income, GDP growth rates, and defence spending are from Pakistan's Federal Bureau of Statistics' Statistical Division, which credits itself alternately as the Federal Bureau of Statistics (2000, 2008a, 2008b) or the Statistical Division (1998a, 1998b, 1998c). The Federal Bureau of Statistics does not, however, have analytically useful data on exports for the years 1951 - 1998, and therefore IMF International Financial Statistics data (Economic and Social Data Services 2008) was used to calculate export value growth rates.[12]

As mentioned previously, there have been five overt coups and at least three coup conspiracies since Pakistani independence. Because the first coup in 1958 was quickly succeeded by the second coup less than a month later, it is more analytically useful to say that four coups occurred, in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. In addition, there were at least three attempts, in 1951, 1973, and 1995. The 1951 coup attempt, also known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, has received some scholarly attention but is omitted from many historical studies. Comparatively little is known about the 1973 and the 1995 coup attempts. As explained in Section II.1, coup conspiracies and attempts generate deep analytical difficulties, but very little insight, and for that reason only the successful coups will be used in this paper. By using a specific definition of coups, this paper avoids using a vague definition of military intervention which can

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[12] Export value and defence expenditure growth rates for each year t were calculated to reflect the annual growth rate from the preceding year $(t-1)$ to the year t. The formula used was: $\frac{t - (t-1)}{(t-1)} * 100 = \text{Growth Rate (\%)}$

lead to invalid data and conclusions by "relying only on those phenomena which lend themselves to statistical measurement" (Farcau 1994, 26).

The coup data was lagged by one year to control for endogeneity, i.e. the possibility that the coup itself was responsible for the worsening, stable, or improving economic conditions in that year. This means that for any coup that occurred in the year t, the economic conditions for the year (t - 1) will be analyzed. Although Pakistan's most recent coup occurred in 1999, the years 1999 onwards were excluded from this study as the base year for calculating economic indicators were changed during this year (see Federal Bureau of Statistics 2008a and 2008b). Therefore data from 1999 to present is not analytically useful or comparable to pre- 1999 data. Fortunately, analytically useful data exists for the last (t - 1) year being tested, 1998.

The data analysis will be twofold. Firstly, this paper will investigate whether or not there was a decline in economic conditions in the years leading up to a coup. The hypothesis predicts that there will be a decline in GDP growth, per capita income growth, export value, and defence spending. To investigate if this has happened in past coups, the difference between the two years preceding the coup, (t - 1) and (t - 2) will be analyzed to see if there was any dramatic change in the economy leading up to the coups d'etat. Secondly, this paper will calculate whether, in general, the years preceding a coup fared worse economically than other years. This will involve examining whether, for the coup year t, if the economic performance for the years (t – 1) is lower than the average of non - coup years (i.e. non- (t – 1) years), and the average for all other years 1951 - 1998.

IV. RESULTS

The data was collected and calculated, and is presented in Table 2, on the following page.

Table 2 – Data

Fiscal Year (ending)	Coup Year	Per Capita GNP at Current Market prices (Rs) Growth Rate (%)	Real GDP Growth Rate at Current Market Prices Growth Rate (%)	Defence Expenditure as Percentage of Total Expenditure (%)	Defence Expenditure as Percentage of Total Expenditure Growth Rate (%)	Value of Exports (Millions of Rs)	Growth Rate of Value of Exports (%)
1951		1.4	3.9	51.327	- 21.73	2525.0	56.153
1952		- 4.12	- 1.82	54.018	5.243	1762.0	- 30.218
1953		- 0.73	1.72	59.344	9.860	1453.0	- 17.537
1954		7.49	10.22	58.916	- 0.721	1188.0	- 18.2381
1955		- 0.26	2.03	54.162	- 8.069	1505.0	26.684
1956	*t - 2*	0.91	3.53	64.023	18.206	1620.0	7.641
1957	*t - 1*	**0.52**	**2.98**	**60.186**	**- 5.992**	**1604.0**	**- 0.988**
1958	*t*	0.16	2.54	56.131	- 6.738	1419.1	- 11.527
1959		2.91	5.47	50.938	- 9.252	1527.0	7.603
1960		4.4	7.04	56.512	10.944	1874.0	22.724
1961		2.98	5.66	58.727	3.918	1906.0	1.708
1962		3.39	6.37	55.798	- 4.986	1891.0	- 0.787
1963		4.47	7.58	53.155	- 4.736	1985.0	4.971
1964		3.96	6.87	49.482	- 6.910	2035.0	2.519
1965		5.97	9.13	46.133	- 6.768	2516.0	23.636
1966		4.68	7.64	63.471	37.582	2868.0	13.990
1967	*t - 2*	1.24	4.14	60.908	- 4.038	3071.0	7.078
1968	*t - 1*	**2.65**	**5.52**	**53.629**	**- 11.951**	**1912.7**	**- 37.717**
1969	*t*	4.63	7.67	55.520	3.527	1670.7	- 12.652
1970		8.18	11.24	53.911	- 2.899	1892.0	13.246
1971		- 1.61	1.55	53.310	- 1.115	2224.7	17.585
1972		- 1.12	1.45	59.095	10.850	5775.7	159.617
1973		2.7	6.55	59.343	0.421	9532.8	65.050
1974		2.19	5.32	42.207	- 28.877	10970.1	15.077
1975	*t - 2*	0.32	3.23	42.992	1.860	10415.7	- 5.054
1976	*t - 1*	**2.5**	**4.61**	**43.766**	**1.799**	**11552.0**	**10.909**
1977	*t*	1.91	3.8	43.068	- 1.595	11765.9	1.852
1978		7.41	8	42.848	- 0.511	14605.3	24.132
1979		2.18	4.81	34.250	- 20.065	20355.1	39.368
1980		5.15	8.7	36.750	7.300	25922.5	27.351
1981		2.87	6.93	39.015	6.163	28538.1	10.090
1982		2.92	6.54	45.203	15.860	28275.0	- 0.922
1983		6.17	6.78	43.724	- 3.272	40320.1	42.600
1984		1.06	5.07	38.866	- 11.111	35993.7	- 10.730
1985		2.97	7.59	38.610	- 0.658	43645.0	21.257
1986		2.55	5.5	36.859	- 4.535	56335.8	29.077
1987		1.65	6.45	32.238	- 12.537	72582.6	28.839
1988		1.79	7.63	30.510	- 5.360	81348.3	12.077
1989		1.15	4.96	30.554	0.143	96646.2	18.805
1990		1.64	4.46	35.529	16.283	121345.0	25.556
1991		0.58	5.45	34.558	- 2.733	155398.0	28.063
1992		3.59	7.83	35.784	3.548	183599.0	18.148
1993		- 1.29	1.91	35.191	- 1.658	187786.0	2.281
1994		0.42	3.9	34.242	- 2.697	225200.0	19.924
1995		2.63	4.8	31.593	- 7.736	252714.0	12.218
1996		0.83	4.68	30.357	- 3.911	335313.0	32.685
1997	*t - 2*	- 3.4	- 0.36	30.667	1.023	359046.0	7.078
1998	*t - 1*	**2.72**	**2.55**	**28.101**	**- 8.370**	**382477.0**	**6.526**

Sources: 1. Central Statistical Office 1959 and 1972
2. Federal Bureau of Statistics 2000, 2008a, 2008b
3. Statistics Division (1998a 13 - 36) and (1998c 1 - 7, 8 - 14, 504)
4. Rizvi 2000, 63 was used to calculate the Defence Expenditure Growth Rate value for the year 1951
5. *IMF International Financial Statistics 1948* - (accessed from Economic and Social Data Service 2008) was used for Value of Export values and growth rate calculations (including for the year 1951)

Table 2 shows the change in absolute values and in growth rates of the four selected variables over time. Three trends can be observed from the data. First, GDP and per capita income fluctuate a great deal over the years. Second, the absolute value of exports has increased substantially during this time, but as with income the growth rate of export values has varied wildly over this time period. The instability in income and export value growth rates is one economic factor which may help to explain the occurrence and recurrence of coups d'etat in Pakistan. Third, defence expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure has almost halved from 1951 to 1998, but this general decline in military spending has been punctuated by sharp rises. The most dramatic example is the defence expenditure for the year 1966, which saw a growth rate of 37.582% and most likely reflects the need to fund the military during the 1965 war with India and may represent the repairs and replacements resulting from the war.

The data collected and used in Table 2 was then further modified to provide data for analysis. Table 3 tracks the changes in the growth rates in years immediately preceding a given coup, particularly in the years $(t - 2)$ to $(t - 1)$. As mentioned in Section III, this method was chosen to investigate whether or not there was a significant drop, change, or shock to the economy in the year prior to coups d'etat in Pakistan. Table 3 additionally shows which of the four economic variables tested in this paper experience greater changes from the $(t - 2)$ to $(t - 1)$ years.

Table 3 – **Changes in Growth Rates [($t - 1$) – ($t - 2$)]**

Coup Year (t)	GDP Growth Rate (%)			Export Value Growth Rate (%)			Income / Capita Growth Rate (%)			Defence Spending Growth Rate (%)		
	$(t - 1)$	$(t - 2)$	$(t - 1) - (t - 2)$	$(t - 1)$	$(t - 2)$	$(t - 1) - (t - 2)$	$(t - 1)$	$(t - 2)$	$(t - 1) - (t - 2)$	$(t - 1)$	$(t - 2)$	$(t - 1) - (t - 2)$
1958	2.98	3.53	- 0.55	-0.988	7.641	-8.629	0.52	0.91	- 0.39	-5.992	18.206	-24.198
1969	5.52	4.14	1.38	- 37.717	7.078	-53.424	2.65	1.24	1.41	-11.951	-4.038	-7.913
1977	4.61	3.23	1.29	10.909	-5.054	15.963	2.5	0.32	2.18	1.799	1.860	-0.061
1999	2.55	-0.36	2.91	6.526	7.058	-0.532	2.72	- 3.4	6.12	-8.370	1.023	-9.393

Sources: 1. Central Statistical Office 1959 and 1972
2. Federal Bureau of Statistics 2000, 2008a, 2008b
3. Statistics Division (1998a 13 - 36) and (1998c 1 - 7, 8 - 14, 504)
4. *IMF International Financial Statistics 1948* - (accessed from Economic and Social Data Service 2008)

The data from Table 3 shows that the only coup in which the expected results (i.e. that GDP, income per capita, export value, and defence spending all experience a decline in the year preceding the coup d'etat) was 1958, the year of Pakistan's very first coup. All four variables saw a decline in growth rates from the year (t - 2) to (t - 1), with export value and defence spending growth rates falling (by -8.629% and -24.198% respectively) much more than GDP and income per capita growth rates (by -0.55% and -0.39% respectively). Economic and social development from independence until 1958 was marked by import – substitution – industrialization policies and was hindered by the large defence expenditure allocated to the military to protect against the security threat posed by India (Noman 1990, 15). The resulting economic stagnation was, according to Ayub Khan, a clear and legitimate motive for taking power (Ayub Khan 1967, 56). Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan's economic policies shifted from centrally - controlled to more laissez - faire, market - based approaches in order to promote economic growth (Kukreja 2003, 87).

The fact that successive coups did not see a similar decline across all four variables may be explained by the coup trap hypothesis (see Section II.3), which suggests that over time, a coup becomes easier to mount and requires relatively less provocation, motivation, and legitimization (Collier 2007b, 36) than a nation's first coup. Therefore, if economic variables are a factor in explaining coups d'etat, the coup trap hypothesis suggests that in comparison to the preceding coup, each successive coup can occur despite a progressively smaller economic decline.

The 1969 coup d'etat did not experience a fall in growth rates across all four variables, but did experience a dramatic fall in export value growth rates (-53.424%) and a significant fall in defence spending growth rate (- 7.913%). Although Ayub Khan implemented more market-based economic policies to increase economic income and boost growth rates (Noman 1990, 37), he was ultimately undone by the same economic stagnation which legitimised his ascent to power. The economic downturn began in 1965 as a consequence of the war against India in 1965 (Waseem 1994, 224) and the resulting suspension of American economic and military assistance to Pakistan (Zaman 2002, 162). As can be seen in Table 2, the 1960's did experience growth. Unfortunately, it was growth which

entrenched class and regional inequalities, and disregarded the provision and growth of social services (Noman 1990, 41), leading to riots, demonstrations, and the end of the Ayub era (ibid, 43). Ayub Khan was unable to quell or contain the "mass upsurge, which finally led to the re-imposition of Martial law […] by General Yahya" (Waseem 1994, 222).

The 1999 coup d'etat saw a significant reduction in growth rates only for defence spending (a change of - 9.393%) and a smaller reduction in the export value growth rate (- 0.532%). Although there was no economic shock between the years 1997 (t - 2) and 1998 (t - 1), an examination of the 1996 data in Table 2 shows a significant drop in per capita GNP, GDP, and export value growth rate from 1996 (which would be the year (t - 3)) and 1997. So although there was no dramatic or significant fall in the independent variables in the year immediately preceding the coup, the (t - 2) year experienced a shock in three variables. This indicates that the economy was already in poor shape two years before the coup took place.

The year 1977 also seems to be an anomalous year as the data shows no significant decrease in the four variables. There is a 0.061% decline in the defence spending growth rate, but this is negligible considering the defence spending data for the other coup years. With this exception, the other three variables testing the state of the economy show that the economy was in fact prospering in the years preceding the 1977 coup. Alternative explanations must therefore be sought for this coup. Collier et. al. have argued that the risk of a coup is much higher in states "ruled by fear" where the state uses force against the civilian population (Collier 2008, 401).As mentioned in Section II, Zulfiqar Bhutto's rule over Pakistan was relatively brutal for a civilian regime (Ziring 2004, 163), and this may have increased the likelihood of a military coup to overthrow him. For example, Bhutto's party, the Peoples' Party of Pakistan (abbreviated as PPP), originally created the Federal Security Force to prevent military praetorian intervention, but it quickly became a "coercive force […] through which the PPP intimidated parliamentary opposition" (Noman 1990, 59). The Federal Security Force and the use of violence against politicians undermined the strength of the civilian institutions and delegitimised the PPP, thus creating an environment of political insecurity (ibid, 111), and opening up an avenue whereby military

intervention could be justified. Another explanation, more rooted in the economy, is that Bhutto introduced a series of socialist economic policies which threatened the military's economic power and liberal economic ideology. These policies included nationalization of large industry and land reform (ibid, xiv), both of which ultimately failed and left a legacy of inefficient industry (ibid, 80) and a well-publicized but poorly implemented land reform (ibid, 94) respectively. Zia ul- Haq's seizure of power therefore replaced Bhutto's "Islamic socialism" with the military's "Islamic capitalism" (Zaman 2003, 163).

Table 3 also seems to suggest that decreases in export value (which declined preceding three out of the four coups used in this study) and defence spending growth rates (which declined preceding all four coups) are more associated with coups than GDP and GNP per capita growth rates, both of which only declined preceding the 1958 coup. Table 3, however, only measures shocks to the economy or to the army's budget that may have occurred in the years preceding a given coup. A coup d'etat may not only be motivated by a sudden drop in the economy or in defence spending but also, as mentioned in Section II.3, a general downward trend in the economy. Table 4 examines whether there is an overall difference between the year*s* preceding coups and other years.

Table 4 – Economic Trends in Coup Years

	GDP Growth Rate (%)	Export Value Growth Rate (%)	Income / Capita Growth Rate(%)	Defence Spending Growth Rate (%)
Average of Sample (1951 - 1998)	5.208	14.953	2.236	- 0.750
Average of Sample less (t - 1) Coup Years	5.497	15.778	2.248	- 0.250
Average of (t - 1) Coup Years	3.915	5.881	2.098	- 6.189

Sources: 1. Central Statistical Office 1959 and 1972
2. Federal Bureau of Statistics 2000, 2008a, 2008b
3. Statistics Division (1998a 13 - 36) and (1998c 1 - 7, 8 - 14, 504)
4. Rizvi 2000, 63
5. *IMF International Financial Statistics 1948 -* (accessed from Economic and Social Data Service 2008)

Table 4 demonstrates that for all four factors observed in this study, the average growth rate of the year preceding coups d'etat is lower than the growth rates of non - (t - 1) years, and indeed even the whole sample of the years 1951 - 1998. Table 4 also confirms what was suggested by Table 3, that low export value growth rates and lower defence spending are much lower in (t - 1) coup years in Pakistan than the growth rates of GDP and income per capita. The export value growth rate for (t - 1) years is 62.727% lower than non - coup years, and defence spending growth is 2375.6% lower. GDP growth rates for (t - 1) are still comparatively lower than non - coup years when compared to per capita income growth rates for coup and non - coup years. The growth rate of per capita income for (t - 1) coups years is just 6.673% lower than the non - coup years, and the GDP growth rate for (t - 1) years is 28.779% lower in non - coup years.

When the data from Table 3 and Table 4 are examined together, it can be observed that in general, coups d'etat occurred in years with poorer than average economic conditions. If the sample for all years 1951 - 1998 is used, the only exceptions to this are GDP and per capita GDP growth rates for 1969, and defence spending growth rates for the year 1977. There is no exception in export value growth rate, as it fell below the sample average for each (t – 1) year.

It must be stressed, however, that this relationship does not imply causation. The data was lagged by one year to control for endogeneity, but it quite possible that the correlation between weak economic indicators and the risk of coups was caused by another factor external to this study, or even that the correlation was coincidental. This latter risk is particularly salient when it is considered that only four coups have been spread out over almost fifty years of turbulent economic performance.

It is possible that the differences observed in Table 4 were the result of chance and that the lower economic performance of (t - 1) years was the result of arbitrary factors or randomness. T-tests were conducted to test whether the differences between coup-preceding years and other years were statistically significant and hence of theoretical interest. All tests were one-tailed t-tests which used the research hypothesis that economic factors were lower in coup-preceding years. A 90% confidence level was selected as consistent with this paper's goal of exploratory research.

Table 5 – Statistical Significance of Economic Trends

	GDP Growth Rate	Export Value Growth Rate	Income / Capita Growth Rate	Defence Spending Growth Rate
p - value	0.067	0.068	0.41	0.083
Probability of Random Chance	~7%	~7%	~40%	~8%
Significance?	At the 90% confidence level	At the 90% confidence level	Not significant	At the 90% confidence level

The results of the test confirm that GDP growth, military expenditure and export value were all lower in (t - 1) years than in non – coup years. These differences had p-values of 0.067, 0.083 and 0.068 respectively, all of which were significant at the 90% confidence level. The test of per capita income growth rates, however, was inconclusive, with a p-value of 0.41, which is statistically insignificant and suggests that there is no strong relationship between coups d'etat and per capita income growth rates in Pakistan.

In sum, the data demonstrates a great deal of fluctuation in growth rates of the four variables GDP, per capita income, export value, and defence spending over the years 1951 - 1998. The data shows that large drops or shocks in growth rates were not necessarily seen across all variables for all coups. Coups d'etat may be a product of long declining or stagnating economies, however, as GDP, export value, and defence spending growth rates were substantially lower in the (t - 1) years preceding each coup than in all years 1951 - 1998 and in non - (t - 1) years. The data shows that there is in fact a relationship between coups and several economic variables, and this link may have policy implications to reduce the risk of further military coups d'etat in Pakistan.

V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Theories of why coups d'etat occur, and why they occur repeatedly in Pakistan, are many, complex and multivariate. Existing theories of coups in Pakistan, outlined in Section II.2, were summarized as a function of institutional interests (**I**), external threat (**X**), civilian governance (**C**), and internal threat (**N**). These theories have for the most part disregarded economic pressures or motivations. This paper has shown that economic threats and interests (**E**) are in fact associated with the incidence of coups d'etat. More specifically, Pakistan's growth rates of GDP, export values and defence spending were found to be significantly lower in years immediately preceding coups than they were in all other years 1951-1998. Pakistan's per capita income growth rates were hypothesized to follow the same pattern, but the data showed that there is no strong link between per capita income and the incidences of coups. The data also indicates that a long –stagnating or –declining economy may be more linked to the incidence of coups d'etat than a shock to the economy. Poor economic performance may therefore have a role to play in increasing the risk of coups d'etat in Pakistan.

This paper is by no means attempting to produce a working economic theory of Pakistani coups. Rather, it has sought to add economic variables to the plethora of explanations for Pakistan's recurrent coups. The state of the economy and economic interests are variables that may *contribute* to the risk of a coup. A conclusive causal relationship or predictive model between poor economic performance and the incidence of coups d'etat is not offered. Instead, this paper demonstrates that some economic variables, in particular the growth rates of GDP, export values, and defence spending are related to the four incidences of coups d'etat in Pakistan. It is important to distinguish between a correlation of economic factors and the incidence of coups d'etat and the claim that coups d'etat are definitively caused by these economic factors. If the latter was true, then a coup d'etat would be expected to occur after every year which experienced an economic shock or sudden setback. Table 2 demonstrates that there were several years which experienced significant falls in growth rates but were not followed by military interventions. An example of this is 1952, which experienced a fall in the growth rates for both

GDP and per capita income and a drastic reduction (- 30.218%) in export value growth rates, but was not followed by a coup d'etat.

The results of this paper lend some weight to the economic theories of coups d'etat, which have thus far only been tested in Latin American and in African contexts. Global tests of these economic theories have not used all four variables tested by this essay together. For example, Collier (2005, 13) cites and agrees with O'Kane (1981) that economic variables have explanatory power with regards to understanding coup plots, attempts, and successes. However, Collier does not test the main explanatory variables which O'Kane finds most robust, namely export values and export earnings. This paper has demonstrated that, at least with regards to Pakistan, export values cannot be disregarded when coups d'etat are tested for economic variables. Although she tests her theory on a global level, O'Kane's methodology is designed specifically with primary - commodity producing, export - dependent developing nations (O'Kane 1981, 291), many of which are the same countries that Collier is interested in testing. O'Kane, on the other hand, disregards the role of defence spending and income (ibid).

Yet the military does indeed seem to have quite an interest and a stake in the economy. A future study of coup motivations in Pakistan, or indeed elsewhere, may find it useful to statistically examine the validity of the coup hypothesis created for Pakistan in Section II.2 and II.3. This hypothesis stated that the risk of coups in Pakistan, $R_{Coup\ Pakistan}$, was a function of several variables. An ambitious study with access to better and more complete data may be able to test the variables X, E, I, C, and N in relation to each other. It would be useful to discover which of these factors have a greater degree of correlation and causation with regard to the incidence of coups d'etat, and which are statistically insignificant. Additionally, this paper was only able to examine the military's economic interests by examining the relative changes in the annual defence budget. Ideally, the military's real economic capital and stake, what Siddiqa terms *Milbus*, would have been measured for inclusion in this study. However, the constraints and lack of data on military organizations and investments prevented an examination of non - budgetary military capital. If this data does become available in subsequent years,

it would be fruitful to examine whether the military did react to the depreciation of its investments by launching a coup d'etat.

What can save Pakistan from further praetorianism? Political reform is needed, of course, to strengthen civilian leadership and institutions in relation to those of the armed forces. To maintain their hold over power, however, civilian institutions must maintain their legitimacy, as poor economic performance may be a delegitimising factor for any government in command. To secure and maintain power, a civilian government should focus on improving or stabilizing national GDP and export value growth rates. The policy implications for defence spending are more problematic. As outlined in Section II.3, Pakistan's armed forces do have a large stake and interest in the economy, and the defence budget is an indicator of the military's economic relationship with the government in power. A reduction in defence spending was found to be highly correlated with the occurrence of coups d'etat in Pakistan. The solution to reduce the risk of coups should not, however, be to increase military spending as this would strengthen the power of the military and may adversely effect the economy.

Ultimately, the risk of coups d'etat will be much lower if the armed forces reassesses its role in the national economy. The military's primary and official role is to serve as the protector of Pakistan's national and territorial sovereignty. At present, Pakistan's armed forces is final political arbiter and the guardian of its own economic interests. A governing civilian regime must work to establish an unquestioned dominance over the armed forces, and therefore reduce the military's political and economic power. This cannot be done under the aegis of the civilian government alone, and must be agreed to (or perhaps even initiated) by the military elite, as previous attempts to suddenly and drastically check the power of the military, for example by Nawaz Sharif in 1999, ended in a coup d'etat. Efforts to disconnect the military from its relationship with the economy must therefore be a conscious and conscientious collaborative effort between the military and civilian elites, and may in time reduce Pakistan's risk of coups d'etat.

VI. APPENDIX

Table 6 – Defence Expenditure Calculations

Fiscal Year (ending)	Total Expenditure met from Revenue (Million Rs)	Defence Expenditure (Million Rs)	Defence Expenditure as % of Total Expenditure
1951	1266.2	649.9	51.327%
1952	1442.3	779.1	54.018%
1953	1320.1	783.4	59.344%
1954	1108.7	653.2	58.916%
1955	1172.6	635.1	54.162%
1956	1433.4	917.7	64.023%
1957	1330.7	800.9	60.186%
1958	1521.8	854.2	56.131%
1959	1956.5	996.6	50.938%
1960	1846.5	1043.5	56.512%
1961	1894.2	1112.4	58.727%
1962	1986.8	1108.6	55.798%
1963	1795.3	954.3	53.155%
1964	2337.2	1156.5	49.482%
1965	2736.2	1262.3	46.133%
1966	4498.1	2855	63.471%
1967	3765.5	2293.5	60.908%
1968	4077.1	2186.5	53.629%
1969	4371	2426.8	55.520%
1970	5099.5	2749.2	53.911%
1971	6002.6	3200	53.310%
1972	6304.3	3725.5	59.095%
1973	7481.2	4439.6	59.343%
1974	11724.6	4948.6	42.207%
1975	16082.5	6914.2	42.992%
1976	17153.2	7507.2	43.766%
1977	18545.2	7987	43.068%
1978	22515.7	9647.5	42.848%
1979	29686.2	10167.6	34.250%
1980	34434.4	12654.8	36.750%
1981	39215.7	15300.1	39.015%
1982	43344.3	19592.9	45.203%
1983	56183.4	24565.7	43.724%
1984	68948.5	26797.5	38.866%
1985	82533.2	31866.3	38.610%
1986	96600.8	35606.4	36.859%
1987	120662.2	38899.2	32.238%
1988	147541.9	45015.1	30.510%
1989	167094.2	51053.4	30.554%
1990	165240.5	58707.9	35.529%
1991	184027.1	63595.8	34.558%
1992	211690.4	75751.2	35.784%
1993	248535.8	87461.2	35.191%
1994	268025	91775.8	34.242%
1995	317227.8	100220.8	31.593%
1996	379660.7	115254	30.357%
1997	415558.2	127440.9	30.667%
1998	476928.8	134019.6	28.101%

Sources: 1. Statistics Division (1998c 1 - 7, 8 - 14)
2. Rizvi 2000, 63 was used to calculate the Defence Expenditure Growth Rate value for the year 1951

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